it's something to see so many young
faces out there like that back
reference to my age and the professor
Perry's åge Hareide
in a way we prove it me come to Stanford
to the young person that think over his
teaching actually I started at Los
Alamos National Laboratory when I was
young his some of the people into the
audience and in 1965 that's
and I've been in the nuclear business
pretty much ever since that time the
first half of my career
essentially were mostly about the Soviet
Union and providing the u.s. against the
second
explain the title to the issue at the
treasured sword you know that's what
Qing Chuang has called their nuclear
program and I'd like to see the day when
the scientific necessary burden so I'm
gonna take you through that as much as I
can but I do know something about focus
but I'm gonna take you through my study
of the history of the North Korean
if they have rightfully happy because
unless we understand them it can't find
a solution let me just ask if I may in
the back can you hear me okay in the
back if you can hear me raise your hand
very good because I can't get much
so the world so this came to money to
review necessary above all inter
adversaries so that's pretty similar and
he absolutely boasted to the fact that
we are here is if decade there are some
ahead of our emissaries so it's no
wonder whether they're leaders of the
most powerful countries say they came to
me but the other lesson
- mykes I thought that would be good
because I've got a lot of photographs
the other lesson that I heard this from
the North Koreans in my visits they said
well there was several leaders of their
countries who didn't have nuclear
weapons and look what happened to saying
most of each that in Serbia he was taken
to the International Court we're not
sure what's gonna happen so these are
lessons that essentially sort of
underscores the why and what Leo Rosten
was also almost exactly one year no
president trucks and so what is a
treasured sword shown you see
so in my lecturers a lot of this so if
you look at nuclear there's three things
that are needed for them they are
supposed to have to have the bottom fuel
material or if you want to make a
hydrogen bomb then do me there is forms
of hydrogen isotopes called deuterium
and for hydrogen bomb
so the needs to be able to bake doesn't
it turns out it's not easy to make the
most a of the curve in nature so you
have to do something for the material
and then second you have to weaponize
and then essentially it means you have
to design you have to build they have to
test whatever went on there to make
things
that you need I think it's not an easy
job and third you have to deliver you
know the crude means the bunker or a van
obviously somebody tells you what they
have you should ask how do you know no
and what sort of confidence do you have
in your accessory the fuel the biofuel
determines how many thoughts you can
have for North Korea weaponization
governs how sophisticated that Arsenal
is in the delivery essentially the
threat they reach so you know how we
know so how do we know what we have
overhead Saturday that used to be just
for the spy agencies
for any place in the world another made
the most-watched place so here's a
collage of the small experiment like
water reactor being constructed over the
years from the time when I first saw it
and November 2010 when the outside was
completed it's still not operating and
because we can't see inside that's
myself in the Atomium laboratory in this
laboratory is I came out of this lack of
training and and so Tony I'm actually
have one of my visits I help there from
Tony a bit by hand in a glass jar a
glass jar so they obviously they wanted
me to see so people have been inside
inspectors were inside
a great framework time inspector seven
times he have just Faro's are the first
sex visits and it's enormously helpful
not only to see the facilities but the
more important part is easy to talk to
the technical people get an assessment
get an understanding and I have the
chance
so this centrifuges decidedly showed me
this modern centrifuge facility quite
frankly it was my body I just I do they
have they had centrifuges but I did not
expect there's one additional aspect of
why we know again they want the world to
know some things so they show kitchen
and the kitchen you know before him at
their various facilities even at the
missile site or in this case this is a
machine that you need to make the
components with centrifuges wrong so
he's there
something about in the Iranian
engagement okay so that's where uranium
or plutonium also similar assessments
for the hydrogen isotopes so what about
the weaponization they've taken me
through those facilities with the
dippity-do mania but of course they have
not showed me their bond directly done
six nuclear tests underground the most
part contained and one of the ground
chicks then you know that they've been
device works and except for the first
one which didn't work so well the other
ones didn't work then again for the
world to know they actually showed this
photograph for what they said was one of
them miniaturize nuclear devices we
don't know other photographs they also
showing missiles which could you could
fit this device into the missile so the
message is we've got a device and
smuggling into the missile and you've
got a pea-pickin so with the nuclear
test that's what we learn in most
organizations so here the first three
2013 just for reference count axes
thousands of tons of highly explosive
the witch was just incredibly
destructive nuclear weapons are that
destruction was caused by one by one
point one and they're easily as it comes
from nuclear physics that when you tap
the energy of the nucleus that is the
nuclear power Lincoln billions of times
the energy density the power that you
get let's say from high explosives of
burning fossil fuels so it is normally
over the whole development especially
the last three or four years with
missile tests those missiles fire them
survive so just to summarize of work I
think North Korea is today and again
it's great uncertainty so in terms of
atonium I say 30 to 40 kilograms let's
say it takes five or six kilograms for
one bottle so you get an idea highly
enriched uranium there is my read those
centrifuge for some reasons you can hide
up any place we just don't know and so
that's the best telegrams retiring
midstream it's not quite as long the
tritium divergent fuel
so total nuclear devices as of the end
of 1718 25 to 30 is like that festival
so today they'd have five with six more
possibly they have the material for some
people say unfortunately my conclusion
today is they most likely can put a
nuclear warhead in at no time or sky and
delivery and that means that today all
of South Korea and Japan are within
range
my assessment is even though it came to
one said you can reach all of United
States so actually very very mystic he
stopped short because there's Australian
every style
Okay now I'm gonna take you through it and I realize this might be difficult.
