Professor Steven Smith:
O.K., today,
what a joy.
What a joy!
We start Hobbes.
And he is one of the great
treats.
Thomas Hobbes was the author of
the first and,
I believe, undoubtedly the
greatest, work of political
theory written in the English
language.
He was a master of English
style and prose,
and his work ranks among the
very greatest in this or any
other language.
Leviathan is to prose
what Milton's Paradise
Lost is to epic poetry.
Think about that.
Hobbes was in many ways a
perfect foil for Machiavelli.
He played the part of Doctor
Watson to Machiavelli's Sherlock
Holmes.
Hobbes, in other words,
carried out what Machiavelli
had helped him make possible.
Machiavelli,
you remember,
claimed to have discovered a
new continent,
new modes and orders.
It was Hobbes who helped to
make this new continent
habitable.
Machiavelli,
you might say,
cleared the brush.
He was the Lewis and Clarke or
the Columbus.
Hobbes built the houses and
institutions.
Hobbes provided us with the
definitive language in which
even today we continue to speak
about the modern state.
However, and this is what I
want to emphasize throughout our
reading of Hobbes,
he has always been something of
a paradox to his readers.
On the one hand,
you will find Hobbes the most
articulate defender of political
absolutism.
Hobbes in the Hobbesian
doctrine of sovereignty,
or the Hobbesian sovereign,
to have a complete monopoly of
power within his given
territory.
In fact, the famous
frontispiece of the book,
which is reproduced in your
edition, although it is not
altogether very clear.
It is not a very good
reproduction,
the famous frontispiece to the
original 1651 edition of
Leviathan depicts the
Leviathan,
depicts the state,
the sovereign,
holding a sword in one hand and
the scepter in the other,
and the various institutions of
the civilian and churchly
ecclesiastical authority on each
side.
The sovereign holds total power
over all the institutions of
civilian and ecclesiastical
life, holding sway over a kind
of peaceable kingdom.
Add to this,
to the doctrine of indivisible
sovereign power,
Hobbes' insistence that the
sovereign exercise complete
control over the churches,
over the university curricula,
and over what books and
opinions can be read and taught.
He seems to be the perfect
model of absolutism and of
absolute government.
You have to consider also the
following.
Hobbes insists on the
fundamental equality of human
beings, who he says are endowed
with certain natural and
inalienable rights.
He maintains the state is a
product of a covenant or a
compact, a contract of a sort,
between individuals,
and that the sovereign owes his
authority to the will or the
consent of those he governs,
and finally that the sovereign
is authorized only to protect
the interests of the governed by
maintaining civil peace and
security.
From this point of view,
it would seem that Hobbes helps
to establish the language of
what we might think of as the
liberal opposition to
absolutism.
And this paradox was noted even
in Hobbes' own time.
Was he a defender of royalism
and the power of the king,
or was he a defender or an
opponent of royalism?
I mean, in many ways,
to be sure, Hobbes was a
product of his time,
and what else could he be?
But Hobbes lived at a time when
the modern system of European
states, even as we understand
them today, was just beginning
to emerge.
Three years before the
publication of Leviathan,
1651, the signing of the Treaty
of Westphalia,
famous peace treaty,
brought an end to more than a
century of religious war that
had been ignited by the
Protestant Reformation.
The Treaty of Westphalia
officially put an end to the 30
Years War, but more than that it
ratified two decisive features
that would be given powerful
expression by Hobbes.
First, the Treaty declared that
the individual sovereign state
would henceforth become the
highest level of authority;
you might say,
putting an end once and for all
to the universalist claims of
the Holy Roman Empire.
Each state was to be sovereign
and to have its own authority.
And secondly,
that the head of each state
would have the right to
determine the religion of the
state,
again thus putting an end to
the claims of a single
universalist church.
This is what the Treaty of
Westphalia put into practice
and, among other things,
what Hobbes attempted to
express in theory in his book:
the autonomy and authority of
the sovereign and the
sovereign's power to establish
what religious doctrine or what,
even more broadly,
what opinions are to be taught
and held within a community,
within a state.
Who was Hobbes?
Let me say a word about him.
Hobbes was born in 1588,
the year that the English naval
forces drove back the invasion
of the famous Spanish Armada.
He grew up in the waning years,
the last years,
of the Elizabethan era,
and he was a boy when
Shakespeare's most famous plays
were first performed.
Hobbes, like many of you,
was a gifted student,
and he went to college.
