 
### Hoping For Better Swindlers' Seats

U.S. National Campaign Promoting Iranian Nuclear Weapons Capacity

Jean-Marc LeBouquin

Copyright © May 15, 2019 Jean-Marc LeBouquin – illustration under same copyright.

Smashwords Edition, License Notes:

This ebook is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This book may not be re-sold or given away to other people. If you would like to share this book with another person, please purchase an additional copy for each recipient. If you're reading this book and did not purchase it, or it was not purchased for your use only, then please return to your favorite ebook retailer and purchase your own copy. Thank you for your very kind regard.

# Table of Contents

### Hoping for Better Swindlers' Seats

Preface – On Spinning and Sifting

Chapter 1 – 2020 Democratic Party Platform on Iran – (First Paragraph)

Chapter 2 – Treaties to be Violated – A Party Playbook Objective (Examination of Paragraph 2 of the Party Platform on Iran)

Chapter 3 – Implausibity and a Lack of Incentive

Chapter 4 – [Before Moving on, Let's not Forget North Korea; (or)  
– Blackmail Circuit Encirclement](tmp_122a9b87379b6c892e77fe2ef9c92df2_R_BZ5g.ch.fixed.fc.tidied.stylehacked.xfixed_split_006.html#A_04)

Chapter 5 – What Passes for Representative Government in the U.S. Today

Chapter 6 – Holding One's Breath Waiting for Trump

Chapter 7 – Appendix 1 – How (why) the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was renamed "S/2015/546

Chapter 8 – Appendix 2 – IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a. and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2.

Chapter 9 – Appendix 3 – Compounding the felony by bundling control over nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets

Chapter 10 – Appendix 4 – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 Inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

Chapter 11 – Appendix 5 – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause

Chapter 12 – Appendix 6 – Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

Chapter 13 – Appendix 7 – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"

Chapter 14 – Appendix 8 – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress"

Chapter 15 – Appendix 9 – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

Chapter 16 – Appendix 10 – The Vote Adopting Resolution 2231

Preface ;

On Spinning and Sifting

The reader may note that I do not spend any time criticizing IAEA inspections of uranium enrichment by means of the use of centrifuges, as is being done in Iran. This is partially because IAEA inspection in this area are actually pretty robust; although with some experts arguing that there are some porous areas in the inspection regime – overall the consensus is that it's pretty good.

But inspections of centrifuges at work is immaterial to the ongoing international sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated inventories, support services and technical data – all in violation of treaty; which are described in this book, and to which Iran could never have had access were it not for the Obama administration's "Iran nuclear agreement" – Security Council Resolution 2231.

Also, Iran does not need to enrich uranium beyond the point needed to fuel a nuclear reactor in order to produce a nuclear warhead.

As of 18 October 2030 (15 years after JCPOA "Adoption Day" – which was 18 October 2015); Iran is no longer forbidden to acquire highly enriched uranium and plutonium;

And is no longer forbidden to cast or form any of this material into configurations applicable for use in setting off a chain reactions in a nuclear warhead (probably it would be an implosion style nuclear warhead that would be most appealing to develop).

The above provision is set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; _Annex A: JCPOA_ : JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A : JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures:

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.

25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years.

After 15 years Iran is no longer prohibited from seeking or buying (acquiring) the above material and;

After 15 years Iran is no long prohibited from working with these materials in the manner which it chooses. There is no provision in the above of any requirement that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspect such Iranian activities with a view to verifying that these activities do not entail the materials being diverted for use in the development of a nuclear explosive device,

Given the ongoing sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated goods, support services, and technical data, such as " _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories_ ," with approvals for these sales having begun in late November 2016; given the various concessions allowing to engage in: " _Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ ;" and prohibitions on IAEA inspections in certain sensitive, vital areas – all of this in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), and all of which will be examined in this writing.

Given these factors; Obama's "Iran nuclear deal," United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, defines itself as a program designed to assist the Iranian Government in achieving nuclear weapons capacity while evading detection and avoiding inspection; this with the with the assistance of the Great Weapons Development and Manufacturing Powers – the U.S., Russia, China, France the U.K., and Germany.

It cannot be construed to be, as the Democratic Party election campaign platform contrives to and does characterize it:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because, as it is vigorously enforced and implemented, it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb...

As a program designed to assist the Iranian Government in achieving nuclear weapons capacity, Resolution 2231 is naturally attractive to those speculative financial or weapons manufacturing entities which would enthusiastically join in on the opportunity to reap handsome profit from investing energies om engaging this enterprise of contraband weapons racketeering in favor of the weapons ambitions of Iran

The Democratic Party is evidently aware of this and has eagerly pursued a specious, false promotional campaign for some four years now pretending that the very serious menacing provisions of Resolution 2231 don't exist and aren't ongoing in the process of being implemented.

The Democratic Party machine can't tell the truth of the matter – that they support and the weapons build up in Iran provided for and ensuing from Resolution 2231; and that U.S. involvement in the contraband arms racketeering swindle provided for in Rresolution 2231 could result in some serious profits for their friends – _the few, the elite, the privileged_ ; even if U.S. endorsement of, and involvement in the matter is a detriment to the existential safety and security of the American People.

The entire population of the national level Democratic Party populating the 115th Congress has willingly converted themselves into professional habitual liars compelled by the Party Line to uphold this fabrication that the "nuclear agreement with Iran" was ever intended to verifiably cut off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb;

And the Democratic Party has shined up a slew of its most exemplary debauched politicians as presidential candidates to carry the pernicious Democratic Party message of persistent deceit all the way to the White House should the Party be able to hold the attention and credulity of enough voters up until early November 2020.

These are candidates who have nothing positive or constructive to offer; and so submit to the public infantile lies and phony promises instead. The lies are the more infantile in that many of the Citizens already know the Democratic Party Line is a complete scam. The collective of Democratic candidate hopefuls show themselves in whole as entirely lacking in integrity; and incapable of coming up with an approach other than to continuously attempt to mislead the public in order to get their way.

And we are somehow expected to believe that any one of this bunch of inept, out of ideas personalities would have the capability to in any way run this country, except into further danger.

And so, insisting that Obama's 'Iran nuclear agreement is other than it is,' the current Democratic Party candidates have at least implied their intention that the U.S. should rejoin on some level in cooperating with the other Great Weapons producing powers in their adherence to the protocols of the Security Council resolution.

The Democratic Party wants back in on this international program assisting in building the weapons arsenals of Iran.

The Democratic Party is obviously confident that it can continue to try and fool as many U.S. Citizens as it can;

But the Democratic Party cannot fool the Sunni Arab Governments of the Middle East who have long since understood the nature of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 and know it to be an instrument highly prejudiced against them.

The Sunni Governments are necessarily aware that there is a strong political movement in the United States in favor of siding with Iran against them in assisting Iran with its ambitious development of nuclear weapons capacity; to the detriment of the entire region and in unthinkable violation of treaty.

Given the lagging infidelity of the U.S. Democratic Party, the United States cannot be reasonably be thought of as an honest, impartial broker in the Middle East.

There is only one honest and impartial broker in the Middle East – and she is not to be found amongst the duplicitous and conflicted international leaderships Party to the "Iran nuclear agreement." She is to be found in the law – and in the discovery truth in Trial under the Law.

The only honest broker is to be discovered in the venue of the International Court of Justice. And the only avenue towards peace and remedy is to be, as well, found there.

I submit that we Citizens should choose to elect the path of peace. We should not follow the Democratic Candidate's Hounds of War into the White House.

We Citizens must take it upon ourselves, as is our right, to stridently demand that President Donald Trump organize petition to the Court (hopefully along with an international coalition allied to this objective) opposing that extraordinarily menacing affront to international law and security, concocted and instigated by the frivolous, self-serving Obama Administration.

Only the Court has the Authority to put a stop to the unrestrained arms profiteering enterprise; to sternly rebuke the five permanent Member States of the Security Council; and to order things back into place and adjudge the indemnities it sees fit.

* * * * *

Proceeding to the details of the examination...
Hoping for Better Swindlers' Seats

– Chapter 1 –  
2020 Democratic Party Platform on Iran – (First Paragraph)

The political clique controlling the national level United States Democratic Party presented to the public, in early 2019, what this group desired the voting public to know about the current Democratic Party's guiding ideology.

The Democratic Party submitted for public review this following political platform which it evidently hopes will lead to a successful electoral victory resulting in the Democrats regaining control of the Presidency in 2020. The partisan platform concerning the stance on Iran is contained in two paragraphs, the first of which follows directly:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because, as it is vigorously enforced and implemented, it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without resorting to war. We reject Donald Trump's view that we should have walked away from a deal that peacefully dismantles Iran's nuclear program...

That Democratic Party platform characterization of the "nuclear agreement with Iran," which had been arranged between previous messianic Democratic Party President Barack Obama and the Ministers of the Government of Iran; discounts and avoids mention of any of the documented well-known facts. Barack Obama's "Iran nuclear deal," officially registered as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), provides for and implements these following:

**Resolution 2231** established a " **Procurement Working Group** " bureaucracy with a mandate to facilitate, expedite and approve sales to Iran of procurement packages bundling nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets in violation of treaty.

The bundling of this contraband weapons class inventory for sale to Iran is not scheduled to begin at some far date in the future; but has theoretically been allowed since 16 January 2016, with the first approvals of sales going through in late November 2016.

The number of sales, since that time is known; the content of the sales is unknown – especially by those Democratic Candidates vying to regain control of the White House in 2020, and who vie to return the U.S. to participate once again in the weapons contraband sales market dedicated to serve the ambitions of the Iranian Government.

The contents of the sales are guarded by an official secrecy agreement [Appendix 6– Chapter 12: _Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories_ []]; so the specific contents of the packages sold Iran aren't known – only that these, by definition, are being sold in violation of international treaty; specifically the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , or Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty.

In the following advertisement the Procurement Working Group, with its mandate, has been carrying on a promotional sales campaign since somewhere in early 2016, which openly seeks out vendors world-wide to present sales proposals offering such wares:

Information on the Procurement Channel

B. Further questions and answers

18. Can a proposal include items which are set out in _S/2015/546_ as well as in _INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part_ _1_ or _INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2?_

A proposal may include items which fall both under _S/2015/546_ , as well as one of the _INFCIRC_ s. Such a proposal should be submitted for review as an activity falling under Paragraph 2 of Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council will decide on such proposals based on a recommendation of the Joint Commission.

That paragraph is found in the United Nations issued document " _Information on the Procurement Channel_ " which is recovered from the United Nations website page: **http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml**

The page directly accessing the document in question (English Version) is: **https://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/Information%20note_EN.pdf**

It is by now well-known to vendors world-wide; that the alpha-numeric code referred to above; " _S/2015/546_ " refers to the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_. [Appendix 1 – Chapter 7: _How (why) the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was renamed by some "S/2015/546_ ; explains how this code name came into existence; []].

The INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2; lately updated as INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 is the IAEA list of nuclear weapons associated inventories which the IAEA warns should not be transferred: "... _when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons_." [Appendix 2 _–_ Chapter 8: _IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2;_ presents the notification [].]

**Sales of procurement packages** , intended for any State; those which bundle nuclear weapons assets and ballistic missile delivery systems, are in direct violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , better known as the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty or the NPT. [Appendix 3 – Chapter 9: _Compounding the felony by bundling control over nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets;_ explains the origins and intent of this aspect of the NPT. []].

**As Resolution 2231** provides sales to Iran of Items listed on the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 lists; these sales can include "Technical Data" such as: " _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories_." [Appendix 4 – Chapter 10: _Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2aand INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)_ ; furnishes an excerpt from the list as sample [].] Blueprints etc., are found under the heading "Technical Data."

**Naturally** Security Council Resolution 2231 also must assert, for any of this to work to be carried on with; that the Procurement Working Group is mandated and directed to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from carrying out any inspection in with the view towards verifying that these contraband items sold Iran are not being diverted to the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capacity. This prohibition is also in violation of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. There is to be no public accounting for what is transferred to Iran under this program. [Appendix 5 – Chapter 11: _The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause_ [].]

**To ensure that there is no public accountability** for the internationally pledged sales to Iran of Weapons of Mass Destruction capacity, Resolution 2231 imposes a "Secrecy Agreement" which disallows any the of Procurement Working Group, or Party to the private club arrangement from divulging what has been transferred to Iran. Nations not directly involved in the wheeling and dealing cannot know what assets or weapons assets Iran is receiving from States supporting its ambitious build up of arsenals. [Appendix 6– Chapter 12: _Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories_ []]]

**The leaderships of the greatest arms dealing nations on Earth** ; France Russia the U.K. China and Germany, (initially with the United States); have allowed, since 16 January 2016, that Iran begin to engage in " _Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ ," such as experimenting with multipoint explosive systems and other sundry, necessary or useful in the development of nuclear weapons capacity.

Naturally the IAEA is prohibited from reviewing any of this for purpose of verifying that none of this permitted activity is somehow, in some way, not being diverted to the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capacity. [Appendix 7 – Chapter 13: _Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"_ [].]

**The Democratic Party** 2020 election platform, regardless of all of these provision set forth in Barack Obama's "Iran nuclear deal;" the United States political movement in favor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 – insists and maintains that:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because... **it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb** without resorting to war. We reject Donald Trump's view that we should have walked away from a deal that peacefully dismantles Iran's nuclear program...

Of course that above is merely political self-promotion in its lowest form; but it doesn't matter what the shaming cabal refuses to admit to the public, the proof of the documentary evidence far outweighs the shambles of their feeble "cover-up" and their malfeasant; intentional falsehoods. The fabrications that pro-weapons proliferation political movement present to the public – in the face of facts well-known to many in the public, only serve as testimony to and confession of the cheap character and lack of integrity of the would-be pro-weapons purveyors, the clique of politicians which have taken control of the Democratic Party in recent years.

This current pro-weapons proliferation political movement; this current clique of pro-weapons purveying politicians, having taken control of the Democratic Party, stipulates in its insidious political platform message that it supports the Security Council resolution and therefore supports all the ambitious weapons development measures documented; and although the Party Platform doesn't say it outright and no one in cabal is willing to come forth and even discuss what the provisions of Resolution 2231 actually consist of and what these entail.

The indication seems clear that the doctrine of this pro-weapons political movement strongly suggests the Party wants to get back in on the weapons dealing action. There's something further to note in putting position of the pro-weapons proliferation politicians all in context. This following provision of Obama's "Iran nuclear deal," very enticing to those groups in the United States interested in speculating on profits to be made through building up the arsenals of the Government of Iran:

On 18 October 2020 the floodgates are open to sell conventional weaponry to Iran – as provided for in Paragraph 5; Annex B of Resolution 2231:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2231); Annex B.

As provided by a resolution so deciding, the following provisions would apply on the date on which the IAEA Director General submits a report verifying that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA [this means "JCPOA Implementation Day];

5. All States may participate in and permit, provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any **battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems,** as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, and the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in this subparagraph...

This paragraph shall apply until the date five years after the **JCPOA Adoption Day** or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

"JCPOA Adoption Day" occurred on 18 October 2015. Therefore conventional weapons sales to Iran could begin as of 18 October 2020 – just before the U.S. election for the Presidency in early November.

Were it that President Trump would be re-elected to the Presidency this could be exasperating for U.S. arms dealing speculative interests. In withdrawing from the "Iran nuclear deal," Trump had frustrated hopes for the significant weapons profiteering promised by the established Obama administration's deal with the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

With Trump out of the way – arms dealing interests might be able to in some manner successfully induce whoever the next Democratic Party President to make some sustained effort to have the U.S. Government re-enter the deal,

The Democratic Party platform unambiguously declares it supports the Security Council resolution – this while omitting any public mention of the trafficking to Iran of Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities, ballistic missile sales to Iran, and the trafficking in conventional weapons as described in Annex B; paragraph 5 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; and the other things.

This Democratic Party political platform may give United States arms dealing interests substantial hope that the Democratic Party – currently controlled by a political movement and a policy in support of the weapons transactions already underway, exasperatingly being carried out by other nations with U.S. arms dealing interests missing out on any the contraband arms sales profiteering. The Democratic Party platform, and the election of a Democratic Party President at this time; may give hope that another President emerging from this pro-weapons dealing political movement could be very amenable to making a serious attempt to bring the Government of the United States back into the international weapons proliferation club; and so rejoin the ongoing internationally promoted build-up of the arsenals of Iran; with the U.S. participating in hopes of possibly catching up a bit on the gainful prizes in profits which could ensue.

This postulate conducts us to an examination of both the domestic and international illegality of U.S. reentry into the bargain:

* * * * *
– Chapter 2 –  
Treaties to be Violated – A Party Playbook Objective  
(Examination of Paragraph 2 of the Party Platform on Iran)

It was at least domestically illegal for Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" to be entered into in the first place. Obama's arrangement violates at least three fundamental international treaties made under the Authority of the United States:

**The** _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ; or Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT;

**The** _International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism_ , and;

... **The** _I_ _nternational Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings_.

Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution Ordains the following:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article VI - Debts, Supremacy, Oaths

[Clause 2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons little more needs be said. Salient provisions of Security Council Resolution 2231 in violation of Articles I, II; and the prohibitions on IAEA inspections are in violation of Clause 1 of Article III; which declare:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and **not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices**.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to **receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever** of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; **and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...

Allowing the transfer to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets in combination with ballistic missile associated weapons assets; the transfer to Iran of Technical support such as nuclear weapons associated: " _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories_ " [Appendix 4 – Chapter 10 [];

The provision allowing Iran, since 16 January 2016, to engage in " _Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ ," such as experimenting with multipoint explosive systems and other sundry, necessary or useful in the development of nuclear weapons capacity [Appendix 7 – Chapter 13: []]; these are all in egregious violation of Article I of the NPT:

That being noted, we are conducted to an examination of the other two treaties.

* * * * *

In 1998 and 1999 two important treaties were signed for on behalf of the United States by then sitting United States President William J. Clinton.

The _International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism_ defines what is to be considered the financing of terrorism, and discusses deterrence and penalties for such financing. These penalties, in the United States, can be quite severe.

The _International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings_ likewise defines what are considered terrorist bombings, as well as measures of deterrence and penalties associated with these acts.

Having signed for these treaties, President Clinton sent each of these off to the U.S. Senate for its essential Advice and Consent towards ratification of the treaties.

The Senate voted its consent to The Conventions and these were both signed into law by President George W. Bush on June 25, 2002. An overview of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism follows:

* * * * *

What is terrorism, and what are funds? The convention defines funds as:

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;

Article 1

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. Funds means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travelers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.

[ **Tangible assets** are included in the definition of funds under this treaty. Tangible assets are assets that are material objects which can be seen; touched: or bumped into in the dark. Such tangible assets could include ballistic missiles or cruise missiles cloaked with the specialized tangible materials and components and technological devices related to stealth technology. Those are tangible assets;

[A **movable asset** is an asset that can ordinarily be moved from one place to another without losing value or without destroying it. A building is not a moveable asset (generally), it is an immovable object. A ballistic missile or cruise missile capable of carrying a fissile or non-fissile nuclear warhead is a movable tangible asset. It is material, and it (possibly) can be moved without its being destroyed – regardless of whether its ultimate intended purpose is to destroy other things, even living things, while destroying itself in the process.]

Article 2 of the Convention defines Terrorism, terrorist activities:

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;

Article 2

1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:

(b) Any... act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

3. For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) or (b).

4. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article. [Emphasis added]

5. Any person also commits an offence if that person:

(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 4 of this article;

Articles 5 and 6 go on the stipulate:

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;

Article 5

1. Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set forth in article 2. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.

2. Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals having committed the offences.

3. Each State Party shall ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in accordance with paragraph 1 above are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions. Such sanctions may include monetary sanctions.

Article 6

Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.

* * * * *

Following are some highlights from the Preamble to The _International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings_ :

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings

Preamble

The States Parties to this Convention,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of goodneighbourliness and friendly relations and cooperation among States,

Deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,

Noting... that terrorist attacks by means of explosives or other lethal devices have become increasingly widespread,

Noting further that existing multilateral legal provisions do not adequately address these attacks,

Being convinced of the urgent need to enhance international cooperation between States in devising and adopting effective and practical measures for the prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators,

Considering that the occurrence of such acts is a matter of grave concern to the international community as a whole,

Noting that the activities of military forces of States are governed by rules of international law outside the framework of this Convention and that the exclusion of certain actions from the coverage of this Convention does not condone or make lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or preclude prosecution under other laws,

Have agreed as follows: [etc]

Here are some of the articles contained the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings:

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings

Article 2

1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility: '

(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or;

(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss.

2. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.

