Professor Robert
Shiller: Well,
I have the pleasure of
introducing to you today Stephen
Schwarzman,
who has kindly agreed to
lecture our class.
Mr.
Schwarzman graduated from Yale
in 1969.
He was at Davenport College.
Do we have any Davenport people
here?
A few, not a lot.
He graduated then from Harvard
Business School in 1972.
He worked for Lehman Brothers
as--I don't know if it was his
first job, but one of his first
jobs,
and became Managing Director at
Lehman Brothers at age
thirty-one and he became head of
their Global Mergers and
Acquisitions team.
In 1985, Mr.
Schwarzman, with Peter
Peterson, founded the Blackstone
Group, which has become the lead
manager of alternative assets.
In some sense,
what he does and what David
Swensen does,
whom we had heard from earlier
this semester,
are similar.
They're both looking at unusual
and different investment assets
and they are both very
successful in doing this.
Mr.
Schwarzman's firm has had a
return on private equity
investments of 23% a year for
the last--on average--for the
last twenty years.
This is a little bit in excess
of David Swensen,
but I think we have to put them
both as remarkable investors.
In the real estate group at
Blackstone, they've had 30% a
year for the last fifteen years
and this is after fees.
Blackstone Group has been very
much in the news recently.
It just came out that they are
apparently going to be buying
$12.5 billion dollars of
leveraged loans from Citigroup
at a steep discount.
So, apparently they've seen a
profit opportunity there or
they're supporting our economy
from the ravages of the subprime
crisis.
Also in the news,
China has announced that it
plans to buy $3 billion dollars
stake in Blackstone Group as its
first effort to diversify its
$1.2 trillion dollars of foreign
exchange reserves.
So, the Blackstone Group was
picked by the Chinese government
as the most fitting place for it
to put some of its reserves.
With that, I will leave it to
Mr.
Schwarzman, who will speak for
a while.
Mr.
Stephen Schwarzman: Well,
thank you very much for coming
out on what's a bit of dreary,
slightly rainy morning.
When I was an undergraduate,
you wouldn't have gotten much
of an attendance;
people would have been sleeping
in.
So, it's awful nice of you to
be here.
There are some dramatic
differences from when I was an
undergraduate and you are.
One of the first differences is
that this course wouldn't have
existed because no one had an
interest in finance at that
time.
It wasn't a particularly
interesting time.
In the 1960s,
the securities markets actually
were regulated,
commissions were fixed on the
New York Stock Exchange;
so, it was very difficult to
find some way to compete.
It was sort of rigged system,
if you will,
and it wasn't open.
So, there was very little to no
interest, really,
in finance.
There really wasn't an
SOM--School of Management--at
Yale at that point.
Business generally was utterly
unfashionable.
We were in the midst of the
Vietnam War and business was
sort of linked to the perception
of that war because they
supplied certain types of war
materials and that was the most
unfashionable thing that you
could be involved with.
So, there was a very
anti-business,
non-existent finance
orientation at the school and,
obviously, that's changed in
the society generally,
with enormous differences.
As a result of when I grew up,
I didn't even take an economics
course at Yale.
I frankly wasn't much good with
math;
I stopped in the eleventh grade
and I think calculus was,
for me, that was way too much
of a reach.
So, I'm more in the add,
subtract, multiply,
and divide kind of category,
which worked and still does
quite well for me.
When I graduated,
I was lucky enough to get a job
at a firm that had just gone
public.
It was the first New York Stock
Exchange firm that had just gone
public;
it was called Donaldson,
Lufkin &
Jenrette.
Bill Donaldson actually founded
the School of Management after
he left DLJ.
That was, because this is a
financial markets course,
that was quite interesting for
me because I didn't even know
what common stock was when I
graduated.
Hopefully, you will have
learned more in this course.
I went to DLJ--I couldn't read
a financial statement,
which is like going to a
foreign country and not being
able to speak the language;
it was sort of hopeless.
One of the interesting
experiences I had about--which
really, now that I'm a little
bit older and can look backwards
on financial markets,
it was my first visit to a
company.
DLJ basically was one of the
first large institutional stock
managers of pension fund assets
and so forth and I was allowed
to go and interview a company.
I had never interviewed a
company executive;
I read their annual report and
I went up to see this gentleman
and I sat there.
I figured out all the things
I'd want to know so that I could
figure out whether I should buy
his stock or invest in his
company.
I went through my list of
questions and he wouldn't answer
most of them.
I found it a very frustrating
experience.
I went back to the office and
by the time I got back to the
office, Dick Jenrette,
who was president of the firm,
had gotten an enraged phone
call from this executive and
called me into his office.
He said, geez you made this man
very angry.
I said, well how could I do
that?
I was just asking questions and
he wasn't answering them,
so I just asked the question
again.
I couldn't quite understand why
he wasn't answering me.
He said, well you were asking
him things that he's not allowed
to answer.
I said, what do you mean?
He said, well you were asking
him for inside information.
I said, well I don't know what
inside information is;
I'm just asking the question
that I need to know to know to
answer whether to buy the stock
or not.
