In science and philosophy, a paradigm () is
a distinct set of concepts or thought patterns,
including theories, research methods, postulates,
and standards for what constitutes legitimate
contributions to a field.
== Etymology ==
Paradigm comes from Greek παράδειγμα
(paradeigma), "pattern, example, sample" from
the verb παραδείκνυμι (paradeiknumi),
"exhibit, represent, expose" and that from
παρά (para), "beside, beyond" and δείκνυμι
(deiknumi), "to show, to point out".In rhetoric,
paradeigma is known as a type of proof. The
purpose of paradeigma is to provide an audience
with an illustration of similar occurrences.
This illustration is not meant to take the
audience to a conclusion, however it is used
to help guide them there. One analogy of how
a paradeigma is meant to guide an audience
would be a personal accountant. It is not
the job of a personal accountant to tell their
client exactly what (and what not) to spend
their money on, but to aid in guiding their
client as to how money should be spent based
on their financial goals. Anaximenes defined
paradeigma as "actions that have occurred
previously and are similar to, or the opposite
of, those which we are now discussing."The
original Greek term παράδειγμα (paradeigma)
was used in Greek texts such as Plato's Timaeus
(28A) as the model or the pattern that the
Demiurgos used to create the cosmos. The term
had a technical meaning in the field of grammar:
the 1900 Merriam-Webster dictionary defines
its technical use only in the context of grammar
or, in rhetoric, as a term for an illustrative
parable or fable. In linguistics, Ferdinand
de Saussure used paradigm to refer to a class
of elements with similarities.
The Merriam-Webster Online dictionary defines
this usage as "a philosophical and theoretical
framework of a scientific school or discipline
within which theories, laws, and generalizations
and the experiments performed in support of
them are formulated; broadly: a philosophical
or theoretical framework of any kind."The
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy attributes
the following description of the term to Thomas
Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions:
Kuhn suggests that certain scientific works,
such as Newton's Principia or John Dalton's
New System of Chemical Philosophy (1808),
provide an open-ended resource: a framework
of concepts, results, and procedures within
which subsequent work is structured. Normal
science proceeds within such a framework or
paradigm. A paradigm does not impose a rigid
or mechanical approach, but can be taken more
or less creatively and flexibly.
== Scientific paradigm ==
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a paradigm
as "a typical example or pattern of something;
a pattern or model". The historian of science
Thomas Kuhn gave it its contemporary meaning
when he adopted the word to refer to the set
of concepts and practices that define a scientific
discipline at any particular period of time.
In his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(first published in 1962), Kuhn defines a
scientific paradigm as: "universally recognized
scientific achievements that, for a time,
provide model problems and solutions for a
community of practitioners, i.e.,
what is to be observed and scrutinized
the kind of questions that are supposed to
be asked and probed for answers in relation
to this subject
how these questions are to be structured
what predictions made by the primary theory
within the discipline
how the results of scientific investigations
should be interpreted
how an experiment is to be conducted, and
what equipment is available to conduct the
experiment.In The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, Kuhn saw the sciences as going
through alternating periods of normal science,
when an existing model of reality dominates
a protracted period of puzzle-solving, and
revolution, when the model of reality itself
undergoes sudden drastic change. Paradigms
have two aspects. Firstly, within normal science,
the term refers to the set of exemplary experiments
that are likely to be copied or emulated.
Secondly, underpinning this set of exemplars
are shared preconceptions, made prior to – and
conditioning – the collection of evidence.
These preconceptions embody both hidden assumptions
and elements that he describes as quasi-metaphysical;
the interpretations of the paradigm may vary
among individual scientists.Kuhn was at pains
to point out that the rationale for the choice
of exemplars is a specific way of viewing
reality: that view and the status of "exemplar"
are mutually reinforcing. For well-integrated
members of a particular discipline, its paradigm
is so convincing that it normally renders
even the possibility of alternatives unconvincing
and counter-intuitive. Such a paradigm is
opaque, appearing to be a direct view of the
bedrock of reality itself, and obscuring the
possibility that there might be other, alternative
imageries hidden behind it. The conviction
that the current paradigm is reality tends
to disqualify evidence that might undermine
the paradigm itself; this in turn leads to
a build-up of unreconciled anomalies. It is
the latter that is responsible for the eventual
revolutionary overthrow of the incumbent paradigm,
and its replacement by a new one. Kuhn used
the expression paradigm shift (see below)
for this process, and likened it to the perceptual
change that occurs when our interpretation
of an ambiguous image "flips over" from one
state to another. (The rabbit-duck illusion
is an example: it is not possible to see both
the rabbit and the duck simultaneously.) This
is significant in relation to the issue of
incommensurability (see below).
