The theory of justification is a part of epistemology
that attempts to understand the justification
of propositions and beliefs. Epistemologists
are concerned with various epistemic features
of belief, which include the ideas of justification,
warrant, rationality, and probability. Loosely
speaking, justification is the reason that
someone (properly) holds a belief.
When a claim is in doubt, justification can
be used to support the claim and reduce or
remove the doubt. Justification can use empiricism
(the evidence of the senses), authoritative
testimony (the appeal to criteria and authority),
or reason.
== Subjects ==
Justification focuses on beliefs. This is
in part because of the influence of the definition
of knowledge as "justified true belief" often
associated with a theory discussed near the
end of the Plato's dialogues Meno and Theaetetus.
More generally, theories of justification
focus on the justification of statements or
propositions.
The subject of justification has played a
major role in the value of knowledge as "justified
true belief". Some contemporary epistemologists,
such as Jonathan Kvanvig assert that justification
isn't necessary in getting to the truth and
avoiding errors. Kvanvig attempts to show
that knowledge is no more valuable than true
belief, and in the process dismissed the necessity
of justification due to justification not
being connected to the truth.
== Explanations ==
Justification is the reason why someone properly
holds a belief, the explanation as to why
the belief is a true one, or an account of
how one knows what one knows. In much the
same way arguments and explanations may be
confused with each other, as may explanations
and justifications. Statements that are justifications
of some action take the form of arguments.
For example, attempts to justify a theft usually
explain the motives (e.g., to feed a starving
family).
It is important to be aware when an explanation
is not a justification. A criminal profiler
may offer an explanation of a suspect's behavior
(e.g.; the person lost his or her job, the
person got evicted, etc.), and such statements
may help us understand why the person committed
the crime. An uncritical listener may believe
the speaker is trying to gain sympathy for
the person and his or her actions, but it
does not follow that a person proposing an
explanation has any sympathy for the views
or actions being explained. This is an important
distinction because we need to be able to
understand and explain terrible events and
behavior in attempting to discourage it.
== Theories ==
There are several different views as to what
entails justification, mostly focusing on
the question "How sure do we need to be that
our beliefs correspond to the actual world?"
Different theories of justification require
different amounts and types of evidence before
a belief can be considered justified. Theories
of justification generally include other aspects
of epistemology, such as knowledge.
Popular theories of justification include:
Epistemic coherentism – Beliefs are justified
if they cohere with other beliefs a person
holds, each belief is justified if it coheres
with the overall system of beliefs.
Externalism – Outside sources of knowledge
can be used to justify a belief.
Foundationalism – Basic beliefs justify
other, non-basic beliefs.
Foundherentism – A combination of foundationalism
and epistemic coherentism, proposed by Susan
Haack
Infinitism – Beliefs are justified by infinite
chains of reasons.
Internalism – The believer must be able
to justify a belief through internal knowledge.
Reformed epistemology – Beliefs are warranted
by proper cognitive function, proposed by
Alvin Plantinga.
Skepticism – A variety of viewpoints questioning
the possibility of knowledge
truth skepticism – Questions the possibility
of true knowledge, but not of justified knowledge
epistemological skepticism – Questions the
possibility of justified knowledge, but not
true knowledge
Evidentialism – Beliefs depend solely on
the evidence for them.
== Justifiers ==
If a belief is justified, there is something
that justifies it, which can be called its
"justifier". If a belief is justified, then
it has at least one justifier. An example
of a justifier would be an item of evidence.
For example, if a woman is aware that her
husband returned from a business trip smelling
like perfume, and that his shirt has smudged
lipstick on its collar, the perfume and the
lipstick can be evidence for her belief that
her husband is having an affair. In that case,
the justifiers are the woman's awareness of
the perfume and the lipstick, and the belief
that is justified is her belief that her husband
is having an affair.
Not all justifiers have to be what can properly
be called "evidence"; there may be some substantially
different kinds of justifiers available. Regardless,
to be justified, a belief has to have a justifier.
Three things that have been suggested as justifiers
are:
Beliefs only.
Beliefs together with other conscious mental
states.
Beliefs, conscious mental states, and other
facts about us and our environment (which
one may or may not have access to).At least
sometimes, the justifier of a belief is another
belief. When, to return to the earlier example,
the woman believes that her husband is having
an affair, she bases that belief on other
beliefs—namely, beliefs about the lipstick
and perfume. Strictly speaking, her belief
isn't based on the evidence itself—after
all, what if she did not believe it? What
if she thought that all of that evidence were
just a hoax? What if her husband commonly
wears perfume and lipstick on business trips?
