At the height of more then 6000 feet above the sea level
A battle was about to take place for the first time in the history of the world
They didn’t know how it would end,
but they knew it wasn’t going to be easy.
Gen PN Hoon deployed the Northern command and the 15 Corps to the Saltoro ridge.
Ladakh Scouts, and a company from 4 Kumaon was also deployed along with a unit of MI8
and Cheetah helicopters from the Air Force.
A chain of command was established
Lt. Col Pushkar Chand would be the Task Force Commander
with Captain Sanjay Kulkarni heading the platoon from 4 Kumaon to Bilafond La.
Major AK Bahuguna would be heading the Ladakh Scouts to Sia La
and Lt. Col. D.K Khanna would be taking on Gyong La with 19 Kumaon.
The first target for Operation Meghdoot was to occupy the Siachen glacier,
specifically Indira Col, Sia La, Bilafond La and Gyong La
the most important points on the Saltoro ridge.
But at an altitude of around 6500 feet
India had to face an enemy even more lethal - the weather.
The temperature in the glacial areas drops to below -30 degree Celsius.
Basic tasks like breathing, talking and walking start feeling Herculean.
The soldiers on ground would risk High Altitude Pulmonary Edema,
Hypothermia, frost bites and even Amnesia.
Pilots were warned about acute sunburn and a condition known as white-out
when after looking at vast stretches of white snow and no landmarks, pilots face spatial disorientation.
A training camp was set up for the troops at HAWS,
High Altitude Warfare School run by Col Kumar
where the troops would be getting training in mountain warfare and acclimatizing.
All troops including Capt. Sanjay Kulkarni and Lt. Col Pushkar Chand sans the Ladakhi Scouts,
who were a mountain-based force that were already acclimatized to high altitudes.
They needed thermal coats, pants, balaclavas,
tents, ice axes, goggles, ice shoes which were available only in Europe.
But when Gen Hoon contacted their supplier in Europe
they were privy to an essential piece of intelligence.
The supplier, while readily offering another supplier’s number, voiced his inability to service Gen Hoon.
Because there had been an order for more than 150 pieces of winter equipment and gear by Pakistan
In Pakistan, a meeting was held in December 1983, in the GHQ Operation Room
under the chairmanship of President General Zia-ul -Haq.
in this meeting Maj Gen Pir Dad Khan (Commander of the Northern Areas) was given the task of pre-empting
occupation of the passes, reaching there not later than May 1984,
as weather conditions before that period would not allow the use of helicopters and the PAF.
This decision, to launch their operation in May was a serendipitous moment for India.
Brig Channa was correct.
Years later Pakistan’s Military  Dictator General Pervez Musharraf
would admit in his book “In The Line of Fire” that India “pre-empted us”.
Any action on the glacier was only possible around mid- June
But Brig Channa wasn’t ready to wait that long
His tactic was surprise.
It was a race, and the winner takes Bilafond La and Siachen.
What stayed with him even 35 years later was when he questioned the delivery
of the new equipment which could be delayed
and asked the men if they would venture into the subzero terrain
with less than adequate clothing?
The answer, he remembers, was a vociferous YES!
Lt Gen Hoon, air marshal MSO Wollen,
Commander-in-Chief, western air command, AVM A Dayala,
Air officer commanding of Jammu and Kashmir
and Maj Gen Shiv Sharma
and carried out a sortie over Sia La and Bilafond La.
The weather was not on their side.
It had started snowing and they could feel a storm building.
The other intense fear other than the impending storm was the winter clothing.
They were on the threshold of the Operation
and as yet the essential equipment hadn’t arrived.
On 13th April at 0530 hours a Cheetah helicopter took off
om Base camp to Bilafond-la.
It carried Capt. S.K Kulkarni and a soldier.
Sqdr Ldr Surinder Bains tells Capt Kulkarni that he isn’t  sure if the snow can withstand a landing.
He asks if they could jump.
Capt Kulkarni says that they can, but how would they know
if they wouldn’t get immersed in the soft snow?
The sack lands with a thud. It was safe to go down
Capt Kulkarni and his JCO take  the plunge.
