Good afternoon, everyone,
my name is Shaun Casey,
I'm the director of the Berkley Center
for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs.
It's really a distinct
honor and privilege tonight.
We have a very distinguished panel.
We've had a day long set of
off the record conversations.
Again, welcome to all of you.
I think we are going to
have a great discussion,
not only on the panel, but as usual,
we'll pivot to the
audience for your questions
in the second half.
This is the fifth of five convenings
that we've done here at the Berkley Center
over about the last calendar year,
looking at the intersection of religion
in various international issues.
And the first of those was religion
and the global refugee crisis.
The second one was religion
and global climate change.
The third one was on religion
and US electoral politics.
And not too recently, not too far ago,
we convened a meeting, I'm
sorry, on the rise of religion
in the alt-right in the United States.
And tonight, religion, governments,
and preventing violent extremism,
what have we learned, is our topic.
So, the other thing I need to note
is that we've been able to
do these five convenings
thanks to a grant from the
Henry R. Luce foundations.
And we are particularly
honored to have Toby Volkman
with us here tonight, and all day.
Toby where are you?
There you are, Toby's in the back.
Please, if you have a chance, say hello.
But we're honored by your presence,
and we thank you for the
largess of the foundation.
It's allowed us to do this
serious over the last year or so,
in a number of very interesting topics.
I'm gonna just pivot right to the panel,
because I think we've got
such an interesting group.
And I'm gonna not offer my
usual editorial comments
on the state of the world.
We have Dr. Mohamed Elsanousi,
who's the executive director
of the Network for Religious
and Traditional Peacemakers.
Which is a global network
that builds bridges
between grassroots
peacemakers and global players
to work towards sustainable peace.
Mohammed, it's great to see you as always.
We also have Susan Hayward.
Who is a senior advisor for
religion and inclusive societies
at the US Institute for Peace.
Hayward directs the Institute's efforts
to advance conflict
prevention, resolution,
and reconciliation projects
engaging the religious sector.
We also have Hishaw Hellier,
who is a senior associate fellow
in international security studies
at the Royal United Services
Institute in London.
A non resident fellow at
the Atlantic Council's
Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.
And a senior fellow in Islamic Studies
at Cambridge Muslim College.
So welcome to both of you.
And our moderator tonight is
professor Peter Mandaville,
who is currently a Berkley
Center senior research fellow.
As well as being a Brookings Institution
non resident fellow,
he's also a professor
of international affairs
at the Schar school of
policy and government
at George Mason University,
where he previously served as co-director
of the Ali Vural Ak center
for Global Islamic Studies,
and of the Center for Global Studies.
And from 2015 to 2016,
he was a senior advisor
in the United States Department of States,
Office of Religion and Global Affairs.
Please join me in welcoming our panel,
and again, thank you all for coming.
(applause)
- Great, well good evening to all of you,
thank you so much for being with us today.
Huge kudos to the panelists
for passing the first test,
which is to sit successfully
without knocking over
the glasses of water.
(laughing)
We're already off to a very good start.
So we have I think a really
compelling set of issues
that we're gonna be
exploring this evening.
For many of you who have
been following developments
in the Middle East in particular,
but in other regions of the
world over the last 20 years,
will know that there's
been an ongoing debate,
and discussion about the
phenomenon of violent extremism,
the sources of it, what causes it,
and how best to address it.
Some of that discussion has focused
on the issue of religion,
and more specifically,
the question of, how
important religion is,
and religious ideology as a causal factor
in violent extremism.
But also, on the other side
of the equation as it were,
a set of discussions about roles that
religious actors and
religious leaders can play
in helping to address the
challenge of violent extremism.
And so this is the kind of terrain
in which our discussion
this evening is situated.
I think it's a discussion that's happening
at a very timely moment.
Because we have in Washington, currently,
an administration that has
tended to place more emphasis
on the idea that ideology
is a significant factor.
And I think that this has kind
of brought renewed salience
to the sorts of questions
that we're gonna be
speaking to this evening.
Just a brief note on format.
I'm gonna be asking each of our panelists
a sort of initial kickoff question.
And then we'll come back to each of them
for a second follow up question,
before turning to you, our audience,
to bring your voices into the discussion.
I think we're gonna have
microphones available
to hear your questions.
So I think I'm gonna
start with you, Hesham,
if you don't mind.
You know there's been now
for the better part of two decades,
and of course most recently
with respect to ISIS,
a debate about the role of
religion or religious ideology
as a causal factor in violent extremism.
The current US administration,
as I mentioned,
has placed increased emphasis on ideology
as a driver of extremism,
and you I know are someone
who has been observing and
commenting on these issues
for a long time.
So I just wanted to ask, how
do you see this question.
- First, thank you very
much Peter, and Shaun,
for the kind invitation.
It's really a pleasure to
be a part of the panel.
And to touch on an issue
that I've been working on
myself for about 15 years.
The conversation seems to go in cycles.
So we address this
question every few years,
and then we feel obliged to do it again.
At the moment, I'm actually doing
a project on 25 countries
with different colleagues,
mostly based in Europe but
also in Asia and Africa,
looking at precisely this issue,
it's an EU funded project called GREASE,
which is an acronym for Governing
Religion, Radicalization,
and Secularism on these
different continents.
And I have to say the
idea of a singular process
of radicalization, which is
really what we're getting at,
is something that isn't
really backed up by the data.
I think that we have a
number of different types
of processes that are actually unfolding.
And it depends very much
on geography, background,
political circumstances,
really across the board, right?
