So let me talk a little bit about
different models, different explanations.
Now a security model for nuclear weapons,
suggests that countries acquire nuclear
weapons when their security environment is
so extreme they face a threat
that they can't get security unless they
acquire their own nuclear weapons.
And the security model sees nuclear
proliferation as a kind of chain reaction.
Nuclear history is explained as the United
States gained nuclear weapons fearing
the Germans would get them during the
second World War.
Stalin and the Soviet Union gained nuclear
weapons because of the United States,
Britain and France gained nuclear weapons
because of the Soviet Union.
China, after the threats the United States
issued at the end of the Cold War, or at
the end of the Korean War, felt threatened
by the United States nuclear weapons and
the Russians backed away from their
agreements to help the Chinese, so
they built their own nuclear weapons.
And Kim Jong ll is seen as a leader
acquiring nuclear weapons because of
the threat from the United States.
The non proliferation treaty is seen as a
solution to a free rider problem.
That is the NPT is seen as a solution for
countries that don't want nuclear weapons.
If their neighbors are restrained from
getting them,
as I mentioned earlier, perhaps if your
neighbors won't get them,
you won't get them as well and that's a
helpful potential use.
There are other countries as well.
Why would a country restrain?
Well, Willy Brandt might have been
restrained partly because the U.S.
security guarantee, and partly because he
thought that if he
acquired nuclear weapons, lots of other
neighbors would get them.
The South Koreans restrained themselves from
getting nuclear weapons
in part because of the U.S. security
guarantee, and in part, at the time,
because they were concerned about what
effects it would have on North Korea.
And the Egyptians may have gotten rid of their
nuclear weapons program because
they feared that all other Arab states
would rush forward, and
they reluctantly accepted that perhaps
Israel having nuclear weapons
was better than having a widespread spread of
nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
It does suggest in helping you understand
why the Egyptians are so concerned and
keep pushing for a nuclear weapons free
zone, in the Middle East keep insisting
that their restraint should be coupled
with an Israeli committment to disarm.
Nuclear weapons however should not be seen
only as a defensive mechanism.
Indeed we now have evidence from Saddam
Hussein's archives
that nuclear weapons in Iraq were seen as
a potential shield behind which
Iraq could use conventional forces more
aggressively.
The quote you have here is from Saddam
Hussein arguing in
a private meeting that if they got a
nuclear weapon,
it would guarantee that they could fight a
long war, that is a long conventional war,
destructive to our enemy, by which he was referring to Israel.
And take at our leisure every meter of
land and
drown the enemy with rivers of blood.
We consider losses in the thousands,
thousands so that we plan to
be prepared to lose in those 12 months
50,000 martyrs and keep going.
Saddam Hussein didn't think that he
could conquer all of Israel if he
got nuclear weapons, but did think they
were a shield,
in which Israel could not escalate and use
it's weapons against Iraq
while Iraq attacked Israel and
occupied territories with conventional
forces.
The Iraqi nuclear weapons also posed a very
severe danger.
That is, if they had acquired nuclear
weapons the inspectors who saw their
weapons design were very concerned that
if they had gone forward and
been permitted to go forward with their
weapons,
if a single bullet hit one it might have
gone off.
"I wouldn't want to be around it if it fell
off the edge of the desk," one of
the inspectors said.
And there are some dangers about
preauthorized use
creating an unauthorized activity?
After all, Saddam Hussein knew that if
there was a nuclear attack on Baghdad,
that he would potentially not be able to
give orders.
So there's some evidence that Saddam
predelegated authority to launch for
example SCUD missiles with biological
weapons in 1991.
Suggesting that he might have done so with
nuclear weapons had he acquired them.
So that's the first mile, looks at security
systems.
And I think the security arguments can
take you a long way,
but can't explain all cases.
Because there are other cases, India in
1974,
and maybe even in 1998 when the tests
began, South Africans and the
Japanese in which domestic politics plays,
I think, a predominant role.
Mrs. Ghandi in 1974, had a capability
to acquire nuclear weapons.
Indeed the Indians, a security model would
suggest, would have been rushing to
get nuclear weapons after the Chinese test
in 1964, but they didn't.
They leisurely developed a program, and in
1974 the scientists came to Mrs Gandhi,
who was in the middle of a domestic
crisis, the emergency, and
presented her with the option that we can
test a weapon, a peaceful nuclear device.
Its a, its a peaceful nuclear device.
People will love it at home, but people
abroad will punish us,
will put sanctions on us because we
haven't signed the treaty.
And it's only for peaceful purposes.
To to use for mining purposes et cetera.
Mrs Ghandi, facing a domestic crisis, wanting to shore up
her domestic support as being a tough
leader,
went ahead and approved of a nuclear test
and then afterwards when the sanctions
were put on, despite what the scientists
have said, they went back to her and said,
can we test again, we want to do some more
testing and she said, absolutely not.
Domestic politics not the international
environment were important even
though the international environment
ending up telling her not to do it again.
South Africa, some people could explain
the South African decision to get rid of
their nuclear weapons saying they weren't
threatened because of the collapse of
the Soviet Union, and therefore they could
safely give this up.
However, if you actually look at the
timing and read the documents it's clear
that many people in South Africa, even
those favoring within the white regime,
the transfer of power to black majority
rule,
were greatly concerned about what would
happen if you get rid of apartheid,
there could be a potential conflict
between radical
whites and radicals within the ANC.
And do you want to have nuclear weapons
during that potentially messy or
dangerous transition period.
So again, they got rid of the weapons
because of domestic change,
not because of international change.
And the Japanese as well, I think should
be seen in a domestic context,
as the Japanese have very strong what's
called an allergy against nuclear weapons.
Because of their experience in 1945 and
because of the nuclear tests
in the Pacific, which hurt Japanese
fishermen and greatly damaged them.
And so Japan, even when faced with
security threats,
there's relatively little pressure from
the public to acquire nuclear weapons.
Indeed, it's exactly the opposite.
There's pressure to move away.
And to be a very good reformer and
encourage other countries to get rid of
nuclear weapons rather than Japan
acquiring them.
So the non proliferation treaty in this
model empowers reformers.
It creates industries that have an
interest in keeping nuclear energy
safe and secure, and not tie it in with
military purposes.
A third explanation looks at norms.
Now a norms model suggests that countries
acquire weapons not just because of
security interests, not just because of
domestic political interest, but
because creating weapons that are the most
modern weapon,
this is what countries do.
If you want to be a strong power, you have
to have the strongest weapons
And people will look at the prestige
involved with having the strongest
weapons, so that's really important.
If you look at France, for example, why
did France feel it was so
important under Charles De Gaulle to
acquire nuclear weapons?
Well, De Gaulle, once said that France
would not be France
if it does not have nuclear weapons.
Once a major power, after the Second World
War being a country in great decline,
to shore up the prestige of France, the
radiance of France.
France felt, the French government felt, that it
needed to have some nuclear weapons.
The Ukraine and other countries might be a
good example of a different kind of norm
the non-proliferation treaty could create.
It says the norm that any country that can
should get a nuclear weapon for prestige,
The NPT says that no, there are new norms
of positive behavior.
You can follow the agreements that you
sign,
and if you develop nuclear weapons you'll be
in that bad category
like North Korea or Iran.
The NPT that creates a norm, a new
norm of positive behavior.
Suggestion that strong states are legal
states to
follow the commitments they've made.
