If you are new to Operation Market Garden,
I’m going to recommend you two books on
the subject that are the bare minimum that
you need to read in order to fully understand
the battle, and the debates that are still
raging about it. The first is Beevor’s Arnhem
- which I’m reviewing today - and Neillands’
Battle for the Rhine. And, in fact, by the
end of this video, you should have a good
idea about this battle, you should know why
the Nijmegen part of the battle is the centre
of attention, you should know who was at fault
and why they’re at fault, and why Beevor’s
book does not get the full five stars - when
really, it should have got them. And this
is the reason the video is as long as it is.
In order to explain why Beevor’s messed
up, I’m going to have to take you into the
heart of the debate. But I promise you, by
the end of this video, you will be clued up
about Operation Market Garden and will be
arguing in the comment section below like
the rest of us. Links, the sources I use here,
and extra notes will be in the pinned comment
of the comment section below, so make sure
you check them out. Right, let’s get into
this. Beevor is at his best here. This is
a fantastic narrative, which draws you into
the battle and keeps you gripped. It’s much
like Beevor’s Berlin or Stalingrad books,
Great storytelling, talks about the Allied
and German perspectives, talks about the planning
stage, talks about what happens in all three
drop zones (Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Eindhoven).
And talks about 30 Corps (the tanks) driving
to link up with them. Beevor challenges some
of the old myths about the battle, such as
the phrase “A Bridge Too Far” which may
not have been said at all. There’s great
explanation in the pre-battle part, hammering
out the personalities and the planning of
the operation superbly. He also tells many
tales of how the Dutch civilians were caught
in the middle of the fighting, with some heroic
but also tragic tales mixed in with the narrative.
I think it’s heartbreaking at times. He
spends the end part of the book talking about
the consequences of the failure of the operation
- which was the Hunger Winter in the Netherlands
and the starvation Dutch civilians. And I
really really cannot emphasise enough how
he tells this entire story very well. The narrative
is very absorbing. The story-telling
alone is what makes this book rise above most
others, comparable to A Bridge Too Far by
Cornelius Ryan, but this is a far more up-to-date
version than Ryan's book (Ryan’s book came out
in the seventies). Which is why I’m happy
to say that Beevor’s book could finally replace Ryan’s book. Now, some of you will still think that
A Bridge Too Far was probably a better narrative overall - and that’s fine - but I would say you can now
skip that and go straight for Beevor’s book
if you’re new to the topic because this
is the more up-to-date narrative. And because
Beevor gives you the German perspective, you
also no longer need to read Kershaw’s It Never Snows in September. Now I would still recommend
Kershaw’s book if you want more detail on
the German side and if you want the operational
side of the battle (where the units are on
the map). And Kershaw’s maps are, in my
opinion, better than Beevor’s - although
Beevor’s are good, as you’ll see. But
in terms of narrative and gaining all perspectives,
Beevor’s book does a good job of the German
side, so Kershaw is no longer essential reading,
as he once was. Beevor’s maps are very very
nice - I don’t think there’s enough of
them, but the ones provided are exceptional.
Inside the front cover is a lovely strategic
map. And the back cover is another great map
of the Arnhem area, both of which are in colour.
Other maps are scattered throughout the book,
and all these maps are fantastic. Again, this
isn’t an operational account of the battle,
so we’re not expecting to know where every
platoon is, and these maps are fine for that.
The book also provides a bibliography (sources)
and an index, so full stars for that. The
way my star rating system works is that I
give every book five stars to begin with,
then deduct stars off the books if they miss
stuff out or get things wrong, or don’t
provide good maps or something. And up to
this point, Beevor’s at full marks. But
Beevor has missed an opportunity here. He
could have made ‘the one book to rule them
all’ on Operation Market Garden, but he
didn’t. He’s failed big time, which is
why I’m going to have to recommend that
you read Neillands’ book Battle for the
Rhine after you read Beevor’s. And, beyond
that, if you want even more details on the
issue we’re about to discuss, pick up the
book Lost at Nijmegen by Poulussen. In fact,
I’m deducting two stars off Beevor. And
to explain why, I’m basically going to have
to show you why. So, it’s time to look at the
Nijmegen debacle. The Market Garden plan was
for three airborne divisions to land in three
sectors - Eindhoven (30kms or 18 miles behind
enemy lines), Nijmegen (roughly 80kms or 50
miles behind the lines) and Arnhem (96kms
or 60 miles behind the lines). Once they’d
dropped, their goal was to capture all the
bridges along the route. Then 30 Corps - the
tanks - would drive up the road and, not swing
right into Germany as some people say, but
go north to the IJsselmeer. This would cut
off the German 15th Army on the coast, either
forcing them to retreat, or weaken them enough
so that taking the Scheldt estuary would be
easier. This would allow supplies to flow
into Antwerp, which would then allow the Allied
armies to continue their advance into Germany.
