So I was going to start this video, like most
philosophical disputes, by outlining the definitions
of all key terms, but since Matt (like most
compatibilists) embraces the exact same definitions
as myself, I’ve decided not to (though,
as you can see, I’ve put clear definitions
on the screen now in case you’re interested).
Anyhow, on the 3rd of February, 2018, Matt
releases a Q and A video in which he answered
questions posed by his patrons, and within
it he fleshed out his disagreement with Sam
Harris on the topic of free will.
Now I’m an avid fan of Matt, as you probably
already know, but in general, I tend not to
watch Q and A videos, and so I would’ve
missed his remarks entirely if it wasn’t
for one of my own patrons suggesting that
I check it out (thanks, by the way).
So what I’ve decided to do is to respond,
in true YouTube fashion, directly to Matt’s
comments, and so this is a response to Matt
Dillahunty’s compatibilism.
“Sam’s objection is that compatibilists
seem to be just redefining free will…”
I can’t speak for Sam, of course, but yes,
that’s precisely the problem.
“…perhaps even defining it into existence
(I don’t want to put words into his mouth,
you can listen to what he has to say).
And I don’t disagree with him…”
Awesome – so it seems that we’re on exactly
the same page.
That you, like Harris and myself, see compatibilism
as the attempt to redefine ‘free will’
– that is, you see yourself as attempting
to redefine free will.
“…I think that if we take a look at what
people actually care about when it comes to
free will, that whether or not we have it,
I agree with him that it’s from a physical
standpoint – that it’s illusory.”
Great!
So, to just plant the flags, as it were, both
you and I believe that compatibilists are
attempting to redefine free will, and that
human consciousness is predetermined (that
is, to quote Sam, that our thoughts and intentions
emerge from background causes which we are
unaware and over which exert no conscious
control).
So far so good, we have no disagreement.
“I’m talking about it from a conceptual
standpoint.
And the example that I used in New York was
if Sam jumped off stage that would be him
as an agent taking an act of volition, it
doesn’t matter if it was predetermined by
the universe or not – but alternatively
I could throw him off the stage, and the difference
between those two events sums up everything
that I think is valuable about the notion
of free will.”
You see, I would define Sam’s jumping off
as an act of ‘will’ rather than ‘free
will’, simply because in doing this I’m
able to retain all of the value that you’ve
just appealed to, but without having to hijack
a label that's loaded with contrary connotations…
In fact, this raises the rather obvious question,
why are you insisting on retaining the term
‘free will’?
Why isn’t the word ‘will’ sufficient?
As I’ve just said, it retains all of the
value that you seem to care about, and, unlike
the term ‘free will’, it’s perfectly
malleable…
“He had mentioned that in his view what
people think about when they think about free
will is ‘oh, if I could go back in time
I could do it differently’, ehm, I don’t
know if that’s actually…
I know people will think like that, they’ll
say ‘oh, if only I could go back in time
I’d do it differently’, but if you think
about that question – ‘if I could go back
I would do it differently’ – what they’re
actually saying is that if I could go back
with the knowledge that I have now, I would
do it differently.
They’re not saying that if we rewound the
clock that they could do it differently, they’re
saying that they wish they could’ve done
it differently.”
Are you sure about that Matt?
I mean, are you really convinced that most
people believe that determinism is true?
Because that’s what you’re indirectly
saying.
I would argue (with great confidence) that
because most people are religious, and because
most religious people believe explicitly in
the libertarian sense of free will, that when
most people say ‘I should’ve done otherwise’,
they mean literally just that – that given
the exact same scenario (atom for atom) they
could’ve, and should’ve, consciously produced
a different result.
In fact, most religious concepts of morality
and retribution, such as heaven, hell, karma,
and Samsara necessitate libertarian free will,
and so, I think you’re mistaken here, or
at the very least you’ve misspoken.
Whatever the case, Harris’ point still stands,
and despite what you’ve just said, I’m
fairly certain you know this.
