>> NARRATOR: Tonight,
an epic journey
through the most war torn region
in the world.
>> The chaos has suddenly
expanded into a dangerous
regional war with Iran on one
side and Saudi Arabia on the
other.
>> Two well-armed rivals, and
neither side appears willing
to back down.
>> The Saudis insist that Iran
is a hostile belligerent,
adventurous nation, attempting
to export revolution around the
region.
How do you respond?
>> Talk is cheap.
Saudis helped Al Qaeda.
Saudis are funding terrorists.
So they started this sectarian
message.
Not us.
>> The Iranians say you've been
busy supporting extremism.
What's your response to that?
>> Nonsense.
The Iranians are the ones who
are exporting terrorism.
They're the ones who are stoking
the fires of sectarianism.
They are the ones who have been
on an aggressive path since
1979.
>> NARRATOR: From the Iranian
Shia Revolution that ignited the
fire, to the threat felt in
Saudi Arabia.
>> Khomeini described the rulers
of the gulf as being like the
shah.
They, who must be toppled.
>> NARRATOR: Frontline traces
the roots of a deadly divide.
>> It is a power struggle
between Iran and Saudi Arabia
for dominance of the Middle East
and the Muslim world.
>> Iranian and Saudi citizens
aren't the ones that are
suffering.
There's been over a million
casualties in the Middle East
over the last decade.
They've been Syrian.
They've been Iraqi.
They've been Yemeni.
>> As the rhetoric escalates, as
the proxy wars escalate, neither
side seems to appreciate that
they're destroying the region.
>> NARRATOR: Filmed in seven
countries with correspondent
Martin Smith, part one of a
Frontline special series,
“Bitter Rivals”.
♪ ♪
>> MARTIN SMITH: I've reported
from the Middle East for nearly
two decades.
Yet I've never visited Tehran
before.
I've come here to report on the
intense rivalry between Shia
Iran and its Sunni neighbor
Saudi Arabia.
It's been nearly 40 years since
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led
a revolution that toppled the
U.S.-backed monarchy.
Ever since, relations with the
outside world have been
strained.
For an American journalist, it's
not easy to report here.
This is an authoritarian state.
It takes courage for Iranians to
speak out.
Many have been jailed for
opposing the government.
>> One of the sight that we are
going to see on the 22nd when
Imam Khomeini has his lecture...
>> My guide is Sassan.
Usually Sassan works with
tourists, but he has been
assigned to me by a media agency
that operates on behalf of the
government.
>> SMITH: Sassan?
>> Yes, sir?
>> SMITH: You tell me again, who
is this man we're going to see?
>> This gentleman?
>> SMITH: Yes, tell me.
We've given them a list of
people we hope to meet.
But it's not clear who the
government will actually
approve.
>> Mr. Rafighdoost is one of the
living historians of the Iranian
revolution.
And me as an Iranian, this is
the first time I'm going to see
him from the very close in
person.
He wants to...
>> SMITH: The man we're going to
visit today, Mohsen Rafighdoost,
is a founder of Iran's powerful
Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, the IRGC.
Today, as a result of his
connections, he is one of the
wealthiest men in Iran, with
stakes in hundreds of companies.
In the late '70s, he led
protests against Iran's
unpopular shah, preparing for
the day Ayatollah Khomeini would
return from exile.
On February 1, 1979, Rafighdoost
was in charge of Khomeini's
security.
(Rafighdoost):
>> SMITH: Iran's Western-backed
monarch, the shah, had left the
country on what he said was a
vacation.
Khomeini seized the moment.
What was going through your mind
and your heart about what this
meant for the country?
>> REPORTER: The people were in
a frenzy to catch just a glimpse
of the man they revere like a
god.
They clawed and clambered
and ran to see and be near him
for 15 miles, and no more than a
tiny fraction of the multitude
succeeded.
(Rafighdoost):
(crowd shouting):
>> SMITH: Later that same day,
Khomeini gave his first major
address to the Iranian people.
It was a rejection of British
and American domination of the
shah's Iran.
(Khomeini):
(applause and cheering)
(crowd shouts Takbir)
>> SMITH: Khomeini would now use
religion to reorder every aspect
of Iranian life.
And he declared that Islam was
fundamentally opposed to the
whole notion of monarchy.
His message was a direct assault
on kings from the Gulf states to
Saudi Arabia.
Iranians believed it was the end
of decades of autocratic rule
and repression.
(shouting)
>> I believe the revolution was
a demand for dignity on the part
of the Iranian people.
They wanted recognition for who
they were, for their history.
For their identity.
>> SMITH: Do you think Americans
generally understand the Iranian
experience prior to the
revolution?
>> I guess not.
I believe the American people
have not been subjected to the
type of indignation and lack of
respect that the people of Iran
were subjected to.
>> FILM NARRATOR: Today both the
peaceful economy and the
defensive strength of the free
world are heavily dependent upon
the petroleum resources of Iran.
>> SMITH: As the Iranians tell
it, there were decades of
exploitation and abuse.
The West had relied upon Iran to
supply much of its oil.
>> FILM NARRATOR: ...which has
supplied more than a quarter of
Britain's needs...
>> SMITH: The British had
commandeered a near-monopoly of
Iranian oil profits.
>> Iran becomes the center of
a major international crisis.
>> SMITH: Then, in 1951,
Mohammed Mossadegh was nominated
by Iran's parliament to lead the
country's first democratically
elected government.
After Mossadegh nationalized
Iran's British-run oil industry
and chased the shah from Tehran,
the C.I.A. and British spies
engineered a coup in 1953.
>> SMITH: Mossadegh was
arrested, imprisoned, and lived
in captivity for 14 years
until his death.
>> We're not so great at history
in America.
When we say, "That's history,"
it's a pejorative.
Well, the rest of the world
takes history pretty seriously.
And 1953 definitely resonated in
1979.
It resonates today.
(man speaking):
>> SMITH: The shah was
reinstalled.
To stay in power, he built a
massive police state, and relied
on the West for support.
>> Iran, because of the great
leadership of the shah, is an
island of stability in one of
the more troubled areas of the
world.
>> What the United States gave
the shah, aside from flattery,
was military might.
>> SMITH: The U.S. sold him
weapons.
And the C.I.A. trained the
shah's secret police, the SAVAK,
which brutally suppressed all
opposition.
>> During the trouble, I saw
the police beating passers-by
indiscriminately with their
sticks.
>> SMITH: By 1978, the country
was convulsed with protests.
(crowd shouting):
>> SMITH: The people wanted
control of their own destiny.
>> The fact is, the shah has
failed to make civilian
government work.
And until a proper solution is
found here, there can be no
satisfactory form of government
for Iran.
>> SMITH: Then came 1979, and
Khomeini's revolution.
Its impact was felt across the
Middle East, wherever unpopular
elites were supported by the
U.S.
>> A huge mob armed with rifles
and shotguns and screaming,
"Kill the American dogs,"
stormed the U.S. Embassy
compound in Islamabad and set
parts of it afire.
>> 1979 was a crucial year, I
think, for the Muslim world.
I mean, Sunnis were celebrating
the Iranian Revolution as much
as Shias were.
There was enormous enthusiasm
and support, because Khomeini's
initial line was not sectarian
against Sunnis and such.
It was anti-American.
>> Iran today saw the biggest
demonstration yet.
More than one million persons
marched through the streets
shouting, "Death to the shah,
death to Carter."
>> Khomeini's vision was to
annihilate America's presence
from the Middle East.
He wanted this Islamic
Revolution of his to spread, and
to see the end of Western
influence-- cultural, political,
military, financial-- in the
entire Islamic world.
>> It just provided the example
that people, without any foreign
help, were able to engage a very
brutal regime, supported by,
primarily by the United States,
and defeat it.
(Sasson):
>> SMITH: To this day, loyal
regime supporters gather to
celebrate their revolution.
They march down Enghelab, or
Revolution Street, every
February 11.
What brings you here today?
>> "My country is the best
country in all over the world."
>> SMITH: What makes your
country the best country in all
of the world?
>> SMITH: Almost four decades of
indoctrination have ritualized
these anti-American sentiments.
Hello.
My name is Martin.
How do you do?
But what we didn't expect is how
everyone went out of their way
to welcome an American reporter.
>> I like all the people in the
U.S.A.
>> SMITH: They make a
distinction.
(man):
>> SMITH: Many people stay
away in protest against the
regime, but government employees
are expected to attend.
(man):
>> SMITH: Compared to the
passions of 1979, the whole
march had a kind of carnival
feel to it.
There were plenty of
anti-Western posters with all
those familiar slogans.
(chanting):
>> SMITH: More than anything,
the march was about pride and
defiance.
(crowd cheering and chanting)
>> SMITH: But in the beginning,
it was not clear if this
revolution would survive.
It was the American hostage
crisis that would help Khomeini
secure its future.
>> The American Embassy in
Tehran is in the hands of
Muslim students tonight.
Spurred on by an anti-American
speech by the Ayatollah
Khomeini, they stormed the
embassy, fought the Marine
guards for three hours,
overpowered them, and took
dozens of American hostages.
