Prof: On to the topic of
today's lecture,
and today's lecture is:
the importance of George
Washington.
 
We're going to be talking about
George Washington today.
And in a sense,
what I'm going to be talking
about is exactly what it sounds
like I'm going to be talking
about,
which is looking at what in a
sense you could call the
phenomenon of George Washington,
right?
 
His reputation--his exalted
reputation--and importance
during his lifetime,
and some of the reasons why
both of those things were true.
 
What is it that he was doing,
or what was it about him,
that made him stand out in the
way that he did then and
actually in a sense forever
after?
But we're going to be looking
really during his lifetime,
what was it about Washington
that made him stand out.
And in a sense,
this lecture sort of represents
a little bit of a turn in this
course as a whole,
because you'll be getting a
sense of Washington today,
and that will be important to
have sort of under our belts for
the next two lectures after
this,
because then we will actually
be looking at fighting battles
and such.
 
We will actually be looking at
how the war was fought in a
really literal way,
so obviously I want us all to
have a sense of George before we
venture up and watch to see what
George is doing as the war gets
under way.
So I've divided that into two
lectures.
It's--Thursday and Tuesday is
when we'll be talking about how
the war was fought,
and then in the end really how
the war was won--
and today is kind of the segue
lecture.
 
I also want to mention
something because by dumb luck
it was in the New York Times
this morning and I was
reading it and it's--
hardly ever do I read the
New York Times and say,
"Oh, I must mention that
in my American Revolution
course,"
but it happened today.
 
In the Arts section,
I guess, there's an article on
a collection.
 
Did any of you see this?
 
Did any of you happen to look
at the New York Times?
Nobody.
 
Wow.
 
I feel so informed.
 
[laughs]
There was an article in the
arts section on a collection of
letters between British military
figures and sort of--
and officials to each other,
not back to the officials in
London but the newspaper,
the Times,
calls them sort of
back-channel letters from
throughout the Revolutionary
War.
 
And what's interesting about
the letters: It's not new
information but it's sort of
wonderfully ground-level
information.
 
It's all of these people
writing to each other from
throughout the war in one way or
another saying,
'Oh, we're in big trouble,'
[laughs]
--
the British from very early on
in the war saying,
'I don't know.'
So at the same time that
they're writing back to London
and reporting,
'Our military forces are strong
and we are supreme and we will
of course win this war for the
greater glory of Britain and the
colonies will be back to where
they should be,' they're writing
to each other and saying,
'I don't know.
 
What do you think about this?
 
Because this is really tricky,
and I don't know if we're going
to be able to do it.
 
I don't know if we can get
enough men here.
Logistically,
this is a disaster.
They hate us.
 
It's hard to be hated.'
 
It's all these really
interesting letters.
I'm sure you can go find it
online but--
and I'll mention it more when
I'm actually talking about the
war and why the British are
doing what they're doing and the
logic behind what the Americans
are doing,--
but I thought it was actually
really interesting that by just
dumb luck that appeared today.
 
And again, it's something
that--It's not a new
realization,
but it's an interesting thing
to be reminded of,
that as powerful as the British
Army is and as much as you would
assume at the time they would
assume things are going to go
swimmingly and we're going to
just sweep this up in no time,
there are all these sort of
back-channel letters of people
on the ground who are actually
in a sense being very realistic
about it and saying,
'This is really hard.
 
This is really tricky.
 
I don't know if this is going
to work'--throughout the war in
really sometimes sort of bemused
and sometimes really depressed
tones.
 
But anyway, more on that to
come.
For now I want us to turn to
George Washington.
Now, as a historian I have to
admit that this kind of lecture
sometimes might make me nervous,
because as a historian it makes
me nervous to declare that one
person was crucial.
That's the kind of declaration
historians don't like to make.
They like to say,
'Oh, well, history's
complicated.
 
Events are complicated.
 
They unfold in complicated
ways'--and all of that is true.
That said, in many ways
Washington actually was crucial
not just to the Revolutionary
War effort but equally if not
more important,
as we're going to see later in
the course,
to the launching of the new
government under the
Constitution.
I'll talk a little bit more
about that in the last lectures
of this course--
but in one way or another
Washington ends up being really
crucial in this period,
and one of the central reasons
why that's true--
and it's a theme I'm going to
come back to at a few different
points in a few different ways
in the lecture today--
is because people trusted him
with power.
We're going to look today
partly at why they trust him
with power--
but in one way or another
throughout this period people
trusted him with power,
and in an age and among a
people who were really wary
about power,
about tyranny,
about where power was being
placed,
this is a very big deal to be
the person that people trust
with power.
 
It matters a lot.
 
And in a sense,
the deployment of power,
the holding of power,
being entrusted with power,
is sort of the central crucial
issue with Washington's
importance.
 
I think--again--the Revolution
and the presidency have sort of
this key thing about him that
makes him different.
Really, he is in many
ways--particularly when he
becomes the first President--
the only person people could
think of trusting in that role
of having extreme power.
And part of what I'm going to
be talking about today is why?
Why is that true?
 
Why is he such a trusted
character?
What did he do to be so trusted?
 
