-Hello, Patrice Gueniffey.
-Hello.
You are a historian,
director of research at the EHESS in Paris,
and author of
Napoleon and de Gaulle: Heroes and History,
which was published by Editions Perrin in 2017,
and won the Montaigne Prize that same year.
Harvard University Press are bringing out
an English version in the next few days.
Thank you for agreeing to answer
the London French Institute's questions
on the occasion of the 80th anniversary
of the appeal of the 18th June.
My first question is: On 19 June 1940, in London,
with the support of Winston Churchill,
General de Gaulle made a historic speech on the BBC
calling on the people of France to join him
in continuing the fight against Germany
through, I quote, "this act of reason, that is also an act
of faith... this gesture that is as moral as it is political".
Do you think General de Gaulle was aware of
representing France against those - frankly the majority -
who had abandoned and betrayed it?
Was he aware? If nothing else, he was willing.
In other words, he'd made up his mind two days earlier,
after seeing the total collapse of France
and, more importantly, after news of the signing of the
armistice, about which there was no longer any doubt,
despite only having been requested on the 17th June.
So, he was aware. He had the will to represent France,
because he was driven by two convictions:
first, the refusal to lay down arms,
he who only a few days before had led
military operations under very difficult conditions,
despite having no illusions about
the outcome of the fighting.
The second is that he was already sure - and this is
perhaps the most surprising thing about him,
and Churchill probably also shared this belief - that
Germany could not win the war.
In fact, he'd said so in a memo sent to a number of
high-level French civilian, political and military figures
a message that was, incidentally, ignored.
And this was in January 1940.
So during the Phoney War and well before the
German offensive after the collapse of the French Army.
He wrote that, besides its ideological dimension
that made engaging with Hitler impossible,
this war was about mechanics.
In other words, ultimately, the winner would be whoever
could maintain the war effort the longest.
And given that Italy was Germany's only ally at that time,
despite its industrial might, it would be impossible for
Germany to maintain the war effort for long,
if a certain number of countries - at the time he hoped it
would be France and Britain - refused to surrender.
And if that were to be the case, in the end,
the industrial capacity of Germany's enemies,
even more so if the Americans were to enter the war,
would far outstrip Germany's
and that would settle things, eventually.
He never mentioned, of course, how long
the war was likely to last.
Now, regarding the betrayal by the French of the
Allied cause and the fight against Nazi Germany,
I'm not sure he was as radical
as you say in your question.
Because he knew full well that
the armistice was inevitable.
The problem was not so much the armistice as
the policy of collaboration that followed.
Because the situation the French Army found itself in,
in May 1940, after the German Blitzkrieg,
meant the armistice was the only option.
But he probably thought that someone should
take stock and show their support for the Allies,
even if the army fell, for that day when
the French Army could resume fighting.
So I think his position was pretty nuanced, and that
for a long time he hoped, how can I put this,
that some of the leaders of the new regime would
join him, or engage with him at least, in London.
I think that was his position, from the beginning
even, but was it sincere? It's seems unlikely.
He called on someone more senior than him, after all
he was only a brigadier general at that time,
he called on someone more senior than him to come
and lead the French resistance in London.
But I think... I don't think it was sincere. He said it
precisely because he knew no one would come.
-OK.
-Yes.
Beyond this crucial but actually quite short
"man of the hour" moment,
your book recalls General de Gaulle's political legacy.
And, to quote you, "he built lasting political institutions,
he restored the country's self-confidence
and international standing,
he represented a power that combined
authority and effectiveness,
and made it possible to put an end to
(not without tragedy) France's colonial period".
I'd like to ask you, now that Gaullism
and anti-Gaullism are dead,
what sense does it make to commemorate
the 80th anniversary of the appeal of the 18th June?
Well, precisely because of everything
you've just mentioned.
Because to do all of that, in a few years
from 1958, was no small feat.