>> SMITH: The fear was that the
United States was preparing to
reinstall the shah.
A small group of students
reacted.
>> The hostages are in our
hands.
>> SMITH: Masoumeh Ebtekar was a
spokesperson for the students.
>> So that in the case of any
military intervention, we will
destroy them.
The students, they believed that
there is a serious possibility
that what happened in 1953, the
coup d'état, could again happen.
History could repeat itself.
>> Militant Muslim students
today vowed to kill the 49
American hostages if the U.S.
launches a military attack
against Iran.
Their demand remains the same--
return the shah to stand trial.
>> SMITH: The taking of the
hostages was initially prompted
when President Carter
reluctantly granted the shah
permission to enter a U.S.
hospital.
>> The former shah of Iran is
suffering from cancer, and is
receiving needed treatment in
this country.
>> The United States gave refuge
to the person who had imprisoned
thousands of people, who had
killed thousands of people on
the streets of Tehran.
He was a mass murderer.
Yet the United States let him
into their country, took him to
a hospital, and then they
expected the Iranian students
not to show outrage?
>> The Iranians burned the
United States flag and
denounced the U.S. government,
saying they would stay until
the U.S. sends the deposed shah
back to Iran.
Earlier today...
>> The students, they thought
that they would take the embassy
for a few hours, maybe.
But then suddenly the people
poured out in millions in
support of this.
And suddenly Imam supported it,
too.
>> SMITH: Khomeini.
>> Yeah, Imam Khomeini.
(Khomeini):
>> Imam Khomeini, he named this
overwhelming response of the
people, he named it as the
second revolution.
He used it to actually construct
the political institutions of
the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(crowd chanting):
>> This was a tactical ploy, to
take the embassy, to demonstrate
revolutionary credentials in the
face of the Great Satan.
We were just a useful tool.
And the regime fostered its
legitimacy by confronting the
United States.
>> SMITH: After the hostage
crisis, Khomeini was fully
empowered.
Post-colonial Middle Eastern
states had embraced nationalism,
capitalism, and communism, but
with Khomeini's revolution, Iran
was embracing Islam.
>> Before '79, Islam as a
political phenomenon was a
marginal idea in the region.
The Arab world was all about
socialism and Arab nationalism,
and Iran was dominated by
secular forces.
Now, once Khomeini takes over,
Islam is squarely put in the
middle of the table in the
Middle East.
>> SMITH: A few hours south of
Tehran is the holy city of Qom,
Iran's pre-eminent center of
Shia learning.
Good, okay.
>> Then you go to the office of
ayatollah, if you want to
interview anything...
>> SMITH: Okay, great, perfect.
Thank you.
I wanted to talk to an ayatollah
here about Khomeini's
revolution.
>> After Islamic Revolution,
there is a movement towards
religion, towards God.
And there is a new role for the
religion in all the issues--
global issues, international
issues.
>> SMITH: The Iranian Revolution
established that Islamic law,
Sharia, would now govern Iran.
And Khomeini determined that a
cleric should rule as its head,
a cleric who received his
authority directly from God.
>> We believe that imams, they
are guided by God.
And, therefore, they are able to
show us the right path.
And this is the idea of Shia.
>> SMITH: Shia are a minority
sect-- around 12 percent of all
Muslims.
They split from the majority
Sunnis 1,400 years ago following
the death of the Prophet
Muhammad.
>> When the Prophet Muhammad
died in 632, a dispute emerged
over who would succeed him.
The Sunnis believed that the
leadership of the Muslim state
and community would go to his
best friend and companion, a man
called Abu Bakr.
(men praying)
But the Shias believe that Ali,
the cousin, should have
succeeded the prophet.
>> SMITH: Shia means "followers
of Ali."
They developed a doctrine that
Ali and his successors were
infallible representatives of
God.
>> He had a certain quality that
was similar to that of the
prophet in that he was
impeccable, or made no errors.
He was error-free.
The Sunnis never agreed to this.
>> SMITH: While in exile,
Khomeini took this Shia belief
and formulated a new kind of
government around it.
He called the principle
velayat-e faqih, the
guardianship of the jurist.
>> What Khomeini did was that he
politicized what was, until
then, much more of a
religious-slash-spiritual
doctrine, and turned it into a
political doctrine whereby a
jurist, a legal and theological
scholar, could actually rule a
state.
>> SMITH: Many Shia scholars
believed Khomeini had gone too
far.
>> He would rule the country,
and he would have ultimate and
final say over all matters.
And if he issues a command
in his capacity as the supreme
leader of Iran, then obeying him
is required, and disobeying him
is a sin.
>> SMITH: He declared his
Islamic revolution in the name
of all Muslims, Shia and Sunni.
But that's not how others saw
it.
>> The revolution had two sides.
Certainly, rhetorically, the
Khomeini's revolution, the 1979
revolution, was pan-Islamic.
But right below that rhetoric,
these were Shia clerics taking
over a country and remaking that
country by the ideas, the
beliefs, the mores of the Shia
clergy.
So it was inextricably Shia.
It was outwardly Shia.
And all of Iran's neighbors saw
this.
Even if it had sort of
pan-Islamic ambitions, it was
very much a Shia experiment.
>> The fact that Khomeini
carried out the revolution in
the name of Islam was a source
of his popularity and power in
the Arab world.
The fact that he was a Shia
ruler was also the limit of his
power.
And it's that limit that the
Saudis, Pakistanis, Egyptians,
Jordanians used in order to make
sure the Iranian revolution
doesn't spread.
>> SMITH: No country feared the
spread of Khomeini's revolution
more than here, across the
Gulf-- Saudi Arabia.
It was a direct challenge for
the leadership of the Islamic
world, and to the royal House of
Saud.
Until 1979, the Saudi royal
family maintained relations with
Iran.
The two countries were both
Western-backed oil-rich
monarchies that the U.S. saw as
pillars of Gulf security.
>> We had very good relations
with the shah, especially in his
later years.
I remember before Khomeini came,
I had gone to Tehran to see the
shah.
And I remember driving to his
palace, Niavaran palace.
It was after dusk.
And there were no lights in the
palace, because there had been a
strike by the oil workers.
And there was no fuel for the
generators.
And it was very indicative of
what was happening in Tehran--
that he was losing his
authority.
>> SMITH: So there's a big
question mark.
Khomeini comes to Tehran, and
you must've been listening
carefully to his words.
>> Absolutely.
Khomeini described the rulers of
the Gulf as being like the shah,
who must be toppled.
>> Khomeini really rattles the
Saudis, because the Supreme
Leader was, in essence,
undermining the Saudi royal
family's own credentials as the
leaders of the Muslim world,
because they are home to Mecca
and Medina, the two holy sites
in Islam.
This is what gives them a
leadership role in the Middle
East.
(horns honking)
>> SMITH: An absolute monarchy,
the Saudi royal family retains
control over everything, from
the country's oil to the news
media.
This is the fifth time I've
reported from here.
In 2005, I was allowed a rare
visit inside the royal palace in
Riyadh.
It was the occasion of a majlis,
where the kingdom's subjects
come for a royal audience.
It reveals a lot about how this
country is governed.
Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul
Aziz, a son of the kingdom's
founder, was then the de-facto
ruler.
To one side sat Sunni Wahhabi
clerics, guardians of tradition,
who habitually resist change.
On his other side, the royal
family-- allies to the West.
These are the partners in power.
(call to prayer over
loudspeaker)
>> SMITH: After the clerics and
the royals paused to pray
together, I took the chance of
asking the crown prince about
his family's claim to power.
If it's okay, I would just like
to ask you a couple of
questions.
He barely responded.
What is the legitimacy of the
monarchy based on?
(Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz):
>> SMITH: In fact, their
legitimacy is rooted in the deal
made at the founding of the
Saudi state in 1932.
King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, in
order to unify the warring
tribes of Arabia, signed a pact
with fundamentalist Wahhabi
clerics.
The Wahhabis follow the
teachings of an 18th-century
Islamic cleric, Mohammed bin Abd
al Wahhab, who had demanded a
return to an older, harsher
faith.
>> Being harsh,
that reflects the
circumstances of Arabia in the
18th century.
You know, when a religious
political movement starts,
always at the beginning, they
are very austere, very
conservative, very harsh, very
radical.
(call to prayer over
loudspeaker)
>> Wahhabism, really, is an
extremely puritan form of Islam.
The Wahhabis believe that Islam
has to be cleansed of all the
accoutrements, that there has to
be very literal interpretation
of the text.
And they are very intolerant
about people who don't agree
with them.
(man):
>> SMITH: In Riyadh I listened
as Saudi Arabia's highest
religious authority, the Grand
Mufti, warned his faithful
against deviation.
The mufti is a direct descendant
of Abd al Wahhab.
>> SMITH: Fundamentalist Sunnis
believe in a direct personal
connection between a believer
and God.
They abhor the Shia embrace of
clerical hierarchy, saints,
shrines, and icons.
(chanting)
>> Wahhabism has a very stark
anti-Shia perspective.
There's no nuance with its
perspective on Shiism.
Shiites are heretics.