And it's--something he's
particularly skilled at is not
just holding positions of power
but managing to have power while
also calming people's fears
about what that power might
mean.
 
Okay.
 
Now in a sense when we think
about Washington,
Washington--I always feel he
gets sort of gypped in the long
run with history,
not because we don't remember
him or not because we don't
honor George Washington,
but because he's sort of a
nonperson.
He's sort of this block of
marble who sort of glides
through history like:
'well, yeah,
I fought a war,
became the President,
went home and died.'
 
George Washington,
the guy--he doesn't get to be a
real person.
 
He's just sort of almost a
symbol to us--
and then I suppose that even at
the time in some ways,
as we're going to hear in the
end of the lecture,
even then he's a little bit of
a symbol--
but we don't think of him very
often as a person with
insecurities and ambitions,
as a person with political
savvy--he actually was very
politically savvy--
as a person with specific
political ideas and ideals,
right?
 
We don't tend to even attribute
many ideas to him at all.
We just think of him as capital
"L"
leader, but in fact he's all of
these things.
He is a person and all that
that entails.
That said, even during his
lifetime, he was already being
shaped into a legend.
 
Right?
 
The title "Father of His
Country"
is a title that was given to
him even before the country
finally existed.
 
The Revolution's not over yet,
and some people are calling him
Father of His Country,
so this happens pretty--at a
pretty early point to
Washington,
that he ascends into this
position.
Now as I'm sure you've gathered
by this time in the course,
John Adams is a little jealous
of other people who appear to be
getting the glory,
credit, and fame that he thinks
he deserves,
and not surprisingly he's a
little irked at Washington's
incredible sort of renown and
status and fame and how beloved
he is,
as it developed between the
Revolution and the 1790s.
To Adams, Washington is just so
revered--and he writes this
letter.
 
I'm going to read a piece of it
here.
Once again, Benjamin Rush,
who keeps appearing and
disappearing in this course.
 
He and Adams write these
amazing--Just in the same way
that Jefferson and Adams write
amazing letters in their old
age,
Adams and Rush do the same
thing.
 
They write these really great
letters to each other.
They're published in a book
called The Spur of Fame,
I think is the name of it.
 
They're really fascinating and
really interesting and this is
one of them.
 
And Adams writes it in 1807,
so it's a few years after
Washington died--
he died in 1799--and they're
talking about Washington clearly
in an exchange of letters here.
And Adams--Clearly one of the
things that irks him is that
Washington wasn't as
book-learned as Adams and many
of their contemporaries were.
 
Right?
 
He's someone who doesn't have a
formal education.
He's not thinking about
Aristotle.
He's not thinking about the
things that Adams thinks people
should be thinking about if
they're great statesmen.
So here in this letter he tries
to come up with the top ten
talents that Washington had that
made him great,
none of them having anything to
do with book learning.
Right?
 
It's like, okay,
so if he doesn't have book
learning, what are the top ten
talents?
It's David Letterman-esque:
the top ten talents of George
Washington that made him so
great.
So this is Adams' description:
"Talents!
you will say, what Talents?
 
I answer, number one--an
handsome Face.
[laughter]
That this is a Talent,
I can prove by the authority of
a thousand Instances in all
ages.
 
Number two.
 
A tall stature,
like the Hebrew sovereign
chosen because he was taller by
the Head than the other Jews.
Number three,
an elegant Form."
[laughter]
You can see where this is
going.
 
"Number four,
Graceful Attitudes and
Movements.
 
Number five.
 
A large imposing Fortune
consisting of a great landed
Estate left him by his Father
and Brother ...
and in addition to this immense
tracts of land of his own
acquisition.
 
There is nothing,
except bloody Battles and
splendid Victories to which
Mankind bowed down with more
reverence than to great
fortune....
Number six.
 
Washington was a Virginian.
 
This is equivalent to five
Talents.
[laughter]
Virginian Geese are all Swans.
Not a Bearne in Scotland is
more national,
not a Lad upon the High Lands
is more clannish than every
Virginian I have ever known....
 
7.
 
Washington was preceded by
favorable Anecdotes.
The English had used him ill in
the expedition of Braddock,
during the French and Indian
War.
They had not done Justice to
his Bravery and good Council.
They had exaggerated and
misrepresented his defeat..
.which interested the Pride as
well as compassion of Americans
in his favour....
 
Number eight,
he possessed the Gift of
Silence.
 
This I esteem as one of the
most precious Talents."
I think that's partly because
Adams does not possess the gift
of silence.
 
[laughs]
"Number nine--he had great
Self Command.
 
It cost him a great exertion
sometimes, and a constant
Constraint, but to preserve so
much equanimity as he did,
required a great Capacity.
 
Number ten, whenever he lost
his temper as he did sometimes,
either Love or fear in those
about him induced them to
conceal his Weakness from the
World.
Here you see I've made out ten
Talents without saying a word
about Reading,
Thinking or writing."
Ooh, thank you, John Adams.
 
Okay.
 
So he's being a little bit
snarky in that letter,
saying that Washington looked
like and behaved like a great
leader and was from Virginia,
and so he was treated like a
great leader.
 