He said, well Steve,
there are all these rules of
what you can ask somebody.
Then if he tells you,
then he has to tell everybody
in the world and that's just too
cumbersome, so that's why he
didn't answer.
I said, well if he didn't
answer, how in the world can you
figure out what to do?
I said, I'm not that smart;
I need to have all relevant
data and he's the person who has
it, so why won't he give it to
me?
It became pretty clear that I
was doing the wrong thing for a
living.
In effect, that's the dilemma
for people who want to buy
liquid securities.
I decided very quickly this was
a bad business,
certainly a bad one for
me--that I couldn't figure out
how I could win that game when
somebody wouldn't fully share
openly everything they knew.
I guess if you were like a sumo
with a good fashion sense,
that's how you manage liquid
securities and beat other
people.
It's not just what you know,
it's a question of whether the
rest of the world will buy into
what you know and drive that
security up.
So, I basically retreated and
went to Harvard Business School,
where I figured maybe somebody
will tell me how this game
really works in a way that I can
prosper in it.
That was a good experience for
me.
They basically taught
you--you're undergraduates,
so you don't know what they're
teaching you at the school like
that--so,
I can explain it actually
pretty clearly.
It's basically--they're
teaching you that everything you
do with a company has something
else to do with that company,
so that it's an integrated
system.
If you are trying to develop a
product for sale,
it would be good to know
whether somebody wants it.
What happens,
actually, in the real world,
is that sometimes people just
get an interesting idea and
they'll produce a product and
nobody will want it.
If you integrate all the
different kinds of knowledge in
the company so that you're doing
intelligent things--and I know
this appears very
elementary--you'll have a better
company.
That's sort of what they were
teaching and after they taught
that for two or three months,
I sort of got it and thought
about dropping out of school
because it got a little
repetitive,
frankly.
I was convinced by my friend,
Dick Jenrette,
who also thought about dropping
out of Harvard Business School.
In December,
it gets very cold in Boston and
really miserable--he was going
to drop out and go and get a PhD
in Economics.
I was going to drop out and go
back to the real world and he
said that his staying on was a
good thing and I should stay on,
so I did.
What I've sort of done for a
career is try and solve that
problem of my initial meeting,
where people will--I want
people to tell me what's really
going on, so I can figure out
whether what they're saying
makes sense or doesn't make
sense.
You can do that in the private
equity business,
which was sort of our largest
business,
and you can do that in the real
estate business because you're
allowed to get all that inside
information,
if you're trying to buy a
company with our rules and also
the rules of other countries.
If you sign a confidentiality
agreement that you won't use
that information for any purpose
other than buying the company
and putting a price on it,
then the shareholders get a
chance to vote on whether they
want the price that you give
them.
So, to me that was like an
answer to my conundrum of how
could we get all the information
and then figure out what to do
with it,
including improving the company.
I'm sure you know something
about private equity.
If you read the general
newspapers, I'll tell you
basically what it is.
Well, all we do is we buy
companies and that's the
simplest thing we do.
We do a lot of other things,
but let's start with,
we buy companies;
we borrow money to buy those
companies.
Historically,
it's been about three dollars
of debt for every one dollar of
equity.
We then improve those companies
through a whole variety of sort
of managerial actions and then
those companies grow with the
general economy.
Let's say--if they just grow at
the regular rate of all
companies, then if you're
leveraged three-to-one,
you're going to earn a much
better return.
If you take a company and can
accelerate its growth so it's
growing faster because you've
improved it and you have
three-to-one leverage,
you'll get a way better return
then any normal stock market
kind of return.
That's sort of the model of
what we do in that business.
As Professor Shiller was
saying, we've compounded,
after fees, at 23%;
but before fees,
because we charge a 20% part of
the profits of the deal goes
back to the general partners,
which is us.
We actually earned around 31%,
which from you being in a
course like this,
you'd see that's really pretty
high compared to a stock market
average over a period,
which would be around 11%,
in real estate,
where we do the same kind of
thing.
But, real estate is an easier
business because buildings don't
talk.
Management of companies talk
and you have to figure out what
they're saying.
Companies are very complex--you
have interesting competition,
you have global
competition--and it's a
complicated asset class.
Real estate is very simple.
I mean there's a--buildings
don't talk, so you can't get
misled by a building;
they can't tell you something;
they don't have a belief system.
It's just there;
it's on the corner;
it's in the middle of the block;
and there are other buildings
that are either getting built or
planned.
You can figure out what the
supply/demand is for real estate
in a much easier way.
Because of that,
our returns in real estate have
been better because it's an
easier asset class and we've
earned,
after fees, 30% a year since we
started and, before fees,
close to 40%.
This alternative asset class,
if handled right,
is really a much better way of
earning money for investors as
well as the general
partner--let's not forget
us--than regular financial
markets investing.
That world has been started
very small.
When we started it,
the institutions had less than
1% of their assets.
It was like infinitesimal in
the private equity side of the
business.
It's now up to about 4.5% and
the returns are so much higher;
you wonder why people don't
give us all their money on an
asset allocation basis.