Shiism is a heretical strain.
Which makes them effectively
non-Muslims.
They're not part of the tent.
Throughout the 1970s, the royal
family faced dual challenges.
They were trying to modernize
the country and maintain their
alliance with the Wahhabi
clerics.
>> One of the teachings of
Islam is that every Muslim
should at least once make a
pilgrimage to Mecca.
>> SMITH: Their guardianship of
the two holy mosques of Mecca
and Medina had always been their
greatest responsibility.
>> The fact that Mecca is the
source and the shrine of Islam
gives Saudi Arabia a central
place in the Islamic world.
>> SMITH: But then, in November
1979, the Grand Mosque of Mecca
came under terrorist attack.
>> 15,000 pilgrims were praying
at dawn, when the 30 giant
doors were sealed off by
hundreds of members of a
Muslim sect.
The first pictures of the siege
showed gunfire from the minarets
of the Muslim's world holiest
shrine.
An eyewitness said he heard
machine guns and explosions,
possibly grenades, within the
mosque compound.
>> The Saudi leadership saw this
as a challenge to the security
and the stability of the
kingdom.
>> Six or seven thousand
pilgrims remain inside the
buildings as hostages.
>> SMITH: It was just days after
the hostage crisis in Iran
began.
The assumption in the West was
that Iran or Iranian-inspired
Shiites were to blame.
Khomeini shot back, blaming the
Americans.
>> Khomeini for his part is
blaming the United States for
the Muslim extremist takeover
in the holy mosque at Mecca.
>> But the Saudis soon found out
that the attack was led by a
young Saudi militant-- part of a
fringe group of Wahhabi
extremists.
>> RADIO ANNOUNCER: The gunmen
seek to purify the religion from
what they say is the corrupt
influence of the current Saudi
Arabian government.
>> SMITH: Then things went from
bad to worse, and this time Iran
was involved.
In the oil-rich Eastern
Province, thousands of Shia took
to the streets in protest.
(shouting)
This is what the royals had
always feared.
>> The Saudis rightly feared
that the Shia population in the
eastern provinces where all of
their oil is are very quickly
going to gravitate towards Iran,
and they may become rebellious,
they may become secessionist.
>> SMITH: A minority
politically, and economically
excluded for years, Saudi Shias
waved pictures of Khomeini and
demanded that Riyadh grant them
more rights.
>> SMITH: They were encouraged
by Iranian radio stations.
>> SMITH: Radio stations in Iran
called for the Shia to rise up
against the state here.
You weren't in government at
that time.
>> I was a student.
>> SMITH: You were a student.
Do you remember it?
>> Yes.
>> SMITH: What was your reaction
then?
>> It's not their business to
interfere in our affairs.
The Saudis who are Shia are
Saudi citizens, they belong to
the Saudi state.
Their loyalty is to the Saudi
state.
And Iran or nobody else either
has the right to interfere.
We don't go and and try to
provoke minorities in Iran.
We don't go and try to provoke
the Sunnis in Iran into taking
up arms against the Iranian
state.
>> We did not take action
against any country.
>> SMITH: The Iranians see it
differently.
>> We make our views clear about
the nature of governments that
were submissive to the United
States, governments that were
presenting a message of hatred.
>> SMITH: But back in 1979,
there were radio reports coming
out of Iran calling for Shia in
the Eastern Province of Saudi
Arabia to rise up against the
monarchy.
>> Well...
>> SMITH: That sounds like
interference to me.
>> We always rejected the use of
force against governments.
We may have encouraged people to
ask for their rights.
>> SMITH: To crush the uprising,
the Saudis pulled whole
battalions of National Guard
away from Mecca, and brutally
suppressed the protests.
At the same time, back in Mecca,
after a two-week standoff, the
army, with the help of French
commandos, moved in with heavy
weapons and explosives.
And with permission from the
Wahhabi clerics.
>> A religious council had to
be convened to permit the
assault on the holy mosque.
>> Saudi troops have been
conducting a mop up operation
there after driving out all but
a handful of Muslim gunmen.
>> SMITH: Scores of rebels
were killed.
Among those captured was the
ringleader, Juhayman al Otaibi.
Juhayman and his followers had
been outraged by recent social
changes and liberalization
condoned by the royal family.
Over the previous decade, the
monarchy had permitted a gradual
loosening of religious rules.
Women had been given prominent
roles in the media, and were
anchoring news programs without
head coverings.
Western brands, pop culture, and
luxury goods flooded the
country.
>> As the thirst for oil grows
bigger, Saudi Arabia gets
richer and richer and richer.
But Western money has brought
Western attitudes along with it.
Last year revenue from oil...
>> The 1970s oil boom was very
disruptive to a traditional
society.
And the reaction of some of the
zealots that they had in 1979 in
the takeover of the great mosque
was a reaction to that
modernization.
>> SMITH: In fact, Juhayman
would get his way.
After his execution, the Wahhabi
establishment pressured the
royals to put in place many of
the conservative Islamic
practices Juhayman had called
for.
>> The consequence of that
siege, the government started to
be more conservative than it was
before.
I think the government was
trying to absolve themselves and
that, "We are not
anti-religious.
We are not anti the religious
establishment."
They emphasize their religious
credentials.
>> SMITH: Women announcers were
banned from TV.
Even Western companies within
Saudi Arabia were discouraged
from employing women.
Movie theaters and music shops
were shut down.
>> There was a reaction.
Religious authority in the
kingdom promoted stricter
practices of Islam, whether it
is in prayers, in the
performance of religious duties,
and social mores.
Meaning, for example, women had
to be more veiled, if you like,
than had previously been
practiced.
>> SMITH: As Iran had embraced
Shia Islam, Saudi Arabia now
fully embraced its own
fundamentalist Sunni Islam.
The double hit that Saudi Arabia
took, both the revolution of
1979 and the siege of Mecca, did
result in increasing
sectarianism coming out of Iran,
but also coming from Saudi
Arabia.
Is that a fair statement?
>> I think perhaps in some
social context.
But also, there were some who
saw Khomeini's efforts must be
countered by similar sectarian
thrust from Saudi Arabia.
>> SMITH: The Saudi government
would grant their religious
establishment billions more
Saudi petrodollars to spread
Wahhabism around the world.
>> They have to double down
after 1979 because they have
these zealots internally, they
have the threat of Iran.
So they mobilize all their
religious resources.
They pump a lot of money into
religion, basically, both
domestically and
internationally, in order to
boost their legitimacy, and in
order to ward off and fight the
Iranian threat, which was very
serious.
>> SMITH: And then came an
historic opportunity to promote
Wahhabi ideas in a country
back across the Gulf.
A country that had been founded
as an Islamic republic--
Pakistan.
(horns honking)
The King Faisal Mosque in
Islamabad is the largest mosque
in Pakistan, and among the
largest in the world.
Evoking a Bedouin tent, it's
named after Saudi King Faisal
because he funded it.
(praying)
>> The King Faisal Mosque is a
very powerful symbol.
It was built at the height of
the relationship between the
Pakistanis and the Saudis.
Khomeini's revolution was a
religious revolution in favor of
Shi'ism.
And that really prompted the
Saudis then to spend so much
money around the Sunni world to
build up support for Saudi
Arabia and support for
Wahhabism.
>> SMITH: Since the 1960s the
Saudis have funneled over $100
billion into funding mosques and
religious schools all over the
world.
(children praying)
60 years ago, there were two 244
madrassas in Pakistan.
Today there are 24,000.
Many of them are still teaching
conservative Wahhabi doctrines.
A majority Sunni country with a
large Shia population, Pakistan
has become increasingly
sectarian over the years.
>> You know, when I was a young
boy, I didn't know who was a
Shia in my class or who was a
Sunni.
It didn't matter.
It was not an issue.
But after the Iranian Revolution
and after the Saudi money
pouring in here, we split
between the Shia and the Sunni.
It is after that, '79, that this
this became a major issue in
Pakistan.
>> Of course, the Saudis, they
wanted to stop Iranian
influence, and Pakistan became
the junior partner.
But I think for the Saudis, the
great opportunity was the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan.
>> ABC News has learned that a
massive buildup of Soviet
troops is taking place in
Afghanistan, leading some
intelligence analysts to
conclude that a Soviet invasion
is underway.
>> SMITH: In the same year as
the Saudis were confronted with
the Iranian revolution and the
siege of Mecca, the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan.
The Saudis seized the
opportunity to defend their
Muslim brethren against the
godless communists, and to gain
regional influence.
They found a perfect partner in
Pakistan's president, Zia al
Haq.
>> President Zia al Haq is very
much the man in charge of
Pakistan these days.
He rules the country with his
own particular style.
>> SMITH: Zia had come to power
in a coup and begun a campaign
to Islamicize every aspect of
Pakistani society.
>> When Pakistan was founded,
equal rights for women were
enshrined in the constitution.
Women were accepted in many
professions.
Under General Zia's martial law
regime, the orthodox Muslim view
is gaining ground that a woman
should be completely covered and
veiled.
>> We'd never had such a
transformative military dictator
who wanted to change the whole
British inherited colonial
system of state institutions,
the legal system, the
constitution, and change it all
towards an Islamic system.
