Chrystia Freeland: Thank you.
Thank you very much, Nikesh.
And as Nikesh was talking, I
realized what the genius of
these Zeitgeist conferences is,
which is the genius of Google.
He pointed out that people
don't come to these conferences
to hear Google people talking;
they invite lots of others.
So it's user-generated content.
They get all of us to come
here and talk to one another.
Anyway, like you, I attend
a lot of conferences, and
I have to say, this is
my very favorite one.
I'm not just flattering
Nikesh and his great team.
They always manage to assemble
the really smartest, most
provocative people from a huge
number of different fields.
And I was particularly
delighted to be asked to
moderate this opening session,
because we're going to hear
from four -- five of the most
interesting, most influential
-- but I would say also -- most
iconoclastic thinkers
and actors around.
We're going to start with two
economists, with Jim Wolfensohn
and Nouriel Roubini.
They're each going to make
presentations and then
we'll have a panel
discussion with them.
Then to show how moderating is
really done, we're going to
have Tom Brokaw talk
to Ted Turner.
As a journalist, I'm really
thrilled and honored that we
have really one of the most
important media pioneers of
our time here speaking.
And they're going to be joined
then by Mikkel Vestergaard, a
really innovative and important
social entrepreneur.
So we're going to start
with Jim Wolfensohn.
Please join us.
Jim Wolfensohn, as you all
know, is a legendary former
head of the World Bank.
He now is the chairman of
Wolfensohn & Company, an
investment and advisory firm.
He's also about to publish a
book, so in October please
go buy "A Global Life."
I'm particularly glad
he's here because of
his global perspective.
He's an Australian originally,
and now is on the advisory
board of CIC, China's sovereign
wealth fund, so he brings that
really global perspective
to the issues of today.
And I just wanted to add,
in case anyone is feeling
particularly proud of
themselves for climbing
camelback, Jim is an
Olympic athlete as well.
He was on the Australian
fencing team.
And just to add to his sort
of intimidating renaissance
qualifications, he is also a
cellist and learned how to play
the cello in his 40s and went
on to perform in Carnegie Hall.
So maybe tonight, Nikesh, for
free entertainment you can get
a cello out and we'll
see how good Jim is.
[Laughter]
He's going to give us a
tour de raison of the
world economy now.
Please, Jim.
[Applause]
James D. Wolfensohn: Well,
I think with that introduction
I shouldn't speak at all because
it's downhill from here.
[Laughter]
But I have been asked to share
the panel here with Nouriel,
and that in itself is daunting
when you're asked to speak
about the economy, because I've
spent the last couple of days
Googling Nouriel and everything
he's said so that I could be
smarter than he is, and by
agreement, I'm going to stay
very lightly on the current
economy and simply say that
today is almost two years from
the date of the Lehman
Brothers collapse.
It just seems like a helluva
lot longer for those of us
that have been living through
this environment, which
I guess all of you have.
And it's only 18 months since
we finished the significant
downturn, at 6 or 7%
per quarter, that
followed that event.
I need hardly remind you that
before that, we had Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, that we had
Bear Stearns and we had Merrill
Lynch going into Bank of
America, and so we've been
through a sort of revolution in
terms of the financial
industry, and a period that is
certainly unprecedented in my
working lifetime and which has
shaken very much the way in
which I, at least, have looked
at the global economy and at
the financial markets.
I'm sure Nouriel will comment
on the last quarter and the
disappointing results, and as
you know, he is very
significantly balanced or
slightly pessimistic, perhaps,
in his approach to where we're
going, but it's valid because
we're in a time when
unemployment -- primary
unemployment in our
country is at 9.6%.
When you add the people that
are involuntarily unemployed
for part-time work, you're
around 16, 17% unemployment.
And these are numbers that we
really have not thought of in
my working lifetime until
recently, and they have a
profound effect on the way in
which we judge our economy
and in which we judge the
world in which we live.
Inflation, as I need hardly
tell you, is not a real issue
at the moment, but our budget
is in poor shape
in our country.
I need hardly go into
those figures with you.
And we're on the way to 2020,
2030, of having our country
with a hundred percent debt to
GDP, which is not a trivial
moment and raises questions
about where do we
go from there.
But let me move away from that
and the current analysis and
just think a little bit about
where we're going in the future
and what is it that we, in this
forum, and indeed outside this
forum, need to be thinking
about as the global frame
in which we're working.
As I worked in my early career
up to the year 2000, it
was all fairly simple.
There were a bunch of rich
countries that had 75 to
80% of the global GDP.
There was about a billion
people in a planet in 2000 of
6 billion, and there were
5 billion other people who
had 20% of the global GDP.
And if you were especially
farsighted and interested, you
started to think about what
might happen to those people,
what happened -- well, what
were the issues of poverty,
what were the issues of social
justice, and if you were crazy,
you then went to work for
the World Bank to see if you
could do something about it.
And it was not an easy
challenge, but it was a
challenge which was there
before us, until the year
2000, in fairly static form.
If you were young and vigorous
and you were interested in
social justice, you tried to
get a job working part-time
or some time in the
developing world.
And as I discovered coming from
Australia, it was incredibly
difficult as a young Australian
to get a job that would take
you into this activity.
And so I took another
alternative and gave up the law
and went to the Harvard
Business School, which couldn't
be more far from these issues.
Except that today, Harvard and
many other universities are
starting to look at this
question of what is the world
that's out there that we
haven't spent a lot of time on.
In the first 10 years of this
decade, we have seen that 75 to
80% of global GDP in the rich
countries moving down by 10%,
and we've seen an extraordinary
change that I'm sure all in
this room would understand, but
far too many do not understand
when they do the analysis,
which is a move eastward again
to a growth of global
economic activity.
Notably in China and India.
In the year 1500, and in
1815, China and India were
50% of the global GDP.
A lot smaller than today.
And after World War II,
China and India were
1 1/2% of the global GDP.
Basket cases in terms of the
impact and in terms of their
apparent economic outlook.
And we in the west were
dominant in terms of first
manufacturing, then in the
service sector, and certainly
also in the research and
the high-tech field.
A lot changed in this last two
years to draw our attention to
the fact that we couldn't relax
in terms of that situation.
The first thing, of course,
that happened is that we
had $50 trillion in sort
of global write-downs.
We had a 12% reduction
in global trade.
Commodity prices went
through the floor.
Capital flows from the rich to
the poor countries went from
1.3 billion a year down
to 350 million a year.
These are not trivial
adjustments.
These are fundamental
changes in the way in
which our world operates.
But perhaps more important than
that is the fact that the
dominance of the west, the
dominance of people in this
room who, no doubt, are still
dominant, the dominance in
manufacturing and the service
industries and high-tech
are shifting.
It's shifted very
meaningfully to Asia.
And you need only to look at
some of the statistics to
see just what is happening.
China and India have
sequentially taken over
leadership in a substantial
part of these three areas.
And as we look at the way in
which the future is holding
itself, as we look at education
and as we look at research, in
our country and in the G20,
research is dropping in terms
of a percentage of GDP, and if
you look at the academic
statistics, it's really
quite astonishing.
There are some 350,000 Indians
and 350,000 Chinese studying
abroad each year at
university level.
About 100,000, according to the
latest statistics, each for
China and India, at
our universities.
And if any of you attend
graduations, you will see when
you look at the doctoral degree
candidates and the degree
people in engineering and for
most of the scientific areas,
it looks significantly
like Asia.
And that is true with the
various universities that I've
attended their ceremonies.
And when you talk to the
professors about the students
that are going there,
significantly -- and without
great statistics, significantly
they will tell you that the
movement towards Asia is both
real and significant.
And indeed, if you just happen
to go to the co-op of any one
of these universities and you
walk through to see, you want
to buy a T-shirt, you'll see
inside these co-ops the
extent to which Asia
is projecting itself.
And we're falling behind
also in terms of growth.
If the world growth is 4% this
year -- and I'm sure Nouriel
will comment on this -- the
advanced economies are
something less than 2% in
terms of annual growth.
China and India, with China
in the lead, of course, are
virtually double digits
in terms of growth.
And these are not just
numbers to throw around.
These are material advances
in terms of the pace
of economic activity.
And while I don't put too much
strength in terms of World
Bank's statistics since I left,
I have got the new
statistics --
[Laughter]
-- I do have the new
statistics, and they are really
quite remarkable as you project
out shares of global income.
Just let me give
you a few numbers.
The G7 in 2010, 52%
of global income.
2025, 41.7.
2050, 25%.
Drop down to China and India.
2010, 11.2%.
By the way, substantially
up from years past.
2025, 24.8.
2050, 47.5.
With a 60% expectation of
share of global growth
in Asia by 2050.
Now, let's assume I'm off by
10% or 20% or 25%, or that I'm
off by 5 years or 10 years.
The truth is that this change
is monumental in terms of the
way in which we look at our
planet, and very, very sadly
we're doing very
little about it.
I mentioned the 350,000
students coming from China and
India -- each country -- 40 or
50,000 in my country of origin
of Australia, amazingly,
100,000 plus in this country.
We have 13,000 students, as of
two years ago, studying in
China and 3,100 in India.
And if you look at the
statistics of where our kids
are studying, it's still going
back to Europe, with some in
Latin America, and more
recently some interest
in the Middle East.
But in terms of projection,
we're missing out.
In terms of the breakdown of
students from Asia, notably
from China 35% in engineering
or in engineering-related
activities.
In the United States, 5%.
Now, I don't guarantee
all these numbers.
They happen to be the ones
that I got from the bank.
But directionally, you
have to draw a message.
The message is that there
is a huge move to Asia.
In a meeting like this where we
have people from many countries
and a significant U.S.
presence, you have to be
encouraged by what is happening
here and by the resumes of the
people here and by the
companies that are
represented here.