There was actually some truth
to what he's saying.
I'm going to talk a little bit
about that today.
And, as Adams suggests,
it's true that Washington
didn't have the same sort of
formal education that someone
like Jefferson or Madison or
even Adams had,
but he was more than a man who
just looked the part.
Now it is true that in some
ways Washington was sort of like
any other Virginia gentleman.
 
As Adams says,
he's a large landowner.
He had inherited his estate,
Mount Vernon,
from his father and then
enlarged it himself.
Like a lot of other Virginia
gentlemen he was a skilled
horseman, which was a very
prized skill in Virginia.
You probably remember or maybe
you might remember earlier in
the course I talked about
William Maclay sitting next to a
Virginian at a dinner party and
saying that all they talked
about was cockfighting and
horses and alcohol.
Horses are in there in the top
three.
So horse--being a good horseman
was very valued and Washington--
some called him "the
finest horseman in the
country"--
so he was impressive as--I
think I--
Did I mention--I did mention
last time at Mount Vernon when I
saw him on that horse and said,
"My, he's impressive on
the horse,"
and then basically repeated
what I'd read a thousand times
in everyone else's letters.
 
He really looked impressive on
the horse.
He did. I can vouch.
 
A somewhat less impressive but
expected one:
Washington was a good dancer.
 
Things you never knew about
George Washington:
he was a good dancer,
which sounds seemingly trivial,
but again as a gentleman
generally and as a Virginian
specifically being a good dancer
is a way--
another way of sort of publicly
displaying your superior
breeding.
 
Adams mentions grace,
dignity--all of these things
that would make a gentleman
noticeable and someone who would
seem to be superior.
 
Dancing is one of them and
luckily he was a good dancer and
he liked dancing--not the image
we have of George.
Also like other gentlemen of
the time, Virginian and
otherwise, Washington was
ambitious.
And this is going to come up
again.
He doesn't necessarily always
look ambitious,
but he was ambitious.
 
He did want to earn status and
reputation.
He was ambitious to better
himself.
During the French and Indian
War, he struggled to raise
himself within the ranks of the
army,
and for the entirety of his
life he was very focused on
protecting and preserving his
reputation.
He talks about it a lot.
 
When he makes a big decision
about should I do this or should
I not do this,
it's clearly--part of that
decision is what will this do to
my reputation?
And Alexander Hamilton,
who served in one way or
another at Washington's side for
many years--
first as an aide during the war
and then as Washington's first
Secretary of the Treasury--
Hamilton is someone who really
knew that if you wanted to get
Washington to do something you
played the reputation card.
 
Right?
 
'Well, if you don't do this,
Sir, it may affect your
reputation.'
 
[laughter]
And so one way or another,
if it might affect his
reputation, Washington's going
to take it very seriously--
so he very much thought about
what anything that he did would
do to his reputation.
And what that actually means
is, when he does take these
positions of great power and
responsibility,
he's earning reputation,
he's also risking reputation,
and I think he realizes both
things.
I'll come back to that
momentarily.
Okay.
 
So a large landowner,
skilled horseman,
good dancer,
ambitious, protective of his
reputation.
 
All of these things would have
been true of many gentlemen from
throughout this period.
 
And plus, of course --this is
obvious but worth stating
because we forget it when we
talk about Washington--
like any other gentleman of the
period Washington was human.
Right?
 
He could be self-interested.
 
He could be gloomy.
 
He could get excited.
 
He was all of these things at
various points during the war
and after.
 
He sometimes doubted himself.
 
He got bored.
 
He got tired of all the pomp
and ceremony that basically
surrounded him for the last
twenty-five years of his life.
There's a story of him as
President;
he really didn't like all the
pomp surrounding him as
President, and there are several
stories actually,
more than one.
 
He was seen giving a ceremonial
dinner as President,
sitting at the head of the
table at this formal dinner,
staring into space and sort of
banging a piece of silverware on
the table,
[whistles]--so not wanting to
be there and so uninterested in
what was going on.
Again, he's all of these
things, including human as other
gentlemen all were.
 
But there is something about
Washington that was different
and in a sense,
there had to be something
different to put him in the
exalted position of being quite
literally,
as one of his friends said at
his death,
"first in war,
first in peace,
and first in the hearts of his
countrymen."
 
So how can we explain the
phenomenon of George Washington?
And what I'm going to talk
about here in the answer
basically is an answer with
three parts.
The first part,
as we're about to see,
has to do with Washington
personally.
He's a man who was extremely
skilled at shaping his public
image, at controlling himself
and presenting to the world what
he wanted them to see.
 
Related to that,
so part of that same thing,
he was very skilled at sizing
up a situation and figuring out
just what sort of statement or
action it required.
He was often a really brilliant
political strategist and a lot
of people during his lifetime
and after praised his good
judgment.
 
He had--That's always the word
they used: He had good judgment.
He was someone who could survey
the opinions of lots of people,
ask all of his advisers for
advice.
They often, more often than
not, had conflicting advice.
He would take it under
advisement.
He'd consider things for
himself.
He'd come to a conclusion and
he'd act on it in a way that
everyone always thought was
calm, considered,
thoughtful.
 