His father, who was a local
pastor from the southwest of
England, sent him to Oxford,
although he went at the age of
14.
And after he graduated,
he entered the service of an
aristocratic family,
the Cavandish family,
where he became a private tutor
to their son.
His first book was a
translation of Thucydides'
History of the Peloponnesian
War, which he completed in
1629;
Thucydides, the great historian
of the Peloponnesian War,
who we mentioned before when we
talked about Plato.
Hobbes was a gifted classical
scholar.
He spent a considerable amount
of time on the European
continent with his young tutee,
Mr.
Cavandish.
And while he spent time in
Europe, he met Galileo and Rene
Descartes.
It was during the 1640s,
the period that initiated the
great civil wars in England,
and the execution of the king,
Charles I, that Hobbes left
England to live in France,
while the fighting went on.
He left England with many of
the royal families,
the aristocratic families,
who were threatened by the
republican armies organized by
Cromwell and that had executed
the King.
In fact, the three justices,
the three judges,
who were in charge of the
judicial trial of Charles I,
King Charles,
the one who lost his head,
those three judges later found
a home where?
In New Haven.
They came to New Haven,
the three judges,
Judge Whaley,
Goff, and Dixwell.
Does that sound familiar?
Yes.
New Haven was in part started
by, founded by,
members of the,
you might say,
the republican opposition to
royalty and to the English king.
And any way,
Hobbes, however,
was deeply distressed by the
outbreak of war,
and he spent a great deal of
time reflecting on the causes of
war and political disorder.
His first treatise,
a book called De Cive,
or De Cive,
depending on how you pronounce
it,
On the Citizen,
was published in 1642,
and it was a kind of draft
version of Leviathan that
was published almost a decade
later,
again in 1651.
Hobbes returned to England the
same year of the book's
publication, and spent most of
the rest of his long life,
Leviathan was written
well into his 60s.
He was 63 when it was published.
He spent the rest of his long
life working on scientific and
political problems.
He wrote a history of the
English Civil Wars,
called Behemoth,
which remains a classic of the
analysis of the causes of social
conflict.
And as if this were not enough,
near the very end of his life,
he returned to his classical
studies translating all of
Homer's Iliad and
Odyssey.
He died in 1679 at the age of
91.
From the various portraits and
descriptions of Hobbes,
we can tell he was a man of
considerable charm,
and I wish that in the book we
had had his picture,
a reproduction of his portrait,
on it.
But I just want to read one
brief passage from his
biographer, a man named John
Aubrey, who knew him.
It was written during Hobbes'
lifetime.
Aubrey wrote about Hobbes:
"He had a good eye and that of
hazel color, which was full of
life and spirit,
even to the last.
When he was earnest in
discourse, these shone,
as it were, a bright- as if a
bright live coal within it.
He had two kinds of looks.
When he laughed,
was witty, in a merry humor,
one could scarce sees his eyes,
and by and by,
when he was serious and
positive, he opened his eyes
round.
He was six foot high and
something better."
So that was very tall in the
seventeenth century.
"He was six foot high and very
better.
He had read much,
if one considers his long life,
but his contemplation was much
more than his reading.
He was want to say that if he
had read as much as other men,
he should have known no more
than other men."
So his point was he had read a
lot, but what was most important
was his thinking.
If he had read as much,
he would know as little.
Gives you a little sense of
Hobbes' spirit,
his humor, the wry wit that
becomes apparent on almost every
page of this book,
but you have to be a careful
reader.
Hobbes was deeply
controversial,
as you might suspect,
during his lifetime.
Leviathan was excoriated
by almost every reader of the
text.
To the churchmen,
he was a godless atheist.
To the republicans,
he was tainted with monarchy,
or monarchism.
And to the monarchists,
he was a dangerous skeptic and
free thinker.
Hobbes, again,
along with Machiavelli,
was one of the great architects
of the modern state.
And to some degree,
he even seems to speak,
he seems even more
characteristically modern than
Machiavelli.
I mean, consider just some of
the following.
Machiavelli speaks of the
prince, while Hobbes speaks of
the sovereign,
that is a kind of impersonal or
in Hobbes' language,
artificial power created out of
a contract.
Hobbes' method seems scientific.
It seems formal and analytical
in contrast to Machiavelli's
combination of historical
commentary and reflection drawn
from personal experience.