Please see my main Battlestorm Market Garden
documentary for a full explanation of what
happens at all parts in the battle, but today
we’re going to be focused on the 82nd Airborne
at Nijmegen - which is where the arguments
begin. At half one in the afternoon on the
first day of the Operation, the first wave
of Gavin’s 82nd Airborne Division land at
the Nijmegen sector, along with Browning’s
Corps HQ. The 504th Regiment takes
the southern bridges, with the help of elements
of the 508th. Otherwise the 505th
and 508th guard the landing zones
at the Groesbeek Heights and explore the Reichswald
forest, where it was believed that the Germans
were hiding one thousand tanks. We will come
back to the one thousand tanks debate later.
The important point is, no one goes towards
the Nijmegen Road Bridge, which at this point
has nineteen German guards - half of whom
were not SS. The landings had taken place
at half one in the afternoon, and at seven
in the evening - five and a half hours later
- Gavin finally decides to send a full Battalion
towards the Nijmegen Bridge. He tells Lindquist
to send Warren’s 1st Battalion to go to
the bridge. Now, some people have complained
in previous videos of mine, saying that the
82nd Airborne absolutely had to guard their
landing zones. Yes, but nobody’s saying
they should have moved everyone off the landing
zones. They just needed to send one battalion
to go to the bridge. And, if they could spare
one battalion at seven in the evening, why
couldn’t they spare it several hours earlier?
The answer is, they could. But they didn’t
- and this is the question that needs to be answered.
Why didn’t they send it earlier? Anyway,
Warren heads off towards Nijmegen at some
point between seven and eight - so six or
more hours after the landings. One company
gets lost in Nijmegen, one company ends up
fighting in the centre alone because the third
company doesn’t catch up until later, and
it’s not until nearly eight hours after
the initial landings that they start to grapple
with the Germans. It’s dark at this point,
and they only get to the bridge at around
midnight - ten hours after their initial drop.
The problem is, because the bridge was still
in German hands, the Germans were able to
send in reinforcements. As the paras near
the bridge, units from the 9th and 10th SS
Panzer Divisions arrive from the north to
defend the bridge. Only two companies engaged
the Germans - who now had more men than Warren
had - and worse, Warren was ordered to withdraw
his battalion at eleven o’clock that evening,
in order to help out at the landing zone.
The frustrating part is - nothing was attacking
the landing zones on day one. Maybe a few
scattered elements, but no more than an understrength
company of Germans were in the area. In fact,
the only unit in the Reichswald at the time
was the HQ unit for the 406th
Division, which only formed into a division
overnight. On day two, the 406th
Division had gathered a bunch of units
- mainly training and replacement battalions,
eyes and ears battalions, and some Luftwaffe
infantry - and formed four kampfgruppen numbering
at most three thousand four hundred men. But
in reality less than three thousand actually
attacked, and these had very little infantry
support-weapons or artillery (the guns they
did have were captured Russian guns). They
had no signals equipment (so it was hard to
coordinate the attacks), didn’t have any
tanks, only had five armoured cars, and three
half-tracks with anti-aircraft guns on them.
They were going up against the elite 82nd
Airborne, who were on their third campaign,
and who were defending. To quote the man in
charge of the division - “I had no confidence
in this attack, since it was almost an impossible
task for 406 Division to attack picked troops
with its motley crowd.”