So the notion of the
problem being all about
ideology, I think, is very problematic.
And I think that there
are many other factors
that we have to consider far
more than actually ideology,
or quote unquote, bad religion.
Having said that, and
this is where I think
nuance needs to come into
the equation a little bit,
ideology does play a role, in some cases.
I would argue a minority of cases.
I would argue a minority of cases
that particularly affects
those in the top echelons,
as it were, of those types
of movements and groups,
but it exists, and it needs
to be identified properly.
It needs to be analyzed authentically.
But we can't simply demand
that we come up with a singular equation
as to how this all
unfolds, and then say okay,
this is one size fits
all kind of solution.
And I think that people
find that very difficult.
Sometimes in academia, but
definitely within policy.
And this is the biggest problem, I think,
that policymakers look
for quick fix solutions,
and also very clear cut singular answers.
And the situation is simply
far more complex than that.
So, I wouldn't say that ideology
has nothing to do with this,
I think that's dishonest.
But I do think that far too often,
those who bring up ideology are the ones
that are frankly looking for an excuse
to avoid discussing the other
massive elephants in the room.
And I think that's particularly the case
when we discuss this internationally,
because it's then used as an excuse
to back autocratic regimes
of different types.
And we've seen that many
times in the last few years.
With various countries
within the Arab world
and the wider region.
- [Peter] Those regimes being essentially
the elephants in the room
that you're referring to?
- In this particular case, yeah.
So, we, again, it's sometimes difficult
because one doesn't want
to let autocracy get away with it, right?
So, we do focus on that and we ought to.
And at the same time,
recognize that ideology does
play a role for some people.
And energizes them in ways
that other factors do not.
But again, I think that
this is really a minority
of the entirety of the problem.
- Okay.
Let me turn to you, Suzie.
You know so much of the discussion
around the religion and CVE
tends to focus on Islam,
or on militant groups
that define themselves
in relation to Islam.
But of course, there are settings today
in which movements affiliated
with other faith traditions
are implicated in violent extremism.
You I know have done a lot of work
on Buddhism and militancy and Myanmar,
and so I wonder if you
could give us a sense
of what that looks like
and how it compares
to some of the cases we tend
to be more familiar with.
- Yeah.
I would first be quick to point out
that a lot of the movements
that we think of in Myanmar
when you ask this question,
so Ma Ba Tha, or 969,
or corollary movements like in Sri Lanka,
the Bodu Bala Sena.
Are...
distinctive from some of
the traditional movements
we think of that give
an Islamic justification
or groundedness, such as Daesh,
or some of the more historic
violent extremist movements
that have an ideological bent to it,
whether that's the LTTE
in Sri Lanka, or the IRA.
In the sense that these groups
are not necessarily
using violence as a means
by which to achieve some sort
of religious or ideological end.
Which is not to say that
they're not using tactics
and language that fuels violence.
But only to say that it's
not part of their tactic.
They don't have a violent campaign,
a militant campaign that's central
to what they're seeking to do.
But if we think more broadly,
beyond just the traditional definition
of a terrorist organization
or a violent extremist organization,
to the broader parameters
of religion and conflict,
or a religious conflict, then these groups
do have some similarities
to the traditional
violent extremist groups.
Which can include things like,
it does include things like
anxiety about modernity,
about globalization, about
processes of secularization,
and particularly with that last one,
rooted in the colonial experience,
and the almost overnight separation
between the pagoda and the state,
in the sense that the health of the state
and the health of the religious community
depended on that relationship.
So the severing of that,
and then the almost enforced
forms of secularization
that resulted through colonialism.
Continues to drive this anxiety
that fuels these movements
and their activities,
as well as the aspects of
exclusionary mentalities,
fear of the religious other,
the ethnic other, to a degree,
an obsession with women's
bodies, and women's sexuality,
and a desire to control women's
sexuality and their bodies.
And in the midst of all of this,
employment of particular religious ideas,
teachings, historical experiences,
in order to frame and
understand and interpret
the contemporary situation
and what is needed
in order to defend the faith,
to defend the Dharma in a
notion that's somewhat akin
to a just war theory that we
might see in other traditions.
They're also, I would say, very responsive
to the specter of violent
extremism within the Muslim world,
so there's a lot of responsiveness
to what they see in the media,
to what they see around them in Asia,
in a way that almost makes
them mimic, to some degree,
what they're seeing, but also
fuels their own anxieties.
And what drives these
groups in particular,
these Buddhist groups in particular,
is an anxiety that's rooted also
in recognition that the Buddhist world
does not have the same
degree of influence, power,
global domination, and so on,
as the Christian world
and the Muslim world.
So it's also driven by that
sense of existential threat,
that then leads them to feel
that this is an extraordinary moment
where we might need to break some of our
traditional ethical
norms in order to defend,
ensure the existence, continued existence
of the Buddhist faith.
So there's some similarities.
Especially in terms of the mentalities
and what's driving this
sort of religious anxiety
or religious interpretation
of the movement that has
violent repercussions,
exclusionary repercussions to it,
but it also has some
qualitative differences
in the sense of where they see violence,
the role that violence can or should play
and whether violence
should be a focused tactic
in order to achieve these religious ends
of defending the faith.
- Okay, great, thank you.
If I may now, I wanted to
kind of pivot the conversation
towards the other side of the equation.
That is the idea of religious leaders
being part of the solution,
and turning to you now Mohamed,
I know you play a very important role
in a global network, excuse me,
of religious and traditional peacemakers
whose work focuses, at least in part,
on addressing the challenge
of violent extremism.