For that matter, what if the evidence existed,
but she did not know about it? Then, of course,
her belief that her husband is having an affair
wouldn't be based on that evidence, because
she did not know it was there at all; or,
if she thought that the evidence were a hoax,
then surely her belief couldn't be based on
that evidence.
Consider a belief P. Either P is justified
or P is not justified. If P is justified,
then another belief Q may be justified by
P. If P is not justified, then P cannot be
a justifier for any other belief: neither
for Q, nor for Q's negation.
For example, suppose someone might believe
that there is intelligent life on Mars, and
base this belief on a further belief, that
there is a feature on the surface of Mars
that looks like a face, and that this face
could only have been made by intelligent life.
So the justifying belief is: that face-like
feature on Mars could only have been made
by intelligent life. And the justified belief
is: there is intelligent life on Mars.
But suppose further that the justifying belief
is itself unjustified. It would in no way
be one's intellectual right to suppose that
this face-like feature on Mars could have
only been made by intelligent life; that view
would be irresponsible, intellectually speaking.
Thus, such a belief is unjustified because
the justifier on which it depends is itself
not justified.
=== Commonly used justifiers ===
Abductive reasoning
A priori knowledge
Argument
Autonomy and freedom of choice
Axiom or Postulate
Coherence
Command and control, subordination in a hierarchy
Common sense
Conformity
Conscience
Consequence (effect)
Cost–benefit analysis
Deduction
Dialectic
Socratic method
Marxist dialectic
Hegelian dialectic
Dogma
Duty and Deontological ethics
Empiricism
Enlightenment (spiritual)
Evidence
Fatalism
Group decision-making
Groupthink
Hedonism
Induction
Intuition
Law
Law of nature
Logical positivism
Mathematical proof
Occam's Razor
Pragmatism
Probability theory
Rationalism
Reason
Revelation
Divination
Divine illumination
Scientific demonstration
Scientific method
Self-interest
Taboo
Tradition
Utility
Will to power
== 
Criticisms ==
The major opposition against the theory of
justification (also called justificationism
in this context) is non-justificational criticism
(a synthesis of skepticism and absolutism),
which is most notably held by some of the
proponents of critical rationalism: W. W.
Bartley, David Miller and Karl Popper. (But
not all proponents of critical rationalism
oppose justificationism; it is supported most
prominently by John W. N. Watkins.)
In justificationism, criticism consists of
trying to show that a claim cannot be reduced
to the authority or criteria that it appeals
to. That is, it regards the justification
of a claim as primary, while the claim itself
is secondary. By contrast, non-justificational
criticism works towards attacking claims themselves.
Bartley also refers to a third position, which
he calls critical rationalism in a more specific
sense, claimed to have been Popper's view
in his Open Society. It has given up justification,
but not yet adopted non-justificational criticism.
Instead of appealing to criteria and authorities,
it attempts to describe and explicate them.
Fogelin claims to detect a suspicious resemblance
between the Theories of Justification and
Agrippa's five modes leading to the suspension
of belief. He concludes that the modern proponents
have made no significant progress in responding
to the ancient modes of pyrrhonic skepticism.
== See also ==
Underdetermination – dream argument
Truth § Major theories
Münchhausen trilemma
Four causes
== Notes ==
== References ==
William W. Bartley: Rationality versus the
theory of rationality. In Mario Bunge (Ed.):
The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy
(The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964)
David Miller: A critique of good reasons.
Critical rationalism (1994)
David Miller: Sokal and Bricmont: Back to
the Frying Pan. Pli 9 (2000), 156–73.
David Miller: Overcoming the Justificationist
Addiction. (2007)
Karl Popper: On the sources of knowledge and
ignorance. Conjectures and Refutations (1963).
David Stove. Popper and After: Four Modern
Irrationalists at the Wayback Machine (archived
October 27, 2009). Oxford: Pergamon Press,
1982.
Swinburne, R: Epistemic justification (2001)
== External links ==
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Epistemic Justification
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Epistemic Entitlement
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Epistemic Consequentialism
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Coherentism in Epistemology
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Contextualism in Epistemology
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Epistemology, 2. What is Justification?
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Public Justification
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions
of Epistemic Justification
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
on Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification
