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WILL MA: OK, so today
I'm going to take a more
empirical approach.
I feel like I've done a lot
of theory in this class,
so today I'm going to
play through the hands
of an online tourney,
so that I played,
and sort of show you the
most interesting hands
and show you exactly what I did.
I don't think I'm going to
finish the whole tourney today.
But I'm going to go
through the first part,
and I'm only going to talk about
a few [INAUDIBLE] concepts,
but mostly just go
through the hands.
OK.
So it's a $55 buy-in
tournament on Party Poker.
And it's a fairly small field.
So this is a tournament
I played recently.
OK, so let's just
get into the hands.
I'm only going to show you the
hands where I did something
at the start.
And we will start with
a bit of theory, OK.
So this is the situation.
It's folded to this player and--
so we have king and queen here.
And it's at hand where
we're in position,
and he raised from
late enough position
where I think our hand
is too good to fold.
So if Dreams crushed,
if the guy who raised
was from under the gun, let's
say, then I might have--
I probably would have folded.
Because against an
under-the-gun range,
king-queen off suit
kind of gets crushed.
But against a range from high
jack minus one or low jack,
I think king-queen is
good enough to play.
But the question is
sort of what do we do.
Do we raise?
Do we call?
I don't think folding
is the end of the world.
I think it's slightly
profitable to play,
but it's not like you're
giving up a ton of equity
by folding this.
So what do we do?
OK, so I'm going to start
out with a bit of theory.
So I haven't really
talked about this.
I want to talk a bit about
preflop re-raising theory.
So in this situation,
I don't want
to just talk about what to
do with this hand, right.
This is how
throughout this class
I've been saying we
shouldn't think about poker.
We should always think
about the general situation.
What's the range of
hands we could have?
What's the range of
hands they could have?
And how should both players
play their overall strategy
with their entire
range of hands?
OK, so there's a few interesting
things to think about here.
So there's sort of a dilemma.
So if we think about
our overall strategy--
so first thing you notice is how
many bets deep is it effective.
What's the stack
size effectively?
It's about, it's about
28, right, I think.
So yeah, we have about
the same amount of chips.
We have like 28
and 1/2 big blinds.
That's clear to everyone?
So it's important that
it's fairly deep here.
So the stack size, the
effective stack size
is 28 and 1/2 big blinds.
So what's the issue?
It's sometimes in
this spot, we have
a hand that's good
enough implied odds
to play in position.
But it's not really
like a good hand
that we're trying to raise
and make the pot bigger with.
Like an example of this
is like king-jack suited
or like king-queen off, I
think, is a good example, too.
It's a hand that's
good enough to play,
but not a hand
that's good enough
that we'd necessarily want to
raise and make the pot bigger.
On the other hand,
sometimes we have a hand
that you want to raise and hope
you get all-in with, like aces,
right.
So we have these sort
of two types of hands
that we want to play
in this situation.
But if we play
according to our hand,
it can become too
predictable, right.
So this is like a somewhat
intuitive strategy.
So you know, let's suppose
this was our strategy.
Let's suppose our strategy
was with the best hands
that we're hoping to
get an all-in with,
let's say in this spot,
pocket 10s plus and ace-king.
I think that's reasonable
as the set of hands
we're willing to and
happy to go all-in with.
So pocket 10s plus,
ace-king, and then
we call with pocket
fives plus, ace-jack off,
ace-10 suited, king-queen off.
I'd say this is a
reasonable strategy to play.
But what are some
problems with this sort
of intuitive,
exploitative strategy?
Yeah?
AUDIENCE: People are just
going to fold to your aces
and pick up money from you when
you don't have the top hands.
WILL MA: OK, great, yeah, good.
So that's a good point.
So basically, if we only
raise with pocket 10s plus,
people could just
fold pretty easily,
because they know that we have
a great hand whenever we raise.
Good.
OK, what's another issue?
This one's a bit more subtle.
What's sort of another issue?
So one issue is when
we raise, it's obvious
that we have a great hand.
And so on a similar
line, another-- yeah.
I'm sorry, did you--
AUDIENCE: Yeah, if we call
them, they know we're weaker.
WILL MA: Right, exactly.
OK, good.
So an almost bigger
issue here is
if we play like
this, when we call,
people know we can't have aces.
So you know one of the
guys behind, like this guy,
[? Aight ?] might
just be able to raise.
And they're going to know
we're going to be fairly weak.
And we're going to have
to fold most of the time.
So basically, this is not
a really balanced strategy.
So what can we do?
Well, we could raise
some assortment of hands
from the call category
to balance it out.
We could call some hands
from the raise category
a small percent of the time,
like play randomized strategy
where you raise
aces 80% of the time
and call aces 20% of the
time to balance it out.
There's some other
more extreme things
you can do that I don't think
are good in this situation
but are reasonable when the
stack size is different.
So I think if it's shallow or,
let's say, only 20 big blinds
deep, then just
raising all hands,
just raising the top X percent
of hands is a decent strategy,
because 20 big blinds is
sort of shallow enough
where if you raise,
you're kind of committing
your whole stack anyway.
And if it's deeper, like if
it's 100 big blinds deep,
some players will like to
call 100% of the hands.
They'll just never raise.
I don't think it's like
the optimal strategy,
but it's not an
unreasonable strategy.
If you're 100 big blinds
deep, and you have position,
it's not terrible.
And then your range is
completely disguised,
because you're playing all
your hands the same preflop.
So these are some
reasonable solution ideas.
So here's sort of
a better solution.
So this will sound really cool
compared to the previous slide,
which is instead of raising some
of the call hands as a bluff
essentially to balance
out the times we raise
with a good hand, what
if we actually-- we
bluff-raise the best hands that
aren't good enough to call.
So let me just, so we can
look at this again, right.
So our strategy was
we're raising for value,
aka we're raising,
hoping to get called
with 10s plus and ace-king.
We're calling with sort of the
pretty good hands like pocket
fives plus, ace-jack, ace-10
suited, king-queen off.
And then we're going to
bluff-raise hands that
aren't positive expectancy to
call, so like pocket fours,
ace-10 off, ace-nine
suited, hands
that are even weaker than the
call hands, but in some sense,
if we bluff-raise
with these hands,
the benefit is we're sort
of not wasting them, right.
Like let's say with
these better hands,
like let's say
with ace-jack off,
I raise, and my
opponent goes all in.
Well, I'm probably
going to have to fold
in this situation for
28 and 1/2 big blinds.
So I sort of like
wasted my ace-jack,
whereas if I did it
with ace-10 instead,
then I get to call with
my ace-jack, which I know
is plus EV to call and not waste
such a good hand bluff-raising.
So this is a very
important concept in poker.
It's called polarizing.
And in general, you know,
it's a sound strategy, right.
By this wasting
argument, I'm saying,
I'm talking about--
polarizing sounds
like a pretty reasonable
strategy, right.
Because it ensures
that you're not
wasting your medium-strength
hands to bluff-raise.
So what's an issue with it?
It can be exploited if your
opponent calls your three-bet.
So does anyone
actually see, does
anyone actually see, so
let's say, in this case,
suppose this was my strategy.
So I'm raising pocket
10s plus and ace-king.
And I'm bluff-raising the
hands that I listed here.
OK, I'll give a $20
gift certificate to you.
So like what's a specific
board, let's say,
where someone can explain
my strategy if this
was my specific strategy?
This is just for illustration.
So look at my exact
range, and can someone
say sort of what's a very
bad flop for my range?
Yeah.
AUDIENCE: If flop's high
cards, because they'll
be thinking your range
is generally high cards,
but those are a bit lower.
WILL MA: Right, so if
there's high cards,
but we do have lots
of aces and kings.
Like if the flop comes,
like if there's an ace,
then it's pretty
good for our range,
right, even though they
might be able to fold easily,
but we're still
going to win the pot.
But what is like a specific,
what's a specific issue-- yeah.
AUDIENCE: Well, if five,
six, seven, or in between.
WILL MA: OK, good, so five, six,
seven is kind of bad for us,
right.
Because our range
basically contains
no fives, no sixes, no sevens.
But even five, six, seven, we
still have like a bigger pair
quite often.
So what's like an
even worse case?
Yeah.
AUDIENCE: High flush draw
or a high straight draw.
WILL MA: Yeah, but we
can have those, right.
We have ace-nine
suit in our range.
We got king-10
suited in our range.
AUDIENCE: So then like a low
pair, like four-four or eight.
WILL MA: Yeah, we don't
have fours or eights,
but you know on those
boards, like pocket jacks,
even like ace-king high is a
pretty good hand and pocket
jacks.
There's something very
specific we're missing.
I mean this is just for
this example, but yeah.
AUDIENCE: Maybe
a pair of queens.
WILL MA: Right, OK, good.
So that's sort of what
I was looking for.
You can come get
this now if you want.
Essentially, suppose this
was our exact strategy.
If the board comes queen
high, then essentially they
know that our range is pretty
bad, because we don't ever
have a queen.
I mean we could
have kings or aces,
but all of our other pairs are
going to be smaller than queen.
So I mean this is just
a specific example,
but I'm saying polarizing
is, in general,
a good concept by this
argument that you're not
wasting your good hands.
But it can be exploited
if your opponent knows
the specific way in
which you're polarizing,
and they just call your
reraise and see the flop.
And they'll be able to
play very well on the flop
still, even if you have some
good hands and some bluffs.
It can also be bad against
unpredictable opponents,
because by the ace-jack,
ace-10 argument again,
let's say you
three-bet with ace-10
instead of ace-jack as
an attempt to polarize.
But let's say your
opponent is kind of bad,
and they might make a loose call
in this situation with ace-10.
Then you would have
really hoped to have
ace-jack instead of
ace-10 if they're going
to call your raise with ace-10.
So if you're
polarizing, you're sort
of assuming your opponent
is going to play reasonably.
So the point is the
reason why I don't
want to sort of waste
ace-jack by raising
is because my opponent's
probably going to fold ace-10.
But what if they
might call ace-10?
Then I really would have wished
I reraised with ace-jack.
OK, the short answer
is I'm not going
to give a conclusive formula
on how to play this situation,
because the short answer
is it's complicated.
And I don't think anyone
essentially knows what
the optimal strategy is yet.
But in practice, I think
just raising a mix of hands
from the call category,
mostly the off-suit hands
which have worse
implied odds, is
pretty good as part of
your bluff-raising range.
And calling the best hands
from the raise category,
like aces, like trapping a
small percent of the time,
just calling aces maybe
a fifth of the time,
so that sometimes you
have it when you call,
so that people can't just
reraise when you call.
And also raise some
of the best hands
that aren't plus EV to call.
So polarize a bit.
Essentially, the short
answer is it's complicated.
You need to do a
bit of everything
with all sorts of hands.
But I just wanted to sort of
talk about how complicated
this situation can be.
All right, so OK, so let's
get back to the hand.
So what I decided to
do here was following
the thing I said about
reraising with off-suit hands,
I decided to, so I decided
to raise here to 555.
And so I think this is
about the right sizing,
because we're making it
about 2.5 times his raise.
And essentially
we're bluffing here.
And our hand is
good enough where
it's not the end of
the world if they call,
because we have a lot of
chances to hit top pair.
And if we do, we're
probably good,
because they're
probably going all in
with ace-king or
ace-queen preflop.
But essentially we're bluffing.
I'm definitely hoping
he folds, and he does.
So OK, we take down the pot.
OK so the very next
hand, I actually
just noticed this
during, when I was
replaying through the hands.
So I didn't notice this.
I didn't notice this during
the tournament actually.
So what do you notice?
We're actually in the exact
same situation again, right.
But we have different cards.
So it's good that we thought
about our overall strategy
when we played that
hand, because you
will end up in
the same situation
again with different cards.
OK, so along the same lines--
but at the time I was probably
playing like 15 tables or more.
So I wasn't really
paying attention.
I probably didn't remember
that I reraised my opponent
the hand before.
But playing through
this, it actually yielded
a really good result.
Because what happened was
they didn't believe my three-bet
the second time around,
and they went all in
with pocket sevens.
It's not a terrible hand,
but it's definitely,
I think, a weaker hand than they
would usually go all in there
with.
But I guess they didn't
believe my reraise
after the previous hand.
So this also sort of
illustrates the importance
of like you said, of sometimes
having a bad hand when
you reraise, so that
people will give you
action when you do have a
good hand like pocket jacks.
OK, so let's go on.
I'm only playing
through the hands
that I essentially played at
the start of the tournament.
So we doubled up.
The starting stack was 3,000.
We've got 6,000 now.
We get ace-queen, we raise,
and we get called here.
And here, this guy makes it--
so this is a different player,
because we eliminated the
guy who used to sit here.
And they make it 755.
I decide to fold here.
I think ace-queen offsuit
is just a bit too weak.
I think going all in is--
it wouldn't be
terrible, but I think
when we raised from
fairly early position,
under-the-gun plus one.
And this high jack called.
They're not going to be doing
this as a bluff very often.
And their reraise to 755 I
think usually commits them.
It's not guaranteed that they're
going to go all in if we--
they're going to call
us if we go all in.
But I think most
likely they will,
and they're going to
be ahead of our range.
So I decide to fold.
It's a fairly tight fold.
So it is a stack.
I'm just going to continue
playing through my hands
from the tournament.
If you have any questions,
just stop me and ask.
So this is sort of a
weird hand, and I actually
think I played this
hand quite terribly.
So this guy calls, which
I said we should never do,
but I guess he
doesn't take my class.
We get queen-10 here.
We check, we see a flop.
So we flop two over cards,
a backdoor flush draw
and a gutter straight draw.
So I decide to lead into it,
sort of lead my draws out,
hope he folds.
He calls, and the
turn is a three.
And then here, so this
is where I sort of,
he decided he suffered at me.
So I talked about how he
should only be doing this
if he doesn't respect me.
Because I mean in
this case, it's
not a completely insignificant
fraction of the pot.
It's like one sixth.
So he is actually getting
some substantial payment
into the pot, but it's
still fairly small.
And the main thing it
does is it gives me
an opportunity to check-raise.
But I'm not going to.
I don't think they're
going to fold often enough.
There's a lot of draws
they're going to call me with,
and I'm going to have to
bluff again on the river.
So I decide to just call,
which is reasonable.
So this is where I think
I played the hand poorly.
So the river completes
a lot of draws,
but it doesn't complete my hand.
And I just check it down.
I just check it,
which at the time
I didn't lead out, because
I thought the fact that I
only called the turn
and suddenly decided
to bet big on the river
would probably get called.
But I think it's just not a
balanced way to play the hand,
because plenty of times
I will have clubs,
or I'll have jack-10
or something.
I'll have a jack, and I
will want to bet for value.
And here when I have a
hand that essentially
has no chance of winning
the hand at showdown.
Like essentially, I'm
giving up the pot for sure
if I check, because my queen
high will never be good.
I should definitely be bluffing.
So I didn't, which I regret,
because I let him take down
the pot with a pair of threes.
Yeah, I guess he kind of
played that hand well.
He called eight-three suited.
I guess he made money from
me, because I didn't play
very well from the big blind.
OK so the next hand, we
get king-jack offsuit here.
We open, probably one
of the weakest hands
I'm opening from this position.
I think probably in
my recommendations,
this is not in the
list you should
open from, high jack minus one.
But I decide to open,
because I'm bored I guess.
And we get three callers.
OK, so the flop is four,
six, four with two hearts.
So I decide to
continuation bet here.
I think it's a
fairly marginal spot.
I think just giving up is OK.
I definitely wouldn't
have stabbed at the pot
if I didn't have
the King of Hearts.
But the fact that I have a
backdoor pretty good flush
draw, I decided to bet and
just hope that everyone folds.
And we do get that
which is pretty nice.
OK, so you know our stack is
hovering around the same size.
We won some hands
and lost some hands.
It's still early
in the tournament.
The blinds have gone up a
bit, but it's still far away
from the payouts.
OK, so we get we
queen-jack on the button.
And this guy just goes
all in for a lot of bets.
I guess it's not that many.
It's like 35.
No, sorry, it's-- yeah, it's
it's about 30, 35 right.
So I fold here obviously.
But I thought a bit
about his range,
and you know it's possible
his range is like entirely--
so I talked about this
in a previous class.
When do you want to be going
all in for a huge size?
It's essentially what hands
that are pretty good to get all
in with preflop but have
terrible post-flop implied odds
in this situation.
And what were the
hands I listed there?
It's essentially small
pairs, like pocket twos,
you really don't
want to see a flop.
It's quite a good hand
preflop but you really
don't want to see a flop,
because it's pretty much
always three higher
cards are going to come,
and you're just going to be
playing this guessing game,
trying to guess whether
your opponent has a pair.
And the other type of hand
is like ace-two offsuit
where once again, you have an
ace preflop which is decent.
But you're just going to
be playing a guessing game
on most flops.
So you know probably if I had
a very strong read on him,
and if I had
jack-10 suited here,
calling is maybe not that bad,
because you're like a coin
flip against ace-two offsuit.
And you're like 54% favored
against pocket threes.
So I folded here, because
my hand isn't suited,
and just because there's
a small chance they're
going to have ace-queen.
And my read was nowhere
near strong enough
to conclude that for sure.
There range was only
small pairs and a six.
OK, so we lose a bit of chips.
We're blinding down a bit.
Here we get 10-2 suited, so I
call from the big blind with 4
and 1/2 to 1 odds.
I think this is probably one
of the weakest hands I'd call.
I might not call eight-two
suited although it's close.
I mean, you could make a case
for calling eight-two suited.
So once again, my
odds were really good,
but the reverse implied odds
do sort of work against me
quite a bit since I'm going
to be out of position,
and I have small cards
which will usually
make a smaller pair than them.
But I decide to call, and
we flopped a flush draw,
which is pretty good.
But I'm still going
to check, because this
is a board where I'm just going
to check to the pre-flop raiser
and let them continuation bet.
So I talked about leading
in an earlier class,
and I don't think
this is a board where
we should be leading.
I think never leading
is OK as well, so.
I decide to check,
and they check back.
So we turn the flush,
which is great.
We bet 600 into 1080.
So unfortunately, we
don't get any action.
So we take it down.
So for the next--
I think this is one
more a bit later.
So under-the-gun raises,
small blind queue
is very, very short.
He only has 7 and
1/2 big blind calls.
And we decide to
call with our 7--
with our 6 and 1/2 to one
odds here, or six to one odds.
So we flop queen, jack, five.
So we have second pair with
a backdoor straight draw
and a backdoor flush draw.
And the small blind goes
all in for 1054 into 1380.
So this is sort of I
think a pretty close spot.
I think if I knew for
sure that Arden1977
didn't have a hand here, I think
calling is definitely fine.
We're given about
2.3 to one odds.
And I think second pair
with these backdoor
draws is more than good
enough against his range.
Because I think his
range will mostly be
draws and top pairs and second
pairs, probably not bottom pair
that often, because
they did call preflop
from the small blind,
which I don't expect
most players would do with a
hand like seven-five suited.
So we're not even that happy
to call him to be honest,
but I probably would call.
But the fact that this
guy here is behind,
and they could raise,
or they could call,
and we'd have to make more
decisions on future streets,
I think really hurts us.
And I think we
should have folded.
At the time I decided to call.
I don't know why, but I don't
think this is a good play.
I think it's just too
risky essentially.
It'll work most of the time.
Because most of the
time [? Arton ?]
will fold, because
they're going to see
two players putting money in.
But the times where
they do have something,
I'm going to have to fold,
and it's going to suck.
So we do call.
They actually had
the same hand as us.
It worked out well.
I guess we sort of
took a bad beat,
because we could've made a
flush, and they couldn't have.
We were technically ahead,
but we get half the pot.
So I'm not going through
my tournament history
from one month ago and saying
I played every hand perfectly.
When I look through
here, I definitely--
there's a lot of mistakes.
There's a lot of hands
I wish I could replay.
So this hand, I guess,
is fairly simple.
So we have ace-king, and I think
it's definitely good enough
to get it all in here with.
So as far as what my
range is I think--
[INAUDIBLE] I think-- sorry.
Did you have a suggestion or?
AUDIENCE: Oh, no, no, I
just saw this guy's handle,
and I thought it was funny.
OK, so you thought it was who?
AUDIENCE: Funny.
WILL MA: Sorry, sorry.
OK.
No, yeah, don't ask
me what my hand means.
My handle is--
AUDIENCE: What does it mean?
[LAUGHTER]
WILL MA: I can't even read it.
I think it stood for something.
I probably made it
when I was like 17,
and I think it
stood for something.
I probably don't remember
what it stands for, OK.
So we go all in here.
So this is sort of
a no-brainer hand,
but let's stop and think a bit
about what our range should be.
So I think with ace-king,
ace-king and pocket tens,
I think it's fairly
easy get it all in.
I think with ace-queen
suited, I would get it in.
I think if I had ace-queen
offsuit, I would probably fold.
Although with ace-queen suited
actually if this Jet Ski Fun
guy had as many chips as us,
then maybe I would have folded.
But the fact that we're
actually not risking
our entire 6250 against the
two players who are in the pot
is very relevant.
Because [? Armond ?] covers
us, and they could in theory
pick up pocket aces.
But it's much less
likely for them
to pick up pocket aces
than this Jet Ski Fun
guy who's already in the pot.
So the fact that they
may have [? SEAM ?]
less than 20 big blinds as
well helps our case a lot.
So I would probably get it
in with ace-queen suited plus
and then pocket
nines plus, probably,
is what I would get
it in with here.
So we go all in, and we beat
ace-jack, which is good.
So I think ace-jack is
slightly on the loose side.
I mean, I think it's a fine
play definitely to get it all
in with ace-jack, but
maybe they could have--
because they do have more
than 20 big blinds here.
So I think maybe they could have
considered calling or raising
small and folding if someone
like us entered the pot.
But nonetheless, I think
they played their hand fine.
OK, so the next hand
we have a pocket nines.
So [? Manny, ?]
this guy, raises.
So we're getting deeper now,
because we won the last hand.
So now we've got, we've got
40 big blinds, and we call.
This guy also calls
and [? Liamkid ?]
goes all in for 30 big blinds.
So they get out of the way.
I think this is actually
a very close spot.
I do think one big
incentive to get
it all in is I
think it's not that
likely that [? Liamkid ?] has
pocket kings or pocket aces.
Because I think
there's a good chance
they would just raised smaller,
maybe, to try to sucker people
in.
So I actually think I'm not
losing to too much here.
And same with [? Armond. ?]
I think it's also very hard
for [? Armond ?] to
have a good hand.
So even though in
the first example,
we talked about how sometimes
calling with pocket aces
here is a good play, but you
know, I said if one guy raised,
and you're the second
guy, you should maybe
call with pocket aces
like 20% of the time.
When it's two guys who have--
like when it's one guy who
has raise, me who has called,
and now you're deciding
what to do with pocket aces.
Instead of 20% you should be
calling, it's literally like,
maybe like 2% or 1% we should
be calling with pocket aces.
So if you multiply
1% by the probability
of getting dealt pocket aces,
which is around one in 200,
it's literally like
one out of 20,000
that he has pocket aces here.
So I'm not too afraid of him.
So I really think
getting it in is fine.
But at the same time, I don't
think I'm ever a favorite here.
I think their range is
essentially ace-king,
ace-queen, maybe ace-jack
suited, and then, essentially,
pocket 10s, pocket nines,
pocket jacks, pocket queens,
maybe occasionally
pocket eights.
So I could have done an
exact equity calculation
on PokerStove.
If I did, it probably would
have been very, very close.
But I decided to fold, and
they take down the pot.
OK, so the next hand
we get a ace-jack.
We raise from under-the-gun.
This guy goes all in
for six big blinds.
We're basically
committed here, even
if we think he's crushing us.
So I call, and we
lose to ace-king.
Not really too much
we can do here.
Although this does
illustrate one concept, which
is when there are stacks
behind like [? Zarbizan ?] who
are short enough that they can
commit you by going all in,
you should be slightly
less incentivized to open
speculative hands here.
Like say I had 10-nine suited,
I think while normally I
would consider opening 10-nine
suited here as a steal.
It's a huge disincentive to
steal here with 10-nine suited
when someone like
[? Zarbizan ?] can just
pick up even a hand as
weak as ace-jack suited
or ace-jack offsuit and go all
and beat our 10-nine suited.
But ace-jack is more than good
enough to still raise here.
We unfortunately
run into ace-king.
Next hand we get ace-jack again.
The same guy who just doubled
up through us goes all in,
and here I call him.