So as you see it, what role
can religious actors play
in addressing violent extremism?
And can you cite some practical examples
of their contributions?
- Thank you so much Peter.
I think, you know,
I have to start by saying
that there is a clear recognition
to the important role of
religious leaders and actors.
Not only in countering violent extremism,
but addressing a number
of other issues as well.
But for this topic, I see
this recognition very clearly
from the international communities,
to, you know, different governments
and I see my friend Shaun Casey's here.
So, this is, recognition, is that,
religious actors and leaders
play a role in addressing these issues
because they are in the front line.
Today, we know that 80% of
the population of the Earth
associate themselves, some
way or another, to religion.
So basically, they have huge followers.
And violent, countering violent extremism,
unfortunately, you know, ideology,
and people who are committing
these terrorist attacks,
they're also somehow
associating themselves
to religious places as well.
So that's why we see the
role of religious actors
is very critical.
And the recognition,
my network, was created
because the former secretary
general of the United Nations,
Ban Ki-moon, realized that the role
of religious actors and
leaders is underutilized.
Their potential is not utilized.
That's why he called for a mechanism
to further actually engage
religious and traditional actors
in many issues, and including
countering violent extremism.
Just last month,
in January, first week of
January I was in Somalia.
A country that 90% of the
population, basically,
affiliated to Islam.
And there is a huge problem of Shabaab.
So if you don't talk to
these religious leaders,
you will not be able to
address a Shabaab crisis.
So you have to involve them, because,
you know, a Shabaab come to the mosque,
a Shabaab go to social,
basically, places and all of that.
So you have to talk to
the religious leaders
so that you have, you
know, kind of a mechanism
to address these issues,
whether it is an ideology that
you wanted to put forward,
basically the right narrative
of interpretation of theology,
or something like that.
So you have to talk to
religious leaders and actors.
Also, I remember during
the Obama Administration,
the situation in Central Africa Republic,
we worked closely with
Shaun's office as well.
And because of the crisis
there, because there is also,
was a concern that maybe Boko Haram
will come to Central Africa Republic,
so we have to engage religious actors
and leaders in the country.
But in collaboration
with the US government,
Obama Administration, at
the time, we, you know,
we went to Central Africa Republic,
we took religious leaders
to talk to religious
leaders on the ground.
To see how we can address
issues of violent extremism.
Not only extremism coming
from specific religions,
but the violence
committed in that country,
has come from both, you know,
Christian communities
and Muslim communities.
So it's important to address that issue.
So that's why this role
we see very critical.
And we see the role critical
if the role is not inclusive.
It's not basically adding value.
So we approach the issue of
engaging religious actors
in an inclusive way.
What I mean is that, we cannot ignore
the role of, you know, womans
who are faith leaders as well.
And I can cite you a number of
examples, that are, you know,
proven to be the involvement
of woman's faith,
womans of faith and faith
leaders is very critical.
Again, in Somalia, we don't hear
about the piracies any more today.
Why?
The reason is, there is a specific leader
of a specific country in the Gulf.
He felt this situation
needed to be addressed.
He sent his special advisor to Somalia,
and the special advisor
was telling me directly,
he traveled to Somalia 30 times,
trying to find out what
is the cause of this,
what is drive, actual Shabaab,
to engage in this piracy,
you know, actions.
He couldn't figure it out.
He talked to the religious leaders.
He talked to the youth.
He talked to the government.
He talked to many, you
know, members of society,
he couldn't figure it out.
But he met with the mothers
of the youth, of a Shabaab.
So the mother told him,
it is a job for them.
They get 50 dollars a month
because of doing this.
He went back to his country,
he reported to the
president of that country,
and the president told
him, go and stop it.
They created fishery companies.
They employed all of these guys,
and instead of 50 dollars,
giving them 500 dollars, no piracy.
So, the point I'm making is that
the role of the womans faith leaders
in addressing violent
extremism, is very critical.
- Thank you. We're gonna
come back to the question
of inclusiveness in religious
engagement in a moment.
I wanted, though, to stay
with this broad theme
of religious actors as contributors
to preventing violent extremism, Hesham.
But I want to maybe, with
you, to explore, potentially,
some of the limitations to that approach.
You know, as we know, several governments
in the Middle East today in particular,
have committed themselves
very forthrightly
to the cause of defeating
extremist ideology.
Some of them are some of the closest
security partners of the United States.
In some cases they've also
sought to offer or mobilize
their own religious institutions
as part of this endeavor.
But I have to wonder,
are these institutions
and the religious scholars
affiliated with them,
are they actually credible voices
for preventing and
countering violent extremism?
- So it's very good that you
brought up that question,
and divided it into two.
Prevent, and counter.
- Yeah.
- Right? And I think that
the answer is different
depending on that question.
So, when it comes to preventing,
I think actually they
might have more space,
because preventing in that regard,
influencing religious curricula.
Providing more in the sense
of religious literacy,
which makes it more difficult
for recruitment from radical ideologues.
I think there's a case
to be made for that.
I'm not saying that that would
be the case I would make,
but, I think there's a case there
that can genuinely be made,
and that there's an
evidence base for that.
If you have communities
that have a sufficient level
of religious literacy, that
they can identify, you know,
very peculiar, rabid,
poor interpretations,
that then lend themselves
to justifying violence.
I think that there's a
case to be made for that.
It's the countering space
that I'm less sanguine about.
Because I think in the countering space,
you are trying to get at people
who've already either become a problem,
or are very close to, at
risk of being a problem.
