[MUSIC PLAYING]
AARON DIGNAN: Thank you.
Thank you.
So I just want to start right
off the gate with a pop quiz.
What year is this from?
Shout them out.
Last year?
'80?
Good.
Closer.
We're going to play
game show rules.
You got to be
under but not over.
AUDIENCE: '92.
AARON DIGNAN: '92?
All right.
Fair enough.
Anybody further back?
No?
All right.
Here's the answer.
It's from 1910.
It's actually one of
the first org charts
to use boxes and lines.
It's from an old Southern
Pacific Railroad in the US.
And yeah, this is 109 years old.
And what I find fascinating
about that is when I show this,
I usually get guesses ranging
from about 1850 to yesterday
or even tomorrow.
This is next month's
org chart release.
And what I find
fascinating about that
is if I'd shown you a picture
of literally anything else--
a shoe, a house, a
car, a dress, a phone--
you would have been able
to carbon date it better.
But when I show you
the main instrument
by which we visualize
all of human labor,
you're kind of like, eh.
There's a century of range on
when that thing was invented.
And so one of two
things is true.
Either it's perfect, and
we can all go back to work
and just cut it short today.
Or there's something
about it that's
quite intractable and
quite hard to change.
And so we have to just sit
with that for a second.
So that's the first pop quiz.
There are two more.
The second one is to look
at these ways of working.
So these are ways of
working that I've collected
from a mysterious source.
Insisting on doing
everything through channels.
Not taking shortcuts
to expedite decisions.
When possible, referring matters
to committee for further study
and having those committees
be as large as possible.
Haggling over the precise
wordings of emails and missives
to customers and to our
fellow employees when
we make changes, et cetera.
Referring back to
matters decided
upon at the last meeting,
maybe in a private one on one
or over coffee or
around the water cooler
or in an email or a
Slack message saying,
hey, I think we should
make a decision differently
than what happened in the room.
And then my personal
favorite is someone
that works with large companies
multiplying the procedures
and clearances involved in
issuing instructions and paying
checks and so on.
We see that three people
have to approve everything
where one might be enough.
So show of hands--
who's ever seen
these behaviors in the workplace
here or elsewhere in the past,
maybe has a spouse
who's dealing with this?
Yeah.
Does anyone know
what these are from?
It's kind of a funny story.
So most people guess that
they're from clients that I've
observed and worked with.
But I didn't come up
with these, actually.
These were invented--
they were invented
in the '40s at the height
of World War II, when
the precursor to the CIA
was trying to figure out how
to sabotage enemy businesses.
And the idea was
that people that
were confederate to us
that were on our side
but inside enemy
businesses would
use these approaches to
slow those businesses down
and grind them to a halt.
So that was the idea.
And actually, there's
quite a long list.
There's about 14 or 15 things.
I chose my five favorites.
But there are many,
many more in there.
And so what has
effectively happened
is in the space
of 80 years, we've
gone from this being obviously
nonsensical to sabotage being
indistinguishable from work--
that effectively, most
people in the modern economy
are working in an environment
where we're actively
sabotaging ourselves
with the way of working,
at least in terms of how people
might have thought 60, 70,
80 years prior.
And what's interesting is
that in the midst of that,
the things that have maybe
served us well in the past
are starting to fail us.
So we're all, of course,
aware of assembly lines
and the factory model of
working and having hierarchies
of managers and thinkers and
doers separated and all that.
But somewhere along the lines,
that has started to fail.
And it's really not something
that we talk about much.
So if we look at indicators
like the average lifespan
of a company, down and
to the right over time.
It used to be a
dynastic 60-year run
that you would have on a
big index like the S&P 500
if you were a big,
successful company.
Now it's closer to 10 years.
Every two and a half
weeks, a company
falls off that list from either
dying and pulling a Kodak
or getting dealt with an M&A.
Return on assets, which
is a much better indicator
of business health than,
say, its stock performance--
the stock can be
manipulated a little bit.
But the ROA is just,
how much profit can we
generate with what we own?
Very hard to manipulate.
And that's gone in the same
time period from close to 5%
to down to nearly 1%.
And it's on its way
down, which essentially
means we can't make more
profit with more stuff.
When we get bigger, when
we get more global, when
we get more interconnected,
suddenly we become immobilized.
And we're seeing the
same thing happen
with productivity growth.
So if you track productivity
growth over the last century,
it has gone down and down and
down to the point where we're
not getting any more gains.
We're inventing all
this incredible stuff.
The people in this
room and this company
are inventing things that
you would think, oh my gosh,
the device in my
pocket has more power
than the computers that
took us to the moon.
And yet productivity--
we're not being
able to make more
per hour than we were
10 years ago or 20 years ago.
It's really grinding to a halt.
And when you ask economists
why this is happening,
they scratch their heads.
They're kind of like,
we're really not sure.
Or they debate about it.
What's interesting
is when you then
ask people what's going on,
they say that they're not
super psyched about work.
So one in two people is thinking
about quitting, thinking
about maybe how they're
unhappy in their current job.
They're disengaged.
They're working for the weekend.
About one in five or
six people is actively
sabotaging their colleagues
and playing the politics game
and playing the
"how do I succeed
at the expense of others" game.
And so we're not thrilled
about work as a whole.
And what's staggering
to me about this data--
this is Gallup data--
is that this has been
the same for 20 years.
Every year, they release the
data with this big fanfare.
And it's like, oh,
disengagement went down by 1%
from 52% to 51%.
And we're all just OK with that.
We're OK with the
fact that most people
spend one third to one half of
their lives in an environment
that they're not psyched about.
And that's just the way
the world is, I guess.
So that's challenging.
Now, as I mentioned, when you
ask what's going on-- when you
ask the economists, when you
ask people that are looking
at the system as a whole
what is happening--
they scratch their heads.
But when you ask the people
at the edge, they'll tell you.
Bureaucracy is what's happening.
What's happening is that
the policies and structures
and boundaries and processes
and rules and norms by which we
govern our behavior at work
have metastasized into something
that we're no longer
fully in control of
and that we no longer
fully understand.
And so it's slowing us down.
It's creating friction.
It's creating tension.
It's creating dissatisfaction.
And that dissatisfaction
has a cost.
It has a very real cost.
So to give you an
example, I like
to talk about it in terms
of organizational debt.
So think about financial debt.
You borrow money.
You owe interest.
That interest is a pain point
for you until you pay it back.
For those of you
that work closely
in software development,
technical debt--
you rush to get the
software out the door.