This attack somehow gained a few local successes,
but when the second air landing happened on
the second day, the Germans fled the battlefield,
losing numerous casualties, having inflicted
only light casualties on the Americans. After
this attack on the second day, no attack came
from the Reichswald on day three. And the
next attack on day four was a bigger attack,
but now the full 82nd Airborne had
arrived and had tank support. 30 Corps
arrived at nine-thirty in the morning of day
three. This is on-time by the way. They’d
gone fifty miles in less than forty-three
hours and were just ten miles from Arnhem.
Arguably they could have done it quicker,
arguably they were a little behind schedule,
but they weren’t thirty-six hours behind
schedule at this point as Gavin claimed later
- a mistake that has been repeated by many
historians, and is still being repeated in
certain books (including Beevor’s book).
Anyway, 30th Corps found that the Nijmegen
bridge was being held by the  10th SS Panzer
Division. Several tanks brewed up and the
British and American infantry fought together
trying to break through to the bridge. The
point to note though is this. On the morning
of day three, thirty-corps had reached Nijmegen.
They were just ten miles from Arnhem. And
they had the rest of the day to go to make
it to Arnhem on time - which they could have
done if the bridge was in their hands. But
it wasn’t. Gavin’s claim that thirty corps
was thirty-six hours behind schedule was right
in one respect - they were thirty-six hours
behind schedule. But not before Nijmegen.
They were thirty-six hours behind schedule
because of Nijmegen. Because Thirty Corps
had to fight for the bridge. It was the beginning
of day three, and the bridge would only be
secured overnight on day four to five. Four
tanks do get across the bridge late on day
four, but one of these is knocked out (which
Beevor forgets to mention), and they have
no supporting infantry. Some say there was
more, possibly five tanks, but either way,
this was just a handful. The reason they have
no infantry is because the British infantry
are fighting in Nijmegen city against 10th
SS Panzer Division, who refuse to give in
until the morning of day five. Arguably they
should have had some infantry and a tank force
ready to head north, and that’s fine, but
the point is this - they were already delayed
by 36 hours at this point. The main issue
is why Nijmegen bridge wasn’t taken on day
one. By the time thirty corps gets going on
day five, Arnhem bridge is in German hands,
and the operation is lost. If they had driven
straight across the bridge on day three - even
if they’d had to fight north of Nijmegen
- they would have had an easier time of it
because they wouldn’t have been fighting
in a city. People make the claim that it still
would have been a hard fight north of Nijmegen
- and I agree - but it’s better for tanks
to fight out in the open than against infantry
in urban terrain. This is why Frost held on
so well at Arnhem, why Chuikov held on so
well at Stalingrad, and there’s plenty more
examples of this. It would be better for thirty
corps to fight north of Nijmegen, than in
it. And it stands to reason that if this fight
had taken place to the north, they would have
reached Frost at Arnhem bridge on day three
or day four, before his unit collapsed. Therefore,
failing to take the Nijmegen bridge on day
one of the operation cost the operation. So,
that’s the context. But how does Beevor’s
book fit into this? And how come he gets two
stars deducted. Well first, Beevor blames
Montgomery, Browning and Horrocks. And it’s
not so much about who he blames - you can
blame whoever you like. Urquhart’s the wrong
guy for the job. Apart from Frost and the
elements that made it to Arnhem bridge, the
Arnhem operation is a complete disaster. Browning
is an idiot, and his blaming of the Polish
general Sosabowski is a disgrace. Montgomery
is a selfish-egotistical liar who could have
done things differently in this operation.
I don’t think Monty is as bad as some paint
him to be during this operation, but he certainly
could have a better job with the plan. And
there’s other British generals who are to
blame too. The issue isn’t so much who Beevor
blames, as to his reasons for blaming them,
and the arguments he uses to blame them are
flawed. He’s right with Montgomery, and
he might be right with Browning - sort of.
But he’s not right with Horrocks, and there’s
a lot more to the Browning story than Beevor
states. So let’s look at this and see why
some of Beevor’s arguments don’t hold
up. Throughout the book Beevor attacks Horrocks
for being too slow. Well, this is certainly
a questionable claim at best. After the war, General
Gavin said that Horrocks was thirty six hours
behind schedule when he got to Nijmegen. But,
is this really the case? Thirty Corps only
starts driving along the road at two in the
afternoon of day one. So, it’s not a full
day. Ideally, by the end of the day, Horrocks should
have linked up with the 101st Airborne, and
he was a couple hours off from doing that. So, yeah, I guess he’s an hour or two behind at this point.