And once they cross that threshold,
in order for them to them
realize or be convinced
that what they have been,
you know, led to believe
by these different recruiters,
is actually not true.
They need to view their
interlocutors as credible.
And I don't think that they
will view them as credible
unless those religious
actors, to use your phrase,
are able to demonstrate that they object,
not only to violence and
abuse of all sorts of things,
to be bad when terrorist groups do this,
but also when state actors do this.
And unless they're able to show that,
I worry that their credibility
with that target audience
is simply going to be shot.
- So religious institutions
that are perceived, essentially,
as mouthpieces of the governments,
that are themselves the
target of these groups?
- Indeed, so,
you know there are a number
of different examples
of governments within the Arab
world and the wider region,
that I think are very concerned,
for very legitimate reasons,
of the spread of radical groups.
Sometimes for example in the prisons.
Okay?
This is a legitimate concern, right?
And then they send
people into these places,
trying to convince them that
what they believe is wrong.
They may well be right on the level
of religious teaching and all of that,
I don't dispute that.
But I don't find it particularly likely
that they're going to be paid attention to
when they are sent there by the state.
When this target audience
already thinks that the state
and everything to do with it
is utterly bereft of any moral integrity,
and ethical value.
And the only way for them to capture that
is to be able to demonstrate
that they also speak
about abuses that are
carried out by these states.
Which is very difficult, because
in most of these countries,
and here I'm talking about
a specific geography, right?
I'm talking about the
wider Middle East region.
I don't know many places.
There are a few, but I
don't know many places
where this is actually possible,
to find religious actors
and religious leaders
that are critical of abuses by the state,
as well as by terrorist actors.
There are very few like that.
Because the space for developing that
is so constricted and small.
So I think this is a great
limitation that unfortunately,
is not down to the
religious leaders to change,
because indeed, if they were to embark
in such exercises, they probably wouldn't,
they wouldn't last very long.
- I hear you.
I hear you.
So Suzie, I wanted to ask you to take us
further down a path that
Mohamed actually started
a few moments ago.
When people talk about religious leaders,
they tend to have in mind
people who carry formal religious titles,
or who occupy specific positions
in clerical or ecclesiastical hierarchies.
And frankly more often than
not, they tend to be men,
and they tend to be older men.
And I know that in the
world that you've done,
you have really emphasized the importance
of taking an inclusive approach
to engaging religious actors
to address violence and conflict.
So I just wanted to ask you
to speak a little bit more
to that imperative.
- Yeah, and I will.
I want to throw out one thing
that we can come back to, maybe,
in the question and answer, too,
while it's turning around in my mind,
- Please.
- Which gets back
to this question as well,
about ideology and the role it plays.
Because I think sometimes
our fascination with,
or our focus on religious ideology
and the role that it
plays, also then constrains
the way that we engage
with religious actors.
Where we tend to start and
stop with religious actors
and the messages that they can give,
the narratives that they can give,
that can be the good religious antidote
to the bad religious narratives
or ideas that are out there.
So I often encourage our government actors
to ensure that the ways
in which they're engaging
with religious actors goes
beyond narratives as well.
Seeing them as social and political actors
that can address a range of issues
that have to do with
the drivers of violence.
- So the idea that the
relevance and standing
and stature and role of
religious leaders in communities
is not limited exclusively
to the realm of theology
or the spaces that we can
eventually demarcate as religious,
but they have broader
influence and importance.
- They can do a lot of mobilization
in order to address issues of injustice,
to address issues of economic inequality.
To address issues of violence as its felt
by communities in their
homes and in their streets,
and so on, and all of these contribute
to larger patterns of violence.
And so we need to think beyond
religious actors simply as
vehicles for the messages.
The alternative messages,
the counter messages.
As part of our toolbox for
ideological warfare, if you will.
And if we're gonna have a more robust
religious engagement that's constructive,
seeing the multiple roles
that they play within society.
- Susan, maybe I want to,
what about the resources,
do they have enough resources
to address all of this,
you know, multiple issues
as religious actors?
- Sometimes they do and
sometimes they don't.
It depends on which religious actors.
It depends on if they're getting the...
I think what you're getting at, though,
is that they need more.
They're often overlooked.
- Because they might not be,
they have enough capacity
to address all of this variety of issues.
- Yeah.
I mean, I think historically
they were often overlooked
as potential players within civil society
alongside some of the others,
in order to support peace building
because of the secular biases
and so on, of the field,
I think that's shifted a lot.
So there is more support
that is being given
to religious peace building, broadly,
religious engagement as part
of violent extremism and so on.
But again especially when
it comes to the latter,
religious actors and religious engagement
in violent extremism, I
think the degree to which
support is going for them,
to be able to do those kinds of things,
it's very limited to the messaging.
Whether it's, you know.
The messaging that they're doing
within their religious
communities via preaching,
or religious education, or
social media, sometimes,
there's religious actors
on social media, but,
but there needs to be a lot more robust,
and so that's where they lack sometimes,
some of the resources.
But there are incredible
resources already,
indigenous to religious
communities, often.
Especially when it comes to things
like mobilization of communities,
and the infrastructure that exists
within religious communities,
to be able to draw on that.
So they're able to do a lot with a little,
with respect to aid and
so on, I think, as well.
So, inclusion.
- [Peter] Please.
- Sorry.
So one thing that worries me is that,
as I mentioned earlier, a
lot of these extremist groups
often have gendered narratives
that tend to reinforce
male domination, right?
Male power, male authority.