But relative, in terms of
global growth and in terms of
global economic activity, we
still have the Googles and we
still have some other examples,
but the challenge is
there and is very real.
And so the point that I want to
leave Nouriel with, as I'm sure
he will also cover -- perhaps
more adequately than I these
areas -- is that we're in
the midst of a really major
change of moving eastward.
It's a change that my
generation didn't anticipate
and sadly didn't do
a helluva lot about.
But it is reality and for
anyone who visits China or
India today, or Asia in
general, this reality
is apparent.
Certainly I believe that at
this forum, where many ideas
will emerge, we would do well
to recognize that we're not
alone in thinking about the
future and at least at this
moment, Asia has to be having a
momentum that we sorely lack.
Thank you very much.
[Applause]
CHRYSTIA FREELAND: Okay.
Thank you very much, Jim.
You, like me, may have been a
bit worried when you saw this
session was titled
"Opportunity" thinking it was
going to be a little bit feel
good, Pollyanna-ish.
So I think Jim has set us
off on a very sober note.
He's also shown what a
diplomate he is by describing
Nouriel Roubini, our
next speaker's stance as
"slightly pessimistic."
[laughter]
Anyone who is familiar with
economic thinking right now
probably knows that Nouriel
has, I think, earned the
sensationalist journalistic
nickname that he hates of
"Dr. Doom."
But I hope he won't mind
my repeating it, because
I think it's a name he
should wear with pride.
He's one of the very few
economists who was actually
right about the crisis, who
called it in advance
and saw it coming.
While you are waiting for
October and the release Jim's
book "A Global Life," you can
keep yourself busy reading
Nouriel's best seller "Crisis
Economics," which talks about
thinking that led up to his
prediction of the crisis.
The last time I heard
Nouriel speak, he was
still pretty gloomy.
So we'll hear now
what he has to say.
And, just as a final sort of
tantalizing observation about
him before we hear his remarks
that may lead us to feel kind
of grim, I wanted to reveal to
you another embarrassing fact
about Nouriel, which is I first
heard of him when I was an
undergraduate in college
because he was the economics
tutor of one of my
college roommates.
And I'm afraid she had a huge
crush on him due to his
charismatic way of talking
about the world economy.
So there you go.
She anticipated one of the
great stars of economic
thinking today.
Please, Nouriel.
(Applause)
Nouriel Roubini: Chrystia,
thank you very much for
the kind introduction.
It's a great pleasure to be
here in front of this great
audience and speaking after Jim
Wolfensohn, who is really truly
a Renaissance man who succeeded
brilliantly in business, in
policy, in culture, in arts,
philanthropy and so and so.
It's an honor being
here with you.
I want to speak about the
outlook for the U.S.
and the global economy.
I will say only a few things
about the short run where we
have many difficulties,
because, after all, this is a
conference about the long-term
opportunities about the
risks and the challenges.
But we have to link what's
happening in the short
run with the long run.
On the short-term I would say
following thing: As been
recognized, we've just gotten
out of the worst economic and
financial crisis since
the Great Depression.
Luckily, we're out of it.
There is a tentative U.S. and
global economic recovery.
But we're not yet out of
the woods, you know?
In a typical economic recovery
from a recession, the
recovery is V shaped.
You rapidly return to potential
growth, or actually about
potential growth, 4-5%
for a couple years.
I've been arguing for a while
that the recovery is not going
to be V-shaped; it's going
to be at best U-shaped and
(inaudible) far below trend in
U.S., in Europe, in Japan,
for reasons I'll explain.
There is even risk of a double
dip recession, something
like a W, if not an L.
If you look at the latest
economic data, it's clear that,
you know, the kind of V
recovery is out of the window.
The recovery has been an anemic
in advanced economies who
are in this hard slog of
weak economic recovery.
And there's even some downside
risk of a double dip recession.
Why that's not the case and why
it's not been a typical
recovery, this crisis was
caused, first of all, by
excessive debt and leverage in
the private sector --
households, financial
institutions, even some fat
tail of some parts of
the corporate sector.
And while there's a lot of talk
about de-leveraging, the
de-leveraging is
barely started.
Those debt ratios in the
private sector are stabilizing
at the very high level, but
there's the burden of insolvent
financial institutions,
households and even firms.
And there's, in the meanwhile,
been a massive re-leveraging
of the public sector.
Very large budget deficits, 10%
to GDP in most advanced
economies, public debt expected
by the IMF to go to all the way
to 120% of GDP in a
number of years.
Why this re-leveraging of the
public sector was automatic
stabilizers where countries
conceived fiscal policy to try
to stimulate the economy
after a recession.
And also socialization
of private losses.
We put on the balance sheet of
governments the losses of
banks, financial institution,
households, and
even corporates.
And, therefore, we see now
a massive re-leveraging
of the public sector.
Therefore, the recovery is
going to be anemic, because
you need the hard slog of slow
and gradual de-leveraging of
financial institutions, of
households, and now
the governments.
And, if the government is going
to do de-leveraging of their
own large deficits,
there is a risk even of
sovereign defaults.
Look what's happening
today in Europe and in
countries like Greece.
So that's where there is a risk
of a slow anemic recovery and
United States growth now is at
stall speed and the third,
fourth quarter expected
to be only 1%.
It's not going to be a double
dip recession yet, but 1% is
well below potential
growth rate of 3%.
And anything can kick you then
into double dip, because you
reach a stall speed for the
economy when you're growing so
much lower than potential.
And it's going to feel like a
recession even if, technically,
it's not a recession
because we grow so low.
The unemployment rate is high
and rising; budget deficits are
larger; home prices keep on
falling; losses to the banks of
unloaded mortgages and consumer
credit, consumer loans are
larger; and protectionist
pressure are going to
be worse than before.
So those are the kind of risks
we face in U.S. But those in
half of the Euro zone where
there is still economic
contraction, in Spain, in
Portugal, in Ireland, in Greece
and Italy, and in a country
like Japan that is in a pattern
of slow and anemic
economic growth.
So those are the downside
risks about the short run.
I don't want to be all doom and
gloom, and let me speak about
what are the opportunities and
potential upsides in the global
economy and some of the
risks we're facing.
If you're to talk about the
bright spots about the global
economy over the short and
mid term, I would speak
about three of them.
First of all, there's still
a process of globalization,
of trade, financial flows,
migration and you name it.
And in spite of this very
severe financial crisis,
globalization is not reversed.
Some fear the reverse
of globalization.
So far that has not occurred.
Secondly, there is, as pointed
out by Jim, not just in Asia
but in most of the emerging
market economy, the recovery
has been V-shaped, much more
robust economic growth above
potential in some cases.
Why?
These countries have higher
potential growth than advanced
economies and they're less
leveraged both in the private
sector and the public sector.
Third observation that is good
about the global economy is
there is still a huge amount of
technological progress
and innovation.
And, in the long run actually,
as we know, technological
progress, innovation is a
major source of economic
performance around the world.
Now, if we are talk about these
three positive spots, I would
like to point out what are the
positive upside about them.
But those are risks and
challenges that come from
globalization, from
technological progress, and
from the emergence of these
emerging market economies.
First of all, if we're to
define our era, it's an era of
increased globalization,
greater trade in goods, but
also greater trade in services.
Services used to
not be tradeable.
But now with IT technologies,
you can outsource stuff and
then new trading in services.
We have massive amount of
capital -- flows, both foreign
direct investment and foreign
investment in stocks, bonds,
securities, you name it.
There is greater amount of
labor migration and also
offshore off-sourcing that
increases over time
productivity growth.
We have now have global
corporation firms and
businesses, and we have a
global supply chain that
also increases productivity.
And the most important thing is
there is a greater amount of
technological innovation and
spread of information, of
innovation and ideas, of
technology or progress from
advanced economies to
emerging markets.
And a lot of innovation now is
occurring also in some of these
emerging market economies.
And I would say the role of
technological progress
innovation is key because, in
the long run, what really leads
to economic growth, leaving
aside a natural population
growth and demographic
is productivity growth.
And productivity growth
depends critically on
technological progress.
So we don't know what are going
to be the new successful
sectors of the new
economy in the future.
We don't know whether there's
going to be alternative energy
and the green economy, whether
lots of progress occurring in
life sciences, things like
cellular research,
neuroscience, genetic therapy
and new applications, whether
it's going to be nanotechnology
and its own applications,
whether it's going to be the
integration of telecom and
media, or new IT technology --
Web 2.0, 3.0, social media,
user-generated content, cloud
computing, new search
technology and things
of that sort.
There's a lot of creative
stuff occurring all over the
world, in U.S., in Europe,
in emerging markets.
In the long term, this
technological progress
is going to be a source
of economic success.
The third source of economic
kind of success in relation to
globalization and technological
progress is this shift of
economic power that is
occurring today from advanced
economies to emerging
market economies.
So we're becoming a multipolar
world where there are major
sources of economic growth,
locomotives and engines,
not just United States
or Europe or Japan.
It's Asia; it's Latin, America;
it's China, India, Brazil,
and many other ones.
If we're to really think about
what's going on in the global
economy to expand some of the
points that Jim has made, there
is a shift of economic, trade,
financial, and, eventually,
also political power from the
U.S. to China, from the G3 --
U.S, Europe and Japan to the
BRICs -- from the west to the
east, from north to south, from
U.S. and Europe toward Asia,
Latin America, and other
emerging market economies, from
advanced economies to
emerging markets.
And the center of global
economic governance has gone
from the G7 that have become
obsolete to the G20 that are
becoming the new steering
committee of the global
economic power.
And some people go as far as
saying that even a country or a
region like Africa that was
underdeveloped might
be the next BRIC.