An example of a currently accepted paradigm
would be the standard model of physics. The
scientific method allows for orthodox scientific
investigations into phenomena that might contradict
or disprove the standard model; however grant
funding would be proportionately more difficult
to obtain for such experiments, depending
on the degree of deviation from the accepted
standard model theory the experiment would
test for. To illustrate the point, an experiment
to test for the mass of neutrinos or the decay
of protons (small departures from the model)
is more likely to receive money than experiments
that look for the violation of the conservation
of momentum, or ways to engineer reverse time
travel.
Mechanisms similar to the original Kuhnian
paradigm have been invoked in various disciplines
other than the philosophy of science. These
include: the idea of major cultural themes,
worldviews (and see below), ideologies, and
mindsets. They have somewhat similar meanings
that apply to smaller and larger scale examples
of disciplined thought. In addition, Michel
Foucault used the terms episteme and discourse,
mathesis and taxinomia, for aspects of a "paradigm"
in Kuhn's original sense.
== Paradigm shifts ==
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
Kuhn wrote that "the successive transition
from one paradigm to another via revolution
is the usual developmental pattern of mature
science" (p. 12).
Paradigm shifts tend to appear in response
to the accumulation of critical anomalies
as well as the proposal of a new theory with
the power to encompass both older relevant
data and explain relevant anomalies. New paradigms
tend to be most dramatic in sciences that
appear to be stable and mature, as in physics
at the end of the 19th century. At that time,
a statement generally attributed to physicist
Lord Kelvin famously claimed, "There is nothing
new to be discovered in physics now. All that
remains is more and more precise measurement."
Five years later, Albert Einstein published
his paper on special relativity, which challenged
the set of rules laid down by Newtonian mechanics,
which had been used to describe force and
motion for over two hundred years. In this
case, the new paradigm reduces the old to
a special case in the sense that Newtonian
mechanics is still a good model for approximation
for speeds that are slow compared to the speed
of light. Many philosophers and historians
of science, including Kuhn himself, ultimately
accepted a modified version of Kuhn's model,
which synthesizes his original view with the
gradualist model that preceded it. Kuhn's
original model is now generally seen as too
limited.
Some examples of contemporary paradigm shifts
include:
In medicine, the transition from "clinical
judgment" to evidence-based medicine
In social psychology, the transition from
p-hacking to replication
In software engineering, the transition from
the Rational Paradigm to the Empirical Paradigm
Kuhn's idea was, itself, revolutionary in
its time. It caused a major change in the
way that academics talk about science; and,
so, it may be that it caused (or was part
of) a "paradigm shift" in the history and
sociology of science. However, Kuhn would
not recognize such a paradigm shift. Being
in the social sciences, people can still use
earlier ideas to discuss the history of science.
=== Paradigm paralysis ===
Perhaps the greatest barrier to a paradigm
shift, in some cases, is the reality of paradigm
paralysis: the inability or refusal to see
beyond the current models of thinking. This
is similar to what psychologists term confirmation
bias. Examples include rejection of Aristarchus
of Samos', Copernicus', and Galileo's theory
of a heliocentric solar system, the discovery
of electrostatic photography, xerography and
the quartz clock.
== Incommensurability ==
Kuhn pointed out that it could be difficult
to assess whether a particular paradigm shift
had actually led to progress, in the sense
of explaining more facts, explaining more
important facts, or providing better explanations,
because the understanding of "more important",
"better", etc. changed with the paradigm.
The two versions of reality are thus incommensurable.