“Whether or not you call it free will I’m
not overly concerned about that…
But I pointed out that Sam’s complaint or
challenge to what compatibilists are doing
is they’re essentially redefining free will,
and Lawrence pointed out that he’s essentially
redefining nothing, and I noted that Sam and
I are both essentially redefining morality
– that throughout history, the terms ‘nothing’,
‘morality’, and ‘free will’ have had
specific usages and what we’ve learned is
that the way they were understood in the past,
the way ‘nothing’, ‘morality’ and
‘free will’ were understood in the past,
those things essentially aren’t real – but
there may still be a valuable perspective
on the concept that’s worth retaining.”
Okay, so I’m going to approach this from
a slightly different angle.
Why, Matt, in the past, have you objected
to theists redefining ‘god’ to mean ‘energy'?
What exactly is wrong with them doing this?
Well, as you’ve rightfully pointed out,
doing so is needlessly confusing.
The word ‘god’ has extremely heavy cultural
and historical connotations, and so attempting
to redefine it to mean ‘energy’ is disingenuous.
Anyhow, the reason I bring up is because I
would say the same is true, though not to
the same degree, when it comes to compatibilists
redefining ‘free will’, and Lawrence redefining
‘nothing’, but that the same can’t be
said of Harris redefining ‘morality’,
because he’s not...
Throughout history the term ‘free will’
has been primarily defined, in the libertarian
sense, as ‘The ability to choose, think
or act without constraint from external forces’,
just as the word ‘nothing’ has been primarily
defined as ‘The absence of everything’,
and so compatibilists and Lawrence are indeed
attempting to redefine these terms, but on
the other hand, the word ‘morality’ has
been primarily defined as ‘Principles concerning
the distinction of right and wrong’, and
so Harris isn’t redefining it… he’s
simply asserting that it’s rooted in wellbeing
rather than in divine command theory, religious
scripture, or a social contract.
Harris has caused, and is trying to further,
a paradigm shift… but he’s not attempted
to redefine ‘morality’, and I think that
because of this your analogy fails.
“Now, Sam had brought up that Dennett seems
to be afraid of the consequences of what would
happen in the world if people find out that
they don’t have the free will that they
think they do… that’s not a concern of
mine.
Ehm, and one of these days I hope to be able
to sit down with Dennett and talk about free
will and figure out where the boundaries – where
we agree, and where we disagree.”
Just as a side-note, for those of you who’re
watching, when I respond to Dennett I’ll
be sure to address his concerns as well as
his arguments.
“But, it reminded me of something else,
that I think I’m going to attribute to James
Randi, which (and I’m paraphrasing), real
magic is fake and fake magic is real.
It’s this notion of magic, and it’s had
a context in people’s minds throughout history,
and its people pretending to do magic that
we now recognise as magic.
You go see a magician, you hopefully realise,
that, you know, he’s not actually sawing
somebody in half, he’s not actually levitating…
these are acts of deception.”
Okay, so I appreciate what you’re saying
here – you’d like for us to say that ‘real
free will is fake and fake free will is real’,
but I see several problems with this…
The first is that there’s always been at
least two prominent definitions of the word
‘magic’, but only one prominent definition
of the term ‘free will’, and there’s
really good reasons for this.
Throughout history some conjurers (and their
follows) have claimed that they have paranormal
and supernatural powers, while other conjurers
(and their followers) have claimed that they’re
simply deceiving people with illusions and
tricks, but when it comes to free will, almost
everyone has, and still does, buy into the
illusion (the ‘magic’, if you will) that
they are entirely autonomous – they really
do believe that they have libertarian free
will.
It’s an incredible persuasive illusion,
and it permeates every endeavour of our lives.
And the second problem, and the most important,
is that you’re not trying to create a new
definition of ‘free will’, you’re trying
to redefine the old one.
In effect, you’re asserting that ‘paranormal
magic is real… but it’s just not paranormal’.
