FEDERALIST No. 54.
The Apportionment of Members Among the States
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, February 12, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE next view which I shall take of the House
of Representatives relates to the appointment
of its members to the several States which
is to be determined by the same rule with
that of direct taxes.
It is not contended that the number of people
in each State ought not to be the standard
for regulating the proportion of those who
are to represent the people of each State.
The establishment of the same rule for the
appointment of taxes, will probably be as
little contested; though the rule itself in
this case, is by no means founded on the same
principle.
In the former case, the rule is understood
to refer to the personal rights of the people,
with which it has a natural and universal
connection.
In the latter, it has reference to the proportion
of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise
measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit
one.
But notwithstanding the imperfection of the
rule as applied to the relative wealth and
contributions of the States, it is evidently
the least objectionable among the practicable
rules, and had too recently obtained the general
sanction of America, not to have found a ready
preference with the convention.
All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said;
but does it follow, from an admission of numbers
for the measure of representation, or of slaves
combined with free citizens as a ratio of
taxation, that slaves ought to be included
in the numerical rule of representation?
Slaves are considered as property, not as
persons.
They ought therefore to be comprehended in
estimates of taxation which are founded on
property, and to be excluded from representation
which is regulated by a census of persons.
This is the objection, as I understand it,
stated in its full force.
I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning
which may be offered on the opposite side.
"We subscribe to the doctrine," might one
of our Southern brethren observe, "that representation
relates more immediately to persons, and taxation
more immediately to property, and we join
in the application of this distinction to
the case of our slaves.
But we must deny the fact, that slaves are
considered merely as property, and in no respect
whatever as persons.
The true state of the case is, that they partake
of both these qualities: being considered
by our laws, in some respects, as persons,
and in other respects as property.
In being compelled to labor, not for himself,
but for a master; in being vendible by one
master to another master; and in being subject
at all times to be restrained in his liberty
and chastised in his body, by the capricious
will of another—the slave may appear to
be degraded from the human rank, and classed
with those irrational animals which fall under
the legal denomination of property.
In being protected, on the other hand, in
his life and in his limbs, against the violence
of all others, even the master of his labor
and his liberty; and in being punishable himself
for all violence committed against others—the
slave is no less evidently regarded by the
law as a member of the society, not as a part
of the irrational creation; as a moral person,
not as a mere article of property.
The federal Constitution, therefore, decides
with great propriety on the case of our slaves,
when it views them in the mixed character
of persons and of property.
This is in fact their true character.
It is the character bestowed on them by the
laws under which they live; and it will not
be denied, that these are the proper criterion;
because it is only under the pretext that
the laws have transformed the negroes into
subjects of property, that a place is disputed
them in the computation of numbers; and it
is admitted, that if the laws were to restore
the rights which have been taken away, the
negroes could no longer be refused an equal
share of representation with the other inhabitants.
"This question may be placed in another light.
It is agreed on all sides, that numbers are
the best scale of wealth and taxation, as
they are the only proper scale of representation.
Would the convention have been impartial or
consistent, if they had rejected the slaves
from the list of inhabitants, when the shares
of representation were to be calculated, and
inserted them on the lists when the tariff
of contributions was to be adjusted?
Could it be reasonably expected, that the
Southern States would concur in a system,
which considered their slaves in some degree
as men, when burdens were to be imposed, but
refused to consider them in the same light,
when advantages were to be conferred?
Might not some surprise also be expressed,
that those who reproach the Southern States
with the barbarous policy of considering as
property a part of their human brethren, should
themselves contend, that the government to
which all the States are to be parties, ought
to consider this unfortunate race more completely
in the unnatural light of property, than the
very laws of which they complain?
"It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are
not included in the estimate of representatives
in any of the States possessing them.
They neither vote themselves nor increase
the votes of their masters.
Upon what principle, then, ought they to be
taken into the federal estimate of representation?
In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution
would, in this respect, have followed the
very laws which have been appealed to as the
proper guide.
"This objection is repelled by a single observation.
It is a fundamental principle of the proposed
Constitution, that as the aggregate number
of representatives allotted to the several
States is to be determined by a federal rule,
founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants,
so the right of choosing this allotted number
in each State is to be exercised by such part
of the inhabitants as the State itself may
designate.