He was someone who had good
judgment and didn't act
impulsively.
 
So one reason for the
phenomenon of Washington,
as I'll talk about in a moment
here,
has to do with his
self-presentation and concrete
skills in presenting himself as
a leader.
The second way in which he
earned his reputation has to do
really with the simple fact that
he's the right person with the
right talents,
at the right place,
at the right time.
 
People often,
when they look at this time
period,
in one way or another they ask
the question,
'Well, why in this period were
there so many great men?
 
What was it about this period
that you have Washington,
Jefferson, Adams,
Madison?
Why all then?'
 
And I think part of the answer
has to do with the right people
in the right place at the right
time.
I've talked earlier in the
course about how,
as young men,
this is a generation of people
who were trained by reading
things like Plutarch's Lives
to think that one of the
sort of noblest and grandest
things you could ever do is to
be the founder of a nation,
to be a great statesman.
 
So you have a generation of
young men who are trained to
think that that's true,
and then that generation
happens to be there when there's
a nation being founded.
That's sort of a great--For
them, it's great,
and they see that.
 
They understand:
'oh, my gosh,
this is the greatest thing I
can do and I can do it.
Who knew?'
 
So you have these people who
had somewhat limited horizons.
Maybe they were going to be a
lawyer or they would serve in
public service in their own
colony,
and suddenly the horizon opens
and they're able to be
nation-founders,
and they know it and they rise
to the occasion to promote
themselves and to do public
good,
to do both things at the same
time,
take advantage of the
opportunity and act.
 
And so it's partly why so many
great men--
It's partly--You have people
who understand the significance
of what's happening and act in
that capacity to do what they've
been trained to think is good to
do,
which is you do great acts of
service for your state,
you become a great statesman
and you earn immortal fame.
So you do great things for your
country and you get to be
famous.
 
They both happen sort of at the
same time, so it's sort of
selfless and self-interested at
the same time.
So Washington also,
like many people in this era,
is the right person with the
right talents at the right time,
but he has very specific
talents that are really well
suited to this moment in time.
 
And then finally,
the third reason for the
Washington phenomenon is kind of
a combination of the previous
two,
and that's basically the idea
that during the prime years of
Washington's life,
Americans lost a king and
needed some other figure of
central importance to fill this
vacuum of national leadership,
some other leader who they
could honor as sort of the
symbolic core of their new
nation.
And Washington,
because of who he was,
because of who he presented
himself as being,
because of what he did,
because of the ways in which he
tried deliberately to conform
with prevailing feelings about
leadership and about doing
things like leading armies,
he really ends up being the
right man for that job.
So for all of those reasons,
Washington ends up being the
Father of His Country even
before the country is officially
a country,
when it's still fighting its
war.
 
So let's turn now to those
three reasons.
Let's start with reason number
one,
which is Washington and
self-presentation,
and in a way this is
along--this is similar not only
what Adams said,
but you'll hear Adams echoed in
some of what I'm going to be
talking about here.
Now, in a general way,
this is true that Washington
presented himself well as a
leader,
and in a general way--by that I
mean in a very specific way--
he just looked and acted like a
Commander-in-Chief.
He was a very tall and imposing
physical presence.
He's a big man,
tall for the time,
also just apparently big-boned.
 
He's just a big,
imposing figure,
very powerful looking,
who also managed to be graceful
in his movements,
as Adams said.
So he's someone who's strong,
big, powerful,
and also seems in command of
himself physically,
so he was just imposing to look
at.
That's a natural gift,
but Washington had other much
more deliberate self-conscious
aspects of his self-presentation
as a leader that really served
him well.
And as Adams sort of hints,
one of them is his
self-control,
which was remarkable,
and he really was controlling
his passions for most of the
time.
 
Now, I will say that any
gentleman of the period would
have been expected to display
self-command or self-control as
a sign of his superior
character,
and the ultimate example of
that of course is dueling.
Right?
 
Gentlemen are the ones
supposedly who duel in this time
period,
and part of what you're doing
when you duel is you're showing
that you're willing to risk your
life to defend your honor by
standing on the field of honor
against someone who is going to
be shooting at you.
And you need to have complete
self-command and mastery of your
passions and stand there
dispassionately,
allowing this other person to
shoot at you.
Right?
 
That's the ultimate example of
what they would have considered
in this period to be gentlemanly
self-command or self-control.
For Washington self-command was
particularly important,
because as Adams suggested,
he really did have a pretty
impressive temper.
 
He kept it under control most
of the time,
but he did lose his temper on a
number of occasions,
and the reason why we know that
is people who were there and saw
it were very impressed and they
usually wrote it down like:
'ooh,
[laughs]
guess what happened today?'
 
So people tend to take note
because it was impressive,
scary.
 
He was a big guy and he would
just--when he lost his temper he
really lost his temper.
 
A great example of it--It
happens a number of times
through the Revolution and I
actually went off looking to see
if I could find a very specific
example--
couldn't find one that I had
enough specific information on
to offer,
so I'm going to offer this
other one,
only because I have a quote
associated with it,
and it's a story that always
makes me happy.
 