And later on, those
choices have a cost.
You have to work to
refactor and reintegrate
the code that you've created.
Organizational debt
is a third concept,
and I actually think
the most pernicious.
Organizational debt is
all the rules and policies
and structures we've created
that are no longer serving us
but that we haven't refactored,
that we haven't changed,
that we haven't updated to
reflect the present day.
So they're sort
of like something
that maybe someone
back in time understood
why we did it that way.
Or maybe it once made sense, but
it doesn't make sense anymore.
Perfect example-- so
there's an auto parts,
a brass foundry in
France called FAVI.
And they are incredible
at what they do.
They're one of
the only companies
in that space that's been able
to survive the outsourcing
boom.
They're one of the only
profitable, successful
factories in that
space in Europe.
And when their prior CEO
came to take over the job,
he noticed as he walked the
floor for the first time
someone standing by a cage of
equipment with a slip of paper
just waiting.
And he said, hey,
what are you doing?
He said, oh, I'm
waiting for new gloves.
OK.
And what's the paper all about?
Well, when you need new
gloves, you go to your manager.
You show the boss your gloves
that are no longer working
that are worn out.
And they approve that
they're no longer working.
And then they give
you a permission slip.
And you leave your machine.
And you go over to this cage
where all the gloves are
under lock and key.
And all the equipment
is under lock and key.
And you turn in that
permission slip.
And you wait while the
person goes back and finds
the right size and what not.
Then they bring it back to
you and stamp all your pages.
And then you can go back
to work with your gloves.
And he had the CFO with him.
And he said, hey, how much
do the gloves cost us?
Well, they're about 5 euro.
And how much does it cost
us for this man's machine
to be down for 30 minutes?
5,000 euro.
OK.
So that's organizational debt.
And the gloves were
free the next day
and from then on
until the present day.
So what happened
there is somebody
stole a pair of gloves.
Somebody went into the store
room and took all the gloves
or took a piece of equipment.
And a leader, whose job
it was in their head
to ensure perfect execution and
ensure compliance and safety
and efficiency, was like,
I'm going to stop that
from ever happening again.
And the way I'm
going to do it is
by creating this
elaborate process.
But in fact, the process cost
us more than just the trust
and the judgment
that would have gone
into a much simpler system.
So there's organizational
debt everywhere.
I've never met a
team that's like, we
don't have a stupid policy.
We don't have a thing
that's in our way
or slowing us down from
doing our best work.
So it's something that
does need to be addressed.
Now, the reason that it
exists and the reason
that it's so hard to
address is that we
have a great confusion about
the nature of organizations.
So an organization is a system.
There are lots of
systems in the world.
And different systems
have different natures.
So when most leaders
and executives
that I meet around the
world see these two words,
they see them as synonyms.
So they say, oh, yes.
Complicated,
complex-- that means
things that are frustrating
and that I don't understand
and that have lots
of parts and that
are very hard to break down.
And they're all the same.
Complicated, complex-- I use
those words interchangeably.
But when you talk to a systems
theorist, they say, no.
There are very distinct kinds
of systems in the world.
And these are two
of those options.
And they have very
distinct meanings.
So I thought what we would do
today is do a rapid 60-second
master's degree in systems
theory by starting with
the final--
well, we might do one more
quiz later-- but nearly
the final quiz.
So by show of hands
in the room, who
thinks that a watch is
a complicated system?
OK.
Who thinks it's
a complex system?
OK.
And what about the engine?
Who thinks the engine
is complicated?
A couple of people.
And complex?
A few more.
OK.
Let's turn the tables.
What about weather?
Who thinks weather
is complicated?
OK.
Who thinks it's complex?
And who's a
conscientious objector
who thinks I'm
trying to trick you,
and you're not going to play?
[LAUGHTER]
All right.
And what about traffic?
Traffic complicated?
And traffic complex?
OK.
Cool.
So you did what almost every
audience in the world does,
which is about half
of you vote for one.
About half of you
vote for the other.
And as we go further
through the examples,
fewer percentages
of people play,
but still roughly equally.
So let's get to
the bottom of this.
So a watch and an
engine are both what we
would call complicated systems.
And by that, I mean that
they are causal systems.
There's a cause-and-effect
relationship
between their components.
And while they might be rich
with lots of components,
there might be lots of
pieces, and it might even
require an expert
to fix them, they're
not going to surprise us.
They are predictable.
They are knowable.
If you take your car into
the mechanic on Friday
and it's not working, and they
say it'll be ready on Monday,
it probably will be.
And it certainly
won't surprise you
with-- a clown is not going
to jump out of the engine
when you pick it up.
It's a known thing.
It's a knowable thing.
And so an expert can do that.
When you have a problem
in a complicated system,
you can solve that problem.
You can solve the problem.
Then we have complex systems.
A complex system is
like weather or traffic
or your immune system or
a six-year-old, things
that we can't predict.
We call them
"dispositional systems."
They have a vector.
They have a way
they're trending.
It looks like it's probably
going to rain today.
But we can't be sure exactly
how much and exactly where.
The only way to understand
a complex system
is to interact with
it, to go outside,
to be in it, to
poke it to see what
happens when something occurs.
And so you're
always in dialogue.
You're always in engagement
with a complex system.
The best way to identify one is
if the thing you're looking at
has a chance of surprising you,
it's probably a complex system
if it's going to just come out
of nowhere with a reaction you
don't expect.
And so with a complex system,
problems are not solved.
They are only managed.
Nobody ever comes in
from the garden and says,
honey, I fixed the garden.
It's done.
That doesn't happen.
You have to nurture it.
You have to be in
relationship with the garden.
And the same thing goes
for a six-year-old, right?
You can try your
damnedest to get that kid
to go to the school
of your choice.
It might work.
It might not.
So complex systems require
that kind of interaction.
So then the question
becomes, well,
what does that mean
for organizations?
So what do you think?
What conclusions might you
draw from your recent master's
in systems theory?
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]
AARON DIGNAN: What's that?
AUDIENCE: The organization
is a complex system.
AARON DIGNAN: The
organization is a--
AUDIENCE: Complex.
AARON DIGNAN: Complex, yeah.
The organization is
a complex system.
It's not a complicated one.
There are complicated
tasks and problems
inside an organization.
If I ship a FedEx
envelope, there's
a very high probability it's
going to arrive the next day.
But the culture,
the way of working,
the dynamics of the
organization with 10 or 100
or 10,000 or 100,000
people working together
is, of course, very
complex, and most obviously
because we human
beings are complex.