The qualifications on which the right of suffrage
depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two
States.
In some of the States the difference is very
material.
In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants
are deprived of this right by the constitution
of the State, who will be included in the
census by which the federal Constitution apportions
the representatives.
In this point of view the Southern States
might retort the complaint, by insisting that
the principle laid down by the convention
required that no regard should be had to the
policy of particular States towards their
own inhabitants; and consequently, that the
slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted
into the census according to their full number,
in like manner with other inhabitants, who,
by the policy of other States, are not admitted
to all the rights of citizens.
A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle,
is waived by those who would be gainers by
it.
All that they ask is that equal moderation
be shown on the other side.
Let the case of the slaves be considered,
as it is in truth, a peculiar one.
Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution
be mutually adopted, which regards them as
inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below
the equal level of free inhabitants, which
regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths
of the MAN.
"After all, may not another ground be taken
on which this article of the Constitution
will admit of a still more ready defense?
We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that
representation related to persons only, and
not at all to property.
But is it a just idea?
Government is instituted no less for protection
of the property, than of the persons, of individuals.
The one as well as the other, therefore, may
be considered as represented by those who
are charged with the government.
Upon this principle it is, that in several
of the States, and particularly in the State
of New York, one branch of the government
is intended more especially to be the guardian
of property, and is accordingly elected by
that part of the society which is most interested
in this object of government.
In the federal Constitution, this policy does
not prevail.
The rights of property are committed into
the same hands with the personal rights.
Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid
to property in the choice of those hands.
"For another reason, the votes allowed in
the federal legislature to the people of each
State, ought to bear some proportion to the
comparative wealth of the States.
States have not, like individuals, an influence
over each other, arising from superior advantages
of fortune.
If the law allows an opulent citizen but a
single vote in the choice of his representative,
the respect and consequence which he derives
from his fortunate situation very frequently
guide the votes of others to the objects of
his choice; and through this imperceptible
channel the rights of property are conveyed
into the public representation.
A State possesses no such influence over other
States.
It is not probable that the richest State
in the Confederacy will ever influence the
choice of a single representative in any other
State.
Nor will the representatives of the larger
and richer States possess any other advantage
in the federal legislature, over the representatives
of other States, than what may result from
their superior number alone.
As far, therefore, as their superior wealth
and weight may justly entitle them to any
advantage, it ought to be secured to them
by a superior share of representation.
The new Constitution is, in this respect,
materially different from the existing Confederation,
as well as from that of the United Netherlands,
and other similar confederacies.
In each of the latter, the efficacy of the
federal resolutions depends on the subsequent
and voluntary resolutions of the states composing
the union.
Hence the states, though possessing an equal
vote in the public councils, have an unequal
influence, corresponding with the unequal
importance of these subsequent and voluntary
resolutions.
Under the proposed Constitution, the federal
acts will take effect without the necessary
intervention of the individual States.
They will depend merely on the majority of
votes in the federal legislature, and consequently
each vote, whether proceeding from a larger
or smaller State, or a State more or less
wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight
and efficacy: in the same manner as the votes
individually given in a State legislature,
by the representatives of unequal counties
or other districts, have each a precise equality
of value and effect; or if there be any difference
in the case, it proceeds from the difference
in the personal character of the individual
representative, rather than from any regard
to the extent of the district from which he
comes."
Such is the reasoning which an advocate for
the Southern interests might employ on this
subject; and although it may appear to be
a little strained in some points, yet, on
the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles
me to the scale of representation which the
convention have established.
In one respect, the establishment of a common
measure for representation and taxation will
have a very salutary effect.
As the accuracy of the census to be obtained
by the Congress will necessarily depend, in
a considerable degree on the disposition,
if not on the co-operation, of the States,
it is of great importance that the States
should feel as little bias as possible, to
swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers.
Were their share of representation alone to
be governed by this rule, they would have
an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants.
Were the rule to decide their share of taxation
alone, a contrary temptation would prevail.
By extending the rule to both objects, the
States will have opposite interests, which
will control and balance each other, and produce
the requisite impartiality.
PUBLIUS
