Meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks
to understand the nature of ethical properties,
statements, attitudes, and judgments. Meta-ethics
is one of the three branches of ethics generally
studied by philosophers, the others being
normative ethics and applied ethics.
While normative ethics addresses such questions
as "What should I do?", thus endorsing some
ethical evaluations and rejecting others,
meta-ethics addresses questions such as "What
is goodness?" and "How can we tell what is
good from what is bad?", seeking to understand
the nature of ethical properties and evaluations.
Some theorists argue that a metaphysical account
of morality is necessary for the proper evaluation
of actual moral theories and for making practical
moral decisions; others reason from opposite
premises and suggest that studying moral judgments
about proper actions can guide us to a true
account of the nature of morality.
== Meta-ethical questions ==
According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen,
there are three kinds of meta-ethical problems,
or three general questions:
What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?
(moral semantics)
What is the nature of moral judgments? (moral
ontology)
How may moral judgments be supported or defended?
(moral epistemology)A question of the first
type might be, "What do the words 'good',
'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' mean?" (see value
theory). The second category includes questions
of whether moral judgments are universal or
relative, of one kind or many kinds, etc.
Questions of the third kind ask, for example,
how we can know if something is right or wrong,
if at all. Garner and Rosen say that answers
to the three basic questions "are not unrelated,
and sometimes an answer to one will strongly
suggest, or perhaps even entail, an answer
to another."A meta-ethical theory, unlike
a normative ethical theory, does not attempt
to evaluate specific choices as being better,
worse, good, bad, or evil; although it may
have profound implications as to the validity
and meaning of normative ethical claims. An
answer to any of the three example questions
above would not itself be a normative ethical
statement.
== Semantic theories ==
These theories mainly put forward a position
on the first of the three questions above,
"What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?"
They may however imply or even entail answers
to the other two questions as well.
Cognitivist theories hold that evaluative
moral sentences express propositions (that
is, they are "truth apt" or "truth bearers",
capable of being true or false), as opposed
to non-cognitivism.
Most forms of cognitivism hold that some such
propositions are true, as opposed to error
theory, which asserts that all are erroneous.
Moral realism (in the robust sense; see moral
universalism for the minimalist sense) holds
that such propositions are about robust or
mind-independent facts, that is, not facts
about any person or group's subjective opinion,
but about objective features of the world.
Meta-ethical theories are commonly categorized
as either a form of realism or as one of three
forms of "anti-realism" regarding moral facts:
ethical subjectivism, error theory, or non-cognitivism.
Realism comes in two main varieties:
Ethical naturalism holds that there are objective
moral properties and that these properties
are reducible or stand in some metaphysical
relation (such as supervenience) to entirely
non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists
hold that we have empirical knowledge of moral
truths. Ethical naturalism was implicitly
assumed by many modern ethical theorists,
particularly utilitarians.
Ethical non-naturalism, as put forward by
G. E. Moore, holds that there are objective
and irreducible moral properties (such as
the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes
have intuitive or otherwise a priori awareness
of moral properties or of moral truths. Moore's
open question argument against what he considered
the naturalistic fallacy was largely responsible
for the birth of meta-ethical research in
contemporary analytic philosophy.
Ethical subjectivism is one form of moral
anti-realism. It holds that moral statements
are made true or false by the attitudes and/or
conventions of people, either those of each
society, those of each individual, or those
of some particular individual. Most forms
of ethical subjectivism are relativist, but
there are notable forms that are universalist:
Ideal observer theory holds that what is right
is determined by the attitudes that a hypothetical
ideal observer would have. An ideal observer
is usually characterized as a being who is
perfectly rational, imaginative, and informed,
among other things. Though a subjectivist
theory due to its reference to a particular
(albeit hypothetical) subject, Ideal Observer
Theory still purports to provide universal
answers to moral questions.
Divine command theory holds that for a thing
to be right is for a unique being, God, to
approve of it, and that what is right for
non-God beings is obedience to the divine
will. This view was criticized by Plato in
the Euthyphro (see the Euthyphro problem)
but retains some modern defenders (Robert
Adams, Philip Quinn, and others). Like ideal
observer theory, divine command theory purports
to be universalist despite its subjectivism.
Error theory, another form of moral anti-realism,
holds that although ethical claims do express
propositions, all such propositions are false.
Thus, both the statement "Murder is morally
wrong" and the statement "Murder is morally
permissible" are false, according to error
theory. J. L. Mackie is probably the best-known
proponent of this view. Since error theory
denies that there are moral truths, error
theory entails moral nihilism and, thus, moral
skepticism; however, neither moral nihilism
nor moral skepticism conversely entail error
theory.