There are lots of things
happening even in Africa
that might lead even Africa
of getting out of this
trap of underdevelopment.
Now, remember, that a few years
ago at Davos, Larry Summers
made the point that the
emergence of Chindia, China and
India, in the global economy
was the most important event in
human history in the last
thousand years after the
Italian Renaissance and the
Industrial Revolution.
And, certainly, the integration
of 2.3 billion Chindia, let
alone other billions of people
in Asia, Latin America, and the
global economy, the fact that
billions of people are joining
the global labor force is a key
element that's going to change
radically the global economy.
And here in the west
sometimes we're not aware
of the importance of it.
So it's really historical.
Now, this rise of emerging
market economy explains also
many of the paradoxes and
conundrums that we see
in the global economy.
For example, the fall in the
real wages of unskilled workers
in advanced economies.
If you add, you know, two
billion Chindians and they're
all low skilled, that implies
from a trade point of view, of
course, a fall in the relative
return to unskilled labor and
return higher to capital.
We also have other
problems, however.
We have greater
income inequality in
advanced economies.
We don't know how much of it is
driven by trade, how much of it
is driven by skill intensive
technological progress, how
much of it is driven by
winner (inaudible) effects.
But that's a source of tension.
We have these rising commodity
prices, all energy, food, and
other ones coming from the
higher growth of China, India,
and other emerging markets.
We have this phenomenon of
global savings lot where
increasing savings in emerging
markets keeps long-term
interest rates low.
We have current economic
imbalances where U.S. is being
the consumer of first and last
resort and China the producer
of first and last resort.
We have this paradox of capital
not going from advanced
economies to emerging markets
but going from emerging markets
to advanced economies, with
advanced economies having
current deficits and being net
debtors other than creditors.
Now, all these things imply the
following thing: The rise of
the emerging market in the long
term is going to be a positive
force in the global economy.
Economies think not in terms of
zero sum games, but they think
that integration actually
is a positive sum game.
The fact that China and India
are emerging is going to be in
the long run good
for all of us.
So lower cost of goods and
services is beneficial
to everybody.
But it's also true that
globalization has to be
managed to make sure
that it is good for all.
And there are lots of tension
in this location that derive
from this globalization.
So what are the risks that
come from this globalization?
We have greater trade conflicts
and risk of trade protection.
We have increased income and
wealth inequality, especially
in advanced economies.
We have these trade wars
and these currency wars.
Look what's happening
with the currency of
countries like China.
We have this hot money flows
that are flowing in and out of
the countries and sometimes
lead to financial crisis.
That's why many emerging
markets react with
capital controls both on
inflows and outflows.
There's been some degree of
backlash against sovereign
wealth funds, the phenomenon
not just of trade but also
of financial protection.
There's been an increased in
frequency and virulence
of financial crisis
around the world.
They used to occur
once every 20 years.
Now they occur
every other year.
Not only they occur with
more virulence, but the
international contagion
of them is more severe.
Not just from large economies
like U.S. to other countries
but even small economies
can have global effects.
Look what happened in the
spring with Greece having
global contagious effects.
So even a small economy can
have through financial channels
global transmission effects.
There's been a rise of state
capitalism with sovereign
wealth funds, state-owned
enterprises, and publicly-owned
multi-national cooperations in
emerging markets becoming more
powerful with the question
about what they're going to do,
whether they're driven by
profit motives or
political ones.
There's been a failure of the
Anglo-Saxon model of a pure
laissez-faire model, but also
failure of the continental
European social welfare model.
So what's the right
economic model?
And Asian economic model?
It's not clear there is one.
So those are some of the
questions that you have to
keep in mind about the
immediate long term.
It's not only the rise in
absolute terms and the relative
fall of the U.S. and the West
that is occurring, but in many
ways I would argue that there
is an absolute fall also in the
economic performance of
advanced economies, not just
the emerging markets that are
emerging in relative terms, but
there's also been an
absolute decline.
Take Japan, take Eurozone
and the European Union and
take the United States.
Japan is a country that has
low potential growth, has a
demographic decline that is
severe, is a country that has
never done structural reform,
had 15 years of near
depression, has a blocked
political system that is
not doing any reform.
They've changed something
like five Prime Ministers
in the last four years.
Looks like Italy in
the '60s and '70s.
This year alone they had two
Prime Ministers and if Ozawa is
successful, there's going to be
third Prime Minister
in 12 months.
They've not done the structure
reform, and they're in
secular long-term decline.
It's becoming already the third
largest rather than the second
largest economy in the world.
That's a serious problem.
There's deflation.
There's the strength
of the yen.
Look what happened this
spring in the Eurozone.
They kicked the can down the
road with trillion dollar
bailout package, but
some spreads are back
to the May level.
There's low economic growth.
They have deflational risk,
loss of competitiveness, risk
of a breakup of the Eurozone
down the line, risk of
sovereign default in
some of the countries.
I was last week in a conference
in Italy, and the Prime
Minister of Belgium said that
the Europeans are going to
react to this financial crisis
by becoming even more
common policies and doing
coordinated policies.
The problem is he cannot keep
together his own country.
Belgium is a country
breaking up politically.
Might be divided into two.
So the guy cannot keep together
his own country let alone
having united Europe.
Those are the problems that
are faced in the Eurozone.
Let's think about
the United States.
The United States in the last
30 years had periods of high
economic growth only when
there was a financial bubble.
When the real estate bubble in
the '80s ended up in the S&L
crisis and a similar
recession 1991.
Then when the tech bubble
in the '90s ended up
with financial crisis
in 2001 recession.
And then we created the
sub-prime credit bubble of
'06/'07 and then ended up in
the worst economic crisis
since the Great Depression.
Can we grow in a way that's
sustainable without going from
one financial bubble and one
bubble followed by
crash and bust?
It's not clear.
Certainly this model of
laissez-faire approach to
financial market without
regulation and supervision has
failed in the United States.
We have very large fiscal
deficits growing, $3
trillion deficit for as
far as the eye can see.
Large current
economic deficits.
We have, both in U.S. and
advanced economies, aging of
population and unfunded
liabilities coming from
social security and high and
rising healthcare costs.
How are we going
to deal with it?
We have poor and crumbling
infrastructures.
I would say we even have a very
low skills of the labor force.
Now, at places like this one
and places like Google, of
course, the human capital
is very high and skilled.
But think about what's
happening on the
average American.
There's been a recent study by
the U.S. Army that tried to
figure out which kind of people
they can take into the Army.
And they decided to exclude
people who have the following
characteristics: People who
were obese, were drug users,
who don't have a high school
degree, and have a
criminal record.
Why would the Army care
about a criminal record
if you're a fighter?
It turns out, if you have a
criminal record, you start
stealing right and left.
Turns out, if you use these
four criteria to exclude young
people, you think young people,
two-thirds of the young
population in the United States
does not qualify for the Army.
So that's the result of a
strategic study of the Army.
So they don't qualify for the
Army, let alone for being
employed in a low-skilled
or high-skilled job.
This is a serious problem.
We don't think about it.
We think about high tech and we
think about the high human
capital around this room
and high tech company.
But two-thirds of the
population young in the United
States who doesn't have the
skill to be in the Army.
That's a serious problem.
We have a culture of instant
consumption, instant
gratification, of
not enough savings.
We have increased income
and wealth inequality.
Is it normal that 1% of the
households in the United States
control 25% of the income,
double from 20 years ago?
It's something
that's problematic.
We have agreed lock
and stalemate in U.S.
Congress in politics.
Someone who has been around in
Washington 30 years told me
I've not seen so much unity but
hatred between the two parties.
The problem can be resolved
with bipartisanship.
There is no bipartisanship.
And after November there
will be more lack of
bipartisanship and division
of government.
It is decline of the
geopolitical power in the
United States that the
U.S. doesn't seem to
be able to accept.
We are going to a
multi-polar world today.
We have now, these nationalist,
activist and isolationist
policies in the United States
on immigration towards
Muslim and the role of
religion in society.
I would like to summarize,
making the following
final points.
The problems in the global
economy are global, but the
policies are still national.
To resolve these global
problems, we need global
coordination but that
is not occurring.
We need it on global
climate change.
Conflicts on water and
resources, over fishing of
fisheries, global trade
conflicts, energy and all
security, global current econ
imbalances, restoring global
monitoring and financial
stability and avoiding
crises, achieving global
security and peace.
All these things are
international problems
requiring international policy
but the policies are national.
Now, there is a theory in
geopoli that says that in
every century, you need an
(inaudible) that is providing
the global public goods.
In the 19th century,
it was the U.K.
In the 20th century,
it was the U.S.
Today people talk about the
Asian or the China century.
The trouble is that the
U.S. is in fiscal decline.
It has fiscal burden.
It has insular policies,
and there is not a
balance of great power.
It is hard to achieve a
coordination of this policy at
the global level because many
of these emerging markets,
whether it is China or India,
are free riding and are
not providing these
global public goods.
China is free riding on
global climate change,
on political issues.
Russia as a declining
power is not cooperating.
The problem is that also formal
power is imbalance at the U.N.,
at the IMF, at the World
Bank, at the G7 level.
And so far we have not had a
shift of effective global
economic power or in the
institution of global
economic power.
So the conclusion is the
following one: Globalization,
emerging market economies,
trade, technology on progress
can lead to an outcome is a
better one in the long run, if
it resolves the problem
in the short-term.
If you don't do it, actually
you could end up like Japan
with a situation of long-term
economic stagnation.
That doesn't have to happen,
but the policies especially
in the advanced economies
have to start to go in
a different direction.
Thanks.
[ Applause ]
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
I don't know if you guys caught
about maybe about five minutes
into his presentation Nouriel
said, "I don't want to be just
gloomy." So, Nouriel, you
didn't do a very good job
of not being gloomy.