He then gets to Son on day two, to find the
bridge is blown, and he takes 8 hours to fix
it. It’s not until the morning of day three
that Thirty Corps moves beyond this point.
So, in the early hours of day three, they’re
behind. But look at how much ground they cover.
They get to Grave bridge at half nine in the
morning on day three. They’ve not even been
on the road for forty-eight hours yet, they
have the rest of the day to go, and they’re
now at Nijmegen. They’ve gone around fifty
miles in two days - despite all the opposition
and Son bridge being blown. They only have
around about ten miles or so to go before
they reach Arnhem, and still have the rest
of the day to do it. So, yeah, they get to
Nijmegen on time. And I don’t know about
you, but being on time does not equal slow.
They then face the 10th SS Panzer Division
- and it is here when they suffer the thirty-six
hour delay that Gavin said about. Yeah, ok,
they may have been an hour or two behind schedule,
arguably. But they weren’t thirty-six hours
behind. Not at this point. This is where the
thirty-six hour delay comes from - Nijmegen.
So Horrocks and Thirty Corps weren’t slow.
But Beevor constantly, over and over, hammers
on about the British drinking tea, and how
Horrocks wasn’t on his game, and how they
were twenty-four hours behind schedule on
day two when they weren’t. The tea-drinking
is more frustrating because these guys are
apparently not allowed to take breaks. They
have to drive to Arnhem in three days without
stopping for food or drink. And also, just
because one tank takes a break, doesn’t mean
the rest all take a break as well.  So, it’s a ridiculous claim. Then, after all this talk about tea-drinking
and slowness, on page two-hundred and twenty,
Beevor finally admits that the failure to
capture Nijmegen Bridge on day one was the
main reason for the failure. So after blaming
Horrocks over and over throughout the book,
he finally admits Horrocks wasn’t to blame!?
And then, he still has to say that
thirty-corps was late. “The simple truth
is that XXX Corps was too late, and so was
the capture of the Nijmegen bridge as a result
of defending the Groesbeek Heights.” Stop
saying thirty-corps was late! Thirty-Corps
was not late - it’s a myth. Now, there is
an issue about the handful of British tanks
that get across the Nijmegen bridge on day
four. Now, this bit is a debate, and I’m
going to explain it as best as I can, but if you want to know more information, please read Neillands’
Battle for the Rhine - which is why I’m
recommending that you pick up both Beevor’s
book and Neillands’ as well. But basically,
a few British tanks make it across the bridge,
late on day four. Now, at this point, 3rd
Battalion of the 82nd Airborne had crossed
the Waal in boats, and a few of these paras
had made it to the northern side of the Nijmegen
bridge. Not all of them, since a lot had to
guard the crossing site and engage the nearby
Germans elsewhere, but some had made it to the
Nijmegen road bridge. I want to make this
clear now - it was claimed AFTER the war,
that the US paras were willing to go with
the tanks to Arnhem. As Beevor points out
(and to his credit, he disputes it), there’s
even a story about one of the US paras threatening
the British tank officer, and there’s several
other stories that are similar to this. The
problem is, these claims were made AFTER the
war. And they don’t take into account what
the British tank men said themselves, nor do they account
for the three very obvious reasons as to why
the British shouldn’t go on. British Sergeant
Robinson’s account of what happened shows
that the US paras were completely exhausted
by their crossing of the Waal. And in fact,
said that the American paras “hadn’t been
there ten minutes before they were on their
way again.” Another, Lord Carrington, the
guy the US paras claim they had an argument
with after the war, tells this account - “...mine
was the fifth tank across the bridge and there
were still Germans in the superstructure.
When I got across there was no sign of Sergeant
Robinson or indeed anyone else, so I halted
my tank at the north end of the bridge and
wirelessed back that the bridge was open.
I was therefore a short while, about ten minutes,
and then more tanks started coming across
and I went forward to find Sergeant Robinson.