3. Any person also commits an offence if that person:

(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2; or

(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2; or

(c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned.

Article 5

Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention, in particular where they are intended or calculated to, provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.

As cited previously, The _International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism_ defines terrorism as:

"Any... act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."

* * * * *

The second paragraph of the Democratic Party platform on Iran declares:

Democrats will also address the detrimental role Iran plays in the region and will robustly enforce and, if necessary, strengthen non-nuclear sanctions. Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism. It violates the human rights of its population, denies the Holocaust, vows to eliminate Israel, and has its fingerprints on almost every conflict in the Middle East. Democrats will push back against Iran's destabilizing activities including its support for terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, counter Iran's ballistic missile program...etc.

The duplicitous political partisans which have taken control of the national level Democratic Party assert that they will "push back" and "... _counter Iran's ballistic missile program_..." How does that work? Support for Obama's "Iran nuclear program" means support for the Procurement Working Group sponsored sales to Iran of the documented ballistic missile weapons assets, goods, support services &c. Resolution 2231 provides for. One either supports these sales to Iran, or one opposes them, there is no middle ground. Reviewing Article 2; Clause 3(c) of the _International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings_ :

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings

Article 2

1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility: '

3. Any person also commits an offence if that person:

(c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned.

And the Democratic Party has shown; through a 26 October 2017 vote in the House of Representatives, that it unambiguously supports these sales.

On that date the House of Representatives voted almost unanimously on its bill favoring the sales to Iran of ballistic missile weapons assets:

House Bill HR 1698 made it clear – that if ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services, combined with nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies and support services, this while prohibiting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from verifying that these combined classes of assets are not being diverted to furtherance of the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran;

If such assets were shunted to Iran under the official auspices of the Procurement Working Group – then the 115th House of Representatives was satisfied that there would be no need for any reporting or announcement of any of that sort of thing to Congress.

Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698

SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES.

(e) SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILES.

''(B) ADDITIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGY.—

''(iv) PROCUREMENT WORKING GROUP DEFINED.—In clause (iii)(I), the term 'procurement working group' means the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established under Annex IV of the applicable provisions in Annex A of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698

SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES.

''(I) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of subclauses (I), (II), and (III) of clause (i), and except as provided in subclause (II) of this clause, efforts by the Government of Iran with respect to ballistic missile-related goods, services, and technologies described in this subsection are efforts by the Government of Iran to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, test or use ballistic missiles or associated goods, services, or technology by the Government of Iran, including efforts by the Government of Iran to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, purchase—

''(aa) goods, services, or technology listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of October 8, 2015, and subsequent revisions that have been acquired outside of the Procurement Working Group or not otherwise approved by the United Nations Security Council;

Sub-paragraph (aa) makes clear that Iran is allowed to engage in all the ballistic missile arsenal building; development, manufacture etc.; explained in Paragraph 1 so long as the assets it uses have been acquired through and under the auspices of the Security Council's Procurement Working Group. Otherwise, Iranian engagement in the same activities is considered nefarious and interdicted – and the President must report on that. This is a case of it matters who you buy from. If Iran doesn't buy from those whom the Great Arms Dealing Nations (of the U.S., the U.K., Russia, Germany, France and China) approve of – then Iran might suffer sanctions from the U.S. Otherwise, the 115th Congress is happy to look the other way on the matter.

And we must also remember that ballistic missile associated assets acquired under Procurement Working Group auspices may also be bundled in procurement packages with INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2, nuclear weapons assets.

In reviewing the fact of the provisions of Obama's "Iran nuclear deal," the preposterous notion that Obama's arrangement with the Ministers of the Government of Iran is about keeping Iran from ever achieving nuclear weapons capabilities can't be taken seriously.

Rather, the agreement is more reasonably construed as an operation to put the Great Weapons Manufacturing nations in charge of a monopoly which decides on who gets to sell contraband weapons assets to Iran; and an overall operation designed to profit arms racketeering interests who are willing and able to contribute making sales to Iran, assisting that Government in the building of its Weapons of Mass Destruction capacity.

* * * * *

Only two Republicans opposed the bill; seven were absent on that day – and the Democrats present voted as a unit in favor of these sales. The Bill was sent by the House to the Senate; it was read twice on the floor of the Senate; and the Bill didn't go anywhere after that. It may have been decided in the Senate that President Trump would never sign it; and the Bill could backfire and reveal itself to be a political embarrassment if public argument over it became too conspicuous. And so, HR 1698 was shunted over to be disappeared into Senate Committee never to suffer further discussion or be heard of again.

Nevertheless, HR 1698 was an unambiguous confession as to the political position of both Parties, especially the Democrats on the issue; and the Democratic Party 2020 election campaign platform stridently confirms the intransigence of the Party's pro-nuclear weapons proliferation stance.

The Democratic Party platform's major intended contributions towards furthering the general criminal activity the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings prohibits; is that political movement's open support for those Resolution 2231 provisions encouraging, facilitating and expediting sales of ballistic missile weapons systems to Iran.

The Democratic Party platform concedes that: "... _Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism. It violates the human rights of its population, denies the Holocaust, vows to eliminate Israel, and has its fingerprints on almost every conflict in the Middle East_...;"

Having confessed its conviction that Iran vows to exterminate populations in at least one nearby neighboring State – and despite Iran's ongoing belligerent declarations regarding its intentions; the Democratic Party persists in its determination to have the United States rejoin the other rogue nations in the ongoing project to assist Iran in its Weapons of Mass Destruction development project in violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT).

It doesn't matter that the Democratic Party denies that Resolution 2231 is designed to promote the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran – the documentation shows that is what the Security Council is designed for. The Democratic Party's expected habitual denials are the spearhead of their ongoing misinformation campaign directed against the U.S. Electorate.

The Party platform favoring continued backing of the illegal internationally assisted weapons development project underway in Iran could most reasonably be construed as an inducement, by the Democratic Party, to re-involve the United States Government in the internationally codified War Crime – _Crimes against Peace_ ; the definition of which follows:

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) **Crimes against Peace**. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, **preparation** , initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, **or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing**.

The Democrats tell us:

...Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism. It violates the human rights of its population, denies the Holocaust, vows to eliminate Israel, and has its fingerprints on almost every conflict in the Middle East...

The pro-Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation Democrats admit to their knowledge of the activities and aspirations of the Government of Iran; and they nevertheless support Obama's Security Council Resolution 2231 with its provisions to further the Iranian Government's ambitions to develop its Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities

This perversion of a political movement – the Democratic Party on the national level – can no longer be thought of as some sort of progressive force in U.S. politics. This is a group led by the amoral policies of the, by international definition, War Criminal.

It must be conceded that the potential for contraband weapons profiteering does evidently seem pretty tasty to some powerful interests in the United States; tasty enough to induce United States participation in the common international plan, the conspiracy to assist Iran in its preparations for the pledged waging of war of aggression, extermination; or a _war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances_ ,

The fact that as of 18 October 2020, Iranian markets are opened for sales to and from Iran of conventional weapons systems as previously presented and documented, this fact for many clearly outweighs and takes precedence over international law; international treaty; and the noted prohibitions established in United States Constitution – not to mention basic human decency.

The Democratic Party has produced several 2020 candidates for the Presidency; all of whom affirm their support for Obama's Iran contraband arms dealing scheme – which is United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

Trump's withdrawal from the contraband arms profiteering swindle has frustrated the dreams and aspirations of powerful U.S. arms dealing interests. He (for the benefit of frustrated interests) must be removed from office in 2020; and replaced with a more malleable President sufficiently invested with, and eager to act with the amoral character of the internationally defined War Criminal.

Although the platform doesn't explicitly declare that the Democrats will attempt to re-enter the "deal," it does suggest it; and the word is all around that many of the Democratic Party candidates vying for the Presidency already boast the intention to try and get back in on the wheeling and dealing;

...Which leads us to an examination of the substance of such an attempt.

* * * * *
– Chapter 3 –  
Implausibity and a Lack of Incentive

With the United States out of the deal, and off the Procurement Working Group, the Government of Iran secures a substantial military strategic advantage over the United States in any potential future conflict.

Due to the Procurement Working Group secrecy agreement [Appendix 6 – Chapter 12: []]; the United States military cannot know what weapons assets Iran has procured and has in its possession to develop;

And owing to the prohibition on International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of the procurement packages sold Iran [Appendix 4 – Chapter 10: []]; due inspections of these packages required by treaty, to be done with a view towards verifying that none of these assets are being diverted towards the development of nuclear weapons capacity – on account of that prohibition placed on the IAEA; the United States military cannot ever be sure how far along Iran is in developing its weapons capabilities, nuclear or otherwise.

Iran now certainly has no reason to allow the United States to rejoin and sit on the Procurement Working Group council – things couldn't be working out better with the United States out of the picture; and it seems unlikely that either Russia or China would be in favor of such a move either.

Some Democratic candidates for the 2020 Presidential election have sputtered conceited boasts about how they are going to "renegotiate" Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" with the Iranians. The Iranians have already firmly declared that it won't renegotiate. Aside from which, all the great arms dealing nations remaining Party to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 project seem very happy with this very cozy contraband arms racketing set up – so what's to renegotiate?

Given the politics of the situation; there is the fundamental status of Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" to consider. The "nuclear deal" is a Security Council resolution, not a private arrangement. This fact prevents a minority of private interests making changes to it. In other words, Security Council Resolution 2231 is not a private arrangement which can be privately renegotiated and altered between a few parties:

THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBER STATES of the Security Council formulating the deal with Iran and Germany decided that they wanted the prestige and sponsorship of the United Nations as back-up – that was their choice. So now, if there are any changes to be made, these must be brought to the Security Council.

A Security Council resolution cannot be amended in itself – the Charter of the United Nations does recognize that possibility. A Security Council resolution stands as its own recorded determination.

The only way for a Security Council resolution to be alterable by the main individual Parties to the agreement would have been if a clear process for making changes to the agreement, a process which characterized the nature to the changes that might be decided upon, would have been made available for the entire body of the Security Council to vote on.

Security Council Resolution 2231 does nothing of the sort; in fact it does exactly the opposite. It stipulates that no changes to the resolution will be allowed (see Resolution 2231; Annex A JCPOA; section _SANCTIONS_ ; paragraphs 26 and 37).

Iran had stipulated that it would not accept any changes to the arrangement, and the other Parties agreed; including preeminent Obama's United States.

The _Vienna Convention on the law of treaties_ ; in various clauses of Articles 17; 19; and 20 – clarifies the matter to a large extent:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

* PART II. CONCLUSION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF TREATIES

*SECTION 1 CONCLUSION OF TREATIES.

Article 17. Consent to be bound by part of a treaty and choice of differing provisions

1.Without prejudice to articles 19 to 23, the consent of a State or of an international organization to be bound by part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty so permits, or if the contracting States and contracting organizations or, as the case may be, the contracting organizations so agree. [Iran doesn't.]

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

* PART II. CONCLUSION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF TREATIES

*SECTION 2 RESERVATIONS.

Article 19. Formulation of reservations

A State or an international organization may, when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:

(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;

_Article 20. Acceptance of and objection to reservation_ s

2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and negotiating organizations or, as the case may be, of the negotiating organizations and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, **a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties**.

It is the case that those Parties remaining in Obama's nuclear agreement will not accept any reservation which the United States would like to "renegotiate with Iran."

Given the reality of circumstance; that an internal renegotiation isn't going to happen; there are choices available to making alterations from outside the Security Council resolution.

The given resolution can be thrown out in its entirety and with prejudice by the Security Council; it may be retained while another resolution may be formulated which conforms to, but further clarifies details of the preceding resolution – perhaps with a view towards resolving some vague areas that might have shown up during the course of the given resolution's implementation – or with a view towards providing for better execution of the provisions of the preceding Security Council resolution, or; the Security Council resolution may be entirely superseded by another resolution on the same topic and of the same nature.

In either of these cases, the entire Security Council must be involved in this adjustment process; and the entire Security Council must take a vote on whatever comes up. It is not up to the U.S., Iran, Germany, China, France, Russia and the U.K. to simply decide on their own that they want to alter something that is no longer their personal property and does not entirely belong to them.

In any event, none of the solutions offered above are viable in this case because any one of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council could, and most likely would, veto any alteration attempted by a new Security Council resolution which affected in any way, the parameters of Resolution 2231. It is highly likely that four of the five permanent Members of the Security Council would all join in on a veto of such attempt.

The whole preposterous fantasy promoted by the 2020 Presidential candidates is a mirage. It is a political ruse designed to make them appear as virtuous and heroic while vilifying the incumbent President for ultimately not entering into the futile distraction, time wasting political device of the phony "re-negotiation" demanded by the pro-contraband weapons proliferation extortionist political movement.

It is a reflection of either the Democratic candidates' complete ignorance of international law (perhaps among the younger candidates); or the purposeful malicious deceitful; misrepresentations of international law intended to mislead the U.S. Citizen (perhaps by the older ones), goading us to vote their way; to vote in favor of that political party and in favor of the sales to Iran of contraband weapons assets which the pro-weapons proliferation political movement promotes and clings to so dearly.

The political platform, and the characteristic ignorance of international law, or willingness to purposefully distort understanding of international law, does not recommend any of these people as viable candidates trustworthy of fulfilling the Presidential mandate to develop reasonable foreign policy determinations. They have all evidently succumbed to the conflict of interest which gives precedence to contraband arms racketeering and profiteering interests over any concerns for the security of the People and the Nation.

The current day political clique in control of the Democratic Party demonstrate that they are out of ideas and have nothing to contribute; so they go about their business of slinging unjustifiable cheap politicians' mud as their designated desperately pernicious choice of political recourse.

The only real and effective way in which this illicit Security Council resolution can be altered is to bring it before the International Court of Justice where it will be necessarily thrown out on account of its various violations; and also on account of this next, following:

* * * * *

Article 2 of the _Vienna Convention on the law of treaties_ declares:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

* PART I. INTRODUCTION

_Article 2._ Use of Terms

1. For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and **governed by international law** , whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation;

It would be fundamentally absurd to accredit with any legal status an international arrangement which did not conform to standards of international law.

And an international arrangement which further declared itself as separate to, or taking precedence over international law could not be ignored by the International Court of Justice once presented with it. Such an arrangement would be necessarily and most naturally found as repugnant to international law, which it denounces, and a direct odious challenge to the Authority of the Court, which stands as the bulwark, preserving, protecting and defending peremptory norm of general international law. It would seem inconceivable that a group of States would enact, then openly dare to announce and implement such an agreement.

Nevertheless, in his despotic conceits, Barack Obama agreed with the Ministers of the Government of Iran, and the leaderships of the other participating nations, to indeed declare that, because their agreement was a Security Council resolution – it had possibly achieved in the mind of the public the status entitling it to be construed as a law in and of itself. Obama began his charade along these lines by foisting his counterfeit rewriting of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. Obama intended to impose this following deceit over the reflections of the world community:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Underscoring that Member States _are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions_...

Naturally Article 25 says nothing of the sort. One aspect of what's so alarming about this obvious fraud is that the Charter of the United Nations has been around since the post World War II 1940s. It is a well-known, well-understood document. It is a sign of our utterly ignorant and negligent era that no international or domestic politician; and no U.N functionary, not even the then or current U.N. Secretary Generals; had or has protested the utter nonsense.

One major "obligation" arising out Barack Obama's counterfeit is the arbitrary demand that U.N. Member States must on some level be complicit with the United Nations Security Council's ambitions weapons transfer agenda begins as follows:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

[section] Terminations:

5. [the Security Council] Requests that, as soon as the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this fact (16 January 2016, as it turned out) to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

Paragraph 7 of section Terminations follows from Paragraph 5.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

[section] Terminations:

7. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, upon receipt by the Security Council of the report from the IAEA described in paragraph 5 {upon 16 January 2016 – which is designated as JCPOA Implementation Day:

(b) All States shall comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 and the provisions in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 of Annex B for the duration specified in each paragraph or subparagraph, and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annex B;

[Resolution 2231; Annex B; paragraph 1 defines the term "all States," as meaning "all States without exception," as follows: "The term 'all States' as used in this document, and as incorporated in the resolution, means 'all States without exception." (quoted from Resolution 2231; Annex B; Paragraph 1.)]

The Security Council decides here that All States are compelled to comply with what is provided for in the above mentioned paragraphs. And paragraph 2 is all about selling nuclear weapons associated assets to Iran:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

2. [first clause] All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and **INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2** (or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;

(b) the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above; and

Here the Security Council softens the language a bit; no longer compelling States to obey, but instead, permitting States to participate in the Security Council project: "... All States may participate in and permit the following activities...;"

So which one is it? Are all States compelled to violate treaty; or are they permitted by the Security Council to violate Treaty at the Security Council's say so?

It doesn't matter either way; the Security Council is not authorized to compel States to violate international treaty or peremptory norm of general international law; nor is the Security Council granted any license to permit, furnish the avenue, or in some way support and promote that States should engage in such manner of activity.

Resolution 2231 continues to advance the argument further along the same lines of reasoning – that upon a Security Council decision all ordained proclamations issued must be accepted and must be carried out as ordered.

The Security Council, without any commission issued which might support its choices of action, usurps the power to signal out States which are now exempted from the obligations of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran naturally, stands first and preeminent in receiving this immunity:

Security Council Resolution 2231;

[section] Other Matters

27. [the Security Council]... Decides that all provisions contained in the JCPOA **are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran** and **should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State** or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices;

The exceptions made for Iran pertain largely to the Resolution 2231 provisions allowing sales of contraband weapons to Iran in violation of treaty.

This is a very comfortable set-up for the E3/EU+3 States (Obama's United States, France, China, Germany, the U.K. and Russia). These E3/EU+3 States are by coincidence the greatest world-wide manufacturers and distributors of weapons of war. These greatest manufacturers and distributors of weapons of war have usurped for themselves, as well Iran; a new power – the power to decide which States are immune to the obligations of treaty; and which States are not.

I can very well imagine that, along with all the Resolution 2201 violations of treaty; the Security Council usurpations pointed out, including Obama's counterfeiting of Article 25 which effectively proclaims that any command by the Security Council, regardless as to whether the command is illegal; is officially entitled to be thought of as outside the rule of law;

All of this the Court, when confronted with it, must necessarily find this whole "Iran nuclear deal" as repugnant to the law and to treaty; and as a vicious assault on the Authority of the Court.

The Democratic Party Platform would have us believe that the reason why the Democrats "... _support the nuclear agreement with Iran_ [is] _because...it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without resorting to war,_ " this while Obama's "Iran nuclear agreement" prohibits IAEA inspections with a view to securing that the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed items sold Iran are not being diverted to the development of nuclear weapons.

* * * * *

AS NOTED, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY platform asserts:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because... it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without resorting to war.

If United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 were all the perfect and flawless arrangement that the Democratic platform says it is, then what need would there be for the Democrats to "renegotiate" the deal?

If previous iconic President Barack Obama's "Iran nuclear deal," really were a system for regulation or prohibition of the flow into Iran of contraband weapons systems, contraband Weapons of Mass Destruction systems – those along with conventional arms systems;

And if; as is publicly promoted; this system of arms regulation really was working to regulate arms flow into Iran as well as the interested international entities involved in and promoting the project declare it to be;

What possible interest could the other Parties have in allowing United States interference in a vaunted as smoothly running and virtuously managed international operation already underway?

If this "deal," so vaunted as regulating the flow of contraband weapons into Iran is working to the satisfaction of every Party participating, why should any such participating Party even consider complicating the issue with some sudden curious request by the U.S. Democratic Party to arrogantly re-enter, on new unstated U.S. terms, the flawless arrangement of the associated membership already involved it; the flawless agreement which has already been so stipulated by the Democratic Party as working ever quite so well in preventing Iran from ever getting a nuclear weapon; even without the Democratic Party complicating matters by injecting itself into and interfering in something that the United States is no longer involved in?

If the Democrats want to engage this "renegotiation" business as a political ploy to convince and impress domestic voters as to the Democratic Party's virtue; that doesn't seem much of an incentive for the international community to take notice or heed of; bolstering the conceits of the U.S. Democratic Party doesn't seem an activity which might constructively serve the cooperative efforts of the international Parties participating in the project.

The Americans wanted out – and now they're out. Why should anyone international or domestic think the U.S. politicians' further impedance and obstructionism, their unpredictable fickle indecisiveness, should be welcomed in an ongoing smoothly flowing operation being carried off by professionally minded people?