[ Laughter ]
If people are feeling really
depressed, I have a little bit
of good news, which is in the
next session we are going to
have one of the most brilliant
thinkers of our time,
professor Martin Seligman.
And he is the guy who really
came up with this notion of
"learned optimism" and how if
we have the right attitude, we
can make our lives better.
[ Laughter ]
So don't slit your wrists.
Hang on until 11:00, and I
think he's going to rescue us.
Before then, though, I'm going
to have a little bit of a
conversation with
Jim and Nouriel.
And then I hope we will
have a few minutes for
you to ask questions.
So please get ready.
I just want to start, Jim, by
asking you -- both you and
Nouriel have talked about this
really painful not paradox but
sort of dichotomy that we're
seeing right now with rising
Asia but really decline in the
west, including in America.
Does that mean there's
going to be a trade war?
Are we going to see U.S.
politicians responding with
some sort of pressure on China?
James Wolfensohn: That is one
way to do it, but I think the
general view is if you get into
trade wars, it really hurts you
in the end and it doesn't
achieve an objective to
give you an advantage.
I don't think that there
is anything that we can
do other than to look
at the fundamentals.
We have to get our
education system better.
We have to really deal with the
next decade to make sure that
our kids are in a position
where they can be competitive
with their Asian counterparts.
Second thing we have to do is
we have to deal -- and this is
very difficult given the
entitlement programs.
We have to deal with our
budget deficit issue.
The strength of our country
is being eroded as we build
up our budget deficit.
And for my money, I think you
can have short-term palliatives
by having trade barriers, but
it doesn't solve the basic
problem, which is that we need
to take a very careful look at
ourselves, stop thinking of
ourselves as the dominant force
in the world and recognize that
we have a lot of work to do if
we are going to be competitive.
And if we are going to have
the leading position on
the planet that we want.
Chrystia Freeland: And you
have talked about deficits.
How do you get that
balance right?
What you are talking
about costs money.
So where -- you have spent a
lot of time in Washington.
What should Larry
Summers be doing?
James Wolfensohn: I don't
think how long Larry
will be doing it.
Chrystia Freeland: We can
have a pool on that.
James Wolfensohn: Maybe Nouriel
can go back and do it for a
democratic administration.
But I think we have a real
difficulty at the moment
because our political system
has become so antagonistic,
Republicans to Democrats, that
almost the national -- the
national focus and the national
program becomes secondary to
the debate between
the two parties.
But what is needed is for the
two parties to come together
and say, as a nation, "We're
falling behind." Statistics
that I gave -- and I think some
that Nouriel gave -- lead you
to believe that our country is
not as competitive as it was,
either in manufacturing or in
services or in innovation.
And that is a fact.
And you can't solve that by
artificial trade barriers.
What we have to do is to
address the fundamentals and
have the confidence in
ourselves and have people like
the audience here take the lead
in terms of innovation and
in terms of getting
our country going.
But the first thing to do is to
recognize that we have a real
problem and that we have to
look at ourselves in real terms
by comparison with other
countries, notably in Asia.
Chrystia Freeland: Now, Nouriel
pointed out the Japanese
situation as sort of a real
nightmare scenario for America.
But if we think back not too
long ago, people were holding
up Japan as the great
challenge to American power.
So maybe, Jim, both you and
Nouriel are incredibly short
sighted and the big Chindia
threat which we see right now
will prove as illusory as the
great economic threat that
Japan seemed to pose.
James Wolfensohn: The
fundamentals are
very different.
The Japanese population
is declining.
The population in China
and India is increasing.
The base is lower and what we
are looking for is a huge lift
in economic activity and in
terms of the creation of
the middle class, first in
China and then in India.
We currently globally have
two-thirds of the middle
class in the G20.
There are about a billion
people and half a
billion in Asia.
By 2025, it will be 3
billion in Asia and 1 1/2
million with us.
It will just be reversed.
We will see the dynamics
of moving towards Asia.
I have said before, I'm not
sure I will be statistically
accurate, that it will be
exactly 2025 and it will be
exactly the numbers I'm giving.
But, directionally, I am
sure that that is correct.
And most of us in my age group
do not perceive the world
as having changed to the
degree that it really has.
And I'm very worried that if
the next generation doesn't
do it, we will be behind
yet another generation.
I don't know what
Nouriel thinks.
He may have a more
positive view.
[ Laughter ]
Chrystia Freeland: He's likely
to be -- Now, Nouriel, before
you say whether you have a
more positive view or not.
Jim just a minute ago -- I
don't know if you caught it.
He has nominated you for a big
job in Washington if the
Democrats stay in charge.
So if you were right now in the
White House or in the treasury
-- you have worked in
Washington before -- what
would you be doing?
And specifically right
now, would your bias be
towards more stimulus or
focusing on the deficit?
Nouriel Roubini: Well, before
I get to that question
on the first point --
Chrystia Freeland: But
that's the hard one.
Nouriel Roubini: I'll
get to that one.
I would say on the changing on
the relative powers in the
world, I think that we
sometimes overemphasize what's
going to happen with China.
In the '60s, Germany was the
rising power and people said
Germany is going to take over
manufacturing the world.
Then in the '70s and
'80s, it was Japan.
Now people speak about
China and India and so on.
The reality is as the capital
income rises, then wages rise
and some comparative event
that China has today in some
things are going to be lost.
Those productions will be
transferred to other countries,
for example, in southeast Asia.
So the globe is going to
rebalance with economic
power shifting towards
China and Asia.
And so on and no one is going
to, quote, take over the world.
But it is true that some
countries in the region
will become centers of
global economic power.
And, as I said, 19th
century was the U.K.
20th century was the U.S. And
this century could be the Asian
or the Chinese current center.
We will have to see.
There are many challenges in
China about rebalancing growth,
moving from exports to domestic
consumption, from regional and
coastal kind of growth to more
internal growth, dealing with
environmental damage that has
been done, political
transition.
There's going to be (inaudible)
and an authoritarian state.
In many ways in all, China is a
different challenge from Japan
because we are speaking about
1.3 billion people, not
about a hundred million.
Secondly, Japan was under
the kind of defense and
geopolitical umbrella of the
United States while China is
going to become also rising
geopolitical power with
probably interests different
from the United States.
Those are the things we
have to think about.
You know, I don't know
what I would do if I
was in Washington.
The reality is that in many
dimensions, we are running
out of policy bullets.
Policy rates are zero.
We already doubled base money.
Banks are sitting on
trillion-dollar reserves and
not lending it because either
credit demand or credit supply.
If we do more QE, they
are not going to lend
the second trillion.
Chrystia Freeland: QE,
quantitative easing?
Nouriel Roubini:
Quantitative easing.
They are not lending
the first trillion.
Why would they lend
the second trillion?
So monetary policy becoming
input then because it can
relieve liquidity problem, not
with credit and solvency
problem, the source of the
problem in the private sector.
The fiscal policy is
also constrained.
There is this debate today with
G20 between fiscal austerity
now or stimulating growth with
more fiscal stimulus now.
U.S. is in the growth-now
camp while everybody else
is in the fiscal austerity.
But even in the United States,
the limit to how much we can do
more stimulus, you know, the
budget deficit, 3 1/2 this
year, is expected to be at a
trillion for the next
ten years every year.
Even the U.S. cannot go from
a budget deficit of 10%
GDP to 12 to 13 to 15.
At some point, the bond
vigilantes would wake up
even the United States.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
But bottom line, what
would you do right now?
It is a terrible,
hard situation.
What should they do?
Nouriel Roubini: I would say
that -- I would do a plan
of medium-term fiscal
consolidation and monetary
stimulation in the short term.
Chrystia Freeland: So
another stimulus?
Nouriel Roubini: Well, I would
say as long as you can commit
to reducing the budget deficit
over the medium term by raising
taxes and controlling
entitlement spending, then you
can afford in the short run to
do more of a stimulus, whether
it is infrastructure,
instead of subsidizing.
By the way, capital with an
investment tax credit, I would
actually have a temporary cut
in the payroll tax so you can
boost the demand for labor
which would make labor
costs lower for the firms.
The problem in the United
States is not enough investment
that firms are doing
enough investment.
They are not hiring workers
because the cost of
labor is too large.
So I would do a two-year
payroll tax cut that's funded
by increasing the tax that
are expiring on the rich.
That's something that would be
budget neutral and is going to
have an effect on labor demand.
The big problem is jobs,
we are not creating jobs.
Creating jobs is
going to be key.
The longer these people
remain unemployed, the more
they lose their skills.
They're human capital, and
the worse it's going to be.
They will be long-term
unemployed.
That's the problem we
are facing today.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
I'm going to ask Jim and
Nouriel one more question, and
then I hope you all will have a
few questions to ask them.
There are mics on the floor.
I'm looking, Jim, for a few
points of light in the
rather grim picture the
two of you have painted.
Nouriel said one, I thought,
quite optimistic thing about
this idea that Africa could be
the coming, emerging market,
that this might now finally be
the moment when we see
Africa taking off.
Do you buy that?
James Wolfensohn: Ideally,
I wish I could buy that.
About 16 countries in Africa
will show 5% growth or better
this year, which relative to
recent history is enormous.
There are 53 countries
in sub-Saharan Africa.
And if you look at the
projections in terms of the
future of Africa, by 2050 --
2025, maybe it will grow from
1 1/2 to 2% of global GDP.
But by 2050, it is still
around 2% of global GDP.
I think Africa, which will then
have a doubled population of
1.7 billion, is really a
fantastic challenge, not just
for the Africans but for us.
Africa used to be a place
where, if you visited it, it
was very contained in villages
and people went out hunting and
the communications were zero.