So even though it's from his
presidency, it's the same
George.
 
There's an instance of
Washington really,
really just losing it during a
cabinet meeting in which one of
his cabinet members came in with
a cartoon from a newspaper
making fun of Washington,
and Washington just lost it.
He just--He didn't like being
President.
Everyone was making fun of him.
 
He just lost control and
literally went into a screaming
rant: 'I never wanted this job.
 
I never wanted this job from
the moment I took this job and
I've never wanted it at any
moment since'--just screaming
ranting.
 
We know this of course because
Thomas Jefferson took notes on
it, right?
 
[laughter]
like, 'you won't believe'--and
it's his personal notes but he
took--he wrote down his version
of what he heard.
 
But my favorite part is
--apparently this was a really
impressive rant,
and in Jefferson's notes he
describes the rant,
and then at the end of the rant
he writes in his notes,
'An awkward silence ensued'
[laughter]
and then ends,
'some difficulty resuming our
conversation.'
[laughter]
And you could just hear--You
could just--It just feels like
you're in the room like:
'okay, [laughs]
now what do we do?
Can we go home?
 
[laughs] You're scary, George.
 
You scared us.'
 
Okay.
 
So mastering your passion is
vital for anyone to be a trusted
and admired leader.
 
For Washington,
considering his temper,
it's very important and he did
master his feelings,
his temper, most of the time,
but he did more than just try
not to display his temper.
 
He actually tried to suppress
any sign of his feelings.
He didn't want people to be
able to read him.
He actually wanted to appear
sort of dispassionate,
someone that you couldn't tell
what he was thinking.
And he apparently did that
reasonably well,
but also, it's clear that he
did it really,
really deliberately,
because there is an account of
someone who went to visit him
towards the end of his
presidency and supposedly
commented to Washington,
'My, Sir, you look eager to get
back to Mount Vernon,' and
Washington replied,
No.
"My countenance never yet
betrayed my feelings."
Right?
 
You don't know I'm looking
forward to getting back to Mount
Vernon.
 
You can't tell what I'm feeling
on my face.
[laughter] 'Okay.
 
Yes, Sir.'
 
[laughs]
But clearly,
he's trying to present a
version of himself probably--
maybe successfully or not
successfully--
but largely some of the time
successfully,
as this sort of dispassionate,
in-command,
in-control kind of a leader.
 
He knew how to present and
preserve his dignity,
and when you joined that with
his very imposing appearance,
his self-command made him a
rather intimidating figure.
He is someone who many,
many people felt intimidated
by.
 
A great story that I have to
tell--I can't resist a good
story.
 
Basically, as I'm writing these
lectures I'm like:
oh, this means I can tell this
story, and then I write it right
into the lecture.
 
This is just a famous example
which--well, or a pseudo
example.
 
It may have happened,
it may not have happened,
but it's a famous story,
which I'll tell anyway with the
sort of proviso that maybe it
didn't happen.
But maybe it did.
 
And it's when he's first
President.
This is a great example of how
everyone perceived him to be
this imposing,
scary character.
There is some kind of a
reception really early on when
the government first gets under
way,
and Washington's there and
Alexander Hamilton is there,
and one of Hamilton's friends
named Gouverneur Morris is
there.
 
And Morris and Hamilton always
get each other into trouble
because they have the same sense
of humor and they're kind of
practical jokers and it's just a
bad thing;
if the two of them are together
bad things happen.
So this is a great occasion of
that in which Hamilton says to
Morris,
'I'll bet you a dinner you
don't dare go up to Washington
and slap him on the back and
say,
'Damn good to see you, Sir.'
[laughs]
[laughter]
It was like:
you don't dare touch him.
Right? 'You go touch him.
 
I'll bet you a dinner you don't
dare.'
Right?
 
Ridiculous, but Morris
apparently takes up the bet,
goes up to Washington,
pats him on the back,
'damn good to see you,
General,' and later reports the
look that he got from Washington
at imposing in this way.
He said he just wanted the
floor to open up so he could
just go through,
like "poof,"
I'm gone,
[laughter]
and he supposedly went back to
Hamilton and said,
"Yeah, I won the bet,
not worth it" [laughter]--
really not worth it.
 
He is just this imposing figure.
 
During the war,
on many occasions he actually
really had to be an imposing
figure not just for reasons of
concrete military success,
which--it's true he did,
for that reason--
but also because he
individually personified the
Revolutionary cause in many
ways,
including to the British,
not just to his own men but to
the British as well,
to British military authorities.
 
He had to be imposing enough to
command respect from people who
were not necessarily prepared to
see him as the commanding
general of a real army.
 
And as an example of this,
one of the sort of war games
that the British occasionally
deployed against Washington was
to address things to him in
writing by a civilian title,
to George Washington,
Esquire, rather than General
George Washington,
right?--doing that really
deliberately.
 
'Yeah, okay,
we're going to be respectful,
George Washington,
Esquire, but you're not really
a general and it's not a real
army'--is the implication.
So on one occasion,
British General Howe addresses
a letter to Washington:
George Washington,
Esquire.
 
Washington sees this,
gets the letter,
refuses to accept it and sends
it back: 'it's not addressed to
me.'
 