France struggled to create lasting and stable institutions.
The Fourth Republic wasn't a bad regime,
it achieved much.
It rebuilt France after the war,
which was no small feat.
But still, the regime was politically unstable and
struggled, how can I put this, to hit its stride.
And that's why it collapsed.
On the other hand, it also came up against the thorny
issue of the decolonisation of Algeria,
given that no one was willing to settle
the problem. One way or another.
And de Gaulle dealt with it in a rather cruel way, considering
he came to power on the shoulders of French Algeria,
yet four years later he signed a treaty with the FLN
returning Algeria to the Algerians, or to the FLN at least.
So he did it in a cruel way.
It would take someone brave enough, strong enough and
unfeeling enough to sacrifice a section of the population
for the greater good, or for the interests of the state.
Because that's basically what happened:
the Pieds-Noirs were sacrificed,
but worst of all, the Harkis, i.e. those Algerians who had
chosen to side with France, were, literally,
abandoned and handed over to their enemies.
A strong character was needed to do this,
and he did all that.
Moreover, he left France with fairly stable institutions,
given that they're still with us and no one has seriously
considered changing the constitution.
And the system he left behind is a kind of synthesis: these days
the Fifth Republic's monarchical aspects are often criticised,
but it reconciled the two principles of authority and liberty that the
revolution had failed to bring together, despite wanting to do so.
Napoleon tilted the regime towards
authoritarianism without freedom,
and then we had parliamentary regimes that
prioritised freedom over authority.
De Gaulle managed to bring the two together.
So his legacy is very impressive, and warrants that the
various anniversary dates for that year be commemorated.
So, while relations between de Gaulle and the French
deteriorated very quickly,
you recall the lasting impact Gaullism
has had on the French mentality.
According to polls, the French still consider General de Gaulle
the greatest figure in the history of France.
Does this mean that this "legend of grandeur",
as you put it, is here to stay?
Yes, I think so. First, because all nations love being represented
by alluring figures, who play their roles well.
You see it in England with Churchill,
despite what happened a few days ago in London,
I think most English people still see
Churchill as a positive figure.
Americans are clearly nostalgic for its good presidents.
Basically, what you call this
legend of grandeur resurges
in depressing or gloomy times, or when
a country's image takes a hit.
So, probably, it is clear that the United States is being
represented in a way that divides more than it unites.
In such times, positive figures in history...
i.e. figures who managed for a time to reconcile...
it's very hard to reconcile a country,
especially those divided by history, temperament,
and divergent interests... it's very hard to reconcile.
And in such cases, figures who
act as reconcilers become revered.
This is the case with de Gaulle,
but far less so with Napoleon,
because though he also acted as a reconciler, he did so
only briefly before causing division with his wars.
But also because he had no personal virtue.
As evidenced by his refusal to retire, he kept
coming back for more. He returned in 1804.
Whereas de Gaulle... certainly age was a factor,
but still, he succeeded twice, and went home.
Which makes of him a politically virtuous figure.
What's more, it's known that he didn't have
his personal interests at heart.
It is for all these reasons that such
legendary figures are here to stay.
The commemorations are also an opportunity to
think about the how we do and teach history.
In your book, you caution against
three current threats to history:
you talk about the "fashionable deconstructivist approach"
that tries to show that France does not exist,
you also talk about a "collective Alzheimer's memory" that
increasingly reduces the depth of our vision of the past,
and about a "leveller mentality" that seeks to
eradicate all these heroes of history.
Do these conflicting (or some might say complementary) views
of your discipline result from the difficulty of
writing a common history for increasingly diverse societies?
Yes, of course.
Certainly... First, it is a phenomenon of the modern age,
it is a contemporary sensibility.
It's true that these days,
modern individuals - you, me, everybody -
are shaped less and less by tradition
or the past, because...
the societies we live in are
much more fixated on the present moment,
so the past plays less of a role
in shaping us than before.