That is not the case today.
It is a place where cellular
radios and where telephones and
things are manifest and where
it is part of the world.
Chrystia Freeland: Doesn't
that mean it this emerging
market phenomenon there?
James Wolfensohn: Well, it is
except that if you have an
average per capita income which
is 1/10th of capita income of
China and India and that itself
is less than half of the per
capita income in the developed
world, you have 2 billion
people that are not
in great shape.
And it worries me very much
that our country and, indeed,
the west pays all too
little attention to Africa.
And I might add it worries me
that the Africans themselves
still persist in having 53
countries to run with 53
finance ministers and 53
central banks when the
continent really needs to be
run in terms of quartiles
of the continent.
And some of the leaders
would like to do that,
but politically it is
still not possible.
But Africa is a hell
of a big challenge.
It is very rich in
natural resources.
It has enormous potential and
it has a growing population.
But at the moment, the economy
is not keeping up with
the population growth.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
So easy answer for Africa,
united into either an United
States of Africa or maybe four
countries.
James Wolfensohn: That's not an
easy answer, but it is one that
the African leaders that I
talked to would love to see
happen and would much prefer
to see how they can share.
But you have -- you have all
the problems of colonialism
where tribalism
was disregarded.
And so you have countries with
the wrong tribal mix and you
have, unfortunately, a very
poor system of governance in
at least half the countries.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
Question?
Please.
Yes, Dr. Roubini, you touched
on quantitative easing.
The money supply generally is
not one of the levers in the
economy that's talked about
very much in terms of
what we manipulate.
And it seems that we may be --
"we" the government -- seems to
be reducing the money
multiplier through the
new regulations on banks
that restrict lending.
Could you talk about whether
more quantitative easing might
be worthwhile and whether
we need to reform some
of the bank reforms?
And this is actually
for both Jim and you.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
Got to love it when the
first question is about
quantitative easing.
Go for it, Nouriel.
Nouriel Roubini: Well, I
mean, you point out some
things very important.
We've pushed down
interest to zero.
We have more than doubled base
money, currency in circulation,
and the reserves of
the banking system.
So that's what's called
base money zero.
But all the other monetary
aggregate, M1, M2, M3, are
contracting and credit
is still contracting.
So as you point out, there is
more money in circulation but
velocity in financial market
has collapsed because banks are
hoarding all the excess base
monies, excess reserves.
They are not lending it out.
Whether they are not lending it
out because there is not demand
for credit, because borrowers
don't want to borrow, or
whether banks are constrained
because of the new regulations,
still risk averse, or they
worry about another financial
crisis or there is a credit
crunch for other reasons,
we don't know yet.
But the reality is there is
something broken with the
financial institution system.
The big banks have been
backstopped, but the FDIC has
on its critical list 840 banks.
Most of them are
going to go bust.
Now, each one of them is small.
It is not systematically
important as a Lehman
or Bear Stearns.
But, you know, take the local
bank that's financing the local
real estate, the residential,
the business and so on, that
bank goes bust and you
have mini credit crunch.
Multiply it by 800 and you have
a nationwide credit crunch.
That's what's happening.
Most of the shallow banking
system has collapsed
in the last few years.
Securitization has
died a few years ago.
It has not been restored.
350 known bank lenders have
gone out of business.
Seasoned conduits are gone.
Bear Stearns, Lehman, Fannie
and Freddie, AIG, CIT, major
institutions have collapsed
or have de-leveraged.
There is a significant
problem in the financial
mediation system.
And just printing money
is not going to make
much of a difference.
That's a sense in which it is
a credit problem, it is not
a liquidity problem,
that's affecting the
financial markets.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
So what -- I think we get the
difficulty of the situation.
What's the answer?
Is this just something we
have to live through?
You've talked about how
de-leveraging is something the
U.S. economy has to go through.
There was a bubble before.
We have to go through
de-leveraging.
Maybe there is no solution?
Just --
Nouriel Roubini: There's no
solution in the sense that in
my view, we live beyond our
means and growth was below
potential for a number of years
because there was a massive
creation of credit that
was unsustainable.
You know, houses, financial
institutions, other ones.
And now we quite have a hard
slog of growth-below-trend for
a while as we save more,
consume less, and
we de-leverage.
And instead we have responded
with something that was, in
part, necessary, fiscal
stimulus that was necessary
because otherwise the great
recession would have become
another Great Depression.
So I'm not against that
stimulus, but in some sense
we've piled now on top of
private debt public debt, and
again we're stealing demand
from the future because at some
point there will have to be
fiscal consolidation and when
we start raising taxes and cut
spending, growth is slow
down, but that's necessary.
So you cannot keep on kicking
the can down the road by having
private debts and then
socializing it with public
debts, and in countries where
the sovereign are in trouble,
we have super-nationals, like
in Greece, bailing out the now
sovereign states, right?
The EU, the IMF, the Eurozone.
At the end of the game,
who is going to bail out
the super-sovereigns?
There's not going to be anybody
from Mars coming and bailing
out the IMF of the Eurozone.
So there is this much you
can do in terms of kicking
the can down the road.
At some point, the
de-leveraging of the private
and public sector has to occur
so you have lower debt and you
have a greater and stronger,
more sustainable basis
for stronger economic
growth down the line.
That's why I think that slow
below-trend growth is going to
be with us for a number of
years until we de-leverage and
the best we can do is through
policy avoid something worse
like a double-dip recession,
but I think that is
unavoidable, a period of
low economic growth.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
Jim, do you buy that?
James D. Wolfensohn: I
agree with what
Nouriel said,
and I think we
should remember that it's only
two years ago since we had this
Lehman event which brought home
to us the extent of
over-leverage in the
financial community.
Two years is not a long time to
put that right, and I think
people are still significantly
affected in the financial
community by trying to ensure
that they're not out of
business, that they can
preserve their capital, and
that they can be ready for the
next problems that emerge.
So I don't think it's going to
be a quick turnaround and I
don't think that we could have
-- in view of what happened
before, it seems to me that we
couldn't have expected
a quick turnover.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
Just more pain.
A blood, sweat and
tears panel here.
And we have a final question.
James D. Wolfensohn: It's
getting better, but...
So my question is: Nouriel, you
talked about the fact that
global coordination is needed,
but assuming that the
governments can't get their act
together and nobody from Mars
is going to come rescue us,
what is the role that you think
that global corporations that
are border-agnostic can play
in terms of saving us?
Nouriel Roubini: Well, you
know, I think that one of the
important things, as I pointed
out, that's happening in the
global economy -- and, you
know, you said that, you know,
I was pessimistic but I spoke
about three things that
are actually positive.
One is globalization is driven
by global corporations; two is
the emergence of these emerging
market economies; and three,
there's a massive amount, as I
pointed out, of technological
progress that is done, again,
by global corporations that
are at the cutting edge.
Most of that indeed is done
by small, medium size,
and larger corporations.
So I think that, you know,
global corporations have
to play their own role.
One of the paradoxes that's
happening in the U.S. right
now is that corporates have
become mean and lean, right?
They're sitting on, at most,
2, $3 million of cash.
They've cut labor costs
massively, they've fired
8.4 million workers, and
now they're starting to
think about the future.
They have to invest more, they
have to start -- hire more
and they have to think --
Chrystia Freeland: But Nouriel,
if they listen to you and Jim,
aren't they going to invest in
the emerging markets, not
in the United States?
Nouriel Roubini: Well, that's a
trend that has to occur, and
it's going to occur
regardless of.
You know, this shift in global
economic power implies there
will be more foreign direct
investment, more investment,
more growth in emerging
market economies.
I think that probably the
corporates, to do their own
thing at all, may have to have
also sound economic policies.
You know, for the U.S. to
become more competitive, we
need to have skilled workers.
We have to invest in
education and skill.
We have to reduce, you
know, healthcare costs.
We have to deal with
unfunded liabilities.
We have to deal with having
infrastructure that works.
So that's the role that the
government can play to create
an environment where the
private sector is going to
start hiring again, investing
again, and do it both in the
United States and in
emerging markets.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
We've run out of time, but I
would just like to hear from
Jim: What can big multinational
companies represented here with
their innovative best
people, what can they do to
resolve this huge problem
we're talking about?
James D. Wolfensohn: Well, I
think there are --
Chrystia Freeland:
Pay more taxes?
James Wolfensohn: I don't think
that that's -- well, I guess our
government would like that to
happen, but I think what is
more important is to build an
international workforce that
understands the changes in the
global economy and that allows
us to compete in Asia in a way
that is maybe more effective
than we have done up to now.
This is not to knock American
corporations, but the truth of
the matter is that we're
confronting a very serious
competitive challenge in Asia
by Asian companies and by Asian
individuals, and we need to
change that, and I think
that we're going against a
background where the countries
with which we are competing --
as I look down the list in
terms of their foreign exchange
reserves, you've got People's
Republic of China with 2.4
trillion, Japan at a trillion,
Russia 450, Republic of China
348, India 287, South Korea at
270, Hong Kong 256, Brazil 241.
There are no G7 countries
in that group and you're
down to number 10.
We just need to recognize, in a
way that I don't think we have,
that we've got to take a good
look at ourselves, training of
our people, and we've got to
get out there and be able
to compete on equal terms.
And I hope very much that -- I
know that companies like Google
already do so, but I hope there
are many more Googles to come.
Thank you.
Chrystia Freeland: Okay.
Well, thank you
very, very much.
[Applause]
Chrystia Freeland: I'm going to
suggest that instead of going
to the party tonight, we all
have a mandarin language
studying session and get up
at 5:00 a.m. for hiking.