Zia introduced Sharia courts
and set up a parallel Islamic
system of punishments.
>> There are public floggings
in Pakistan and the authorities
put microphones around the
necks of those being flogged so
their screams could be
amplified to the crowds
watching the flogging.
>> We started out with an open
hand, hand of love and affection
for the people of Pakistan.
But then I find that at times a
squeeze has to be applied.
>> All this Zia carried out with
his own agenda, but which was
very lavishly funded by the
Saudis.
>> SMITH: Funded by the Saudis,
with the support of the United
States.
>> In addition we are deeply
grateful for President Zia's
visit.
He's a military man who received
part of his training in our
country.
He's familiar with our own
nation.
His knowledge of the
sensitivities and ideals of
America make him particularly
dear to us.
>> SMITH: Beyond his expression
of friendship, President Carter
pledged to defend Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia against Soviet
expansion into the gulf with its
oil.
It became known as the Carter
Doctrine.
>> An attempt by any outside
force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the
vital interests of the United
States of America.
(applause)
>> The United States wanted
Pakistan and the region to
become a bastion against
communism.
And in order to become a
bastion, they thought that these
religious forces were the best
to act as some sort of a great
break against the expansion of
communist forces.
And that resulted in creating a
monster in Pakistan and in the
region.
>> SMITH: President Carter
approved a covert operation in
which the U.S. and Saudis would
jointly fund the Afghan
mujahedeen.
>> And it was Pakistan and its
intelligence service, ISI, that
identified the Afghan rebel
groups that they wanted most to
support.
And so Pakistan really
affiliated itself with some of
the networks that regarded
Shiism as, you know, heresy.
>> SMITH: So basically the
Americans outsourced the
selection of who to back to the
ISI, to the secret service of
Pakistan?
>> Yep.
>> SMITH: And they chose the
most radical elements of the
jihadists.
>> That's right.
Partly because... Pakistan chose
the most radical elements among
the jihadists because it saw
that radicalism as a potential
instrument of control in
post-Soviet Afghanistan.
If they won the war, these were
groups that would be loyal to
them.
>> In Afghanistan, the Soviets
are continuing their heaviest
offensive of the war against the
Afghan rebels.
>> SMITH: The war dragged on for
years.
Following Carter, President
Reagan celebrated the efforts of
the Afghan fighters...
>> Thank you very much.
>> SMITH: ...and dramatically
increased their support.
>> You are not alone, freedom
fighters.
America will support you with
moral and material assistance--
your right not just to fight and
die for freedom, but to fight
and win freedom.
>> Intelligence sources have
told NBC News that the
administration is now sending
secretly more than $600 million
worth of military supplies to
the resistance fighters in
Afghanistan.
>> Now we know, of course, that
every billion that the Americans
were giving to the Afghan
mujahedeen to fight the Soviets,
the Saudis were matching that.
>> SMITH: And the Saudis did
even more.
The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia
had decreed the war a jihad, and
encouraged thousands of Saudis
to become holy warriors.
One of the first to go to
Pakistan and join the Afghan
cause was this man.
>> When bin Laden came to
Pakistan, his first job, which
was given to him by the C.I.A.
and Pakistani intelligence, was
actually to create ammunition
dumps and arms dumps on the
Pakistan-Afghan border but just
inside Afghanistan.
And he dug out these caves,
which eventually became, of
course, the famous caves of Tora
Bora, where he escaped to after
the Americans bombed him and
invaded Afghanistan.
>> The last major convoy of
Soviet troops from Kabul has
crossed the border from
Afghanistan into the Soviet
Union on its way home.
The last Soviet soldiers...
>> SMITH: By 1989, after ten
years of fighting, the
mujahedeen had succeeded.
>> 13,000 Soviet soldiers
killed and the Afghan
guerrillas stronger today than
when it all started.
>> The moment the war ended, the
Americans handed over Afghan
policy to the Pakistanis and the
Saudis, and literally told them,
I mean, "We're out of here now.
You do what you will.
You do what you want."
And what we had then was
Pakistani-Saudi joint support
for bringing in extremist Afghan
mujahedeen into power.
And, of course, everything stems
from there.
If you see the growth of Al
Qaeda and the acts of terrorism
against the West, it all stems
from this original cardinal sin
whereby jihad is elevated, and
is then supported at the global
level by everyone.
>> SMITH: Many of the jihadists
trained for the Afghan war would
mature into the jihadists of Al
Qaeda and ISIS, encouraged by
Saudi Wahhabi teachings.
Why was it that this extremism
came from your schools and from
your mosques?
>> It was the provocation of the
Iranian revolution created a
reaction in the Sunni world that
then translated into extremism
and violence on our streets.
>> SMITH: So you blame the
Iranians?
>> In part, yes.
And in part I blame ourselves
also, in hindsight.
Because are there things that we
could have done?
Probably.
But at the time that... that
this was all... that all these
forces were being unleashed, you
deal with them at the time.
30 years later, you can go back
and say, "Could things have been
done differently?"
Of course.
>> SMITH: That's an important
reflection on your part, I
think.
I think a lot of Americans feel
that they never hear that from
the Saudis.
>> But that's the reality.
That's the nature of life.
You learn as you go.
>> SMITH: While the Saudis
supported jihad in Afghanistan,
Iran took sides in another
regional war.
Across the Middle East, west of
Iraq and Syria, and bordering
Israel, is Lebanon.
(horn honking)
I drove south into Lebanon's
Shia heartland and the town of
Nabatieh.
Lebanon has had a large Shia
minority for hundreds of years.
>> There's been a linkage
between the Lebanese Shia and
Iran that goes back centuries.
So there are family connections
that continue to persist.
The followers of Khomeini going
back to the 1960s have been
there.
>> SMITH: The Shia had been a
poor and disenfranchised group
compared to Lebanon's Christians
and Sunnis.
>> Shia was the marginalized
group in that society.
Population wise, they were big
enough, but their share of power
was not that much.
So Iranian revolution really was
a turning point in a type of
identity revival.
And then, of course, many other
issues came, including the
Israeli aggression.
>> The Middle East appears
dangerously close to all-out
war tonight, with thousands of
Israeli troops deep inside
Lebanon.
>> SMITH: In June 1982, Israel
invaded and occupied southern
Lebanon in order to drive out
the Palestine Liberation
Organization, which had been
shelling Israel from here.
The residents of Nabatiyeh
remember those days.
What do you remember of the time
during the Israeli occupation?
(man):
>> SMITH: Within weeks of
their invasion, Israel had
advanced on Beirut.
>> Israeli warplanes pounded
the area around the
headquarters of the PLO in
central Beirut today, leaving
scores of people dead and
wounded.
>> The Israelis fired shell
after shell into the western
part of the city.
Some analysts said that the Arab
world had reached an all-time
low if it was prepared to stand
by and see an Arab capital taken
by the Israelis.
(crowd chanting):
>> SMITH: Seizing an
opportunity, Khomeini
immediately sent around 1,500
Islamic Revolutionary Guards to
Lebanon.
(chanting)
(Rafighdoost):
>> SMITH: Mohsen Rafighdoost,
one of the founders of the IRGC,
made more than 30 trips to
Lebanon.
>> SMITH: The IRGC, which had
started as Khomeini's private
militia, was always meant to
spread Iran's influence
throughout the Islamic world.
Now they began recruiting Shia
fighters from other local
militias.
>> We had Iranian revolutionary
guards coming into Lebanon.
And they were very much the
impetus to get things going.
This was a very small, nascent
organization back then.
They would inspire the Shia
population there living in these
little hill villages to embrace
the cause of Iran.
And they marshalled them into
military units.
They gave them basic training
and some weaponry as well.
And gradually the ideology of
Hezbollah spread from the Beqaa
to the Shia areas of southern
Beirut.
(men singing song):
>> SMITH: Why was Lebanon given
such a priority?
>> Well, I think they
recognized... first of all,
there's the obvious ideological
struggle against Israel.
And there was an opportunity to
be had.
>> Hezbollah, the Party of God,
the most fanatical of Lebanon's
Shiite Muslims, are now firmly,
openly and successfully
established in Beirut.
Day by day their following
grows.
>> SMITH: When exactly Hezbollah
was formally established is
still contested, but a turning
point for the group came by
accident in 1983, during the
Ashura festival in Nabatieh.
Ashura in Nabatieh is
particularly dramatic.
The Shia faithful cut and beat
themselves bloody to honor the
death of Husayn, the Prophet
Muhammad's grandson, who was
martyred in the 7th century.
But on this day, an Israeli
military convoy lost its way and
drove into the crowd.
People began throwing rocks.
The Israeli soldiers fired back.
At least two people were killed,
and many injured.
Tensions had been escalating for
months.
>> This just in from Beirut.
At least 40 U.S. Marines and ten
French soldiers are dead after
two explosions.
>> SMITH: A week later there was
an attack on Israel's allies
France and the United States.
>> A truck filled with
explosives crashed through the
gate...
>> SMITH: A suicide bomber
driving a truck loaded with TNT
blew up the barracks of U.S.