And, you know, professors do these crazy things.
Showing you things that you can't read, but
you'll get the idea of what I'm trying to do. Because eventually
I'm gonna show ya, I'm gonna use colors.
And this... by the way... I'll show the Stanford website here...
You can all look it up, it's there on the website. You can stop it, you can read it...
My colleagues and I at our department and our assistants [INAUDIBLE] did this study
where we looked at the evolution of the North Korean nuclear program from 1992 to 2017.
We looked at diplomatic initiatives like U.S.
diplomacy with North Korea we separate the diplomacy.
With the presence of Americans [INAUDIBLE] in Pyongyang
because it turns out that's very important.
So then I turned to: "Alright, how much plutonium...
what about uranium, what about the hydrogen isotopes
what about weaponization let's summarize
the nuke status and the missiles.
And so we tracked our whole age group, and...
since I like to say people in Washington don't read...
then, we show this in color, you know, for each of those boxes. You can go to our website and we have a page
or so of details of what happened that year. But then we summarize it with a colour.
With three shades of green, and three shades of red.
The darker the green the better, green is good...
and better from a U.S. standpoint.
The darker the red, the worse.
So that's, that's what I'm gonna take you through.
So what I'll take you through first, that is... I'm gonna do it by American administrations.
Meaning American presidents.
So this is the very top years, the [INAUDIBLE] of George W. Bush.
And then the next thing Bill Clinton here and as you see on the diplomacy side these are
green mostly because, actually of dark...
the darkest green. For those who have
color problems and seeing... We put R1 or G2 or G1 in here so you can actually read it. Again if you look at the website you can read it.
But I'm trying to get is the big picture across.
So what this tells you is during Clinton time there was diplomacy, there was engagement...
And as far as plutonium goes is they actually stopped their plutonium program. And in fact they
actually rolled it back significantly
during the time of that agreed framework.
That time was not without problems
because that's how we got the pairing
process because the North Koreans tried to launch a space rocket.
But they saw them diplomatically, and so things were green.
But then, also, you know, we know now
if we look at uranium enrichment,
they were doing R&D, research and development.
And then they started to get more serious about uranium enrichment.
So they were already doing some of the uranium enrichment while they were behaving on the plutonium front.
And then as far as weaponization, that is, thinking about or designing nuclear weapons,
they did that in the 1980s, already,
and they didn't send the designers home! And so... but, it wasn't dangerous, it's pink, you know, it's R1.
And as then far as the nuke summary, well we had some problems here maybe in the 90s,
we weren't sure exactly where they're going.
But then things turned good, because they turned off the plutonium and didn't make highly enriched uranium yet.
And then the missiles, they've been doing missiles since the sixties, but, they didn't get very far.
And then actually, here, they did a moratorium, as a result of the pairing process.
If you had a look at that, and you say "Alright, this is where we were...
in 2000, there was actually the October joint-communique, which was probably the high-point of U.S.
and North Korean relations." And the Clinton administration thought they were almost there. They knew
the North Koreans were covertly at least examining uranium enrichment,
but they decided, let's not kill this agreed framework, and keep an eye on this.
Well what happens, ah... What happens is we have new administration come in.
And so again, if you can at least see the colors, that, over here. The Bush administration comes in
and immediately turns the diplomacy red. In other words, they turn it off.
They said the agreed framework was the worst deal ever made,
and they were intent to walk away from it.
They North Koreans at that point, they didn't figure out yet what's going on!
