AMONG PROCEDURAL
LIBERALS, AMONG THOSE
WHO SAY GOVERNMENT SHOULD
BE NEUTRAL IN ORDER
TO RESPECT FREE CHOICE,
THERE ARE REALLY
TWO DIFFERENT POSITIONS.
THERE ARE LIBERTARIAN
LIBERALS LIKE MILTON FRIEDMAN,
FOR EXAMPLE, ROBERT NOZICK,
WHO SAY THE WAY TO RESPECT
CHOICE, THE WAY
TO RESPECT RIGHTS,
IS FOR GOVERNMENT TO STAY
OUT OF SOCIAL POLICY,
AND NOT TO REDISTRIBUTE.
AND THEN THERE ARE
EGALITARIAN LIBERALS
WHO SAY, NO, THE WAY
FOR GOVERNMENT REALLY
TO RESPECT CHOICE IS TO
PROVIDE A DECENT SOCIAL MINIMUM
AS IN CONTEMPORARY
WELFARE STATES.
SO, THIS IS A DEBATE.
THIS DEBATE FOR AND
AGAINST THE WELFARE STATE
OVER THE LAST 20,
30, 40, 50 YEARS
HAS BEEN LARGELY CONDUCTED,
AT LEAST IN THE US,
BETWEEN LIBERTARIAN LIBERALS
AND EGALITARIAN LIBERALS.
THEY SHARE THE ASSUMPTION
THAT THE PURPOSE OF GOVERNMENT
IS TO RESPECT THE
INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT
TO CHOOSE HIS OR HER OWN ENDS.
THEY DISAGREE ABOUT
HOW TO SECURE THAT.
BUT WHAT WE'RE NOW
SEEING IN THE US,
AND I ALSO THINK IN SOME
EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES,
IS THAT THE MORAL CASE
FOR THE WELFARE STATE
CAN'T BE SUSTAINED ON PROCEDURAL
LIBERAL GROUNDS ALONE.
IT'S NOT ENOUGH TO SUPPORT, TO
PROVIDE THE MORAL FOUNDATION
OR LEGITIMACY FOR
THE WELFARE STATE,
TO SAY GOVERNMENT
IS BEING NEUTRAL
FOR THE SAKE OF RESPECTING
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE,
AND THAT'S WHY WE HAVE
TO HAVE SOCIAL PROVISION
OF VARIOUS KINDS.
I THINK THAT'S WHY THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE HAS
BEEN ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE
POLITICALLY, BECAUSE IT WAS
NEVER REALLY DEFENDED
IN THE NAME OF STRONGER
NOTIONS OF COMMUNITY,
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY,
A SENSE OF COMMON CITIZENSHIP.
NOW, IN SOME WESTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES,
THE CASE FOR THE WELFARE
STATE DIDN'T REST SOLELY
ON PROCEDURAL LIBERALISM,
RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL CHOICE.
IT ALSO DREW ON OTHER
STRONGER COMMUNAL NOTIONS
OF MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY,
SOCIAL SOLIDARITY.
I THINK THOSE RESOURCES, THOSE
MORAL AND POLITICAL RESOURCES,
ARE NECESSARY TO SECURE THE
LEGITIMACY OF WELFARE STATES.
AND I THINK IN THE
US, WE'RE SEEING
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE WELFARE
STATE PHILOSOPHICALLY IS
BASED ON TOO THIN A CONCEPTION
OF CITIZENSHIP, AND
COMMUNITY, AND OBLIGATION.
AND TO SOME EXTENT IN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES,
THINKING, FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE
ROLE THAT MARGARET THATCHER HAD
IN THE PUBLIC
DISCOURSE OF THE UK.
THE LIBERTARIAN
STRAND OF CONSERVATISM
HAS RESHAPED THE POLITICAL
DISCOURSE OF THE UK.
AND SO THE BRITISH
WELFARE STATE, I THINK,
IS BEGINNING TO DRIFT
IN THE DIRECTION
OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE.
BUT I DO THINK THAT
THERE'S A DIFFERENCE
IN THE UNDERLYING JUSTIFICATION
THAT THE AMERICAN WELFARE
STATE HAD [INAUDIBLE],
WHICH WAS VERY THIN,
PROCEDURAL, BOUND UP WITH
RESPECTING INDIVIDUAL CHOICE.
AND THE RICHER, MORE
COMMUNAL MORAL RESOURCES
THAT SUPPORTED THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE.
AND I THINK THE GRADUAL EROSION
OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE
REFLECTS THE THINNESS,
THE FRAGILITY,
OF ITS PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS.
NOW, ANOTHER ISSUE,
YOU HAD ASKED ME ABOUT.