Marines who had been stationed
as peacekeepers.
>> A minute later, the same
happened here at a French
military headquarters.
>> SMITH: At almost the same
time, another suicide driver
crashed into the French barracks
a few miles away.
>> In Lebanon the death toll
has been steadily climbing all
day-- 125, 135...
>> SMITH: 241 U.S. Marines and
58 French paratroopers died.
>> The explosion was the worst
attack on the Marines...
>> SMITH: The era of suicide
bombings had begun.
The attacks were widely
attributed to Hezbollah acting
under Iranian direction.
And they continued.
>> The latest attack brings to
more than 100 the number of
people killed in bombings in
Lebanon this year.
>> SMITH: The attacks seemed to
be working.
Hezbollah won new followers.
>> More and more fundamentalist
Shiite Muslims are volunteering
to blow themselves up in what
they see as the holy fight
against oppression.
>> SMITH: The U.S. pulled out
and Israel was forced to
retreat.
Israel would eventually withdraw
all its troops from Lebanon.
(shouting)
>> Never before had we seen an
Israeli withdrawal from occupied
Arab territory.
So that was basically the big
turning point-- the image of
Hezbollah as a successful force,
which achieved what other other
Arab militaries were not able to
achieve.
(singing)
>> SMITH: Hezbollah marks their
victories every year in a
celebration they call Liberation
and Resistance Day.
>> SMITH: Hezbollah's security
would not allow us to bring our
own camera crew, so they
assigned us one of their own.
(man singing):
>> SMITH: Hezbollah has grown
into a major political party
with a powerful militia.
Designated a terrorist
organization by the U.S.,
Hezbollah is widely seen as
controlled by Iran.
But Hashem Safieddine, one of
the party's highest ranking
officials, disagrees...
(Safieddine):
>> SMITH: The connection between
Hezbollah and Iran is hard to
deny.
Hezbollah's name, the Party of
God, was given by Ayatollah
Khomeini.
Its emblem is modeled on the
IRGC's.
And they hold allegiance to the
current Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei.
(man):
>> The ideology comes very much
from Iran.
Not just the military training,
but the very intensive religious
lessons that they undergo.
Even after they've become
full-fledged fighters, they're
still learning about Islam and
about the velayat-e faqih and
all this kind of thing.
>> SMITH: Velayat-e faqih,
"guardianship of the jurist"--
Khomeini's core doctrine that
gave him ultimate religious and
political authority.
>> Velayat-e faqih, this is
really the backbone of Hezbollah
that binds all its constituents
parts together.
They have to subscribe to this
central ideological pillar.
(man):
>> SMITH: With Iranian funding,
training, arms, and exported
ideology, Iran turned Hezbollah
into a powerful militia that
serves Iran's interests.
For security, Hezbollah's
leader, Hassan Nasrallah,
almost always speaks
from an undisclosed location.
(Nasrallah):
>> SMITH: Was it as clear
at the time that this was
to be a major Iranian project?
>> I don't think the Iranians
necessarily planned that, you
know, in 35 years, by 2017, we
will have turned Hezbollah into
this massive military machine
that is even stronger than the
Lebanese army that Israel has
called for the first time in
January of this year its
greatest threat.
Today, my guesstimate on their
strength is a standing army of
20,000 fully trained fighters.
>> SMITH: And it's a force that
projects outside of the borders
of Lebanon.
>> And it's now a force that
projects outside.
And it allows Iran to project
its influence across... across
the region.
>> SMITH: One can't fully
understand Iran and the bitter
divides in the region today
without looking back to the
1980s and the Iran-Iraq war.
(man speaking over loudspeaker)
Each year Iran rolls out a huge
military parade to commemorate
the eight-year-long conflict.
They see it as instrumental in
shaping their foreign policy
stance today.
>> This event is also an
opportunity for Iran to show off
its military power...
>> SMITH: Here is where they
parade their latest long-range
missiles.
>> ...uniting to keep out
foreign invaders.
>> We are required to produce
our own means of defense
because the United States
conducts a campaign of
preventing Iran from acquiring
its means of defense.
(man shouting on loud speaker)
That campaign started during the
Iran-Iraq war.
So we have to do our own
defense.
>> SMITH: I don't think it's a
war that Americans understand
very well.
Your generation, that now leads
Iran, you were all shaped by
that experience.
>> But it's a very unfortunate
fact that people have short
memories.
And, actually, some of them may
not want to remember what
happened.
>> Iraq declared today that its
fighting with Iran is now a
full-scale war.
Twice today Iraqi warplanes
bombed Iranian air bases.
Iran retaliated with heavy
damage to both sides.
>> SMITH: In the year following
Khomeini's revolution, Saddam
Hussein suddenly attacked Iran.
(loud explosions)
He sensed an opportunity to both
capture territory and possibly
topple the regime before it
became a threat.
>> Are they interested in
knocking off, in toppling the
Khomeini regime?
>> Absolutely, they'd like to
see Khomeini gone and a moderate
regime embedded...
>> This was a shock and awe
operation almost.
Everybody expected the Iranian
government to fall within seven
days.
>> Under Khomeini, Iran's armed
forces are a pale shadow of
their former selves.
The best officers have been
purged, shot or escaped.
>> SMITH: Iran's military was
woefully unprepared.
Without money or allies, Iran
focused on building up their
ground troops.
>> The same way that the
revolution succeeded, Imam
Khomeini brought people by
millions to the war against this
aggression.
(crowd chanting)
>> SMITH: Ayatollah Khomeini
told his people that Iran's
troops were "equipped with
divine power."
(crowd chanting)
Many of those encouraged to
sign up were just boys.
>> How old is he?
How old this guy?
He must be 14, 14 or something.
But he has come here to fight.
He has left his mother, he has
left his father, just to fight
the Iraqis.
>> SMITH: Boys as young as 12
were sent into battle with keys
to wear around their necks--
keys they were told that as Shia
martyrs would get them into
heaven.
Poorly trained and barely armed,
these young soldiers were meant
to clear the way for the more
experienced regular troops in
what became known as human wave
attacks.
>> Young boys aged ten and
upwards sent in human waves by
the Iranians against the Iraqis.
They're told of the glory of
martyrdom.
God will make them invisible to
their enemies.
(gunfire, explosions)
>> Hi, I'm Mohammed.
>> SMITH: Mohammed, good to meet
you.
One of the few reporters to
witness these human wave attacks
was Mohammed Salam, who had been
reporting for the Associated
Press.
>> Come on in.
>> SMITH: Thank you.
I found him at his home in
Beirut.
Did you see these waves of
children?
>> Oh, yes, oh my god, they gave
their little children, the
children soldiers-- 12, 13 years
old-- these keys to heaven.
I mean, that's-- that's-- that--
that's really-- that's-- that's
something that made me cry.
I mean, usually the group was a
group of children with an elder
guy who had the imama,
religious-- who was the leader.
They go through these
minefields.
Then they go through the-the
Iraqi... fortifications that
were actually protected by a
network of napalm mines.
Then they enter Iraq, and during
all this process, they were
under shelling.
They were being blown up.
Earth up, sky down.
(helicopter rotors whirring)
They were being bombed by
helicopters, by warplanes, by
Howitzers, by rocket launchers,
and stepping on mines.
And they kept coming!
They kept coming.
They kept coming.
They were like actually like sea
waves.
And there were more humans than
bullets.
They were stepping on their
colleagues' bodies.
(explosions)
>> SMITH: These human wave
attacks turned out to be
extremely successful.
Iran learned that by sheer force
of numbers they could compete
against Iraq's superior military
power.
Over the course of the war,
hundreds of thousands of Iranian
boys would be sent to the
front lines.
♪ ♪
By Spring of 1982, Iran
succeeded in pushing Iraq back.
>> The Iraqi leader, Saddam
Hussein announced a voluntary
withdrawal from all captured
territory.
>> SMITH: Iran was then faced
with the decision to either
accept a ceasefire or advance
into Iraqi territory.
>> Iranians are showing signs of
resistance to the very idea of a
ceasefire.
>> SMITH: Khomeini chose war.
He declared that Iran would not
be satisfied until Saddam
Hussein was toppled.
(singing):
>> SMITH: Taking the holy
city of Karbala in Iraq-- that
became the battle cry for
Iranian troops.
Karbala is where in the 7th
century the revered Imam Husayn
was martyred.
It's an event depicted in
Iranian films.
>> So Imam Hussain is the
Prophet Muhammad's grandson.
He claimed to be the successor
to the prophet.
♪ ♪
And there was a very famous
battle that took place in
Karbala between him and the
Sunni army.
The Army surrounded him and his
supporters, many of his
supporters abandoned him, and he
was brutally murdered by this
Sunni army.
(man in film):
>> His murder, his abandonment
by his followers has become a
great tragic tale for the Shia
community.
For most of Shia history, that
story, the story of Hussain, was
one of admitting defeat, of
accepting your fate as having to
live under unjust circumstances.
What Ayatollah Khomeini did was
that he reinterpreted this
story.