They were expecting good things to happen,
and it didn't. But then, with the Jim Kelly visit
for those of you who are familiar with North Korea timelines, that was around here...
Then finally the North Koreans said "All right, we're outta here." and they withdrew from the nuclear non-probation period.
And they went and reprocessed the plutonium, that went beet red.
The threw the inspectors out, they kept the uranium enrichment going.
Still didn't get very far because it takes a long time to really make that work.
The missile moratorium they kept for a few years, then went on. So, after that red... and also you know there
know there was the September 19 2005
was the September 19th, 2005 agreement, which again North Korea thought they were almost there... But the U.S.
slapped sanctions on them; North Koreans walked away from that. And then they tested.
So this mushroom cloud was their first test. That change everything! Because once
you test the nuclear weapon,  you know, you've demonstrated that you want a nuclear device. So then the Bush administration actually started going green.
In 2007, 2008 for those of you who know,
that's when Chris Hill was doing the beef with North Korea...
Ah... And North Korea was somewhat cooperative.
They actually went backwards in some of these things, but never gave it up, never gave it up.
So then come President Obama, in 2009.
That-a-way. From 2004 I was there every year, and I had discussions with the North Koreans.
And so I also got their sense of why they're doing what they're doing.
And when I was there in February of 2009 and they said "We're gonna do another space launch."
And I said "Why would you want to do that? We got... President Obama said "I will reach out my hand if you will unclench your fist."
And you're gonna hit him right between the eyes!" And they just said "That's the way it is, and you
don't know how much worse it's going to
get." So my own view is that in 2008 when Kim Jong-il
had a stroke that changed everything
from their standpoint so the North
Koreans then, here, were actually determined that they are going to go ahead and proceed with their nuclear weapons program.
And they did. And President Obama,the way that I would put it the Obama administration, never fully recovered from that.
And so, they tried a few times with some agreements, the North Koreans would knock 'em
back had a few greens where they had diplomacy. But for the most part you can see
how things just got more, and deeper red, more nuclear tests, and then comes President Trump.
And probably some of you can't see this, but just, if you can't see it: it's all red in 2017.
So for 2018 we'll wait!
So, that's what I wanted you to see! And so the question is:
How could this happen? Right?
This was, presumably, a backward country.
It was sanctioned around the world.
How did this country develop that capability over the years?
And that's what we need to think about. I'm not sure I have the answer,
but let me give you my opinions.
So first is, if you look at this: The Kims were determined.
From Kim Il-sung, to Kim Jong-il, to Kim Jong-un.
They were determined. And if you look at some of these columns,
they kept them in the red, they never went all the way out.
They went back in the green in some of them but then went back to the red again.
And so the way that I interpret that
there were several times when they were looking to diplomacy to see how they were gonna
proceed. But just in case diplomacy
doesn't work out, they had a [INAUDIBLE]. so
they slowed down, went backwards in a
couple of times, but never gave up the
program, and so they were determined.
Let me just show you, sort of, take you
through this quickly. Because what's
important is "What were they determine to
do?" So they would determined in my
opinion to have a nuclear deterrent. Okay so "Why do you want a nuclear deterrent?" To make sure you keep the United States out.
So what was their deterrent? Well, I'm going to show you how it evolved, and that is... Here in 2004
when I was first there, that's myself by the reactor,  [INAUDIBLE] the plutonium processing laboratory... It is... They actually told me
when they showed me the plutonium, they said "Dr. Hecker now you've seen our deterrent."
And remember the three things we need? For a nuclear... So I said "Well, no you don't have a deterrent, showing me the plutonium, but you don't have a deterrent."
But that's the message they want across.
So at that time it was enough for them to send the Americans the message. Dr. Hecker is gonna tell you guys
that we know how to make the plutonium. And that should give you enough cause to stay out of here.
But, as time went on, that didn't work enough. So finally in
2006, they test it. And so they're gonna show
the Americans we can actually make the ground shake.
And here I am, with Director Lee [INAUDIBLE], and he told me, you know, we got our first nuclear test, we're filled with pride. It worked.
And I told him "It doesn't look like it worked that well, because the ground barely shook."
But then one of the generals actually said "Well, of all people, you Dr. Hecker should know, it's more difficult to build a small bomb
than a big bomb." And I said "It's also very easy to have"
the thing go off small when the
big one doesn't work."
But, uhh, and by the way the North Koreans had quite a sense of humor through this.