NATURALLY however, Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" is nothing like what Democratic Party acolytes pretend it to be. It is, as documented and explained, an insidious contraband arms dealing scheme which violates treaty and violates international law in assisting Iran to obtain Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities and enhancing Iranian capacities in other weapons classes; and thereby assisting Iran in its preparations for pledged future waging war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances. The Democratic Party, evidently supporting arms dealing interests rather than the interests of the General Welfare – clearly are mustering and eager to get back in to the arms profiteering swindle.

It would seem highly implausible that any of the Parties still participating on the Procurement Working Group council; England, France, Russia, Germany, China and Iran – would find it desirable to allow the United States to rejoin the group seated at the Procurement Working Group table.

The best that a newly elected in 2020 Democratic President evidently could hope for in serving powerful arms dealing U.S. domestic corporate interests – is to seek to drop U.S. weapons sanctions against Iran and promote a policy of allowing U.S. contraband arms dealing interests to submit weapons sales proposals to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 Joint Commission, which the Commission would then pass on to the Procurement Working Group for review. That might be acceptable to Iran. And what might be especially appealing to Iran might be the opportunity to get hold of: " _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories_ ;" the intellectual property of U.S. weapons developing corporations furnished willingly by U.S. arms dealing, racketeering interests. It may sound far-fetched; but the whole idea of re-entering the Resolution 2231 arms swindle arrangement is an idiot plan anyway. And once engaged in an idiot plan, all restraints may fall by the wayside in the service of such. Implementation of the whole stupid idea could lead anywhere and no one can know how far it will go.

In any event – whatever domestic weapons sales proposals are put forward, such offerings would have to initially be presented to a malleable and amenable Democratic Party President eager to please.

Individual corporations cannot submit any proposal directly to the Joint Commission, as only States are allowed to tender such instruments on behalf of the Sellers.

Any of the 2020 Democratic Party candidates vying for the White House, might be just right for and suited to eagerly fit into that job description.

The whole set-up lends to reflection on a very probable and sinister scenario:

One of these current candidates for the 2020 Presidency is installed in office. A powerful domestic, very influential arms manufacturer submits a weapons sales proposal aimed at Iran to the President. The transmission to the President is done in secret – per the rules set up in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

This new President – pledged to the current Democratic Party's doctrine sympathetic with this policy expediting sales of nuclear and ballistic missile associated inventories to Iran gladly passes this sales proposal on to the Procurement Working Group through the Joint Commission to meet with its almost inevitable approval.

Who in the public would ever know the contents of whatever was passed on, whenever any particular procurement package was approved for sale to Iran? And no one in the public would be aware of the quantity of procurement packages bundling ballistic and nuclear weapons associated assets being approved for sale to Iran. This doesn't seem to make for much transparency or accountability in what is intended as a representative Government ordained by the People in Our earlier ratification of the Constitution; which is the Law of the Land governing those temporarily elected to be stewards of a public Office of Trust.

And the Democratic Party's consistent track record of amoral malfeasant mendacity on this issue strongly indicates that this bunch can be most reasonably expected to be exactly that secretive and bad. (Nobody of the national level Democratic Party is publicly suggesting that this political movement turn over a new leaf and reform its contraband arms racketeering inclinations).

* * * * *

How bad is this current clique of politicians in control of the Democratic Party?

It is not just the Democratic Party membership of the 114th, 115th, and the 116th Congress that is solely to blame. The Republican Party has colluded in playing its part in the matter.

Obama's United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 is a Democratic Party invention; and so the Democratic Party is especially preoccupied with asserting its special virtue at least for political face saving purposes.

But there is the other, very tangible reason for bi-partisan support of the measure; that is the already mentioned possible lucrative weapons sales to Iran which U.S. weapons manufacturers and high powered financial speculative arms dealing interests might make a financial gain from were U.S. participation in the ongoing weapons sales bonanza allowed somehow with Trump out of the picture. As noted, any of the Democratic Candidates vying for the 2020 Presidency hold out the promise of some form of re-entry into the deal.

That all said – this writing concerns itself with the 2020 Democratic Party platform and the unacceptably amoral quality of character of the current Democratic Party Candidates running for office.

During and since the time of the 114th Congress – the Democratic Party has shown itself as implacable in its refusal to discuss or acknowledge any aspect of the contraband weapons sales to Iran currently undertaken by elements of the International Community and the current Democratic Party.

The Democratic Party membership has done its best to directly lie about the true nature of their cherished "Iran nuclear deal."

Take for example the extraordinary mischaracterization and falsehood very Senior Democratic Senator Democratic Party ranking leader in the U.S. Senate decidedly promoted from the floor of the Senate on 26 April 2018:

The Iran nuclear agreement is the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated. It blocks Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon, protecting our security and the security of our partners in the region.

This is only the typical hogwash nonsense coming out of this current version of that political organization.

All the candidates Democratic Presidential candidates put forward by that bunch of pro-contraband weapons politicians controlling the national level Democratic Party; savor and endorse these sales to Iran now being carried out under the auspices and sponsorship of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council; these sales of contraband nuclear and ballistic weapons assets which everyone in the Democratic Party refuses publicly to speak of; although these weapons transfers are documented and beginning to be understood by growing numbers of the U.S. electorate..

The 2020 Democratic Party candidates want to jump back in on this action in some way or form. They want the U.S. Government to again eagerly join in assisting furnishing Iran with _the lethal weapon for the purpose of_ furthering the ambitions of Iran in its future pledged war of aggression.

The Iranian pledge to wage future war of aggression against its neighbors is well known, and cannot be denied – not even by the Democratic Party membership. And in this future war of aggression they will most probably be well equipped with nuclear weapons capacity courtesy of Germany, France, Russia, the U.K., and China; and yes, courtesy of the United States Government if the Democrats get their way.

The assistance to Iran in this capacity is defined and codified internationally as the War Crime, _Crimes against Peace_. Re-examining the definition, only this time with a look at which entities may be held as liable for participating:

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) **Crimes against Peace**. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, **preparation** , initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, **or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing**.

[UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON (Public Domain): Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals; Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume III: page XIX]

The list of persons or entities which may be found liable in association with such crime is more extensive then what I present next; but this item 4 following will suffice for the purposes of this writing:

4. (a) The official position of any person, whether as Head of State or as a responsible official in a Government Department, does not free him from responsibility for a crime or entitle him to mitigation of punishment.

(b) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation.

[UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON (Public Domain): Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals ; Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume III: page XX]

It is highly unlikely that any of these 2020 Presidential candidates will ever actually be charged with the War Crime, _Crimes against Peace_. Nevertheless – the Crime remains independent of prosecution under it. Regardless of how they would like to promote themselves publicly; regardless that the Democrats refuse to discuss it publicly; that hawk political movement favors arming Iran in its preparations; they favor arming that State with nuclear weapons capacity in its pledged waging of war of aggression. Their involving nuclear weapons as one of the elements on the menu of this spectacularly ambitious enterprise is to be construed as Democratic Party assistance in support for a genocidal war of extermination conducted by Iran against some of its neighbors; courtesy of the United States Government, and the others;

And all this for the sake of a form of warped political face saving, and the few crumbs of profit to be gained for interested parties in the United States.

Regardless of how people feel about incumbent President Trump, who clearly gives people much to feel anxious about; it is for the U.S. electorate to ultimately decide whether the United States is to be become a land led by fool troglodytes of the amoral quality of character of the War Criminal; who have shown over the last close to four years; that their chosen approach to the public on the topic is to simply continue to openly lie and dish out the same nonsense over the issue that the "Democratic" weapons proliferation political movement is becoming oh-so-well known for.

* * * * *

The only way to put a fully effective halt to all this contraband arms racketeering is to bring the matter in petition to the International Court of Justice. In part, due to the multiple and very serious violations of treaty provided for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; and also due to the Security Council resolution's flaunting infringements on international law; the overall international menace to the peace imposed by the Security Council resolution;

And also because of the direct challenges it poses to the Authority of the Court itself; and to the Authority of the Charter of the United Nations; and for other reasons – which I detail and explain in the earlier book _A Vice President's Adventures in Letter_ ; the Court cannot allow the international weapons scheme to continue. The Court will consider Security Council Resolution 2231 in the context of at least these articles.

**The Court** must throw the Security Council resolution out as void upon its conclusion:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 2. INVALIDITY OF TREATIES

Article 53. Treaties Conflicting With a Peremptory Norm of General International Law ("Jus Cogens")

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

The Court, having made a determination as to the application of Article 53 – would necessarily move on to the next step:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVALIDITY, TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF A TREATY

Article 71. Consequences of the Invalidity of a Treaty which Conflicts with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law

1. In the case of a treaty which is void under article 53 [above] the parties shall:

(a) Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law; and.

(b) Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

The Court would then interpret how, and determine and Order what actions would be required to be carried out, both by the Security Council and the Parties most directly responsible.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 would, under an unfavorable ruling, be thrown out and treated as though it never existed (per Article 53). It would have been found void upon its conclusion, being the 20 July 2015 Security Council vote. This could mean that all previous sanctions placed upon Iran by preceding Security Council resolutions would automatically be back in play again, as of Resolution 2231 had never existed.

If the Court were to confirm that Resolution 2231 was void from the time of conclusion; then such ruling might consequentially demand the necessary opening of the secreted Procurement Working Group books with a view towards discovery of what had been going on in Iran; what contracts had been made;

No secrecy agreement in regards to this or any other aspect of the Security Council resolution could be honored as Resolution 2231 never had existed and this whole activity may be considered a rogue operation put into effect without any Authorization from the Charter of the United Nations. The Court could order the books on Procurement Working Group sales to Iran be opened – with Contracts involved being examined and publicly disclosed.

The ruling might include the decision that assets contained in all procurement packages must be returned to place of origin – and moneys paid for those be returned to Iran. It would follow from such a determination by the Court; that Contracts made between Iran and vendors would needs be submitted and investigated. These contracts could be annulled, not by anything that could be construed as a retroactive decision, but because they violated standing law in the first place.

Just bringing Security Council Resolution 2231 to Court would put a thorough chill on the contraband arms dealing business community. For one thing, it becomes much more difficult to get insurance for the prospects of a sales project when the risks of total loss and failure are exponentially increased.

It is conceivably abhorrent for any of the 2020 Presidential hopefuls, for any of these to even make public mention of petitioning the Court of the Law for remedy.

A Ruling by the Court, unfavorable to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, destroys the speculations of the contraband arms dealing profiteering sector. Legal remedy is not in the interests of the international arms racketeering syndicate which the Democratic Party 2020 candidates want so badly to join up with again.

* * * * *
– Chapter 4 –  
[Before Moving On, Let's not Forget North Korea  
(or)  
Blackmail Circuit Encirclement](tmp_122a9b87379b6c892e77fe2ef9c92df2_R_BZ5g.ch.fixed.fc.tidied.stylehacked.xfixed_split_001.html#ref_n_a04)

Iran and North Korea being best buddies, and best trading buddies at that, what's to keep from their slipping a few better ideas into their joint commerce action and exchanges?

It's an easy game plan. As we've learned, Iran has long since been given permission to buy from any Party: " _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories_ " [Appendix 4 – Chapter 10 []]. And every States can sell that stuff to Iran if there's a mind to; and if there's a good price to be laid on the table, so to speak.

(The Parties to the Obama deal: Russia, the U.K., France, China and the U.S.; the Great Arms Dealing Nations of the world; are in the best position to sell Iran the kinds of things it might like = as is obvious.)

Once Iran gets its hands on the blueprints etc. of the advanced nations, there's no prohibition against their exchanging these with North Korea for something else. There is no prohibition; and even if there were; such a prohibition could ever be enforced. It kind of makes a person wonder...

* * * * *

Suddenly, out of nowhere in late 2017, the denizens of Congress were screaming their lungs out. Something has gone horribly wrong!

On 24 October 2017 Democratic House of Representatives Congressperson Waters of California noted (page H8101) hollered out in her nightmare dismay:

...the rapid acceleration in the scale and range of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs is so alarming, including the launch of two intercontinental ballistic missiles in July, one of which experts believe could have had the capacity to reach the continental United States. Then, in September, the regime tested its sixth nuclear explosive device, and, according to U.S. and international estimates, this thermonuclear test was significantly higher in magnitude and yield than any previous test.

On 10 January 2018; a highly agitated Republican Senator Inhofe strenuously complained:

North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests of increasingly powerful weapons. The latest test was in September of last year. The major test actually came after that, and that was on November 28. On November 28, he demonstrated that he had the range of the United States and the central part of our country. In other words, it was stated by others who observed that he now has the capability of reaching any target in mainland United States...

Here is the scary part of this. Those who are not wanting to believe that the threat is real and the threat is there are saying: Well, we don't know that the missile he demonstrated on November 28 could have reached that range if it had a full payload, a load of a nuclear warhead.

_We don't know if they had one or not, but that doesn't give me much comfort. They_ [analysts] _also questioned whether or not it could sustain the reentry back into the atmosphere._

The point is that they now have that capability, and that is something we have to keep in mind as we are making decisions, because we have decisions to make...

So they're complaining now. But all the screamers in Congress knew, and know, what the Procurement Working Group is up to; almost the entire population of the 115th House of Representatives voted in favor of their bi-partisan _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698._ It was voted in favor of on 26 October 2017.

The 115th House of Representatives was concerned that if the situation arose where Iran was buying ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services from some entity other than the Procurement Working Group, there should be some reporting on this by the President – if it turned out Iran was doing this outside of Security Council auspices, that is.

House Bill HR 1698 made it clear – that if ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services, combined with nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies and support services, this while prohibiting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from verifying that these combined classes of assets are not being diverted to furtherance of the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran;

If such assets were shunted to Iran under the official auspices of the Procurement Working Group – then the 115th House of Representatives was satisfied that there would be no need for any reporting or announcement of any of that sort of thing to Congress.

Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698

SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES.

(e) SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILES.

''(B) ADDITIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGY.—

''(iv) PROCUREMENT WORKING GROUP DEFINED.—In clause (iii)(I), the term 'procurement working group' means the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established under Annex IV of the applicable provisions in Annex A of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698

SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES.

''(I) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of subclauses (I), (II), and (III) of clause (i), and except as provided in subclause (II) of this clause, efforts by the Government of Iran with respect to ballistic missile-related goods, services, and technologies described in this subsection are efforts by the Government of Iran to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, test or use ballistic missiles or associated goods, services, or technology by the Government of Iran, including efforts by the Government of Iran to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, purchase—

''(aa) goods, services, or technology listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of October 8, 2015, and subsequent revisions that have been acquired outside of the Procurement Working Group or not otherwise approved by the United Nations Security Council;

* * * * *

From what nominal information the Security Council Procurement Working Group is willing to disclose; on page 12 of the _Presentation by the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group on the Procurement Channel_ – presented and published on 14 July 2017 – the Procurement Working Group lists several classes of inventory procured by Iran under the explanation: _Spectrum of current Proposals_.

The first class of inventory listed is " _Machine tools_." Although, due to the Secrecy Arrangements (documented and explained in Appendix VII – _Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed inventories_ [FOOTNOTE19 see haranguing memories]), the presentation can't furnish exact details on where these acquisitions are headed in Iran. The exact end-use location is never specified; it is suggested that acquisitions are destined, in general, possibly to flow into the " _Automotive Industry_ " in some capacity.

(There is no way to actually verify where these inventories; ostensibly destined for the "automotive Industry" actually did end up, or what they are or were put to use for.)

[The July 14, 2017, presentation is found on http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/briefings-by-the-facilitator.shtml ; document file: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/PWG_PC_Presentation-14%20July%202017.pdf]

The Procurement Working Group is approving INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a defined and listed "machine tools" of a very specific character. Let's have a look at part of what's listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a regarding machine tools:

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

1. INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

1.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

1.B.2 Machine tools, as follows, and any combination thereof, for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites, which, according to the manufacturer's technical specifications, can be equipped with electronic devices for simultaneous "contouring control" in two or more axes:

a. Machine tools for turning, that have "positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning) for machines capable of machining diameters greater than 35 mm;

b. Machine tools for milling, having any of the following characteristics:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988)* along any linear axis (overall positioning); [* Editors Note: " μm" means "micrometers," "microns;" ISO represents by the standards set up by the International Standards Organization."]

2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or

3. Five or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

Note: Item 1.B.2.b. does not control milling machines having both of the following characteristics:

1. X-axis travel greater than 2 m; and

2. Overall "positioning accuracy" on the x-axis worse (more) than 30 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988).

c. Machine tools for grinding, having any of the following characteristics:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);

2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or

3 Five or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

This above sampling of the kinds of tools being referred to gives us the sense of the quality under discussion.

The kinds of machining – milling, grinding tools for example – which are listed here are of a kind capable of extraordinarily fine precision work. This is why they are of such interest to the auto industry; and not coincidentally the industry of developing very capable advanced ballistic missile systems; along with complimentary aerodynamically suitable warhead casings to match, and along with other necessary components.

This INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 list is meant as a caution, an advisory as to what is needed to produce nuclear weapons – so it doesn't deal with just general types of inventories; this list deals specifically with inventories of a variety of classes which could be used to make a nuclear weapon.

The first bomb makers at Los Alamos had nothing nearly as sophisticated to work with as machining tools which the United States Government now assists Iran in acquiring.

Considering, in this following, the level of precision under discussion in the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a document:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);

The specification "all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm;" makes clear that for such a device to be listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a it must be able to grind the material to a degree of accuracy better than a difference of 4 microns; or, in other words, a deviation of accuracy of 4 microns is too much – therefore the tool must be able to fit and match the targeted shape to within less then 4 microns of any deviation. This is the type of accuracy and level of detail wanted in fabrication of the nice, most up-to-season styled aerodynamically shaped intercontinental ballistic missiles.

This is the type of accuracy wanted for the construction of your modern day nuclear warhead. That is why such equipment – aside from the other categories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a, are placed on list; which was created as a warning not to distribute the material listed when there is a danger of these falling into the hands or terrorists, or being diverted to the development of nuclear weapons capacity [Chapter 8 – Appendix 2 _– IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a_. and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2. []

Noted that Iran and North Korea are best trading buddy allies; this is not to say that Iran is going to sell its acquired machining tools to Korea. But it isn't so far fetched unlikely that the Government of the Islamic Republic might be enthusiastic about setting up some cottage industry outposts here and there in Iran which could produce nifty custom made parts, per North Korean specifications, which nicely produced could be packaged and sent on to North Korea for the purpose of exponentially advancing the range capabilities of North Korean ballistic missile assets.

We know that the Procurement Working Group has approved Iranian acquisitions of weapons associated goods, technological intelligence, and support services since November 2016. The Procurement Working Group does not disclose exactly what is being sold Iran in these procurement packages.

We know that within less than a year of the first approval, North Korea's ballistic missile range and nuclear warhead yield has dramatically increased exponentially.

* * * * *

The politicians doing all the squawking about North Korea's sudden increase in weapons capacity wouldn't, didn't publicly make the association that alarming turn of events in North Korea might have a great deal to do with the procurement packages acquired by Iran through the Procurement Working Group. Instead, prominent Democratic leaders in Congress continued to mouth off (then as they do now in 2019) about how this whole Iran nuclear deal is going to prevent Iran from ever getting a nuclear weapon.

Democratic Party ranking leader in the U.S. Senate; Senator Diane Feinstein; another hard-line United States proponent of the project dedicated to the expediting and approving of Iranian acquisitions of defined nuclear weapons associated assets in combination with ballistic missile technologies; on 26 April 2018; pronounced this following verdict:

The Iran nuclear agreement is the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated. It blocks Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon, protecting our security and the security of our partners in the region.

[Source: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 164; No. 68: (page S2456), WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2018]

The politicians of the 115th Congress predictably, rather than taking responsibility and measuring the situation rationally, at least by putting forth the idea that Obama's Iran nuclear deal is not working out as advertised, as a starting point;

They instead went on to address North Korea as a separate issue from Iran and the "Iran nuclear deal." Members of the 115th Congress acted as though somehow North Korea was a far more unstoppable and dangerous case than at first perceived. North Korea (it must have been supposed) could on its own suddenly, ingeniously; or perhaps magically with the help of supernatural forces, increase by light years its destructive capabilities in a matter of a few months.

So the Democrats went in search of the solution to North Korean invincibility and decided upon the approach most certain to yield no results whatsoever in putting a slow down on North Korea's nuclear weapons development project.

They fell upon the, at this time, tried and true evasion that negotiating with North Korea to stop developing its nuclear arsenal would convince north Korea to put a halt to what it has been up to.

What could the U.S. possibly negotiate with? North Korea already has everything it wants from the international community weapons wise.