He was stopped about a mile up the road, talking
to some US paratroopers, who were very pleased
to see us.” When asked about the US officer
who would later call the tankers ‘cowards’,
and how he felt ‘betrayed’ by the British,
Lord Carrington said - “My recollection
of this meeting is different. I certainly
met an American officer but he was perfectly
affable and agreeable. As I said, the Airborne
were all very glad to see us and get some
support; no one suggested we should press
on to Arnhem. This whole allegation is bizarre;
just to begin with I was a captain and second-in-command
of my squadron so I was in no position either
to take orders from another captain or depart
from my own orders which were to take my tanks
across the bridge, join up with the US Airborne
and form a bridgehead. This story is simply
lunacy and this alleged exchange did not take
place.” Gavin’s own memoirs also confirm
that the US paras were happy to meet the British
tanks. So, at best, this is a he-said-she-said
debate. But either way, a few tanks and a
handful of exhausted US paras couldn’t have
gotten to Arnhem. And there are three reasons
- first, they expected a German counterattack
against the northern end of the bridge. If
this had happened, a few tanks and a handful
of US paras would have had a hard time defending,
let alone attacking. Second, Nijmegen city
was still in German hands. This meant that
the British infantry and tanks were embroiled
in a city-fight, and couldn’t just disengage.
Nor could they just leave a substantial portion
of the Tenth SS Panzer Division on their flank,
so they had to secure Nijmegen first. And
finally, there was German resistance to the
north. Now, this may not have been able to
stop an entire division at this point, but
it would have been able to stop a handful
of paras and a few tanks. Another member of
the Welsh Guards, Andrew Gibson-Watt, commented
“An advance that night was ‘not on’
and general military historians have erred
greatly in assuming that it would have been
possible and should have been done.” And
all of this, is just to show that Thirty Corps
wasn’t slow, or didn’t have the ‘attacking
spirit’. And it is a distraction to the
main debate - and this main debate renders
the tanks should have pressed on debate mute
- if Nijmegen bridge had been taken on day
one, then British tanks and infantry would
have been across the Nijmegen road bridge
36 hours earlier, and would have been united,
rather than fighting in Nijmegen to mop up
the Germans. So, this claim that Thirty Corps
was slow, or that Horrocks was not on his
game, is complete rubbish. And Beevor fails
to put forth anywhere near a convincing argument.
His claims that thirty corps were behind schedule
are simply false, and again, a distraction
from the main debate. Now, you might be wondering,
why didn’t the 82nd capture the Nijmegen
bridge on day one? Well, the reason given
is that the Groesbeek Heights had to be held
because there was an intelligence report that
suggested a thousand German tanks were in
the Reichswald. On top of this, people point
out that the 82nd Airborne Division had to
defend its landing zones, which were on the
Groesbeek Heights. Well, first off, yes their
landing zones had to be defended. And they
were defended. Nobody’s saying you have
to pack up and leave the heights undefended.
The issue is that Warren’s battalion (just
one battalion from the one and a half regiments
on the heights) was spared several hours later
- so why couldn’t it be spared earlier?
The answer is, it could have been. Warren
could have gone to Nijmegen six hours earlier,
well before Tenth SS Panzer Division arrived,
secured the bridge, and dug in. Just like
Frost at Arnhem, they could have held onto
the Nijmegen bridge, meaning Thirty Corps
would have been across it on day three. Now
people say, yes but there could have been
attacks from the Reichswald. True, but in
reality, there wasn’t. And, the irony is,
the main threat to the Eighty Second Airborne
Division did not come from the Reichswald.
It came from north of Nijmegen. So, if you’re
that concerned about defending yourself, taking
Nijmegen and her two bridges would be the
priority. But it wasn’t. And where did this
idea of the thousand tanks in the Reichswald
come from anyway? Well, I’m going to be
relying on Lost at Nijmegen by Poulussen here,
so if you want more details, pick up his book
and examine it. But the 505th Parachute
Infantry Regiment states in it’s after action
report that 1st Battalion went around questioning
civilians about the Germans in the Reichswald.
And they were informed that a thousand tanks
were not in the forest. In fact, they discovered
that the forest was too thick for tanks - and,
in fact, there wasn’t a single tank in there.
