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# Nuclear: Turkey like N. Korea?

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# Explore the potentiality of climate change mitigation and energy efficiency policies being associated with pursuit of mastering nuclear weapons technological knowhow; in the new era within geopolitical context, as formulated by energy developments. Elaborating cases of N. Korea and Turkey.

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# by Georgios Ast. Zizopoulos

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# All rights reserved worldwide. This study is protected by Greek Law (L. 2121/1993 as modified and is valid today) on intellectual properties and by multilateral international conventions and agreements. No part of this book may be reproduced in any written, electronic, recording, or photocopying without written permission of the publisher or author. The exception would be in the case of brief quotations embodied in the critical articles or reviews and pages where permission is specifically granted by the publisher or author.

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# 1st Edition, Thessaloniki, December 2017  
Language: English   
ISBN: 978-960-93-9710-0   
Contact: https://sites.google.com/site/gzbiblio/   
© 2017, Georgios Ast. Zizopoulos

# Preface of English edition

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I know that many people will most probably read this study just because they are intrigued by the fact that is about nuclear weapons. Less will read it, in order to satisfy their curiosity about how can production of nuclear weapons be connected to energy efficiency and climate change mitigation policies.

But please, treat this study with respect, because for me is not about reaching to an affirmative conclusion on Turkey's future regarding nuclear weapons, but a demonstration of my commitment to principles and history of philosophy and sciences.

Besides, my motivation is to introduce a novel topic as also to utilize scientific tools and use previous studied knowledge in an innovative and creative way.

But let me shortly state how philosophy of science is being integrated, because I don't want this to be misinterpreted as a matter of cultural heritage. The latter due to the fact of used political realism of Thucydides, Aristotle's work on induction and deduction, or even Plutarch's concept of studying in parallel.

Although, foreign literature on political realism is extensively being used, this will not be utilized as an argument. Also I'm not going to lecture you on induction and how it troubled many other significant personalities during past times. Nor talk on similarities and parallel studying.

Actually I'd like to talk about building the structure of this study using elements of Euclidian and Euler's logic.

Regarding borrowing elements of Euclidian logic, you will find the use of axioms (i.e. accepting that Turkey already once reacted to EU's energy and climate policies by adopting a strategy of gas transit country, or, that nuclear program of N. Korea did not initiated after the implemented change in country's leadership), or the confirmation of an introduced proposition (i.e. linking in N. Korea's case) as true in a QED logic and then checking if this concept is being satisfied for another problem (Turkey's future propensity) in a QEF logic.

Regarding Euler's logic, it's a little bit trickier, since has to do with the substantial scope of this study. In particular, similarly to Euler's disassociation of natural details in "Seven Bridges of Koenigsberg" from problem's solution, here the conclusion on whether Turkey might reflect upon domestic nuclear weapons production is disassociated from components of nuclear weapons. So, if anybody might believe that in this study will find information on secret reactors, will most probably be disappointed.

Finally to be said, that this electronic copy is the translation of my original published work in Greek. Just keep in mind that though I have tried to translate in relative small periods, nevertheless the original was written in a more formal way and with longer periods. Of course, the translation completed over a weekend, so you may have to read it twice. Nevertheless, I have tried to use simple language.

Having these been said, it's up to readers to decide whether to read further or look for an other book.

# Preface of Greek edition

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The study your are holding, was initially intended to serve as a PhD proposal, so by design had to be original. Additional to that, I've tried to introduce a novel topic, that happens to concern issues of present times while being of national interest.

Unluckily, these virtues, make it difficult for me to find a supervisor that would be specialized on such topic, that would be interested in and that is not bounded from other obligations.

Nevertheless, despite its original purpose, having a PhD is not a goal in itself. Rather, it was a paid job, since I was targeting on getting a scholarship. Sadly, the deadline for applying for scholarship and the hard time I had for finding a supervisor in such sort time, did not allow me to proceed any further.

Thus, I decided to publish it in some scientific journal, instead. The reasons for this decision, are pretty clear. I don't want my working time to be wasted and also to get the recognition for my work.

The main title, would have been the same: "Explore the potentiality of climate change mitigation and energy efficiency policies being associated with pursuit of mastering nuclear weapons technological knowhow; in the new era within geopolitical context, as formulated by energy developments. Elaborating cases of N. Korea and Turkey".

So, as I was reorganizing information and adjusting structure in order to meet article's criteria, I was possessed by second thoughts.

And after balancing pros and cons, I decided to turn the aforementioned bad luck into an opportunity that must be exploited.

If this study was to be published as an e-book that will be sold under a symbolic price, the gains would be multiplied. Not only the earlier mentioned purposes would be fulfilled , but also the study would easier be communicated with a wider target group – not only experts – while Internet would operate as the mean of popularizing knowledge.

An operation that should be the default role of Internet. Nevertheless, as after Gutenberg's typography for printing the method also used in spreading misleading informations, in the same way, Internet's role in phasing the monopoly of knowledge out was abusively utilized for spreading news questionable to their degree of tolerance in accuracy.

So, selecting Internet's solution and in particular to distribute this study as e-book, not only I'm satisfying a personal projection on the role of technology – which is to serve scientific knowledge and help its communication – but also add my personal contribution towards this direction.

After all above, as can easily be understood the choice of e-book was selected.

As a result, I will try to introduce the elaborated topic through a comprehensive text, without trying to go on too long in technical talks. However, the text is densely-written, and should be read with proper assiduity. Moreover, once again the structure was adjusted, so that it will be easier to be read in a linear way. Also the main title was set as secondary, while the main title became: "Nuclear: Turkey like N. Korea?".

I hope to meet your acceptance, since it will also help you to better "read" the world by adding a piece in a very complex jigsaw.

# Abstract

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In this study, is being developed and examined the validity of a hypothesized propensity in Turkey's future entropy for nuclear arms under the perspective of being connected to energy and climate change policies; as a case study. In particular, whether Turkey could at least seek and pursuit technological knowhow acquisition on nuclear weapons in connection to EU's climate mitigation and energy efficiency policies. In order to be able to conclude on the aforementioned, initially such connection between this category of policies and development of nuclear arms is being illustrated, for the existing case of N. Korea in reference to China's policies.

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#  Keywords:  China, climate change, economics, energy, EU, geopolitics, international relations, N. Korea, natural resources, nuclear weapons, policies, political realism, trade, Turkey 
Table of Contents

Cover page

Preface of English edition

Preface of Greek edition

Abstract

1.Introduction

2.How to be read

2α. Reasoning schemas

2β. Functional vs substantial role of N. Korea

2γ. Concluding procedure

2δ. Approaching conclusions

3. Theoretical framework

4. What has and has not been discussed

5. N. Korea's case

5α. In advanced given

5β. Drivers of China's policies

5γ. Uncertainty and energy trade

5δ. Cross-checking rational reasoning

6. Turkey's case

6α. Side by side study and parallelisms

6β. Big picture

6γ. Shortly illustrating EU policies' momentum

6δ. Under Morgenthau's prism

7. Constraints and limitations

8. Conclusions

Bibliography

Greek

English

Back cover

# Introduction

And Poesy is always one like one is the sky.  
What matters is from where anyone stares the sky.  
I have stared the sky right through the sea.  
(Odysseas Elytis, The Little Nautilus)

This study – shortly bearing the title of "Nuclear: Turkey like N. Korea?" – is a novel approach to nuclear weapons, that introduces the missing link between them and both energy and climate policies.

In particular, the kind of policies that are being associated with controlling and limiting fossil fuel's utilization, gas emissions and harmful air pollutants. Namely, those of energy efficiency and climate change mitigation policies.

We have all attained debates around the environmental impact of fossil fuels, their contribution to countries' trade balance, or even on global warming controversy and whether climate change is indeed occurring.

During this study, will be illustrated that even if climate change is milder than the estimated one, nevertheless its policies' effect is undeniable, while resulting impacts can be non-transparent and invisible connected; not only observable. Moreover, the aforementioned impacts can be enhanced by the effect of a combined action with energy efficiency policies. This combined effect still lies under the same non-observed impacting status; that generally can be described as unanticipated and undesirable consequences.

Consequences like, promoting seek and pursuit of technological knowhow acquisition on nuclear weapons at least or/and accelerating advancements in nuclear weapons development. Respectively to reflection upon production of nuclear weapons as a minimum determinant, the validity of a hypothesized propensity in Turkey's future entropy, is being developed and examined. While, featuring accelerated advancements, the link will be illustrated through N. Korea's paradigm.

In more details. Through this study, is being introduced and examined the linkage between China's climate change mitigation and energy efficiency policies with N. Korea's recent nuclear weapons related tests. Such, will be elaborated under the prism of disrupted trade patterns between China - N. Korea, or and the uncertainty on the stability of these patterns.

Furthermore, will be introduced and explored the likelihood of similar linkage existence elsewhere, as a hypothetical case study. To be more precise, will be examined the validity of a hypothesized propensity in Turkey's future entropy for domestic production of nuclear arms under the perspective of energy and climate change policies of European Union (EU). Turkey's case study will finally be cross-checked through Morgenthau's view of foreign policy perspectives in accommodating nation's interests; as being succeeded both through peaceful means and against national interest of other nations.

In general, the elaboration of topic is being brought by connecting causes and means with effects, so that actors' behavior based on intellectual context of political realism could be backed up by something tangible and meaningful. This is being succeeded by enlightening various aspects under the dimension of energy policies, rather than trying to demonize individuals, policies and energy sources. Besides, the latter is not considered as part of targeted aims.

Also, concerning conceptual framework's articulation of parent study, should be noted its pioneering character while utilizes existing knowledge in an innovative way to produce new.

In particular, in one hand, are being explored the factors that could at least contribute in acquisition of knowhow in relevance to not that peaceful use of nuclear technology. Such approach, is being attempted through the perspective of policies' impacting (non-transparent and invisible), and rational behavior of actors.

On the other hand, the aforementioned exploration is being conducted in connection to international relations – and specifically foreign policy of one country as a reaction to energy and climate change policies of (an) other countr-y/ies – in the ground of energy trade.

Finally at the end of this study, mainly the following two questions will have been answered; amongst others.