I actually still wonder why
they don't since we put most of
our money in that and we keep
making more and more and
outperforming.
It just takes the rest of the
world apparently the equivalent
of your lifetime to sort of
figure out exactly what they
should be doing.
I think the projections are
that this should be growing at a
lot faster rate going into the
future and some institutions,
like Yale, have private equity
with around--I guess it's
around--16%, 17%.
It was up to 18% of their
portfolio and that's one of the
reasons why Dave Swensen has
done much better than regular
money managers.
Turning to a different
subject--it's a financial
markets course and I thought it
would be useful to talk to you a
little bit about what's really
going on in the real world.
Even though this course is
being recorded and whatever you
say about the current moment
turns out to be right or wrong,
but it's just a current moment;
it's such a fascinating one.
You all are,
I guess, somewhere between
eighteen and twenty-one years
old, probably nineteen and
twenty-one,
so you don't have the
perspective to understand how
really interesting and dangerous
this current environment is.
What's happened is that through
an abnormal issuance of
something called subprime
securities--nobody in this
audience,
certainly people watching,
have probably owned a house.
What happened was that in the
late ‘90s,
the government in Washington
passed a law to encourage more
low-income people being able to
buy houses and resulted,
along with other factors,
in an explosion of these types
of loans.
In terms of loans--and
Professor Shiller can correct me
if I'm slightly off on this--but
in the year 2002,
of the total mortgage loans
that were originated for houses,
probably around 2-3% of them
were subprime.
These are for people who don't
have enough money to really pay
normal principle or interest and
expect their mortgage to be
current--to not go into default.
By 2006, this had exploded to
30% of all the mortgages that
were issued that year.
When you go from 2-3% to 30%,
this is an almost out of body
experience and to entice these
people to take these loans they
actually would tell somebody--in
the olden days,
when I was your age,
to buy a house you had to put
up 25% of the cost of the house.
Sometimes, you'd have to put up
20% of the cost of the house and
you can borrow 80%.
The subprime loans--sometimes
you only had to put up 3% of the
cost of the house;
sometimes you didn't even have
to put up anything.
That makes it really affordable
and then you didn't have to pay
any interest for two or three
years.
So, you put up nothing and you
paid nothing,
so this led to a stampede of
people who wanted this.
What's happening now is that
the mortgage--the interest which
no one--a lot of these mortgages
didn't have to pay now,
two to three years later you
have to pay it and a lot of the
people who didn't have the
resources can't pay the
mortgages;
those mortgages are defaulting.
The issue that created all the
problems in the financial system
that you're reading about in the
front page is that these
mortgages were pooled in a new
security.
Imagine just,
sort of, a jar where somebody
threw in a few thousand of these
mortgages and then put the lid
on it.
They had these new securities
and what they did is they said,
well the first 83% of them must
be really safe because mortgages
basically hardly ever default.
They rated those--the rating
agencies, which tell people how
secure something is,
rated this as a "triple-A"
security.
In the world of finance,
when you tell somebody that a
security is triple-A--they get
rated all the way from AAA's
down to CCC's and CCC means
something's about to blow up;
AAA means there's no possible
chance you're ever going to lose
your money.
Because 83% of this jar was
rated AAA, people bought this
all over the world as if it was
a security that could never,
ever, ever default.
As you can see,
these were basically mortgages
made to low-income people who
weren't even paying,
in some cases,
interest on it and the chance
that these were going to default
was really sky high.
Historians will go back and
figure out why anybody would
believe that these things could
be AAA.
They did and they were bought
everywhere;
so, these securities became
like American SARS.
They were exported throughout
the world, creating enormous
problems for individual
institutions around the world.
In the United States,
they've created what will be
hundreds of billions of dollars
of losses for the financial
institutions.
As part of Sarbanes-Oxley,
which was a law passed after
Enron and some other things,
we've developed accounting
procedures with something
called--very technical--called
FAS-157,
which is called Fair Value
Accounting.
It means, before these defaults
even happen, the fact that other
people think they're going to
happen results in the securities
being worth less and you have to
take a loss based on that
expected value.
The financial institutions were
losing all this money without
the defaults even happening or
people knowing how bad it would
be.
As a result of that those large
losses, the financial market
started losing confidence in
some of the financial
institutions and different asset
classes in those financial
institutions.
Principally banks started
trading in a really bad way.
People thought they were going
to be forced to sell some of
those and we had a variety of
different asset classes,
ranging from municipal bonds,
basically changing their value.
People said,
I don't want these anymore,
there were hedge funds that
owned those on leverage,
so there were margin calls,
which forced those securities
to be sold, which made them
worth even less.
That got the banks even more
nervous.
That resulted in higher-rated
securities being sold that were
also unleveraged.
What you had was panic selling
of securities rolling through
every element of the financial
system as people desperately
tried to get out of stuff before
it would become worth less.
This type of rapid
de-leveraging resulted in
downward valuations for all
these securities--a lot of hedge
funds going bankrupt.
Anyone with leverage borrowing
more than five to one to carry
some very secure real
securities,
not subprime,
but government-oriented
securities--those institutions
got into trouble.