The solution for the Democrats was that the U.S. should go begging North Korea to put off its weapons ambitions while the U.S. was assisting its friend, Iran, in developing its own weapons deployment capacities. And even with the U.S. out of the deal a little later on; the other Great Weapons Dealing States all continued enthusiastically assisting in this adventure. So the solution was to go begging and without asking the question: Why should North Korea stop developing its nuclear weapons capacity when the Great Nuclear Weapons States are clearly in favor of, and assisting Iran in developing hers?

As long as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 would remain in place, North Korea's weapons development program has a bright future given its relations with Iran.

China and Russia do not seem to care any more if North Korea expands its program than they do about Iran getting the bomb, given that they're promoting the whole Iran project.

North Korea obviously cares about what Russia and especially China might want; with powerful friends like that, why should North Korea be concerned with what a hostile United States thinks it ought or ought not to do? There doesn't seem to be any pressure coming out of Russia or China for North Korea to change its ways.

Currently the U.S. has nothing to offer North Korea in a negotiation, and North Korea has much to lose by conceding to U.S. "diplomacy" which finds no real friendship with Russia or China.

Negotiation with North Korea would continue as it has in the past; a smiling go round and round façade which produces nothing but is mainly acted out for publicity purposes. When each negotiation inevitably fails to produce a result; then North Korea gets to crow on the international stage about how impossible it is to deal with this out of control guy Trump President of the United States; etc., etc.

The Democrats want a waste of time, a pretense; what they don't want is a real solution to the crisis primarily of their making, the crisis they won't admit exists. Pro-proliferation Democrats don't want for Resolution 2231 to be brought into Court, that the contraband arms dealing should be shut down with indemnities payable and with things being forced to be put back into place as much as possible.

The Democrats don't want that, they don't want Rule of Law to intrude upon their corrupt ambitions. They want the freedom to sell contraband in violation of treaty.

What the Democrats want is to have the opportunity to jump the Country back into the Middle East arms race promoted by Resolution 2231. A Court Ruling against the Security Council resolution would put a damper on that.

Without a Court ruling, the Iran-North Korea Pipeline continues unabated. North Korea continues to build on what it may learn from Iran. Iran continues to develop its nuclear capacity with advanced weapons expertise bought from the Great Arms Dealing States (with or without U.S. participation); and adherence to the Rule of Law is dropped in favor of arbitrary and immediately changeable rules and deals.

Although neither North Korea nor Iran might use their weapons in the near future, there will always be that opportunity to use them as taunts and threats for bullying and blackmail, or rather, coercion.

With their arsenals, Korea will have the West Coast of the United States, at least, completely covered; and Iran will service the Middle-East and eventually Europe.

Naturally, since the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty has, or will have effectively gone out the window, other nations will arm themselves in a like fashion as Iran; and this does not make for a particularly stable and peaceful planet.

But that is the world which will most likely ensue if United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 is not brought before the International Court of Justice for its day of reckoning.

AND OF COURSE, with all that and more – the Democratic Party Election Campaign Platform inflexibly must insist:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because, as it is vigorously enforced and implemented, it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without resorting to war. We reject Donald Trump's view that we should have walked away from a deal that peacefully dismantles Iran's nuclear program...

These are hardened people, habitual professional liars compelled by their Party policies to intentionally deceive; to spread false rumors to the public. These are the opportunist politicians, the Democratic Party candidates vying for the White House in 2020; these are the presidential candidates so wanting the People's U.S. Government to jump back in and assist in inflaming the targeted regions by aiding Iranian and North Korean weapons development programs.

These candidates will have us tolerate them for four years as they point the way to a future (and present) world wherein the Great Arms Dealing Nations, whenever a convenient handsome profit is to be made, disregard treaty and participate in and assist belligerent nations in their announced preparations for war of aggression or war in violation of treaty and international assurances;

They propose and promise the vision of a world sunk in cynicism and mistrust; where the Court is disregarded, shunted aside so that the autocratic leaderships of the Great Powers may have their way whenever they like;

A world wherein the United Nations itself becomes the tool to arm the belligerent – as it is now become – the venue used to oversee and approve transfers of contraband arsenals in violation of treaty. And this, at least in part, to assist the belligerent State in its fanatical, genocidal pledge to exterminate populations of at least one neighboring State,

* * * * *
Chapter 5 –  
What Passes for Representative Government in the U.S. Today

Pennsylvania Assemblyman Dr. Franklin gives us an ideal example of how to very politely turn down a bribe.

However, before continuing to the story we must first collect our bearings; and also learn of this "Proprietary" which keeps coming up in the conversation.

In March, 1664, William Penn obtained a charter from Charles II, which invested him as Proprietary of the land we now know of as Pennsylvania. He became the "Landlord" if you will, of Pennsylvania; to govern, to manage the settlers therein; and profit from in such way as he chose in so far as his direction should not be repugnant to the laws of England or the Crown.

Penn's progeny were to inherit and share the Proprietary Status; and hence this new Landlord class continued to grow through Dr. Franklin's time a little over a century later.

Penn was allowed to cede generous concessions to settlers and so these multiplied and by Franklin's time farming communities and urban centers enjoyed a comparatively thriving commerce for the day.

An assembly of Free Men was elected from across the State; which eventually was given authority to make laws subject to the approval of the Governor.

This is a very slim description of the history, but it is enough to give a sense of the meaning of the "Propriety."

The setting for the account presented is pre-revolutionary Philadelphia, and the writing is in Assemblyman Franklin's own wods taken from his autobiography:

Our new governor, Captain Denny, brought over for me the before-mentioned medal from the Royal Society [legally accepted], which he presented to me at an entertainment given him by the city. He accompanied it with very polite expressions of his esteem for me, having, as he said, been long acquainted with my character. After dinner, when the company, as was customary at that time, were engaged in drinking, he took me aside into another room, and acquainted me that he had been advised by his friends in England to cultivate a friendship with me, as one who was capable of giving him the best advice, and of contributing most effectually to render his administration easy. That he therefore desired of all things to have a good understanding with me, and he begged me to be assured of his readiness on all occasions to render me any service that might be in his power. He said much to me also of the proprietors' good disposition towards the province, and of the advantage it would be to us all, and to me in particular, if the opposition that had been so long continued to his measures was dropped, and harmony restored between him and the people, in effecting which it was thought no one could be more serviceable than myself; and I might depend on adequate acknowledgments and recompenses, &c. The drinkers, finding we did not return immediately to the table, sent us a decanter of Madeira, which the governor made liberal use of, and, in proportion, became more profuse of his solicitations and promises.

My answers were to this purpose; that my circumstances, thanks to God, were such as to make proprietary favours unnecessary to me; and that, being a member of the Assembly, I could not possibly accept of any; that, however, I had no personal enmity to the proprietary, and that, whenever the public measures he proposed should appear to be for the good of the people, no one would espouse and forward them more zealously than myself; my past opposition had been founded on this, that the measures which had been urged were evidently intended to serve the proprietary interest with great prejudice to that of the people.

That I was much obliged to him (the governor) for his profession of regard to me, and that he might rely on everything in my power to render his administration as easy as possible, hoping, at the same time, that he had not brought the same unfortunate instructions his predecessors had been hampered with. On this he did not then explain himself; but when he afterward came to do business with the Assembly, they appeared again; the disputes were renewed, and I was as active as ever in the opposition, being the penman, first of the request to have a communication of the instructions, and then of the remarks upon them, which may be found in the Votes of the Times, and in the Historical Review I afterward published: but between us personally no enmity arose; we were often together; he was a man of letters, and had seen much of the world, and was entertaining and pleasing in conversation. He gave me information that my old friend Ralph was still alive, that he was esteemed one of the best political writers in England; had been employed in the dispute between Prince Frederic and the king...

This Author submits that Assemblyman Franklin's chosen delicate and diplomatic approach in that event is instructional. It informs the constituency of what is its due; what the constituency is entitled to.

Dr. Franklin thereby in hes account, asserts that the constituency has a right to expect and demand of him; that Assemblyman Benjamin Franklin will retain his loyalty to the concerns and aspirations of his community regardless of any bribe or favor from proprietary interest – as he had explained.

* * * * *

NEW PERSPECTIVES on the meaning of "Representative" – by the People for the People government – have emerged in the national level culture of our modern form of obscenely funded political party led, desperation showpiece governance.

We may deduce from especially the way the Democratic Party has carried on about Obama's "Iran nuclear deal;" that the national level Party Machines, as one tool in a common promotional strategy campaign toolbox; expect the modern day partisan Party-Line Congresspersons to assign themselves the task – in the interests of Party-Line doctrine no doubt – to return home to the various respective constituencies and point that index finger heavenward calling out as the credulous fidgeting masses look on: this community has struck GOLD – never mind that bubbling mass of steaming, highly toxic corrosive sewage eating its way through the cement just down the block.

The partisan Congresspersons carry out the mission with eagerness in supply – done as much for themselves as for the Party welfare.

So it must be. The Obama "deal" is a device documented as designed to sell Weapons of Mass Destruction capacity to Iran. It is in need of some strenuous support. The fact that more and more U.S. Citizens have learned or are learning the true nature of the Nuclear Deal must never prevent the "Representative" elected salesperson from going about trying to continue to sell their charlatans' wares.

"We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because... **it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb** without resorting to war..."

...So the Democratic Party Congressperson turned Party Line Sales Person tell us their stuff; knowing all too well about the Obama administration instigated weapons sales to Iran are for good reason prohibited as aggressively violating the fundamental nuclear weapons control treaty: the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty; and knowing all about the other things as well.

And the Democratic Party Congressperson knows that this unthinkable violation of treaty and international law is done to benefit the belligerent ambitions of the government of Iran; which continually fanatically boasts that it will someday wipe another nation, Israel, off the face of the Earth; that there are strong indications it may possibly advocate or act to overthrow the Sunni Government of Saudi Arabia; and who knows what other mayhem may be in store for the region as nuclear Iran might as well assist itself to lavishing hegimonial expansion over its sector of the Middle East.

And then there is that thing; Iran doesn't like us at all either – as that regime continually reminds us. .

As roughly explained earlier, it is highly unlikely the U.S. will ever be allowed to rejoin Procurement Working Group activities. Iran would lose a significant strategic military edge over the United States were the latter to be made aware, through working contact with the Procurement Working Group, of the later statistics on the nuclear weapons assets sold Iran through the Procurement Working Group.

However, Iran may find it highly desirable if the U.S. would sell more of its gear to Iran. Iranian examination of, backwards engineering of U.S. goods could gain the Iranian military more knowledge; give it more of a sense of what to look for if the two parties were to at some point meet on the battlefield. The edge on intelligence would be theirs.

As it stands now, since Trump pulled the U.S. out of contact with Procurement Working Group activities – the U.S. has no clear picture of what Iran has managed to acquire through the Procurement Working Group, or what might it have in store in a conflict scenarios, for our gals and guys in the armed forces. It seems reasonable to assume that the Iranians like it that way.

And since all participating Parties to the Resolution 2231 arrangement are happy with the way things are running with the U.S. out of the deal; and since the U.S. is not a Party to the Security Council arrangement; any suggestion from a U.S. Democratic Candidate for the Presidency in 2020 that any of them will bring Iran to terms more suitable to the U.S. is mere posturing. It is a ploy pretending that the candidate is possessed of a nonexistent power and virtue – a phony promise designed to impress.

If the Democrats were to win the White House in 2020; and the U.S. would be allowed to sell its U.S. weapons technology, goods and support services to Iran provided that the U.S. drop sanctions on Iran;

Such an arrangement would naturally be vaunted to the public by politicians as another victory for "hard-nosed U.S. diplomacy" over Iranian intransigence.

And when the central political concern of the Democratic Party is the profits from contraband weapons racketeering which can be gained for some domestic financial interests; there is no need to seriously consider the finer details of national security interests or policies or the well-being of those volunteers in the service, or the General Welfare of the People of the United States.

There certainly is no need to share these issues and mull them over with the general public – certainly no need for the Democratic Party, one of the Nation's two political parties which for the past four years have both effectively ignored and refused to openly discuss the ongoing nuclear weapons concessions made Iran – there is certainly no need to bring these security issues back to the forum for review and debate.

Briefly, what effectively ends up passing for "Representative" under our current U.S. model of political party led showpiece governance; as the political party machines currently have things organized, is that:

The boys and girls elected to the Congress go back to their constituencies to convince those to believe in and vote Party Line doctrine. The tools for convincing, especially on the part of the Democrats are; to lie by omission, to ignore and suppress facts, and to lie directly to the voter;

To fabricate outrageous tales like the one about how the Obama administration's arrangement with the Ministers of Iran, instigating the well-known international sales to Iran of nuclear weapons assets and the other things, will verifiably cut off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb – to fabricate is the Democratic Party way.

Although every Congressperson in Congress knows that the vast majority of the electorate is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and especially not to a belligerent State like Iran; but also to any State;

The Democrats especially have decided that regardless of whatever it is that the Citizen is crying about; jumping back into the market selling contraband weapons to Iran is something they want done and this is what's going to happen if one of them manages to get elected to the Presidency in 2020.

And that's part of what passes for "Representative" government in the United States of today. We have two despotic political parties doing as they please, unaccountable to the People and acting in complete disregard of the General Welfare.

* * * * *

With all the pointing of nuclear weapons around, or potential pointing on nuclear weapons around; North Korea having at least the Western United States covered, and Iran soon to have the Middle East and later Europe taken care of; and what with this business of these Democratic Candidates indicating they want the U.S. back in the arms race; and with these Republican Party Congresspersons playing at impersonating adult humans with their Mr. and Ms. Sweet and innocent "What, who me? What did I ever do?" routine – their sitting and back and saying nothing while they let the Democrats do all the heavy convincing;

With all this lunacy running around, it would be unfair to leave the role President Trump has played in this affair since his retirement from the scene after making his big contribution of pulling the U.S. out of the arms deal.

Continuing in the examination, the next chapter fills in a little on some summary' and proceeds to discuss Mr. Trump a little further.

* * * * *
– Chapter 6 –  
Holding One's Breath Waiting for Trump

Summaries and Observations

Donald Trump's approach to the issue appears enigmatic on the face of it. On the one hand, contrary to being under severe pressure from those supporting arms dealing interests to remain in the deal, he pulled the United States Government out of Resolution 2231;

And then, without following through with the logical course of legal action; the logical course of taking Resolution 2231 to the International Court of Justice to have it thrown out in an internationally embarrassing Court rebuke to the Great Powers, he simply sits back; folds his hands and goes to sleep.

On 12 January 2018, before withdrawing the U.S. from the Resolution 2231 contraband weapons dealing arrangement, Trump presented the Congress with a four point plan on what he would have liked to see changed in the Security Council resolution. Trump was indicating a desire to appease the pro-weapons proliferation advocates by offering to renegotiate elements of Obama's "Iran nuclear agreement." Naturally Trump was ignored both domestically and internationally – no one was interested; and, as has been examined – renegotiation is not a legal option, although neither political Party would admit to that.

In any event, the points were never even given the time of day, were never even considered in any debate on the Congressional Record. As noted, it wouldn't matter; these were fundamentally immaterial to the case and wouldn't have gone anywhere anyway. But the presentation of them did reveal Trump's very poor understanding of the issues surrounding Resolution 2231; a poor understanding of the position he was and still is in regarding the relationship of the United States to the other Great Powers insisting on remaining in the deal.

AS NOTED PRVIOUSLY, A SECURITY COUNCIL resolution cannot be altered in any form by a minority group of interested Parties working form within the resolution; unless the resolution had already specified change orders procedure or indicated specific alterations which could be allowed had these been declared by the time the draft resolution was submitted for vote by the Security Council, to be voted on and approved by the Security Council. As noted, alterations to Resolution 2231 were forbidden by the Security Council resolutions itself. No renegotiation of the arrangement would be tolerated.

A Security Council resolution stands as a U.N. Security Council document. External; alternations of it are possible; and I have earlier offered the reader several approaches to externally altering a preceding Security Council resolution;

Any external alteration of a given resolution must be debated and voted upon by the entire Security Council, and is vulnerable to a veto by any of the five permanent Members of the Security Council.

Any attempt by Trump to renegotiate the deal would put the President himself in a very awkward position. All the arms trading and nuclear weapons projects the Security Council resolution provides for would once again have to be voted on by the Security Council.

Trump could find himself back in front of the Security Council; yet this time he might accidentally find himself endorsing the decision to provide support for all the contraband arms wheelings and dealings provided for in the Security Council resolution.

The scenario is preposterous and naturally it never came to be. The President did not seem to have thought the ramifications of the concept through very carefully at the time.

That is somewhat understandable though; after all, the President was distracted and preoccupied trying to appease the demands of Democratic Party officials agitating, and pressuring him to somehow get back into the arms escalation nut-house horse race.

* * * * *

Trump had laid on some U.S. sanctions after he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, which he must have hoped would induce some level of response from Parties directly involved in Obama's "Iran nuclear deal;" and then waited through 2018 for anyone to come along and give his irrelevant points of impossible renegotiation the time of day. No one ever did. No one seemed to care much.

So the President squandered the whole of 2018 sitting back, waiting for nothing, perhaps feeling smugly vindicated imagining that he had lent to himself a political image of having made a great effort.

The argument for "renegotiation" had earlier been put forward by many of the pro-weapons proliferation movement in Congress. The "renegotiation" business was a ploy; it was a charade to make the promoters of it look even more fantastic and marvelous than ever – meaning that if they were in the position to renegotiate, they would have had that done by now. It was the false premise leading to the distraction of simply taking sides on arguing about the merits or drawbacks of a mirage.

Trump proved himself to be easily distracted, easily sidetracked by political gambits of the sort meant to mislead to nowhere. Impulsive Donald Trump; instead of arguing facts, which are all on the side of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons provided for in Resolution 2231; he instead indulged himself pretending that the fantasy concept of "renegotiation" has any merit or has anything to do with the reality of the situation.

If Trump had had it in him, he could have read the Security Council resolution more carefully. If he had had it in him, he could have long since begun the critically necessary work of bringing United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to petition before the Court; he could have long since gathered an alliance of international States all concerned with, and objecting to the egregious violations promoted in the provisions of Resolution 2231; he could have brought together an international fellowship of nations; the individual States gathered together with the shared objective to organize a petition to the Court, bringing to the Court's attention the egregious violations and usurpations ordained in Resolution 2231; he still can.

Instead the President persisted in wasting the Citizen's time through 2018 and the first half of 2019; and wasting his own tenure in Office mired in indecision, doing nothing and leaving the issue to fester and worsen.

Meanwhile, those Parties actively involved in supplying enhancements to Iran's weapons arsenal's; without a second thought – continue in pursuit of their joint effort.

THERE IS NO INDICATION that petition to the rule of law plays any part in the vocabulary of the Washington D.C. political culture at this time.

No one in the Congress; not one of the of the 2020 Democratic Party presidential candidates – all supporting the contraband arms transactions enabled by Barack Obama's "Iran nuclear deal:" nor does our current President Trump – claiming to be opposed to the "deal" – ever publicly mentions recourse to the Court as an option. This recourse being the only lawful means available to effectively and thoroughly shut these transactions down.

AND SO the U.S. Citizen Voter opposed to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities is stuck on the horns of a dilemma. The choices are, in 2020, to either vote for a Democratic Party candidate – all of whom support Resolution 2231, which provides for the expediting and subsequent approval of sales to Iran of Weapons of Mass Destruction associated assets, or;

To vote for the incumbent President who does nothing – who sits back, squanders time; too timid, too indecisive to engage the United States in the only lawful recourse which would effectively put a halt to this international contraband arms dealing syndicate scam.

Donald Trump wanted the job of being President of the United States, and he got it. Before entering into the duties of his office he took this following Oath:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Treaties made under the Authority of the United States are of a piece with the Constitution. Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution Ordains the following:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article VI - Debts, Supremacy, Oaths

[Clause 2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The President is under Oath to defend that treaty, the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_. Yet he won't bring himself to take any action on his constitutional obligation; he hasn't so far.

Although adherents loyal to powerful domestic arms dealing interest entrenched in the Congress of the United States might want to – there's nothing these could effectively do to impede the President's bringing this issue, along with other aggrieved nations, in petition to the Court with the objective of having Resolution 2231 thrown out in its entirety.

Although adherents loyal to powerful domestic arms dealing interest entrenched in the Congress of the United States might want to – there's nothing these could effectively do to impede the President's in the carrying out of his Constitutional obligation to defend the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty in Court against all malfeasant comers currently acting in defiance of it.

The promoters of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction for profit campaign currently entrenched in the Congress could continue with their fabrications about how the "Iran nuclear agreement" is going to forever block Iran from getting nuclear weapons capacity – while they smile knowingly that the U.S. (when it was yet Party to Resolution 2231) was slipping Iran its nuclear weapons capacity out the side door. They could go ahead and throw that charade about the "Iran nuclear deal" preventing Iran from ever achieving nuclear weapons capacity back at Trump's to try and obstruct any movement towards the Court.