Kuhn's version of incommensurability has an
important psychological dimension; this is
apparent from his analogy between a paradigm
shift and the flip-over involved in some optical
illusions. However, he subsequently diluted
his commitment to incommensurability considerably,
partly in the light of other studies of scientific
development that did not involve revolutionary
change. One of the examples of incommensurability
that Kuhn used was the change in the style
of chemical investigations that followed the
work of Lavoisier on atomic theory in the
late 18th Century. In this change, the focus
had shifted from the bulk properties of matter
(such as hardness, colour, reactivity, etc.)
to studies of atomic weights and quantitative
studies of reactions. He suggested that it
was impossible to make the comparison needed
to judge which body of knowledge was better
or more advanced. However, this change in
research style (and paradigm) eventually (after
more than a century) led to a theory of atomic
structure that accounts well for the bulk
properties of matter; see, for example, Brady's
General Chemistry. According to P J Smith,
this ability of science to back off, move
sideways, and then advance is characteristic
of the natural sciences, but contrasts with
the position in some social sciences, notably
economics.This apparent ability does not guarantee
that the account is veridical at any one time,
of course, and most modern philosophers of
science are fallibilists. However, members
of other disciplines do see the issue of incommensurability
as a much greater obstacle to evaluations
of "progress"; see, for example, Martin Slattery's
Key Ideas in Sociology.
== Subsequent developments ==
Opaque Kuhnian paradigms and paradigm shifts
do exist. A few years after the discovery
of the mirror-neurons that provide a hard-wired
basis for the human capacity for empathy,
the scientists involved were unable to identify
the incidents that had directed their attention
to the issue. Over the course of the investigation,
their language and metaphors had changed so
that they themselves could no longer interpret
all of their own earlier laboratory notes
and records.
=== Imre Lakatos and research programmes ===
However, many instances exist in which change
in a discipline's core model of reality has
happened in a more evolutionary manner, with
individual scientists exploring the usefulness
of alternatives in a way that would not be
possible if they were constrained by a paradigm.
Imre Lakatos suggested (as an alternative
to Kuhn's formulation) that scientists actually
work within research programmes. In Lakatos'
sense, a research programme is a sequence
of problems, placed in order of priority.
This set of priorities, and the associated
set of preferred techniques, is the positive
heuristic of a programme. Each programme also
has a negative heuristic; this consists of
a set of fundamental assumptions that – temporarily,
at least – takes priority over observational
evidence when the two appear to conflict.
This latter aspect of research programmes
is inherited from Kuhn's work on paradigms,
and represents an important departure from
the elementary account of how science works.
According to this, science proceeds through
repeated cycles of observation, induction,
hypothesis-testing, etc., with the test of
consistency with empirical evidence being
imposed at each stage. Paradigms and research
programmes allow anomalies to be set aside,
where there is reason to believe that they
arise from incomplete knowledge (about either
the substantive topic, or some aspect of the
theories implicitly used in making observations.
=== Larry Laudan: Dormant anomalies, fading
credibility, and research traditions ===
Larry Laudan has also made two important contributions
to the debate. Laudan believed that something
akin to paradigms exist in the social sciences
(Kuhn had contested this, see below); he referred
to these as research traditions. Laudan noted
that some anomalies become "dormant", if they
survive a long period during which no competing
alternative has shown itself capable of resolving
the anomaly. He also presented cases in which
a dominant paradigm had withered away because
its lost credibility when viewed against changes
in the wider intellectual milieu.
== In social sciences ==
Kuhn himself did not consider the concept
of paradigm as appropriate for the social
sciences. He explains in his preface to The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions that he
developed the concept of paradigm precisely
to distinguish the social from the natural
sciences. While visiting the Center for Advanced
Study in the Behavioral Sciences in 1958 and
1959, surrounded by social scientists, he
observed that they were never in agreement
about the nature of legitimate scientific
problems and methods. He explains that he
wrote this book precisely to show that there
can never be any paradigms in the social sciences.
Mattei Dogan, a French sociologist, in his
article "Paradigms in the Social Sciences,"
develops Kuhn's original thesis that there
are no paradigms at all in the social sciences
since the concepts are polysemic, involving
the deliberate mutual ignorance between scholars
and the proliferation of schools in these
disciplines. Dogan provides many examples
of the non-existence of paradigms in the social
sciences in his essay, particularly in sociology,
political science and political anthropology.
However, both Kuhn's original work and Dogan's
commentary are directed at disciplines that
are defined by conventional labels (such as
"sociology"). While it is true that such broad
groupings in the social sciences are usually
not based on a Kuhnian paradigm, each of the
competing sub-disciplines may still be underpinned
by a paradigm, research programme, research
tradition, and/ or professional imagery. These
structures will be motivating research, providing
it with an agenda, defining what is and is
not anomalous evidence, and inhibiting debate
with other groups that fall under the same
broad disciplinary label. (A good example
is provided by the contrast between Skinnerian
radical behaviourism and personal construct
theory (PCT) within psychology. The most significant
of the many ways these two sub-disciplines
of psychology differ concerns meanings and
intentions. In PCT, they are seen as the central
concern of psychology; in radical behaviourism,
they are not scientific evidence at all, as
they cannot be directly observed.)