What we've had is basically
melt in the financial markets,
where the banks have been so
severely impacted that they have
stopped lending to certain whole
asset classes,
particularly leveraged lending,
which we're involved with,
as well as other areas.
The costs of credit have gone
up, sort of, 3%,
4%, which doesn't sound like
much to you, but it actually in
the overall system is a lot.
What that's resulted in is a
financial crisis.
It's resulted in the Federal
Reserve, who's the ultimate
protector of the system,
very quickly lowering interest
rates--agreeing to lend huge
amounts of money to the banking
system because banks are now not
even lending money to each
other.
They're sufficiently scared
about what's going on and the
Federal Reserve is saying,
well everybody can come to me
and I'll lend you all money to
keep you liquid,
so this whole system doesn't
stop.
As it impacts regular people is
when the financial institutions
go into a crisis like this and
stop lending or reduce their
lending of money.
There's less money for regular
people to borrow to go about
their lives and businesses to
get.
As that starts happening,
an economy will slow down and
go into a recession and that's
what's happening in the United
States.
For those of you who are
graduating this year,
your prospect of getting a job
will be less than the people who
graduated last year and the
people who graduated the year
before had a much better deal
than the ones that were
graduating last year.
This is a problem that's a
pretty pervasive one and it will
probably take longer to get out
of this recession than other
ones that we've had.
The implications of financial
markets, which may sound like
just sort of a dry academic
course--this will also effect
the outcome of presidential
elections among other things
because you'll see that from
what the presidential candidates
started talking about nine
months ago,
which was a lot of foreign
policy, war in Iraq,
which we'd be doing a better
variety of those issues.
You'll see that by the time
this election occurs,
that the focus will be much
more and perhaps dominantly so
on the economy,
on people defaulting and being
thrown out of their houses,
on what's happening to the
economy generally.
It's going to hit other things,
such as trade and the country
being more populist,
more protectionist,
which also has negative
implications because the United
States right now is the largest
debtor nation in the world.
Ten years ago,
we were the largest creditor,
and when you're the largest
debtor,
that means you have to borrow
money all the time from people
in the outside world.
If we become more protectionist
and outsiders basically say,
look these Americans are
starting to not have an open
world;
I'm worried that maybe I won't
be able to get my money back or
they don't really want me to be
part of their world,
then there's the potential that
they will invest less with us,
which again will raise our cost
of borrowing in financial
markets,
whether they're for Treasuries
or other types of things,
which will have the effect of
again slowing our economy.
You all are about to enter the
world in a very,
very, very interesting time.
The problems with our financial
institutions are perhaps the
greatest that we've had since
the 1930s,
in the era of the Great
Depression, which is when my dad
was sort of a young man and he
grew up in the 1930s.
Anyone who did would tell you,
that was just a disastrous
economic time because those
financial institutions--as
opposed to struggling the way
ours are and ours will
ultimately be fine--those
financial institutions collapsed
because they didn't have the
kind of safeguards that the
system has basically put into
our system,
currently.
We learned from the 1930s how
to avoid a complete collapse of
the financial institutions.
This is a trying time for the
system and the Federal Reserve
is doing a really excellent job
at sort of guaranteeing it.
If you read about the recent
Bear Stearns crisis,
which was front page of
literally every newspaper in the
world,
where the Federal Reserve
stepped in and basically
provided sufficient guarantees
and credit support so that this
one institution wouldn't go
bankrupt.
There were--it's a brokerage
firm.
Brokerage firms are not
regulated by the Federal Reserve
and they don't have access to
the borrowings of the Federal
Reserve to protect them,
which is--they're sort of
outside the system.
The reason why the Federal
Reserve went and did that is
that the large brokerage firms,
which don't have the same kind
of regulation or the same kind
of ultimate lender,
literally have trillions and
trillions of dollars of
counter-party risk--sort of
guarantees that they've given
that they'll do something.
If they go bankrupt,
they can't do it and that
leaves the system vulnerable to
people expecting performance on
things like credit default swaps
and things that are too
technical to actually explain to
you at the moment.
But, there are so many
trillions of dollars of those
obligations that if they get
into trouble--this isn't just
like a subprime mortgage;
these are in the trillions.
Just credit default swaps are
about forty-five trillion
dollars and the subprime
mortgage losses will only be a
few hundred billion dollars.
The Fed was basically going in
and saying, we can't take this
risk to our overall system.
That's one reason why the stock
market has gotten better because
the prospect of a collapse of
the system has been really
reduced.
I wasn't trying to depress you
on an early morning.
The American system is
enormously resilient and there
will be solutions that happen
over time that will deal with
this.
The impact of financial
markets, which is your
course--I'm just a visitor--is
really driving the whole overall
economy and is affecting the
global economy.
The countries in Asia--China,
India, and in particular those
large ones--will obviously
sustain lower growth rates as a
result of this financial markets
problem here in the United
States.
You're seeing the U.K.
having already slowed down and
this will probably,
as it has historically,
roll into continental Europe
and result in the whole world
growing slower,
higher unemployment and people
being adversely affected.