And that are seeking to reinforce
what they see to be
traditional gender norms,
gendered activities
within their societies,
in ways that can really marginalize
and disempower women in particular,
but also, I think, have intergenerational
repercussions, as well, for young people,
and can actually fuel some of the cultural
and ideological norms that
create the conditions,
as well, for sexual violence,
and other forms of violence
that women and young people can face.
And one thing that concerns
me is that sometimes
the ways in which governments
or the international community
goes about doing religious engagement,
actually can reinforce the assumption
that it is men, and it is older men,
who are the authorities
within religious spaces.
So when, and it's...
I believe it's unintended, right?
But, when governments come in
and they're only or
primarily engaging with
the older male clerics in
some of these activities,
it can end up silencing, disempowering,
just reinforcing that narrative,
that religion is the space of men.
That religious beliefs,
religious interpretations,
religious ideas, that's the purview of men
to be able to do the
interpretation, and so on.
But, the reality of course
on the ground, is that,
is that women are incredibly
involved in religious spaces.
Are very involved in shaping
religious interpretation and behavior,
and attitudes, particularly
within their local communities,
but also women hold a great deal of,
a great deal more traditional authority
than we often recognize or see.
Whether that's nuns within
the Catholic church,
and the more formal roles of authority
that they play in those spaces,
but also women who are
serving as religious scholars,
who are trained in theology,
in the Quran, in jurisprudence.
So I want to make sure
that we're also recognizing
the formal role that women religious play.
And not just the informal
roles that they play
as authorities as well.
But what's important is that as we engage
with religious actors in this
work of violent extremism,
that we ensure that we're
including young people,
we're including minorities,
we're including women as a part of that.
So that the process that we're using
reflects the goal that we're
seeking to achieve, right,
in creating inclusive societies.
And ones that respect the
dignity of all people,
and that are addressing
some of these drivers
of forms of sexual violence
as well as larger
structural in violence...
Structural violences.
(stammers)
Structural forms of violence.
And one thing that I think
is particularly powerful
about women religious in doing this work,
is that they're often, to
get back to the ideological,
if we're looking at
challenging and transforming
some of the religious ideas that justify,
legitimate violence or exclusion.
Women are hitting that, right,
they're seeking to transform
some of those, and challenge
some of those religious
justifications of violence,
at the same time that they're
also seeking to address
and transform some of the religious ideas
or ideologies that are used
in order to reinforce male
domination over women.
And so, you get a twofer
with women religious, right?
They're transforming both forms
of religious ideology
that drives violence.
Which is more bang for
your buck, in some ways.
And I also just want to
point out my colleague,
Palwasha Kakar at USIP
has been doing a lot of work recently
to highlight the role that
some of these women religious,
not just mothers, but women religious,
who are trained in theology,
and in religious history,
and jurisprudence, and so on.
The work that they're doing
in order to engage directly
with extremist actors.
And they're often able to get access
to these extremist actors,
in part because they're women,
so they're not seen as a threat,
they're able to get around armed actors
and checkpoints and so on.
But then they use their
religious authority and knowledge
in order to negotiate directly with them
for the release of hostages,
in order to open up girls'
schools in Afghanistan,
this is women religious
who have negotiated with the Taliban
in order to open up girls' schools,
for education and so on.
So they're using their
religious authority,
precisely in order to have access to,
and to negotiate with some
of these extremist actors
in ways that are incredibly effective.
But then of course the tragedy,
is then when the formal peace process,
the peace talks happen, as
they're happening now in Doha,
those women aren't being included.
Despite the fact that
they've had these successes,
they've had these experiences before,
they're not there in Doha,
participating in that, unfortunately.
- Taliban negotiation, yeah.
- Yep.
- So, I'm gonna turn the audience shortly,
so please start getting
your questions ready,
but before doing so,
I wanted to turn to you,
Mohamed, one more time,
to explore another stereotype or trope
that tends to circulate
in these discussions.
And it's the idea that certain variants
of Islamic belief and
practice such as Sufism,
are inherently apolitical and peaceful,
whereas others such as Salafism,
are more prone to extremism and militancy.
But then you find things
in the world, right,
reality is always much messier
than these categories allow,
you see things in the
world such as the fact
that some of the more prominent acts
of political assassination
in Pakistan in recent years,
as well as the sort of
heart of the outcry,
and the threats against
the physical safety
of Asia Bibi in Pakistan
recently, have come from the heart
of the Barelvi Sufi
establishment, within Pakistan.
And also with respect to Salafism,
much of it in the Middle
East and elsewhere,
is politically quietist and
very sort of loyal, to regimes.
So I just wonder, could
you talk a little bit about
how you see this discussion and debate?
- Sure.
Yeah no, thank you.
I mean just before I address that issue,
I want to also answer a question to Hesham
about limitations of religious actors.
And there are a number of limitations.
I mean, one that I always highlight,
and that's really the lack
of safety and security
of religious actors,
those particular who are
speaking out against violent extremism.
There is no mechanism for
their safety and security.
We probably rely on
government and all of that,
but that's not enough.
Second, also,
these religious actors and
leaders in a number of countries,
particularly in the Muslim countries,
they're not free, you know.
They're not free in the
sense that they don't have
that freedom of expression,
right, because they really,
they say whatever the
regime wants them to say.
And that's really a problem.
Somehow is also increasing
this question of violent extremism.
But your questions, you know,
in the dynamics in the
Muslim world, today,
yes it is true there is that kind of
different interpretation of Islam,
different, you know, even you
find the Barelvi in Pakistan,
you know, rallying against, you know,
Asia Bibi and all of that.
