Warfare occurred throughout the history of
Ancient Greece, from the Greek Dark Ages onward.
The Greek 'Dark Age' drew to a close as a
significant increase in population allowed
urbanized culture to be restored, which
led to the rise of the city-states (Poleis).
These developments ushered in the period of
Archaic Greece (800-480 BC). They also restored
the capability of organized warfare between
these Poleis (as opposed to small-scale raids
to acquire livestock and grain, for example).
The fractious nature of Ancient Greek society
seems to have made continuous conflict on
this larger scale inevitable.
Along with the rise of the city-state evolved
a new style of warfare: the hoplite phalanx.
Hoplites were armored infantryman, armed with
spears and shields, and the phalanx was a
formation of these soldiers with their shields
locked together and spears pointed forward.
The Chigi vase, dated to around 650 BC, is
the earliest depiction of a hoplite in full
battle array. With this evolution in warfare,
battles seem to have consisted mostly of the
clash of hoplite phalanxes from the city-states
in conflict. Since the soldiers were citizens
with other occupations, warfare was limited
in distance, season and scale. Neither side
could afford heavy casualties or sustained
campaigns, so conflicts seem to have been
resolved by a single set-piece battle.
The scale and scope of warfare in Ancient
Greece changed dramatically as a result of
the Greco-Persian Wars, which marked the beginning
of Classical Greece (480-323 BC). To fight
the enormous armies of the Achaemenid Empire
was effectively beyond the capabilities of
a single city-state. The eventual triumph
of the Greeks was achieved by alliances of
many city-states, on a scale never seen before.
The rise of Athens and Sparta during this
conflict led directly to the Peloponnesian
War, which saw diversification of warfare.
Emphasis shifted to naval battles and strategies
of attrition such as blockades and sieges.
Following the defeat of the Athenians in 404
BC, and the disbandment of the Athenian-dominated
Delian League, Ancient Greece fell under the
Spartan hegemony. But this was unstable, and
the Persian Empire sponsored a rebellion by
the combined powers of Athens, Thebes, Corinth
and Argos, resulting in the Corinthian War
(395-387 BC). Persia switched sides, which
ended the war, in return for the cities of
Ionia and Spartan non-interference in Asia
Minor. The Spartan hegemony would last another
16 years, until, at the Battle of Leuctra
(371) the Spartans were decisively defeated
by the Theban general Epaminondas.
The Thebans acted with alacrity to establish
a hegemony of their own over Greece. However,
Thebes lacked sufficient manpower and resources,
and became overstretched. Following the death
of Epaminondas and loss of manpower at the
Battle of Mantinea, the Theban hegemony ceased.
The losses in the ten years of the Theban
hegemony left all the Greek city-states weakened
and divided. The city-states of southern Greece
were too weak to resist the rise of the Macedonian
kingdom in the north. With revolutionary tactics,
King Phillip II brought most of Greece under
his sway, paving the way for the conquest
of "the known world" by his son Alexander
the Great. The rise of the Macedonian Kingdom
is generally taken to signal the beginning
of the Hellenistic period, and certainly marked
the end of the distinctive hoplite battle
in Ancient Greece.
== Military structure and methods in ancient
Greece ==
=== 
Hoplite ===
Along with the rise of the city-state evolved
a brand new style of warfare and the emergence
of the hoplite. The hoplite was an infantryman,
the central element of warfare in Ancient
Greece. The word hoplite (Greek ὁπλίτης,
hoplitēs) derives from hoplon (ὅπλον,
plural hopla, ὅπλα) meaning an item of
armor or equipment, thus 'hoplite' may approximate
to 'armored man'. Hoplites were the citizen-soldiers
of the Ancient Greek City-states. They were
primarily armed as spear-men and fought in
a phalanx (see below).
Hoplite armor was extremely expensive for
the average citizen, so it was commonly passed
down from the soldier's father or relative.
Alexander’s Macedonian army had spears called
sarissas that were 18 feet long, far longer
than the 6–9 foot Greek dory. The secondary
weapon of a hoplite was the xiphos, a short
sword used when the soldier's spear was broken
or lost while fighting.
The origins of the hoplite are obscure, and
no small matter of contention amongst historians.
Traditionally, this has been dated to the
8th century BC, and attributed to Sparta;
but more recent views suggest a later date,
towards the 7th century BC. Certainly, by
approximately 650 BC, as dated by the 'Chigi
vase', the 'hoplite revolution' was complete.
The major innovation in the development of
the hoplite seems to have been the characteristic
circular shield (Hoplon), roughly 1 m (3.3
ft) in diameter, and made of wood faced with
bronze. Although very heavy (8–15 kg or
18–33 lb), the design of this shield was
such that it could be supported on the shoulder.