[Laughter]
To, I think, cheer us up, we're
now going to have a really, I
think, exciting session with
Tom Brokaw, who is going to
show you how this moderating
is done, and Ted Turner.
As I said, iconoclastic
media pioneer.
[Applause]
Ted Turner: Where do
you want to sit?
Tom Brokaw: Why
don't you sit here.
Ted Turner: With you there?
Tom Brokaw: You're the skipper.
Ted Turner: Yes, sir.
Tom Brokaw: First of all, I'm
very happy to be back at the
Google Zeitgeist conference.
The last time I was here, I
was with Yvon Chouinard.
Many of you may have remembered
his presentation, and they
asked me if I could match it
and I said, "There's only one
guy in the world who could
rise to that level and it's
my friend Ted Turner."
I want to just say at the
outset that I sometimes have to
be a little careful about how I
introduce Ted because we have a
strong personal relationship
and I have such an
affection for him.
I was introducing him to a
fusty New York audience one
time and I was trying to give
him a hard sell and I got kind
of carried away and I said, "I
just want you to know over the
time that I've known Ted
Turner, I really have come
to love him in every
conceivable way."
And he got up and said --
[Laughter]
-- "That's not true that
he loves me in every
conceivable way."
He said, "His wife wouldn't
like that and my girlfriends
wouldn't like that, so I don't
want you to think that."
The fact is that there is no
more celebrated or accomplished
American in my lifetime than
Ted Turner in so many ways.
We first knew him as
a champion sailor.
He then, of course, was the
inventor of CNN, which
reformatted American
journalism and journalism
around the world.
A philanthropist.
An entrepreneur in sports and
in movies, in entertainment.
He is, as well, one of the
great philanthropists of his
time with his work with the
United Nations Foundation.
I've always thought a metaphor
for Ted really was the
1979 Fastnet race.
Some of you may not be aware
of it, but it was 605 miles
through some of the worst
weather in the North Atlantic.
Ted stayed at the wheel all
night long of his sailing
ship and won the race.
Other ships went -- other
yachts went down, lives were
lost, but Ted prevailed.
He stormed -- he's sailed
through a lot of stormy seas
since then, of course.
So I want to begin, Ted: You've
-- you've managed a lot
of risk in your lifetime.
You've given the world examples
of enormous enterprises
and daring ventures.
Are you an optimist right
now or a pessimist?
Ted Turner: Can't afford
to be a pessimist.
I was on the Calypso
underwriting one of Captain
Cousteau's programming trips
down the Amazon and it was just
when Reagan had been elected
president and he had just
called the Soviet Union
"the evil empire."
And that will be probably the
last thing that a person says
before the bombs drop will be
calling somebody
an evil empire.
You've got to be very careful
who you call an evil empire.
I don't think -- it's
like burning the Koran.
That's not a good way to make
friends and influence people.
And I believe that -- I
believe, as an optimist,
that what you want to do
in life is make as many
friends as you can.
And that's the reason why we
should do away with war,
because now with globalization,
we're doing business all over
the world and you don't want to
bomb your customers, you know?
[Laughter]
That's --
[Applause]
I found that to be
the case with CNN.
I mean, we were doing business
in every country in the world,
including North Korea.
I think we were the only
company in the world that was
doing business everywhere.
And I just -- we couldn't go
to war with anybody without
bombing our customers.
So I became a man of
peace because I want to
protect my customers.
Tom Brokaw: Let me ask you
about journalism and cable news
especially, 24-hour cable news,
and the impact that it's having
these days on the domestic
political discourse in this
country and the way Americans
see the world as a result of
the prism that is presented to
them not just through cable
news but the symbiotic
relationship between cable
news and the Internet.
Ted Turner: Let me finish
the first question
because I didn't get --
Captain Cousteau.
I said, "Captain Cousteau.
I'm getting discouraged."
He said, "Ted, even if we knew
for sure that we were going to
lose, what could men of good
conscience do but keep working
to the very end to
save humanity?"
And so that's my look.
I cannot -- I hardly --
Every now and then I'll harbor
a pessimistic thought, but
we've got to remember this --
this is -- this global climate
change situation and the
nuclear situation, these are
the greatest problems that
humanity has ever faced, and we
really aren't that -- we
haven't had much time to
equip ourselves for them.
The Industrial Revolution
only started 200 years ago.
The age of flight and
nuclear weapons are just
a little over 50 years.
We really -- we're being asked
to deal with the most
complicated problems and we
don't -- we haven't had enough
time to get the social
structure worked out.
So we're having to
learn so fast.
I like us.
You know, I know we're hairless
apes, but I still like us.
I mean, I -- you know, I
think we're pretty cool.
Tom Brokaw: You like
the big challenge.
Ted Turner: And I like
gorillas, too, and bonobos.
I think it would be a real
shame if we killed them all.
Tom Brokaw: We'll get
to that in a minute.
Ted Turner: So anyway,
basically I'm an optimist.
Tom Brokaw: All right.
But let me ask you about
television news and the
Internet and the ability
of people to --
Ted Turner: That's
a big question.
Tom Brokaw: You're a big guy
with a big view of the world.
Ted Turner: Yeah.
Well, I think -- I think
because of the competition and
the fact that the news --
there's only so much really
important news every day, that
-- and with the proliferation
of news channels all over the
world, not just here in the
United States, there's
tremendous pressure to get
people to watch these channels
so they can sell advertising
for a higher price.
So they go to more sensational
-- to me, trivial --
programming and I think it
hurts us because we need
good solid information
now more than ever.
And my greatest regret in life,
other than the failure of my
marriages, was losing control
of CNN, because if I still had
control of CNN, I would have
the courage to stick with more
important news and more
international news and try --
because we're not going to make
it through this difficult time
without good information.
We're going to have to mobilize
all of our institutions:
education, government,
philanthropy, and business.
Our major institutions
worldwide are going to have to
mobilize because these problems
we have right now are global
problems and they can only be
solved by everybody in the
world working together.
I mean, and if we don't -- if
we fail, we're going to have a
hard time looking our
grandchildren in the eye
because we do really have the
information that we need to
handle these problems.
Tom Brokaw: Are we pandering
to fear right now and some
people say we're dumbing
down America, the way we --
Ted Turner: Yes, I think so.
I think so.
I think at a time when we need
the best information, the most
accurate, that we deal with
complicated issues in
a mature, adult way.
We're playing with the
future of our existence.
Tom Brokaw: But there are
economic consequences,
as you --
Ted Turner: There are.
Short-term economic
consequences.
That's another thing.
I don't think -- I'm not -- the
country with the biggest GDP
doesn't mean squat to me.
The country that does the
most good is what counts
as far as I'm concerned.
Hell, I was worth $10 billion.
I've given myself almost
into the poorhouse.
A combination of --
Tom Brokaw: Oh, no.
Wait a minute..
Ted Turner: -- of
stupid business deals.
Tom Brokaw: My beating heart.
I know.
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: Well, if I had the
$10 billion that I had for a
few moments 10 years ago, if I
had that, I mean I would have
put another billion dollars in
the United Nations Foundation
by now, at least.
Anyway, you know, when Gates
and Buffett came out with this
thing and said, "You know, we
should all give half our money
away," hell, I did
it 10 years ago.
You know, been
there, done that.
Where do we go from here?
[Laughter]
Tom Brokaw: You gave it
to the market, however.
You gave it to Time Warner
AOL, not to social causes.
Ted Turner: Right.
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: I've seen
it from both sides.
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: I've had the
most interesting life.
I really --
Tom Brokaw: No one here
will dispute that.
Ted Turner: I'm not going
to say any more than that.
Tom Brokaw: What are you
and Boone Pickens up to?
Ted Turner: Well, we
hit it off together.
We agree about the energy
situation on most points.
And although natural gas has
kind of taken it on the chin in
California, it turns out these
old fuels like oil -- well, the
problems we have in the Gulf of
Mexico and the explosion there,
I mean, it's even -- it's not
safe to deal with coal, and the
miners are getting killed
all over the world.
I mean, nobody's ever
been killed by solar
power, I don't think.
And I'm building a 250-acre,
$100 million -- I'm partners,
junior partners, with -- and
we're building one of the
largest solar arrays in
the world in New Mexico.
It's going to power
9,000 homes.
And I'm excited to finally
get into alternative
energy in a major way.
And I intend to make
a little money, too.
Tom Brokaw: What do you think
of the people who just refuse
to believe that, if not global
warming, even global
climate change?
There are prominent members
of the United States
Senate, for example --
Ted Turner: Yes.
Tom Brokaw: -- James
Inhofe from Oklahoma --
Ted Turner: But, you know,
there are people who
don't believe in God.
You've got to go -- you've got
to hope that you can convince
the majority to go along
with what's intelligent.
And if we can't, then we fail.
And if we fail, we'll
pay the consequences.
And already, a billion people
go to bed hungry tonight in
this world, out of our 7
billion people that are here,
and they're paying the
consequences of our mistakes.
We've got to stop doing
the dumb things and start
doing the smart things.
Tom Brokaw: What are the
principal dumb things
that we're doing?
Ted Turner: We're not
stabilizing the population.
Half the women in the world
still don't have equal
rights with men.
We need to -- if we're going to
stabilize the population, the
best way to do it is to educate
the women and give them equal
opportunities with men.
It's the half -- the population
is only growing in the half of
the world where women don't
have equal rights with
men, where women are
treated as slaves.
Now, you can look back.
In 1900, only a hundred years
ago, none of the women in the
world had equal rights with
men, and today half the
women in the world do.
That's huge progress.
A hundred years ago,
we abolished slavery.
We do not -- you know, not
on any kind of scale,
we do not have slavery.
We have -- you know, we can pat
ourselves on the back for a lot
of good things that we've done.