Then they were getting across the message in 2010 with these centrifuges
"We now have both paths to the bomb, and you'll never know how much uranium we have because you can't find it."
Then, in 2016, they started firing missiles left and right.
And here, a couple of No Dongs launched from a highway.
And that means, they aren't going to be able to find the launchpad.
And then, they actually showed this thing along with the missiles.
To say "We can miniaturize the delivery." So, now
by this time they actually say "The deterrent is our ability to reach South Korea and Japan." So you have the attention.
And then even more, since we started talking about missile defense,
saying "We can launch four at once! And you're gonna have trouble with missile defense so we still have the attention."
Then they launch one from under the sea, submarine launch.
And Kim Jong-un said "We will launch from anywhere, at anytime."
Again these are all great visual effects. I'm not worried about their submarine launch nuclear weapons, they haven't got anywhere close to that yet.
But they're demonstrating to us that [INAUDIBLE].
Then the Hwasong-14, the first two ICBMs... Then they show this thing!
In September of 2017 which
they said this was their hydrogen bomb.
And if it was over 200 kilotons, it was likely their hydrogen bomb.
And there's actually, Director Lee [INAUDIBLE] showing this to Kim Jong-un.
And then the big one, the Hwasong 15.
So I wanted to show you that, that was their own evolution because then they
finally saw that it takes more and more for us to demonstrate to the Americans
that deterrent. So they wanted to
get all the way to having an ICBM and to having a
hydrogen bond and telling the United
States "We can reach you." Again, I don't believe they can reach us, but they deter us.
Because a nuclear explosion in South
Korea or Japan is a disaster not only for South Korean or Japan
it's a disaster for the United States, it's a disaster for the world.
Okay, so, next thing is import/export. Again, what we do in our study, we actually look at how they imported over the years, how they exported over the years.
These big reds are the... North Korea did some really terrible things with Libya, and with Syria.
They built Syria a reactor. They haven't been exporting as much because it's become more difficult and I
think also they have a little more sense. Importing they've done all along.
But, the most important part of this is: most of what they did was
indigenous! They didn't just get this
from somebody, they have their own nuclear weapons program.
They designed their nuclear weapons, they tested their nuclear weapons.
And so, they're past that part, they're efficient.
Then, here's one part where I criticize, sort of, U.S.
approaches, and it's not of one US
administration, again
I don't do politics, you know? I'll be very... I'm just a scientist. I can't do politics.
But, I look at risk! And, as I look, at what the U.S. did
here and I told you already in 2000.
New administration comes in, and it makes this decision
because North Koreans were developing uranium enrichment
we're gonna kill the plutonium program. What happened? Then they developed and tested the bombs.
So that's a poor risk decision.
They weren't anywhere close yet with
uranium enrichment! So you gave up... you know... You stopped the program because you were worried that in 10 years
time they may be able to do uranium enrichment. North Koreans withdraw from that [INAUDIBLE]
agreement and built a bomb in six
months. So that's a poor decision.
So, that was from Bush.
So here you have, for those of you aficionados the so-call "Leap Day Agreement."
In the Obama administration, February 29th, 2012. Just after Kim Jong-un got into power, and started doing his father,
that is the negotiations and the North Koreans said "All right, look, here we are, we've done two nuclear tests
we've got plutonium, we're making... They didn't say anything yet about uranium enrichment, they were still hiding this until 2010.
But now they said they had enrichment,
and we're gonna stop plutonium, we're gonna let you into the enrichment facility
we're not gonna do any more nuclear
tests and we're not going to any more
missile tests. What we want in return, as
you stop, you must have policy and we need some [INAUDIBLE].
And they more or less had a deal, although if you read the actual paperwork they didn't really have an exact agreement
because the North Koreans said "But we can still do space launches" and the Americans said "No, we'll consider that a missle launch."
But the North Koreans did a space launch, and the Obama administration walked away from that agreement.
Again if you use this chart, and say "This was not a good risk decision" because things ran really dark red.
Then in 2015 Kim Jong-un makes another proposal: "We'll do a moratorium on nuclear testing, if you don't do your military exercises."
It was dismissed immediately. Then after 2015 they do two more... three more nuclear tests.
So it does not... It isn't clear that if those programs would have gone through the North Koreans would have gone backwards for good.
However, it would not go to this kinda [INAUDIBLE].
Okay... Relying on sanctions and they get stronger and stronger and stronger and then in 2017 they go into red.
So you can tell, if you believe in sanctions rolling back your nuclear program, then the nuclear part would turn green.