More importantly, it permitted the formation
of a shield-wall by an army, an impenetrable
mass of men and shields. Men were also equipped
with metal greaves and also a breast plate
made of bronze, leather, or stiff cloth. When
this was combined with the primary weapon
of the hoplite, 2–3 m (6.6–9.8 ft) long
spear (the doru), it gave both offensive and
defensive capabilities.
Regardless of where it developed, the model
for the hoplite army evidently quickly spread
throughout Greece. The persuasive qualities
of the phalanx were probably its relative
simplicity (allowing its use by a citizen
militia), low fatality rate (important for
small city-states), and relatively low cost
(enough for each hoplite to provide their
own equipment). The Phalanx also became a
source of political influence because men
had to provide their own equipment in order
to be a part of the army.
==== The hoplite phalanx ====
The ancient Greek city-states developed a
military formation called the phalanx, which
were rows of shoulder-to-shoulder hoplites.
The Hoplites would lock their shields together,
and the first few ranks of soldiers would
project their spears out over the first rank
of shields. The Phalanx therefore presented
a shield wall and a mass of spear points to
the enemy, making frontal assaults much more
difficult. It also allowed a higher proportion
of the soldiers to be actively engaged in
combat at a given time (rather than just those
in the front rank).
The phalanx formed the core of ancient Greek
militaries. Because hoplites were all protected
by their own shield and others’ shields
and spears, they were relatively safe as long
as the formation didn't break. When advancing
towards an enemy, the phalanx would break
into a run that was sufficient to create momentum
but not too much as to lose cohesion. The
opposing sides would collide viciously, possibly
terrifying many of the hoplites of the front
row. The battle would then rely on the valour
of the men in the front line, while those
in the rear maintained forward pressure on
the front ranks with their shields. When in
combat, the whole formation would consistently
press forward trying to break the enemy formation;
thus, when two phalanx formations engaged,
the struggle essentially became a pushing
match, in which, as a rule, the deeper phalanx
would almost always win, with few recorded
exceptions.
When exactly the phalanx developed is uncertain,
but it is thought to have been developed by
the Argives in their early clashes with the
Spartans. The chigi vase, dated to around
650 BC, is the earliest depiction of a hoplite
in full battle array. The hoplite was a well-armed
and armored citizen-soldier primarily drawn
from the middle classes. Every man had to
serve at least two years in the army. Fighting
in the tight phalanx formation maximised the
effectiveness of his armor, large shield and
long spear, presenting a wall of armor and
spearpoints to the enemy. They were a force
to be reckoned with.
=== Hoplite warfare ===
At least in the Archaic Period, the fragmentary
nature of Ancient Greece, with many competing
city-states, increased the frequency of conflict,
but conversely limited the scale of warfare.
Unable to maintain professional armies, the
city-states relied on their own citizens to
fight. This inevitably reduced the potential
duration of campaigns, as citizens would need
to return to their own professions (especially
in the case of farmers). Campaigns would therefore
often be restricted to summer. Armies marched
directly to their target, possibly agreed
on by the protagonists.
If battle was refused by one side, they would
retreat to the city, in which case the attackers
generally had to content themselves with ravaging
the countryside around, since the campaign
season was too limited to attempt a siege.
When battles occurred, they were usually set
piece and intended to be decisive. These battles
were short, bloody, and brutal, and thus required
a high degree of discipline. At least in the
early classical period, hoplites were the
primary force; light troops and cavalry generally
protected the flanks and performed skirmishing,
acting as support troops for the core heavy
infantry.
The strength of hoplites was shock combat.
The two phalanxes would smash into each other
in hopes of quickly breaking the enemy force's
line. Failing that, a battle degenerated into
a pushing match, with the men in the rear
trying to force the front lines through those
of the enemy. This maneuver was known as the
Othismos or "push." Thucydides described hoplite
warfare as othismos aspidon or "the push of
shields". Battles rarely lasted more than
an hour. Once one of the lines broke, the
troops would generally flee from the field,
chased by peltasts or light cavalry if available.
If a hoplite escaped, he would sometimes be
forced to drop his cumbersome aspis, thereby
disgracing himself to his friends and family.
Casualties were slight compared to later battles,
amounting to anywhere between 5 and 15% for
the winning and losing sides respectively,
but the slain often included the most prominent
citizens and generals who led from the front.
Thus, the whole war could be decided by a
single field battle; victory was enforced
by ransoming the fallen back to the defeated,
called the 'Custom of the Dead Greeks'..
=== Other elements of Greek armies ===
Greek armies also included significant numbers
of light infantry, the Psiloi, as support
troops for the heavy hoplites, who also doubled
as baggage handlers for the heavy foot. These
included javelin throwers (akontistai), stone
throwers (lithovoloi) and slingers (sfendonitai)
while archers (toxotai) were rare, mainly
from Crete, or mercenary non-Greek tribes
(as at the crucial battle of Plataea 479 B.C.)