While Hobbes,
excuse me, while Machiavelli
often spoke of the sublime
cruelty of men like Scipio and
Hannibal,
Hobbes speaks the more
pedestrian language,
the language of power-politics,
where the goal is not glory and
honor, but self-preservation.
And Machiavelli's emphasis upon
arms is considerably attenuated
by Hobbes' emphasis on laws.
Hobbes, in other words,
tried to render acceptable,
tried to render palatable,
what Machiavelli had done by
providing a more precise and
more legal and institutional
framework for the modern state.
So let's think a little bit
about what it was that Hobbes
was attempting to accomplish.
Hobbes, like Machiavelli,
was an innovator,
and he was self-consciously
aware of his innovations.
And like Machiavelli,
who said in the fifteenth
chapter of The Prince
that he would be the first to
examine the effectual truth of
things,
as opposed to the imaginings of
them, Hobbes wrote that civil
science, that is what he called
political science,
civil science,
was no older than my book De
Cive.
Modern political science,
he said, began with this book
of 1642.
What did he think of as his
novelty?
What was new?
What was revolutionary about,
or innovative,
about Hobbes' political
science?
Hobbes clearly saw himself,
in many respects,
as founding a political science
modeled along that of the early
founders of the scientific
revolution.
Galileo, I have already
indicated that Hobbes had met,
William Harvey,
Rene Descartes;
a handful of others who were
part of what we think of as the
modern scientific
revolutionaries.
And like these other
revolutionaries who had
overthrown, you might say,
the Aristotelian paradigm in
natural science,
Hobbes set out to undermine the
authority of Aristotle in civil
science, in political and moral
science.
Hobbes set himself up as the
great anti-Aristotle,
the great opposition to
Aristotle.
Consider just the following
passage from Leviathan
with one of my favorite titles
from the book,
a chapter called "Of Darkness
from Vain Philosophy and
Fabulous Traditions."
In that chapter,
chapter 46, Hobbes writes:
"There is nothing so absurd
that the old philosophers have
not some of them maintained.
And I believe that scarce
anything could be more absurdly
said in natural philosophy than
that which is now called
Aristotle's Metaphysics,
nor more repugnant to
government than much that he had
said in his Politics,
nor more ignorantly than a
great part of his
Ethics."
So there, you see Hobbes laying
down a challenge.
What was it that he claimed to
find so absurd,
repugnant and ignorant in
Aristotle?
Why did he--what did he--what
was he trying to un-throne,
dethrone in Aristotle?
Hobbes is typically concerned
with the foundations of this new
science, getting the building
blocks right from the beginning.
The opening chapters of
Leviathan,
which I have only assigned a
few, but the opening chapters
present a kind of political
physics where human beings are
reduced to body and the body is
further reduced to so much
matter and motion.
Human beings can be reduced to
their movable parts much like a
machine.
"What is life?" he asks,
rhetorically in the
introduction.
"What is life but a motion of
the limbs?
What is the heart but a spring,
or reason but a means of
calculating pleasures and
pains."
He sets out to give a
deliberately and thoroughly
materialistic and
non-teleological physics of
human nature.
In fact, a French disciple of
Hobbes in the next century,
a man named La Mettrie,
wrote a treatise very much
following in the lines of Hobbes
called L'Homme Machine,
or literally,
Man a Machine.
This is the way Hobbes' new
science of politics appears to
begin, and that new beginning is
intended to offer in many ways a
comprehensive alternative to
Aristotle's physics,
or Aristotle's politics.
Aristotle, remember,
argues that all action is
goal-directed,
is goal-oriented.
All actions aim at preservation
or change, at making something
better or preventing it from
becoming worse.
Hobbes believed,
on the other hand,
that the overriding human fact,
the overriding motivation of
human behavior,
is largely negative,
not the desire to do good,
but the desire to avoid some
evil.
Aristotle, for Hobbes,
had simply seen the world
through the wrong end of the
telescope.
For Aristotle,
human beings have a goal or a
telos,
which is to live a life in
community with others for the
sake of human flourishing.
But for Hobbes,
we enter into society not in
order to fulfill or perfect our
rational nature,
but rather to avoid the
greatest evil,
namely death or fear of death,
at the hands of others.
Politics, for him,
is less a matter of prudential
decisions of better and worse,
than it is, you might say,
an existential decision of
choosing life or death.
For Hobbes, in many ways,
as for Machiavelli,
it is the extreme situation of
life and death,
of chaos and war,
that come to serve as the norm
for politics and political
decision-making,
fundamental alternative or
challenge to Aristotle.