Because even though
there's more chips,
the positions are a lot
later, and specifically,
they went all in for
14 big blinds when
no one else was in the pot.
So their range is, their
range isn't super duper wide,
but it's definitely wide
enough that ace-jack I'm
happy to call here.
As far as what my
range is, I think
I wouldn't call
with ace-10 offsuit,
but I would call
with ace-10 suited.
So probably ace-10
suited, and I think
I'd call with king-queen suited
but not king-queen offsuit.
And the smallest
pair I get it in with
is probably pocket sixes, I
think, maybe pocket five is OK.
Yeah, probably pocket
fives is too loose,
probably pocket sixes.
So we call.
So unfortunately, we
lose to king-10 suited.
So he doubles up
through us again,
and we're kind of short now.
AUDIENCE: I have a question.
On that last hand, why
go all in yourself?
Why not just call his all in?
WILL MA: Oh OK, good question.
So yeah, this is
a good question.
So in this case, the
two plays I'd say
are fairly close to equivalent.
Because OK, so what's
the defense, right?
They're going to be
the same almost always,
because Check Raise
is just going to fold.
[LAUGHTER]
So what's the difference?
The difference is if
we don't go all in,
then Check Raise let's say,
he picks up aces, right.
Then he can just go all in, and
we're basically forced to call
him, because we can't--
if we put in 4,118,
and they go all in,
we can't really fold
for only 3,000 more.
We can't really fold preflop
with four to one odds.
AUDIENCE: Would that change
if you're the big stack?
If like, you had the Check Raise
stack, and he had your stack?
WILL MA: Oh yeah, for sure.
Yeah, that's a very good point.
Yeah, for sure.
So if we had the same
stack as Check Raise here,
I would just call.
And then if Check Raise goes
all in, I would probably fold.
But I mean, I'm also going to
call here with pocket aces,
so they can't just look down
at pocket twos and go all in
and bully me around.
So my strategy if
we had their stack
would be to call my entire
range that I plan on playing.
But in this case, the
only thing calling does
is it gives him more options.
Like let's say they had a
very marginal situation,
like let's say they
had king-queen suited.
I think if I only
called, they could maybe
argue for calling themselves
with king-queen suited
and seeing a flop.
Whereas if I go all in,
I think they're forced
to fold king-queen suited.
AUDIENCE: Basically,
you have a better chance
at making him fold.
WILL MA: Exactly.
I'm just giving
him fewer options.
But it's very, very marginal.
It affects it basically
specifically for me
the king-queen suited, like it
effects basically for one hand
or maybe like two
or three hands.
But you might as well
minimize the options
you give your opponent.
Yeah, like I'd say the
minimum stack size I would
need before I call instead
of go all in with is maybe,
I think maybe like 13,000.
I think at 13,000,
it's sort of more
than I want to risk
against the pot.
So now we're kind of short.
So we blind out for a bit.
We don't get cards.
And when you don't get
cards in a tournament,
there's not really much you
can do other than blind down,
not just go all in with
crap and just lose.
So we blind down
for a bit, but we're
fortunate to pick up kings.
So this is sort of a no-brainer.
We go all in.
There's no point
trapping, because they're
guaranteed to call us.
And we get called by ace-five,
and we win, which is good.
The next hand we get
eight-seven offsuit,
and against a button raise,
I think calling is fine.
I think their range is just
going to be wide enough, where
even though the reverse
implied odds, once again,
really don't work in
our favor, we just
have to sort of realize
the equity from 4 and 1/2
to 1 odds, so I'm going to call.
So we flop nothing.
I'm planning to just check-fold.
So I check.
They check back.
The turn's a four.
Once again, we have nothing.
I could bluff here, but
I figure I'm not really
looking to make a big
bluff with this hand,
because I have no draw, no pair.
There's no point.
But I will probably look to
make a bluff on the river
if they also check,
just because whenever
you have no chance of winning
the pot and it's the river,
then making a bluff
is not unreasonable.
But in this case,
bluffing is kind of bad,
because with any club,
they might just call me.
Because any club is going
to have some equity.
So I check.
They check back.
The river is a fourth
club, which is, I think,
a pretty good card for me.
Because I can easily represent
a small club, and if I did
have a small club, I am
definitely value betting.
So it's a pretty good
card for me to bluff,
and they're probably going
to have to fold king high.
So I bet, and I don't
think I bet fairly big.
I'm just looking
for a size where
they have to fold
sometimes, and they'll
have to pay me off sometimes
when I have a small club.
So they raised me here,
which is pretty weird.
I still don't really have a good
idea of what I think he has.
I mean I'm certain
they have me beat.
You know so I just fold.
We could think a bit about
doing something crazy,
like go all in, but it
would just be weird.
I think it's unnecessary.
We've got nothing.
So I just fold.
I don't really know.
Maybe they just had like
a slow played flush.
It's possible they had like
a king high flush here.
And they slow-played the flop.
They decided to
slow-play the turn again,
because the turn sort
of didn't hit anybody.
Yeah, I'm not sure.
So I fold here.
I mean, it's possible
they just had a high club.
But I feel like
with a high club,
they should have
bet at some point,
just because a good flush
draw is just as enough equity.
But nonetheless, I
guess we'll never know.
That's one benefit of calling.
You get to find out
what your opponent had.
So the next hand,
we have queen-jack.
We've got 12 bets.
I just go all in.
12 is around the cut
off, like I said,
12 is sort of the cutoff where
if you have 12 bets or less,
instead of raising,
just go all in.
And that's what we do.
So we get called, but--
so this is actually
a pretty sick board.
Yeah, so they
flopped a full house,
but we rivered a
higher full house.
[LAUGHTER]
Yeah, it's sort of a
waste, because normally
if this happens, you can win
like 100 big blinds from them
probably.
But instead we only won
how many, eight big blinds.
So it's sort of a
waste but whatever.
OK so the next hand,
I got pocket fives,
and we raise to a thousand.
And [? Liamkid ?]
goes all in again.
And you know, it's irritating,
but once again, I have to fold.
I think I just--
I don't have enough equity
to call, given his range.
Once again it's a situation
where it's a fairly big all in.
So I could maybe not
put them on aces,
although given that
they've done this once,
they're more likely to just do
this with their entire range
and play a strategy
where they're just
going on preflop a lot.
So maybe they could have
aces in their range,
but nonetheless, regardless, I
think it's not even that close.
I just fold.
Yeah, we don't really want
to call in frustration,
because you saw what happened
to the guy with pocket sevens
when he ran into our pocket
jacks in the earlier hand.
OK, so I'll take a
short break there.
And then I'll finish up
the rest of the hands
in like two minutes.
OK, so I'm going to get started.
The next hand we get
we king-eight offsuit.
And once again, it's one
of these situations where
we're not thrilled
to be calling,
especially now that our
odds are even a bit worse,
because they actually made it
2.25x, actually a bit more,
like 2.35x instead of 2x.
So against Degenerated,
but king-eight offsuit, two
big cards, I think, with when
we're sort of not that deep,
the reverse implied odds don't
work against us that much,
so we call.
And we get a good preflop.
[LAUGHTER]
So we check, because once again,
I'm checking my entire range.
That's how I choose
to play my strategy.
And they bet.
And so this sort
of, I think this
is a somewhat close situation,
because there are some draws.
There is a flush
draw, and there are
a bunch of straight
draws if someone
has jack-10 or
queen-jack or queen-10.
So I do think there is a
decent amount of incentive
to just check-raise all in.
So on the second
lecture, I showed you
a bunch of examples where
on boards like this,
you can check-raise all
in with your good hands
and check-raise all
in with your draws,
and it's a pretty
balanced strategy.
Because when you have a good
hand, you have a good hand.
And when you have a
draw, you have lots
of outs when you get called.
And another advantage
of going all in is--
let's say I had like
10-nine, I would probably
want to be raising.
Because with 10-nine,
even though we
have a pretty good hand, we sort
of want to protect our hand.
We don't really want a
jack or queen or an ace
to come that much.
So it's close, but in the
end, I decided to call.
And I think I decided
I'm just going
to play pretty close, pretty
much my entire strategy,
I'm just going to call here.
As tempting as it is, like let's
say I had ace, Two of Diamonds,
or let's say like queen, Six of
Diamonds to check-raise all in,
I think it's a board
where it's already paired.