Most of us are, first and foremost, city dwellers.
So we're no longer as rooted as people
who lived in predominantly rural societies.
This of course leads to a shrinking of
the historic perspective.
We no longer believe what happened in the
Middle Ages shapes what we are today.
And this is happening all over the developed world,
in all industrialised and democratic societies.
Attempts are now being made to either erase history,
because by definition it can't include everybody,
or invent another type of history, or rather write another type
of history - that sounds less derogatory -
in which everybody is represented.
It's true, this is a real problem in the diverse
and plural societies we currently live in,
with this migration and mingling of different populations.
Still, I think it is a loss that does nobody any favours.
After all, France was not populated by people who
solely originated from the Massif Central.
Common histories are histories you identify with,
by an act of will, without them necessarily being yours.
Moreover, the whole of French history, if I look at my
family's history, for example, or that of the region I come from,
the whole of French history is not my history.
And I don't recognise myself in
the whole of French history.
Nevertheless, French history is my history
on two levels or indirectly.
It is a collective history that I identify with
even if I don't approve of it all.
Even if this history does not shape me
or reflect who I am.
So, every country has its history. For example, not all
English people are descended from the Saxons.
Nevertheless, the Saxon invasion gave much to Britain.
If we stop teaching this more distant history, if we stop
explaining to the English that they escaped Roman rule,
then we'll never understand why Britain managed to
curb the State's authority in ways that France wasn't able to.
History explains a lot.
I don't think the problem is... identity.
It doesn't matter if people identify with a history or not.
What matters is that this history be modelled and designed
on the current environment and overall culture
that people grow up with and will live in.
That's what matters. It's not about personal identity.
OK. I'd like to finish this interview with a quote
from General de Gaulle:
"It is my belief that Europe could not today, any more than
in previous times, be a fusion of its peoples,
but that it could and should result from
a systematic rapprochement.
My policy therefore aims at the setting up of
a concert of European States.
There is no reason to think that from this, especially if
these States were to one day face a common threat,
developments could not lead to their confederation."
End quote.
What significance should be given to these words by
General de Gaulle in the new Europe,
the Europe we now live in, conceived, you write,
"as the antithesis and transcendence of the old nations"?
Yes. That's one of its dimensions, at least.
I think de Gaulle's vision of Europe is actually
very similar to Germany's vision of Europe.
And it was a good and powerful idea.
He was too much of a  historian,
because he knew the history,
but I think Churchill shared the same ideas.
He was too much of a historian to believe
in the existence of a European people.
He did not think it possible to create a single entity
out of a European population
temporarily divided into
different nationalities,
to merge these diverse peoples into a single entity.
He never thought that.
But he did believe that Europe was
the future of these nations.
In other words, even if these nations were to live on
because they reflect a kind of organic reality,
Europe was still a necessity.
Especially in his day, with the clash of two superpowers:
the United States and the Soviet Union.
He didn't think France could survive between these two giants,
but felt the construction of Europe needed promoting,
a Europe built on cooperative ventures,
trade, a common market
and possibly -  something he did not rule out
for the future - some kind of integration.
I think deep down he had this traditional idea
that, sooner or later, Europe had to become French
and that was very much his mindset.
In other words, a European confederation.
I'm not sure confederations work,
but anyway, apart from in Switzerland,
but a European confederation mainly led
by France and then Germany.
In a way, I think his vision of Europe
is the same as Germany's vision today:
who do not want a federal Europe,
who want Europe to be a branded zone,
with Germany playing a leading role,
without dissolving into a European entity.
I actually think such a Europe would work
much better than the Europe others have imagined,
and that Britain has just left.
Perhaps if Europe were to realign itself more closely with what
de Gaulle and Adenauer, the 1950s German statesman, had wanted,
then Britain might well consider re-joining.
Patrice Gueniffey, thank you for having
shared your thoughts with us.
Thank you.
