- Hey everybody, TJ here
from "I Need More Space".
I typically don't do
these like news videos
but I felt like this was something that
we should really talk about.
This week, NASA and Boeing
completed their test review
from the botched Boeing
Starliner launch a few months ago
back in December 2019.
Something that we all kind
of knew was that Boeing
was always kinda the favorite child
in the Commercial Crew Program
between Boeing and SpaceX,
where Boeing got more funding and frankly,
just some more leeway in their program.
SpaceX was just looked
at under a microscope
but we never had anything
official until now.
NASA essentially admits
that they gave Boeing
a very long leash during
this process and trusted them
because of their history
with the space shuttle
and the International Space Station
and other cost-plus contracts
that they worked on,
Space Launch System included.
Now, I can go into this in a lot of detail
but I figured I'd let
the NASA spokespeople
just talk for themselves.
This was initially a
one hour long phone call
that I decided to cut down to
the most important aspects.
The two NASA spokespeople
that you hear today
is Kathy Lueders, who's the
Associate Administrative
of Human Exploration and
Operations Mission Directorate,
congratulations on your promotion,
and Steve Stich, the Commercial
Crew Program Manager.
So they are the folks that
really oversaw this review
and are falling on the sword, so to speak.
So let's just have a listen.
- [Steve] It's great to be
here today to continue to talk
about our progress as we
work toward the OFT-2 mission
with our Boeing provider.
When we talked last to you
in the March timeframe,
at the time they had come
up with 61 recommendations
which we were in the process of reviewing,
but since that time those really dealt
with the two primary
anomalies on the flight,
the liftoff time anomaly
with the Starliner grabbing
that time from the Alice vehicle
and also the separation associated
with the independent propulsion controller
at the end of the flight.
Since then, we've implemented a number
of other recommendations dealing with
the communications anomalies,
and now we're up to a
total of 80 recommendations
that you'll see on the blog post.
We had the team interviewed
about a total of 20 plus people
across NASA and Boeing to
try to better understand
other causes that could
have led to the anomalies
that we saw on the OFT
mission back in December.
So that report is closed out.
Some of the things we looked at was
did we have the right level of engagement
from the beginning,
and I'll remind people
that the commercial model
that we're utilizing has
shared accountability
between NASA and the contractor.
When we went back and
looked back at our culture
and the way we were approaching
software development with Boeing,
perhaps we didn't have as
many people as embedded
in that process as we should have.
- [Kathy] Whenever you
go to one of these things
it's a real huge learning
opportunity for us
then to look at our other
processes with a new lens
and just make sure that
we're able to not only find
the initial error, but
also that we have ways
through our testing
and assessment programs
to be able to catch the
errors at the right time.
Boeing also is changing how
they're doing business to you.
Right, I think this is a place
where both Boeing and NASA
we're learning together
about doing business
in this new way.
This is a different model than having
a cost-plus contract with Boeing,
and I think that's gonna be real learning
that we can take forward into
our Human Lander System Program.
- [Steve] We tend to try to
ask ourselves all the time
when we're working with both partners,
are we looking at the higher risk systems
on each vehicle consistently?
Across the board on each
mission I think we've done
a really good job at looking
at all the higher risk areas
and trying to focus on things
that would be really detrimental
if they happen in the flight.
I would say in the software
area, from a NASA perspective,
we may have been focused
a little more on SpaceX
because they use a bit of
a non-traditional approach
to their software development,
in terms of maybe a bit
of a spiral development,
and then they code to the requirements
and they do unit tests and they
do all the kinds of typical
software testing but
they maybe do it in a,
kind of a spiral development approach,
which many aerospace
companies do these days.
And so we may have had a few
more people looking at that.
And then we were, I would
say, a little more used to
the Boeing process.
It's one that we have used in the past
in successful NASA
programs like Space Shuttle
and the International Space Station,
where you lay out all the
requirements for the software,
and then you hand them
to the software team,
and then they implement
those requirements.
They test them at kind of a module level,
and then as they integrate
modules, they test them.
And so, perhaps we were a
little more focused on SpaceX.
I think now looked back
across both companies
and tried to balance the
portfolio of people we have,
we've certainly added resources
to both software development
on SpaceX and Boeing.
These are complicated spacecraft
with launching, landing,
and then they do ascent aborts
and they do aborts, as well,
close to Space Station.
So we've augmented
resources on both partners
to make sure that we're covered.
When one provider has a
newer approach than another,
it's often natural for a
human being to spend more time
on that newer approach
and maybe we didn't quite
take the time we needed
with the more traditional approach.
We had maybe more familiarity
with the Boeing process
from those that had worked
on International Space Station.
Many of the team that did the software
for International Space
Station was actually working on
the Starliner and so maybe
we just didn't quite take
the time that we needed to.
In hindsight, these high
visibility close calls
and these investigations,
you know, many times,
I've seen it over my career, it's always,
it's a little more obvious afterwards
then when you're in the middle of it.
And I think we've sort
of learned that lesson,
and we're applying it equally
across both providers.
We're looking to cross multiple
systems on the vehicles
whether it be the launch
kick or the launchpad,
the control center is to see
if we have any other gaps.
I think one of the things that
these close calls do for you,
and Kathy talked about that
for even Lander Systems,
it's a bit of a wake-up call
for NASA and its contractors,
and I would tell you
all the contractors are,
were interested when the anomalies happen.
When we had the IRT, they
all want the lessons learned
because they all know this
business is really tough.
- [Kathy] This has been a big
learning experience for us.
I tell people, and people
get tired of hearing it
and that this was a gift,
but this is helping us
develop more robust processes
across the Mission Directorate
and then be able to provide
that learning to the
joint contractor NASA team
perhaps to continue to apply these lessons
to our further and future
success on the tough missions
we have going forward.
- [Steve] When SpaceX
had heard of the anomaly,
even after the OFT mission,
they began to contact us
and ask questions about
what, if anything, they
could do to prevent
this from happening on
any of their flights.
And I think, in the aerospace industry,
all of the companies
are sorta in it together
and they all understand how tough it is,
and so all the companies, Sierra
Nevada, Axiom, and others,
are interested in learning
from this particular anomaly.
- So that's really it.
I could give NASA a lot of credit.
It took a lot of guts for
them to come out to the public
and say, "We tried our
best but it wasn't enough."
And I really hope that
they learn from this.
I think it's only gonna make
the Commercial Crew Program better.
I'd love to hear what y'all have to think
in the comments below about this,
and let's just hope for a brighter future
with the Commercial Crew Program,
and that Boeing can just move
on and have a great OFT, too.
All right, thanks for watching.
Hope you learned something.
Bye.