And if I have a
flush draw, I still
have lots of opportunities
to bluff on the river.
And if I have a
good hand, there's
not that many outs,
especially when I have a king.
So I'm just going to call and
hope that the board comes out
well, which I guess it does.
So I check again, because this
is how I'm playing jack-10.
This is how I'm playing
all my hands essentially.
So they check back.
The river is kind of bad for us.
But I think it's hard for them
to have a king at this point,
so I just bet out about
a bit more than half
the pot, maybe 60% of
the pot, yeah, 60%.
Oh, so they actually call
me with ace-seven, which
I think is pretty reasonable.
I think ace-seven is a fine
call against my strategy,
because I could have
easily had jack-10
or queen-10 or queen-jack here.
Although I probably also
play a nine the same way,
so they are also
paying off my nines.
So one good thing, actually.
So this is one
interesting thing to think
about that's sort of
advanced, but I think
it's cool is the fact that
they have ace-seven, I think,
makes their call a lot
better than if they had,
say, ace-10 or ace-jack.
And the reason for-- so even
the ace-seven is in some sense
a worse hand than
ace-10 and ace-jack,
they're the same on this board.
And the problem with
ace-10 and ace-jack
is if they have a
10 or a jack, it's
less likely I have
a 10 or a jack.
So when they're
calling with ace-seven,
essentially what
they're hoping for
is hoping for me to have jack-10
or queen-10 or queen-jack.
So if they have a 10 or a jack,
it just decreases that chance.
So it's almost like
ace-seven is a better hand
to call with then ace-jack.
But nonetheless, with any
ace, I think calling here
is reasonable, because I
do have plenty of bluffs.
Any missed straight draw,
any missed flush draw,
I will bluff in the
same way on this river.
OK, so the next hand.
We won a bunch of
pots, which is nice.
So we built our stack up.
So we get pocket fours here,
and this guy raises it to 1,200.
Pocket fours is
definitely a hand
where I want to be
bluff-reraising with.
So I'm not I'm not hoping to
get called when I reraise here,
but it's a hand that does quite
well against the range of hands
I get called by, because
a lot of times it'll just
be ace-king, ace-queen.
And they will fold quite a
large percent of the time.
So I definitely want to raise.
The only question is
how do I raise, right.
I could just go all in, which
has the benefit that they can't
call and try to hit a pair.
Because that would
actually be bad.
Let's say I only
reraised to 3,000 here.
It's actually kind
of bad if this guy
calls with this queen-jack
trying to hit a pair.
Because that's actually
the best strategy.
Basically, their
obvious strategy
is good against my hand.
So I want to either go all
in, which sort of denies them
that opportunity, but the
problem with going all in
is let's suppose Check
Raise picks up a hand.
Then I'm going to be losing
with my pocket fours.
So there is this
delicate balance here.
And this is why I think
tournaments are interesting,
because there's plays that
are good against big stacks
and plays that are good
against small stacks.
But in reality in a
tournament, there's
going to be big stacks and
small stacks at the table,
and often you do have to
compromise between the lesser
of two evils.
And that's sort
of what I do here.
So I decide to raise to
3,600, which is bigger
than I'd usually make it.
Usually, I'd make
it maybe like 3,000.
But when this guy is this
short, [? RoflLolBoom, ?] I
don't really want to
let them just call,
but on the other hand, I want to
be able to fold if one of these
two guys, Check Raise or
[? Vampson ?] picks up a hand.
So I sort of compromise
between making it 3,600.
They both folded.
This guy also folds, which
is, I guess, an ideal result.
The next hand we have
eight-queen offsuit,
and we make it 1,600.
So I know I said make it
2.25x, and I stand by that.
I think that's a good strategy.
I think at the time I'm
just, so once again, I'm
probably still playing a lot of
tables, and I'm kind of lazy.
So I'm too lazy to
type in 1,800 manually,
whereas the software
defaults to just 2x.
So I tend to just
2x, but I think
it's probably not the
theoretical optimal strategy.
I would guess that the optimal
thing to do is closer to 2.25x.
So [? Vampson ?]
calls us in position.
So immediately I could think of
it like, what is their range?
Because it's a
spot where I expect
him to go all in with
most of their good hands.
So the question is
are they trapping me,
or do they literally
just always have
a hand like jack-10 suited,
king-queen, or something
like that.
So immediately, it's sort
of an interesting spot,
because I expect them to
mostly be raising when
they want to play their hand.
So we flop four, 10, nine.
And it's definitely a pretty
bad board for us, overall.
Like I think if, like
regardless of their strategy,
like if their strategy
is to trap us sometimes,
then this board
is just terrible.
And even if their
strategy isn't to trap us,
they've always got a
straight draw on this board,
because they're going to
have king-queen or queen-jack
or something.
So I think objectively,
it's a pretty bad board.
Maybe they could have ace-jack
or ace-queen themselves.
Although ace-queen, I
think they're definitely
raising preflop, so
probably just ace-jack.
I do think we're not
in great shape here,
but I decide to bet anyway,
essentially just banking
on my Ace of Clubs.
I definitely wouldn't be betting
this without Ace of Clubs.
But my strategy is to
bet, and if I get called,
I'm going to go all in on any
club turn, any jack, queen,
or ace turn.
So essentially, any club turn
I'll have the nut flush draw.
Any jack turn, I have
a good straight draw
with two overcards,
and any queen or ace
turn pairs with my hand.
So I just think
there's enough turns
where I can basically
continue bluffing, continue
barreling on.
That one barrel has to be OK.
But I'm only making
this play, because I
have the Ace of Clubs.
Even with the Queen
of Clubs, I probably
would've just
given up this hand.
But we do get a fold.
So I guess they
probably had ace-jack.
That's probably their
most likely hand,
maybe something like
pocket sevens they folded.
Yeah, so that sort of shows
you the importance sometimes
of backdoor draws.
Because let's say they
had pocket sevens here.
Let's say they called
with pocket sevens, which
I don't think is unreasonable.
If I didn't have
the Ace of Clubs,
I'm going to just have to end up
giving up on a bunch of turns,
and they would take down the
pot with their pocket sevens.
But because I have
the Ace of Clubs,
it's just very, very
unlikely they end up
winning the hand with
the pair of sevens.
Because I'm going
to shove a lot of
turns, and they're just
going to have to fold.
OK, so the next hand we
get queen-jack again.
And we raise here.
And so this same guy,
[? Vampson, ?] they call.
And we get a good flop.
So I bet-- OK, so I'm
going to talk about this.
So I bet 1,600 here,
which is quite small.
It's like 40%.
It's like less than
40% of the pot.
I might have done
it out of laziness,
or I might have just done
it because of my cards,
because I have two
pair, and I'm trying
to sucker him in and get him to
put in all this money slowly.
But looking back,
I definitely don't
think this is how I want to
be playing my entire strategy
on this flop.
I think I want to be betting at
least half the pot when there's
a flush draw, a straight draw,
like a bunch of straight draws.
I definitely think this
bet is way too small.
On average, even if I
have a pretty good hand,
let's say like
queen-nine, there's
just a lot of bad
cards for me that I
don't want to be betting
this small on this board.
I don't know if at the time I
just misclicked and messed up,
or I was lazy and I just
wanted to make it 2x,
or I specifically had a
read that I could exploit
this player by betting small.
But this is not how I would
like to balance my strategy.
And If you ever see me
doing this, most likely
I had a really good hand,
as I do in this case.
So unfortunately
it doesn't work.
So I'm going to talk
about this a bit more.
So I'm going to jump back
to theory just for a bit.
I don't think I've
talked about this before,
but I want to say that
bet sizing depends
on board texture.
So let me explain
what I mean here.
So essentially, there's
two types of boards.
There's dry boards
and drawy boards.
So I hate this
terminology, because these
are two words that
mean opposite things,
and they sound very
similar, especially
if you don't enunciate.
But it's dry and drawy.
Maybe I can't
pronounce them well.
Dry boards is basically boards
where the winner is mostly
decided before the
river, and you're either
way ahead or way behind.
Drawy boards is basically
boards with a lot of flush
draws, straight draws,
where every subsequent card
can change the board a lot.
And it's hard to fold,
because all hands have equity.
So in reality, most boards,
they're somewhere in between.
It's a spectrum.
So what are some
characteristics of dry boards?