Okay.
 
So then Howe readdresses it and
this time he says to:
George Washington,
Esquire, etcetera,
etcetera.
 
Yeah.
 
[laughter]
This gets sent along with an
aide back to Washington and
Washington--
the aide assures Washington
that, quote,
"The etcetera, etcetera,
implied everything that ought
to follow."
 
Right?
 
He may not have said General
Washington but the etcetera
means he was thinking it
[laughs]
so that's pretty feeble.
 
Washington says,
"It's true that etcetera,
etcetera implied everything and
they also implied anything"
and he refuses to accept it
again: 'this is not addressed to
me.'
 
And he sends it back,
which takes some fortitude to
be sort of standing there
handing back this piece of paper
multiple times to this person--
this aide to General Howe.
Supposedly, someone who was
there said that the aide had,
quote, "a pleasing
confusion on him the whole
time."
 
Right?
 
He just didn't know what to do,
because he just didn't expect
to confront this figure who
would just stand there and say,
'No.
 
You don't respect me.
 
I don't accept it.
 
Now what are you going to do?'
 
So it completely put him on the
defensive,
this poor British aide,
and he had to sort of go back
and sort of figure out what to
do so that they could address
him in some way that he would
actually read the letter.
He had to be someone who could
maintain his dignity and
maintain his position,
not just to command an army,
but also to command the respect
of the enemy.
So clearly he's an imposing
figure and he had to be,
but there's an important point
to make here,
and that is,
Washington combined that
imposing demeanor with something
that was equally if not more
important for him to display as
a leader in the new nation,
and as particularly a military
leader in the new nation,
and that is that he had a
modest demeanor.
He was imposing,
but he did not look like
someone who was grasping for
power.
He knew how to display himself
to his best advantage,
but he wasn't all pomp and show
and display.
He was the opposite.
 
He was modest,
he was cool,
he was reserved,
and this was really important
in the new American nation for
some very good reasons which had
to do with distrust of power.
 
In many ways,
as we've seen in this course so
far,
the events leading up to the
Revolution had confirmed
Americans' worst fears about
tyranny and power.
 
To Americans,
first Parliament and then the
King had become tyrannical and
had used their power to destroy
the liberties of American
colonists.
So now, enter George Washington
who is given command of the
American army and,
as you've already seen and
discussed in the course,
one of the most obvious and
deadly tools of tyranny is a
standing army.
And history has plenty examples
of what happens when the wrong
man gets control of an army,
and of course the most famous
example would be Julius Caesar.
 
And in Caesar you have this
brilliant warrior whose army was
loyal to him and not to the
Roman state,
and eventually Caesar took his
army,
marched on Rome,
seized power,
basically destroyed the Roman
republic and installed himself
as emperor.
 
That's not ancient history to
Americans or to anyone in the
period.
 
That's a lesson.
 
That's a warning.
 
Look at what happens when
ambitious men get military
power.
 
You get dictatorship.
 
You get tyranny.
 
You get all of the things that
Americans certainly are afraid
might happen--and things are in
flux;
they might happen.
 
So here we have Washington
taking command of an organized--
or I suppose you could say
semi-organized--
army, a frightening concept and
certainly a really tricky
situation for the person taking
command of an army in that kind
of an atmosphere.
 
So creating a small "r'
republican army is a tricky
thing.
 
That kind of an
army--It--Certainly,
it has to be disciplined,
but it can't seem like this
polished,
professional fighting force
because that moves off into the
territory of:
wait a minute.
 
Is this detached from the state?
 
What is this?
 
Is this some private Washington
army?
It has to seem able to be sort
of submissive to the state and
yet able to fight and defend.
 
It has to be a really careful
balance between having power but
not having too much power,
being able to do what it's
supposed to do but not being
able seemingly to do it without
any other authority of any
kind--
and this is Washington's task.
 
He has to create this really
difficult to define thing,
a republican army,
and we've already seen how hard
it would have been just
generally to create an army out
of people from all of these
different colonies and then
finally all of these different
states who don't necessarily see
eye to eye and they hadn't
worked together before and they
care more about their locality
than about anywhere else.
So there are all these basic
logistical problems with the
army,
and now add this one into the
mix, right?--
which is an army is something
people are very,
very nervous about,
and now he's going to be the
guy who's taking command of it.
Now Washington was really aware
of all of these prevailing fears
about power-hungry tyrants and
armies,
so he did literally everything
that he could do to prove to
Americans inside the Continental
Congress and outside of the
Continental Congress that he was
not seeking power.
Rather, he was accepting power.
 
It was being given to him but
he was not seeking it.
And here you can see his good
judgment as well as his skillful
self-presentation in play.
 
He's really sensitive to these
prevailing fears and he's really
skilled at appeasing them.
 
So for example listen to what
he says in his address to the
Continental Congress after he's
nominated as Commander-in-Chief
of the Continental Army.
 
Okay. This is his address.
 