  1. Whether the occurred uncertainty on the stability of trade patterns between N. Korea and China – to the extent of being affected by China's energy efficiency and climate change mitigation policies – could influence properties of nuclear weapons development schedule; namely planned time allocation. The focused time frame of latter, would not be since the very early beginning of N. Korea's nuclear programme, but rather since it was principally manifested by Kim Jong-Un (Mansourov, 2014) with a stress to recent developments.

  2. How could Turkey react, when EU's transition to a new energy era – as described by a RES dominated energy-mix – or even earlier when phasing out comes to a point where Turkey's natural gas transit services will not be considered as strategic asset anymore. And more precisely, whether EU's energy efficiency and climate change mitigation policies could likely contribute (and in combination with other factors) to Turkey's reflection upon nuclear weapons domestic production.

But of course, before everything, all the necessary infos and terms on political realism and how these are being adapted into the context of this study will be provided; so that to make easier causation's comprehension and let readers to reach conclusions on their own.

# How to be read

He who learns but does not think, is lost!  
He who thinks but does not learn is in great danger.  
(Confucius)

Before delving into study's inner core and answering title's issue at stake, is crucial that all readers should not omit reading this chapter. The reason for this, is so that reader can easier follow writer's argumentation till concluding closure and since early start.

Beside reading this chapter, also reading theoretical framework and limitations of study, is considered useful and also being suggested by the writer.

## Reasoning schemas

The following reasoning schemas, can be noted.

  1. Initially, having in mind Turkey's behavior pattern in exercising its foreign policy and in particular regarding Turkey's reaction to EU's energy efficiency and climate change mitigation policies, in reference to those of controlling the gradual transition to RES domination through natural gas domination in energy mix – what is shortly described by the generic term "pipes diplomacy" – can be said that Turkey have utilized peaceful means. So Turkey's reaction is the stepping stone in connecting foreign policy of one country with the particular sub-genre of energy and climate policies than have been adopted by other countries; at least by peaceful means.

  2. Afterwards, by studying N. Korea's paradigm, is illustrated the fact that such linkage between foreign policy of one state and the aforementioned policies' category of other state(s) can not only be identified by peaceful means. In particular can be associated with targeting in domestic production of nuclear weapons; along with accompanied programmes (i.e. ballistic missiles).

  3. Thus, eventually will be examined whether Turkey could include in its foreign policy toolset similar components to those just mentioned in second pillar. This case study, will be developed on the ground of Turkey's reaction to EU's policies that are targeting in fading out of transitional period of natural gas.

Nevertheless, should be stated that paper's structure is slightly different, by organizing provided information in separate chapters according to studied country. The latter is attributed in having a less complex structure that could produce perplexities while allowing readers to easier locate needed information.

## Functional vs substantial role of N. Korea

At this point, is considered useful to clarify the difference between functional and substantial role of N. Korea, for this study.

As explicitly stated above, the functional role of N. Korea is to bridge the two phases of Turkey's foreign policy to EU's aforementioned policies. In particular, between the noted as occurred – which is generally described as "pipes diplomacy" – and the hypothesized which will be tested.

Nevertheless, N. Korea's substantial role does not exactly coincide. More specifically, is about clearly pointing out that during transition from coal to liquid fossil fuels and during the disengagement of them, is not the energy source itself that results in the various geopolitical events. Rather are, the taking place or anticipated to be realized (absolute or relative) changes to balance of power, following other associated changes; such as, modification of energy trade partnership statuses.

Such shift of states' position of power, most probable will play key role during following years, since we are in the middle of a transitional period which is bounded by two different eras; as described by the dominated source of energy. The one that we are just about to live behind in EU, by fading out to natural gas, and the one of RES domination. Hence we are about to live in interesting times, that will be studied by historians and political scientists of future.

## Concluding procedure

Following the taking of evidence, the following logical path of argumentation should be noted.

At the beginning, the suggested theory – of the policies under investigation and nuclear weapons linking – would be explored and the factual ground of supported evidences will be highlighted; at least for one occurring case (Quod Erat Demonstrandum). For this, N. Korea's example will be used.

Subsequently, the soundness of the aforementioned will be tested, and in particlar for whether could reproduce similar linking effects; in other cases. However, since the described link is not some natural phenomenon that deterministically takes place and the proposed theory is not a mathematical model that describes this link, the following two points should be highlighted. The first is the prerequisite of traced similarities between tested at time case with ones for which the link has already been identified. And the second is that the contingency of failure can not fully be ignored. In any case, the tested theory should be carried out under scientific standards, and always being proceeded along with acknowledging limitations.

Moreover, should be noted the fact that it's not yet possible to use cases from past times, since the suggested link cannot precede the referred policies. Thence, the illustrated link will be cross-checked under a hypothesized case study (Quod Erat Faciendum). This case study will examine the validity of a hypothesized propensity in Turkey's future entropy for nuclear arms under the perspective of being connected to energy and climate change policies of EU. Of course the dimension of forecasting propensity of future events, is not considered a guesswork, since is elaborated on the ground of factual argumentation.

In support of selecting Turkey as the country to be used in the latter case study, should be noted that has already adjusted once it's foreign policies as a reaction to EU's referenced above policies; even though using peaceful means. The latter won't extensively be discussed and for the greatest part of this study, is almost axiomatically being accepted in advance; without being interested in challenging the peaceful characterization since such would lessen the effort to conclude in possible linking.

Having in mind all above, can be said that answering to title's question is not simple at all. On the contrary is the culmination of an intellectually complex syllogism.

## Approaching conclusions

In order to avoid perplexities and ensuing misinterpretations, is considered useful that readers should at least to be acquainted with the following.

In N. Korea's case the described situation and it's events are taking place at present time without having reached to an end yet, while the other one lies on the ground of future events. Moreover, at the very time of all these, developments are dynamically progressing. So, in principle, is not part of study's aiming to operate as an prejudice of future developments. Where this study aims, is to enlighten various aspects under the dimension of energy policies on the ground of observed patterns.

Of course, reaching to a conclusion on Turkey's propensity does not automatically imply realization or/and realization absolutely in a certain way, but for sure is a sound indicator of current patterns. However, ending up to a universal rule regarding the suggested linking that will certainly fit studying of other countries, is not considered as a mature choice.

Thus, utilization of reductionism and induction in general is not suggested when considering such universal rules as mentioned above; especially when your pool of examples contains two (at top) case studies. Nonetheless proceeding with critical thinking and adjusting reasoning of parent text to other cases not only is not discouraged but is considered quite useful in a sense of a more exhaustive study of suggested linking. Besides, the latter could feed-back this study.

Finally, the exploration is being safely conducted under the prism of political realism. Albeit it would be useful, the suggested linking to be approached also from the point of view of other methods, in order to fully comprehend the mechanism of the aforementioned connection.

# Theoretical framework

..as stones and bricks, wood  
and tiles, if thrown together in confusion,  
are of no use whatever.  
(Xenophon, Memorabilia, 3.1.7)

In this chapter, lies the hard core of theoretical framework that has been used for this study.

Before going any further, should explicitly stated that models (e.g. climate, energy etc.) will sparingly be used in order to avoid their complexity and their own limitations. As also so that to provide readers an easier to be read text by non-experts in the area.

Besides, in on hand is not considered as inevitably necessary to be illustrated that China will reach its most ambitious targets in fighting climate change and seeking energy efficiency, while on the other hand Europe is considered as one of the leading powers in these areas. Thence, is plenty enough mainly to exhibit that China is certainly moving towards this direction. Such certainty will be derived form the causes and the facilitating necessities that drives the motivation of suggesting and bringing to action all those policies.

Thus, as can easily be understood, the main used method will be that of political realism (that is notoriously traced back into Thucydides).

As far as political realism is being considered, for start, should be noted that even though there is an everlasting debate between supporters of different schools of thoughts in the area of international relations and decision making (e.g. realism, liberalism etc.) – equally excessive to traditional "war" between different economic schools, especially when considering optimum trade-offs between "marketization" and distributional justice (Zizopoulos, 2017) – however using the particular method is not a choice of dogmatic application of a single method. Thus, political realism, is not applied in a diligently formalist way. It is rather considered as tool that its use and the extent of its use should be in harmony to the needs of the study.

Also generally speaking on realism, there are scholars that do consider it as an obsolete perspective, that mainly developed during past and suits better in reference to those time (Lebow & Risse, 1997; Legro & Moravcsik, 1999; Waltz, 2000; Russett, 2001); and not as an alternative perspective. A alternative perspective that could operate supplementary or contribute by comparing its contracting outcomes, so that to get a better picture (Moravcsik, 1992; D'Anieri, 2017).

Nevertheless, other scholars do claim that the international stage has not been critically altered, so that its qualities can still be described by political realism (Waltz, 2000).

But even if for the sake of promoting such debate to next level, we do accept that it might suits better when considering the characteristics of past times and in particular that of cold war, then we should also admit that nuclear weapons' production do divide wold in a rudimentary bi-polar way; between those that produce or want to, but don't have the consent of rest and the rest.

Moreover, reaching to conclusions can be achieved in many ways that are not necessary uniquely linked together or and with the elaborated topic, while many important questions could receive multiple answers (D'Anieri, 2017). As such, depreciating one of oldest methods and with extended literature in energy issues, like realism, considered as a luxurious choice and in expense of knowledge.

Not to mention, that exploring the topic under the dimension of realism's rationality, is something useful for determining the boundaries between this approach and others (i.e. idealistic, psychosocial), as also between interests of states and those of individuals or groups of them (e.g. elite). This, could explain the chronological order in which various approaches heavily integrated in international relations studying. So, using realism is also valuable in cases of a subject described as novel, just as the parent study.

At this point, should be noted that liberalism indeed can outclass other approaches, in recognizing forthcoming gradual transitions (Moravcsik, 1992). Nevertheless, liberalism axiomatically presumes that societies' decision-making procedure is based on polycentric model (Irakleidis, 2015). But, such model, obviously is not the case for N. Korea. As far as concerning Turkey, in contrast with N. Korea, could be said that when considering electoral system of Turkey and the fact of a multi-party democracy, the claim of polycentrism could be proved true. Nevertheless, being at state of emergency since 20th July of 2016 (Srivastava, 2016; DW, 2017; Reuters, 2017a; Reuters, 2017b) and without being able to know what will follow (even) after the end of emergency state – especially because if Turkey is indeed going to exhibit such intentions in future, and specifically in the future time before EU's implemented transition and before Turkey's gas pipelines are no longer considered as a "strategic asset", then the design and made decisions should take place in a not that long-term horizon – as also when considering Turkey's traditionally centralized character as a state (Loewendahl-Ertugal, 2005; Özçelik, 2011; Taşpinar, 2011a; Kaliber, 2014), in a second though makes sense to use political realism instead.