But all that Trump would need to do to counter such an assault is respond with the facts.

It seems one of the impossibly enigmatic points of Trump's character is that he doesn't discuss the facts of the issue publicly, regardless that these are all on his side. Maybe Trump really doesn't know or understand the facts; which would be a good reason for him not to try to go into them publicly.

Perhaps Donald Trump would do well to sit down and diligently study the material itself so that he might honestly learn how truly bad this situation is. I think this would be of great benefit to himself were he to gather up the energy to look into the material carefully as a grown adult might. To my mind it would be of great benefit to all of us were he to attempt something of the sort.

And what do the ranks of pro-proliferation politicians infesting Congress have on their side to argue with (aside from their cheap fabrications) against the President bringing Resolution before the Court for nullification?

The Congress doesn't have even a phony, unconstitutional law to protest with. It is documented on the Congressional Record that the Congress never even voted on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; the instrument in question. (The 114th Congress did vote, September 10th and 11th, on the JCPOA, which is only one Annex of the entire resolution – and even that portion of the resolution failed to meet with any approval).

No one in Congress at the time could be bothered to look into the Security Council resolution – or publicly mention or comment on it. [See Appendix 8 – Chapter 14 [].] An attempt of the Congress to obstruct or impede the President from fulfilling his Constitutional obligations in regards to preserving, protecting and defending the Constitution would help to remind the public of the remorseless sub-moron sensibilities prevailing in the Congress of the United States in this period.

In any event, any domestic vote approving that Security Council resolution would have been a vote to approve the unlawful violation of Treaty made under the Authority of the United States. The vote would be fundamentally unconstitutional and void.

It would be thoroughly proper for the United States to strongly remonstrate before the Court against the egregious and intolerable assaults on treaty imposed by Resolution 2231. The Executive is a different department from the Legislature; and the Legislature itself is in general blocked by the Constitution from impeding the Executive's performance of its duties to the Constitution.

AS TO the current gathering of 2020 Democratic partisan candidate hopefuls: These might perceive that any action by incumbent President Trump to seek justice in bringing Resolution 2231 before the International Court of Justice could steal away some of that political thunder they imagine themselves to have. No doubt such a display of integrity would expose and embarrass them resulting in an outcry of enraged jealousy and shattering resentment; even hatred. An appeal to justice on behalf of the United States' Citizen, and to world Citizen's of the various States might be felt as a political upstaging of their publicized election campaign platform. This would be an anathema to them.

* * * * *

THE SECOND CLAUSE of Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations ordains the following:

The Charter of the United Nations;

*CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 24

2. In discharging these [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations...

The Security Council is not authorized by the Charter of the United Nations to vote just any way it pleases as Obama has misrepresented in the case of Resolution 2231.

The Security Council voted to violate treaty in order to facilitate the expediting and approving of contraband sales of Weapons of Mass Destruction assets to Iran; this activity in turn must be most reasonably construed as openly assisting Iranian acquisitions of such in its preparations for its pledged waging of war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances.

Furthermore, it is well known that Iran's pledged war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances is notably intended, as advertised by the Iranians, as a war of extinction of neighboring peoples. It is a case where the perspectives and the most primitive amorality of the ancient world has been handed the atomic warhead by elements of the modern day international community; thus possibly making for short work the satisfaction of xenophobic grudges persistent since ancient times.

The 2020 Presidential hopefuls supported by the Democratic Party weapons purveying, arms profiteering political movement, and the funding poured into the coffers of the Democratic Party political machine treasury; those candidates have refused for some four years to talk about the true nature of the already well-known international contraband weapons sales profiteering scheme.

They refuse to speak up, and this maybe makes it easier for them to jump right back into the international competition to assist Iran in its preparations for its pledged waging of war of extermination of neighboring populations once they get Trump out of office.

The Democratic Presidential hopefuls clearly don't want to talk about it with the public, so they think to evade the whole issue by continuing to refuse to acknowledge that any of this exists of this exists. The candidate hopefuls stick with their announced platform party-line:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because...it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without resorting to war...

This propaganda issued by Obama himself just after the Security Council vote on the Security Council resolution (20 July 2015); the claim couldn't be confirmed at the time. It would take several weeks before U.N. translators could produce viable version of Resolution 2231 in all the various languages and issue them all at once. But the facts have been out there for almost four years now; and the fantasy wears thinner and thinner as more and more Citizens come to understand the hard reality of the nuclear and ballistic weapons associated assets being sold Iran by the great nuclear powers.

TRUMP HAS an official duty to discharge here. The Obama-era five permanent Member States of the Security Council had effectively ditched the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council (minus the U.S. for the time being) remain enthusiastic in their maintenance of the project.

And the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty remains in peril, regardless that it is probably the single most important element in United States defensive capabilities.

The effectiveness of the great prowess of the U.S. Military; with all the arsenals and impressive hardware at its command and disposal – is seriously impaired without the support of that treaty.

As Commander in Chief, President Trump – if he really does care about defending this country – this President has a duty and an obligation to see to it that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is acknowledged, recognized and upheld – over any objections or protest of the international arms dealing community or the Congress – the treaty must be upheld in the Court of the Law; the International Court of Justice (in this case.

THE ELITIST THUG HAWK Democratic Party candidates vying for the Presidency in 2020, show us all they don't care about anything like treaty or any of those things of such obscure and abstract nature.

The charlatan pretend pacifist Democratic Party candidates continue with their tired old story-line asserting that despite the well-known ongoing sales to Iran of assets associated with enhancing Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities – this done under the auspices of Obama's iconic "Iran nuclear deal" – the whole "Iran nuclear deal" project, so they say, will permanently prevent Iran from ever getting the bomb.

The Democratic Party hopefuls vying for the Presidency in 2020 never need explain this peculiar paradox they impose upon the public. Why should there be a need to do so? The chosen Party-line solution to resolving the paradox is that the candidates as a group simply refuse to acknowledge the documented fact of the ongoing weapons transactions – and thereby may feel free to carry on with their infantile masquerade.

The worn out line, pretending that Obama's Iran nuclear deal would prevent Iran from ever getting the bomb, originally depended in part on the former President's refusal to allow the 114th Congress any full review of what was contained in the entire Resolution 2231. [Appendix 8 – Chapter 14: []] documents the silly ploy he undertook to distract an imbecile assembly from ever taking a look at this essential instrument. A review of Appendix 8 provides some insight into the kind of filthy politics Obama did indulge in to get whatever he wanted.

The original quote, which was never true in the first place, and yet is parroted in similar form over and over by the pro-nuclear weapons proliferation political movement; was coined by Barack Obama himself. In his speech of August 5, 2015, delivered on the campus of the American University, he declared:

"After two years of negotiations, we have achieved a detailed arrangement that permanently prohibits Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. It cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb... _*_ "

***[BARACK** OBAMA; Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal; American University, Washington D.C.; August 5, 2015; this file has been archived, find it on google at: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal]

Instead of discussing the facts of the matter; the current inheritors of Obama's mantel proceed to loyally support the complete fabrication espoused by the Democratic Party platform which falsely claims that the project "... _verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without resorting to war_...," evidently betting that there are enough people left who will believe anything they say regardless of facts, – and regardless of how many in the general public begin to catch on to how empty the phony story-line claim has shown itself to be.

RETURNING TO the charade of not "... _resorting to war_...;" that specious assertion is typical of the usual stack of nonsense coming out of the elitist current day Democratic Party leadership. In their choice to assist in Iranian preparations for its openly pledged war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances; the supporters of Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" resort to the War Crime – _Crimes against Peace_. The "Iran nuclear deal" does resort to war; the origins of its very existence resorts to supporting, instigating and assisting in preparations for the propagation of war somewhere else other than in the United States – and the propagation of suffering somewhere else by someone else in the world.

As the United States politician is well practiced at shifting responsibility in general, the United States politician supporting the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities believes one can ignore any need for accountability and any political assumption of responsibility for the nearly inevitable pledged consequences directly resulting from Resolution 2231.

In the mid-20th Century, directly in the aftermath of World War II, Presiding Justice James Tenney Brand, in the Ruling handed down by the Court in Nuernberg Trial Case III; noted:

...This is but an application of general concepts of criminal law. The person who persuades another to commit murder, **the person who furnishes the lethal weapon for the purpose of its commission** , and the person who pulls the trigger are all principals or accessories to the crime.

The Democratic Party thug candidates vying for election to the Presidency in 2020 show no concern for such niceties. They publicly exhibit themselves as quite eager to jump back into the "Iran nuclear deal," and join in with the others participating in furnishing the lethal weapon in the service of Iran's pledged waging of war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances.

These grasping politicians, so eager to get back in on Obama's contraband weapons sales scheme, must be imagining that any resulting blood spilled will not also be on their hands; either morally or legally.

The narrow-minded bigoted Democratic Party elitist hawk candidates disregard how enormously detrimental it will be to the defensive capabilities of the United States if their policy of ignoring and discarding the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , as of the Obama era, to become the official policy of the United States Government.

Their pernicious preoccupation with getting a few crumbs of profit which the U.S. speculative and corporate arms dealing interests, whom they may feel they represent; the few crumbs of profit which might be garnished from United States re-entry on whatever level, into the international contraband arms racketeering swindle; takes precedence over any concern over justice and domestic national security.

The Obama administration negotiated away the relevance of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ; and the current Democratic Party contenders work towards having this fundamental and essential treaty stay negotiated away.

Universal deference to and respect for treaty, in this case the Treaty on the _Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , engenders a quality of conduct shared by all signatories; which creates a high regard for the protections arising from the restraints the treaty imposes on arbitrary belligerent rogue actions which might in themselves result in catastrophe.

That agreed upon situation of mutual adherence to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty would allow for a certain amount of international trust in the assurance that all nations agree that there are certain areas which no State will wander trespassing into.

The Obama administration discarded that sensibility of trust for its own politically expedient purposes. Obama's "Iran nuclear agreement" opened the door for a competitive international race to sell contraband weapons assets to Iran. Obama was never rebuked for this by the autocratic leaderships of Germany, France, Russia, the U.K., and China – and certainly not from anyone in his camp.

Instead, he was celebrated for having brought about the sea change enabling the greatest arms dealing nations on Earth to profit by selling Iran pretty much whatever was wanted.

The change came about quickly. It took only from the time Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" was voted on as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) on 20 July 2015; until 16 January 2016 – some six months later – for Iran to be allowed to undertake work with: " _Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ ," without the required IAEA oversight to ensure that none of this work was being diverted to the development of nuclear weapons capacity. [Appendix 7 – Chapter 13 []]

The bundling of nuclear and ballistic missile assets for sale to Iran had been allowed since 16 January 2016, as well; but it took till late November for the first of the Procurement Working Group approvals to be enacted on that account.

The autocratic leaderships of Germany, France, Russia, the U.K., and China – as well as the United States under the previous administration of Barack Obama, have thrown the world backwards into a darkly primeval pre-treaty era; an era that no longer relies upon flint tipped spears and arrows as the weapons of choice; but now has intercontinental ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear warheads at general disposal.

The named autocratic international leaderships have discarded any respect for the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty; they violate the instrument as a matter of course, and thereby dispense with any regard for the restraints imposed by that guidepost. They do as they please. The constraints on assisting Iran in the development of its nuclear weapons capacity imposed by treaty are only an imposition on their business dealings; an encumbrance which must necessarily be ignored and brushed aside in order to properly get along with their project. They have thrown the world back into an era of growing mutual suspicion, mistrust and fear.

None of these absolutist leaderships can assure their own peoples a somewhat normal lifetime unthreatened by the breakout of nuclear war somewhere in the world, and perhaps nearby. Why should these autocrats worry about that? The concern for the peace of mind of regular people is of low priority in comparison with the enormous predominant autocratic preoccupation with arms profiteering interests.

The only way to restore mutual trust in international assurances is to bring this matter to Court so that the International Court of Justice will have the opportunity to rebuke Security Council and to Order Resolution 2231 thrown out, and Order that these autocratic leaderships bring their mutual relations back into conformity with peremptory norm of general international law in a manner similar to what has already been described in this writing.

THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES easily have their way with Trump at this time. The Candidate Hopefuls can continue to directly lie, falsify and mislead as they have, and as the Obama administration had from the time of the 20 July 2015 Security Council vote on Obama's draft resolution submitted by the United States, through the end of Obama's tenure in the White House.

It was Obama's United States which deposited with the Security Council the Draft resolution which became known as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). [Appendix 10 – Chapter 16, documents that it was indeed the Obama administration which deposited the Draft Resolution with the United Nations Security Council. And the Appendix shows, in the timeline of events, how none of the non-permanents members of the Security Council could possibly have had time to review the instrument before the bogus Security Council vote taken on it 20 July 2015 []].

The Candidate Hopefuls are given license to do this because President Trump so far has proven himself as to be so indecisive, timid and weak that despite having all the facts on his side, and thus the capability of exposing and blowing apart the entrenched malfeasance mythology of the Democratic Party; he instead remains passively acquiescent – the silent and slumbering moss covered log which obligingly doesn't take notice or interfere.

Trump isn't helping anything. He knows that the vast majority of U.S. voting citizens are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to any country, much less Iran. But he, as obliging, courteous and tolerant of entrenched Democratic Party malfeasance as he is, has so far refused to speak up and take the side of the electorate.

Trumps lack of support for the electorate makes it very hard on that larger portion of the U.S. voting population that has already long since been aware of what this clique of Democratic Party politicians is all about – and it makes it easier for the Democrats to maintain their credibility and hold over that minority population of loyalists choosing to be ignorant of facts long since available; and choosing to remain deceived as to the true aspirations of the Candidate Hopefuls.

Trump affirms in his pusillanimous reticence, that he's not a guy made up of the kind of stuff to exactly galvanize the population over to his side of the argument. Despite his theatrical boisterousness, he just hasn't shown himself as having any energy to argue in defense of the argument.

Regardless that the Citizens' views go unheard and unattended; it is the American Citizen which has long since taken the lead in the discussion. Trump, the man who cannot pull himself together enough to argue the facts, must know that he's a follower of the overwhelming sensibility of the U.S. Electorate. Nevertheless, Trump doesn't avail himself to the overwhelming public sentiment against the proliferation nuclear weapons;

The sentiment that a government's assisting in the proliferation of nuclear weapons is an activity in defiance of treaty which is so contrary to the moral conscience of the community; so menacing to peace and justice in the world and to humanity at large; it demands that by appropriate processes the activity be entirely eliminated and suppressed in the interests of the safety and peace of the world community. It demands to be taken to Court.

The Democratic Party Candidate Hopefuls certainly know this. And their response is to warp themselves into the defensive role of the collective cabal of known professional habitual liars; to play out their chance at misleading enough of the public as to their true preoccupation with contraband arms profiteering priorities to gain a foothold in an election.

ON JULY 23, 2015; three days after the Security Council vote on Resolution 2231; Obama's Secretary of Energy, Dr. Ernest Moniz – himself one of the chief negotiators and architects of Obama's "Iran nuclear deal," went before the United States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and indefensibly lied outright – he was not under Oath, and so he freely falsely testified:

"Under this deal, Iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including multiple point explosive systems. **These commitments are indefinite**."

[TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE; Secretary Ernest Moniz; Washington, DC; July 23, 2015; internet access to pdf document is found at: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-23-15%20Moniz%20Testimony.pdf [Last accessed June 24, 2016.]]

Lo and behold, as of 16 January 2016 Iran was openly permitted Obama's to engage in "...activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including multiple point explosive systems...;" [Appendix 7 – Chapter 13 relates the details of the scam []].

A Scientist is understood to be a seeker of facts – not a warehouse in the business of substituting fact with fiction; or, as a real Scientist, Maestro Galileo Galilei once put it:

"Chi non conosce la verità è sciocco, ma chi pur conoscendola la chiama menzogna è un criminale."

"Who does not know the truth is a half-wit; but he who, in the knowing of the truth, calls the truth lie is a criminal."

Dr. Moniz might once have enjoyed some credibility in some circles – but through his intentional attempt to deceive the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and thereby the whole of the American People – he exchanged whatever credibility he may have had for his chance to sit at the table and take discredit for the Iran nuclear deal" along with the other big boys.

His low character, which Dr. Moniz himself chose to put on public display, is consistent with that of the entire Obama Administration in its choice to instigate its policy and doctrine of Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation in the Middle East, in the service of domestic and international contraband arms dealing interests; and in the service of the ambitions of the Government of Iran.

All of the violations of treaty in support of contraband weapons racketeering and profiteering described in the beginning of this book and throughout have their origins in the Obama administration, responsible for instigating and enacting every aspect of this procedure. Fortunately, the out-of-ideas Democratic Party 2020 Candidate Hopefuls do not add any imaginative new twists to the original warped ideology.

They sis respond with great jealousy and resentment to Trump's interference with their plan, and the current President's delay of their process. The 2020 Candidate Hopefuls simply want Trump out of the way so the Democratic Party swindle might have some opportunity to rejoin the ongoing arms race escalation currently underway; an escalation which may afford some lucrative reward to certain domestic U.S. interests.

And so they continue directly to promote their purpose with their usual malevolent false claims; including those proudly put forth in their Party Platform:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because... it verifiably **cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb** without resorting to war. We reject Donald Trump's view that we should have walked away from a deal **that peacefully dismantles Iran's nuclear program**...

THE POLITICAL MOVEMENT, the current partisan political extremism which has taken control of, and takes its refuge in the collected Democratic Party Machine corrupting sanctuary may be unique in United States history. This Democratic Party is the only national level political machine since the onset of the Atomic Age which, deny it as they will, actually seeks the proliferation of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear-weapons-State. And the opportunistic partisan extremists in control of the national level Democratic Party have chosen to specifically to endow as its favorite a non-nuclear-weapons-State particularly hostile to the United States/

Furthermore – these Candidate Hopefuls, vying for the 2020 White House may actually be the first in the history of the United States to seek election on their collective promise to violate the Law of the Land in denunciation of the United States Constitution upon their entry into gaining control of the Executive Branch. Examining and explaining the irrefutable veracity of these two statements; which may seem, to some, at first inflammatory on the face of them; but will be proven as candid, true and correct.

AS TO THE FIRST observation, little more need be stated then has already been explained. It is at this point clearly well known and understood, by the documentary evidence, that regardless of the false claims the out-of ideas Democratic Party Machine insists on relying upon for its Candidate Hopefuls' re-election purposes, the "Iran nuclear deal is not an instrument which: "... _verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb_...;" it is a document which provides for the illegal provisioning of Iranian arsenals with contraband weapons and associated technologies and services.

This entire activity is carried out in flagrant violation of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ;

And so – the extremist Democratic Candidate Hopefuls, one and all, vying to gain control of the 2020 White House; are probably the first to run on a political platform openly dedicated to the proliferation or Weapons of Mass Destruction associated assets,

A LITTLE MORE INFORMATION, once supplied, will clarify the honest assessment of the second observation.

The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013 - H. R. 893 (113th Congress) (otherwise known as INKSNA), after being voted in favor of by both Houses of the 113th Congress, and subsequently submitted to President Obama in 2013 for ratification – was subsequently signed into law by sitting afore indicated sitting President Barack Obama.

The Statute provides for numerous measures which either inhibit, or successfully prevent U.S. support for; or U.S. associated sales or transfers of certain classes of armaments to Iran, North Korea, or Syria. As an example of such provisions, I furnish this following:

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013 - H. R. 893 (113th Congress)

1 SEC. 3. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN FOREIGN PERSONS.

(a) RESTRICTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the day of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose, **for a period of not less than two years** , the **sanctions specified** in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the person—

(1) (A) on or after September 1, 2007, transferred to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria—

(i) goods, services, or technology listed on—

(II) the **Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment** and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions;

As Chapter 7 – Appendix 1: " _How (why) the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was renamed "S/2015/546_ " [] documents; the Obama administration deposited the United States "Iran nuclear agreement" draft resolution with the Security Council on 17 Friday 2015;

If a Democratic Party Candidate become President were to re-enter Obama's Resolution 2231; that President would have to strike the above law from the books; as the deal Obama made with the Ministers of Iran demands it. But a President doesn't have the Authority to strike laws from the books. The President is not the legislature. This whole pledge to bring the United States back into Resolution 2231 would be, if it could ever be carried through on, repugnant to the Constitution and in denunciation of the Constitution.

But the whole premise of bringing the U.S. back into the resolution is only a preposterous obtuse politician's bedtime fairy tale to the electorate. The Democratic Party candidates have nothing for the constructive good to offer, so they invent their own circular chatter.