So you put a bunch
of us together,
that can only be more.
And so if that's
true, then that means
that the way we engage
with the organization
when we think about culture
and way of working and change
has to be appropriate.
It has to be fit to the context.
So for example, when
I talk to leaders
who are quite frustrated
because they've just
gone through a culture
change initiative
where they wrote down
all the values on posters
and put the posters up, and
people are still not behaving
differently, I laugh.
Because effectively, they're
shouting at the weather.
They're just sort of like
yelling at a thing that
doesn't respond to that.
You can yell at the weather.
You can yell at the
garden all you like.
That's not how things
change in a complex system.
The way things change
in a complex system
is you introduce something new.
You put it into the wild.
And then you see what happens.
Maybe it's an attractor
that creates a big reaction.
Maybe you like that reaction.
Maybe you don't.
But you're now interacting
with that system.
So we have to bring the right
mindset and the right tool set
to organizations if we
want to change them,
if we want to shape
them, if we want
to make them serve us better.
And that doesn't matter who
you are in the organization.
That's true.
So I like to say it this way.
To manage complexity, we need
a different operating system.
We need a new OS.
And I use the metaphor lightly.
But I like the idea of
just basically saying
there's a foundational set of
assumptions, of principles,
of practices, of
norms in every team,
in every organization upon
which everything else happens.
We assume what's true.
And then the norms and the
behavior of the organization
is built on top of that.
So my favorite example of
an OS, of an assumption,
is a conference room should
have a table and chairs in it.
Nobody questions that.
That is just a given.
Every office, every
startup I've ever
been to anywhere in the world--
you go in the conference room,
sure enough, table, chairs.
Why?
Because we assume
we're going to be
in this room to do something.
What are we going to do?
We're going to have a meeting.
What's that require?
Well, it's going to
require sitting a lot.
Why?
Because it's going
to last a long time.
OK.
And we're going to need
a table for our laptops.
Why?
So we can be checking our email
because we can't let that go.
There's a whole lattice
work of assumptions there
that build that OS.
And then, of course, when
you come into that room,
you're limited.
You've now constrained yourself.
If I want to do something
physical with us in this room,
and there's a table
in the middle,
if we want to use
our bodies to think,
if we want to use the walls and
they're not set up that way,
suddenly we're limited
in our capacity.
So there's a limitation
that comes with an OS.
And this is a
really good example.
So to bring the idea
of the OS to life,
here are two different solutions
to the same problem space.
So the problem space is,
two roads are crossing.
So we have a problem
we have to solve for.
How do we make sure they
don't hit each other?
And how do we maximize
the throughput,
the number of cars that get
through the intersection
per hour?
And there's an OS on the
left and a different one
on the right.
The OS on the left has
a set of assumptions
about people and the problem.
What do you suppose are the
assumptions about people
and the problem in the
lighted intersection
with the red,
yellow, green light?
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]
AARON DIGNAN: What's that?
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]
AARON DIGNAN: Yeah, sure.
What else?
AUDIENCE: People will respond
to a red light or a green light.
AARON DIGNAN: People will
do what they're told.
Yeah.
And more importantly,
people need to be told that
effectively, I don't
really trust all y'all.
And so we're going
to have to keep
this thing under lock and key.
We're going to keep
this thing moving
based on a set of
central instructions.
And so we're going to
use this apparatus.
And by the way,
because it's electronic
and because it requires
an algorithm and controls,
it's quite a big apparatus.
So we're going to have a central
control station and people
that program that.
And we're going to need
an electrical grid.
And we're going to need
to do a lot of things
to make this intersection safe.
And that is the knock-on effect.
And then what about this one?
What are the assumptions
of the roundabout
about people and the problem?
We've got a few of these.
AUDIENCE: People are capable.
AARON DIGNAN: What's that?
AUDIENCE: People are capable.
AARON DIGNAN: Yeah.
People are capable.
Essentially, it's on you.
The responsibility is
with you to each other
and for each other.
I'm going into the
coliseum with you.
And I hope that we
can all coordinate,
that we'll socially coordinate.
And the way they do that is
with a set of constraints, just
two simple rules.
We call them "enabling
constraints."
One is go with the
flow of traffic.
So you got to go in
the same direction
as the circle,
whatever that might be.
And the second rule is that
you have to give right of way
to the people in the circle.
So they have the privilege.
And you have to kind
of work around them.
Those are the only two
rules in a roundabout.
And if you follow
those rules, you
can handle an almost
infinite number of scenarios
of things that can happen.
And to know how true
that is, you only
have to look at one of
Europe's eight-lane roundabouts
to see just how profound
those simple rules can
be when put into practice.
So these are two different
operating systems,
two different sets
of assumptions.
The question that we now
have to ask ourselves
is, well, which one's safer?
So on the whole, which
one do you think is safer?
AUDIENCE: Roundabouts.
AARON DIGNAN: Yeah.
The roundabouts are about
80%, 85% safer, about 95%
safer on fatality collisions.
Which one's higher throughput?
AUDIENCE: Roundabout.
AARON DIGNAN: Roundabout, about
80% to 88% higher throughput
per hour.
Which one's cheaper
to build and maintain?
AUDIENCE: Roundabout.
AARON DIGNAN: Roundabout,
yeah, 10 to 20 grand cheaper.
Which one works better
when the power goes out?
[LAUGHTER]
Humorous, right?
Which one do we have
1,000 times more of?
AUDIENCE: Traffic lights.
AARON DIGNAN: Yeah.
And in fact, when I ask people--
certainly stateside, and
sometimes here in Europe--
which one do you feel more
comfortable in, they're like,
oh, I much prefer a
light because I don't
trust all these other people.
I always feel uneasy
in a roundabout.
And I like to be able
to kind of relax.
And when I pull up,
I can check my phone.
I can change the radio.
I'm off the hook, essentially.
The powers that be will
tell me what to do.
And I can be off the hook.
This one requires
quite a presence.
It requires that you're
there in the moment.
It's on you.
It's on all of us
in coordination.
So this is, in
most sense, in most
contexts-- not every
possible scenario on earth,
but in most contexts--
the superior solution.
But it asks more of us.
It asks us to show
up differently.
And this one makes us feel
like we're safe but is actually
less safe.
So really, it's just
two operating systems
built on these ideas, control
and compliance and trust
and autonomy.
So we're making a choice.