Non-cognitivist theories hold that ethical
sentences are neither true nor false because
they do not express genuine propositions.
Non-cognitivism is another form of moral anti-realism.
Most forms of non-cognitivism are also forms
of expressivism, however some such as Mark
Timmons and Terrence Horgan distinguish the
two and allow the possibility of cognitivist
forms of expressivism.
Emotivism, defended by A. J. Ayer and Charles
Stevenson, holds that ethical sentences serve
merely to express emotions. Ayer argues that
ethical sentences are expressions of approval
or disapproval, not assertions. So "Killing
is wrong" means something like "Boo on killing!".
Quasi-realism, defended by Simon Blackburn,
holds that ethical statements behave linguistically
like factual claims and can be appropriately
called "true" or "false", even though there
are no ethical facts for them to correspond
to. Projectivism and moral fictionalism are
related theories.
Universal prescriptivism, defended by R. M.
Hare, holds that moral statements function
like universalized imperative sentences. So
"Killing is wrong" means something like "Don't
kill!" Hare's version of prescriptivism requires
that moral prescriptions be universalizable,
and hence actually have objective values,
in spite of failing to be indicative statements
with truth-values per se.
=== Centralism and non-centralism ===
Yet another way of categorizing meta-ethical
theories is to distinguish between centralist
and non-centralist theories. The debate between
centralism and non-centralism revolves around
the relationship between the so-called "thin"
and "thick" concepts of morality. Thin moral
concepts are those such as good, bad, right,
and wrong; thick moral concepts are those
such as courageous, inequitable, just, or
dishonest. While both sides agree that the
thin concepts are more general and the thick
more specific, centralists hold that the thin
concepts are antecedent to the thick ones
and that the latter are therefore dependent
on the former. That is, centralists argue
that one must understand words like "right"
and "ought" before understanding words like
"just" and "unkind." Non-centralism rejects
this view, holding that thin and thick concepts
are on par with one another and even that
the thick concepts are a sufficient starting
point for understanding the thin ones.Non-centralism
has been of particular importance to ethical
naturalists in the late 20th and early 21st
centuries as part of their argument that normativity
is a non-excisable aspect of language and
that there is no way of analyzing thick moral
concepts into a purely descriptive element
attached to a thin moral evaluation, thus
undermining any fundamental division between
facts and norms. Allan Gibbard, R. M. Hare,
and Simon Blackburn have argued in favor of
the fact/norm distinction, meanwhile, with
Gibbard going so far as to argue that, even
if conventional English has only mixed normative
terms (that is, terms that are neither purely
descriptive nor purely normative), we could
develop a nominally English metalanguage that
still allowed us to maintain the division
between factual descriptions and normative
evaluations.
== Substantial theories ==
These theories attempt to answer the second
of the above questions: "What is the nature
of moral judgments?"
Amongst those who believe there to be some
standard(s) of morality (as opposed to moral
nihilists), there are two divisions: universalists,
who hold that the same moral facts or principles
apply to everyone everywhere; and relativists,
who hold that different moral facts or principles
apply to different people or societies.
Moral universalism (or universal morality)
is the meta-ethical position that some system
of ethics, or a universal ethic, applies universally,
that is to all intelligent beings regardless
of species, culture, race, sex, religion,
nationality, sexuality, or other distinguishing
feature. The source or justification of this
system may be thought to be, for instance,
human nature, shared vulnerability to suffering,
the demands of universal reason, what is common
among existing moral codes, or the common
mandates of religion (although it can be argued
that the latter is not in fact moral universalism
because it may distinguish between Gods and
mortals). Moral universalism is the opposing
position to various forms of moral relativism.
Universalist theories are generally forms
of moral realism, though exceptions exists,
such as the subjectivist ideal observer and
divine command theories, and the non-cognitivist
universal prescriptivism of R.M. Hare.
Value monism is the common form of universalism,
which holds that all goods are commensurable
on a single value scale.
Value pluralism contends that there are two
or more genuine scales of value, knowable
as such, yet incommensurable, so that any
prioritization of these values is either non-cognitive
or subjective. A value pluralist might, for
example, contend that both a life as a nun
and a life as a mother realize genuine values
(in a universalist sense), yet they are incompatible
(nuns may not have children), and there is
no purely rational way to measure which is
preferable. A notable proponent of this view
is Isaiah Berlin.