* * * * *

As earlier observed, the Procurement Working Group began advertising in mid 2016 for vendors to come forward and submit proposal for sales to Iran of ballistic missiles bundled with nuclear weapons assets – with the first Procurement Working Group approvals of such sales going through in late November 2016.

Obama's well-known solution to the possible inconvenience of having anyone remember that U.S. law forbids the transfer of _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ inventories to Iran was simplicity in itself; change the name of the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ to "S/2015/546;" and then simply never transmit United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114 Congress for review. [Chapter 14 – Appendix 8 [].] This way the disinterested, careless, frivolous and malleable self-absorbed politicians infesting the 114th Congress wouldn't raise an eyebrow to Obama's showy display of that politicians' practice of expert malfeasant stink-man-ship.

A plan like that works beautifully when a President has at his disposal an indifferent, entirely negligent Congress, such as the 114th; wherein no member of either House would ever bother to simply download Resolution 2231 and read it for themselves.

WE ARE ALL OF US at one time or another, and to a greater or lesser degree; inclined to place personal attachment and tastes above the cautions of hard fact.

The Democratic Party platform with respect to the nuclear deal strongly indicates the core constituency the contraband arms profiteering Democratic Party national political movement means to target for support; those who will faithfully believe any false declaration officially issued by the Party.

That makes things easy for the 2020 Democrat Candidate Hopefuls. Adoring sycophantic acolytes, Party blind followers, fanatical party-line partisans and apologist generally don't give much thought to investigating an issue other than in so far as they may familiarize themselves with, and perhaps memorize the Party's official assertions and incantations. There's no conflict there.

And most of the ambulatory of the loyal adherence can always be counted on to rally enthusiastically before the news media cameras given an officially announced and sufficiently advertised event.

With the solid foundation of their core constituency to back them up, there is no need to waste time on the rest of us who know a lot more than these low life squirrelly politicians care to publicly admit to.

The Democratic Party gamble for the 2020 White house is that this group has formed enough of a groundwork for developing the Citizens' personal attachment to any one or all of the Candidate Hopefuls; or a personal attachment to the Democratic Party brand name; and they may very well have.

For the Candidate Hopefuls, the only political crusade they can run off of their Party-Line political platform must necessarily be a beauty pageant styled contest popularity campaign.

Those among us unimpressed with the charisma and glamour of the national pro-weapons proliferation political movement; those of us not partisan supporters of their pernicious antics; the pro-proliferation politicians despise and mistrust us. The Candidate Hopefuls are fully aware that the vast majority of U.S. Citizens; registered Democrats, Republicans and Independents of all stripes are deeply set against the proliferation of nuclear weapons – and especially against assisting the Government of Iran in its acquisitions of these.

Even those whom the current contraband arms dealing political movement have managed to so thoroughly dupe are also clearly opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Which is why this fabrication must be especially targeted against that part of the population remaining credulous and accepting whatever the Democratic brand name Party-Line says about Resolution 2230.

These current 2020 Candidate Hopefuls; having chosen to conform to the most viciously corrupt policy imaginable; this is the current cabal comprised of individuals who consider themselves deserving and entitled to take control of the Country in 2020.

PRESIDENT TRUMP, on his end, carries on with his snoozing. As observed, despite his proclivity to boast extravagantly, he is surprisingly timid and polite in the face of the ongoing specious claims being spewed from the mouths of the Democratic Party Elite. Perhaps Trump should reserve some of that courtesy for the American People who truly deserve it.

Trump as of yet, has not managed to summon the courage within himself to contend with the falsehoods he has so far given the Democrats free reign to impose upon the People.

President Trump could easily sit himself down, gather the facts and his thoughts together in preparation; and then broadcast the facts to the nation over the airwaves. So far he has shown no inclination or stamina to do so.

Eventually, if a positive and constructive legal recourse and remedy to the debacle introduced by the Obama administration is to be secured. Trump, or some other Agency must engage in bringing the whole affair in petition before the International Court of Justice. President Trump so far has shown no inclination towards implementing the imperative necessity of that remedy either.

Trump has so far chosen the easy way out; to simply sit in his office taking up space; and wasting his and everyone else's time by effectively ignoring the issue.

Given the situation; and with his multiple obvious failings; a vote for incumbent President Trump is not necessarily a vote for the administration's policies which promote very justifiable public anxious misgivings and criticisms of those policies in various areas. A vote in 2020 for the incumbent administration is not to be construed as writing a blank check for the administration to continue unrestrained in carrying on as it will with many of its most unpopular policies (although unfortunately such a vote might be taken that way by a majority of the most enthusiastic pro-Trump partisans – there's no helping that).

Rather, such may be understood as a _vote against_ the entirely intolerable Democratic Party aspiration to continue to insidiously promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the benefit and appeasement of the belligerent ambitions of the foreign potentate well-known to be hostile to the United States from the start;

Instead, in this case a vote in favor of President Trump is a choosing of the lesser of two evils; a vote for incumbent President Trump may be understood as a _vote for_ what currently appears as a long-shot; the far fetched possibility that Trump may someday become exasperated with himself, and manage to get his act together, and bring this human created catastrophe in petition to the Court where it belongs; he would become the Agent of the People, conveying and placing this catastrophe before the International Court of Justice, the only venue which has the Authority to bring the mess to positive, constructive conclusion.

The Citizens of the United States should be at least entitled to that much.

Any citizen with strong convictions against the proliferation of nuclear weapons could justifiably find it utterly repulsive to vote for any of these insufferable Democratic Party pretenders grasping for a chance to get at the Presidency and to use that office so they may promote the Democratic Party's promise to support Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation in the Middle-East.

The Citizen concerned about Trump may feel compelled to either hold the nose and vote for Trump anyway, as a protest vote against this perverted manifestation which has taken control of the Democratic Party organization on the national level; or stay home, and vote for no candidate at all, hoping that the Democratic Party candidate doesn't get elected by others.

TRUMP wanted to be President, and got elected. He originally pledged that he would undertake to perform on the duties of the office. But currently we find him shirking and malingering on the job. The President did pull the U.S. out of the deal. And seemingly content with that initial contribution, Trump leaves the essential bulk of the work undone. The thing must be brought to Court where it can be properly disposed of and the whole project shut down in the manner already described.

A large portion of the population of U.S. eligible voters sending the President emails and letters, at this early time, urging him to organize an international Fellowship of Nations with the objective of formulating and implementing petition to the International Court of Justice on the matter;

These emails and letters sent with that urgent request; could include polite but firm expressions of dissatisfaction with the President's negligent inactivity regarding this issue. That might be a start at helping President Trump out of his comfortable easy chair and getting him around to begin doing something about it. This until such time the Citizens of the United States are able to, present themselves to the Washington politicians with substantial materially concrete and tangible presence in the form of growing multiple peaceful manifestations across the country and in Washington D.C. itself – those manifestations being the living example of the Citizens' Constitutional right to petition the Government for extremely justifiable redress of grievance.

The demand stemming from the grievance is not obscure; it is not so vague that it may be found impossible to understand or to be acted upon.

The activities being carried out by the Great Weapons Manufacturers on behalf of developing nuclear weapons capacity in Iran are pure villainy intentionally violating international law and treaty.

The avarice of the Democratic Party contestants vying for the 2020 Presidency seems certain, given their demonstrated political eagerness to return to collusion in the affair. This is an avarice which the electorate is entirely justified in concluding as being beyond reason.

On 18 October 2020, just a few weeks before the U.S. national election, Iran is given the freedom to trade and transfer conventional weapons to which ever nation or terror proxy it chooses:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

5. All States may participate in and permit, provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, and the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in this subparagraph.

This paragraph shall apply until the date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.*

***** [Resolution 2231; Annex B; paragraph 5]

The 18 October 2020 opening of the conventional weapons market in Iran could mean big money for some speculative interests in the United States; and presents one more incentive for an unquenchable domestic avarice to keep its mouth shut about what is to be gained in profits by jumping back into the Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" on some level.

Democratic Party rivals for the Presidency, once again, show themselves as having no interest in discoursing on the possible gains to be made by joining back in on the international plan to assist in the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran.

BARACK OBAMA'S Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking before an audience gathered in the National Constitution Center of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on September 2nd, 2015, Mr. Kerry offered that:

"... we will maintain international pressure on Iran. United States sanctions imposed because of Tehran's support for terrorism and its human rights record – those will remain in place, as will our sanctions aimed at preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and transfer of conventional arms... "

[JOHN KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE: Remarks on Nuclear Agreement with Iran – National Constitution Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: (September, 2, 2015): http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/09/246574.htm]

It was all a lie. The Obama administration proved itself in its Resolution 2231 quietly acquiescing to Iran's insistence that Iran be left alone with regards to the issue of projecting terror across the Middle East. The U.S. would see to it that sanctions aimed at Iran preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and transfer of conventional arms would be dismantled over time.

AND BARACK OBAMA'S Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, Ben Rhodes; who, speaking in a March 31, 2016 White House Press Briefing, claimed:

"...And we've always been very clear that the JCPOA is about rolling back and constraining Iran's nuclear program. We were also clear that they were going to continue to be engaged in behavior that we found counterproductive -- ballistic missiles, support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the region. That's not the nuclear deal; it's a separate set of issues in which we have the ability to respond... " *****

***** [THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY; Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Nuclear Security Summit; March 31, 2016 (For Immediate Release); internet address: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/31/press-briefing-senior-administration-officials-nuclear-security-summit [last accessed May, 2016]

But it never mattered what fiction Barack Obama and his acolytes invented; it never mattered that Barack Obama and his acolytes tried to slip out the back door on the weakness of their false charlatans' assertions. The fact is that the War Crime, _Crimes against Peace_ has long since defined as:

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) **Crimes against Peace**. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, **preparation** , initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, **or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing**.

The participation in or entering into a common plan to assist Iran in its preparations for its pledged initiation, pledged waging of war in violation of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances – is considered a War Crime.

International law does not recognize the mealy mouthed evasion of Obama and acolytes; and of the current disciples to the cause; International law does not recognize the evasion that the handing off of nuclear weapons capacity is in any sense a separate issue from enhancing the conventional weapons arsenals of that nation. These two activities are, rather, most reasonably construed as intended to maliciously compliment each other.

Both are done with the intention of assisting Iran in its preparation for its pledged war of aggression promised the region; regardless of whatever spin Democratic Party contestants vying for the 2020 might put on the issue.

The Party-Line Contestants, sharing the identified and defined amorality of the War Criminal; in their smug infatuation with potential domestic gains from contraband arms profiteering, seek the satisfaction of an avarice which can never be fulfilled.

Their self-serving obsession makes them blind to all else; for example, to the misery of those caught in the conflagration very likely to result from their choices, were any of them to be empowered by regaining mastery in the White House.

It is this sickening political clique in control of the Democratic Party which, feeding off of and reinforced by the combined misanthropy of its membership, perversely seeks to justify itself with some phony maxim insinuating that the enrichment of Iranian weapons arsenals with nuclear weapons capacity; and the enrichment of Iranian arsenals with conventional weapons, are entirely two separate issues, regardless that these both fit into an overall plan to participate in Iranian long term preparations for its pledged war of aggression in the region.

The Democratic Party collective shows no public interest in atoning for or correcting the extravagances of the Obama administration, and the dangers imposed by that administration. The politically expedient Party Collective chooses instead that certain domestic interests should profit from the promises made by the Obama administration, and by the concessions Barack Obama made to the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

A Court Case in action could very well muzzle somewhat the wild, unrestrained pretenses and behavior of this self-serving bunch – and could help to starve out the degrading impositions that would be inflicted primarily by the Democratic Party political machine upon the U.S. Citizen; degrading to the Citizen and to the form of Representative governance we, the People would hope to enjoy without being tricked or compelled or forced to go along with organized political party mischief, swindles and scams.

The demand of the President from those Citizens of the United States opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is simple and clear: it is for the President to bring this insufferable travesty to Court where it will be shut down so that a reasonable amount of international peace and security, of respect for treaty and international law, may be reestablished and upheld by the Court.

* * * * *

This ends the narrative of the writing. Appendices now follow:

* * * * *

Books by the Same Author: Jean-Marc LeBouquin

– Congress Jerks the General; The Citizen Too –

– Throw All the Bums Out Legal;  
Explanation of the National "Vote of No Confidence" Amendment –

– A Singular Charter in Perpetuity –

– Hoping or Better Swindler's Seats –

– U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking –

– A Vice President's Adventures in Letter –

– Smiling Vultue Ignites Escalation –

– What Do I Ask Myself on This Yom Hashoa?–
– Chapter 7 –  
Appendix 1 – How (why) the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was renamed "S/2015/546

]; [[19]

Two days after the July 14th Vienna signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ms. Samantha Power, sent a Letter of Transmittal to the acting President of the United Nations Security Council, Mr. McCully of New Zealand. Ms. Power wrote: "The United States Mission to the United Nations requests that the attached Missile Technology Control Regime list (see Appendix 9 – Chapter 15, for an excerpt of that list []) be circulated as a document of the Security Council."

The letter was necessary as part of a gambit. Nobody needed the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex to be re-circulated through the Security Council. Such an action would represent a redundancy. The above list is a well known international document.

It would be like asking the Security Council to re-circulate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is perfectly alright to do so – but it would be sort of a waste of departmental secretaries' time.

The purpose of this seemingly trivial exercise was not necessarily to have the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex circulated. It was to get that Security Council document number appearing on that upper left hand corner of the page of the copied letter of transmittal. This document number was immediately used as a code word, avoiding the need to refer directly to the Annex by name within the text of Resolution 2231.

When it came time for Congress to debate United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; the use of the code word, which nobody in Congress did show any signs of thinking to wonder as to the meaning of or look into it; would initially obscure from the body of the Security Council: and, or from the Congress, or from the electorate, positive knowledge that certain classes of weapons were to be made available to Iran through the agreement – as is shown by the provision of Resolution 2231 presented below.

The Code Word was used once in Resolution 2231. It was needed for use in Annex B of the resolution, paragraph 4(a) below.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B. - Statement

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; and

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

The code word gambit would make it easier for the administration to hide its assistance to, and promotion of the Iranian expansions of its ballistic missile program and arsenals; while at the same time maintaining the pretence that the agreement authored by the Obama administration, was designed with every intention of retaining sanctions limiting Iranian weapons procurements – as opposed to allowing and promoting unheard of Iranian paying procurement of the latest in western weapons design style advanced achievement.

Annex B would never be transmitted to the Congress – nevertheless the code word was used in the Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B; paragraph 4(a).

The meaning of the code word has since become well-known in many quarters; although, even almost three years later, apparently not by our self-indulgent, indifferent 115th, or 116th Congress of the United States.

* * * * *
– Chapter 8 –  
Appendix 2 – IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a. and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2.

[]; []

Below is the Statement of purpose the International Atomic Energy Agency has declared concerning this INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list of inventories the Agency itself had put together:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013);

GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR-RELATED DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, SOFTWARE, AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY*

OBJECTIVE

1. With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, suppliers have had under consideration procedures in relation to the transfer of certain equipment, materials, software, and related technology that could make a major contribution to a "nuclear explosive activity," an "unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity" or acts of nuclear terrorism. In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common definitions, and an export control list of equipment, materials, software, and related technology. Suppliers intend to implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation and relevant international commitments.

And some of the Basic Principles are:

BASIC PRINCIPLE

2. Suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, materials, software, or related technology identified in the Annex:

– for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or

– in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or

– when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism.

*[ INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents \- or as an alternate https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]]

* * * * *

– Chapter 9 –  
Appendix 3 – Compounding the felony by bundling control over nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets

[]

The activities undertaken under the Procurement Working Group mandate are in direct egregious violation of the very first, basic Article of the NPT.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and **not in any way to assist,** encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to **manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices** , or **control over such weapons or explosive devices**.

Article I declares: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer **to any recipient** whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or **control** over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to **assist**...etc."

To better understand how the dedicated bundling of nuclear and basslistic associated assets further compounds the felony; clarification of the intent of the meaning, the definition, of control over such weapons is necessary. This is found in the correspondence of the two nations authoring the NPT – the then Soviet Union, and the United States touched upon earlier in this writing.

On January 1, 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union presented a joint draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation to the United Nations Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee; thus confirming that earlier efforts at consolidating differing points of view were not simply intended as political grandstanding marked by competitive one-upmanship – as has been so often the case – rather, the sincere efforts at cooperation were evidently the product of seriously frightened parties motivated by a deeply felt desire to avoid a perceived inevitable disastrous and irreversible harm to humanity and to the planet that could result from a single act of negligence, error in judgment, or madness.

It is through the documentation of the discussions relating to the development of a mutually agreed upon terms between the Soviet Union and the United States that one learns of part of the intention and meaning of Articles I and II of the NPT, and the meaning of control of nuclear weapons. This writing mentions two documents that it feels may be helpful to clarify the aspects of the intentions of the NPT, and the interpretation of those first two articles.

Four question between the U.S. and NATO allies were reproduced in a then classified document titled: Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together with Answers Given by the United States. This document is comprised of a set of four questions with corresponding responses. The questions and answers outlined the United States' position on the first two proposed articles of the NPT. The document was considered classified at the time; these have since been declassified. The questions and answers contained therein were intended to be presented to the Soviet Union for correction or approval. These were presented on April 28, 1967 and met with no objection from the Soviet Union. The Questions and Answers follow:

Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty asked by U.S. Allies together with answers given by the United States.

1.Q. What may and what may not be transferred under the Draft Treaty?

A. The Treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted.

It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of "nuclear weapons" or control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosives devices because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use.

It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipients, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads.

2.Q. Does the Draft Treaty prohibit consultations and planning on Nuclear Defense among NATO Members?

A. It does not deal with allied consultation and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of Nuclear Weapons or control over them results.

3.Q. Does the Draft Treaty prohibit arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons owned or controlled by the United States within the territory of Non-Nuclear NATO members?

A. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer on nuclear weapons or control over them, unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the Treaty would no longer be controlling.

4.Q. Would the Draft prohibit the unification of Europe if a nuclear-weapon State was one of the Constituent States?

A. It does not deal with the problem of European Unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European State to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to been so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federate state, the Treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.

IN A LETTER, DATED APRIL 10, 1968 from Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, Mr. Katzenbach indicated that:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Before you go to The Hague for the Nuclear Planning Group meeting on April 18-19, I believe you should be familiar with the US interpretations of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regarding alliance arrangements for nuclear defense...

...The language of Articles I and II of the NPT was chosen in order to protect alliance consultations on nuclear defense as well as on nuclear defense deployment arrangements. These are not explicitly sanctioned by Articles I and II, since the USSR was not prepared to provide such an endorsement of NATO arrangements.

In Secretary Rusk's October 10, 1966 talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko, it was clearly understood that Articles I and II of the NPT deal only with what is prohibited and not what is permitted. Article I of the NPT prohibits the transfer of ownership or control of nuclear weapons (understood to mean warheads and bombs and not delivery vehicles). It does not mention alliance consultations or deployment arrangements not involving a transfer of nuclear weapons. We worked out interpretations on these and other aspects of Articles• I and II with our allies (and in particular the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany, the nation of then divided West Germany]) which were presented to the Soviets on April 28, 1967 in the form of answers to questions posed by our allies (Tab A). *****

***[** This letter and related correspondence can be found under: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964–1968 Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 232. Document 232 refers to the particular letter; Volume XI provides related items of interest. **]**

This excerpt from the April 10 letter confirms that Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko, and hence the Soviet government, understood the U.S. position as early as the end of April, 1967. As previously mentioned, on January 1, 1968 the United States and the Soviet Union presented a joint draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation to the United Nations Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. This Joint Draft between the US and the USSR (presented long after the April 28, 1967) supports that the Questions and Answers document presented to the Soviet Union was considered an appropriated interpretation of Articles I and II by both parties.

A facsimile of the full April 10, 1968 letter is reproduced on following pages for the readers' interest (the Addressee's name, Clark Clifford, is listed on the bottom of page 1). The reproduction of the Questions and Answers document follows. Both documents were considered sensitive at the time, but they have long since been declassified. And so, as unclassified government documents, they are in the public domain. These documents are presented following:

* * * * *
– Chapter 10 –  
Appendix 4 – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 Inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

[]; []; []; []

This following is an excerpt – the complete list is found at: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents

Or as an alternate source: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

ANNEX CONTENTS

5. Test and Measurement Equipment for the Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices

5.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

5.B.1. Flash X-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators 5 – 1

5.B.2. High-velocity gun systems

5.B.3. High speed cameras and imaging devices

5.B.5. Specialized instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments

5.B.6. High-speed pulse generators

5.B.7. High explosive containment vessels

5.D. SOFTWARE

5.D.1. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment not controlled in Item 5.B.3. so that it meets or exceeds the characteristics specified in Item 5.B.3.