Now, again, if we're
complexity aware,
if we're aware of all
these different contexts,
there are going to be situations
and problems and products
and moments where control
and compliance approach--
the red light--
makes perfect sense.
And god bless.
That's wonderful.
But there's a lot of situations
where trust and autonomy make
sense, but we haven't even
considered it in a century.
We haven't even gone back
to say, wait a second.
Does an annual budget
make sense in a world
that changes this fast?
Does telling someone
what they should work on
make sense in a world
that's this varied, where
their talents and
skills are developing
and moving and changing and
shaping over time make sense?
And what are the things that
we're not really getting
served by anymore?
What's the org debt
where we're like,
is there a better
way to do this?
Is there a better way to handle
travel expenses than a travel
freeze, where
everybody gets told
they can't travel no matter
what without manager approval?
Is there a better way
to solve that problem?
Is there a roundabout solution?
So a few organizations
around the world
that have taken a crack
at that, that have sort of
flipped the table
over on bureaucracy
and played with it a bit.
Handelsbanken, which is based
in Sweden and Stockholm,
is a bank that in the '70s
was in trouble, coming out
of a financial crisis.
And the new CEO was asked
to really change things up.
And he came in and
said, hey, you know,
I think we've got
this backwards.
We at HQ are telling all
these branches what to do.
But they know the customers.
They're at the edge.
They're in community.
They're the ones that
have all the information.
Maybe we should change that up.
And so his headline was,
the branch is the bank.
And hundreds of
branches were suddenly
given the authority to
say, hey, make loans
to who you want to
make loans to at rates
you want to make them at.
Do service for your customers
the way you need to do it,
where they're not going to have
a central service line where
some person reading
off a script is
going to handle your customers.
You guys can figure it out.
And to keep things on
the straight and narrow,
we'll just pick a couple
metrics that are learning
metrics for us that matter.
And that will be
the thing that we
use to know if we're
on the right track.
So we'll measure profit
over revenue, back to ROA.
So we'll measure, is it
actually working as a system?
And we'll measure
customer satisfaction.
And we'll measure that
branch to branch and then
as a system as a whole.
So the branches will see
transparently every month
how profit over revenue
and customer satisfaction
is trending.
And then we'll see as
a system as a whole
how we're doing versus
the aggregate industry.
And in order to fix
the incentives problem
in the financial
industry, we won't
have these big individual
bonuses and these incentives
to sell, sell, sell or
create 15 different accounts
for a customer that
doesn't need one.
Instead what we'll
do is we'll just
track profit over revenue
for the entire category
here in Europe.
And if we're better
than the average,
then everybody gets a
bonus to their pension.
And if we're not better
than the average,
then we just roll right
into the next year.
And everyone's paid fairly.
And that's fine.
And so we're now all winning
together and losing together.
And so they went
and made this play.
And for 40 years--
for 40 straight years--
they've beaten the
average of all the people
in their competitive
set on profit
over revenue and
customer satisfaction.
And they've actually
gone so far as
to blow up their annual
budgeting process
and move to something that's
more dynamic, that's more
local, that's more regional.
Because again, as long
as you're tracking
profit over revenue and
customer satisfaction,
what difference
does the plan make?
What matters is,
are we performing
this week, this month,
this quarter, this year?
Through every financial
crisis that we've had--
the big ones that have
really shaken the system--
they've been able to just
very resiliently skate over
that because they don't
make stupid loans.
Why?
Because no one is
incentivized to.
Or Morning Star tomatoes,
which is an American tomato
processing company.
It's actually the
world's largest.
So if you've had
some ketchup lately,
you might have had
something to do with them.
Their founder decided
that it was already
a tough enough
industry as it was.
And so to make it more
vibrant and more interesting,
we would let all the
employees write their own job
descriptions and set
their own salaries.
When I say that, people
are like, [GASP]..
But of course, they've
done it for 20 years.
So this is a company where
their category average
profitability is about 2%.
Their average over the
last 20 years is 20%.
So they're a 10x
outperformer where
people are writing their
own job descriptions
and set their own salaries.
How do they do it?
They do it with
an advice process.
So every year, I sit down.
I write what I think
I want to do this year
and who I want to do it
with and make an agreement
with my colleagues.
And then they react to that.
They give me advice.
This is overshooting.
This is undershooting.
You're really good at this.
I can't wait to work
with you on that.
This is something I think
you should consider.
And people edit their
take because they
know they're going to be
working with these peers.
They're in relationship
with these peers.
So there's a social pressure
instead of a top-down pressure.
And the same thing
goes for comp.
So they have these elected
compensation groups
in every pocket of the business.
And when people
propose their salary,
they're doing it with
total transparency
about the firm's profitability,
the category averages,
what their colleagues
get paid, and for what.
And they're saying, all right,
this is what I think is fair.
Then they get advice.
And then they modify
their take based on that.
And again, this is
all judgment based.
It's trust based.
So if they say, I think
I'm worth $20 an hour
and everybody else is
worth $15, the system
is going to let
them play that out.
And they're going
to find out, what
are the reputational
consequences of that?
What are the social
consequences of that?
What are the P&L
consequences of that?
That's going to be found out.
And if somebody
does something so
aggressive in a system like
this that it can't be tolerated,
there's a conflict process
that someone can engage,
where they'll have some
mediation and some discussion.
And they can use their judgment
and their adult communication
to try to find a way forward.
And that's something that
they very rarely need.
So that's something that's
going on at Morning Star.
For those of you that
have read the book
"Turn the Ship
Around," I'm a big fan
of David's work on
the USS Santa Fe,
where he inherited the
worst-performing ship
in the Navy essentially,
a nuclear sub
that was not doing well.
Was told he could not change
the staff of that sub.
Had to actually
keep them exactly
as they are, but needed
to turn the ship around.
And he did this through
a series of adjustments
that increased transparency
and increased clarity
about what competency looked
like, but most importantly,
increased empowerment.
So people would come to
him and say, Captain,
what are my orders?
And he would say, well,
what do you intend to do?
And they'd say, I have no idea.
No one's ever asked
me that before.
And he's like,
well, come back when
you know what you intend to do.
And over time, people realized,
we have to show up ready.
We have to show up prepared
for our role to the captain
because he's not
going to tell us.
So they'd come and say,
oh, I thought about it.
And I want to go 45
degrees north and dock
and refuel and do
this training exercise
and then go back out to sea.
And he'd say, very well.
Sounds good.
Let's do it.
He reserved one
choice for himself.
That was the choice to
fire a nuclear weapon.