He makes a very brief address,
a statement,
to the Congress:
"Tho' I am truly sensible
of the high Honour done me,
in this Appointment,
yet I feel great distress,
from a consciousness that my
abilities and military
experience may not be equal to
the extensive and important
Trust.
However, as the Congress desire
it,
I will enter upon the momentous
duty,
and exert every power I possess
in the service,
and for support of the glorious
cause.
I beg they will accept my most
cordial thanks for this
distinguished testimony of their
approbation.
But, lest some unlucky event
should happen,
unfavourable to my reputation,
I beg it may be remembered,
by every Gentleman in the room,
that I,
this day, declare with the
utmost sincerity,
I do not think myself equal to
the Command I am honored
with."
 
Okay.
 
He's just been given the
command of the army and he says,
'I'm going to do it.
 
I'm going to try my hardest.
 
I don't think I'm up to the
task.
I don't think I'm good enough
for this but I'm going to try my
hardest.'
 
Now, given that I've already
described how he showed up to
the Congress in a military
uniform basically saying,
'Hi.
 
I want this position,'
certainly he's not--he was not
someone who was going to look
away.
He wanted this position of
being Commander-in-Chief of the
Army.
 
And he then stands up and
announces,
'I don't think I'm good enough
for this,' which might lead you
to assume that it's an empty
platitude,
but it really isn't.
 
It's the absolute perfect thing
for someone in that position to
say at that moment because it
reassured people;
this is very explicitly what he
was doing.
He's not an ambitious tyrant in
the making.
And it did contain some truth,
because the fact of the matter
is he wanted the position and he
was honestly fearful.
You heard him say that if some
bad thing happens to my
reputation--his reputation--He
does truly fear that maybe he
isn't up to the task.
 
This seems pretty enormous and
who knows what's going to
happen?
 
So he's also expressing a
sincere concern,
a sincere fear.
 
In that same statement to
Congress, he goes on to do
brilliant thing number
two--again another example of
his good judgment.
 
He announces that he will serve
without pay as proof that he
does not want to make any kind
of profit from his service,
that he wants no financial
benefit for what he's doing for
his country.
 
Again, really brilliant thing
to do.
Now of course he also says he's
going to keep an exact account
of his expenses.
 
Right?
 
He doesn't want to get a
salary, but he will charge
Congress for his expenses--
and there is an amusing book
titled George Washington's
Expense Account by Marvin
Kitman that looks at what
Washington was actually charging
the Congress for.
 
So it's not as though he was
spending a lot out of pocket.
He did keep a careful account
of all of his expenses as
Commander-in-Chief,
but again that's a pretty
significant statement to make.
 
People noticed it at the time
and commented on it and saw it,
the symbolism in it and the
meaning of it,
and commented just in the way
that he would have hoped people
would have done.
 
He really wanted to make a
certain impact,
and he did.
 
So for example,
here is John Adams at the
time--not afterwards with his
ten talents, but at the time.
He says,
"There is something
charming to me in the conduct of
Washington.
A gentleman of one of the first
fortunes upon the continent,
leaving his delicious
retirement, his family and
friends,
sacrificing his ease,
and hazarding all in the cause
of his country!
His views are noble and
disinterested.
He declared,
when he accepted the mighty
trust,
that he would lay before us an
exact account of his expenses,
and not accept a shilling for
pay."
 
Or, as another Congressman put
it, "Let our Youth look up
to this man as a pattern to form
themselves by;
who unites the bravery of the
soldier with the most consummate
modesty and virtue."
 
Okay.
 
That's exactly the point that
he's trying to make,
right?--that I'm going to take
this large command,
that I'm not looking personally
to profit by it,
and there we have witnesses
that are exactly getting that
message.
 
Shortly thereafter he made yet
another symbolic gesture,
another example of the way in
which he's so good at appeasing
people's fears.
 
He gets a letter from the New
York Provincial Congress with a
little nervous passage in it
reminding him that when the war
ends he's expected to resign his
position and return to civilian
life.
 
Okay.
 
This is a little nervous letter
from New York saying,
'Please don't be a military
dictator after the war.
Sincerely, the New York
Provincial Congress.'
I don't know what they thought
they would accomplish with that
letter, but it's a valid fear.
 
It's one that many people
had--and again,
Washington responds with a sort
of model reply.
He says, "When we assumed
the Soldier, we did not lay
aside the Citizen;
and we shall most sincerely
rejoice with you in that happy
hour when the establishment of
American Liberty ...
 
shall enable us to return to
our Private Stations in the
bosom of a free,
peaceful, and happy
Country."
 
This is exactly what people
would have wanted a military
leader to say:
'I look forward to the end of
the war where I and everyone
else can all go home,
end of army, end of power.'
 
And that letter and the New
York letter that called it forth
are both published in newspapers
around the colonies.
In both of these actions,
Washington is styling himself
after the sort of republican
ideal of a leader,
right?
 
Someone who's public minded;
he's self-sacrificing;
he's virtuous;
he's devoted to his country.
There is a play at the time by
British writer Joseph Addison
titled Cato,
which is based on the life
of Cato the Younger who defended
Rome and Roman virtues against
the tyrant Caesar,
and that was highly popular in
America at this time and not
surprisingly,
it's Washington's favorite play.
 