Now, I don’t know where this rumour of the
one-thousand tanks started from. People have
asked me, but I don’t actually know. All
I know is that there was a concern that a
thousand tanks were in the Reichswald - that
much we can confirm. What I can tell you is
that there were currently less than one-hundred
German tanks in the whole of the Netherlands
at the time - possibly as few as fifty. Yes,
technically the Reichswald is actually in
Germany, but thinking rationally, why would
there be a thousand tanks in a random forest,
fifty miles behind the lines in 1944?
That’s probably like a third of the German
tank strength at this point in the war! And
why would the Germans have a thousand tanks
just sat there doing nothing? Well, the answer
is simple - they weren’t. All I can tell
you is that one day one of Operation Market
Garden the 505th Regiment of the Eighty
Second Airborne was investigating Dutch civilians
trying to figure out if these panzers existed.
Frost himself says this thousand tank idea
was there by rumour only, and not confirmed
by the Dutch underground. So why the Eighty
Second Airborne really did think this was
a possibility, I don’t know. And, interestingly,
it is at half seven in the evening, that they
confirm that the woods are too thick to house
tanks. What time did Warren start heading
towards Nijmegen? Between seven and eight.
Coincidence? Gavin later claimed that he gave
pre-drop orders to Lindquist, for him to send
Warren’s battalion to the bridge - again,
check out Poulussen’s book for more details.
On the 25th of July 1945, in an official statement
to the Historial Officer Captain John Westover
of the US Army Center of Military History,
Gavin said - “About 48 hours prior to take-off,
when the entire plan appeared to be shaping
up well, I personally directed Colonel Lindquist,
commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry, to
commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen
bridge without delay after landing, but to
keep a very close watch on it in the event
he needed it to protect himself against the Reichswald.”
I don't get why he was so concerned about the Reichswald.
So he was planning to pull himself away from the main bridge to go to the Reichswald.
I don't get it.
“Just before take-off,
I discussed the situation with Colonel Lindquist
and directed him to commit not more than one
battalion to the seizure of the Nijmegen bridges
as soon as possible after landing, so as to
take advantage of both surprise and darkness.”
Please bear in mind that it’s light, since this
is a day operation, and Gavin seems to forget
that it’s not usually dark in the middle
of the day. And as Poulussen concludes - “By
writing “as soon as possible”, General
Gavin created the illusion that it had been
the responsibility of the cautious Colonel
Lindquist to decide when to send troops to
the Waal Bridge.” “By doing so, General
Gavin introduced the myth of the “misunderstanding”
and an excuse for not having captured the
Waal Bridge in time for operation “Market
Garden” to succeed.” “The “misunderstanding”
argument has been used, over and over again,
and successfully downplayed the role of the
82nd Airborne in operation “Market Garden”.”
So Gavin blames Lindquist, and also Warren
(saying he was a cautious commander), and
Beevor backs him up, without really explaining
why. But if Linquist had disobeyed his orders,
wouldn’t he have been punished for this?
Well, apparently not. That to me suggests
this entire pre-drop idea is a cover-up for
the fact that nobody went towards the Nijmegen
bridge for several hours. Lindquist himself
says he never received pre-drop orders, so
again, this is a he-said-she-said debate at
best. But what we do have is a convergence
of evidence that says, Gavin and the 82nd
(possibly Browning as well) were concerned about
the threat of a thousand tanks in the Reichswald.
At the same time that it was confirmed that
this ridiculous claim was false, Gavin then
sent Warren’s battalion to go towards the
Nijmegen bridge - and this was several hours
after they’d landed. Warren then didn’t
get to the bridge in time before the SS arrived,
thus causing the operation to fail. The fault
then clearly lies with Gavin and/or Browning.
The question now remains, which of these two
is to blame? Alright, it’s now time to look
at the main debate, and explain why Beevor’s
book misses the mark. All you get throughout
the entire book is praise after praise of
General Gavin. Any time Gavin is mentioned,
it’s never his fault. It’s Browning’s
fault, it’s Warren’s fault, it’s someone
else’s fault. Whenever you hear about the
Groesbeek Heights being prioritized over the
Nijmegen Bridge, the reason given is because
Browning wanted it that way. So, for example,
“Yet Gavin himself had been told by Browning
that his first priority was to secure the
Groesbeek heights south-east of Nijmegen.”