THE RELATION BETWEEN
COMMUNITARIAN
AND REPUBLICAN POLITICAL THEORY.
THOSE OF US WHO
HAVE BEEN CRITICAL
OF PROCEDURAL
LIBERALISM HAVE BEEN
LABELED COMMUNITARIAN CRITICS OF
LIBERALISM, AND TO SOME EXTENT,
THERE IS SENSE IN
THAT, BECAUSE WE'VE
EMPHASIZED THE
CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY
AND STRONGER NOTIONS
OF CITIZENSHIP,
AND OF OBLIGATION
THAN ARE AVAILABLE
ON THE PROCEDURAL
LIBERAL PICTURE.
AND YET I'M UNEASY ABOUT
ACCEPTING THE LABEL
COMMUNITARIAN, BECAUSE
WHAT IT SUGGESTS VERY OFTEN
IS THAT THE VALUES THAT
PREVAIL IN ANY GIVEN
COMMUNITY AT ANY PARTICULAR
TIME SHOULD DEFINE JUSTICE,
OR SHOULD DEFINE RIGHTS.
AND I REJECT THAT IDEA.
THAT'S NEAR MAJORITARIAN,
THAT'S LITTLE
BETTER THAN MAJORITARIANISM.
SO I'M NOT ALTOGETHER
COMFORTABLE
WITH THE COMMUNITARIAN
LABEL, BECAUSE I
DON'T THINK THAT JUSTICE
AND RIGHTS SHOULD BE DEFINED
BY WHATEVER VALUES HAPPEN
TO PREVAIL IN ANY GIVEN
COMMUNITY AT ANY GIVEN TIME.
THAT WOULD BE SIMPLY TO INSTALL
PREJUDICE, OR CONVENTION
AS THE DEFINITION OF
JUSTICE AND RIGHTS.
I THINK THAT THERE HAS TO BE
SUBSTANTIVE MORAL JUDGMENT
ABOUT THE NATURE
OF THE GOOD THAT
IS AFFIRMED BY ANY
PARTICULAR COMMUNITY.
SO WHAT I'M ARGUING FOR IS TYING
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR RIGHTS
TO A CONCEPTION OF THE GOOD
LIFE, BUT I THINK WE HAVE,
THEN, TO ENGAGE IN PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTION ABOUT WHAT
IS THE NATURE OF THE GOOD LIFE?
I DON'T THINK WE CAN
AVOID THAT QUESTION.
WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN
COMMUNITARIAN POLITICAL THEORY
AND REPUBLICAN POLITICAL THEORY?
WELL, THE SO-CALLED
COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE
OF LIBERALISM SAYS
THAT JUSTICE AND RIGHTS
HAVE TO BE DEFINED AND JUSTIFIED
IN RELATION TO THE GOOD,
IN RELATION TO SOME CONCEPTION
OF THE GOOD LIFE OF THE HIGHEST
HUMAN ENDS.
REPUBLICAN POLITICAL
THEORY IS ONE POSSIBLE WAY
OF WORKING OUT A VIEW THAT
DEFINES RIGHTS IN RELATION
TO A CONCEPTION OF THE GOOD.
THE CONCEPTION OF THE GOOD THAT
REPUBLICAN POLITICAL THEORY
AFFIRMS IS THE GOOD OF
SHARING IN SELF RULE.
IT'S THE GOOD THAT
ARISTOTLE EMPHASIZED
OF RULING AND BEING
RULED IN TURN.
AS ARISTOTLE EMPHASIZED, SELF
GOVERNMENT IN THAT STRONG SENSE
REQUIRES CERTAIN VIRTUES.
IT REQUIRES CERTAIN
QUALITIES OF CHARACTER
THAT CITIZENS ACQUIRE,
THAT CITIZENS POSSESS
OR COME TO ACQUIRE.
SELF GOVERNMENT IN ARISTOTLE'S
SENSE REQUIRES CIVIC VIRTUE.
BUT THAT MEANS
THAT GOVERNMENT HAS
A STAKE IN THE CHARACTER
OF ITS CITIZENS.
TO SAY THAT SHARING IN SELF RULE
REQUIRES CERTAIN VIRTUES MEANS
THAT VIRTUE, CHARACTER
IS, AT LEAST IN PART,
A PUBLIC CONCERN.
THAT'S WHAT WORRIES LIBERALS.
THAT'S WHAT WORRIES,
WELL, ANYONE
WHO THINKS THAT WILL
LEAD TO COERCION.
THAT WILL LEAD TO GOVERNMENT
IMPOSING A PARTICULAR VIEW
ABOUT CHARACTER, OR VIRTUE.