And furthermore,
Hobbes not only criticized,
you might say,
the foundations,
the motivational and
psychological foundations,
of Aristotle's theory of
politics and human nature,
he blamed the influence of
Aristotle for much of the civil
conflict of his age.
Aristotle, who was increasingly
being embraced by civic
republicans in England of his
time had been brought up,
according to Hobbes,
on Aristotle's teaching that
man is by nature a political
animal.
This was, again,
the thesis of the classical
republicans according to which
we are only fully human,
or we only become fully human,
when we are engaged in
political life,
in ruling ourselves by laws of
our own making.
This was a doctrine that Hobbes
attributes to many of the
teaching, much of the teaching
at the universities of his age.
And it is precisely this desire
to be self-governing,
you might say to rule directly,
to have a direct part in
political rule,
that Hobbes saw as one of the
great root causes of civil war.
And his answer to Aristotle and
to the classical republicans of
his age, was his famous doctrine
of what we might call "indirect
government,"
or what perhaps would be more
familiar to us by the term
"representative government."
The sovereign is not,
for Hobbes, the people or some
faction of the people ruling
directly in their collective
capacity.
The sovereign is,
for Hobbes, the artificially
reconstructed will of the people
in the person of their
representative.
The sovereign representative
acts, you might say,
like a filter for the wills and
passions of the people.
The sovereign is not the direct
expression of my will or your
will, but rather an abstraction
from my natural desire to rule
myself.
In other words,
instead of seeking to
participate directly in
political rule,
Hobbes wants us to abstain from
politics by agreeing to be ruled
by this artificial man,
as he calls it,
this artificial person or
representative that he gives the
name "the sovereign."
"For by art",
he says in the introduction,
"For by art is created that
great Leviathan called a
commonwealth or a state,
which is but an artificial man,
though of greater stature and
strength than the natural for
whose protection and defense it
was intended."
The sovereign,
he says, or Leviathan,
this great artificial man,
the sovereign is something more
like what we would call today an
office,
rather than a person,
as when we speak of the
executive as an office.
And it is simply the person who
inhabits the office,
although that might be somewhat
questionable in some of our
recent executive decisions.
But for Hobbes,
Hobbes creates this office of a
political called the sovereign.
Now, his language in that
sentence that I just read from
the introduction,
"For by art",
again, "is created that great
Leviathan called a commonwealth
or a state."
When Hobbes uses the term "art"
there, "For by art is created,"
that term is deeply revealing of
his purpose.
Again, for Aristotle,
by contrast,
art presupposes nature.
Or in other words,
nature precedes art.
Nature supplies the standards,
the materials,
the models, for all the later
arts,
the city being by nature,
man by nature,
nature provides the standard.
Nature precedes art and human
artifice or human making.
But for Hobbes,
think of this by contrast,
art does not so much imitate
nature,
rather art can create a new
kind of nature,
an artificial nature,
an artificial person,
as it were.
Through art,
again, is created the great
Leviathan.
Through art properly understood
and by "art," of course,
I mean something like human
making,
human ingenuity,
human artfulness,
through art we can begin not
just to imitate,
but we can transform nature,
make it into something of our
own choosing.
"Art" here is not to be
understood also as the
antithesis of science,
as when we speak of the arts
and the sciences.
Rather, science is the highest
form of art.
Science is the highest kind of
human making.
Science, or what Hobbes simply
calls by the name "reason," is
simply the fullest expression of
human artfulness.
"Reason," he says in chapter 5,
"reason is not a sense and
memory born with us,
reason is not born with us,
nor gotten by experience only,"
he says, "but is attained by
industry,
first in the act imposing of
names and secondly,
by getting a good and orderly
method."
Think of those terms.
"Reason," and again,
he uses this synonymously with
other terms, like science or
art, is not simply born with us.
It is not simply a genetic
endowment, nor is it simply the
product of experience,
which Hobbes calls by the name
"prudence."
But rather reason,
he says, is attained by
industry, by work,
and it is developed first,
he says, by the imposing of
names on things,
the correct names on things,
and second by getting a good
and orderly method of study.
Reason consists in the
imposition of a method for the
conquest of nature.
By science, Hobbes tells us,
he means the knowledge of
consequences,
and especially,
he goes on to say,
"when we see how anything comes
about, upon what causes and by
what manner,
when like causes come into our
power, we can see how to make it
produce like effect."