How financial markets work,
how they're impacted,
and what would have happened if
these subprime mortgages
wouldn't have been allowed to
have been made from a regulatory
point of view,
and what would have happened if
they were, instead of being
rated AAA, they would have been
rated single B.
Hardly anybody would have
bought them and that would have
controlled the expansion and the
risk to the financial system.
Historians will look back on it
and real people,
not that historians aren't,
but real practitioners will try
and solve this problem by having
different types of regulation so
that you can't get into this
kind of risk posture.
In any case,
why don't we take some
questions.
That's an opening and we can
talk about anything you'd like
to.
Dare to be great?
Yes?
Student: I'm sort of
curious;
maybe you can sort of take us
through one that went great in
your opinion and one that went
very poorly.
Mr.
Stephen Schwarzman: The
question was,
can I take you through a good
deal and a bad deal?
I assume private equity or--
Student: Yes.
Mr.
Stephen Schwarzman:
…to show you how this
works.
Well, a good deal--those are
always more fun by the way--a
good deal was really our first
deal.
It was a company called U.S.
Steel Corporation,
which is sort of a big one.
It was attacked by a corporate
raider named Carl Icahn,
who I think you have some
familiarity with,
being a prior speaker.
The corporation didn't want to
be taken over,
so they were trying to marshal
cash to fight him off.
The way they chose to fight him
off was by buying their own
stock at a higher price to give
their shareholders the
equivalent of a really big
dividend,
but doing it by buying their
stock, which gave them capital
gains treatment;
so, they needed to get a bunch
of money.
The way they thought about
getting some money was to sell
one of their big assets;
the asset they chose to sell
was their railroads and barge
lines and ore boats on the Great
Lakes.
To make steel,
for those of you who have never
done it, it's a lot like
cooking.
You need a variety of different
ingredients and the ingredients,
instead of just being carried
into your house in a shopping
bag,
come in on a railroad because
they're iron ore,
and coke, and all these really
heavy things.
I guess around 1880-1890 a
fellow named Andrew Carnegie,
who owned U.S.
Steel--it was then called
Carnegie Steel--built all these
railroads to bring this stuff
in.
U.S.
Steel wanted to sell it and
they didn't want to lose control
of it because they felt if that
was a lifeline artery into their
steel plants,
where it brought in 100% of the
raw materials to make steel and
took out about 85-90% of the
finished product because steel
is really heavy.
So, you just can't carry it out
and put it on a truck,
necessarily--goes out by
railroad also.
Because this was an artery that
went right into the company,
if we started overcharging for
the railroad,
they were worried that we would
bankrupt the steel companies,
we'd siphon off all the profit.
We did a partnership deal where
we owned 51% of the railroads,
in effect;
they owned 49% and we--let me
show you how excessive finance
can get.
I believe the deal was
somewhere around 600 million
dollars--700 million dollars in
1988-89, so that's a lot more
money today.
We borrowed almost all the
money;
I think we put up fifteen or
twenty million dollars,
so the leverage was huge.
The business wasn't
particularly a growth business;
it was pretty stable.
We bought it in the middle of
strike, so part of the art of
what we did was guessing whether
U.S.
Steel would come back to the
same production level that they
were before.
Our guess/analysis was correct
and every year the profits from
that company would be worth more
than the amount of money that we
invested in the equity.
So, we ended up making
twenty-four times our money in
that deal in twelve years.
In our world,
not the academic world,
if you make twenty-four times
your money in twelve years,
this is regarded as a success;
so, that was a good one.
Now, a bad one shows you a
little bit about the volatility
and danger of the currency
markets.
We, in 1998,
bought--it might have been 1997
or 1998--controlled the second
biggest cellular phone company
in Argentina,
which was an interesting place
to be.
I'm sure you all have one of
these if you don't have
something more elegant and some
other sort of personal device
like one of these that can get
email or it can--you can talk on
it.
You can almost set it up as a
disco;
you can do almost anything with
it.
We bought this company for
eight times cash flow,
which is not real high for a
company that's growing very
rapidly in what was called an
emerging markets country.
This particular country had its
currency indexed to the dollar,
so it was almost like investing
in the United States because,
what could go wrong?
A rapidly growing country
invested in dollars.
We borrowed dollars to buy this
company because in Argentina you
couldn't borrow money for a long
time.
One of the great things about
the United States' financial
markets is that you can borrow
debt for long periods of time.
This looked to be a very
low-risk, rapidly growing
situation, where we were hopeful
we were going to make four to
five times our money.
There was only one problem
that--Argentina the country
collapsed.
I mean, literally collapsed.
The linkage,
which is called a peg to the
dollar, turned out to be a most
unfortunate thing and the
emerging markets--this is when
you started with the Russian
financial crisis and this
crisis.
Then you had an Asian financial
crisis;
it rolled through the whole
world with currencies rapidly
changing their values--all kinds
of countries at risk of
collapse.
It got to Argentina and the
whole economy pulverized;
it was like a depression.