Of course, the utilization of political realism as a tool, does not entail an according to Waltz rejecting of characteristics like ideology (Waltz, 1979; Irakleidis, 2015); since is applied selectively. Besides, lets not forget that ideological argumentation is being included in Kim Jong Un's Nuclear Doctrine (Mansourov, 2014). Nevertheless, regarding foreign policy in general, ideology could occasionally operate as a cloak able to camouflage purposes with a deeper meaning or could be used to describe similar things with different vocabulary, and in any case to harden attempting a fully attribution of primal causes to results. Such personal view, is mainly different from those expressed by many realists (Carr, 1964; Fozouni, 1995; Hanish, 2013; Irakleidis, 2015), in including adverb "occasionally". The latter is being used so that more cases could be treated; like of bottom-up built strategies of foreign policies (i.e. when politicians express people's common demand), or when foreign policy is being affected by street-level policy-makers that cannot utterly understand highly technical issues.

In this vein, ideological reasoning should be critically examined in a case-by-case study. However, including the dimension of ideology is not part of study's targeting, and so argumentation that derives from such reasoning will not be used even though could enhance the urgent nature of title's question.

For example. Are not being used causations based on "neo-ottomanism" ideology, even though – not only does not coincide with a west-oriented view, but also – makes scholars wonder if could be better described by the term of "eurasianism"; for better attributing the notion of declining from aforementioned orientation (Wigen, 2009; Taşpinar, 2011a; Sengupta, 2014). Despite, the existence of studies claiming that such declining is anticipated to precede or co-exist with Turkey's realization of its nuclear ambitions (McCurdy, 2008).

Nevertheless, avoiding the use of ideological reasons as arguments is one thing, while utilizing structural elements that shape or interact with ideology is another thing. Thus, the latter will not be excluded from this study. Par example, elements like improvement in Turkey's economy, the relatively significant population size – inside and outside Turkey – and a rising domestic defense industry, do provide for Turkey the space to exercise foreign policy in more independent way. However, such foreign policy is within the determinants of "neo-ottomanism"; in contrast to a foreign policy exclusively committed to a west-oriented nature. So, Turkey's inclination towards Asia could not be ignored, even though such view could also be attributed to ideological reasons.

Going further regarding application of political realism, should be noted that the elaboration of topic will be based in three pillars as can be found in Hanish article under the title «The 1990 Gulf Crisis: Political Realism Applied», but adjusted to parent's study framework.

According to first pillar, external forces when comparing to internal factors, are being considered as rather major contributers in determination of states' foreign policy.

This, in our cases, is translated in a higher influential role of the specified energy-climate policies of China and EU over foreign policy of N. Korea and Turkey respectively; rather than factors originating from within their own countries.

According to second pillar, states tend to pursue their national interest in terms of maximizing their power (Hanish, 2013). Thus, we assume that the rationale behind countries that are going for adding domestic produced nuclear weapons to their arsenal, is the determinant of maximizing their power. Such maximization, is not apprehended only as a mean of deterrence in a "balance of terror", but rather – in terms of law of force or simply called "might is the right" – as a leverage for serving their interests (e.g. economy, politics).

According to third pillar, the maximization of states power is accomplished through rational decisions (Hanish, 2013).

To be noticed, that in terms of political realism as defined above and for this study, the two latter pillars are inextricably linked; thus having found the requirements for supporting second pillar, then will almost inevitably found those for third.

Also to be noticed that, when comes to rationality and third pillar, along with the criteria for determining actions and decisions built upon realistic logic comes the likelihood of subjectively judging. For example, what assumed as rational for the analyst, might not be rational in culture of involved party (Penney et. al, 2013).

Albeit, N. Korea already exhibited that can "read" rational made choices of great powers and other sovereign states according to their culture, in a "tit-for-tat" tactic; which evolved by them. And can be said that actually did that quite well, when considering the accomplished money-flow with direction from international donors to N. Korea – in terms of financial aid, and – in exchange for made pledges on nuclear use.

Could that be the reason for the attempted re-introduce of "unpredictability doctrine" (Fuchs, 2017; Sullivan & Tumulty, 2017; Thrush & Landler, 2017) by the current president of US? Or is that, because was something that N. Korea might was expecting; based on Nixon's heritage (Burr & Kimball, 2015; Fuchs, 2017; Thrush & Landler, 2017). Nevertheless, this issue is presented over-simplified so that cannot capture the full rational behind. Thus, this example should only be considered as demonstration of culture's role in rational made choices and nothing more.

Having above in mind, can be said that "game" of rational choices, supports author's choice for selecting political realism as the vehicle for analysis.

Approaching summarization, two crucial principles that are derived from neorealism (Morgenthau, 1952; Hanish, 2013), should be mentioned. According to first principle the accommodation of a nation's interests could be accomplished by utilizing peaceful means. Juxtaposed to that, according to second principle, nations can also defend their national interests against those of other nations.

After all above, shortly summarizing what has been written in this chapter, can be said that this study will primarily be accomplished using political realism. However political realism is not applied in a diligently formalist way, but rather adjusted to context of study. The justification behind selecting political realism as a tool, lies on several reasons. Some of them are: 1) the observed bipolarization of international scene as far as production of nuclear weapons is being concerned, 2) the system of countries governance, 3) rational pattern of involved parts, or anticipation for such followed patterns.

Additionally, during the elaboration of topic, the following three pillars will be used: 1) the role of external forces in forging foreign policy of some state, 2) states tend to pursue their national interest in terms of maximizing their powers, and 3) the pursue is described by realistic rational.

Moreover, the fact that political realism is not a choice of a strict application, gives the necessary degrees of freedom for adopting principles from neorealism. These are being attributed to Morgenthau, and will be used in Turkey's case.

Finally, to be noted that for this study the expression "realistic rational" will be used for describing the logical patterns on the ground of political realism, and would be considered as equal in meaning with other characterizations like "logical pathways", "realistic logic", or simple just "rational".

# What has and has not been discussed

The greatest single element in all  
prospecting, past, present and  
future, is the man  
willing to take a chance.  
(Everett Lee DeGolyer)

Today is known and well studied the effect of hampering stability and peace disturbance as the result of exploitation or/and anticipation of exploiting mineral resources – and in particular those connecting to fuels – or aspiration for controlling them.

In the above reasoning can be subsumed the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 (Cordesman & Wagner, 1990), or the conducted by Iraqis invasion of Kuwait at 1990 and the subsequent Persian Gulf War (Gause, 2001; Hanish, 2013).

Albeit, the burst of such wars, occurred inevitably when considering the amounts of modernized – in reference to wars' present time – weapons and machinery in general that were concentrated in the area of South-West Asia (Peters & Deshong, 1995).

Also known, are cases of forcing economic and political pressure by using fuels as a leverage. For example like was the case of 1973 oil crisis (OECD, 1973; Siniver, 2013; Penney et. al, 2013).

Or, as happened in cases of attempting to exert influence. Such cases could even be traced, just after the end of WWII, like the signed «Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement» of 8th August 1945 (U.S. Senate, 1945).

The above, can be portrayed by the paradigm of energy intensive economies, and can be connected to non-sustainable use of, or and depletion of energy resources (Meadows, 1972; Hubbert, 1974; Zizopoulos, 2017). These economies, are also negatively linked regarding pollution (Allan, 2009; Canes, 2015; Wu et. al, 2016; He et. Al, 2016; Chen et. Al, 2016; Xia et. al, 2016). The latter is the reason why developing countries are being discouraged from following the same non-sustainable developing paths (OECD, 2011; OECD, 2012a; OECD, 2012b; OECD, 2014).

The paradigm of non-sustainable economies based on use of fossil fuels, is also used so that to justify the need for a gradual transition to a new era concerning economy for developed countries; when the aforementioned paradigm will have been transformed to the model of "green economy". The vehicle for such transition, are the policies of energy efficiency and climate change mitigation.

Until now, any negative effect of the just mentioned policies can mainly be distinguished in two categories. The first, is expressed in terms of a suggested degrowth (Latouche, 2006; Smith, 2010; Foster, 2011; Blauwhof, 2012). The second, is related to how fair is for developing countries to be asked to ratify additional measurements when their per capita emissions are below world's average (Pickering et. al, 2012; Moore, 2014; Shukla et. al, 2015; Underdal & Wei 2015; Robiou et. al, 2017). Thus, negative references are respectively associated to accompanied suggestions and equitability between states.

Apart from these, there is also a criticism on the effectiveness of Market Based Mechanisms, like the EU Emission Trading Scheme (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008; Judson & Stavins 2008; Helm, 2009; Revel, 2011).

Having above in mind can be said that negative aspects can be either more theoretical (like degrowth) or more applied in a sense of adaptive management (like EU ETS).

So as can easily be understood, until now there is a lacking literature on the impact of these policies of one country on the foreign policy of another, and more specifically on unanticipated and undesirable consequences. In particular, on at least promoting seek and pursuit of technological knowhow acquisition on nuclear weapons production or/and accelerating advancements in nuclear weapons development.

Nevertheless, there are studies that – maybe do not focus on policies' impact, but they do – focus on the effect of climate change itself upon the landscape of geopolitical influence (Mou, et. al 2017); albeit not in connection to nuclear weapons.

According to Mou, et. al (2017), climate change can indeed impact on the shifting landscape of geopolitical influence, but without being crystal clear to which extent since can also be attributed to preexisting factors. Moreover, exerting influence can significantly vary in a country-based scope, so countries can be classified in four different groups. However, even within the same group, countries tend to arrange their priorities according to their own needs and thus groups can not be considered as uniform.

As far as nuclear weapons are being concerned, in general one of the most notorious explanation for assembling and possessing nuclear weapons is the one described by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence (Klein, 1994; Joseph & Reichart, 1998).