That he was going to
keep for himself just out
of pure responsibility.
But everything else was
distributed to the system.
Two years later, it was the
highest-performing ship,
produced more officers than any
other ship in naval history.
It's a great story.
I highly recommend
you take a look at it.
And then last but
not least, Haier.
Haier is a Chinese
appliance manufacturer
that has done some
really interesting things
in the past few years.
Their CEO started to
recognize that they
were getting further and
further removed from customer.
And that was because
of functionalization.
So you have HR over here
and design over here
and marketing over here.
And everybody's
trying to communicate.
But they can't because
we're in silos.
And the end customer is not
hearing or seeing that value.
And so what they did is they
took a 60,000-person company,
and they blew it up into
2,000 autonomous teams.
Each team had a product or a
service, internal or external,
that they were responsible for.
And each team had a customer.
And it was end to end.
It was P&L-level responsibility.
So it's make or break.
You decide when
it sinks or swims.
If you fold up your
tent on a product
that you're trying
to make happen,
that doesn't mean you're fired.
You just move in the
marketplace to another system.
You start a new
innovation project.
Or you join another existing
team that's scaling.
So there's kind of
a career pathing
and a role mix ecology
inside the system that's
quite powerful.
And this has been so
remarkably successful
that in the past
few years, they've
gone from 60,000
to almost double
that number of employees.
They've become the world's
fastest-growing appliance
manufacturer.
And they actually
acquired GE Appliances
in the midst of all this and
implemented their model there.
And for the first
time in a decade,
that business posted a
profit and a revenue growth.
So there's a real power to
this connection to customer
and this new
structure that focuses
on functional integration
and speed and connection
rather than, how do
we centralize things
to make them more efficient?
It would be so
much more efficient
if we put all the
lawyers together and got
rid of half of them.
Well, yes.
That would be efficient for the
P&L right now in this moment.
But would it be more efficient
for our overall outcomes,
for our success as a system?
So it's really about pulling
on those different tensions.
So at the end in
the book, I looked
at about 68 different companies
out of a group of over 300
that we could consider.
And there were really
only two mindsets
that permeated these places.
And some of them were
living them to the fullest.
Some of them were
experimenting with them.
It depends on the company.
But these were the two ideas.
One was that they were
generally people positive,
meaning they took the
roundabout take on, how do
we feel about people and risk?
And the idea was people are
worthy of trust and respect.
People are capable
of using judgment.
People are capable of growing
and learning themselves
if left to their own devices
in the right environment.
And that we ultimately seek
autonomy, mastery, and purpose.
As self-determination theory
and Dan Pink would say,
those are the things that
really unlock our motivation,
not some end-of-year
bonus scheme that's
going to mess with our wiring.
And then complexity
conscious, which you all now
have a master's in, was
really just about the idea
that they recognized
that the market was full
of different contexts,
that the organization was
full of different contexts,
and that we needed
the right approach for the job.
So if we're dealing with
something that's uncertain,
that's going to
surprise us, we need
to have the right constraints.
We need to allow for emergence.
We need to test and learn.
All the values of
agility and lean
and those sorts
of things that we
hear bouncing
around the industry
are all rooted in this basic
idea that if it's unknown,
then we need ways of
knowing and finding out.
We need ways of doing
this dynamically.
We don't want to
make big commitments
to a three-year plan or a
budget that's going on forever
or a set of choices that are
going to come back to bite us.
We want to actually learn
more and steer continuously.
And that's the big idea there.
One of the founders
of sociocracy,
which is one of the early
distributed authority systems
based in the
Netherlands, used to talk
about a bicycle as an example.
He would say, if I told
you to ride from point A
to point B on a bicycle
and I locked the handlebars
and I screwed them
down tight, you
would fall down
in three seconds.
You cannot ride a bike when
the wheel doesn't turn.
And I invite you to try
it with proper padding.
But you immediately fall over.
What you actually do when
you ride from point A
to point B is you
keep your eye on B.
And as you overshoot
left, you correct right.
And as you overshoot
right, you correct left.
And you're doing this
in micro adjustments
all the time when you're riding.
You're not even aware of it.
You're unconsciously micro
adjusting, always heading
towards intent, always
heading towards purpose.
And that should be the
design of the organization.
That should be the design
of any organism that's
trying to achieve its intent--
is that it's continuously
steering, that it's
continuously adjusting
towards its collective
and stated intent
rather than saying, all right.
Let's lock these at
17 degrees and pray.
And we'll check
again in January.
So everybody says, great.
That's lovely, Aaron.
Let's change.
But here's the problem.
Change is impossible.
And change sucks.
So even though we're
all excited about this,
we can't do anything about it.
That's because we view change as
something that looks like this.
It is essentially
the mourning process.
Change is a death to
us in our culture.
And so we have this,
I don't want to do it.
And then we're forced to do it.
And then we trip and
fall, and it's miserable.
And then some of us have
this moment of epiphany.
And then we crawl back up.
And we're 5% better off than
we were when we started,
which to me seems like
a horrible way to do it.
And of course, if you can afford
a very fancy, exotic consulting
company, then it
looks like this.
And so now you have
the exact same thing
but with more bullet points.
And it's in 3D.
And again, if this is your
vision of change, of course
you're going to find
yourself frustrated.
Because what does a system
of progressive steps,
of linear steps of change
assume about the nature
of the system itself?
That it's complicated, right?
It's treating it as a watch.
We're all in the discover phase.
And then we're all in
the visualize phase.
We're going to do a
survey of what's broken
and then we'll tell you
the most important things.
Oh, there's a lack of
trust at XYZ company.
Well, that was the average take.
But if Bezos walks into a
bar, the average net worth
is $100 million.
But that's not true.
That's not what's really
going on in the bar.
What's really
going on in the bar
is there's a rich guy and
a bunch of poor people.
So we have to
recognize that when
we start to talk about averages
and we talk about us all being
in the same stage,
that we're doing change
like the organization
is a watch,
we're going to find
ourselves frustrated.
And so what we do
instead is we change how
we change to a different model.
And that model looks
more like this.
It is teaching teams at
every level, at every shape--
I don't care whether
you're flat or hierarchical
or whatever you are--
to do this looping process.
And this looping process is
about taking back ownership
of our way of working.
It's about saying, the way
we work as teams is something
that we care about, that we
think about, that we nurture.
It is our second job.
Our first job is
to do what we do.
Our second job is
to be org designers
and to shape the way we do it.