But it turned dark red. So there is no correlation, not through 2017 between sanctions and their nuclear program.
So you would at least think well there should be a correlation
between sanctions and the North Korean economy.
You know, we've squeezed the daylights out of 'em. Yep, as it turns out, that's also not true because as we look at the North Korean economy
of course it was in dire straits in the 1990s, and then it got better.
The sanctions got worse and the economy got better.
So there's not even a one-to-one correlation with sanctions and economy, and not with the nuclear program.
So we relied on sanctions, and it didn't work so far! 2018 may be a little different, but it certainly hasn't worked so far.
South Korea! So we also... and by the way, for all of these I asked other experts to give the input. So asked other experts about North / South relations, compared to U.S. diplomacy.
And so, here's what we found.
Here's North / South relations, you can see some green, some pink, some red...
You can associate that with your own administrations and governments.
And for the most part, the conclusion is:
We're not aligned! We're out of phase. If we're gonna be effective with North Korea
we should be much more in phase as to what we do together, as to whether we
engage, or we don't engage. Okay, in the U.S. one of the most popular
things was saying "Oh, let China do it!" You know
China doesn't do the sanctions, doesn't do the sanctions enough
so we looked at North / China relations, and so that's this column right here. Again what you'll find is there's no good
correlation between North / China relations and the North Korean nuclear weapons program.
So China has much less influence. Then we went pretty dark red and you also have the North Korean economy. You know China went pretty dark here, and the North
Korean economy still got better so it's
not as simple as "Let China do it."
So what I'm trying to show to you, and I know you have difficulty reading the details of
this but I hope you get the idea, of the flow of the colors. That's the sort of analysis that I believe that one needs to do in
order to actually make assessments as to what worked and what didn't work. So here we are, and the point I want to make, 2017 was a very
dangerous year.
You know, the President Trump quote, and then Kim Jong-un came back and said, you know, "The nuclear
button is on his desk." And of course, President Trump came back and said "My nuclear button is bigger" you know that doesn't help much.
so you know he needed up to you but I
hope I gotta cost me
what happened was amazing this doesn't
look like a 70 year
it doesn't mean hopefully amazing we had
this so the unfort that I was
recommending while it turns out we hit
the big time singing Bru instead of
Kenya and don't decide yeah you know
sing important information and then I
must say is also she choose any three
meetings laughter was there from Russia
and I'm sure he's not
the outside - Kim so American kids happy
is what happened this is when my man
came back so-called empty-handed
it was
it's like Peninsula you know the
pessimist of surrender will do DPRK just
continues to buy and you know maybe we
just we still need regime change and
better we just to give you wish you know
not the worst thing because I'm a
worried about the nuclear weapons in
kitchen one's hands but what I'd really
be worried about is a nuclear weapons
out of King John has hands so then there
are skeptics
focus on managing the sale or create the
conditions but then to consider leave an
address
those conditions do not exist now and so
therefore this is gonna focus is on
demonization but they are certainly
excited since it's just so here's
actually
in the
my recommendation is take steps so I've
got three steps one is first thing is
pop just as we say the United States
when you're not hole stop digging so
don't make it worse
second one is well back then the third
Venturi's eliminating
building up the trust this is important
you cannot test ICBMs you know why we're
in the process of site but then things
like space launches initially during the
initial negotiations you don't want to
have the replay agreement again that
their rocket launched at this residence
I don't watch anything for now but
eventually maybe in space and then
actually forwards
because that's what
or testicles that somebody
because of the space so we stick
together one way to speed this process
up recommended you
it's actually the same look will not
only consider those things we're gonna
encourage you to do that but only if we
do it together and that is us in South
Korea comes it works with 50 people
converted military to civilian comfort
missile program to space chain just the
whole game
is Kim jong-un seriously
I said I don't know but as I look at his
declarations about the economy sounds
very serious in my advice would be so
let's find out let's find out okay
seriously with the space so that and
actually the hope lately enjoy because
when the boys and the girls were out
there playing soccer that's painted you
know six seven eight years old and it
just reminded me I have nothing I was a
happy kid I saw those kids they look
just like me and I thought you know they
deserve a better life so right then I
saw this most remarkable thing in 2006 I
was actually Miss Utley coming out of
this subway
so I saw this young man and he was
wearing a backwards Nike swoosh this is
young young 2006 so yeah and both his
Lena this young man's might be 21 years
old now and he's up there somewhere
he wore that baseball cap back stories
then he might be