There’s numerous other quotes like this,
with another on page sixty-four where Beevor
says Gavin never challenged Browning about
the heights. Well, of course he won’t challenge
him about the heights - the evidence says,
it was Gavin’s idea in the first place!
If you believe Beevor, Browning deprioritized
Nijmegen bridge, and Gavin followed him. But
here’s a quote from Gavin himself which
says otherwise - “This decision was made
by myself and approved by my Corps Commander.”
Gavin made the decision, and Browning agreed
with it. That’s the total opposite of what
Beevor says! And this is where I find the
most fault with this book. Beevor makes a
statement. He says Browning made the initial
decision, and Gavin backed him up. But, he
doesn’t provide any evidence, or even an
argument, to back up his claim. Nor does he
acknowledge that this is up for debate. He
just states - Browning made the initial decision,
and paints him as the villain. And the thing
is, you can paint Browning as the villain.
I said so in my Bad-Boy of Market Garden video.
But in order to make a proper argument for
that (with all the counter-evidence we’ve
just been through), you have to acknowledge
Gavin’s role at Nijmegen. All you need to
say is, Gavin made the decision, but this
was backed up by Browning, therefore it’s
Browning’s fault. Personally, I would argue
against that, but at least it’s a valid
argument. And if Beevor had done this, this
video would have been five minutes long and
I would have given him five stars. But Beevor
doesn’t say this, and in fact defends Gavin
by saying he didn’t agree with Browning’s
decision. But we have evidence that says Gavin
did agree with Browning. And we have evidence
that says Gavin made the initial decision.
So, how do we explain this? What evidence
is there that supports what Beevor says? Well,
this is the main issue with this book - there isn’t
any. Beevor has failed to provide any evidence - and
as far as I can see, none exists in any of
the literature. Now, Beevor may have some
evidence to back up this claim - great. But
where is it? What good is evidence if you
don’t give it us? Let me use an analogy.
We all know that two plus two equals four.
So, what we have here is a valid argument
with evidence. The evidence says two plus two,
and the convergence of that evidence is four.
So, our argument is based on the evidence,
and thus this is a valid argument. Beevor
has stated ‘five’! But, that’s it! He’s
not said why. He’s not provided us with
his equation. The current equation says, two
plus two equals five. And this makes sense.
So if Beevor was to claim five, this equation
must be wrong somehow. Maybe the current evidence
has been reinterpreted - and so it’s three
plus two equals five. Or two plus three equals
five. Or perhaps there’s other evidence
we don’t know of yet. Two plus two plus
one equals five. Any of that would make sense.
But because Beevor hasn’t provided his equation
- he hasn’t shown us his workings out. We
can’t explain it! And this is where I’m
saying Beevor is wrong. He’s either wrong
with his conclusion - Browning made the initial
decision and Gavin agreed, or that it isn’t
five, it is in-fact four. Or that he hasn’t
provided the evidence that proves that the
conclusion has changed - so it wasn't Browning’s
initial decision somehow, and that Gavin’s
later claim is somehow rendered invalid - two
plus two plus one equals five, or something
similar. Either way, Beevor’s at fault here.
And I’m left in a position where I cannot
explain any of this. Given the current evidence,
I can’t even imagine what sort of evidence
Beevor has that invalidates Gavin’s statement,
where he clearly says that he made the initial
decision and Browning backed him up. If he
had said, Browning agreed with Gavin’s decision,
therefore it’s Browning’s fault - I can
explain that. If he had said, Browning takes
responsibility for the airborne part of the
plan - I can explain that. If he had given
us some evidence that showed his claim to
be correct - I could have explained that argument,
even if I’d disagreed with it. But as it
is, I have nothing. I can't explain Beevor’s
reasoning. It doesn't make any sense.
I've been racking my brain over this trying to think - maybe I've forgotten something.
Maybe there's something else - but I'm literally in the dark. I have nothing. I have absolutely nothing.
I cannot explain why Beevor is arguing what he's arguing.
And as I say, evidence might exist but...
I can't even imagine. Even if Browning had a statement which said 'I made the initial decision'.
Then, what the heck happened with Gavin? Like, why would he self-inflict his own...?
I mean, Gavin should have just gone 'yep, it was Browning's fault. But he didn't.
He said, no I made the decision. So why would he shoot himself in the foot?