They got off their linkage to
the dollar;
their currency became close to
worth nothing;
and then we had to pay debt
back in dollars with earnings in
Argentina, which were worth
nothing.
We lost every cent--every
dollar we invested in that
investment--and even as we were
going bankrupt,
it was still a good company.
In finance, bad things can
happen to nice people and even
when you think things through,
you can have some really bad
outcomes.
We've had--obviously,
if you have very high returns,
you have wonderful
stories--many more wonderful
stories than the bad ones.
We bought a chemical company
called Celanese in about 2003,
right after the recession was
lifting.
It was a company in Germany,
but it had only 10% of its
activities in Germany.
It had about 60% of them in the
United States,
so it was really a U.S.
company masquerading as a
German company.
The price-earnings multiples of
German chemical companies were
very low.
The price-earnings of American
companies were much higher.
Not being entirely dim-witted,
what we did was we changed the
location of the company--the
headquarters--from Germany to
the United States.
They also, for some reason that
we didn't completely understand,
had three headquarters
operations going--two in the
United States,
one in Germany.
We closed two of those three;
we invested a lot more money in
expansion as we were coming out
of a recession;
we leveraged the company pretty
highly;
and we made,
I guess it was,
about six times our money in
two years owning Celanese,
which is on the New York Stock
Exchange now.
It's a lovely company,
wonderful company.
There are many stories of that
type, where we invest more
money, move things around,
borrow a lot of money,
catch fundamentals as they're
going up.
The good stories are really a
lot of fun;
we enjoy those and so do our
investors.
Those are--I gave you two
winners and one loser instead
one and one because,
in our real estate business,
we've probably,
just to give you perspective,
we've only lost money on two
situations in our history out of
about 160 investments.
The number of good stories to
bad stories--I mean,
this isn't like Las Vegas where
you end up as a net loser or
it's a lot of luck.
Every time you do one of these
things, you have a team of
people working on it,
some of whom are in their early
40s, who are usually partners.
Then, each one of the firms
scales down in some kind of
hierarchy, where you have
managing directors,
and vice presidents,
and associates,
and analysts.
The folks like yourself tend to
get hired at firms like ours as
analysts, which means you do
statistical work.
I guess they're called now
models on a computer,
which give us an idea that if
any of the variables affecting
these deals change,
how will it affect the overall
earnings of the company,
or cash flow of the company,
or our ability to service the
debt of that company.
Then we can figure out,
from doing that,
what price we'd want to pay for
the company,
how much debt we could safely
put on it so that the business
doesn't get in trouble.
Now, this analyst program that
firms like ours have and people
all over Wall Street have is
like a huge industry for people
your age.
This didn't exist when I was in
college and I'm actually not
that old compared to you.
I sort of think I'm almost the
same age, a little older,
but it's amazing having people
like yourselves.
I mean, in two years you could
be in my conference room with
all the rest of the team talking
about a live deal and putting in
your two cents--a perception
whether you think something's a
little more risky.
What we do at our firm,
whenever we're considering
something, we always go around
the table and ask everybody.
So, we're not trying to
intimidate anybody,
but we figure that if somebody
your age has been working on
something and knows the numbers
sort of cold,
you'll have some views.
It's always fun,
particularly for me,
to ask because that's how you
start the process of learning.
Finance is a business that is
an apprentice business.
It's sort of like going back to
the Middle Ages where they had
guilds and you'd learn your
business by apprenticing with
somebody else who's already done
it.
There's a base level of
knowledge that you have to have
in finance before you can be
creative.
The only way you get that is by
working with other people who've
already done it and are doing
it.
People take enormous care when
working with folks like yourself
in terms of making sure you get
the right answer or not.
What I'd say,
which is different in the real
world--as a visitor from the
real world to you in the
academic world--one of the real
differences is,
in the real world there is only
one grade for every project,
which is the equivalent of a
course,
and that is an A grade.
The definition of an A isn't
the same as in academics.
In academics,
you can get an A--and I don't
know what Yale's current grading
curve is now--you can get A
sometimes with a ninety,
you can get an A with a
ninety-two, you can get an A
with ninety-three;
that's sort of pretty
good--that's an A.
In our world, an A is a hundred.
This was shocking to me because
I wasn't a one hundred kind of
person.
My first project that I
did--just to give you an idea of
the real need for excellence and
perfection in what we do--is I
was assigned a project.
I worked on it really hard;
I wrote something up that was
like a term paper,
which normally you only get to
do one a year.
In the real world,
you get to do them every two to
three weeks.
I submitted this thing to a
gentleman named Herman Kahn,
who was a partner at Lehman
Brothers--an older partner at
the time when I was doing it.
I sent it down to him and he
was waiting for this project and
I got a phone call about three
hours later.
It sort of went like this:
"This is Herman Kahn calling,
is this Steve Schwarzman?"
I said, "Yes it is, Mr. Kahn."
He said, "I got your paper;
there's a typo on page
forty-three."
Bang.
That is the only thing I ever
heard from Herman Kahn.
A slammed phone because a comma
was in the wrong place on this
piece of work and I had really
struggled.