And that's always going on.
So it starts with
identifying, well,
what are the tensions you hold?
And the question I always
ask teams when I start out
with them is, what's
stopping you from doing
the best work of your life?
That's the bar for me.
What's stopping you from doing
the best work of your life?
Because if you're not
doing it, life is short.
What are we doing here?
And so then they'll say,
oh, we have meetings
to prepare for meetings, Aaron.
And it's nonsense.
Or, we have way too many emails.
Or, we have a lack of trust.
Or, we can't make
decisions quickly.
Or, my boss talks nonstop and
I never get a word in edgewise.
Or, we're not diverse enough.
Or, fill in the blank.
There are hundreds of
things that you can hear.
They're all fine.
Whatever is true for the
team is true for the team.
And instead of saying, what's
the tension for the org, which
is not a real
thing, we say, what
are the tensions for the
teams inside the org?
What is true?
And if there are things that
are present as patterns,
then that's cool to find out.
But let's find that out
by talking to the system.
So I have these tension
and practice cards
with tensions on them.
Routinely, I will
get a leadership team
of 40 or 50 top execs in a room.
And I will have them choose
the tensions that they think
are most present for
the organization--
the top five, let's say,
out of a list of 78.
But I'll do it in three groups.
And then I'll have
them come together
and share with each
of the three groups
that the very top of the
house thought was going on.
And they are routinely
wildly different.
And that is the
moment when I can say,
yeah, there's no one
true thing going on here.
You're right, and you're right.
But now what are you
going to do about it?
So we find our tensions.
We pick the ones that are
most present and alive for us.
Then we explore practices.
What are alternative ways
of solving this problem?
What are the
roundabout solutions?
Maybe we invent some.
Maybe we borrow some.
Maybe we go on a
field trip and talk
to some of these
other organizations
and see what they've learned.
But the idea is we got to go
figure it out for ourselves.
And then finally, let's
design an experiment.
So let's say we decide to
try something different.
Maybe one of our
problems is that we
don't do a good job of
hearing everyone's voice.
And we've learned
from a project that
was done in house
here that equal talk
time is one of the best
predictors of team success.
And so we're going to start
meetings with a check-in, where
we just hear everyone's voice.
What's a question we
can all answer that will
get us present in the room?
Really small experiment.
But then we have to decide,
who's going to do it
and for how long?
And how will we
know if it helped?
So a very tightly
defined, constrained,
safe-to-try experiment
that moves us
from here to what Steven Johnson
calls the "adjacent possible."
What's right next door that
we can actually get to?
Because if I come in on
day one and I'm like,
let's blow up the budgeting
process, everybody's like, no.
That's not going to work.
This place will be pandemonium.
But we could get there if
we take some steps that
start to move the momentum
and start to trigger
bigger questions in our heads.
So I started with one leader
at an educational company,
where the first question
in their head was,
how do we make decisions
better and faster?
Super exciting, but
also easy to get at.
It wasn't until
month 12 that they
started asking, what should we
do about resource allocation?
Because it seems awful slow that
we're making these decisions
once a year.
And we were sort of like,
oh, interesting question.
Once the question's there,
there's a space for the answer.
Once you have that
negative space in your head
or the leader has that
negative space in their head,
they're going to go on the
hunt to find the answer.
So designing the
experiment, then we do it.
And then eight weeks
later, we get together.
And we hold a little
retrospective.
Did that help?
Did it hurt?
Is it the same?
Is it different?
What's going on?
When we teach teams to
do this concurrently
and we have experiments alive
in the system about the way
we work, the things that
start to work spread.
So a team figures something
out that really serves them.
They tell other teams about it.
And if we created a system
of trust and autonomy
where things can
spread, where we're
allowed to choose our way
of working, then suddenly
we find that more and more
teams are doing it that way.
And there may even
be moments where
the leadership or the people
at the edge or whoever
start to make bigger
pronouncements.
We're going to do
things this way.
Or we're going to take what
those teams have figured out
and try to scale it.
So this is the model of
continuous participatory change
that we're finding has the
most legs in these systems.
A few quick rules of thumb
or heuristics or principles
that we've figured out along
the way that help while you're
doing this process.
The first is through
them, not to them.
So again, this has
to be happening
in the system in relationship
with participation.
This is not a
PowerPoint document
that's written over the weekend
and foisted upon 10,000 people.
That is not change.
It's not changing how we change.
The second is learn by doing.
So I am so sick of having
debates with people
about what's the right way to
make decisions or the right way
to have a meeting
or the right way
to talk to somebody or the
right way to get feedback.
Just try something
new and then decide.
Did it help?
Did it hurt?
Just do it.
This is my son riding
a balance bike.
Riding a training wheels bike
is not learning to ride a bike.
That is learning to
be in a spin class.
Learning how to ride
a bike is balance.
It is being in
relationship to the bike.
So learn by doing
rather than by arguing.
We're not going to argue our
way to an answer about what
our operating system should be.
Start small.
Big systems are so
addicted to scale.
Because to have
a idea that moves
a billion-dollar system 1%, it
has to be a $10 million idea.
But instead, we
know that systems
change through the progressive
pattern of small things
that spark revolution.
So we actually want to-- instead
of trying to move this boulder,
we want to figure out, how
do we do this with one team,
with two teams, with 10
teams, with one location?
I did one factory last year.
Just figure it out here.
And then let the echo
effect start to unfold.
Start by stopping.
So this is a really good one
in the age of Marie Kondo
and tidying up.
We all are really
good at accumulating.
This is a real client calendar--
45 hours a week of meetings
on average for this exec team.
45 hours a week.
No time for lunch.
So instead of trying to fix that
by adding more stuff to it--
let's add another smart meeting.
Let's add an agile practice.
Let's add, add, add--
we said, let's stop.
Let's stop meeting for two
weeks and see what hurts.
What do you miss when we stop?
When we do that, we learn
things that we couldn't ever
have the space to learn.
So we want to actually take
the time and make the space.
Take 90 minutes at the end of
the week to reflect on the way
we work.
Stop a policy that
doesn't make sense.
You don't have to
have the solution.
Someone's like, well, if we
get rid of our travel policy,
what will we do without
a travel policy?
I don't know.
Let's see what happens.
What if we just didn't have one?
Would it be worse?
Would it be better?
Would we learn something?
Would someone else
propose something
that we wouldn't have
thought of as the leader?
Sometimes it's OK to just
let the negative space create
a pull on our system.
And then finally,
join the resistance.