I think there is a lack of education.
There is no interaction
between those who are,
you know, well known,
grounded Muslim scholars,
that understand the
interpretation of Islam
in the 21st century, and the others.
So there is no forum to have
that kind of discussion today.
You know example of that, for instance,
you know earlier the discussion was,
on Marrakesh declaration was raised.
As a document, that fits pretty well
in Pakistan, for instance,
because, you know,
the Christian communities or
minority groups in Pakistan,
they don't have the rights.
And the argument coming
from the other side,
is based on Islamic theology.
But here we have an
authentic Islamic theology
that's clearly saying that
the practice of majority
of the population is not aligned
with authentic Islamic theology,
based on the Quran as
well as the tradition
of Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him.
So I think there is
that lack of interaction
and education, which is, we see,
even people like Sufism
or Barelvi and others,
that tend to be more peaceful.
You see them again, you know,
Asia Bibi, or they have their position
on apostacy and blasphemy and all of that.
On the other hand we see all of that
in the other part of the Muslim world.
There is no mechanism today
of discussion between
hardcore, self group,
and other, you know, basically,
well grounded Muslim scholars
that understand Islam today.
You know, a prominent
Muslim scholar told me,
I wish I will have the opportunity
to have a discussion with
the scholars in Saudi Arabia,
who are hardcore Salafis
on the ten commandments
of Muhammad, din ab dur al-hab.
To discuss these issues.
Because, a number of
violent extremist groups
actually based their violent act
on those ten commandments.
Which is basically, you know,
supported by some of the Salafi scholars.
So this prominent scholar
told me, I want that space,
so we can have that discussion.
So the lack of that space,
the lack of the freedom
even of expression,
or to discuss these issues, basically,
contributing to what we see today.
On inclusion, I have to say,
that the example of Morocco.
I think something that
needs to be lifted up,
in the Muslim world, particularly,
the description that, you
know, that Susan Hayward
provided to us, in the
inclusion of womans.
Morocco today, with this
called Morshidad model.
Training womans religious actors
on Islamic theology, so that they can play
multiple, various roles in society.
So I think that's something that is,
I always tell the Muslim world,
that I wish your guys, you
would adopt this model.
It is a strong, preventive measure.
- [Peter] Thank you.
I'm keen to get everyone else's
voices into the conversation.
I know some of you may want to respond
to points that you're making,
so maybe you could weave
those responses in too.
So I think we have microphones available.
So if you could raise your hands.
If you could briefly identify yourself,
before posing your question,
and then please pose an actual
question, would be great.
Sir.
- Hi, my name is Erdoan
Shipoli, I'm a researcher
on security and religion
at the Center for Muslim
and Christian Understanding
here at Georgetown.
My question will be
something about the tools
that we talked about,
fighting religious extremism.
And maybe Susan, this is
something more related to you.
So, if you ask me or if I ask you
about the tools that we have developed,
or maybe USIP in
particular, has developed,
to fight Islamic religious extremism,
there are things that you
can say that I can't say
and stuff like that,
but, I'm wondering if,
with the rise of Christian
right for example,
are there such tools
developed for fighting
other religious extremism,
or like, have we learned that yet,
that we need to develop
those kinds of tools?
Thank you.
- Should I answer that?
- Yeah, please.
- So, one of the reasons I,
so the religion program at USIP
is actually the oldest
thematic program at USIP,
it was created in 1989.
And we have David Little here,
who was actually involved
in the founding of the
religion program here.
And one of the things that drew me to it
was the fact that it predated 9/11.
So it didn't have a myopic
focus and obsession with Islam,
but was actually looking at multiple forms
of religious violence.
So it was looking at forms
of Christian extremism
in Nigeria, or in Uganda.
It was looking at forms
of Hindu nationalism,
or Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka.
And was taking more of a
equal representation approach
to understanding religion,
and then looking at
how to engage with religious actors, also
across these different
religious traditions,
in order to support peace.
So I would say that we're doing,
some of the things that
we're doing, for example,
in Myanmar and Sri Lanka,
in order to address some of the forms
of Buddhist extremism,
or Buddhist nationalism,
or Buddhist exclusionary ideas and so on.
Are similar to, similar
but with slightly different
contextual and religious
and so on, nuances.
But there're things like
doing peace education
within religious schools.
That take some of the
traditional Western concepts
of analyzing conflict
and transforming conflict
and bringing it into conversations
with the Buddhist principles,
Buddhist understandings,
of what the causes of conflict are,
and how to support peace building,
and having discussions about
diversity and coexistence,
and what Buddhism history
and teachings have to offer
about living with a religious other.
So those are the same kinds
of things that we're doing
in place where there are forms
of Islamic justified violence,
or exclusion in working within
the religious schools there
in Islamic peace education.
And similarly, on the work
that we've done in Nigeria
that's working with Muslim and Christian,
male and female, religious actors on
mitigating against the forms of extremism
within Christianity and within Islam,
that manifest in Nigeria,
building interfaith relationships
and reconciliation, and
the aftermath of violence,
and is a preventative measure.
Creating networks of
youth and religious actors
who can respond when tensions are rising
between religious communities.
There's some incredible
women religious leaders
who are leading efforts there
in partnership with security actors,
to try to mitigate
against forms of extremism
and the effects that they're
having in their community.
And again, when I say extremism here,
I mean forms of, of
course there's Boko Haram,
but there's also forms
of Christian extremism,
and Christian driven,
Christian legitimated violence,
particularly against the
Muslim community there
that they're addressing as well.