Nevertheless, deterrence is a rather generic term. According to Narang, three main categories can be distinguished on how such weapons can be utilized. Shortly naming them, these are: 1) catalytic role in a geopolitical context, 2) assured retaliation or second strike, and 3) as a tool of asymmetric escalation (Narang, 2014; Shane, 2015).

Especially for N. Korea, various explanations have been given; even not including pure military reasoning (Graham, 2013; Lanʹkov, 2015; Narang, 2014; Shane, 2015). For example, like targeting at diplomatic achievements (Lanʹkov, 2015), or oven as a technological demonstration to any interested buyer (Graham, 2013).

However, explanations suggesting drivers that are non-transparent and invisible connected to what is perceived as N. Korea's strategical desideratum is a mere chance; even though that tracing back to causes that are driving developments is commonly used.

Thus, as some scholar's are noting down, the already analyzed motivations cannot easily be integrated in a strategic analysis of linking means with results based in rational patterns (Shagan, 1997; Shane, 2015).

So, having all above in mind, can easily be understood that not only from the side of scholars who are studying energy and climate change there was any attempt to confirm/reject any connection to nuclear weapons, but also from the side of scholars that focus their studies in nuclear arms there was no intension to look after those policies.

Finally, what already has been said about N. Korea is also valid for Turkey. But this time, rational justification, is being put in terms of other countries' nuclear capabilities. For example, from time to time the international community's worries are being expressed as a concern to Turkey's nuclear ambitiousness in relevance to nuclear programme of Iran (Dorian, 2006; Larrabee, 2007; Dario, 2009; McCurdy, 2008; Chalmers & Lunn, 2010; Kibaroglu M., 2014; Jewell , & Ates, 2015). Nevertheless, published works from scholars of Turkish origin, do assert that such ambitiousness is not the case for the near-by future (Dinç, 2011; Kibaroglu M., 2014). While other works published in Turkish journals, explicitly state that realization of a nuclear programme is anticipated concurrently to or preceded by a diversion of Turkish foreign policy from being west-oriented; albeit such realization comes along with significant economic and political costs (McCurdy, 2008). Of course, there are not only disputants of realizing nuclear projects, but also people that openly support them (MEMRI, 2017a; MEMRI, 2017b; O'BRIEN, 2017).

# N. Korea's case

There are not more than five musical  
notes, yet the combinations  
of these five give rise to more  
melodies than can ever be heard..  
(Sun Tzu, The Art of War)

Shifting away from the energy era of solid fossil fuels (coal) to this of liquid (oil) – Winston Churchill's doctrine (Dahl, 2001;Luft & Korin, 2009) – oil's economy contributed in the characteristics of a shifting geopolitical landscape, the development of advanced weapons and on hampering stability.

Today, we are in the middle of another transition, between two different eras regarding energy. In particular shifting towards to energy-related age of RES domination. Energy efficiency and climate change mitigation policies are leading such transition; worldwide.

During this transitional period, the restrainment of solid and liquid fuels popularity is being supported by a largely growing natural gas penetration and partially the use of unconventional gas (eg shale gas).

Furthermore the ongoing transition is being developed gradually in a step up way. Thus, policies – at some point close to their ratification – might be perceived as idle and not being related to each other, while their effectiveness is being argued; albeit over time is not expected to carry on the same pattern. The latter will be apparent through drivers that lead China's such policies.

## In advanced given

In reference to earlier mentioned time frame, the likelihood of China's climate change mitigation and energy efficiency policies to be reflected on N. Korea's accelerated advancements regarding its non-peaceful nuclear programme will be studied.

For exploring the suggested link, the following two points regarding N. Korea's tests would be considered as given facts and generally true:

  * Of military purpose nuclear apparatus.  
Since 2006 (Fedchenko, 2009; SIPRI, 2012).

  * Missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMB); as the vehicle that will carry nuclear weapons towards target (Mansourov, 2014).  
Precursor of ICMB, was the unsuccessful lunch of satellite in 2009 (Reuters, 2009; The White House, 2009, Mariani, 2017), while concerning strictly non-military use of such technology is documented since 1990's (Mariani, 2017).

Thus, neither of above, did not appeared maidenly during Kim Jong Un's establishment of power. Nor can be unconnected to modern history and foreign policy of N. Korea. And so, a coherent continuity in N. Korea's foreign policy; is being noted. Also is being noted the fact of state's less and less need for covering its ambitions over time.

Moreover, the noticed escalation, is not considered as being developed in vitro, but shaped dynamically and interactively to various factors and events; like Six-Party Talks.

## Drivers of China's policies

For China, the case of scaling back carbon footprint is considered as a tricky challenge but the payoff is of critical significance.

China, after the first economic reform of 1978 and driven by economic paradigm of a growing manufacturing sector (Gao et. al, 2001, Garnaut & Song, 2012), has been transformed in one of leading economies worldwide (Chow 2004). The trade-off for rapid economic growth, is the extended dependency on cheap energy produced by coal (Gu 1997, KAPSARC 2016b).

Moreover, China did not only stopped being an oil net exporter since the start of 1990's (approximately), but also emerged as the second largest importer of crude oil and oil products (U.S. EIA, 2015). Fact the illustrates the difficulties in balancing between growth and sustainability; based on the obsolete paradigm that followed after 1978.

Furthermore, China is being under pressure due to environmental degradation and climate change, as also by the geopolitical dimension of Secure Lines Of Communications (SLOCs).

Regarding SLOCs, is enough to be said that on 2014 approximately two third (2/3) of importing crude oil – not to mention the almost ninety percent (~90%) of exports – passes through Malacca's strait (Xiaoyan, 2014); which connects Indian with Pacific ocean.

Going to environmental degradation and atmospheric pollution, the occurred problems do not consist a case that can easily be neglected. Studies showed that atmospheric pollution is being connected with health issues (Wu et. al, 2016) and mortality rate (He et. Al, 2016), while the impact on public health produces significant socio-economic costs. For example, the occurring costs based on the production-lost time during hospitalization of Chinese workers, the outpatient care services and loss of skilled workers – as the result of PM2.5 pollution – approximately reached one point one percent (1.1%) of Chinese GDP for 2007 (Xia et. al, 2016). Which is almost the annual GDP of Vietnam for 2010 (Xia et. al, 2016). Moreover, other studies showed that a rise in industrial emissions (i.e. sulfide dioxide) would trigger rising of lungs cancer and cancer of respiratory system incidents, while its effects would spread also in adjacent areas outside Chinese territory (Chen et. Al, 2016).

Therefor, the diversification of energy resources, the adoption of energy efficiency policies and the decoupling between production and fossil fuels – primarily coal – considered as exigent.

Most certainly, the Chinese state having all above in mind, entered the negotiation phase for Paris agreement in 2016 pledging for sixty percent (60%) emissions cut down of prime pollutants on energy sector up to 2020; and by that saving around a hundred million tonnes (100 MM TCE) of coal, that otherwise would have been used in production of power (Reuters, 2015a; Henderson et. al, 2017).

Concluding, can be said that the combined contribution of all above mentioned factors – that may not necessarily be directly connected with each other, though are connected through energy – for sure leads to developments regarding climate change mitigation and energy efficiency policies. Policies that eventually tend to mold a new landscape in terms of energy and growth for China.

## Uncertainty and energy trade

The shifting landscape in terms of energy and growth for China, is not only driving developments within China but also outside; like trade partnerships and especially of energy. A case of an already noticed possibility of influencing energy trade between exporting countries and China, has been studied regarding Countries of Gulf Cooperation Council (KAPSARC 2016a; Lester, 2016).

To be stated that, even though succession of developments in energy trade is characterized by its dynamic nature, nevertheless how and what is being exactly traded is a functions of importing countries' policies and politics (KAPSARC 2016a; Lester, 2016). Increasingly in significance of functioning, are the policies of environment and climate change. Albeit, still today, the dominant energy policy concerns security and its principal component is that of diversification.

So the question is, whether could disrupted trade patterns between China - N. Korea, or and the uncertainty on the stability of these patterns to be influential connected to properties of N. Korea's efforts towards nuclear weapons development and in particular planned time allocation?

Supporting the significance of trade partnership component of the question above, is enough to say that China is not only the main strategic partner but largely the solo one when comes to coal and iron (Yonhap, 2016b).

Concerning uncertainty causation in relevance to military programmes, supporting argumentation can be found in the outburst of WWI. In particular, to that is partly attributed to uncertainty on (back then present) security and in conjunction to shift of balance that was about to follow – along with its implications on economy and trade – but, without involving parts being able to deeply understand the futurely brought changes on the long run (Keohane 1984; Waltz 2000). Indicator of shift of ballance that took place, is the fact that after the end of WWII – which ended open issues of WWI – new superpowers rose. These new superpowers defined world scene in new political and trade partnerships, while the establishment of their position of power is concurrently taking place with shifting from coal to oil. So, uncertainty is a major determinant of developments and cannot be ignored.

Moreover, the reasoning behind the decisions and actions of involving parts on the above example, does not variate extremely from a reasoning according to which N. Korea's accelerating developments in it's non-peaceful nuclear programme is targeting in more than just enhancing military capacity. Like, the utilization of nuclear power as a political leverage, in the uncertain and currently taking shape power balancing of future. Of course, such mentality is bounded by the same restriction, poor capability of fully understanding the futurely brought changes on the long run.

Going further, also cannot be overlooked the fact that N. Korea, is an extremely "thirsty" country for oil after the dissolution of Soviet Union at the end of 1991, from which (N. Korea) was buying oil bellow market prices (Stewart, 1999; EIA, 2017). Illustrating this "thirst", is plenty enough to say that oil consumption of N. Korea during 1991 was seventy six thousands barrels per day (76000 b/d), while on 2003 was up just to seventeen thousands (170000 b/d); less than a quarter approximately a decade after (EIA, 2017). However, there are offshore located deposits of liquid and gas hydrocarbons (Stewart, 1999; Bermudez Jr., 2015; Byrne, 2015; Rego,2015; USGS, 2017). That still have not been exploited, because – beside the reasons of depth and technology – the exploration and exploitation also bears difficulties of economic and political risk, which are being connected to non-resolved differences with China, Russia and Japan (Bermudez Jr., 2015; USGS, 2017). From the latter mentioned countries, the first two already possess nuclear weapons. While the third one, not only is under the "umbrella" of US but is also assumed that is able to produce if is in need; though there are doubts on delivery mechanisms and whether is there any such intention (Windrem, 2014; Large, 2016; Bitzinger, 2017). Nevertheless, the noticed difficulties are not without opportunities in case of a resolution. In example, that of a site-specific commodity located nearby states-markets with significant energy demand (Rego, 2015). Opportunities not only for N. Korea, but also for the nearby states. For example, for China would be translated in more than just bypassing Malacca's strait, as in case of Myanmar's pipe, but also avoidance.