So it's very easy in
change work to argue
that the person
that's not playing
is a resistor, that they're
a laggard, that they
don't get it, that they need
to get on or off the bus.
And instead, if you engage
those people in curiosity--
not to convince them,
but just to ask,
why isn't this working for you?
Why aren't you engaged in this?
Why wouldn't you
try this new thing?
What about this is
not appealing to you--
they'll tell you stuff
you need to hear.
The incentive system
is not set up for them.
And they have two kids
in private school.
They don't have time
on their calendar
to show up to this
thing because they
have three bosses that
they dotted line to.
And they are back
to back packed.
There's a reason.
People are rational
for the most part.
And they will tell
you what's going on.
And then you can
say, all right, well,
let's design our
way out of that.
So is there something
that we could
co-create that would make
this more accessible for you?
Or you can just take
that and thank them
for the gift of the feedback,
of the clarity about what's
really going on.
So I'll leave you with this.
The high jump was done
this way in the early '60s
and late '60s.
And for those men
in the room, you
can see how precarious this is.
And this was the norm because
the other side of the bar
was, for a long time, just dirt.
So you had to land on your feet.
And this was the way to do it.
But then towards the
latter half of the '60s,
that dirt became foam.
It became padded.
Other options became possible.
Dick Fosbury came along
and obviously went
over backwards and
head first, which
is now quite a famous
story, and not one
that I intend to bore you with.
But what's fascinating about
Dick's story is that after he
won the gold medal
in the '68 Olympics,
the reaction from the
fellow competitors was,
works for Dick, but
won't work for us.
It's great for him.
He's a freak.
But we have these reasons
that we can't do that,
that it won't work for us.
And over time, those
reasons got whittled away.
And now, of course,
only one person
has held the world
record jumping
any way different than
this for the last 50 years.
So what we know
is that people are
going to have that reaction.
Oh, works for Buurtzorg,
won't work for us.
Works for Morning Star,
won't work for us.
Works for Google,
won't work for us.
That's not really
a great excuse.
The way to find out what
will work for you is to jump.
It's uncomfortable.
It's a little nerve wracking.
It feels weird.
But the reality is,
it's pretty safe to try.
And if you constrain where
you do it, how you do it,
and you make sure that the
people that are doing it
are using their judgment, that
they're in the roundabout,
then a lot of things are
possible that we're not
seeing today.
And we just might be able
to unlock our potential
and solve some of the
quite intractable problems
that we face.
We have climate issues.
We have political issues.
We have issues in for-profit
and nonprofit businesses
that are going to require a
different level of performance.
And we're not going
to be able to get that
with what got us here.
So it's really incumbent
that we take the leap.
And that's why I'm so
excited that you all came
to hear this message today.
So thank you so much.
[APPLAUSE]
SPEAKER: We have about
10 minutes for questions.
Does anyone have a question
they'd like to ask?
AUDIENCE: I just
wonder, what's been
your experience of working
with the executives
and getting them all
excited about an idea?
What then happens after that?
Do you continue to
hold their hands?
Or do they go in and implement?
Or do they go in,
and it sort of falls
by the wayside a little bit?
AARON DIGNAN: Yeah, yeah.
So what we have
found is most helpful
is to have at least
some coaching support,
both internally and externally.
So when we get
started, we'll start
by having a red-pill,
blue-pill moment to see,
do we want to go deeper
into the rabbit hole?
And if we have that alignment
and we have the right mindset,
then we might provide
a couple of coaches
into the system to be present
and help the teams that
are looping stay
honest to the loop
and stay honest to themselves.
And then we'll also
find people internally
who are very excited
about this stuff
and maybe have been trying
to agitate this themselves.
And we'll start to bring
them into the fold as coaches
as well so that as
practices bubble up
and we realize, oh,
this is a way of meeting
that really works here.
This is a way of sharing
that really works here.
This is a tool that we're
getting excited about,
they can become knighted
in those things.
And that way, when
we're not needed,
which is hopefully
soon, then there's
still a support
structure in place.
One of the things that's
not often talked about
is most of the cases in the book
have a set of internal people
who are coaches with no
authority, who exist purely
to serve teams at the edge.
So in Buurtzorg, I think there
are 14,000 nurses now out
in their distributed system.
And there are 50
people in corporate.
And of those, like
15 are coaches.
So if a team throws
up a distress signal,
like our numbers
aren't looking good,
or our engagement isn't good,
or we're not feeling right,
or something's off, they
can request a coach come in.
And the coach lobs in with
all that systemic knowledge
and just tries to help.
But again, they
have no authority
to tell that team what to do.
So there's an ecology like
that in most of these systems
that we see in some
way, shape, or form.
SPEAKER: Are there one or
two examples which come
up again and again?
I know, for example,
at Google, we have--
with our corporate credit
cards, anything under $20
you don't need a receipt for.
And that's a really good
example where we are trusted.
And that just eases
through the system.
Do you find examples
similar or other
where it comes up again and
again in large corporations?
AARON DIGNAN: Yeah.
Well, I think to
your point, the thing
that comes up again and
again is the concept
of what WL Gore
calls a waterline.
So the waterline is when
you're sailing a boat.
If you get a hole below the
waterline, everybody dies.
But if you get a hole
above the waterline,
you can patch it when
you get back to shore.
And so what they taught their
people very early on is,
when you're making a decision,
any decision, we trust you.
And think long and hard
about, is this decision
above or below the waterline?
If it's above the waterline,
knock yourself out.
And so for different companies,
that's at different levels.
My company can
only risk so much.
A bigger company might
be able to risk more.
But we know where
our waterline is.
And then if it's below the
waterline, seek advice.
So go to people that
have done it before.
Go to people that will
be affected by it.
And seek advice before
you make that decision.
And then for those
very few decisions
that are really critical, maybe
it's an integrative decision.
So it means that multiple
roles have to consent
to that before they act on it.
So for example, we can't change
the maternity and paternity
policy at my company without
multiple roles consenting.
But someone can spend
$10,000 with advice.
And someone can spend
$1,000 whenever they want.
So there are different
levels of clarity.
And then when you
see decisions being
made that don't align with
maybe what you would do,
there's a question to ask.
A, is it safe to try?
So is the learning that will
occur worth the squeeze?
Because again, if we
just protect everybody
from learning, then
we end up immobilized.
We end up with these
very incapable teams.
It's sort of like
raising a kid where you
don't let them skin their knee.
They'll never be good runners.