Moral relativism maintains that all moral
judgments have their origins either in societal
or in individual standards, and that no single
objective standard exists by which one can
assess the truth of a moral proposition. Meta-ethical
relativists, in general, believe that the
descriptive properties of terms such as "good",
"bad", "right", and "wrong" do not stand subject
to universal truth conditions, but only to
societal convention and personal preference.
Given the same set of verifiable facts, some
societies or individuals will have a fundamental
disagreement about what one ought to do based
on societal or individual norms, and one cannot
adjudicate these using some independent standard
of evaluation. The latter standard will always
be societal or personal and not universal,
unlike, for example, the scientific standards
for assessing temperature or for determining
mathematical truths. Some philosophers maintain
that moral relativism entails non-cognitivism.
Some but not all relativist theories are forms
of moral subjectivism, although not all subjectivist
theories are relativistic.
Moral nihilism, also known as ethical nihilism,
is the meta-ethical view that nothing has
intrinsic moral value. For example, a moral
nihilist would say that killing someone, for
whatever reason, is intrinsically neither
morally right nor morally wrong. Moral nihilism
must be distinguished from moral relativism,
which does allow for moral statements to be
intrinsically true or false in a non-universal
sense, but does not assign any static truth-values
to moral statements. Insofar as only true
statements can be known, moral nihilists are
moral skeptics. Most forms of moral nihilism
are non-cognitivist and vice versa, though
there are notable exceptions such as universal
prescriptivism (which is semantically non-cognitive
but substantially universal).
== Justification theories ==
These are theories that attempt to answer
questions like, "How may moral judgments be
supported or defended?" or "Why should I be
moral?"
If one presupposes a cognitivist interpretation
of moral sentences, morality is justified
by the moralist's knowledge of moral facts,
and the theories to justify moral judgements
are epistemological theories.
Most moral epistemologies posit that moral
knowledge is somehow possible, as opposed
to moral skepticism.
Amongst them, there are those who hold that
moral knowledge is gained inferentially on
the basis of some sort of non-moral epistemic
process, as opposed to ethical intuitionism.
Empiricism is the doctrine that knowledge
is gained primarily through observation and
experience. Meta-ethical theories that imply
an empirical epistemology include ethical
naturalism, which holds moral facts to be
reducible to non-moral facts and thus knowable
in the same ways; and most common forms of
ethical subjectivism, which hold that moral
facts reduce to facts about individual opinions
or cultural conventions and thus are knowable
by observation of those conventions. There
are exceptions within subjectivism however,
such as ideal observer theory, which implies
that moral facts may be known through a rational
process, and individualist ethical subjectivism,
which holds that moral facts are merely personal
opinions and so may be known only through
introspection. Empirical arguments for ethics
run into the is-ought problem, which asserts
that the way the world is cannot alone instruct
people how they ought to act.
Moral rationalism, also called ethical rationalism,
is the view according to which moral truths
(or at least general moral principles) are
knowable a priori, by reason alone. Some prominent
figures in the history of philosophy who have
defended moral rationalism are Plato and Immanuel
Kant. Perhaps the most prominent figures in
the history of philosophy who have rejected
moral rationalism are David Hume and Friedrich
Nietzsche. Recent philosophers who defended
moral rationalism include R. M. Hare, Christine
Korsgaard, Alan Gewirth, and Michael Smith.
A moral rationalist may adhere to any number
of different semantic theories as well; moral
realism is compatible with rationalism, and
the subjectivist ideal observer theory and
noncognitivist universal prescriptivism both
entail it.
Ethical intuitionism, on the other hand, is
the view according to which some moral truths
can be known without inference. That is, the
view is at its core a foundationalism about
moral beliefs. Such an epistemological view
implies that there are moral beliefs with
propositional contents; so it implies cognitivism.
Ethical intuitionism commonly suggests moral
realism, the view that there are objective
facts of morality and, to be more specific,
ethical non-naturalism, the view that these
evaluative facts cannot be reduced to natural
fact. However, neither moral realism nor ethical
non-naturalism are essential to the view;
most ethical intuitionists simply happen to
hold those views as well. Ethical intuitionism
comes in both a "rationalist" variety, and
a more "empiricist" variety known as moral
sense theory.
Moral skepticism is the class of meta-ethical
theories all members of which entail that
no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral
skeptics also make the stronger, modal, claim
that moral knowledge is impossible. Forms
of moral skepticism include, but are not limited
to, error theory and most but not all forms
of non-cognitivism.
== See also