It became a source for activist
politics for Shias to not accept
their permanent fate having to
live in an unjust state, but
rather one in which they could
take matters into their hands
and try to change the world.
>> ...a dawn raid by Iranian
jets.
>> Fighting on a massive scale
is continuing this morning along
the Iraq-Iran...
>> SMITH: With Khomeini's push
into Iraq, the war entered a
dangerous new phase.
>> ...heavy casualties on both
sides.
>> SMITH: Sunni Gulf states who
had mostly stayed out of the
fight now became involved.
>> No let-up in this war is in
sight.
>> When Khomeini began attacking
Iraq and declaring, publicly,
that his aim was to topple
Saddam and liberate Baghdad,
that's when Saudi Arabia and the
other G.C.C. countries decided
to support Saddam Hussein, along
with European and-and-and
American countries as well.
>> Their nations running into
millions from countries like
Saudi Arabia enable Saddam
Hussein to buy the arms to keep
the war going.
>> We supported Saddam Hussein,
because Saddam Hussein was an
ally.
It was a war between Iran and
Iraq.
Iraq is an Arab country.
We had difference agreements
within the Arab League, and so
we supported Iraq.
Iran at the time publicly called
for the overthrow of the Saudi
government.
>> They want to export their
revolution.
They want to topple the
monarchies.
They want to send their
militias.
Of course, the Saudis will
support Iraq.
>> Iraq buys weapons around the
world.
Countries include France, West
Germany, Russia, Jordan, and
China and many more.
>> We were up against a regime
that was receiving equipment
from almost everybody.
The Americans provided it with
AWAC's intelligence.
The French provided it with
mirage fighters.
The Russians provided it with
MiG fighters.
>> SMITH: And the Saudis?
>> The Saudis provided it with
all the money they need.
>> The Ayatollah Khomeini has
called on the Iraqi Army to
desert and overthrow Iraq's
president, Saddam Hussein.
>> SMITH: Khomeini had hoped
Iraq's Shia-- a majority of the
population-- would support Iran.
But as Iraqis, they opposed
Khomeini's invasion of their
country...
>> When the revolution
happened in Iran, a lot of Arabs
sympathized with the revolution
for various reasons.
>> SMITH: Sunnis as well as
Shias?
>> Sunnis as well as Shias.
But once Iran started the war
machine and started trying to
export the revolution, then
people started to realize
gradually that this is really a
sectarian way to dominate.
>> War has become a way of life
for both sides, as has as hating
each other.
>> This bloody war, which has
cost 200,000 lives...
>> SMITH: Saddam Hussein, now
fully emboldened by his Arab and
Western allies, did not hold
back.
>> Iraq said it will use any
means at its disposal to
vanquish the Iranians.
>> Saddam Hussein was not a
joke, that was a regime.
A real tough, cruel regime.
I mean you cannot...
>> SMITH: Mohammad Salam was in
Iran with Iraqi troops after one
notably brutal battle.
>> After the battle, I went into
the battlefield.
And I found something strange.
I found thousands and thousands
of Iranian soldiers in trenches
holding their AKs and dead.
I couldn't understand what
happened.
They had no bullet wounds.
They had nothing.
They simply had blood up their
noses and mouth.
And they had urinated in their
clothes.
And we started counting and
counting and counting.
Was a full day counting bodies.
Lines of bodies, like the photos
of World War I in trenches.
But obviously it was the first
evidence I saw of the effect of
chemical weapons.
>> SMITH: So you reported this.
>> Yes.
>> SMITH: There was no outrage?
>> Oh, no, nothing.
No, nothing.
No, nothing.
>> SMITH: In the Arab press
there was no outrage?
>> Iraq came out victorious,
period.
>> SMITH: That chemical attack
was one of the first of a series
launched by Saddam Hussein.
Recently declassified C.I.A.
documents have revealed that the
Reagan administration knew about
Saddam Hussein's use of chemical
weapons.
And they suspected he might get
away with it.
At least once the C.I.A. gave
Hussein the intelligence he
needed to target Iranian combat
units, despite knowing he could
again use chemical weapons.
>> These dead Iranians soldiers
lie where they fell.
But they do not bear the
mutilation or obvious signs of
artillery or small arms fire, a
possible indication that
chemical weapons have been used.
>> These were crimes against
humanity.
American officials should be in
prison for these crimes because
they gave Saddam Hussein the
technology.
I was a victim of chemical
attacks personally, and I
survived two attacks.
Where was the outrage?
There was no outrage.
>> In the Persian Gulf today,
both Iran and Iraq have staged
new attacks against each other
while diplomatic efforts
intensify in an effort to bring
about a ceasefire.
>> SMITH: Finally, in 1988,
eight years after it began, with
the war at a stalemate, Khomeini
agreed to a ceasefire.
>> Just as a UN team arrived in
Tehran to discuss a truce in the
eight-year-old Gulf War, Iran
said that Iraq...
>> SMITH: As many as one million
people had died.
>> This has cost more lives than
any conflict since World War II.
>> SMITH: Both Iran and Iraq's
countries and economies had been
devastated.
Iran had been internationally
isolated by the war.
But six years before, Iran could
have stopped it.
You had a chance to bring that
war to an end in 1982.
And yet you made decisions at
the top of the government to
continue the war.
>> No, no, no, no.
It was important that they
confess.
Our condition was that, no, we
do not stop the war unless you
confess that Saddam Hussein is
started this war.
>> SMITH: Was it a mistake to
reject the ceasefire?
>> No, no, in 1988, we had a
resolution, 598, which addressed
Iran's major demand.
That Iraq was responsible to
initiate this war.
That was very important for us.
>> SMITH: But a lotta lives were
lost in the interim.
>> It's the unfortunate
situation.
>> SMITH: For that principle...
>> That's a question that the
Iranian people need to ask the
international community.
Why didn't anybody in the
international community say a
word about the Iraqi use of
chemical weapons?
I believe the international
community owes Iran an
explanation for its disastrous
behavior.
Iran doesn't owe anybody any
explanation for defending
itself.
>> From Iran came a statement
reportedly from Ayatollah
Khomeini, who admitted that
changing his position and
agreeing to a ceasefire was like
taking poison.
He indicated that he only did it
because things had become so
desperate in Iran that the
survival of the revolution
depended upon it.
>> I think more than any other
historic event, it's been the
Iraq war which has really
shaped the worldview and
attitudes of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
And it's notable when you look
at the last will and testament
of Ayatollah Khomeini, he
reserves the most amount of
hatred not towards America, not
towards Israel, but towards
Saudi Arabia.
And I think it was really as a
result of Saudi Arabia's support
for Saddam Hussein.
>> SMITH: Khomeini's mausoleum
is just south of Tehran.
After accepting the ceasefire,
his son wrote that the Ayatollah
"never again spoke in public."
A year later he died.
But for Iranians, the survival
of the revolution was its own
victory.
>> And the fact that they didn't
win that war, but they didn't
lose that war, was a testament
to them of their resolve and of
the strength of their ideology.
Of the strength of their faith,
that they could basically fight
the entire world.
They could fight the United
States.
They could fight Iraq.
They could fight chemical
weapons.
They could fight Saudi Arabia
and do it all with not having to
capitulate on their ideals, on
their beliefs, or even on their
geographical integrity.
>> SMITH: 14 years later,
Iran would have another chance
to extend its power into Iraq,
this time thanks to
the United States.
>> This was, once upon a time,
the Fertile Crescent.
Saddam's turned it into a
desert.
>> SMITH: I came to Iraq for the
first time in 2003, right after
the fall of Saddam.
I was with the Iraqi writer and
activist Kanan Makiya who, for
more than a decade, had been at
the center of efforts to topple
Saddam.
He hadn't seen Baghdad since he
was 19.
How do you feel coming back
here?
>> I feel that the size of the
task is overwhelming, facing
reconstruction of this country.
>> SMITH: I was with you in
2003.
>> Yeah.
>> SMITH: Just as the American
soldiers had taken down Saddam.
We followed on their heels,
drove up from Kuwait.
You favored that invasion.
>> I did.
For me that kind of regime was
an abomination that I was... I-I
was prepared to say, and I
still think is true, the country
had no future whatsoever
until-until that abomination
was eliminated.
(crowd cheering)
(gunshots)
>> SMITH: For years, Makiya had
been watching as Saddam's Sunni
Arab regime had suppressed all
opposition, including the
majority Shia population with
threats, expulsions and a
routine brutality.
(shouting)
>> (translated): In accordance
with the law, we say he who
collaborates with a foreign
party is sentenced to death.
(gunshots)
>> SMITH: Back in 1991 the Shia
had risen up against Saddam.
The U.S. had just driven
Saddam's army out of Kuwait.
>> Out with that brutal dictator
in Baghdad.
(crowd cheering)
>> SMITH: But President George
Bush Sr. had decided it would be
unwise to take out Saddam.
He encouraged Iraqis to do it
themselves.
>> ...the Iraqi military and the
Iraqi people to take matters
into their own hands and force
Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to
step aside.
(man speaking on loudspeaker)
>> SMITH: The Shia believed the
U.S. would come to their aid.
They were wrong.