That's all I got--an angry man
and a slammed phone and I
basically said,
what kind of crazy world am I
in?
What is this about?
What I learned is that any
piece of work that you did that
wasn't completely correct,
you got a version of Herman
Kahn in your face.
Different people did it
different ways,
but this was a radically
different world--the real world
in finance--than I was used to.
I was a major here in something
that doesn't exist,
I'm sure, anymore--a creature
of the 1960s called Culture and
Behavior.
What we did is we had an
interdisciplinary major with--in
psychology, sociology,
biology, and anthropology.
In other words,
we studied how people thought
and why they thought that way.
I thought that was a pretty
neat thing to be doing.
We had professors from each of
those disciplines;
we had two seminars a week;
we had eight students in the
major and we had four professors
working with us all the time.
So, I was used to a little
softer, more loveable world than
finance.
So, finance for me was
shocking--that people would have
to have everything correct all
the time.
At your level,
what you'll be doing--that's
sort of what it is,
there's no alternative.
People are nice,
they'll help you get there,
but there's no,
absolutely no flexibility in
terms of getting perfect scores.
Now, once you do that--I'm
giving you a little career
advice here--you do that for
about two years or three years
and then after that you can
start being more creative and
finance can be a really
creative,
interesting,
problem-solving business,
where it's global--it's fun.
I mean, in my last two weeks,
where have I been?
Let's see, certainly in New
Haven now;
I was in Bahrain,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Abu Dhabi, Dubai,
Cambodia, Korea,
Ireland and Germany.
It's actually really
interesting and you meet people
all over the world;
you get to see how they think
about issues--how their
financial systems and their
economies work.
During that trip,
I met heads of countries,
heads of financial
institutions.
You're trying to figure out
really the most complex stuff in
the world, which is how all
these systems work and how they
interact.
Ultimately, what you will do in
an individual situation is based
upon this immense flow of
knowledge and data and cultural
differences.
I missed China and India on
this trip, but we get them on
other trips and it's
really--finance done
appropriately is a wonderful
lifetime learning,
ever changing,
exciting kind of business.
It's not like,
sort of, selling socks to a
department store;
this is a really fascinating
business--it never stays the
same.
You have so many different
people in so many different
countries making so many
different kinds of decisions
that you,
as one decision maker in that
enormously complicated
matrix--the chance that you're
going to get it right is only
because you're absorbing as much
information as you can from
every place and trying to thread
the needle to make a correct
decision.
It's a lot of fun,
so any of you who go from this
course into being a
practitioner,
which is sort of what I am in
the real world--it happens to
have historically been quite
financially rewarding,
which I guess is like a--I used
to think that was a really good
thing, until the U.S.
is reevaluating exactly what it
thinks about success.
But, it's basically a good
thing and it's fascinating and I
would encourage you if you have
an interest in it to pursue it.
Yes?
Student: [Inaudible]
Mr.
Stephen Schwarzman: Can you
speak up a little?
Student: [Inaudible]
profitable and my second
question for you is from where
and what kinds of classes do you
see the next return for
[inaudible]?
Mr.
Stephen Schwarzman: Okay,
it was a question about carried
interest being taxed at a lower
rate and the next question is
what asset class do we think is
going to have really high
returns over the next five
years.
On the carried interest
question, this is something that
has been pretty well,
sort of, surfaced.
There are a bunch of arguments
from different sides of the
political spectrum on this.
Folks like ourselves,
who have had carried interest
taxed at capital gains rates
since the 1930s,
are sort of wondering where the
whole discussion is coming from.
In other words,
this has been going on for
longer than I've been
alive--that this has been a
capital gains treatment item.
The way carried interest works
is, we get a 20% share of the
profits of any investment over
some type of hurdle rate,
which is a minimum return.
In our case,
usually it's around 8%.
To get this carried interest,
we have to invest significant
monies in our funds,
which is totally unlike normal
compensation.
Most people--to get--some
people in the government want to
characterize this as normal
compensation,
ordinary income;
people who get ordinary income
just work and they get it.
They normally don't invest
millions of dollars for the
opportunity to get their salary.
We also have to--if we don't
make a certain minimum return
and we've gotten some of this
carried interest,
by the time a whole fund's
over, we have to pay the carried
interest back.
Most people who earn ordinary
income don't pay back their
income after they've gotten it.
Carried interest basically
comes out of splitting the
profits from a partnership,
where it's sort of quite normal
for a working partner to get
more of a deal than just a
passive investor.
Whether it's somebody just in a
family--somebody who works in
the business and somebody else
in the family puts up the money
to buy part of the business.
Usually, the person working in
the business gets more.
So, we sort of look at this as
sort of an issue that's now in
the political world and it will
be solved in that world.
We don't have much of a say in
that, but I would say that the,
sort of, characterization of
this is being something as sort
of an odd thing.
It's really been going on for
eighty years,
so I don't quite understand
exactly why it's officially odd
now and it hasn't been for all
that time period.
The second part of that
question is--I'll ask it a
different way than it was asked,
which is, what's going to be
the best performing asset class
over the next five years?
I think that was more or less
what you were asking.