We can see how to make it
produce like effects.
Reason, science,
art is the capacity to
transform nature by making it,
imposing on it,
a method that will produce like
effects after similar
consequences.
There is, in other words,
a kind of a radically
transformative view of reason
and knowledge and science,
political science,
civil science,
running throughout Hobbes'
work.
Reason is not about simple
observation, but rather,
it is about making,
production,
or as he says,
"making like consequences
produce the desired effects."
We can have a science of
politics, Hobbes believes.
We can have a civil science,
because politics is a matter of
human making,
of human doing,
of human goings on.
We can know the political world.
We can create a science of
politics because we make it.
It is something constructed by
us.
Hobbes' goal here,
as it were, is to liberate
knowledge, to liberate science
from subservience or dependence
upon nature or by chance,
by fortuna,
by turning science into a tool
for remaking nature to fit our
needs,
to impose our needs or satisfy
our needs through our science.
Art, and especially the
political art,
is a matter of reordering
nature, even human nature,
first according to Hobbes,
by resolving it into its most
elementary units,
and then by reconstructing it
so that it will produce the
desired results,
much like a physicist in a
laboratory might.
This is Hobbes' answer to
Machiavelli's famous call in
chapter 25 to master
fortuna,
to master chance or luck,
fortune.
But you might say,
Hobbes goes further than
Machiavelli.
Machiavelli said in that famous
chapter 25, that the prince,
if he is lucky,
will master fortuna
about half the time,
only about 50% of the time.
The rest of human action,
the rest of statecraft,
will be really left to chance,
luck, contingency,
circumstances.
Hobbes believes that armed with
the proper method,
with the proper art,
or scientific doctrine,
that we might eventually become
the masters and possessors of
nature.
And I use that term "masters
and possessors of nature," a
term not of Hobbes' making,
but of Descartes from the sixth
part of the Discourse on
Method, because I think it
perfectly expresses Hobbes'
aspirations,
not only to create a science of
politics, but to create a kind
of immortal commonwealth,
which is based on science and
therefore based on the proper
civil science,
and therefore will be
impervious to fluctuation,
decay, and war and conflict,
which all other previous
societies have experienced.
You can begin to see,
in other words,
in Hobbes' brief introduction
to his book,
as well as the opening
chapters, you can really see the
immensely transformative and
really revolutionary spirit
underlying this amazing,
amazing book.
So where do we go from here?
We turn from methodology and
science to politics.
What is Hobbes' great question?
What was important when
reading, starting out with a new
book, asking yourself,
what question is the author
trying to answer?
What is the question?
And it is not always easy to
answer, because sometimes they
do not always make their deepest
or most fundamental questions
altogether clear.
In the case of
Leviathan,
I would suggest to you,
Hobbes' central question is,
what makes authority possible?
What is the source of authority?
And you might say,
what renders it legitimate?
Maybe the question is,
what makes legitimate authority
possible?
This is still a huge question
for us when we think about
nation building and building new
states, how to create a
legitimate authority.
Obviously, there is a
tremendous issue with this in
Iraq today.
People there and here struggle
with what would constitute a
legitimate authority.
Perhaps we should airlift
copies of Leviathan to
them, because that is the issue
that Hobbes is fundamentally
concerned with.
His question goes further.
How can individuals who are
biologically autonomous,
who judge and see matters very
differently from one another,
who can never be sure whether
they trust one another,
how can such individuals accept
a common authority?
And, again, that is not just
what constitutes authority,
but what makes authority
legitimate.
That remains not only the
fundamental question for Hobbes,
but for the entire,
at least for the entire social
contract tradition that he
helped to establish.
You might say,
of course the question,
what renders authority
legitimate, is only possible,
or is only raised when
authority is in question.
That is to say,
when the rules governing
authority have broken down in
times of crisis,
and that was certainly true in
Hobbes' time,
a time of civil war and crisis.
What renders authority
legitimate or respectable?
And to answer that question,
Hobbes tells a story.
He tells a story about
something he calls "the state of
nature," a term he did not
invent,
but with which his name will
always and forever be
associated, the idea of the
state of nature.
"The state of nature" is not a
gift of grace or a state of
grace from which we have fallen,
as in the biblical account of
Eden, nor is the state of nature
a political condition,
as maintained in some sense by
Aristotle, when he says the
polis is by nature.
The state of nature for Hobbes
is a condition of conflict and
war.