(loud explosions)
Saddam came after them with
extreme violence.
>> We used to calculate the
casualties of the 1991 uprising
at 40,000 to 60,000 people in
human rights reports and so on.
We now are talking 100,000
people killed.
The regime did something for the
first time that it hadn't done
before.
It attacks Shiites as Shiites.
(crowd cheering)
>> SMITH: Saddam held
on to power.
But Makiya and other Iraqi
exiles continued to press
the US to help remove him.
>> And I said this at the time,
the chances of
something dramatically better
than Saddam was a very small
chance.
I personally felt morally
obligated to struggle for that
five percent, ten percent chance
that the transition from Saddam
to something better might be
possible.
♪ ♪
>> SMITH: And then came 9/11,
and its consequences...
>> The war on terror is not
confined strictly to the Al
Qaeda that we're chasing.
The war on terror involves
Saddam Hussein.
>> SMITH: This President Bush
would do what his father had
not.
>> ...the history of Saddam
Hussein.
>> Saudi Arabia has publicly
opposed U.S. military action
against Iraq and says the U.S.
won't be allowed to use Saudi
air bases.
>> SMITH: The Bush
Administration sent Vice
President Dick Cheney to Saudi
Arabia to get their support for
an invasion.
But Crown Prince Abdullah warned
against it.
>> ...change in the Saudi
stance.
>> Abdullah, in particular, felt
that we were actively working
against Saudi national security
interests.
>> SMITH: To destabilize the
neighborhood and allow for Iran
to move in.
>> Yeah, and not to heed Saudi
counsel, which was, "Don't do
this."
>> We do not want people to rush
into something that could have
disastrous consequences.
Do you know what will happen the
day after?
What if...
>> Saudi Arabia knew that if you
smash the state in Iraq, you
would open up a Pandora's box.
They just knew it that Iraq
would implode.
And then it would offer an
opportunity to the Iranians to
take it over, which is exactly
what happened.
>> SMITH: But U.S.-Saudi
relations were tense.
15 of the 19 hijackers in the
9/11 attacks were Saudis.
>> The relationship between the
United States and Saudi Arabia
at that point was so poisoned by
9/11, there was really very
little willingness on the
American side to heed this
advice.
They felt that the Saudis, while
maybe not directly complicit in
9/11, were indirectly complicit.
But the momentum for the
invasion out of the Pentagon and
elsewhere, as we well know, was
unstoppable.
>> This was central Baghdad
today as Saddam Hussein's regime
finally lost control.
>> The statue of Saddam Hussein
is still hanging on the
pedestal, but as it collapsed a
great roar came out from the
crowd.
There it goes, it is falling
down to the ground.
It has come apart.
The crowd is going mad, rushing
towards it, they've been pelting
it with stones.
>> SMITH: Taking Baghdad took
just three weeks.
But the Bush administration
failed to anticipate what would
come next.
(chanting)
>> There was a complete failure
to understand the Sunni-Shia
equation that existed in Iraq at
that time.
I think the Americans have never
really understood, even as late
as after 9/11, when there should
have been much greater
understanding of the Muslim
world, the depth of the
antagonism between Shi'ism and
Sunnism.
>> SMITH: With Saddam suddenly
gone, the fervor and strength of
the Shia population was on view
for the first time.
(man singing)
Just days after Baghdad was
taken, Shia poured into the
streets to begin one of their
holiest pilgrimages, the
Arbaeen.
It commemorates the 40th day
after Imam Hussein's death.
(chanting)
An estimated two million
pilgrims turned out.
Shia themselves were surprised
at their numbers.
>> The Shia power came as a
wave, no one was expecting there
is this majority here in the
country.
We didn't know there had been
Arab Shias.
We thought Shi'ism is Iranism.
And then we recognize that we
have, we have Shi'ism in Iraq.
So the fall of Saddam Hussein
really exposed the whole
situation.
This made it a direct fight
between Shi'ism and Sunnism.
(shouting):
>> SMITH: Leading the pilgrims
that day was an ayatollah just
back from years of exile in
Iran.
He and other returning exiles
were eager to remake Iraq into
another Shia Islamist state.
(chanting):
>> Basically, very early on, you
have Shia political groups that
become very important in Shia
politics, after Saddam Hussein.
Groups that had just spent the
last 20 years learning Persian
becoming very close friends with
Iranian leaders, with leaders of
the I.R.G.C., and trusting them
as much as they trusted any
government.
(crowd cheering)
>> What the 2003 invasion did
was give Iran an opportunity
that it could never have dreamt
of having, which was to bring
Shiites into power in Iraq who
were beholden to the Iranian
state.
(man):
(crowd chanting)
>> SMITH: The Americans did you
a favor.
They took out Saddam Hussein.
>> Oh, yes, you are right.
They did us a favor.
>> SMITH: In Tehran they were
elated.
>> To take Saddam Hussein that
we wanted to do.
So you were sacrificing your own
soldiers for our aim.
>> The American role in Iraq is
just a puzzle, I think for me
and I think...
>> SMITH: In Saudi Arabia they
were dumbfounded.
>> Why would the American hand
the government to the allies of
Iran?
Iran is considered a sponsor of
terrorism by the Americans.
>> And those who were on high
before, in particular the
Baathists, who used their power
to repress the Iraqi people,
will be removed from office.
>> SMITH: Then, American
envoy, Paul Bremer, handed Iran
another gift.
>> Shortly, I will issue an
order on measures to extirpate
Ba'athists and Ba'athism from
Iraq forever.
>> SMITH: 30,000 to 40,000
members of Saddam's Ba'athist
Party-- most of them Sunnis--
were banned from holding any
public office.
And the Iraqi army was
dissolved.
Protests broke out immediately.
Moderate Shia leaders had warned
the U.S. against
de-Ba'athification.
>> I considered what happened as
a very wrong mistake and is
going to be disastrous for the
country.
(Abdul Latif al Humayem):
(shouting)
>> The way it was applied it
became an instrument to
intimidate people, even people
not Ba'athists.
It became really a way to-to
push people out.
(siren blaring)
>> SMITH: Violence followed
Bremer's orders.
First a car bomb detonated
outside the Jordanian Embassy,
killing 18 people.
12 days later, a second attack.
(debris falling, shouting)
This one was on the UN
headquarters.
>> The attack was similar to
last week's bombing of the
Jordanian embassy in Baghdad.
>> SMITH: The attacks had been
planned by radical Sunni
extremists.
Their leader was a Jordanian who
had been trained in the
mujahedeen camps of
Afghanistan-- Abu Musab al
Zarqawi.
Later he would tell Osama bin
Laden that he aimed to begin a
sectarian war.
(people shouting)
Ten days after the UN attack, a
massive bomb exploded outside
the holy Shia shrine of Imam Ali
in Najaf just after Friday
prayers.
More than a hundred people were
killed.
Embittered Sunnis and officers
once part of Saddam's regime now
joined Zarqawi's cause.
>> We saw Abu Musab al Zarqawi,
and we are seeing a
proliferation of these groups,
like-minded ones springing up
and joining the cause.
>> For the officers who served
during Saddam regime, I cut his
salary and I put him in the
street.
What do you expect from him?
Of course, he-he will fight.
He will join all the military
groups who try to destabilize
the country, because he lost all
of his rights.
>> These guys are spreading and
growing.
They have hundreds if not
thousands of new Iraqi recruits.
>> There was a sense in the
region that Sunnis had lost and
that Iran was on the rise
because suddenly Shias had more
power in Iraq.
Sunnis, in principle, should not
feel like they are helpless.
They represent 80% of Muslims in
the region.
And yet, many of them are
feeling wronged, and it's hard
to argue with that perception.
(chattering)
>> SMITH: Samarra, in central
Iraq.
During much of the ninth
century, this was the capital of
the great Sunni Abbasid dynasty,
an Islamic empire that stretched
from North Africa across the
Middle East and into Central
Asia.
The Great Mosque of Samarra
completed in 851 was then the
largest mosque in the world.
It could hold more than 10,000
worshippers.
(Mahmoud Mohammad):
>> SMITH: Samarra is a majority
Sunni city, but it's also an
important Shia pilgrimage site.
(radio chatter)
They come to worship under the
golden dome of the Al Askari
Mosque, one of the most sacred
sites in all of Shia theology.
Local Sunnis used to join them.
(Mahmoud Mohammad):
>> Iraq got worse today, a lot
worse.
Terrorists committed a uniquely
shocking act of religious
violence.
>> SMITH: In 2006, two bombs set
off by Zarqawi's al Qaeda in
Iraq destroyed the dome.
Shia took to the streets and
began a new wave of sectarian
reprisals.
(chanting)
These were among the darkest
days Iraq has ever endured.
>> The anguish and rage of the
Shia crowds soon turned into
bloody retaliation.
>> The attack has sparked rage
and revenge across the country.
The majority Shia are venting
their fury on the minority Sunni
Muslims.
>> Many Iraqis have been killed
in the last two days; 47 men
were pulled from buses near
Baghdad and executed.
Sunni mosques are pock marked by
bullets, some still smoldering
after grenade attacks.