So, as can be noted, the uncertainty on the characteristics and the status of trade partnership regarding coal coexists with the opportunity for substituting coal with an alternative commodity of energy, along with the possibility for establishing new partnerships; which will be friendlier than coal-based ones to world's new energy scene. In any case, the cross-border trade of energy commodities lies in the ground of high energy demand in adjacent countries, in conjunction to an extremely compressed local market with significant margins (under circumstances). Nonetheless, exploration and exploitation, requires attractive economic environment, political stability and resolution on maritime disputes with adjacent countries.

Beginning from last requirement. To what extent, N. Korea – as being placed at the group of countries with nuclear capabilities – could indeed exercise foreign policy from an elevated position, is something that has to be proved in reality. Nevertheless, if indeed is willing to use such means, then should accelerate in acquiring nuclear capabilities. And this, because exploration and having productive facilities is a time-consuming procedure. Not to mention that the transitional period won't last forever. But even if last longer than expected, it doesn't mean that the same conditions will be met when coming late in to market. In latter case, most probably, the needs of adjacent countries would have been satisfied. Focusing to time consuming procedures, this could partly explain China's impatience (Bermudez Jr., 2015) for joint exploitation of offshore deposits located in west cost of Korean peninsula during 2013; but the whole issue was stagnated, because of the on going dispute on demarcation of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Anyway, the pursuit by N. Korea of an elevated negotiating position through some nuclear programme, is in complete coherence with the principle of states' national interests pursuit being a function of state's power maximization (Hanish, 2013).

The latter described mentality of N. Korea, might be the reason why did China's position changed in 2013 from "no war, no instability, no nuclear" to "denuclearization, peace-stability, and continue with halted Six-Party Talks". Though, should be noted that other answers are being suggested by scholars. Like targeting at dwindling instability in the wider region of Korea (Su & Saalman, 2017).

However, regarding denuclearization of N. Korea, there are voices within China for minimizing its importance by stating that neighboring with a denuclearized but less friendly and uncontrolled N. Korea with a regime in collapse, is worst than having a friendly N. Korea dedicated to China's priorities even if is nuclearly armed (Perlez, 2016; Su & Saalman, 2017). Such views are based on the fact that Chinese are familiarized to the idea of a N. Korea with nuclear weapons, while assume that it won't be difficult for China to approach N. Korea due to geographical proximity (Perlez, 2016); with whatever the latter means. Albeit such proximity didn't result in a successful resolution of their bilateral maritime disputes.

Going further. By considering Kim Jong Un's doctrine (Mansourov, 2014) from the nuclear utilization point of view apart from energy dimension, then such utilization is primarily explained by deterrence theory (Chung, 2011). However, the finalization of a favorable solution of maritime disputes – on the ground of an elevated position in negotiations due to nuclear capabilities – and the subsequent exploitation of whichever deposits, could theoretically provide N. Korea with the needed energy for conducting large scale attacks against S. Korea. While today's lack of significant energy reserves – among other reasons (i.e. of logistic capability and infrastructures) – bounds N. Korea's attacking abilities. The latter, is the reason why threats coming from N. Korea are being perceived by S. Korea as a local provocation (Chung, 2011). So using nuclear weapons as the mean for exploiting energy resources, leads to a situation where enhanced attack capabilities due to upgraded energy reserves could take the role of nuclear weapons as a mean for exerting pressure and exercising foreign policy.

Thus, an enhanced ability of N. Korea in launching large scale attacks – based on the energy reserves – that could operate as a leverage, is also in complete coherence with the principle of states' national interests pursuit being a function of state's power maximization (Hanish, 2013).

But, could the above, beside a rational reasoning, traced in how nuclear programme is perceived inside N. Korea? Actually not only there is no reason to say that cannot, but furthermore similarities can be spotted. As stated by Mansourov, in a critical review of Kim Jong Un's doctrine, the purpose and role of nuclear weapons are: "to ensure the favorable environment for regime survival and national development by deterring external threats against the country's sovereignty and leadership and by freeing internal resources for economic growth and individual consumption" (Mansourov, 2014). Most of the quoted part can easily be traced to all above, besides ensuring leadership principle which is out of this study purposes. Nevertheless, it would be helpful to highlight a few things around sovereignty notion. For N. Korea, the division of Korea, as occurred after WWII – once again in times of a shifting global landscape as noted before in this chapter – have never been accepted, and considers it as the result of non-communist and out-of-Korea powers' role. This perceived idea of a great communist Korea, is apparent on the fact that the Korean Armistice Agreement was never been followed by a peace treaty, and thus war never officially ended. So N. Korea's sovereignty is perceived as covering a wider geographically region, than as defined by post-WWII demarcation.

Returning to N. Korea's political stability, according to Chinese scholars, can be said that – after the seventh (7th) WPK conference (May of 2016) and five years after the succession in country's leadership – N. Korea is entering in a stability period; along with whatever this might presume.

Nevertheless, the case of stability can not easily be supported for growth and development of N. Korean economy (Su & Saalman, 2017). In particular for economy. In one hand the new economic programme after succession in country's leadership still haven't been proved as fruitful (Su & Saalman, 2017). While on the other hand the failed currency reform of 2009 (Su & Saalman, 2017) should have amplified uncertainty's perception regarding future coal trading with China.

However, despite an amplified perception, N. Korea's concern around coal trade uncertainty is not considered as excessive, since the local demand in China under circumstances demonstrates as a factor of higher importance on trade than international sanctions do. The latter was clearly signaled on other mineral commodities after the sanctions that followed the second test during 2016; which took place in September of that year (Silberstein, 2016; Yonhap, 2016a).

In particular. In a crucial for N.Korea's export activity, province of China, called Jilin, iron imports followed a downward trend to seven point twenty-eight million dollars (7.28 mm USD), at first quarter of 2016; which is translated in nineteen point three per cent (19.3%) decline (Yonhap, 2016a). At similar levels was the drop-down of imports from Jilin in general (Yonhap, 2016a).

Thus, policies inside China – tightly connected to climate change, energy efficiency and security issues mentioned earlier, along with an expressed will for phasing out from manufacturing economic paradigm to that of services – can indeed force relatively significant influence over trade; when compared to sanctions.

Still on uncertainty issues, should be also noted that does not apply in same magnitude in general for all trade partners of China.

For example, as far as concerning energy business cycle transmission between China and Australia, and in particular the dependence between Australian mineral industry and manufacturing Chinese sector, there are studies supporting a bi-directional Granger causality (Norrie, 2013). Albeit, such direction is in contrast with other studies that support the existence of uni-directional causation with direction from Chinese to Ausralian GDP (Kueh et al., 2010).

Obviously, in a bi-directional sense, Australia's uncertainty regarding trade partnership with China is considered as milder; since disrupted trade patterns on China's import could result in a negative feed-back effect on Chinese economy.

Anyway, in either bi- and uni-directional Ganger causation, between China and other states, still the energy trade is largely depended on the importing state (KAPSARC 2016a; Lester, 2016); in our case China. Of course, the latter is also true for another reason in case of Sino-N.Korean trade. When approaching the issue in terms of locomotive hypothesis (Bronfenbrenner. 1979; Mai et. al., 2010; Norrie, 2013) adjusted for a close economic system – from the point of view of a N. Korea being detached from international economic developments (excessive "juche") and heavily linked to Chinese economy – the reason is the size of importing economy that is comparatively larger.

Thus, the dependence of energy trade on importing country's policies is in complete coherence with the principle on the role of external forces (when comparing to internal factors) as a major contributer in foreign policy determination of a state.

Summarizing above, a complex logic behind maximization of power can be spotted. Such logic, only partly includes the notion of deterrence, while also includes elevation of negotiation's position and leveraging, so that to satisfy the determinant for economic stability and regime's survive. Moreover, in this complexity, the rational reasoning is a function of natural resources exploitation and energy trade. The latter, is influenced from Chinese policies on energy efficiency and climate change mitigation; albeit the extent of influence energy trade isn't clear, since the nuclear issue can also be attributed to preexisting factors.

## Cross-checking rational reasoning

Although, that N. Korea's tendency for power maximization through rational decisions has already been highlighted and despite that second's pillar maximization is considered inextricably linked to third's pillar rationality, nevertheless supporting argumentation will be provided regarding realistic rational of N. Korea.

As mentioned earlier, N. Korea managed to secure financial aid – that was translated in to cash-flow with direction from international donors to N. Korea – or to broach other claims, during past times, in exchange for made pledges on nuclear use (Chandran, 2017; Maidment, 2017).

On this basis. The following comments can be made.

In one hand, N. Korea knows how to take advantage of "tit-for-tat" tactic that evolved by great powers (Sigal, 1998; Signorino, 2016); mainly during past century, and primarily during "cold war" (Bunn & Payne, 2007). This tactic – that is based on prisoner's dillema and related games like closed-bag exchange – presumes that players exhibit rationality during decision-making in abating costs and maximizing gains. So, if put states in the places of players and the game represents the field of international relations, then the rationality can be described by political realism.

On the other hand, in such "tit-for-tat" tactic over the past, N. Korea proved quite skillful in "reading" rational made choices of great powers and other sovereign states according to their culture.

Thus, in this case the component of realistic thinking is apparent not only as a characteristic of how choices are being made, but also on how one part expects from the other to take its decision. The latter, is being put in the portrait of other's culture.

So, the assumption that the maximization of states' power is being met through rational decisions (Hanish, 2013), is once again confirmed.