So, yes.
There are tools and there are ways
that we're looking at the multiple forms
of religious violence around the world.
- Thank you.
So next on the list is Jose Casanova
down in the front of the room here.
- [Jose] Yes, thank you.
I have a question about
interreligious alliances
in interreligious conflicts.
Because if we look at the world today
we see two different, very
different alternatives.
One is that of alliances, very clearly,
the more religious groups
fighting their common enemies,
which basically are
declared to be secularism,
liberalism, feminism.
And there is a lot of
religious groups that feel
that this is their main
threat, and this leads to,
we see the collision between
evangelical Christian right
and the Mosul pat arcade,
and the traditionalist
Christians in Europe.
And then we saw about two weeks ago,
the visit of the Pope to
the United Arab Emirates,
in which the emphasis is precisely
and this is a fraternity looking for
issues of social justice,
issues of immigration.
So, I mean, those are from
them as you point out,
is not only a question of the
religious message, as usual,
but precisely the other issues
in which religious leaders
can also play a role in the community.
So if we are seeing these
two fundamental alternatives
and the narratives about
religion in the modern world.
So I just wanted to, want you to address
these two problematic options we have
at the global level of
collisions of religious leaders.
- Thank you Jose,
Hesham, do you want to take that,
and then we can see if Suzie...
- I would.
So, a few things really.
First that's a wonderful question.
And I think it brings
up several good points
that ought to be addressed
and are very often ignored.
First a slight comment
about the papal visit.
It's a bit of a bugbear of mine,
simply because it was presented
as such a unique occasion.
It was not a unique occasion.
The Catholic pope has been to
many parts of the Arab world
in the last few years,
he's going to Morocco next year,
sorry, next month.
And the Orthodox pope has
been on the Arabian Peninsula
quite few times, et cetera.
And I felt very uncomfortable, frankly,
about how it was presented,
because it implied
that it was so unique, that it meant
that actually interreligious tolerance
in the Arab world is abysmal.
And I don't think that's true,
and I think that that really escapes
the history that has a very
long pedigree in the region.
So it's an interesting example
of how ignorance of certain
things can be misrepresented.
But on the alliances, I
find this very interesting,
particularly within the West.
So you have for example, the suggestion
of an alliance between
different religious groups,
precisely because of things
like secularism, and a loss
of respect for the sacred,
and the absence of a religious feeling
in the public sphere, et cetera.
And thinking that oh, okay, in that case,
there can be these alliances
between these different types
of religious communities.
For example, someone like John Milbank,
or Roger Scruton in the United Kingdom.
There's only one problem with this,
which is that they happen to have
extremely problematic views on
other religious communities.
Roger Scruton and John Milbank,
they speak a lot about secularism,
and about the loss of
the sacred and so on.
They also have extremely poor views
on Muslim communities
within the West and beyond.
And these are then overlooked
in order to establish
some greater alliance.
This is very problematic, and
has we have these discussions,
the rise and influence
of anti-Muslim bigotry
and Islamophobia is very often overlooked.
And I think that's important
for use to pull out.
It infests, frankly, a good
portion of our public discussion
whether we speak about it or not.
When politicians from certain
backgrounds say certain things
and then are attacked in ways
that they never would have been
if they were not of that
particular religious tradition.
So the alliances aspect, I think,
is something to be problematized
for us to really get at the root of this.
It's not simply about,
oh, there's a loss of
transcendence in the public sphere,
so then everything else
can be put to one side,
because it feeds into this dynamic,
where I think communities get put
into a very problematic situation,
at a time when the far right is rising
in terms of being mainstreamed.
And that has real life effects
on the ground with people.
- Suzie or Mohamed, would
either of you like to...
- I'll defer so there can
be more time for questions.
- I just want to, I just like basically,
have a different opinion
regarding the papal visit.
And you know, disagree with
Hesham a little bit here.
I think it was a step forward,
that's the way I look into it.
It is something that is
historic in the Gulf states.
And I'm really not looking
into the small population
of the citizens of the Gulf,
but I'm looking into the tens of millions
of Christians, and Catholic in particular,
living in that part of the world.
With this visit, I think
it is very critical
to recognize their rights,
also, to have, you know,
public mass with 150,000
people and all of that.
Of course I mean, there
is a political gain
from a number of countries
including UAE and the Egyptians,
you know the Grand Mufti of al-Azhar,
Sheikh al-Azhar projected himself
with the leader of the
Muslim world, you know,
equivalent to the pope.
I mean, so they are, we can
talk about these things,
but I think, toward the
progress of interreligious,
basically, dialogue and participation, or,
I mean it is something significant.
And we need to recognize
that there are limitations,
no question about it.
But we have to recognize
the significance of it.
- To that end, I asked my
brother Mohamed, who was there,
I said, how many people
in the room were women?
And what was your answer?
- Well, yes, you asked me, I
said maybe five to 10%, max.
And that when they signed the documents.
Fraternity of something.
- Mohamed, though, why is it
any more significant than,
I mean, the same pope has been to Egypt,
he's been to Jordan.
- He's going to Morocco next month.
- Why was this moment...
- I mean I'm talking
about the Gulf states.
I'm not talking about the
wider Middle East, to Morocco.
How many Christians in Morocco?
How many of them?
But how many millions
- [Hesham] Okay, so,
the Orthodox pope
- of Christians...
- [Hesham] has also been to the gulf.
- But how many millions
of Christians, Catholic,
in the Gulf states?
They are, at some states,
they don't allow them
even to build a church.