>> SMITH: Within a week of the
Samarra bombing, scores of Sunni
mosques were reported attacked;
Sunni imams were killed.
Bodies were dragged through the
streets.
The violence would only
escalate.
The police lost control.
(gunshots)
(crying out in pain)
(shouting)
(sirens blaring)
(radio chatter)
>> SMITH: I was in Iraq a few
months after the bombing.
By that point, the bodies of
Sunni men were turning up
regularly on the streets of
Baghdad.
>> Bravo Charlie, this is Alpha,
we found a dead body, over.
>> SMITH: Shia militia, many of
them funded and trained by Iran,
were operating death squads from
within the Shia-led government.
>> He has no eyes, his ear's
been cut off, his nose has been
cut off.
Tore off part of his skin.
>> SMITH: You see a lot of this?
>> Yes.
>> How often do you find bodies?
(exhaling)
>> Um... every day, every other
day.
>> There was a particularly
gruesome style of murder,
basically a Shia tool, where it
was death by power drill.
That's kinda how you could tell
who was the victim.
The guy had drill holes in his
head, he was probably a Sunni
taken by the Shia.
I mean, what-what the Sunnis
did was no nicer.
But it had sunk to that level.
It was a... it was a horrible,
horrible period.
>> SMITH: And who were the
Shiites that were doing this?
>> Well, there was quite a
collection.
Certainly, the Badrs, the Badr
Brigade was involved in it.
(chanting)
>> SMITH: The Badr Brigade was
just one of many militias
operating under the guidance of
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps.
>> The I.R.G.C. is the branch of
the Iranian military that does
foreign operations.
Not doing direct fighting
themselves, but supporting
allies.
Helping with training.
Helping with logistics.
Helping with funding.
Where Iran excels is that ground
game.
Is working with people outside
of Iran's borders being able to
create actual relationships of
trust, and being able to get
those groups to do what Iran
wants to do.
(car horns honking)
>> There were hundreds of
different armed groups.
On the Shia side, far more so
than on the Sunni side.
(chanting)
And the Iranians were having a
field day playing or arming this
group, contacting this group.
All of them were turning back to
the Iranians.
>> SMITH: Qais al Khazali runs
one of the most powerful
Iranian-backed Shia militias in
Iraq today.
He claims to have launched 6,000
attacks against American and
allied forces.
Following the bombing of
Samarra, he turned his sights on
al Qaeda.
(Qais al Khazali):
(man shouting)
>> SMITH: Khazali, who has never
spoken to an American TV
reporter before, was open about
the support Iran gave to his
Shia militia in those days.
(Qais al Khazali):
(horn honking)
>> The tensions are sustained by
violence committed on both
sides.
The Shiite militias have not
been disarmed.
Sectarian scores are settled.
From 2006 to 2007, each month
some 3,000 Iraqis were killed.
(sirens blaring)
>> The removal of Saddam Hussein
created this perfect opportunity
for Iran to establish leverage
over an important Arab capital,
Baghdad, and that forced the
Saudis to try to, you know,
counteract that and to confront
Iran.
This Saudi-Iranian competition
is primarily a competition about
the direction of politics in the
Middle East.
The two never fight, but they
have access to proxy forces
throughout the region that can
do the fighting on-on-on
their behalf.
>> SMITH: Within Saudi Arabia
the royals were conflicted about
how to respond to the situation
in Iraq.
>> The Saudi royal family was in
a real difficult position and it
was on the defensive-- worried
about sanctions, worried about
other forms of pressure if it
were accused again of supporting
violent groups like Al Qaeda.
(indistinct chatter)
On the other hand, it had a
restive population, full of
radical ideas, which it had
funded over many years.
You know there were certainly
some people in Saudi Arabia who
thought that it was just and
important to counter Iran's
influence in Iraq after the U.S.
invasion.
>> SMITH: This Saudi insurgent
was encouraged to go to Iraq to
fight the newly empowered Shia.
>> So you had young Saudi men
turning up as volunteers in
Sunni territory of Iraq
facilitated by the same kinds of
networks that have facilitated
the jihad in Afghanistan,
preaching networks, charity
networks, volunteer networks.
>> SMITH: Networks that got
money from the government.
>> Networks that were funded by
the government.
Very much.
And those volunteers would turn
up and the next thing, you know,
a Saudi father would know he'd
be getting a call from somebody
on a cell phone in Baghdad
saying, "Your glorious son was
martyred in a car bombing
yesterday, you know, here's a
video of his last moments."
♪ ♪
>> SMITH: From Riyadh and other
Gulf capitals, money also
streamed into Iraq for the
Sunnis taking up arms.
(Al Humayem):
(loud explosion)
(speaking foreign language)
>> And Abdullah, in particular,
was still so bitter toward us
for having carried out the
invasion in the first place.
I'm sure he was paying people
here and there, but without a
clear policy objective that we
could determine.
>> SMITH: Paying whom?
>> Various Sunni leaders.
They were supporting the tribal
leaderships.
Those were the allegations.
I mean, you know, there was
never any evidence for that.
>> SMITH: I understand there was
no evidence, but what was your
belief?
>> I... my belief was that the
Saudis, at... were not funding
Al Qaeda directly, by any means.
Did some of their largesse get
to Al Qaeda?
Probably.
(loud explosions)
>> Shock and awe, but this time
Sunni insurgents were sending in
the bombs.
The series of coordinated blasts
were in mainly Shia areas have
claimed more than 50 lives.
>> An Al Qaeda group claimed
responsibility today and warned
of more attacks against Iraq's
government.
>> Saudi Arabia was joining the
great struggle against Shi'ism.
And they were successful in so
far as, you know, the sectarian
genie had been let out of the
bottle.
>> The situation in this country
has done nothing but deteriorate
from Al Qaeda, the local
insurgency, the death squads
buried within this government,
to to Iranian influence.
All of it...
>> But the Iranians had much
greater influence.
Because they had an influence
over the majority Shia
population and the new Iraqi
government, which was Shia.
>> SMITH: At the end of that
year, the Shia-led government in
Baghdad cemented their power and
pushed their sectarian agenda
further by rushing forward to
execute Saddam Hussein.
It was a decision carried out
despite U.S. and Arab concerns.
>> We were worried that
something will happen.
We don't know what's that
something happen.
The Americans will change their
mind.
Saddam will run away from-- "run
away"-- from the American
prison.
All sorts of things he can be
done.
>> SMITH: You had bodies showing
up on the streets of the
neighborhoods in Baghdad every
day.
I was here, I saw it.
And in the midst of this, you
have a Sunni Arab leader who is
up for execution.
I mean, the sectarian component
of this or dimension of this
wasn't lost on you?
>> I can assure you that there
was no shred of settling scores
or revenge in my heart or in my
mind when we carried the
execution.
(man speaking foreign language)
>> SMITH: But it was just that.
The government released an
official video of the execution.
But that is not what most of the
Arab world saw and heard.
>> The government said a number
of the relatives of those who
were killed by Saddam's were
asked to attend his execution.
But they started filming--
through their iPhones and so
on-- the scene and started
shouting sectarian slogans.
(shouting)
>> SMITH: Muqtada referred to
the militant Shia cleric whose
father had been tortured and
killed by Saddam.
Saddam responded: "Muqtada?
Is this how you show your
bravery as men?"
(shouting)
>> Saddam, throughout the whole
incident, handled himself very
well.
The rope was put around his
neck.
He refused the hood.
He asked to be allowed to read
verses from the Koran.
>> In the meantime this jeering
shouting crowd hurling insults.
>> And halfway through the
reading of the Koran, the
trapdoor was released.
(man):
>> The only person who emerged
from that scene, that piece of
theater, with dignity was the
arch-criminal himself, Saddam
Hussein.
>> SMITH: So you were the man
that pulled the lever.
>> That's right.
>> SMITH: That released the
door.
>> Yes.
And Saddam came down.
>> SMITH: But clearly then there
was a sectarian tone to the
taunting and his response.
>> I didn't see it that way.
>> SMITH: Many Sunnis did see
it that way.
(chanting):
(gunshots)
>> SMITH: Around the world they
came out to protest.
India, Sri Lanka...
(chanting)
In the West Bank, demonstrators
carried the green Saudi flag and
railed against Iran and Shia.
(shouting):
>> SMITH: The execution was
meant to mark the end of
Saddam's reign of terror.
Instead he emerged as a Sunni
hero who had stood up to both
the Americans and their Shia
partners.
(chanting)
>> Really we shouldn't have
given him that status.
I mean, this dictator, this
criminal, to turn him into a
hero, you see, and courageous,
with all this slogans, you see,
of sectarian content.
It's bad.
It helped him; it damaged us.
(chanting):
>> I was physically sick that
day.
And any lingering doubts and
hopes, et cetera, dissipated.
♪ ♪
>> SMITH: So this weighs heavily
on you?
>> It did, for many years.
And, naturally, for a year or
two I wouldn't admit to the
failure in all its magnitude.
But that was a turning point for
me personally.
It's sickening, you know, to
think that I had-- you know, I
had a role in this was... was
shameful.
♪ ♪