Well, a board tends
to be dry if it's
paired, like four, four, eight.
That tends to be pretty dry,
because not much is going in.
Most will have
missed that board.
A board is dry if the
highest card is big.
Like if the highest card is
an ace, then against someone
with an ace, if you don't have
a face flush or straight draw,
you're already kind of
drawing close to dead.
Whereas if the highest card is
a 10, then if you have a queen,
you always have an opportunity
to turn a queen and beat them.
It's dry if there's no middle
cards for straight draws,
if there's no
flush draws, or I'd
say, if there's already four
to a flush or already four
to a straight, then it's
also sort of dry, because--
like if there's already
Four of Diamonds,
then it's also sort of
decided who wins already.
Like if you have a
big diamond, you're
pretty much guaranteed to
win, barring some full house.
Same with four to a straight.
If it's like nine,
10, jack, queen.
If you have a king, you're just
pretty much guaranteed to win.
And so on the other hand,
what are drawy boards?
It's sort of the
opposite, right.
Small cards, why small cards?
Because everyone's going to have
overcards, which is six outs.
Flush draws or three to a
flush is also very drawy,
because if there's
three to a flush,
then someone with just any card
of that suit has a flush draw.
Boards with straight draws.
So how should your play change
on these two types of boards?
Well, on dry boards, you can
bet pretty small fractions
of the pot on the flop and turn.
And your opponent might
not have the odds to call.
So like if the flop is
ace, ace, two or maybe ace,
ace, seven with no
flush draws, you
can bet like a fifth of
the pot, and your opponent
is still going to have to
fold a lot of their hands.
Because if you've got an
ace, they're just way behind.
What's another characteristic?
Is any draw might be good
enough to make a bluff.
So like if the board is ace,
ace, seven with no flush draw,
and you've got like eight, nine
with a backdoor flush draw,
that's a pretty good
hand to make a bluff.
Because you've got three
to a straight and three
to a flush, which
is sort of the most
you could possibly ask for
on that flop with respect
to draws.
And another aspect of playing
dry boards is slow playing.
Tricky plays are good.
Because the thing that matters
isn't preventing your opponent
from seeing the turn and river
and not letting them see outs.
The thing that matters is sort
of convincing your opponent
that you have a good hand when
you don't or convincing them
that you don't have a
good hand when you do.
So it's all about
tricking your opponent,
disguising these tricky--
I mean, I shouldn't say that.
Simple play can still
be good on dry boards,
but in general, slow
playing is reasonable
And tricking, trying
to trick your opponent
is more important.
Whereas on drawy
boards, you just
want to bet large fractions
of the pot before the river,
because every hand
has so many outs.
You really don't want to be
giving them good odds to call.
And on the flop and turn,
if you don't have anything,
then just don't
put any money in.
Because bluffing is pretty
moot, because so many hands
aren't folding,
because they have outs.
And yeah, don't
really slow play.
If you have a good
hand, similarly,
just put all the money in
right away, because they're
going to call very often,
because they're always
going to have some outs.
So that's roughly
how the play changes.
OK, so I'll come back to this.
We'll see these hands in a bit.
So coming back to
this queen-jack hand,
the reason why I think
my bet is too small
is because I would
consider this queen, jack,
three with a flush draw to be
a fairly drawy board, fairly
close to the drawy
end of the spectrum.
And I said you have to bet
big fractions of the pot
and here I am betting close to
a third of the pot on the flop.
So I think it is
not a good strategy,
but I take the pot down.
OK, so the next hand, we
have ace-queen offsuit.
So this guy calls.
My rule was roughly
raising it to 3x plus one.
So you could count how many
limpers there are before you,
and you add three to that,
and you multiply that
by the big blind is roughly
what you raise it to.
So in this case, 4,000.
I make it 4,250.
If they decide to do some
weird plays, by the way,
like if they go all in here,
I'm definitely calling.
I am just not going
to believe them,
and ace-queen offsuit is
definitely good enough.
So they decide to
just call, which
is a bit weird considering
their odds aren't that good,
and they're out of position.
We flop three hearts, and
we have the Queen of Hearts.
And in this situation,
I'm just betting
pretty big into the pot.
So I consider this to
be a fairly drawy flop,
so I bet big.
Even though I'm in
position-- so position
is sort of an incentive
to maybe bet smaller,
because you have position
on later streets.
And you can control the betting
better on later streets.
So this is a fairly big bet
considering I'm in position.
But I'm just happy
to get it in here.
So contrast this
with an earlier hand.
I think I also had
ace-queen, except I only
had three to a flush.
And I said it was very important
that I had the ace of the suit.
But here it's just very hard
for me to be in terrible shape.
Like in theory they
could have, I suppose,
ace-nine with an Ace of Hearts.
Like that hand would
be crushing me,
because I would be drawing
to literally three outs
to carry my queen.
But it's just there's not
that many combinations,
because it would involve an
offsuit hand, which they're
way less likely to have when
they call me out of position.
Or it would involve a
hand like pocket kings
with the King of Hearts,
which is also pretty unlikely,
because they probably would
have done some raising preflop.
So I just think no
matter what they have,
I'm going to be in
great shape here.
I just have more than
enough outs to just gamble.
And so they fold.
OK, the next hand
we had queen-10 off.
So I opened from under the gun.
I think it's fine.
It looks a bit loose,
and it is, but I
think in terms of raising some
smaller cards to balance it,
so that I will sometimes have
smaller cards in my hand.
You know you can't really
ask for more than a suited
connector.
So queen-10 suited, I
raise from under the gun.
And the big blind calls
when they only start
the hand being 18 bets deep.
So we flop two, two, 10.
So this is a good example of a
very dry board, where there's
really not much going on.
And it is possible
they have a deuce,
but just in general, there is no
straight draws, no flush draws.
I guess there are
some overcards,
but still, it's pretty close
to as dry as you can get.
And they checked
to me, and I bet
2,000, which I think is
actually too big here.
To be honest, I don't think
I needed to risk this much.
I mean, I have a good hand
but if I didn't have a pair,
I only want to be
betting like 1,500.
I think that's a fine size.
I think betting 1,500 is more
than enough on this board,
just because there's
really nothing going on.
But I guess I was lazy.
I bet 2,000, and they call.
So as you can see,
there's a huge difference
between my flop bet
sizing depending
on the texture of the board.
And that's sort of--
that's the point I
wanted to drive across
through some of these examples.
So they call me.
So we turn a six,
and they check.
I'm just going to keep
it simple and bet.
I'm not going to
try anything tricky.
And obviously I'm not folding
with top pair and a flush draw.
So they go all in.
I call.
So we river a flush,
and it turned out
to actually be necessary,
because they had a deuce.
So it is possible here, I
think, for them to have a deuce.
I think their play preflop is a
bit loose with two-nine suited
but not completely terrible.
Because with 4.5
to 1 odds, nothing
is really that terrible.
But I guess we get lucky.
But I do think their
call is a bit marginal.
Because we are under the gun,
so our range is fairly strong.
That's a nice pot to win.
So we're a fairly big stack now.
I guess we're chip
leader at the table.
And Check Raise
mid-raises from there.
And we have pocket deuces.
I think definitely
our hand is too weak
to go all in with as a bluff
against an under-the-gun
opening range.
So the only options
really are call or fold.
Basically our hand does have
terrible reverse implied odds
post-flop though.
So I think if you wanted to fold
here, it wouldn't be terrible.
But I guess I think calling
is fine, too, with 4.5 to 1.
And also in some sense, you
do have odds to set mine here
I think.
The chances of hitting a third
deuce on the flop is about one
in eight.
My odds are only 4.5 to 1,
but there are implied odds
in the case I do hit a set.
So literally if my
strategy is call and fold
unless the flop
has a two on it, I
don't think I'm losing
a ton of money there.
And if there ever is a
case where they check down,
and I get to take down the
pot with just a pair of twos,
then I'm just printing
money by calling.
So I decided to call.
The flop doesn't have
a two, so it's bad.
But out of the flops that don't
have a two, it's probably not
that bad, considering
the three and seven
is not that likely to pair
him when he's under the gun.
But nonetheless I fold.
You know like if I could do
the cheat I talked about where
I could disconnect and
call and see the river,
I definitely would.
