For nullification, Thomas Jefferson opposed an all-or-nothing strategy.
In a 1799 letter to James Madison,
Thomas Jefferson clarified his strategic approach to nullification.
Like John Dickinson
before him,
Jefferson made the case that passing non-binding resolutions were an important starting point.
That’s exactly what Kentucky and Virginia had done the year prior when they passed
the Resolutions of 1798.
Discussing the fact that several states had rejected the resolutions,
Jefferson recommended publicly responding to those objections and further making the case
that by passing the Alien and Sedition Acts,
the federal government has greatly overstepped its constitutional limits.
More importantly, though, Jefferson recognized their right to go further than discussion,
protest, resolutions and debate,
but he advised waiting for greater consensus.
He wanted to make sure the had the right amount of support before taking more aggressive
action.
He recommended:
“a firm protestation against the principle & the precedent;
and a reservation of the rights resulting to us from these palpable violations
of the constitutional compact by the Federal government …
so that we may hereafter do,
what we might now rightfully do”
This is similar to what Jefferson wrote in another letter to Madison:
“I inclose you a copy of the draught of the Kentucky resolves.
I think we should distinctly affirm all the important principles they contain,
so as to hold to that ground in the future, and leave the matter in such a train as that we may not
be committed absolutely to push the matter to extremities,
& yet may be free to push as far as events
will render prudent.”
In short, going for broke right out of the gate might be standing up for what’s right,
but if you don’t have enough popular support, you’ll never get the job done.
Like the ancient Chinese proverb, we know that “a journey of a thousand miles
begins with a single step.”
Next up, strategy lessons from Patrick Henry and the Virginia Resolves.