# Turkey's case

And due to the irregularity of land's relief,  
the view of sea battle was also irregular  
for them.  
(Thukydides, The history of the peloponesian war)

Even though the very early beginning and the establishment of political realism is traced back to Thucydides, nevertheless at the begging of this chapter we will implicit point to Plutarch through parallel studying; so that to smoothly bridge between the occurred N. Korean case with the hypothesized for Turkey.

Afterwards, proceeding towards Turkey and nuclear weapons, the whole issue will be illuminated under a more generalized view. The logic behind this goes without saying. If there is no way to support a hypothesized case of Turkey's future and building nuclear weapons in general, then cannot be a case for linking with energy and climate policies neither. Next the possibility of linking will be checked under Morgenthau principles on states' foreign policy. Of course, before this, first some quick facts on EU's energy efficiency and climate change policies will be provided; so that to illustrate their capacity of forward momentum.

As you understand, such endeavor as the described above, is not something that can easily be accomplished. Not only, any lack of seriousness and of paid scientific attention would have operated against the already built relationship of trust between reader and writer, but also proceeding with due diligence is absolutely necessary for studying some hypothesis before its realization. However, despite the strict nature of the latter, still the study of this case is doable. Supporting to study's doability, is the fact that reaching to a particular conclusion for sure is not part of study's targeting but to exhibit the underlying impetus by cross-checking the validity of hypothesized link.

## Side by side study and parallelisms

The following two points should be marked before establishing a relationship of present and future origin, between N. Korea's occurring effort for adding domestic produced nuclear weapons in its arsenal and China's policies – regarding energy and climate change – with a hypothesized case study under which EU take's place of China and Turkey that of N. Korea's.

The first one, is about an underlying relationship between past and present for EU and China. In particular, EU's beginning is traced back to 1952's European Coal and Steel Commission (ECSC) as an "energy plan" (Reuters, 2015) while China has just recently started elevating the burden of steel's excessing production capacity (Yonhap, 2016a).

Thus there is a relationship – of analogue, not identical – of former and later origin, which changes direction depending on focused facts.

The second one, has to do with Turkey's posing as a wanna be "hard-power" (Gullo, 2016). Such, exhibited intentions, are reflected on the development of indigenous defense industry. The latter, could easily be described according to a more neorealistic view, under which "States do not willingly place them selves in situations of increased dependence" (Waltz, 1979, Gullo, 2016). Controversially, a similar approach for the development of indigenous defense industry derives from N. Korea's communistic perspective of self-reliance. In particular, the latter is on the same vein with Waltz's view on security within an anarchic world. According to Waltz, the issue of security is closely related to independence and projection of power against other states, through hard-power capacity.

Further supporting above, to be noted that within the new economic plan of N. Korea – know as Byongjin line – is described the idea for serving the needs of building a superior military power through a strong and stable economy. And that's why reorders its priority by putting in higher order the economic development, while keeping military in first place (Su & Saalman, 2017). A similar approach can be located to a more offensive neorealistic point of view, as expressed by Mearsheimer. According to Gullo, the latter view fits on Turkey, regarding how military spending and development could be reasoned upon population's size and growing economy (Mearsheimer, 2013; Gullo, 2016).

Albeit, the correct characterization for Turkey is more of a "latent-power" (Mearsheimer, 2013; Gullo, 2016), than a pure hard-power. The latent condition, of Turkey's power capabilities, makes sense when considering the divergence between acquired and perceived as being acquired power, within Turkey. In particular, the perceived acquired power, based on the ground of neo-ottomanism – a prevailing political ideology in modern Turkey – describes state's power in socio-economic terms. Thus, latent condition is the resultant of latter with the acquired characteristics of hard-power state.

Anyway, the tendency for adopting a parallel thinking in developing domestic defense industry is apparent for these two countries; even though described by different ideological framework (neo-ottomanism Vs communism) and culture. And is parallel, despite that both might have been influenced by China (Mearsheimer, 2013; Gullo, 2016 ; Su & Saalman, 2017). Albeit Turkey, could also be influenced from France of Charles de Gaul (Cagaptay, 2011; Park, 2011; Taşpinar, 2011a; Taşpinar, 2011a; Rynning et. al., 2015) and subsequently "force de frappe".

So, could there be a parallel thinking regarding adding domestic produced nuclear weapons to their arsenal? That's something that will be explored later on.

But before that, to be noted that parallel thinking notion does not considered equivalent to notion of identical. Rather refers to both moving towards the same result, but without being total overlapped. Besides, the latter would axiomatically be the case if both were to serve identical objective targets and not just to use common means for meeting their goals. Of course the aforementioned could not easily be supported, due to their different political, economic and diplomatic priorities.

Such defined parallel thinking, is reflected on the fact that domestic production is primarily being perceived in terms of reduced dependence for Turkey, while for N. Korea is translated into autonomous and considered as the direct result of an absolute self-reliance.

## Big picture

By illustrating the existence of in parallel similarities, is safe to initially proceed within a wider consideration of Turkey's future entropy regarding domestic production of nuclear weapons; so that to secure the ground for checking later the linkage of such hypothesized production in connection to EU's policies. Thus, the first question to be answered is, whether could be said that Turkey rejects the idea of neorealists for relative peace and stability as the resultant of a mutual assured destruction and based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence (Sagan & Waltz, 2010)?

Obviously, Turkey is not against this doctrine, since already hosts part of NATO's nuclear weapons. Besides, seems that Turkey likes to use arms production (in general) as a tool for exerting foreign policy (Yanarocak, 2016). Thus, is not strange that various think tanks – like Royal United Services Institute – from time to time are expressing their concerns on the possibility of Turkey taking its chances and going after independently building nuclear weapons (Chalmers & Lunn, 2010).

Nevertheless, exhibiting a mentality which is railed on tracks of nuclear deterrence (as is being reflected on hosting part of NATO's nuclear arsenal) is one thing, but going after domestic production is another. Thus, the next question to be answered is whether Turkey's appearance as a friend of west could support the idea of not entering into production? Approaching the latter from the perspective of adequate justification, the fact that Turkey poses as less hostile towards west – than other muslim countries – does not necessarily justifies a priory rejection of a futurely expressed willingness for going after domestic production. Moreover, history already gave an answer on that.

Let's not forget the fact that an other country (Iran in particular) with a muslim majority and the most westward looking among muslim countries – during its last Shah (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) – eventually was heavily accused for trying to build nuclear weapons. And though accusations came after the fall of Shah, nevertheless based on historical events can be said that Iran's whetting its appetite started during Shah period; along with nuclear use as source of energy and after the provided assistance regarding nuclear technology by USA and EU-countries.

But, lets just not focus on muslim countries. Lets get a wider picture, but still on westward looking countries. In particular, countries that are traditionally considered as allied-counties after Bretton-Woods Agreement and part of Non-Proliferation Treaty – of which Iran was and Turkey still is – such as S. Korea (South Korea, 2001; South Korea, 2012). Yes, even S. Korea have expressed similar desires (Taylor, 2017).

Of course the fact that such expressed desired is considered as a reaction to N. Korea's confirmed efforts to build nuclear weapons, does not mean that Turkey would not express similar desire. The latter can partly be justified on the base of similar reasoning for Turkey's case. In particular regarding the assumptions on Israel's nuclear answering readiness (Aftergood & Kristensen, 2007; Borger, 2014; SIPRI, 2015) and because of suffered tensions in Turkey-Israel relations; i.e. Mavi Marmara incident (BBC, 2016). At this point should be explicitly stated that former reasoning does not imply that Turkey is one and the same with S. Korea and Israel with N. Korea, as is not similarly implied for Turkey with N. Korea during parallel study.

Thus, not only the possibility of a future exhibited willingness for building cannot be ignored but such willingness could be explained in terms of other countries' nuclear answering readiness.

Going further, in order reader to get a clearer picture, is considered useful to highlight the fact that Turkey already is moving towards exploiting the benefits of nuclear power (WNN, 2016; Japan Times, 2017; WNA, 2017). As also useful to be stated, is that referencing nuclear energy harvesting for electricity is not targeting in portraying use for civil purposes as evil or to connect it with the earlier mentioned Iran's case. Rather is being referenced in order to exhibit the nuclear-friendly mentality in general. Albeit, Turkey's capabilities on using energy programme's multi-purposely "flourished" during past times; i.e. Ataturk dam (Jongerden, 2010; Stratfor, 2016). Also, in a sense of keeping equal distances from all sides, should be mentioned that there are expressed opinions on the ulterior origin of Turkey's motives for building nuclear plants; even though concurrently there are factual reasons connected to energy demand (Dombe, 2015). Such opinions, are in the same vein with ones concerning the extended ballistic range, as the result of its space programme (Stein, 2014; Dombe, 2015; Yanarocak, 2016).

Finally, based on Turkey's attitude on EU's immigration crisis – as the result of the illegal immigration flooding at eastern EU's borders with Turkey – can be said that some kind of "tit-for-tat" game is apparent (Robinson, 2015; Dinçer & Hecan, 2016, LSM, 2016); without judging whether or not is political correct to call it such, or justifying such tactics for such cases. Anyway, the aforementioned illegal immigration flows from Turkey to EU, resulted in reverse flow of money (Baczynska, 2016; Kingsley, 2016).

So similarities between followed tactics and results can be spotted in a side-by-side study of "tit-for-tat" for Turkey and N. Korea. Thus, the question that follows logically is the next. Whether today's observed use of same tactics for different reasons, could also be used for the same reasons by Turkey in the future; during equivalent shift to new energy-described era.

The weight of latter question gets heavier when considering the fact that Turkey's negotiations on entering EU, is frozen and there are no significant indicators exhibiting willingness to prioritize on entering from Turkey's side (Tocci, 2014; Nasr, 2017; Pitel, 2017; Riegert, 2017; Reuters, 2017c; Ülgen, 2017). Especially, when having in mind that shifting of Turkey's position from a westward-looking orientation is expected before or/and during realization of nuclear ambitious (McCurdy, 2008).

Thus, the subsequent question on whether Turkey could at least seek and pursuit technological knowhow acquisition on nuclear weapons in connection to EU's climate mitigation and energy efficiency policies, is of prime importance and will be discussed right after a short illustration of EU policies' momentum.