On the other hand, we have not
abolished nuclear weapons yet.
We're working on it.
I mean, one way to end the
whole thing in an afternoon
is push the button in Moscow
or Washington and --
Tom Brokaw: Or Pakistan.
Ted Turner: -- we could
blow ourselves up.
I mean, we already have
designed, built, implemented,
installed, and armed a
situation where within 30
minutes the majority of the
people in the world are dead.
Now, is that smart?
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: Is that real -- why
-- and we refuse to -- at the
United Nations, the presidents
of all the countries at the
U.N. agreed unanimously that we
should get rid of
nuclear weapons.
Well, why aren't we doing it?
That's what I call dumb.
Because we know what
we want to do.
And everybody wants to do it.
The Chinese have
figured it out.
The Russians have
figured it out.
We've figured it out.
I mean, these things don't
make us safe, they make
us more dangerous.
These things are to
blow ourselves up.
Why do we want to
blow ourselves up?
I mean I know some people
might want to, but I don't
think the majority do.
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: God
help us if we do.
Then let's go ahead and do it.
Hell, I --
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: It would
be less work.
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: This going around
trying to save the world,
boy, is a big job.
[Laughter]
Tom Brokaw: Well,
you're the man for it.
Ted Turner: I'm not saying be
pessimistic, but, you know,
don't -- get good odds,
you know, if you bet.
The trouble is, who's going
to be there to collect
when the bombs go off?
Nobody.
Tom Brokaw: So share with this
audience your exchange with
President Obama when he
was just a candidate.
Ted Turner: I talked to him.
Tom Brokaw: And
tell us about it.
Ted Turner: Well, I told
him I'd help him any way
I could and I wouldn't
ask anything in return.
He said, "Well, you
don't need anything."
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: He was right.
Tom Brokaw: You just heard your
friend Jim Wolfensohn and
Professor Roubini talk about
the position of the United
States in this global economy,
especially against
India and China.
Ted Turner: I don't
see it that way.
Tom Brokaw: All right.
Ted Turner: I see India, China,
and the United States all
in the same basic boat.
If we don't deal with the
survival issues, stabilizing
the population, feeding
everybody, working together,
doing away with war and
conflict, getting rid of
nuclear weapons, if we don't do
those things, the rest of it
is not going to matter.
You know, when you're dead, it
doesn't matter whether you're
a Chinaman or an Indian.
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: What I want to do
is see everybody be alive.
And what we just need to do is
start acting like intelligent,
educated, decent,
kind-hearted human beings.
Tom Brokaw: You see much
evidence of that in the
political culture in
this country today?
Ted Turner: Ah, um ...
[Laughter]
Ted Turner: There are some
things that -- there seems to
be a lot of trivialization
and not a spirit of
working together.
I think we -- I'd like to see
the parties try and work
together to deal with our
common problems instead
of being so polarized.
I think we're getting nowhere.
And the fact that we have gone
nowhere as far as, at the
federal level, as far as our
energy policy, I mean, it is
just very disheartening for me
to see us in the position,
basically, we were after
Kyoto 10 years ago.
We haven't learned.
That's one things that
Boone Pickens and I do
definitely agree on.
And that's why we've done
this sort of program
four different times.
It's kind of like Mo and Joe
and Curly, the Three Stooges.
Tom Brokaw: Ted, I know of your
personal commitment to energy
and rearranging consumption
practices in this country
and where we go from here.
But at the same time the two
of you live very large.
You've got homes, airplanes
and other things.
And that's become kind of the
model for this country for a
lot of people, which is who's
got the most money, who's got
the most toys at the end
of their lives, they win.
Does that fight against the
idea of trying to have a more
conservative-minded country
when it comes to energy
consumption and
proportion in our lives?
Ted Turner: Yes.
Tom Brokaw: But you're
not prepared to change?
Ted Turner: Yes.
I'd change.
But I -- for instance, I
couldn't have come down here
if I didn't have a plane.
[Laughter]
Tom Brokaw: You could have been
with me running through the
Salt Lake City airport and
getting on terminal D9 and
getting on the last flight to
Phoenix, but that wouldn't have
turned out too well probably.
Ted Turner: You know, It's --
overall, I'm sequestering more
carbon than I'm creating.
[Laughter]
Tom Brokaw: But how do we get
the country to think about
proportion and use and
appropriate size --
vehicles, housing --
Ted Turner: Well, in all
fairness, appropriate is
defined to some degree
by who's defining it.
You know, what might be
appropriate for -- that's
one of the problems.
We don't all want to live in
exactly the same size --
Tom Brokaw: Oh, of course not.
Ted Turner: --
apartment and whatnot.
They tried that in Russia,
and it was pretty boring.
Tom Brokaw: But the dialogue
about what's appropriate and
whether you can live --
Ted Turner: There were no
individual houses built
in Russia during the
Soviet Union time.
Tom Brokaw: I understand
that, but --
Ted Turner: All just
flat, all the same size,
all the same shape.
Tom Brokaw: But to be perfectly
wonkish for just a moment, in
France and in Germany 20 years
ago and in the United States
the average size of the house
was about the same, about
1400 square feet or
1500 square feet.
We went up to 2500 square feet.
McMansions populated --
Ted Turner: 60,000 square feet.
Tom Brokaw: And all the way up.
And now they're beginning
to come back down again.
Ted Turner: That's
because of the economy.
People would -- and you --
you've been all my houses.
Tom Brokaw: Not all of them.
I'm trying to work my way
through as many as I can.
A lot of them.
Ted Turner: I haven't
been extraordinarily
wasteful in the size.
Tom Brokaw: No, no.
They're appropriate homes.
[Laughter]
[Applause]
There are just a lot of them.
Ted Turner: Appropriate
for a billionaire.
Tom Brokaw: Right.
Ted Turner: Barely.
Tom Brokaw: One of the
essential truths in the
military culture is
that you don't want to
fight the last war.
But we always are fighting the
last war on the same terms.
If you apply that to where
we are in the world --
Ted Turner: It's time
for the last war.
Period.
Why don't we make the war in
Afghanistan the last war?
Let's get out and get
out and stay out.
Of everywhere.
Ted Turner: And what do you
think about Islamic rage?
Do you think it's real as
a threat to this country?
Ted Turner: I'll
tell you one thing.
I try to make friends,
not enemies.
And the best way to make
friends is to be friendly.
And I've been all
over the world.
And, for the most
part, I made friends.
I made from Fidel Castro to
Gorbachev and Vladimir Putin
and, you know, the Chinese.
Tom Brokaw: Do you have any
friends in the Islamic world?
Ted Turner: I do.
I do.
We have representation on both
the board of the Nuclear Threat
Initiative and the United
Nations Foundation from
the Islamic world.
You bet.
You got to have.
Tom Brokaw: But how would you
deal with the objective reality
that there are, in the
Madrasahs in India or in
Pakistan, especially, and in
Afghanistan and other areas of
the Middle East and Somalia, a
very narrow view of the world
about how a young Muslim, for
example, should live his life,
primarily, which is to join
Jihad against the
western world?
Ted Turner: And every one of
those countries, those
groups, none of them are for
equal rights for women
either, are they?
I don't think so.
Not a one.
Tom Brokaw: No.
Ted Turner: And the rest of the
world is heading towards -- so
we're headed towards a world
where women have equal
rights with men.
The question is will we
get there before we
destroy ourselves?
Because I think, when women do
have equal rights with men --
I've been advocating for years
that only women should be able
to serve public office anywhere
in the world for 100 years.
And if we did that, we
wouldn't -- war would end.
There would be a lot more
money spent on healthcare
and education and a lot
less on the military.
And it would be a much better,
more peaceful world with women
running it for a while.
And men could do
everything else.
You know, they could be in
education and science and
business and -- just politics.
Let the women -- give
them something to do.
[Laughter]
Let them deal with it.
Ha-ha.
I -- I would rather have my mom
run the world than my dad.
[Laughter]
Tom Brokaw: That's a whole
other subject that we probably
don't want to get into here.
If you were starting over now
as an entrepreneur, given
all the technology --
Ted Turner: What would I do?
Energy.
Energy, my man.
30 years ago I would
have said plastics.
But --
[laughter]
Energy.
Clean renewable energy
because everybody's got
to have it and quick.
That's one of the things that
we fail to do it at our peril.
And every day that we wait --
the sunshine is right there.
It's just waiting to be tapped.
All we got to do is capture it
and distribute it, and our
energy problems are over.
You can put solar panels on top
of a little hut in Africa and
give people lights so their
kids can get educated.
That's -- you know, we got to
-- everybody's got to be
educated, too, in
the new world.
Tom Brokaw: You and I once
talked about this one night
after a day of fishing.
I asked you about what made you
the greatest sailor in the
world when you were sailing.
And you told me I thought
a fascinating story.
You said that you lost more
races than you won when
you were a young man.
You lost a lot between the time
when you started sailing
competitively until what?
You were at Brown when
you were a freshman?
Ted Turner: Right.
Broke through.
Tom Brokaw: And then
you began to win.
Ted Turner: Yes.
Tom Brokaw: Is that a
lesson for life for you?
Ted Turner: Absolutely.
Keep trying.
Keep working at it.
Never give up.
Quitters never win.
Winners never quit.
In the first five years I had
the baseball team, we came in
last every single year in our
division, setting a record that
stood for all time for the
most consecutive losses
in divisional play.
And then after that
we turned it around.
And we won, like, 19 straight
divisional titles, which set
a record in all sports for
the most wins of anybody.
You bet your ass, buddy!
We weren't losing
in the beginning.
We were just learning
how to win.
The trouble is you got
to live long enough to
start winning, you know?
[Laughter]
Tom Brokaw: Well, you were
the most successful sailor
this country's ever had.