Such considerations explain the conflict between
the Kuhn/ Dogan view, and the views of others
(including Larry Laudan, see above), who do
apply these concepts to social sciences.
Handa, M.L. (1986) introduced the idea of
"social paradigm" in the context of social
sciences. He identified the basic components
of a social paradigm. Like Kuhn, Handa addressed
the issue of changing paradigm; the process
popularly known as "paradigm shift". In this
respect, he focused on social circumstances
that precipitate such a shift and the effects
of the shift on social institutions, including
the institution of education. This broad shift
in the social arena, in turn, changes the
way the individual perceives reality.
Another use of the word paradigm is in the
sense of "worldview". For example, in social
science, the term is used to describe the
set of experiences, beliefs and values that
affect the way an individual perceives reality
and responds to that perception. Social scientists
have adopted the Kuhnian phrase "paradigm
shift" to denote a change in how a given society
goes about organizing and understanding reality.
A "dominant paradigm" refers to the values,
or system of thought, in a society that are
most standard and widely held at a given time.
Dominant paradigms are shaped both by the
community's cultural background and by the
context of the historical moment. Hutchin
outlines some conditions that facilitate a
system of thought to become an accepted dominant
paradigm:
Professional organizations that give legitimacy
to the paradigm
Dynamic leaders who introduce and purport
the paradigm
Journals and editors who write about the system
of thought. They both disseminate the information
essential to the paradigm and give the paradigm
legitimacy
Government agencies who give credence to the
paradigm
Educators who propagate the paradigm's ideas
by teaching it to students
Conferences conducted that are devoted to
discussing ideas central to the paradigm
Media coverage
Lay groups, or groups based around the concerns
of lay persons, that embrace the beliefs central
to the paradigm
Sources of funding to further research on
the paradigm
== 
Other uses ==
The word paradigm is also still used to indicate
a pattern or model or an outstandingly clear
or typical example or archetype. The term
is frequently used in this sense in the design
professions. Design Paradigms or archetypes
comprise functional precedents for design
solutions. The best known references on design
paradigms are Design Paradigms: A Sourcebook
for Creative Visualization, by Wake, and Design
Paradigms by Petroski.
This term is also used in cybernetics. Here
it means (in a very wide sense) a (conceptual)
protoprogram for reducing the chaotic mass
to some form of order. Note the similarities
to the concept of entropy in chemistry and
physics. A paradigm there would be a sort
of prohibition to proceed with any action
that would increase the total entropy of the
system. To create a paradigm requires a closed
system that accepts changes. Thus a paradigm
can only apply to a system that is not in
its final stage.
Beyond its use in the physical and social
sciences, Kuhn's paradigm concept has been
analysed in relation to its applicability
in identifying 'paradigms' with respect to
worldviews at specific points in history.
One example is Matthew Edward Harris' book
The Notion of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth
Century: The Idea of Paradigm in Church History.
Harris stresses the primarily sociological
importance of paradigms, pointing towards
Kuhn's second edition of The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. Although obedience
to popes such as Innocent III and Boniface
VIII was widespread, even written testimony
from the time showing loyalty to the pope
does not demonstrate that the writer had the
same worldview as the Church, and therefore
pope, at the centre. The difference between
paradigms in the physical sciences and in
historical organisations such as the Church
is that the former, unlike the latter, requires
technical expertise rather than repeating
statements. In other words, after scientific
training through what Kuhn calls 'exemplars',
one could not genuinely believe that, to take
a trivial example, the earth is flat, whereas
thinkers such as Giles of Rome in the thirteenth
century wrote in favour of the pope, then
could easily write similarly glowing things
about the king. A writer such as Giles would
have wanted a good job from the pope; he was
a papal publicist. However, Harris writes
that 'scientific group membership is not concerned
with desire, emotions, gain, loss and any
idealistic notions concerning the nature and
destiny of humankind...but simply to do with
aptitude, explanation, [and] cold description
of the facts of the world and the universe
from within a paradigm'.
== See also ==
== Footnotes