## Shortly illustrating EU policies' momentum

EU is being through an equivalent transition phase, as China is; regarding energy. In particular, EU, since 2007 have set the ground for moving away of 90's economy – that is heavily dominated by fossil fuels – to that of low carbon emissions, namely "Triple Twenties". Triple Twenties describes targeting on GreenHouse Gas (GHG) emissions, penetration of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and energy efficiency (EC, 2007).

Already by 2014, EU has implemented its target on GHG emissions, while projection of RES penetration and energy efficiency targets were more than optimistic for meeting set goals for 2020 (EEA, 2016). Nevertheless EU, did not rest upon its own laurels, but set new targets for 2030 (EC, 2014; EEA, 2016). More specifically, set cut down on GHG emissions up to 40% (still when compared with base year of 1990), and at least 27% for both penetration of RES in energy mix and energy efficiency improvement (according to With Existing Measure's scenario). And if these targets sounds ambitious, then those published at 2011 roadmap for energy upto 2050, should not be considered as feasible to non-experts.

Whether EU would reach, meet or overcome its targets, is not something that will trouble this study; since at least for most of EU habitants its common knowledge. Besides, sooner or later than initially projected, EU will phase out from transitional period of gas to age of RES domination in energy mix.

So how could Turkey react, when EU's transition to a new energy era – as described by a RES dominated energy-mix – has been fully completed, or even earlier when phasing out comes to a point where Turkey's natural gas transit services will not be considered as strategic asset anymore.

## Under Morgenthau's prism

From the short text on EU policies' momentum, can easily be understood that according to dominating energy source in the energy mix of EU's countries, Europe – from near past to not that far future – is divided in three different ages. The age of liquid and solid fossil fuels domination, the age of natural gas domination and the age of RES domination. Going from one age to other, is being succeeded transitional. While the age inbetween first and third, is the bride from fossil fuels to RES.

Also for this study, Turkish choice on seeking and utilizing peaceful means by adopting the strategy of being a gas transit country, is a priori considered as a fact. Of course, such choice is considered rational, since targets both on geopolitical and economic gains. Furthermore, does not only exhibits a realistic logic, but also is in consistency with more neorealistic views; and in particular with the first stage of Morgenthau's view on foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1952; Hanish, 2013).

So, naturally comes the question of whether could Turkey's foreign policy also be in consistency with the second stage of Morgenthau's view.

In order to answer the question above, the example of Turkish dams (Jongerden, 2010; Al-Makhzoomi & Albdeewy, 2017; Stratfor, 2016) in South-Eastern Anatolia – i.e. Ataturk Dam on Euphrates & Ilisu Dam on Tigris river – will be used.

Before, entering the hard core of analysis, is useful to provide a couple of quick facts for the basin-system of Tigris-Euphrates river. Like the fact that six littoral states are sharing the rivers. From which, Turkey, Syria and Iraq are the major users of rivers' waters. While the major contributer to water replenishment of both rivers is Turkey; albeit Iraq is also a significant contributer to hydrologic diet of Tiger river (~40%). And the fact that the two rivers, form an inverted triangle that bends in a bottleneck like shape fifty kilometers (50km) away from Baghdad; which triangle hosts a significant number of Kurds within.

Beside the aforementioned facts on basins, it is also useful to be stated that the analysis of Tigris-Euphrates example will strictly be confined on the scope of analysis itself; without bothering on taking place or supporting sides.

The latter, from another perspective is the reason of selecting this example for the analysis; even it might not be that clear from head start how can it be helpful.

To be more precise, the reason is that does not consist a matter that directly involves Greek and Turkish sides. Thus, no accuses for subjectivity or serving other purposes, can stand.

Another reason for selecting the particular example, is the fact that is directly being associated with energy – like nuclear is – and in particular power generation.

Also to be stated that, a generalized historical view of hydro-politics in the area will be mostly avoided – so that reader won't be lost within the provided amount of information – while provided information will be as simple as can be, but no simpler.

Of course, trying to follow a K.I.S.S. principle and the fact that the example is about politics of water, doesn't mean that the attempted analysis should be perceived as something easy to be done. Supporting the seriousness and complexity of such cases and why K.I.S.S. principle should not be perceived as over-simplification, is enough to say that, in the wider region of Middle East, the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War that took place on 1967, is partly attributed to Jordan's water management (Alqallaf, 2003).

Narrowing from wider region of Middle East to the area of Tigris-Euphrates, another incident is indicative of the occurring complexity in general and the gravity of waters' management on bilateral relationships within the area. The incident took place during first months of 1990, when Turkey in order to fill one reservoir (Jongerden, 2010; Pring & Banaei, 2015) cut down water flow. Consequently, occurred tensions between Iraq and Turkey were about to result in an armed confrontation. Nevertheless, the conducted by Iraq invasion of Kuwait, didn't allow the conflict between Iraq and Turkey to be evolved in an armed skirmish (Jongerden, 2010).

Though an about to be escalated conflict could be a critical indicator of hydropolitic's severity on the area, nevertheless it is not the fact of an almost to take place armed confrontation itself that fully illustrate the dynamics of the area regarding littoral states of Tigris-Euphratis. Rather is the fact that for a water's management dispute, the reaction was not what is typically expected from the side of downstream states; in particular not the usual seek for cooperative solution (McCaffrey, 2013). Te aforementioned indented to be realized confrontation, is the true indicator of preexisting problems between Iraq and Turkey (Adams, 2000; Wasinger, 2015). Similar problems, were also between Syria and Turkey (Adams, 2000; Wasinger, 2015).

Moreover on indicative facts, but this time on complexity, should be stated that even though the possibility of an armed confrontation is still considered significant (Jongerden, 2010), nevertheless a direct attack to dam's infrastructures from Iraqi army is not expected. The latter, is not only attributed to the size of Turkish army, but also on the fact of the fear for NATO's reaction (Alqallaf, 2003). NATO's reaction would be the result of the incompatibility between destruction of water's infrastructures and articles 54-56 of 1977's Protocol I of Geneva Convention (Benvenisti, 2013).

Moving from complexity due to pre-existing factors and armed conflicts to the use of water as a medium of exchange and instrument of power for exerting (economic and diplomatic)pressure, the core of Turkish mentality is characteristically expressed through Suleyman Demirel quotes. According to Demirel: "Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey's rivers anymore than Ankara could claim their oil". (Wasinger, 2015).

In this context, is obviously placed the adoption of a logic according to which Turkey's water is considered as the equal of Arab's oil; and used similarly. Thus, control of water masses is not just appraised as the medium of exchange for petrol or petrodollars, but as an instrument of power in Turkey's toolset for foreign policy (Iakovou, 2015). Thus, can be identified an early projection of Turkish national interests. But such will be better exhibited in 1998's incident, right away.

In particular during 1998, Turkey directly threatened Syria when asked the latter to export PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan and not to support Kurdish fighters (Adams, 2000; Hatem & Dohrmann, 2013; Kibaroglu A. et. al., 2014). Of course water as a leverage was one of the parameters that critically contributed to developments; but not the unique. Another significant parameter was the military power of Turkey, that contributed in such claims to be taken seriously (Adams, 2000). Just to have an idea on how did Turkey's military power got to support the use of water disruption threat as a leverage, to be mentioned the fact that at 1998 and before Adana's Agreement and PKK's leader deport from Syria, ten thousands (10000) Turkish soldiers were placed along the borders with Syria (Wasinger, 2015). So, having events developed as such, can definitely be distinguished a projection of Turkish national interests against interests of others.

Nevertheless, the issue of projected national interests is not always clearly apparent – how about in association with water facilities and infrastructures – especially if is about post-Saddam federal structure of Iraq; under which the Kurdish element managed to establish the only autonomous administrative division. Such autonomous status, highly concerns military and political leadership in Turkey (Alqallaf, 2003). Turkey's concern is not just an express of the interest of a good neighborhood. More likely Turkish leadership is being heavily troubled by worries on the contingency of a de-facto establishment of Greater Kurdistan through separation of Turkish southeastern region. Especially when for preventing such from happening, the cooperation with Syria, Iran, Iraq is needed. The cooperation of states, that beside also having Kurdish minorities (Taşpinar, 2011b), are also considered as rivals for leadership in the wider area of South-South-West Asia.

So, can Turkey manage to obtain Iraq's support using mountainous infrastructures of water's reservoir, despite the prevailing tenses and conflict of interests in the area?

As can easily be noticed, the role of dams is not only that of power generation and controlling rivers diet from the upstream. Can also passively serve by occupying lands, while operates as a barrier for crossing from both sides. This obstructing function of dams, along with the fact of a relocated rural Kurdish mass (Hatem & Dohrmann, 2013) – that could also be connected to dams' passive role – tends to create a quasi- "geographical discontinuity" between Kurds of Northern Iraq with those of Southeast Turkey.

So, having these in mind, in conjunction to a possible influence of Iraq's Kurdish leadership by Turks over the independence referendum of 2017 – like is noted that might have occurred from some scholars (Al-Makhzoomi & Albdeewy, 2017) – can be said that in reality there wasn't really any imperative necessity for exerting such influence, since it was enough just not to try to stop it; and the shift from back then current Iraqi position regarding Kurdish issue to that of Turks should had follow.

How? in both cases (a.k.a. influencing or not) even though Turkey side is not in favor of Iraq's Kurds independence – being afraid of area's destabilization and possible strengthening of similar tendencies inside its own territory – nevertheless, the prosecution of referendum would eventually had presented Iraq with a fait accompli; which Iraqi side alone would not be able to query or reverse it. Thus Iraq should find allies in persuading international community against a recognition of referendum's result. And so, pooling efforts should be attempted under mutual and balanced advantages; and obviously Iraq was the one that had to abate. The latter for Turkish side is being apprehended as a required adoption of their own logic from Iraq's; according to which different Kurdish groups should be treated differently.

Many more could be said on why could Turkey appeals friendly to Iraq's Kurds, even though is not in favor of an independent Kurdistan. Like cooperating in energy and economy issues (Van Heuvelen, 2013; Wasinger, 2015; Alaaldin, 2016; Idiz, 2017). Nevertheless, whether the latter could indeed create the idea of a Turkish implicit support of referendum – despite that such is not reflected in Turkish President speeches – or the connotation of direct influence (Al-Makhzoomi & Albdeewy, 2017), will not bother this study since could not provide any further assist on answering the question under investigation. And that's so, because of at least an underlying projection identification of Turkish national interests against those of others; based on the passive and functional role of dam.