It doesn't make any sense! So I have nothing - I have no idea what evidence Beevor is using.
I can't even imagine any that would invalidate Gavin's claim.
And even if that evidence exists, there's another problem as well. Because Beevor says
Browning made the initial decision, and Gavin didn't dare challenge him.
But then later goes on to criticise other British generals like Browning for not having challenged
his superiors. But doesn't do the same with Gavin.
So it's really bad because if Browning had made the inital decision, why wouldn't Gavin challenge him?
So, even if this is correct and turns out to be correct.
Gavin's still in the wrong! So it doesn't make any sense. There's no point going down this road.
Unless you provide your evidence there's no point doing this.
I don't even know. I'm just speculating now. I have no idea. I have zero idea what Beevor is on about.
The evidence converges on the fact that either Gavin and Browning are at fault.
But to make it Browning's fault, you have to admit that Gavin made the initial decision.
And that's fine. But that's the problem because Beevor's disagreeing with the evidence. I don't get it!
I am lost. I'm completely stuffed. I can't explain it.
In every battle I've always studied, you can see where there's a dispute or whatever.
This is the complete opposite. It's like - no, you've not used the evidence.
And the thing is - Beevor uses Neillands!
It's in his bibliography! He has used it.
So if he's used it, why's he not figured it out? I admit he hasn't used Poulussen.
He hasn't used Lost at Nijmegen, which is perhaps where he's going wrong. And that's a bad thing.
But it's like - you've read Neillands. Are you just ignoring that? I just don't get it.
I have no idea. I literally have no idea what Beevor's doing. I cannot explain Beevor's argument.
Other than to say, the evidence does not support it.
So, I'm left with this conclusion. Whether the evidence exists to back up Beevor's statement or not.
Beevor has failed to provide that evidence in his book. Therefore his statement falls flat on it's face.
Given the current evidence, it just doesn't make any sense.
We can speculate that evidence might be there. And if that evidence exists, I would still like to see it first.
Because I think it would be debateable evidence. But let's assume it does exist and it does invalidate
all the other evidence. That's fine.
But until that evidence is presented, and until we know what that evidence is, and whether it holds water or not.
We are left with the conclusion that Beevor has failed at this juncture.
He has failed to provide the answer that we're looking for - who's to blame for the failure
of Operation Market Garden. If I say it’s
Gavin, nothing in Beevor’s book contradicts
that. His current answer, with the evidence
provided, does not work. And it comes across
as though he’s trying to do anything he
can to make sure that Gavin is not at fault.
The evidence suggests that Gavin is involved
in this debate, whether you like it or not.
And Beevor hasn’t shown us why Gavin wasn’t
involved. But is happy to praise him over
and over, and state the opposite of what the
current evidence suggests - that Gavin made
the initial decision. And I don’t know why
Beevor did this. I only have speculations
- but if you guys have any theories on any
of this, please let me know, because I’m
at a loss. And as a result of all this, I’m
taking two stars off the book. One star for
stating something that’s contradicted by
the current evidence. And another star for
failing to provide evidence to back up the
argument - thus leading the reader to the
wrong conclusions. The evidence of the current
historiography contradicts Beevor’s claims
entirely. Therefore, while I do recommend
this book - it is still the most up-to-date
narrative of this operation in my opinion
- I can only recommend if you read Robin Neillands’
book as well, or watch my videos which explain
this. And, once you’ve read Neillands’
book, check out Lost at Nijmegen by Poulussen
as well, because that’s where a lot of the
quotes and evidence came from in this video.
So yeah, I think Beevor’s really messed
up here. He’s robbed us of a great all-encompassing
Market Garden book. And he’s given us an
example of what not to do - don’t state
something without providing evidence for it.
I’ve had plenty of people in the comments
section of other videos say I’m wrong, but
then didn’t say why or provide any evidence
to back up their claims. Again, this is not
how you make an argument. Two plus two equals
four - state multiple pieces of evidence to
back up your claim. It’s a damn shame Beevor
didn’t do this, and it leaves us speculating
why. What is the evidence? Why didn’t he
provide it? And what were his reasons for
not providing a solid argument? Anyway, thank
you for watching, thank you to my Patreons
for supporting, you guys are awesome, bye
for now.