They don't allow them even
to worship in some places.
- But this isn't the case in the UAE.
- [Hesham] It's not the case in the UAE,
but the message to the
neighboring countries as well.
We shouldn't ignore that.
- The Orthodox pope has been...
- Yeah, the Orthodox pope,
- To these different,
has been to these different
- But we are talking about
- countries, actually.
- The Catholic popes here.
- Indeed.
But here's the issue that I think
is very very important for us to remember,
in terms of presenting the visit.
When we go to the point
of establishing it as,
I'm not saying it's not significant.
- Mhm.
- This is true.
- Right.
- But it's not about the significance,
simply as being significant,
but it's the extent of that significance.
Because when we overplay its significance,
then I think we then declare
that actually there was
no religious tolerance,
that the interreligious dimension of
what is life in the broader Arab,
as well as within the
GCC part of the world,
is actually completely absent.
That's the problem that I have with this.
- It's not something extraordinary.
- It was significant, it
was not extraordinary.
- Right, right.
- And there are political
reasons for that, of course.
Which you recognize.
- Of course, I mean,
you and I agree.
- Which you recognize of course.
But I think that that's
important, because,
the way in which this then gets
played into other discussions, right,
because while this is going on,
you also have different political actors
far beyond the Arab world,
nothing to do with, not
within that part of the world.
Are arguing for the excusal of autocracy
and authoritarianism in a
number of different countries,
I'm thinking particularly of
Syria and Bashar al-Assad,
on the basis of, well
he's kind to Christians.
And we've seen this increasingly
over the last few years,
within the UK, on the European continent,
probably within the United
States as well, increasingly so.
And I think we have to be
very careful about this.
- So we've got time for one more question.
Gentleman in the back
there had his hand up.
There's a microphone, sir.
- Thank you.
My name is Michael Asofor,
I'm originally from Cameroon.
I was educated by Jesuit priests.
But, when I came to this country,
the Catholic mission was basically,
a middle-leftist organization,
fighting a lot of what was right.
- [Peter] Could you hold the mic close?
- It is no longer that.
I'm asking the...
Panel.
To what extent
- [Peter] Sir, could you
speak into the microphone,
otherwise we can't hear you.
- What extent do they believe
that those who pontificate
for the different religions,
actually profess the
doctrine of that religion?
Because I ask this question in relation
to the debate about the
pope visit, to that,
the country where I came from.
The popes have been to Cameroon
I don't know how many times.
And the Cameroon dictatorship has been to
the Vatican I don't know how many times.
But that does not stop the violence
that we now have in that country.
Same thing here.
The bishops here, have switched
to a policy that doesn't
look like the collection
that was in the United States
in 1985, when I came here.
- Who would like to...
- I don't understand the question.
- I think the really important thing
is that these elite initiatives
can't stay at the elite level.
They can have symbolic
importance and significance,
and so on, but if it's
not translating down,
and responsive to, what's
happening on the ground,
then it can actually end up sometimes
even creating more of a backlash,
if it doesn't lead to change.
We were discussing earlier
today the declaration culture.
So when there's these elites come together
and sign these declarations
that often have very visionary, inclusive,
inspiring language, as
a component of them,
but then when years pass,
and the declaration just sort
of gathers dust on the shelf,
it actually ends up creating more cynicism
among some community members who don't see
that declaration in, the
vision in that declaration
coming true for them in
their day to day lives.
So I think the important thing,
if I'm understanding your
question correctly, Michael,
is that those elites' initiatives,
like what we saw in the UAE and so on,
actually translate into
actions on the ground.
And also are responsive to the desires
and the needs and the visions
of the communities as well.
- Great.
- Could I add one thing to that?
So, this was set under Chatham House Rule,
so I don't think that I can repeat
too many of the details,
but one of the suggestions
was that, against the background
of elite pronouncements like this,
stuff happens in the background,
that we are not necessarily made aware of,
that might improve the condition
for certain communities on the ground.
I don't think by the way, that
was behind the papal visit,
because again, I think within the UAE,
that type of interreligious
tolerance is well established
and has been for a long time.
But that might not be
the case necessarily,
when other high profile events
of that nature take place,
in other countries.
The problem is very difficult to assess,
because by their very
nature, they're quiet, right?
Having said that,
all too often, we were talking
about this declaration culture earlier.
All too often there are
these big grand events,
and by the way, they're not
just with religious actors,
they're with political actors,
they're with all sort of
different civil society actors,
that they come together, they
make grand proclamations,
but then there isn't follow up.
And the follow up is grunt work.
The follow up is stuff
that happens on the ground.
Takes a lot of time and effort.
Doesn't have fanfare.
Isn't in front of the cameras.
Doesn't have huge amounts
of resources put towards it,
and you know, Muhammad
brought this up earlier,
do they have the resources
to do what we expect them to do?
Or what we're demanding that they do?
And I'm not convinced that they do.
Unfortunately.
- So, this is a set of issues
that the Berkley Center is
going to continue to work on.
We hope to be doing a series
of convenings around these
questions, on debates.
And so if you are
interested in this topic,
please make sure that you tune in
to the Berkley Center and its
products and its listserv.
I wanna thank all of you for
being with us this evening.
I hope you won't run away too quickly,
because we have a reception outside,
and hope you'll stay with us for that.
But I wanted to end by
thanking our panelists
for giving us such a
fantastic set of things
to take home and cogitate on.
So Hesham, Suzie, Mohamed,
thank you very much.
- And thanks to all of you.
- Thank you.
(applause)