Washington has it performed for
the troops.
It's reprinted again and again
and again in revolutionary
America.
 
And Nathan Hale's famous last
words,
"I regret that I have but
one life to lose for my
country,"
are adapted from that play.
That's the sort of ideal that
Washington's trying to live up
to,
and any wise man assuming a
position of leadership--
and particularly military
leadership--
would have done the same thing.
Modesty, self-sacrifice,
not lusting for power.
The best way to be trusted and
beloved as a leader was to
modestly surrender power again
and again,
and people would then be sure
to come back and offer you more.
Now it's worth mentioning at
this point that maybe the most
famous thing that Washington
ever did is right along these
lines.
 
The most famous thing that he
did at the time,
is at the close of the war.
 
The war is over.
 
He has won.
 
He has an army at his command
and what does he do?
He resigns his commission and
goes home, period.
That was literally
world-shaking in its impact.
It is not what people thought
would happen at the end of the
war.
 
You have a victorious general
and an army.
People assume,
what happens now is that that
victorious general takes power.
 
Washington literally just said,
'Thank you very much' and went
back to Mount Vernon,
end of story.
It was noticed the world over.
 
It was--had such an impact.
 
It literally ensured that
Washington would be the one man
most trusted with power forever
after,
because he had given that
supreme example of giving it up.
He had said at the moment where
everyone expected him to keep
it, 'No.
 
I'm giving it right back.'
 
That's why he ends up being the
one guy who could have been
President--
because he proved in--to
Americans at the time,
in the ultimate way possible,
he was not hungry for power.
 
Supposedly, at the time--When
King George heard that this was
what was going to happen--
that Washington was just going
to resign and go home--
supposedly his response was
that if Washington did do that,
quote, "he will be the
greatest man in the world."
 
That's the King saying:
the impact of that will be
enormous, if he's actually going
to do that.
The King doesn't even really
believe he will,
but if he actually does that,
that's an incredible act.
He will be the greatest man in
the world.
So one historian has said
basically, "George
Washington was the virtuoso of
resignations."
[laughs]
He perfected the art of getting
power by giving it away.
 
In a sense that's true.
 
It's not that he's being
devious.
It's not that he's sort of
pretending to be modest because
he wants power.
 
It's that he understands
people's fears.
It's that he's serving in
positions that he wants to
serve,
but he then also understands
that his job after serving in
them is to step away and allow
future responsibility to be
given to him again.
He maintains a sort of ideal
balance between ambition and
modesty--
and it's this ideal and sort of
really necessary balance in
America at the time where people
were so scared of power,
standing armies,
monarchs, tyrants,
dictators, all of these things
sort of looming.
 
And Washington ends up in one
way or another proving again and
again that he isn't any of those
things.
And it's for all of these
reasons why, when King George
III finally is let go of--right?
 
I've talked in the past about
how Americans first are upset
with Parliament and then finally
they're upset with the King and
it's a slow process of Americans
sort of divorcing themselves
from their love and loyalty for
England.
When they finally let go of the
King,
it makes sense,
given everything that I've just
said,
that Washington is the logical
person who fills that vacuum of
the sort of symbolic leader
who's going to represent
America,
who's going to be the sort of
core symbolic leader of America.
Very early on in the war,
people begin to substitute
George Washington for King
George in ceremonies and
rituals.
 
As early as 1778,
Washington is called the Father
of His Country.
 
Washington's birthday,
and not the King's,
is celebrated as early as 1779.
 
So literally,
he's just being substituted
right in.
 
It's like, 'well,
we lost that symbolic figure.
Here's a new George.
 
We'll just put him right in.
 
We have a new leader and he's
virtuous and he's not ambitious
and he's a good republican
leader so we can actually
celebrate him and we want him to
be a sort of symbolic center of
the American cause.'
 
Okay.
 
So I have two minutes to
complete here.
What have we seen today?
 
We've certainly seen how
Washington looked and acted the
part of the ideal republican
leader.
We've seen how and why this was
so important to Americans in
revolutionary and early national
America.
They had really good reasons to
be scared,
suspicious about power and who
had it--
and Washington proved again and
again he was the ideal person to
trust with power.
 
He understood prevailing fears.
 
He addressed himself to calming
those fears in sincere ways in
his manner,
in his actions,
in his self-presentation,
yet also managing to remain an
imposing leader throughout.
 
It was a really difficult
balance, I think,
for anyone to maintain and in
many ways it's why he really is
the right man with the right
skills in the right place at the
right time.
 
He's the guy who manages to
maintain that difficult
balance--
to command an army,
to sort of be a symbolic center
of a new nation,
to allow for the fact that he's
ambitious but to not seem too
ambitious,
to not seem desirous of power.
It's a really,
really tricky thing to carry
off and Washington actually did,
which is kind of remarkable.
And, granted,
there are moments probably when
he did it better than others,
but in the end it's his ability
to maintain that kind of balance
that made him the perfect figure
for that moment in time and for
serving the role that he served
in the Revolution.
 
Okay. On that I will conclude.
 
We will move on,
on Thursday,
to watching Washington in
action as we begin to look at
how the war is unfolding on the
field of battle.
 
 