You have to let people learn
and bump up against reality.
But you want to do that
in a safe-to-try way.
So you want to find like,
where's that dynamic?
Where's that edge?
So that kind of decision
stack, as I call it,
is present in almost every case.
And there are different
languages for it.
But it's always about,
what's the waterline?
What's the advice process?
What are those decisions that
we reserve for certain roles
or for integrative
groups to make together?
And how do we push as much as
possible above the waterline?
Because obviously, the
more we have there,
the more adaptive and the
more resilient we are.
AUDIENCE: To extend the
metaphor about above the line
and below the line,
it sounds like there's
a presupposed
assumption that everyone
agrees where that line is.
AARON DIGNAN: Correct, yeah.
AUDIENCE: And it also
assumes that everything
is net positive.
And there is nobody that will
lose as a result of the change.
So how do you
navigate situations
where there's perceived
headcount losses or perceived
political influence losses that
one person will lose if you
make the change to the system?
AARON DIGNAN: Yeah.
Great question.
So a couple of things.
One, it's very true
that the waterline
is in different places
for different people.
So based on their own
comfort, their own experience,
the roles that they hold--
I mean, certainly as the
founder of my company,
I feel like my waterline
is higher than other people
just because I'm
like, I don't know.
I just feel a sense of
ownership that I can do more
than maybe someone else does.
That doesn't mean
that I wouldn't allow
them to do the same thing.
But they may not
allow themselves.
So their waterline
is where it is.
So I think that's
absolutely true.
Part of developing a system
with this kind of maturity
is having that dialogue.
So the value of
the advice process
is, if you're even not sure,
just engage some advice
because you'll become a
richer decision maker.
And we'll all benefit from
understanding your situation.
So there's a little
bit of extra work
that goes into it early on
while we build that competency
and that mastery.
And then over time, we
get better and better
at refining where that line
is and also as the situation
changes.
So at the beginning
of this year,
my company changed the
nature of our incorporation.
And to do that, we had
to kind of dump cash
and then re-add it.
There was a month
where we didn't have
a lot of money in the bank.
And it was like,
hey, everybody, flag.
The waterline just moved.
So now we all need
to be aware of that.
And then once it
recovers, we can go back
to our normal attenuation.
So that's the first answer.
The second question was
about, when someone loses,
what does that look like?
And there are two
kinds of losing.
So there's legitimate losses of
power or influence or control.
And then there are
perceived ones.
And I think one of
the big shifts that
happens in these
types of organizations
is changing one kind of
control for another, one
kind of identity for another.
So as a leader, yeah, maybe
I don't have the same number
of headcount underneath me.
Does that actually
make me lesser?
Is the debate worth having?
And the identity of who I am in
the system and how I add value
and what I'm worth may or
may not change based on that.
So there's a little
bit of growing up
that has to happen about
what's really being lost here.
But the other thing is,
when there are real losses--
when someone's going to lose
their job or a bunch of people
are or we're going to change
something that materially
affects what we're doing--
that's probably an
integrative decision.
So we're going to get
consent from multiple roles
that we've entrusted to
hold that type of decision.
And even though not everyone
will agree with that decision,
we've agreed with
who will make it.
So it's possible that we
could make a decision tomorrow
at the ready that eliminates an
entire section of our business.
The people that are in that
section of the business
have consented to
the body that would
make that decision making it.
So it's something that
we're more explicit about.
Where do decision rights live?
And who do we trust?
And a lot of the roles that
hold that kind of power
in systems like
this are elected.
So in hire, at the ready,
in other companies,
often the people that hold
those levels of influence
are elected.
So that they can be trusted to
do what's best for the system
or the collective as a whole.
And for sure, sometimes
what's best for the collective
is not best for the individual.
And there's some real
tension and stress there.
AUDIENCE: I've got a
question about transparency
of remuneration.
You mentioned in one
or two of the companies
that everybody knew
what everybody else was
getting paid.
Is that an obstacle too far?
It feels like a
really strange thing.
I know in Sweden they
publish their salaries
and everybody knows what
everyone's getting paid.
But how divisive
is it not to know
what everybody's getting paid?
AARON DIGNAN: So there's
a few things about it
that are interesting.
One is that in most
cultures, the opacity of pay
leads to bias and
unfairness in comp.
So just on the whole,
it means that people
that are less vocal
or less negotiative
or have a different
background or situation
might end up not being paid
as well as their counterparts.
And there's just a lot
of data to suggest that.
So one of the things it
does is create more fairness
or more equity over time.
But I think the more
interesting thing
is that when we don't know
what people are being paid,
we're missing out on a huge
part of the economic equation
of the business.
So if we're meant to be leaders
and managers and people that
are shaping the decisions we
make and we don't know what
those decisions
cost, we're missing
a huge piece of the puzzle.
And so in terms of developing
that entrepreneurial spirit
and that awareness,
it's a big gap.
And so I think there are
a lot of cultures where
it's quite a
sensitive topic, where
it's quite an emotional topic.
But what we've learned
through practice--
and we did first transparent pay
at the ready and then self-set
pay in two progressive years.
And what we've
learned is that it's
the transition that's painful.
Once you're on the other
side and you're really
embedded there, then there's a
different kind of discussion.
But it's actually the transfer
from one thing to another
that's the most dangerous.
So I invite people to
be cautious about that
rather than where they're going.
The how you do it almost matters
more than the doing it itself.
But yeah, on the whole,
I think I definitely
come down on the side of the
benefits outweigh the costs.
But there are stresses
and tensions and costs
and outbursts and
people who realize
unbelievable inequity
has been occurring
and other people
who don't understand
why there's a difference.
But again, I think that's
building the capacity.
So if someone comes
to me and is like,
Aaron, I'm paid half what
this other person is paid
and I think that's
totally unfair,
now we have a chance to
understand something.
Either they're right,
or we're right.
So if they're right, we'll
find out through dialogue
that maybe it is a
little bit unfair
and we can make an
adjustment or they
can if it's a self-set
pay environment.
And if we're right, they're
going to learn something
about what the company values.
So maybe they haven't
sold anything.
And this other person has
sold $2 million of services.
That's why they get
paid twice as much.
And now they realize, oh,
this place values sales.
But they didn't
know that before.
It was just sort of in the soup
of how the important people
judge the other people.
So I think just the transparency
creates those conversations.
SPEAKER: With that,
please join me
in a mass round of
applause for Aaron Dignan.
[APPLAUSE]
AARON DIGNAN: Thank you.