And then you walked
away from it.
Ted Turner: I did that because
I was neglecting my family.
And CNN had just started, and I
figured if I wasn't there to
work hard with CNN,
that I'd go broke.
And that would not be good.
Tom Brokaw: And you
almost did go broke.
Ted Turner: I came
within a gnat's hair.
Tom Brokaw: You're going
to go Newport tomorrow to
sail for the first time.
Ted Turner: In a long time.
Tom Brokaw: What's the race?
Ted Turner: It's
the 12-meter race.
They invited me to come
back, kind of like
an old-timers deal.
Tom Brokaw: The boats will be
different now because they'll
be wired in a way that they
weren't when you were sailing.
Ted Turner: Yeah, but it's the
same old boat that I was racing
in -- the American Eagle,
which I owned in '69 and '70.
And I raced it, so it will
be like coming home.
It's even the same color.
Tom Brokaw: And the crew will
say: Ted, the computer printout
says this is what we ought to
do." And the wind direction,
according to the
computer is --
Ted Turner: Yeah, I'll do it.
Tom Brokaw: You're going to do
it that way or the old way?
Ted Turner: Combination
of the two.
But I'll be rusty.
And I'm racing with guys that
have been sailing all the time.
So I probably won't
do too well.
But I'm going to be
out there anyway.
Tom Brokaw: I heard from a
mutual friend of ours, Tom
McGuane, who covered sailing
for "Sports Illustrated" at one
point, described when the
computer began to take over
sailing and people were
measuring the wind and where
they should tack and so on, you
instead would walk in and look
at the charts and say, "We're
going to tack right there."
And one day you said to me
there was something that you
had when you were on the wheel
that you could be 20 seconds
ahead on a given course, and
then one of your crew members
would take over, hold the same
course and they would catch
up until you got back
on the wheel again.
Is that about life as well, the
touch that you have and the
intuition that comes with a
lifetime of training and
something that is just, if
you will, codified in you?
Does that make sense?
Ted Turner: Hmm-mm.
[Laughter]
Too complicated.
Tom Brokaw: Are there things
that you do that you know
that are just intuitive --
Ted Turner: Yes.
Tom Brokaw -- that grow out
of your life experiences
and who you are?
Ted Turner: Yes.
I think a lot, and I spend my
time with intelligent people.
I don't spend my time with
a bunch of dumb dumbs.
You know, I want to get
smarter all the time.
And because I think it's really
important for our survival for
us to be just as smart as we
can possibly be right now.
And that means we got to
be thinking all the time.
And I'm thinking all the time.
Tom Brokaw: We want to bring on
stage now a friend of yours,
Mikkel Vestergaard, who
has an eponymously-named
company in Switzerland.
Come up, Mikkel.
Mikkel's company produces
products that are not
only profitable but
socially responsible.
For example, how to avoid
malaria, how to make water
cleaner in a simple fashion.
And he works in
the free market.
But also he has a very strong
association with a lot of
the NGOs around the world,
including one with which I'm
closely associated called the
International Rescue Committee.
Mikkel, share with this
audience, A, quickly, your core
business and, B, how it evolved
into a company that is
doing well by doing good.
Mikkel Vestergaard: Thank you.
And let me start by just
mentioning what an honor
it is to be on stage
with both of you.
It actually reminds me of the
first time I met Ted, he talked
me into racing sailboats.
And I'm learning now what
an expensive hobby it is.
But, to answer your question,
we've really built the entire
company around the opportunity
that there is in making
the world a better place.
And in the rising understanding
that there's neither
controversy nor conflict
between doing business
and doing good.
For us it means, in practical
terms, that we have, for one,
built our entire innovative
platform around developing
technological breakthroughs for
the most vulnerable people in
the most extreme situations.
You mentioned malaria.
What we've done there is
developing fiber technology
that kills the mosquito on
impact when it lands
on a bed net.
The opportunity to save
millions of lives is easily
understood, but is also a huge
economic contributor when
malaria would otherwise rampage
through African villages
leaving survivors too sick to
work or too sick
to go to school.
The water filters, as you
mentioned, is something I'm
very passionate about.
The world seems to have sort of
dropped disease eradication
since small pox was eradicated
in the '60s and '70s.
So we, together with the Carter
Center, teamed up for the
Guinea worm eradication program
and developed a water filter
that has become so successful
that the guinea worm is the
second disease to be eradicated
and the first to be eradicated
without the use of a vaccine.
We have only four
countries left.
So we're doing all these
innovative technologies.
We're also very much involved
in assisting and getting the
products out there by
integrating infectious
diseases, communicable diseases
like cancer and diabetes and
climate change and
food security.
So the point is this really:
That there is a huge
opportunity for private
companies to get
involved and to invest.
90% of all health investments
today benefit only the 10%
wealthiest on the planet
while, obviously, only 10% of
all health investments is
available for the other 90%.
And, as a result, the -- to
give a good example, the drug
available for river blindness
was developed for chlamydia.
And that's just one example.
The larger picture is that the
average -- the best measure of
human welfare is average
life expectancy.
That's 80 years in the richest
countries and it's 40 years
in the poorest countries.
That's an intolerable gap.
But it's also an opportunity
for companies to get involved.
I think, if I can end the
response to your question on
more provocative note, I think
that companies who don't
understand how to get involved
in an opportunity like this,
one way or the other, probably
won't be around in
20 years from now.
Tom Brokaw: The U.N.
Foundation
which you're a
principal patron of, has
a relationship with the
Vestergaard Company as well
and providing these kind of
materials around the world.
Is that a model for the
future do you think
of public/private--
Ted Turner: Certainly a model.
It's a model of cooperation.
I think we're going to -- the
problems are so great today
that it, whenever we can,
cooperate with each other and
work together, we can many
times have economies of scale
that make it work better.
That's why I gave the billion
dollars to the United Nations
instead of the Red Cross.
I believed that the United
Nations is the hope for the
future because that's all
of us working together.
At least that's the objective.
And that's what we do.
And we work together with
dozens of corporations, dozens
and dozens of NGOs and with the
majority of the countries in
the world we have
projects with.
Tom Brokaw: Let me, Mikkel,
ask you about some
political realities.
One of the kind of undertold
stories in the world today, in
my judgement, is the presence
of China and Africa and in
the extracted industries.
I mean, they're everywhere in
mining and forestry and taking
advantage of the extraordinary
natural resource riches
of that country.
There's not much evidence,
however, that the state-run
Chinese economy in Africa
has a big social conscience
about what they ought to be
doing for the population.
Is that an overstatement
on my part?
Let me start by just answering
the first question that
you also asked Ted
about the role of U.N.
Foundation.
Because I think there's
something that the U.N.
Foundation does very well
that I just want to mention.
And that is the partnering
with the private sector.
For us it's the epicenter of
where the private sector
partners with the U.N.
I gave the example of a
long-lasting net that was
invented for malaria control.
What the U.N.
Foundation
brought to the
table was understanding
the value of integration.
That was the second thing that
came together that made us have
these big strides in malaria.
By integrating measles
vaccination with bed net
distribution, we were able to
distribute mosquito nets not
$5 a net but $1.30 a net.
That was really a brain child
that came from the
U.N. Foundation.
And with those two we are now,
together with United Nations
Foundation and other partners,
sending out more than 100
million mosquito nets to Africa
in 2010, which will -- which
we're confident will reduce
the malaria burden to less
than half in more than 20
subsaharan African countries.
So massive breakthroughs there
that has happened with the U.N.
Foundation as the epicenter
with the linking of the private
sector and United Nations.
To answer your other question
on China and Africa, I think
there are great parallels with
what Europe and U.S. has done
in the past in Africa and
what China is doing now.
I think we remain optimistic
that a more long-term
sustainable partnership
attitude can be developed from
China that is less about
extraction and more
about investment.
Tom Brokaw: Are they open
to a dialogue on that?
Mikkel Vestergaard:
That's my impression.
Tom Brokaw: Ted?
Ted Turner: When we
started the U.N.
Foundation just a little over
ten years ago, there had never
been a private donation from a
corporation or NGO to
the United Nations.
And, in fact, when I tried to
give the billion dollars to the
United Nations directly, they
had to say, "We can't take it
because we can only" -- "our
charter only allows us to get
money from other sovereign
states." Only governments could
fund the United Nations.
And so we went ahead and
created the foundation
to work parallel.
We didn't know whether it was
going to work or not either.
It was an absolute
billion-dollar experiment.
But it did work,
and it is working.
And after only ten years, we
have dozens of partnerships
all over the world.
And I think it's made -- it's
making the world a little
better place because the more
we learn to work together,
the better we feel.
You know, if you have ever been
married -- and I have many
times -- [ Laughter].
It's -- when you are getting
along with your wife or your
husband, when you are working
together in a positive
way, you feel so good.
While you're fighting,
it is miserable.
You know, how many people would
rather fight with their wife
than get along with her?
Nobody, right?
And how many people
want to bomb somebody?
I never find anybody --
we're bombing everybody.
But we can stop,
and maybe we will.
I mean, it is a possibility.
Tom Brokaw: Final note, this
audience I'm sure is curious,
do you carry a cell phone, Ted?
Ted Turner: Not personally
but I have friends close
by that have them.
[ Laughter ]
Tom Brokaw: On that note,
thank you all very much.
[ Applause ]
That was very good.
Thank you.
Time for a break now, right?
Chrystia Freeland: Yes.
Thank you very much.
And how can we resist someone
who suggests that for 100
years only women should
run governments?
I love that.
Thank you very
much, Mr. Turner.
Please come back at ten past
11:00 when one of my favorite
writers, Jim Fallows, will be
leading a session
on leadership.
Thank you very much.
(Break)