Sqdr Ldr Bains did  17 sorties to deliver 27 soldiers.
At 0700 hours an Indian Flag is  planted on top of Bilafond La
The first point of Saltoro ridge was secured.
However, within 3 hours of landing, they had to evacuate
their radio operator who suffered from HAPE (High Altitude Pulmonary Oedema)
despite being trained, acclimatized
and fit. Now Capt. Kulkarni had a radio, but no radio operator.
29 men remained at Bilafond-La
but tragedy struck within 48 hours,
when another soldier died of Hypoxia
and they were down to 28.
And of these 28, 21 had got severe frostbite.
We could not proceed beyond our camp location because of poor weather.
We could not do that on the 14th again because of bad weather.
The moment of victory of the 13th of April turned to nervousness
because of the storm that picked up from the evening of the 13th and lasted till the 16th.
Everything came to a standstill.
The ground troops from the Base camp however had started to establish
camps 1 2 and 3 along the route to Bilafond-la.
This task was completed by the 15th of April.
Major Bahuguna who had to move to Sia-la
was meanwhile grounded at Base Camp because no helicopters could fly.
Meanwhile Captain Kulkarni’s switching on of the radio
pass on the information of a soldier’s death had been picked up, as expected.
They were paid a visit, and It wasn’t a friendly one.
Things were getting very uncomfortable for Brig.
All eyes in Northern Command
and the Military Operation Directorate were turned on him.
Sending troops in winter on the glacier now seemed a bad decision
and the entire onus was on him since he had been stubbornly adamant on the date and final call.
And after 3 days, the storm abated.
The Indian Air Force flew over 32 helicopter sorties, a record
on 5 Cheetahs and 2 Mi8’s to drop Major Bahuguna and 29 men 5 km east of Sia-la.
The Ladakhi scouts under Maj. Bahuguna trudged 5kms,
up the treacherous slopes, movement being extremely difficult
because of the heavy snowfall, to reach and occupy Sia-la.
While Capt. Kulkarni had occupied Bilafond-la on the 13th,
Major Bahuguna had Sia-la under his able command by the 17th.
Lt. Col. D.K Khanna meanwhile, with 19 Kumaon, was moving slowly to the highest
and most treacherous peak, Gyong-La
which they would eventually occupy by the first week of June.
The top brass in Northern Command now decided to take stock.
Since the Indian soldiers were visible to an immense number of Pakistan planes
flying furiously back and forth overhead,
and the fact that India had beaten them to the glacier, meant that a backlash was inevitable.
Sam- surface to air missiles-7 , 2 detachments were inducted at Sia-la and Bilafond-la
on 22nd and 23rd April.
2 Zu-23-2 guns were airlifted by Cheetahs to lolofond-la and the Siachin glacier.
2 Zu-23 guns were deployed for the protection of the Leh airfield a 2 more for the Thoise air field.
Indian intelligence had had reported a formation of a Burzil force on the Pakistani side,
in the 80 Infantry Brigade.
They had launched Operation Ababeel to evict Indian troops
and capture Bilafond La and SIa La.
Capt. Sanjay Kulkarni, well established with his platoon on Bilafond-la
had put a system in place where every hour the sentry would come
and give a report and Kulkarni would respond by saying ‘ok’ or ‘Ram Ram’.
He had posted one sentry at the edge of the pass
about 500 metres from where the tents were pitched called the listening post.
The sentry would stand at the farthest point possible to look out for any Pakistan troop movement.
From that position the sentry could see at least a kilometre into Pakistan territory.
It was a monotonous and physically demanding task.
The first serious attack came on the 23rd of June at 0450 hours.
26 Pakistani casualties were reported that day. The Indians had lost 1 man,
but this wasn’t the last attack.
In June Pakistan attempted another attack but it was thwarted by the Indians.
In August 1984 2 more attacks were mounted by Pakistan but they were foiled on both accounts,
and Pakistan suffered 30 odd casualties.
Meanwhile Gyong-La, the highest point at 18665 feet
had been secured by Lt. Col. D.K Khanna,
and the whole of Siachin was now under the control of the Indian Army.