But if I call, I have to
decide again on the turn
whether to call and decide again
on the river whether to call,
and it's just not going to
be a good situation, even
though for this immediate
bet, I think I definitely
have odds to call with
a backdoor flush draw,
and often they're just
going to have ace-king.
It's just impossible
to play the hand good.
This sort of just
demonstrates why
it's very risky when you decide
to play a hand like pocket
deuces out of position,
because it's just
very easy to get roped in.
Like let's say I call here, and
then I call the flop thinking
they might have ace-king.
They bet small, so
I have good odds,
and I have a
backdoor flush draw.
So let's say I call,
and then the turn
is like the Five of
Clubs or something,
and they bet like
40% of the pot.
Well, am I going to talk
myself into a call again?
Maybe, because now
I hit a third club.
But if I do then, if the
river's something random--
it's just all these
decisions that I'm not
going to be able to make well.
Whereas for my opponent,
it's going to be fairly easy.
They're going to just
bluff their bad hands,
value bet their good hands,
and check down the hands
in the middle which beat me.
OK, so the next hand we
get ace-king offsuit,
and we raise, and
the big blind calls.
The flop is nine, two, seven.
So note that the big blind
just got moved to the table,
and they actually cover us.
So they're probably
one of the biggest
stacks in the tournament.
So they check to us.
I decide to check
back here, which
I don't think is
terrible, but I think is
a bit of a scared play that I--
I think I would have
rather saw myself bet.
If I was shallower, like let's
say we only had 20,000 chips,
then I think just
checking is good.
Because if I bet,
they're probably
going to be check-raising with
a lot of their flush draws,
straight draws,
and then like pairs
of nines or pairs of sevens.
And I'm going to have to
fold with a pretty good hand
where I have two good overcards
and a backdoor flush draw,
but when it's this deep, they
really can't just check-raise
a nine, because they're
going to have to be worried
about pocket aces on our part.
So I think it's--
we're not going to get
check-raised that often,
and by betting, we just
make the pot bigger
when we do hit a king
or an ace and also
make it more likely
that we can bluff them
off a nine or a
seven by the river.
So I would have liked
to see myself bet,
but I don't think
checking is terrible,
by the argument that I
will most of the time,
you know by betting
I am folding out
basically all the
hands that I've beat
and keeping in all the
hands that beat me.
It's close but I would have
liked to see myself bet.
But as played, you know, if
I'm going to check the flop,
I'm not going to bet this turn.
Because the whole point
of betting the flop
is so that I could potentially
bet the turn and bet the river
and get him to fold a pair
of nines or a pair of sevens,
but by now I'm not
going to really
have any hope of getting
him to fold a nine.
And I'm just trying to win
the pot with my ace-king high.
And so yeah, I
just check it down.
The river check, I think,
is very, very obvious,
because I'm literally only
getting called by better hands
if I bet the river.
They have queen-10.
I think they probably should
have bluffed the river.
I think queen-10 is
weak enough where
they're just very rarely winning
the pot with queen-10 high.
They basically need to bluff
and then put me to a decision.
But nice to win that.
The next hand we have
jack-10, not too exciting.
So this same guy who's now the
button, raises from the button.
And we call, and
we flop nothing.
So the best thing to do is
bluff off all your chips,
but no, I just fold.
[LAUGHTER]
OK, so the next hand, it's also
against this [? GarlaEDU. ?]
So the two big
stacks at the table
are actually playing a lot
of hands against each other.
I just call here with jacks.
I don't think it would be
terrible to just raise and bet
it all in, but I think it is
sort of unnecessarily risky.
I think it wouldn't
be a terrible play
to just raise and get it all
in, but it's definitely thin.
Like you're not printing value
by raising and getting it
all in, because if
they reraise all in,
their range is going
to be pretty strong.
And pocket jacks is not
really crushing them.
I think you need to
have queens or better
to really be hoping to get it
all in against this guy here.
So with jacks I just call.
And also, you know, this
protects my calling range
of it.
Let's say, like Check Raise
thinks I'm weak and decides
to make a play here.
And they reraise to like 10,000,
then if [? GarlaEDU ?] folds,
I can come back around and go
all in and sort of surprise
them.
So it does protect my
calling range a bit as well.
I call.
We get a nine, six, five flop.
They check, and I bet.
I think betting is a
fairly natural play.
I don't want to
give ace-king outs.
And I just want to
win the pot right now,
but I was thinking
to myself after
that if they check-raised here,
that's really a gross spot.
Actually, I would hate my
life if they check-raised me.
Because I literally don't
know what I should do.
On one hand, I would
be inclined to fold,
because it's kind
of weird for them
to want to check-raise
me here without having
like a bigger pair or a
flush draw with lots of outs.
But at the same
time, it's just why
would they check pocket
aces to me here, maybe
to try to trap me.
It would have been a
really gross spot, I think,
if I got check-raised.
And by that argument, I think
against a very tricky player,
if you could be
check-raising here as a trap
and as a bluff with a balance
strategy, maybe checking
is better just to
protect myself from that.
But I think against him, I was
reasonably confident nothing
crazy was going to happen.
And yes, so they just fold.
OK, so it's against
this guy again.
I guess we're playing a lot of
pots against the same player.
I think it's getting fairly
late into the tournament
at this point.
It's not a huge tournament,
maybe like 80, 90 players,
and it's probably down to
like 20, 25 at this point.
So they raise.
We call with queen-eight off.
We're a bit deep here, so
our reverse implied odds
are actually sort of bad.
But we decide to call, and
we flop two, three, five.
So I'm just going to fold here.
But they decide to check.
And then we turn a flush
draw, but I'm still just going
to check and basically bet
pretty much every river, maybe
not an eight river.
So we river a six, and I
essentially bet as a bluff,
because our hand has no hope of
winning if it gets a showdown.
And it works this time.
So yeah, we played a
lot of pots against him.
And it seems like they
are fairly willing to just
check and fold their hands,
so not too aggressive.
So I guess one thing
to keep in mind
is maybe we can get out of the
way if we do see them raising.
OK, so this situation is
similar to the situation
in the very first
hand we discussed
where we had king-queen, and
we had roughly 30 big blinds.
And I talked sort of
about the benefits
of raising versus calling.
It's pretty much the
exact same situation.
And I decided to sort of
raise, essentially as a bluff,
but also king-queen plays
pretty well when they do call.
Because I'm always good
when I hit top pair.
So make it 8,000.
But unfortunately, this
time this [? GerarDocks ?]
goes all in.
So we basically
just have to fold.
Yeah, unfortunately,
8,000 is small enough
where we can just
happily get away here.
And it actually turns
out this guy also
goes on, which makes the
decision even easier.
So it looks like we ran into
pocket aces and pocket kings
that time.
It doesn't always work when
you reraise with king-queen.
All right, so still
at the same table,
we get ace-jack
offsuit, under the gun.
We reraise, and this
[? GerarDocks ?] guy calls.
We flop king, nine,
deuce with two hearts,
and I think this is sort of
pretty much the worst flop, one
of the worst flops I could get.
If there was like two higher
cards like a king and a queen,
I would have a
gutshot straight draw.
And if it was all low cards,
I'd have two overcards,
but here there's a flush
draw that I have no part of.
And also, they are somewhat
likely to have a king,
and if they do, I only have
three outs and my aces,
so I'm just going give this up.
So I talk about the power
of continuation betting
before where continuation
betting is good,
because my range is
stronger than theirs.
I could have aces.
I can bluff, et cetera.
And yeah, in general,
continuation betting,
being aggressive,
especially when
you're the pre-flop
aggressor, is very good.
But I think this is just
one of the worst flops,
and I'm just going to give up.
So I check.
They bet, and I fold.
I mean, I think sometimes I will
check a reasonably good hand
here to protect the times--
so that they can't just
bet here with any two cards
and know for sure I'll fold.
But most of the time
if I'm checking here,
I'm going to be fairly weak,
which is maybe exploitable.
But I give up the hand.
So eight-five suited.
I decide to call
on the small blind.
I know this goes against
my recommendation
from the first class.
I think calling from the
small blind is actually,
both theoretically
and practically,
a pretty good strategy
for a lot of cases,
but it's a bit complicated.
Because you have to sometimes
limp raise as a bluff.
You have to sometimes limp
raise and trap with aces.
So it's a bit complicated.
So I just said for simplicity,
you should just raise or fold,
which is still a
reasonable I think.