5.D.2. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment controlled in Item 5.B.3.

5.E. TECHNOLOGY

5.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 5.A. through 5.D.

6. Components for Nuclear Explosive Devices

6.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

6.A.1. Detonators and multipoint initiation systems

6.A.2. Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulse generators

6.A.3. Switching devices

6.A.4. Pulse discharge capacitors

6.A.5. Neutron generator systems

6.A.6. Striplines

6.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

6.C. MATERIALS

6.C.1. High explosive substances or mixtures,

6.E. TECHNOLOGY 6 – 4

6.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development","production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software"

These are examples of some of the inventory found in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; but to understand a little of what is meant by the above we must look at some definitions:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013) ;

DEFINITIONS

"Development" --

is related to all phases before "production" such as:

• design

• design research

• design analysis

• design concepts

• assembly and testing of prototypes

• pilot production schemes

• design data

• process of transforming design data into a product

• configuration design

• integration design

• layouts

"Production" --

means all production phases such as:

• construction

• production engineering

• manufacture

• integration

• assembly (mounting)

• inspection

• testing

• quality assurance

"Technical assistance" --

"Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

"Technical data" --

"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

"Technology" --

means specific information required for the "development", "production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance".

*[ INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents \- or as an alternate https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]]

The above is a partial list, giving a sense of the kinds of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies, training and support services the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel.

The list of nuclear weapons associated inventories from which the United Nations pledges to expedite procurement of to the benefit of the discretion of use ultimately to be decided upon by the Sovereign Government of Iran – has been identified; and a sense of some of the classes of inventories has been presented.

* * * * *

– Chapter 11–  
Appendix 5 – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause

[]; []

What is allowed and what is not allowed as far as concerns IAEA Participation in review of nuclear related assets acquired by Iran is detailed in the JCPOA as follows:

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

6.4. Except as otherwise provided by the Joint Commission or the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:

6.4.1 Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA..:

As a concession to the IAEA, the Agency is informed as to the contents of a proposal when such proposal "... relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA...;" which, as it turns out, means when a proposal has nothing to do with nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories.

6.1.6....When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.

A clearer sense of which meetings the IAEA is authorized to attend, as opposed to not authorized, begins to take on more defined shape upon a bit further examination of later provisions of paragraph six with its subs and sub-subs:

6.7. Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.

6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.

The IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1; unlike INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; refers to components and technologies associated specifically with nuclear energy production.

Sub paragraph 6.7 says the IAEA can hang around and check out the lay of the land – the end uses and end use locations of any goods and technology, any inventory, procured from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1.

When it comes to Iranian acquisitions from the prominent, nuclear weapons related inventories listed of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a, the IAEA is dropped from the picture; the Oligarchy authors of the arrangement leave out mention of anything about the IAEA being invited to drop in for inspection time.

It being the case therefore, that IAEA is explicitly not allowed in either to meetings, and is not explicitly granted authority to confirm end-use location of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories – one might ask if the IAEA is allowed to inspect this anyway.

Paragraph 26 of Resolution 2231 – Annex A: JCPOA – section SANCTIONS informs us of the following:

26. ...There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration... will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. **Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part**.

Any attempt to insist – after the fait accompli – that the IAEA suddenly should be given access to meetings relating to; or given applicable knowledge of end-use or end-use location whereabouts of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons related inventories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; anything like that could justifiably be understood as an attempt to sabotage the E3/EU+3 Iran arrangement effort by imposing a new nuclear related restriction, or restrictive measure.

Note: All participating Parties to the negotiation and concluded arrangement were united in their approval over what had been agreed upon.

It must also be noted that All Parties signatory to the NPT agree that it is the International Atomic Energy Agency that has the duty, the obligation, the responsibility and the mandate to verify that there is no "... diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," as follows under the first clause of Article III of the NPT – or to report otherwise:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...

* * * * *
– Chapter 12 –  
Appendix 6 – Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

[]; []

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 secrecy arrangements favoring Iranian acquisition of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed assets make it impossible for anyone on the outside to really know what is being acquired and when.

Iranian procurement activities are overseen by an arm of the Joint Commission – the Procurement Working Group. The secrecy surrounding the operations of the Procurement Working Group is described as follows:

United States of America: draft resolution July 17, 2015 (S/2015/547);

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

3. Procedures

3.4. Except as provided in Section 6 of this Annex which will be subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN, the work of the Joint Commission is confidential and may be shared only among JCPOA participants and observers as appropriate, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.

The above explains that the work of the Joint Commission is confidential; and that the work discussed in Section 6 of Annex IV is "subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN." The confidentiality procedure is of a much higher standard than the mere status of something being considered as confidential.

Section 6 refers to the functions and procedures of the Procurement Working Group. The Working Group carries out its work under the standard of secrecy of the confidentiality procedure of the UN. The current definition of this U.N. confidentiality standard is found in the U.N. document, document number ST/SGB/2007/6; Secretary-General's bulletin; Information sensitivity, classification and handling; (February 12, 2007): and can be located at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/235/79/PDF/N0723579.pdf?OpenElement

The Bulletin's Section 5 – Handling of classified information gives a sense of the strict security surrounding the Procurement Working Group's activities. Documents are to be kept under lock and key in a secured location; any duplication of documents is tightly controlled – and logged if copied; transmission of documents must be sealed and clearly marked as classified, the addressee and sender is clearly stated, etc.; all transmissions are duly recorded, logged; and there are the various other aspects of strict document controls that are described in the bulletin. And, of course, no one from the office is to divulge any knowledge of what they might have thought they had read or heard somewhere. Here are some examples from Section 5, just to give an idea:

United Nations Secretariat – Document Number ST/SGB/2007/6

12 February 2007

Secretary-General's bulletin

Information sensitivity, classification and handling

*Section 1

Classification principles

1.1 The overall approach to classifying information entrusted to or originating from the United Nations is based on the understanding that the work of the United Nations should be open and transparent, except insofar as the nature of information concerned is deemed confidential in accordance with the guidelines set out in the present bulletin...

*Section 5

Handling of classified information

5.1 Heads of departments or offices shall ensure that the following minimal standards are maintained in the handling of classified information received by or originating from their department or office:

(a) All classified information must be transported in sealed envelopes or containers, and clearly marked as such;

(b) All outgoing and incoming classified information must be recorded in a special registry that lists the staff members who are authorized to handle such information;

(c) Classified materials may be duplicated only with the authorization of either their originator or the head of the receiving or originating department or office, and such copies must be entered in the special registry;

(d) All classified information must be filed and stored under lock and key in a secure location within the department or office concerned, accessible only to the authorized staff members;

And it goes on from there with more detail. If anyone is particularly interested the document is freely presented by the United Nations at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/235/79/PDF/N0723579.pdf?OpenElement.

* * * * *
– Chapter 13 –  
Appendix 7 – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"

[]; []; []; []

AS HAS BEEN presented in the various appendices, the International Atomic Energy Agency is to be kept from the knowledge of any contents of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies, or support services – and subsequently, any knowledge of end-use location, whereabouts, or end-use of such acquisitions.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 also asserts this in its _JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures_ :

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

A. General

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.

Nothing in Annex V mentioned in the paragraph _A – General; 1_ , mentioned above; indicates that the timeline for putting in to effect the very important Section T following below "... _has otherwise been specified_...;" therefore the following activities described under JCPOA Annex I; Section T have been permitted since JCPOA Implementation Day; 16 January 2016.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

The JCPOA has already indicated, in _JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission_ ; paragraph _6. Procurement Working Group_ ; sub-paragraph _6.8_ , that Iran has not given the IAEA permission to:... _verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2_...;"

The materials referred to above, in 825.2 through 82.4 e.g.: "...multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device...explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras)...;" neutron generating systems in application as: "... explosively driven neutron sources..." etc.; these are all INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories (see Appendix II [footnote]).

Again – the IAEA is not entitled to look into these per the JCPOA. The above paragraph 8, with subparagraphs, stipulates that these things will be monitored. The answer to the question of "by whom" is not within the scope of that paragraph. Paragraph 6.7 of Resolution 2231; Annex A: JCPOA; (sub-Annex of JCPOA) JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission; paragraph 6.8 gives us an idea:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6. Procurement Working Group

6.8 **Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2** (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, **the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification**.

The Security Council JCPOA Joint Commission asserts that it will provide expertise required for end-use verification. That's open ended it would seem. End-use verification can suggest that the monitoring and verification of the end-use of any Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories in the capacity detailed in paragraphs 82.2 through 82.4 listed above is to be conducted by the ad hoc committee set up by the Joint Commission – as much as the ad hoc committee set up by the Joint Commission feel like doing. It's pretty vague. Nevertheless:

This set-up bears witness of the intent by the Security Council to supersede treaty with vague promises. The Security Council asserts it will supersede treaty by preventing the IAEA from fulfilling its mandate to verify that INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories are not being diverted.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive **purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**...

Every signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT) has agreed that it will be the International Atomic Energy Agency which verifies there is no diversion of resources to a nuclear weapons development project. It is not for an ad-hoc committee of lackey functionaries, playing the role of foxes guarding the hen house, to say that everything is going just fine.

Any committee the Procurement Working Group sets up for "verification" is simply not recognized by treaty.

That having been mentioned, the Security Council proceeds to supplant the IAEA with its own ad hoc unrecognizable verifiers – those who are not recognized by the NPT treaty signed on to by a multitude of Nations.

* * * * *
– Chapter 14 –  
Appendix 8 – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress

[13 – return]; [14 – return]; []

Barack Obama did not share with the Congress, any part of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 other than Annex A – as is documented in this following timeline of ev7ents – this despite that he had signed into Law and agreement that should have guaranteed his doing so.

The following presents a step-by step timeline of how this evasion of responsibility by the Obama administration was carried out:

**ON 22 MAY 2015** , as President, Barack Obama, signed the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ into law. This law stipulates that within not later than five calendar days "... _after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit_ [such agreement] _to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership_...;"

And that " _an agreement_ ," for the purposes of that Act is defined as:

"... _an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future_."

This appendix is an examination of the simple ruse used by the White House to evade transmitting United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to Congress.

**ON TUESDAY 14 July 2015** , the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed in Vienna. President Barack Obama made a speech from the East Room of the White House corroborating the event stating, among other things:

"After two years of negotiations, the United States, together with our international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has not: a comprehensive long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon." *

*[BARACK OBAMA; Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal; American University, Washington D.C.; August 5, 2015; This file has been archived, find it on google at: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.]

**On the same day** ; in another part of the world, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano asserted that the following had been agreed to and mutually signed on to by the IAEA and Iran:

"I have just signed the Road-map between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. The text has been signed on behalf of Iran by the country's Vice-President, and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi. This is a significant step forward towards clarifying outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme....

'... Implementation of this Road-map will provide an important opportunity to resolve the outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme...." *

*[INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: IAEA Director General's Statement and Road-map for the Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program; (Tuesday 14 July 2015 8:30 CEST); Web address: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-road-map-for-the-clarification-of-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-programme]

Director General Amano then proceeded to an explanation – which was reprinted in IAEA Board of Governors report GOV/INF/2015/14: In his explanation, Director General Amano stipulates that Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on 14 July 2015, had entered into two side agreements, which can be associated with the new JCPOA. Here are some excerpts of his explanation:

Road-map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program:

Joint Statement

By the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi.

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi agreed on 14 July 2015 the following...

1. The IAEA and Iran agreed on a separate arrangement that would allow them to address the remaining outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director's General report (GOV/2011/65). Activities undertaken and the outcomes achieved to date by Iran and the IAEA regarding some of the issues will be reflected in the process....

5. Iran and the IAEA agreed on another separate arrangement regarding the issue of Parchin.*

*[INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: GOV/INF/2015/14: (Date: 14 July 2015) https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2015-14.pdf - The contents of the document have been published in many places by the IAEA, in its press releases and secondary sources reporting on it – on or around July 14, 2015.]

This declaration by the IAEA Director General is brought up here as it is used indirectly by at least one specific Democratic Party member of the House of Representatives to distract attention away from the fact that the Congress had never been transmitted the official United Nations recognized version of the agreement.

**ON THURSDAY, 16 July 2015** , Texas Senator Ted Cruz addressed a letter to Barack Obama describing some of his concerns relating to the JCPOA. Senator Cruz wrote:

"Language in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) assumes Congressional consent of this agreement and fails to even mention the statutory review process that you signed into law on February 27, 2015...."

[This writing isn't sure why Senator Cruz mentioned February 27, he may have been thinking of the date of the inception of the original Bill – the bill which would be later known as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.'' This writing adheres to the date listed on Public Law 114–17, which is 22 May 2015]

_"Specifically, Annex V of the JCPOA states that the United States and Iran "will endorse this JCPOA," and further elucidates that the UN Security Council will undertake a prompt review of the agreement after the conclusion of negotiations..."_

In the above, the Senator is paraphrasing material from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:

i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.

Presented following is a facsimile of the letter Senator Cruz sent the White House on 16 July 2015 – viewing the whole of what was sent might give a better understanding of the impressions the Senator was under during the course of the week's events.

[The letter which follows can be found at:

https://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/20150716_LettertoPOTUSonIranDeal.pdf.]

For the purposes of this writing, referencing this 16 July 2015 letter clarifies that the Executive Branch had transmitted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to the Congress by at least 16 July 2015. We note from the above facsimile that on Thursday the 16th, Senator Cruz was under the impression: "... _That_ [Ambassador] _Samantha Power has already introduced a draft resolution to the Security Council_..." Actually, Ambassador Ms. Power was up to something quite different on that day.

* * * * *

On Thursday July 16, 2015, two days after the July 14th Vienna signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ms. Samantha Power, sent a Letter of Transmittal to the acting President of the United Nations Security Council, Mr. McCully of New Zealand. Ms. Power wrote: " _The United States Mission to the United Nations requests that the attached Missile Technology Control Regime list (see annex) be circulated as a document of the Security Council_." *

*[U.S. AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER: Letter dated 16 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. (United Nations document number S/2015/546): Available on the internet at: https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/6d9eec6cdd36149b85257ddc006cd868/e7551f39803265f285257e92005b6a0c/$FILE/S%202015%20546.pdf [last accessed: August 22, 2016.]]

The letter was necessary as part of a sub-gambit. Nobody needed the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ to be recirculated through the Security Council. Such an action would represent a redundancy. The above list is a well known international document.

It would be like asking the Security Council to re-circulate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is perfectly alright to do so – but it would be sort of a waste of departmental secretaries' time.

The purpose of this seemingly trivial exercise was not necessarily to have the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ circulated. It was to get that Security Council document number appearing on that upper left hand corner of the page of the copied letter of transmittal. This document number was immediately used as a code word, avoiding the need to refer directly to the Annex by name within the text of Resolution 2231 – as we shall soon examine.

When it came time for Congress to debate United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; the use of the code word, which nobody in Congress would think to wonder as to the meaning of or look into, would initially obscure from the body of the Security Council: and, or from the Congress, or from the electorate, positive knowledge that certain classes of weapons were to be made available to Iran through the agreement – as is shown by the provision of Resolution 2231 presented below.

The Code Word was used once in Resolution 2231. It was needed for use in Annex B of the resolution, paragraph 4(a) below. Annex B would never be transmitted to the Congress – nevertheless the code word was used in the following Annex B; paragraph 4(a), which has since become well-known:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B. - Statement

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in _S/2015/546_ and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology **that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems** ; and

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

The code word gambit would make it easier for the administration to hide its assistance to, and promotion of the Iranian expansions of its ballistic missile program and arsenals; and to assert that the agreement authored by the Obama administration, had every intention of retaining sanctions limiting Iranian weapons procurements – as opposed to allowing and promoting unheard of Iranian paying procurement of the latest in western weapons design style in advanced achievement.

The Appendix (Chapter 9) – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex presents a substantial excerpt from the list and gives a pretty good idea of what the administration was attempting to cover up with its code word.

**ON FRIDAY 17 July 2015** : Barack Obama, completely ignoring the Texas Senator's letter as a matter of course; went ahead and had his draft resolution deposited with the Security Council.

Here is a facsimile of the header to the first page of _United States of America: draft resolution S/2015/547_ is presented immediately below presented as verification of the chronology as stated:

The entire document of the original draft resolution (in pfd format) submitted on the 17 July 2015 was to be found at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/547 [last accessed May, 3 2016.]. However, the United Nations has since modified the document it allows the public to review. The new web address finding United States of America: draft resolution is: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2F2015%2F547&Lang=E

What's missing in this newer version here is any mention of the submittal of the draft resolution by the United States – or the date on which the draft resolution was deposited, by the United States, with the Security Council (17 July 2015). That's perhaps an example of part of your Obama-era, post Obama-Era United Nations Security Council emerging style of paperwork deciding upon the new ideal of what to show the public, and when, in this day and age:

The header of this later version does note that the draft resolution was put out for General Distribution on 20 July 2015, the date of adoption of the resolution by the Security Council. Here then, the Security Council establishes its claim that the entire body of the Security Council, which does include the non-permanent Member States of the Council (none of which were privy to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA negotiation itself); here the Security Council establishes its chronology, which verifies the claim (voiced the morning of the 20th by U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power, and which will be documented anon) that there had been no real review of the draft resolution by the entire body of the Security Council before the 9 AM vote for adoption on Monday morning, 20 July 2015, before anyone was really sure if everyone had even already had their cup of coffee yet.

The original version of the draft resolution can still be found in two places that this writing knows of:

_Human Rights Voices_ has it listed at:

http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/7.17.2015.security.council.resolution.iran.pdf

And _document cloud.org_ retains this at:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2168507/security-council-draft-resolution.pdf

The identical adopted Security Council Resolution 2231 version, as adopted on 20 July 2015 is found at is found (in English) at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015)

To find United Nations Security Council resolutions by year refer to: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions

**ON SUNDAY, 19 July 2015** , Obama Spokesperson John Kirby announced in a press release that the State Department had transmitted to Congress everything relevant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – this was the day before Resolution 2231 was even adopted by the Security Council. The resolution didn't exist yet, transmittal of an authorized version was impossible – and since, as the Security Council claims, the draft proposal would only be circulated of the following day; for the State Department to transmit to Congress an official copy of an un-circulated U.N. document would have been a bureaucratic impossibility. Here is what Kirby released to the news media:

"Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include the Unclassified Verification Assessment Report on the JCPOA and the Intelligence Community's Classified Annex to the Verification Assessment Report, as required under the law. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20 ."*

*[DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Press Statement, John Kirby, Washington DC (July 19, 2015). This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# - Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245051.htm]

What Kirby does here is to declare that the administration has transmitted these documents as " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ ;" the act which stipulates that:

Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership— ''(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes;

...and continues on by defining what an "Agreement" as far as it concerns the Bill:

''(1) AGREEMENT.—The term 'agreement' means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.

The JCPOA is of interest; but no more so than the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. According to the law, the 60-day countdown period for review couldn't and can't begin just because the Obama administration had only transmitted a part of Resolution 2231. The President had not transmitted to Congress the main attraction, the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

Sunday 19 July 2015, was the day before Monday 20 July 2017 – the day when the Security Council voted unanimously to recognize the Draft Resolution deposited by the United States administration of President Barack Obama.

It's too easy to know: Barack Obama's intentionally mendacious Puppet Gnome Agent John Kirby claimed to have transmitted everything required by the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ to Congress on the day before the awaited United Nations Security Council authorization qualifying the agreement existed. The United Nations' recognized perception the agreement didn't exist yet.

John Kirby declared that: " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include...,_ _as required under the law_ _. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20_."

The Obama administration, in asserting that it had sent everything, asserted the irrelevancy of the United Nations Security Council resolution to be declared the following day.

This was the excuse the maliciously mendacious overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress that there were any significant additions to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA that the administration felt might merit any discussion by the Congress of the United States.

This was the excuse the maliciously mendacious overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress the various weapons transactions agreed to within the entirety of Barack Obama's United States Proposed Draft Resolution, which was accepted as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) on 20 July 2019 – the day after Obama Gnome Agent offered the Obama administration's official statement claiming that it had sent everything relevant which needed be submitted to Congress.