Surely, you can see the problem with this?
What you’re doing isn’t invalid, of course,
but it’s definitely disingenuous.
You know, this analogy with magic reminds
me of a fantastic point that Harris once made
in response to Dennett conjuring a similar
analogy: “The disagreement between Dan and
myself is essential this - it's like, we're
living in a world where most people believe
in Atlantis, and they believe in the underwater
kingdom, and they read Plato closely trying
to figure out where it was, and, um, I want
to say 'Atlantis doesn't exist, it didn't
exist, people are confused about Atlantis'.
Dan wants to say that ‘Atlantis is really
Sicily’, and he'll give a whole argument
about why Sicily answers to many of the claims
that people are making about Atlantis, and
I want to say 'no, but they're still talking
about being underwater…
Sicily doesn't do that', and he's says 'well
Sicily is a great place, and there's reasons
to visit, and let's talk about Sicily', and
when he and I argue about this he begins to
respond to me as though I'm saying 'Sicily
doesn't exist', and that's... so there's a
fair amount talking past one-another in these
kinds of debates.
Of course Sicily exists but the people who're
talking about underwater... an underwater
kingdom, are at the very least confused - and
that's the situation we're in with free will.”
So, to be crystal clear, I entirely appreciate
that with extensive and laborious effort,
over a very long time span, you may be able
to redefine ‘free will’, but it seems
to me patently obvious that, again, you can
retain all of the value that you care about
by just using the word ‘will’.
The reason Dennett won’t use this word is
because, as you’ve just said, he’s afraid
of the consequences, but you’re not, so
seriously, why are you insisting on retaining
it?
“It’s okay, and this was the point that
Krauss made at the end that I liked, when
he redefines ‘nothing’ – this is what
he looks at as learning.”
Again, I disagree – it’s not okay for
him to redefine the word.
It’s perfectly okay for him to create a
new definition and to declare that the old
one is nonsense, but it’s not okay for him
to redefine the old one.
When people say ‘nothing’ they mean ‘The
absence of everything’, and so telling people
‘Nothing is real… but it’s just not
nothing’ is indeed disingenuous…
“That we have… he didn’t go into it
in great detail, but like I was saying a minute
ago, the understanding that we have of nothing
is not a thing.
It’s nothing that could exist, you know,
creation ex nihilo, and the idea of creating
something completely from nothing – all
of that’s nonsense, but there may be a context
of nothing that actually is valuable and real.
I think that’s the -case for morality, I
also think that’s the case for free will.”
So I’ve already expressed that I think you’re
wrong in asserting that Harris is redefining
‘morality’, and that I object to Krauss
redefining ‘nothing’, and so I won’t
repeat myself again.
But this really does get to the heart of the
conflict – you and I share almost exactly
the same view on free will, but we disagree,
quite critically, on its definition.
By explaining why your views differ from Sam’s,
you’ve put forward a few argument and analogies
as to why you think the term ‘free will’
is worth retaining, and I’ve responded by
explaining why I find them flawed, and why
I think you’re better off using the word
‘will’.
But at the end of the day we’re on the same
side in all but name, and, really, that’s
all what truly matters.
We both believe in Sicily, but you want to
call Sicily ‘Atlantis’, and I don’t,
because Sicily is not underwater, and that’s
what people really care about.
They shouldn’t, I agree, but they do.
As always, thank you kindly for the view,
and an extra special thank you to my wonderful
patrons and those of you who’ve donated
via PayPal.
You’re awesome!
Oh, and Matt, if you’re willing and able
to discuss this topic at length then know
that I’d certainly be interested, as I’m
sure it would make for a very fruitful conversation
that both of our audiences would enjoy.
You and I are not Harris and Dennett, of course,
but we seem to represent the contention between
them quite nicely.
Would be awesome to hear from you, but I appreciate
that you’re a very busy man.
Keep being awesome, Sir!
You’re an inspiration