But I decide to call
here, and it's checked.
We get a pretty good
flop for our hands
but probably a better
flop for his range,
because when we call, we're
less likely to have really
small cards than he does.
But I mean, we have a
good flop for our hand,
so I am still going
to bet my hand.
So I bet half pot,
which is maybe not big
enough, to be
honest, considering
how dry the board is.
And we get a call.
We turn a nine, which is a
great card, because it gives--
not only does it
complete our hand,
there's lot of draws out there,
and I bet quite big here.
So this is where I was talking
about if the board is drawy,
you need to bet big and not
give your opponent odds.
So I bet 688 into 10,800.
The reason for the
eights is because it's
easier to type
like 688 then 6800,
so you'll see that quite a lot.
And we get called.
Yeah, and another, sometimes
you can get more creative,
you can do like 1234567.
That's a popular bet, because
you can just slide your finger
across the keyboard.
Yeah, there's a lot of
weird idiosyncrasies, OK,
so I bet 15,555
here, and he folds.
I'm playing like this with
my missed spade draws,
and I missed heart draws.
Unfortunately, we
don't get paid off.
OK, so jack-eight suited here.
The small blind raises.
Definitely I'm going to
call, and we flop top pair.
They bet, and-- so I think this
is a spot where I think my hand
is--
there's benefits of raising
and benefits of calling.
And overall, I decided
the benefits of raising
were higher.
So I decided to
raise and just get it
all in, although I think
calling is not unreasonable,
because your hand sort
of isn't good enough
where you are just really,
really happy to get it all in.
I mean, it's good enough where
I'm going to get it all in,
but I'm not like thrilled
if they go all in,
and I have to call.
So that's one disadvantage
of getting it all in,
but I just think compared to
the advantage of not giving them
a chance to suck out
on me and beat me
in the hand is a
pretty big advantage,
not letting a queen,
king, or ace roll off.
Another advantage of calling is
being able to pick off bluffs.
But I just think in
this spot, I want
to play a strategy where I'm
going to raise to a small size
and put him to the decision,
both with my top pairs
like jacks and also my hands
like seven-nine or whatever.
So I decided to
raise, but I think
calling would have been
fine and [INAUDIBLE]..
The next hand we have ace-king.
All right, so we got like
seven more hands to get to.
I'll go a bit quickly
here at the end,
but I think we'll get
through all the hands.
This hand is fairly easy.
They make it 5,000,
and we have ace-king,
and we just go all in.
There's no point slow
playing essentially,
especially when if
they have jack-10,
they have lots of outs.
So we go all in, and they fold.
So it is a bit curious here,
because they actually only
had 12 big blinds here.
So they could have just
went all in themselves,
but they decided
to raise small, so
that they could fold if someone
behind picks up a monster.
And I guess they were
paid off this time.
But yeah, like for this
hand, like one disadvantage
of their play, suppose
we had king-two suited.
We would have folded
if they went all in,
but now we can call
and see a flop.
But because we had
ace-king, I guess
they profited from not
committing their whole stack.
OK, we have king-jack offsuit.
We make it 6,000, and
this guy goes all in.
I fold here.
I think it's not that close.
I think with king-jack
suited, it's close.
But I'd still fold
with king-jack suited.
I'd probably call with
ace-jack offsuit plus.
I would probably call
with ace-10 suited,
and I'd call with king-queen
suited and probably
king-queen offsuit as well.
In this case-- so in the last
class, I said being suited
is very important
when you're behind.
But when you're
potentially ahead,
just having a slightly better
hand is very important.
So I think in this situation,
I would fold king-jack suited
but call with
king-queen offsuit,
because a decent
part of his range
is hands like king-jack
and king-queen.
Here I have king-queen
and Degenerated-- so
for some reason, I love making
this play with king-queen.
It's actually not
that unfounded.
It's just a good hand to bluff
with that at the same time
sort of protects your range
in the case that he calls,
and also your hand doesn't play
that well if you just call.
Because you're not suited,
so it really is king-queen--
I mean in this
tournament, we've happened
to have been dealt
king-queen a lot
and gotten into situations where
we can reraise-bluff people.
But it really is my favorite
hand to do this with.
It might even be
too predictable,
because I just always have
king-queen whenever I do this.
But we do take it down here.
Ace-jack offsuit.
This guy, so this
Degenerated guy who we just--
at this point, it's probably
late enough in the tournament.
I am paying attention, and I
am aware that I just reraised
this guy three hands earlier.
So they make a big
raise here, do 9,000.
And I call with ace-jack,
which I regret quite a bit.
I think it's just too
weak a hand to play.
And if I'm going to play it, I
think I should just go all in
and try to win the hand preflop.
Even though I'm in
position, I think it's just
going to be hard to play.
Even when I hit
an ace or a jack,
I'm still going to
quite often be behind.
And if I don't hit
an ace or a jack,
I'm pretty much always
just going to have to fold.
And that's basically
what happens.
So I don't know why I just
gave away 9,000 chips there.
OK, so queen-jack suited.
I just go all in from the
small blind, because it's--
so even though we have 15 big
blinds, which is more than 12,
I said last class that
from the small blind,
you're really, really
incentivized to go
all in, because
if you don't then
the other guy has position.
Whereas like from the
button, if you just raise,
the big blind calls,
you have position.
So I go all in.
Queen-jack suited is
more than good enough.
And we get a fold.
And the next hand, OK,
so this is actually
a great illustration.
The very next hand we
get queen-jack off,
and we just raise
from the button.
And it's exactly the reason I
said, because we have position.
So we don't mind if the
pot gets played post-flop.
So the small blind goes all in.
And note that they're
actually fairly short here.
They only have 14 big
blinds to start the hand.
So I would have easily
with queen-jack suited.
Even with queen-jack
off, I'm not certain
that folding is a better
play than calling.
It's just your odds are
basically good enough here,
and their range
will be fairly loose
when I raise from the button.
Because they're going to
think I don't have much when
I raise from the button.
So it's quite
possible calling here
would have been the right play.
It's very close.
I think I would definitely
called with ace-nine offsuit.
I would have definitely
called with king-10 offsuit.
Yeah, it's pretty close.
I decided to fold.
Maybe I also knew that
they were kind of tight.
Normally when I play
but I'm not showing here
is I have like statistics
on every player,
of like overall the hands,
what percent of the time
they raised, what
percent they folded.
So I have a rough
idea while I'm playing
of how tight everyone is, and
maybe I just knew he was tight.
Actually let me see if I
can turn it back on here.
Yeah, let me see.
That might be why.
So OK, so these numbers--
Actually, he's fairly loose.
Actually, I'm not
sure why I folded.
So this 10.7 is his
reraise percentage,
and what this says is
10.7% of the time he could
have reraised, he reraised.
It's only over a sample
of 187 hands, but it's--
Yeah, I think it's definitely
looser than average.
Although it's a bit
biased, because we're
playing at a five-handed table.
Nonetheless, it's close.
I think calling probably
would've been OK, but I folded.
Let me turn this off.
It's quite annoying.
So this is near the
final table now.
This is, I think, the
second final table.
There's maybe like
11 or 12 left,
and I'm just going to
show you the final hands
before the final table.
This hand is a no-brainer.
We go all in, and fortunately,
we hold against pocket twos.
OK, so the very last hand,
also fairly no-brainer.
This guy goes on.
So yeah, poker is easy if you
just get dealt pocket jacks,
pocket aces all the time.
So we win this one.
OK so, this is the last
hand before the final table.
So in a future class, not
the Friday class, because
Jennifer Shahade is speaking.
But in a future class I'll
go through the final table,
and I'll maybe also go through
all the hands, not just
the hands where I
got in a big pot.
So let me just quickly
go back to the slides.
Right, so I really only
talked about two concepts
in this class.
It was this drawy
versus dry boards.
So try to remember that
while you guys are playing,
changing your bet
sizing depending
on the board pressure.
And also this pre-flop
reraising strategy,
even though I didn't give
you a conclusion here
on what you reraise with.
I should give you some rough
guidelines and the advantages
and disadvantages of each play.
Yeah, OK, cool, so that's it.
Come on Friday's class.
It should be really exciting.
Jennifer Shahade, she'll
probably talk a bit about chess
as well, but I'll
convince her not
to talk too much about chess
when it's a poker class.
But thanks, guys.