It's always hard to tell
exactly what that will be,
but typically you have to have
a view of the world and I think
our view of the world is that
the economies of the developed
countries are going to get hurt
over the next year or so.
It ought to drive down asset
values of a variety of types and
there should be a great
opportunity out about,
sort of, a year to start buying
companies and other types of
assets at what should prove to
be a bottom.
Then, if you can leverage those
assets, as the economy keeps
getting better,
you'll make really great
returns.
The last time this set of
circumstances presented
themselves was 2002,
after the recession in 2001,
which went into 2002.
We were the biggest purchaser
of companies in the world in
2003 and 2004 and,
as a result of that,
the fund that we used to buy
those companies earned about 51%
after fees,
which for those who keep score
of these things is really quite
extraordinary.
We think that kind of cycle is
going to repeat itself.
We would think that the private
equity business--you're seeing
now, we've just involved with a
deal that Professor Shiller
mentioned--it was in the
newspaper this week,
I guess--where we were buying
assets from Citibank--loans at
discounts.
There will be opportunities in
the debt area over the next year
or so that also ought to be very
good.
Yes?
Student: How do you feel
about and how do you deal with
failures in investments,
like your Argentina investment?
And how do you think that in
the future?
Mr.
Stephen Schwarzman: The
question is, how do we deal with
failure like our Argentinean
investment?
The second part of that was?
Student: How do you
think the private equity will
evolve in the future?
Mr.
Stephen Schwarzman: How do
we think private equity will
evolve in the future?
How do we deal with failure?
I really hate failure.
I mean it's deep, it's visceral;
I really can't stand it.
Because I feel so passionately
about that, the people who work
at our firm, all of whom I've
been involved hiring,
understand how I feel about
failure and so we don't have a
lot of people around who like
failing either.
One, because they don't want to
disappoint me,
but two, because I don't hire
people who don't feel the same;
this is like a passion not to
fail.
When we fail it's a major,
major, major event.
This is not a normal thing.
What we do when we fail is we
spend enormous time thinking
through, what did we do wrong;
what should we have seen;
are our processes good;
did we misidentify a variable
that got us or did we identify
it and didn't evaluate how bad
that can be--we got that wrong.
Or did we just simply have bad
luck where there are three or
four bad things that could
happen and they all happened,
like in a very rapid period of
time?
Failure is a--how you manage
failure is very important and
some people manage failure by
making pretend it didn't happen.
They just go about their jobs
and people don't pay
attention--well we lost money on
that one.
I don't believe in that.
I like to learn.
Sometimes, you learn more from
your failures than you do from
your successes.
We actually changed the way we
made decisions at the whole firm
after a very early failure that
we had had and changed our whole
investment process;
that one failure created most
of our successes.
Failure--when you make a lot of
decisions--I used to think we
could make no mistakes.
That's what I always try and
do, but if you're very active in
making decisions--I think about
this stuff so much that we
probably get about 90 to 93% of
our decisions correct,
maybe a tiny bit higher;
but, that means we've failed a
lot, so there's 7% failure.
Sometimes we get 95% right,
but we're still making 5%
failure across the firm.
So, we're always struggling to
improve and get that down to
almost nothing.
So, failure is a really
important element in learning.
It's like bad dating.
You date somebody,
it doesn't work out;
that's the way,
by the way, most dating is--it
doesn't work out.
Works out for a while,
then it doesn't work out.
So, all of you would probably
think about, what did I learn
from this?
Why did I get involved with
this person?
Was this a good thing on
balance or not a good thing?
Am I going to repeat this
mistake in the future?
What did I learn?
That's what we all do in our
own lives and we do it in our
commercial life as well.
Second part of that question
was the evolution on private
equity.
Private equity is an enduring
asset class because it basically
makes really great returns.
It attracts very talented
people.
It reallocates capital around
the globe.
It goes where there's
opportunity and it improves
companies by investing more
capital in these businesses.
So, there's an enduring place
for private equity.
Right now, there's a capital
crunch and there's not much
money available to borrow except
on smaller deals.
That circumstance happened
briefly in 2002,
it happened in 1990-91,
happened in 1987,
happened in 1982,
happened in 1975;
so, it happens.
When it happens,
everybody always says,
oh my goodness this business is
going away and so forth;
that never ends up occurring
because capital always comes
back.
The evolution of the business
will have a few super-bracket
kind of firms,
like ourselves,
who keep attracting more and
more capital,
who are investing globally,
who have people all over the
world.
The future for these kinds of
businesses, I think,
is pretty good--quite good.
You have smaller firms that are
in individual countries,
sometimes segmented by an area
of concentration.
You'll have a healthcare group
and some of those businesses
will do well;
some will wither.
You have smaller firms that do
smaller kinds of deals;
there's always a place for that.
So, I think that private equity
tends to grow in step functions,
as a function of how much money
institutions have to put in the
class.
When stock markets go down and
institutions generally have less
money, they put less money in
the class.
When the markets get better,
they put more money,
so it's not a straight line of
growth;
it's a little wavy like that
and I think that will continue.
I think we're done.