And by a "state of nature" he
means, or by a state of war,
he means a condition where
there is no recognized authority
in his language to keep us in
awe,
no authority to awe us.
Such a condition,
a state of war,
may mean a condition of open
warfare, but not necessarily.
It can signify battle,
but Hobbes says it can also
signify the will to contend,
simply the desire or the will
to engage in conflict,
renders something like a state
of nature.
A state of war can include,
in other words,
what we might call a "cold
war,"
two hostile sides looking at
each other across a barrier of
some type, not clear or not
certain what the other will do.
So the state of nature is not
necessarily a condition of
actual fighting,
but what he calls a "known
disposition to fight."
If you are known or believed to
be willing to fight,
you are in a state of war.
It is a condition for Hobbes of
maximum insecurity where in his
famous formula "life is
solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish,
and short."
Perhaps he should have said
fortunately short.
This is the natural condition,
the state of nature,
the state of war that Hobbes
attributes to,
again, the fundamental fact of
human nature.
Now, his claim that the state
of nature is the condition that
we are naturally--the state of
war,
rather, is a condition that we
are naturally in,
is to say, among other things,
that nature does not unite us
in peace, in harmony,
in friendship,
or in solidarity.
If nature is a norm,
it does not,
again, mandate or incline us to
peace, friendship and solidarity
with others.
Only human art or science or
art, human contrivance,
can bring about peace.
Conflict and war are primary.
Peace is derivative.
In other words,
for Hobbes, authority and
relations of authority do not
arise naturally among us,
but are rather,
again, like civil science
itself, the product of
contrivance or art.
So the question for us remains,
which deeply challenged readers
in Hobbes' own time,
what makes Hobbes' story,
as I am calling it,
his story about the state of
nature being a condition of war,
what makes it plausible?
What makes it believable as an
account of, again,
the condition we are naturally
in?
Why should we believe Hobbes'
story and not some other story?
I just want to say a word about
that before closing.
From one point of view,
reading Hobbes,
his account of the state of
nature seems to derive from his
physics of motion and rest,
in the opening chapters of
Leviathan.
He begins the work,
you remember,
with an account of human
nature, account of human
psychology, as a product of
sense and experience.
We are bodies in motion,
and who cannot help but obey
the law or the physics of
attraction and repulsion.
We are bodies in constant
motion.
He seems, in other words,
to have a kind of materialistic
psychology in which human
behavior exhibits the same,
as it were, mechanical
tendencies as billiard balls
that can be understood as
obeying,
again, geometric or causal
processes of cause and effect.
Right?
The state of nature is not seen
by him as an actual historical
condition in some ways,
although he occasionally will
refer to what we might think of
as anthropological evidence to
support his views on the state
of nature.
But the state of nature,
for him, is rather a kind of
thought experiment after the
manner of experimental science.
It is a kind of thought
experiment.
It consists of taking human
beings who are members of
families, of estates,
of kingdoms,
and so on, dissolving these
social relations into their
fundamental units,
namely the abstract
individuals,
and then imagining,
again, in the manner of a
chemist or a physicist,
how these basic units would
hypothetically interact with one
another,
again almost like the
properties of chemical
substances in some ways.
How would we behave in this
kind of thought experiment?
That would be one way of
reading that Hobbes seems to,
wants us to think about the
state of nature as akin to a
scientific experiment.
Hobbes is the,
again, the great founder of
what we might call,
among others,
is the experimental method in
social and political science.
And there is a reason,
perhaps a reason for this,
too.
And I will end just on this
note.
When Hobbes was a young man,
he worked as a private
secretary for a short time,
a private secretary to another
very famous Englishman by the
name of Francis Bacon,
the great founder of what we
think of as the experimental
method, the method of trial and
error,
of experience and experiment,
and arguably Hobbes was
influenced in many ways by
Bacon's own philosophy of
experience and experiment.
And Hobbes took Bacon's method
in some ways applying it to
politics, tried to imagine,
again, the natural condition of
human beings,
and what we are by nature,
by a process of abstraction,
and abstracting all of the
relations and properties that we
have acquired over history,
through custom,
through experience,
stripping those away like the
layers of an onion,
and putting us almost,
as it were, in an experimental
test tube or under a microscope,
seeing how we would under those
conditions react and behave with
one another.
I will leave it at that,
although I will start next week
by showing how that view of
Hobbes is only at best partially
correct.
So anyway, have a wonderful
weekend with your parents here,
and I will see you next week.
 