**ON MONDAY, 20 July 2015** , the vote adopting Barack Obama's _United States draft proposal S/2015/547_ as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 takes place in the 7488th meeting of the Security Council. Now Barack Obama finally had something to send Congress; but there is no movement at that time of any time following, in that regard, emanating from the Obama White House. The 60 day countdown for Congressional review of the "Iran Deal" officially begins – not because Obama had transmitted Resolution 2231 to the Congress; but because Obama had decided explicitly on his own that the race will get started at that time; perhaps, because it should be thought of as the race to see if Congress would ever figure out within the 60-day countdown period that Obama had not acted on any pretence of an intention to effect transmission of Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress...

The day before the resolution existed; on Sunday 19 July 2015; the Obama administration effectively told the Congress that whatever was in that resolution; to be voted on the next day, wasn't of interest to the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015,_ law. The Obama administration here had implicitly, or maybe more or less explicitly, asserted that many of the agreed upon weapons transfers to Iran which are reflected in parts of Resolution 2231 other than Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, were not of interest to Congress or the law Obama had signed on to. Whatever the case contemplated and put into effect by the Obama administration; there was never a transmittal of Resolution 2231 to the Congress from the; but further confirmation on that point is required:

**ON WEDNESDAY, 22 July 2015** , White House Spokesperson John Kirby held a press conference in the White House.

The following is a recounting of some further details of the questions posed, and answers given during that July 22 press Conference.

QUESTION: _Yes, please. Just to clarify, you mentioned that the Congress has what we have. And in the same time you mentioned yesterday and today in a TV appearance that you transferred to the Congress all the documents that you have regarding this issue. Can you describe it? I mean, what is it? I mean, it's like it is detailed or it's just – I assume it's not --_

MR KIRBY: _It's the entire set of documents that go along with the deal to include the annexes and a verification assessment._

QUESTION: _...It's all the technical, the financial part and everything?_

MR KIRBY: _...It's – everything that we have about this deal has been provided to Congress. And I would point out that much of it is already available to all of you online._

QUESTION: _...It's not the 158 pages, right? It's more than that, right?_

MR KIRBY:...There is some additional information provided there, yeah, but a lot of it's already been made publicly available. But yes, everything is up there. It got there on Sunday.*

*[U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT: Daily Press Briefing - Washington DC (July 22, 2015); John Kirby, spokesperson. This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# - Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/07/245186.htm]

It was all a nonsensical lie, of course. On Sunday, 19 July 2015; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 didn't exist yet. Kirby simply made up an inane story to cover for the Obama administration's refusal to transmit the resolution to Congress. And naturally., the imbecile members of the 114th Congress , incapable of exhibiting any common sense whatsoever, unanimously swallowed the story whole; And naturally, no member of the 114th Congress would take an interest in going up to the Security Council website and pulling down a free copy of the resolution to read it and consider what it might contain. This was, and remains even today, the going standard of disinterest in this whole issue of Barack Obama's "Iran Nuclear Deal."

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 was not going to get transmitted to the Congress. Going through the Congressional Record, and State Department records, there is no trace of anything having to do with Obama's "Iran Deal" being transmitted or received after that Sunday, the 19th. The Statements made on the 22nd by John Kirby would be the White House final word on the matter.

That no one in Congress would complain about how the information being relayed by the White House simply didn't match up with the facts is another example of the lack attention, the dinterest; and the primitive nature of discussion surrounding this issue of Security Council Resolution 2231, "JCPOA."

* * * * *

But not quite; the White House later, in December 2015, made a very interesting declaration in writing concerning this "Obama Deal" which was never reviewed by the Congress.

Although everyone in Congress knew about the 20 July 2015 vote in the Security Council, it was blithely ignored until members of the Senate – Republicans Tom Cotton and Mike Pompeo made an earth-shattering discovery/observation on or around 18 September 2015 that nobody in Congress had any signed copies of the JCPOA.

This discovery dawned on these two after both Houses of Congress had voted on something purported to be the "Iran Nuclear Deal" on 10 and 11 September 2017, a little over a week before.

Being the wondering audience they were, Senator Pompeo wrote the State Department, Secretary of State John Kerry, on 18 September 2015, asking questions:

Dear Secretary Kerry:

I have reviewed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Islamic Republic of Iran – or at least the parts of the agreement that were provided to Congress by the administration. As you know, pursuant to H. Res. 411, the House of Representatives considers the documents transmitted on July 19, 2015 incomplete in light of the fact that the secret side deals between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran were not provided to Congress. I look forward to seeing the entire agreement – including the two secret side deals that are part of the JCPOA – so that Congress may continue to evaluate the JCPOA and, depending on the outcome of the vote under the relevant provisions of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, potentially end the current and continuing prohibition of the lifting of sanctions on Iran.

During that review, I found that the copies provided to Congress of the JCPOA are not signed by any of the P5+1 members nor by Iran. Having never seen an international agreement of this magnitude not signed by the parties or an agent of the parties, I assume this is simply an oversight or an administrative error. That is, Congress must not have the final version of the agreement that would necessarily be signed. I request that you provide us with copies of a final, executed copy of the JCPOA. In the event that the JCPOA has not yet been signed by the parties, please inform us (a) when signatures will be placed on the agreement, (b) what parties will be signing, and (c) which person you anticipate will sign on behalf of each of those parties, including on behalf of the United States.

I am confident that you intended for the JCPOA to be signed by each of the P5+1 participants. I can find no international agreement of this "historic" nature that was not signed by the parties. Each of the past five major nuclear agreements to which the U.S. is a party – SALT I, SALT II, START I, START II and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea – were signed by representatives of each nation that was party to the agreement. This is not a mere formality. Those signatures represent the commitment of the signatory and the country on whose behalf he or she is signing.

A signature also serves to make clear precisely who the parties to the agreement are and the authority under which that nation entered into the agreement. In short, just as with any legal instrument, signing matters.

This is particularly important with respect to JCPOA. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has made clear that he does not believe that JCPOA is legally binding on his nation, saying, "If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is sent to (and passed by) parliament, it will create an obligation for the government. It will mean the president, who has not signed it so far, will have to sign it. Why should we place an unnecessary legal restriction on the Iranian people?"

Given the many benefits that will accrue to the ayatollahs, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and other unsavory elements of the Iranian regime, I believe that Iran should, at the very least, bind itself to the few requirements placed on it under the JCPOA by signing the agreement. I also believe that the United States and its P5+1 partners on the JCPOA should execute the agreement on behalf of their countries. I look forward to your response.

We all do. *

*[The text of the letter was found in two places

https://cjhsla.org/2015/11/01/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/

And:

http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/2015/09/19/

I was unable to locate an original facsimile; however, the response to the letter from the State Department verifies that the letter was sent.]

The text of the response follows – and a facsimile of the response is presented after:

Dear Mr. Pompeo.:

Thank you for your September 18 letter regarding the nuclear deal with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the European Union. As you know, the United States has a long-standing practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in political commitments.

The success of the JCPOA will depend not whether it is legally binding or signed, but rather on the extensive verification measures we have put in place, as well as Iran's understanding that we have the capacity to re-impose and ramp up – our sanction if Iran does not meet its commitments.

Everything the JCPOA and its annexes are commitments Iran made, and must keep, to remain in compliance. Iran breaks these commitments, we can snap back both unilateral and UN sanction.

We provided Congress with everything agreed to between the P5+1 and Iran in the JCPOA, in full compliance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INAEA). There are no "secret deals" between the P5+1 and Iran, and no JCPOA document that Congress does not already have. The Administration is fully committed to providing information to Congress to ensure full transparency as we implement the JCPOA.

We hope this information is useful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Julia Frifield; Assistant Secretary; Legislative Affairs.

The facsimile presented next can be found at: _http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/11.24.2015.state.dept.letter.jcpoa.pdf_

The letter claims that the JCPOA was unsigned. The letter doesn't mention that the JCPOA had been incorporated into the larger, Resolution 2231 program and that the resolution's policy of arms transactions is not presented in the resolution's Annex A: JCPOA.

To an extent – this letter gives evidence; again, that Resolution 2231 was never transmitted to the Congress, and never looked at or voted on by the Congress.

* * * * *
– Chapter 15 –  
Appendix 9 – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

[Return to Appendix 1]; []

Following is an excerpt of the inventories listed on the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ :

Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex

CATEGORY I -ITEM 1

COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

1.A.1. Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.A.2. Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.B.1. "Production facilities"

1.D.1. "Software"

1.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY I -ITEM 2

COMPLETE SUBSYSTEMS USABLE FOR COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

2.A.1. "Complete subsystems"

2.B.1. "Production facilities"

2.B.2. "Production equipment"

2.D.1. "Software"

2.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 3

PROPULSION COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT

3.A.1. Turbojet and turbofan engines

3.A.2. Ramjet/scramjet/pulse jet/combined cycle engines

3.A.3. Rocket motor cases, 'insulation' components and nozzles

3.A.4. Staging mechanisms, separation mechanisms and interstages

3.A.5. Liquid and slurry propellant (including oxidisers) control systems

3.A.6. Hybrid rocket motors

3.A.7. Radial ball bearings

3.A.8. Liquid propellant tanks

3.A.9. Turboprop engine systems

3.A.10. Combustion chambers

3.B.1. "Production facilities"

3.B.2. "Production equipment"

3.B.3. Flow-forming machines

3.C.1. 'Interior lining' usable for rocket motor cases

3.C.2. 'Insulation' material in bulk form usable for rocket motor cases

3.D.1. "Software"

3.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 4

PROPELLANTS, CHEMICALS AND PROPELLANT PRODUCTION

4.A. None

4.B.1. "Production equipment"

4.B.2. "Production equipment"

4.B.3. a. Batch mixers

4.B.3. b. Continuous mixers

4.B.3. c. Fluid energy mills

4.B.3. d. Metal powder "production equipment"

4.C.1. Composite and composite modified double base propellants

4.C.2. Fuel substances

4.C.2. a. Hydrazine

4.C.2. b. Hydrazine derivatives

4.C.2. c. Spherical aluminium powder

4.C.2. d. Zirconium, beryllium, magnesium and alloys

4.C.2. e. Boron and boron alloys

4.C.2. f. High energy density materials

4.C.3. Perchlorates, chlorates or chromates

4.C.4. a. Oxidiser substances –liquid propellant rocket engines

4.C.4. b. Oxidiser substances –solid propellant rocket motors

4.C.5. Polymeric substances

4.C.6. Other propellant additives and agents

4.C.6. a. Bonding agents

4.C.6. b. Curing reaction catalysts

4.C.6. c. Burning rate modifiers

4.C.6. d. Esters and plasticisers

4.C.6. e. Stabilisers

4.D.1. "Software"

4.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 6

PRODUCTION OF STRUCTURAL COMPOSITES, PYROLYTIC DEPOSITION AND DENSIFICATION, AND STRUCTURAL MATERIALS

6.A.1. Composite structures, laminates and manufactures thereof

6.A.2. Resaturated pyrolised materials

6.B.1. a. Filament winding machines or fibre placement machines

6.B.1. b. Tape-laying machines

6.B.1. c. Multi-directional, multi-dimensional weaving machines or interlacing machines

6.B.1. d. Equipment designed or modified for the production of fibrous or filamentary materials

6.B.1. e. Equipment designed or modified for special fibre surface treatment

6.B.2. Nozzles

6.B.3. Isostatic presses

6.B.4. Chemical vapour deposition furnaces

6.B.5. Equipment and controls for the densification and pyrolysis process

6.C.1. Resin impregnated fibre prepregs and metal coated fibre preforms

6.C.2. Resaturated pyrolised materials

6.C.3. Fine grain graphites

6.C.4. Pyrolytic or fibrous reinforced graphites

6.C.5. Ceramic composite materials for missile radomes

6.C.6. Silicon-carbide materials

6.C.7. Tungsten molybdenum and alloys

6.C.8. Maraging steel

6.C.9. Titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel

6.D.1. "Software"

6.E.1. "Technology"

6.E.2. "Technical data"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 9

INSTRUMENTATION, NAVIGATION AND DIRECTION FINDING

9.A.1. Integrated flight instrument systems

9.A.2. Gyro-astro compasses

9.A.3. Linear accelerometers

9.A.4. All types of gyros

9.A.5. Accelerometers or gyros

9.A.6. Inertial or other equipment

9.A.7. 'Integrated navigation systems'

9.A.8. Three axis magnetic heading sensors

9.B.1. "Production equipment", and other test, calibration and alignment equipment

9.B.2. a. Balancing machines

9.B.2. b. Indicator heads

9.B.2. c. Motion simulators/rate tables

9.B.2. d. Positioning tables

9.B.2. e. Centrifuges

9.D.1. "Software"

9.D.2. Integration "Software"

9.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 10

FLIGHT CONTROL

10.A.1. Hydraulic, mechanical, electro-optical or electromechanical flight control systems

10.A.2. Attitude control equipment

10.A.3. Flight control servo-valves

10.B.1. Test calibration and alignment equipment

10.C. None

10.D.1. "Software"

10.E.1. Design "technology" for integration of air vehicle fuselage, propulsion system and lifting control surfaces

10.E.2. Design "technology" for integration of the flight control, guidance, and propulsion data into a flight management system

10.E.3. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 11

AVIONICS

11.A.1. Radar and laser radar systems including altimeters

11.A.2. Passive sensors

11.A.3. Receiving equipment GNSS e.g. GPS,

GLONASS or Galileo

11.A.4. Electronic assemblies and components

11.A.5. Umbilical and interstage electrical connectors

11.D.1. "Software"

11.E.1. Design "technology"

11.E.2. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 12

LAUNCH SUPPORT

12.A.1. Apparatus and devices

12.A.2. Vehicles

12.A.3. Gravity meters (gravimeters), gravity gradiometers

12.A.4. Telemetry and telecontrol equipment, including ground equipment

12.A.5. Precision tracking systems

12.A.5. a. Tracking Systems

12.A.5. b. Range instrumentation radars

12.A.6. Thermal Batteries

12.D.1. "Software"

12.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 15

TEST FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

15.B.1. Vibration test equipment

15.B.1. a. Vibration test systems

15.B.1. b. Digital controllers [continued]

15.B.1. c. Vibration thrusters (shaker units)

15.B.1. d. Test piece support structures and electronic units

15.B.2. Wind-tunnels

15.B.3. Test benches/stands

15.B.4. Environmental chambers

15.B.5. Accelerators

15.D.1. "Software"

15.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 16

MODELLING-SIMULATION AND DESIGN INTEGRATION

16.A.1. Hybrid (combined analogue/digital) computers

16.D.1. "Software"

16.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 17

STEALTH

17.A.1. Devices for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A. or 20.A.

17.B.1. Systems specially designed for radar cross section measurement

17.C.1. Materials for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A.

CATEGORY II -ITEM 18

NUCLEAR EFFECTS PROTECTION

18.A.1. "Radiation Hardened" "microcircuits"

18.A.2. 'Detectors'

18.A.3. Radomes

18.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 19

OTHER COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

19.A.1. Complete rocket systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.2. Complete UAV systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.3. Complete UAV systems

19.B.1. "Production facilities"

19.D.1. "Software"

19.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 20

OTHER COMPLETE SUBSYSTEMS

20.A.1. a. Individual rocket stages

20.A.1. b. Solid propellant rocket motors, hybrid rocket motors or liquid propellant rocket engines

20.B.1. "Production facilities"

20.B.2. "Production equipment"

There's more to that list – but that should give the reader a pretty good idea that a substantial part of the E3/EU+3 Iran, Resolution 2231 is about promising technological support to a weapons development program; all the while claiming that this whole arrangement is deeply concerned only with promoting the "exclusively" peaceful development of nuclear energy – and could never possibly have anything to do with any impure motives like arms trade profiteering.

THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME – Equipment, Software and Technology Annex is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry, primarily dealing with ballistic missiles and delivery systems; and with other weapons technologies associated with ballistic missiles. This list was developed by the international Missile Technology Control Regime association. The Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was assembled as a list of weapons inventory the M.T.C.R. association considers should be controlled.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (M.T.C.R.) itself is a voluntary association of (currently) 34 member States joining together to establish and promote guidelines coordinating national export licensing efforts aimed at containing and restraining the proliferation of specific weapons war. The M.T.C.R. is not affiliated with the United Nations, but its members may also be United Nations members. All five of the Nuclear Weapons Nations (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China) as well as Germany are all members of this association; the Islamic Republic of Iran is not.

For a more detailed description of the association's purpose and activities the interested reader may refer to the Missile Technology Control Regime website: http://www.mtcr.info/english/The Missile Technology Control Regime; or, possibly better, http://www.mtcr.info/.

The _Missile Technology Control Regime – Equipment, Software And Technology Annex_ does not correspond to the weapons inventory of any particular nation – rather, as mentioned, is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry that the M.T.C.R. association considers should be controlled; and that great care and restraint should be exhibited when considering the import, export, sale or transfer of the listed inventory. The M.T.C.R. has established suggested common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines). These are non-binding legally, but may serve to be taken into account when developing export / import regulations regarding the list of voluntarily controlled items presented in the M.T.C.R. Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

The E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel agreement, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, utilizes the M.T.C.R. Equipment, Software and Technology Annex for a use other than for which it was initially intended. It is used in the arrangement between Iran and the E3/EU+3 as a convenient shopping list which the Islamic Republic of Iran is to be given access to, on a case-by-case, basis as of 16 January 2016, and full access to some eight years after. The use of the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex by the E3/EU+3 Iran Project resembles the Cartel's employment of the International Atomic Energy Agency INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list.

* * * * *
– Chapter 16 –  
Appendix 10 – The Vote Adopting Resolution 2231.

**[** **]**

**ON FRIDAY 17 July 2015** : Then United States President Barack Obama had his draft resolution deposited with the Security Council.

Here is a facsimile of the header to the first page of United States of America: draft resolution S/2015/547 is presented immediately below presented as verification of the chronology as stated:

The entire document of the original draft resolution (in pfd format) submitted on the 17 July 2015 was to be found at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/547 [last accessed May, 3 2016.]. However, the United Nations has since modified the document it allows the public to review. The new web address finding United States of America: draft resolution is: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2F2015%2F547&Lang=E

What's missing in this newer version here is any mention of the submittal of the draft resolution by the United States – or the date on which the draft resolution was deposited, by the United States, with the Security Council (17 July 2015). That's perhaps an example of part of your Obama-era, post Obama-Era United Nations Security Council emerging style of paperwork deciding upon the new ideal of what to show the public, and when, in this day and age:

The header of this later version does note that the draft resolution was put out for General Distribution on 20 July 2015, the date of adoption of the resolution by the Security Council. Here then, the Security Council establishes its claim that the entire body of the Security Council, which does include the non-permanent Member States of the Council (none of which were privy to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA negotiation itself); here the Security Council establishes its chronology, which verifies the claim (voiced the morning of the 20th by U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power, and which will be documented anon) that there had been no real review of the draft resolution by the entire body of the Security Council before the 9 AM vote for adoption on Monday morning, 20 July 2015, before anyone was really sure if everyone had even already had their cup of coffee yet.

The original version of the draft resolution can still be found in two places that this writing knows of:

Human Rights Voices has it listed at:

http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/7.17.2015.security.council.resolution.iran.pdf

And document cloud.org retains this at:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2168507/security-council-draft-resolution.pdf

The identical adopted Security Council Resolution 2231 version, as adopted on 20 July 2015 is found at is found (in English) at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015)

To find United Nations Security Council resolutions by year refer to: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions

Before examining the vote, it is important to note that Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations requires of any vote concerning the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, the Military Staff Committee must be involved in the development of such:

Charter of the United Nations

*sER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47 plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

The Military Staff Committee was never invited into any consultation with the entire body of the Security Council. The JCPOA intentionally precluded this possibility in the following provision:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2013)

Annex A – JCPOA

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:

i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council **for adoption without delay**.

Adoption without delay would mean in this case; that there would be no time to waste discussing the finer esoteric and uninteresting points in pondering these over with the Military Staff Committee.

Moving on to the vote: this following is taken from the meeting notes of the 7488th meeting of the Security Council. [The meeting Notes in their entireity can be found at: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SEVENTIETH YEAR 7488TH MEETING; S/PV.7488; Monday, 20 July 2015, 9 a.m. New York, United States of America; internet address: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7488.pdf.]; following is the excerpt:

The meeting was called to order at 9.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

[the topic of the agenda was non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of how the Security Council masterfully resolved the issue is a matter of the record, as follows:]

Non-proliferation

**The President** [Mr. McCully of New Zealand _]: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting._

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. Thomas Mayr-Harting, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2015/547, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.

_The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I would like to thank all Council members for their sponsorship of the draft resolution, which is now a presidential text. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now_.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

_In favour_ :

Angola, Chad, Chile, China, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

**The President** : _The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2231 (2015)_.

THAT WAS ALL THE TIME needed to take a cursory vote keeping the Military Staff Committee away from required discussion..

* * * * *