Resuming on projection of national interests of one state to another, and in particular of Turkey's, through the provided examples of dams in South-Eastern Anatolia, the following can be said. In one hand water is being used as an instrument of power, while on the other hand projecting is not always clearly apparent but can also occur implicitly.

In conclusion, finally, is entirely comprehensible that Turkey can satisfy the properties of both stages in foreign policy as conceived by Morgenthau, while under circumstances and according to each case's conditions can support its foreign policy by exhibiting military capabilities. Such power capabilities, is the resultant of a significant population size and of economic development. As far as its population size is being concerned, can be said that in relevance to other countries in Europe and Middle East is generally considered true. As far as economic development is being concerned, Turkey invests in the areas of natural resources, energy and defense industry. Thus, not only an adoption of more neo-realistic views regarding foreign policy is being observed, but such view is closely related to energy and defense industry.

# Constraints and limitations

Where did I act wrongly? What did I did?  
What I haven't done though I should have?  
(Pythagoras)

In this study, like any other, constraints and limitations can not be ignored. Limitations, not only do not trivialize this study, but are pointing out the unique characteristics of it; while let reader to better understand its substance.

Starting on limitations – featuring unique characteristics – the foremost issue, is the absence of literature regarding the linking with energy efficiency and climate change mitigation policies. This issue, is the direct result of elaborating a novel topic. Nevertheless, limitation's contribution with negative sign is counterbalanced by the opportunity for introducing new literature in the area of energy, policies and international relations.

An other issue, produced by literature's lack, is the lack of a common accepted and standardized direct methodology on how to safely approach the suggested link.

Of course – no matter of how numerous are former published studies or not – the lack of a standardized methodology is common characteristic of studies that do integrate the essence of international relations; because simple it's not about physics or mathematics (D'Anieri, 2017).

Not to mention, that even mathematically produced models – like those used in game theory – are also subjected to constraints (Box, 1979; Couclelis, 2000; Chawla, 2015; Zizopoulos, 2017), while optimal solutions are not always feasible (Madani, 2009; Read et. Al, 2015; Zizopoulos, 2017) and trade-offs are subjected to uncertainty and fuzziness (Giampietro, 2013; Zizopoulos, 2017).

Moreover regarding standardized methodology and in conjuction to elaborated topic, the existence of a single and direct methodology could not fulfill the purpose of its creation due to the fact that reaching to conclusions can be achieved in many ways that are not necessary uniquely linked together or/and with the elaborated topic, while many important questions could receive multiple answers (D'Anieri, 2017).

Indicative of such complexity is the fact that the set questions could be substituted by others equally matching, but nonidentical regarding their meaning.

For example, the question "whether Turkey could at least seek and pursuit technological knowhow acquisition on nuclear weapons in connection to EU's climate mitigation and energy efficiency policies" could be substituted by "what are the motivations that at least might have driven Turkey's decisions".

Another issue that should be taken into account is the constraint imposed by the author on not ending up to a universal rule for suggested linking between aforementioned policies and nuclear arms that will certainly fit studying other cases; which is the direct result of the inherited limitations from reductionism and induction. Thus, such linking in general is not considered a priori true, but in a case-by-case study could be used, by satisfying the determinant of similarities.

So another similarity with models of game theory can be noticed. In particular, the produced model is as useful as the purpose for which it was constructed (Couclelis, 2000). Likewise, the validity of suggested linking primary concerns the two case studies (N. Korea & Turkey); of which it was build upon. However, methodology of this study could be inherited, while other cases can be constructed upon the findings of this study – as long as the aforementioned determinant is being satisfied and on the grounds of equally paid scientific attention – like a properly adjusted model could be used in other cases.

Returning to limitations, the following two are also considered as critical.

The first one has to do with the fact that the suggested linking is attempted thought cases that their developments either are taking place at present time or lying on the ground of future events. The latter, does not imply any intentions for this study to operate as an prejudice of future developments, but just to portray future developments that may occur within a rational framework.

The second one, is in connection to N. Korea's studying and regarding the fact that it is characterized by a closed economy and society. Therefor the size of official open data publicly available for use is not considered as any significant (Ruediger, 2017), while the existing ones are only covering particular sectors and not fully. Thus, whichever data or information on data is being used by this study, have been taken from articles and other published means of communication or studies (official or not), and are characterized by the credibility and validity of the used sources. So, assessing suggested linking – if such was to be expressed in terms of uncertainty quantification – the notion of epistemic uncertainty is apparent. In order, to maintain "epistemic uncertainty" in manageable low levels and by that not to interfere with study's quality, the sources where filtered so that study's quality to be as sound as possible.

Finally, returning to constraints imposed by author, to be noticed that building argumentation upon profiles of individuals is generally being avoided. This constraint should rather considered as author's providence and has been selected on purpose. Obviously such purpose has nothing to do with canceling the role of persons as agents. But let's better say why have this been selected. In one hand in a typical view of political realism, the fundamental entities are the states. On the other hand, it is a personal belief that the sovereign role of states represents the resultant of various factors, of which – but not alone – are personality and interests of natural entities. Thus, individuals' action and mentality is not by itself enough, albeit could be quite useful in order to explain attained shifts in foreign policy. Moreover, by such author's providence, is not realized the possibility of introducing errors by trying to estimate the magnitude of each person's contribution due to over- or under-estimation. While, fraudulent judgment on the influencing power in favor of particular persons against others, is being avoided.

Besides, no matter how significant is the contribution of natural entities, still foreign policy does not change overnight. Unless maybe, in cases of regime's fall, coup d' etat, or popular revolution. For example from early "neo-ottomanism" of Turgut Ozal until the Davutoglu's doctrine of strategic depth, have passed approximately three decades (Taşpinar, 2011a). Or like N. Korea's nuclear programme did not initiated by Kim Jong Un, rather the latter is leading the accelarating effort to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Thus, a continuity in long term states' politics can be identified, which might be more or less loose, but directly connected with history, present situation and expectations for the future.

# Conclusions

Talking based in facts is needed, not garrulity.  
(Democritus)

Having extensively explored the elaborated topic for the particular states, a review of main points would be shortly provided here.

Initially, (Quod Erat Demonstrandum) identified the linking between China's energy efficiency and climate change policies with N. Korea's foreign policy and the accelerated effort of latter for entering into production of advanced nuclear weapon systems; during China's effort to uncouple its economy from coal and reduce its gas emissions. Nevertheless, linking operates in parallel with other preexisting factors and within a more stereotypical view of natural resources geopolitics, towards the same effect. Regarding preexisting factors and climate change, the role of climate change is apparent in a shifting geopolitical landscape in a study of Mou, et. Al (2017); albeit does not focus on policies of climate change and is not in connection with nuclear weapons. Besides, the chances of some kind of interplay between aforementioned policies with other preexisting factors should not be neglected anyway, due to complexity of international relations and the fact that states' strategy is not flat and requires a multidimensional approach while taking into consideration both bearing tools' capacity and the course of events.

Afterwards, having illustrate the existence of suggested linkage in at least one case – while having in mind that a universal rule based in induction and reduction could not stand by itself alone – found similarities between Turkey and N. Korea allowed bridging the cases of these two states.

Illustrated similarities led to conclusion of a parallel thinking between Turkey and N. Korea regarding the development of independent/domestic defense industry, as also about hard-power's capabilities.

However, since parallel thinking is not considered equal to identical thinking, the need for invoking paradigms/models that might have influenced Turkey and the need for highlighting facts that generally support the case of domestic nuclear weapons production, were apparent.

Having illustrated all above and a priori considering that Turkey already once have linked its foreign policy with EU's particular energy and climate change policies – during EU's shifting to natural gas – by adopting a strategy of transit country, what left to be shown is whether Turkey's foreign policy cannot only be connected with peaceful means but also through projection of national interests against those of those others.

The latter, illustrated through studying examples of projected national interests and hydropolitics in the area of south-east Anatolia's dams.

After that, can safely be concluded that, the linking – not only was confirmed for N. Korea's case, but also – fits the case study of Turkey's future entropy (Quod Erat Faciendum). In particular, EU's energy efficiency and climate change policies, could indeed contribute (among other factors) in Turkey's reflection upon the possibility or attempt to build nuclear weapons; in relation to EU's implemented transition to era of RES dominated energy mix and before Turkey's gas pipelines stop being a "strategic asset".

Whether Turkey will finally decide in going after a future domestic production of nuclear weapons, and if yes, whether it would be sooner or not, is something that only history will surely tell us. However, is not considered as study's inexpediency if Turkey eventually manage to come to a point when will be able in relative short time (e.g. 6 months) to produce if wish as such and without having produce any up to then. And it is not a inexpediency, because by reaching to that point, has already passed through the stage of reflecting upon the possibility and because it will only be mater of time if ever decide that wishes to produce. Moreover, a subsequent entering into production phase or not, is not considered substantial for confirming concluded linking. The latter, because the build capacity for and the integrated proficiency in producing nuclear weapons, is enough for being used as a leverage and can produce significant results; if not equivalent as in case of entering production. Besides, since the early beginning, Turkey's propensity set on the ground of similar and not necessarily identical practices between N. Korea and Turkey.

Of course, if readers are willing to follow developments, they should keep their-selves constantly updated and they should carefully assess information, since we are living in a rapid and dynamically shifting environment.

Anyway, closing this study, the following three bullets should be pointed out.

The first is that, never before have been identified the existence of suggested linking between energy efficiency and climate change policies of one state or union of states with the foreign policies of another country in terms of production of nuclear arms. Thus, this study has the right to bear the characterization of being novel; besides being original.

The second is the introduced a new way of studying topics under the prism of international relations. In particular, initially introduced a theory to be checked up, and after being conclusively illustrated as valid for an occurring case, to be cross-checked upon a future hypothesized. Thus, this study's approach has the right to be characterized as innovative.

Finally, the reader – after having finished reading this study – will be able to better understand geopolitical events that are connected to natural resources and energy. As also to better "read" international relations, albeit this is the result of adopting political realism as this study's method and not because it was part of set goals. Thus, not only promotes knowledge but also contribute in communicating knowledge with readers; even if aren't experts in the area.

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