Greek armies gradually downgraded the armor
of the hoplites (to linen padded thorax and
open helmets) to make the phalanx more flexible
and upgraded the javelineers to lightly armored
general purpose infantry (thorakitai and thyreophoroi)
with javelins and sometimes spears. Eventually,
these types effectively complemented the Macedonian
style phalanx which prevailed throughout Greece
after Alexander the Great.
Cavalry had always existed in Greek armies
of the classical era but the cost of horses
made it far more expensive than hoplite armor,
limiting cavalrymen to nobles and the very
wealthy (social class of hippeis). During
the early hoplite era cavalry played almost
no role whatsoever, mainly for social, but
also tactical reasons, since the middle-class
phalanx completely dominated the battlefield.
Gradually, and especially during the Peloponnesian
war, cavalry became more important acquiring
every role that cavalry could play, except
perhaps frontal attack. It scouted, screened,
harassed, outflanked and pursued with the
most telling moment being the use of Syracusan
horse to harass and eventually destroy the
retreating Athenian army of the disastrous
Sicilian expedition 415-413 B.C. One of the
most famous troop of Greek cavalry was the
Tarantine cavalry, originating from the city-state
of Taras in Magna Graecia.
== The economics of ancient warfare ==
Campaigns were often timed with the agricultural
season so as to impact the enemies or enemies'
crops and harvest. The timing had to be very
carefully arranged so that the invaders' enemy's
harvest would be disrupted but the invaders'
harvest would not be affected. Late invasions
were also possible in the hopes that the sowing
season would be affected but this at best
would have minimal effects on the harvest.
One alternative to disrupting the harvest
was to ravage the countryside by uprooting
trees, burning houses and crops and killing
all who were not safe behind the walls of
the city. Ravaging the countryside cost much
effort and was also dependent on the season
because green crops do not burn as well as
those nearer to harvest which are drier.
War also led to acquisition of land and slaves
which would lead to a greater harvest, which
could support a larger army. Plunder was also
a large part of war and this allowed for pressure
to be taken off of the government finances
and allowed for investments to be made that
would strengthen the polis. War also stimulated
production because of the sudden increase
in demand for weapons and armor. Ship builders
would also experience sudden increases in
their production demands.
== Ancient Greek military campaigns ==
=== The Greco-Persian Wars ===
The scale and scope of warfare in Ancient
Greece changed dramatically as a result of
the Greco-Persian Wars. To fight the enormous
armies of the Achaemenid Empire was effectively
beyond the capabilities of a single city-state.
The eventual triumph of the Greeks was achieved
by alliances of many city-states (the exact
composition changing over time), allowing
the pooling of resources and division of labour.
Although alliances between city states occurred
before this time, nothing on this scale had
been seen before.
The Greco-Persian Wars (499-448 BC) were the
result of attempts by the Persian Emperor
Darius the Great, and then his successor Xerxes
I to subjugate Ancient Greece. Darius was
already ruler of the cities of Ionia, and
the wars are taken to start when they rebelled
in 499 BC. The revolt was crushed by 494 BC,
but Darius resolved to bring mainland Greece
under his dominion. Many city-states made
their submission to him, but others did not,
notably including Athens and Sparta. Darius
thus sent his commanders Datis and Artaphernes
to attack Attica, to punish Athens for her
intransigence. After burning Eretria, the
Persians landed at Marathon.
An Athenian army of c. 10,000 hoplites marched
to meet the Persian army of about 25,000 troops.
The Athenians were at a significant disadvantage
both strategically and tactically. Raising
such a large army had denuded Athens of defenders,
and thus any attack in the Athenian rear would
cut off the Army from the City. Tactically,
the hoplites were very vulnerable to attacks
by cavalry, and the Athenians had no cavalry
to defend the flanks. After several days of
stalemate at Marathon, the Persian commanders
attempted to take strategic advantage by sending
their cavalry (by ship) to raid Athens itself.
This gave the Athenian army a small window
of opportunity to attack the remainder of
the Persian Army.
This was the first true engagement between
a hoplite army and a non-Greek army. The Persians
had acquired a reputation for invincibility,
but the Athenian hoplites proved crushingly
superior in the ensuing infantry battle. To
counter the massive numbers of Persians, the
Greek general Miltiades ordered the troops
to be spread across an unusually wide front,
leaving the centre of the Greek line undermanned.
However, the lightly armored Persian infantry
proved no match for the heavily armored hoplites,
and the Persian wings were quickly routed.
The Greek wings then turned against the elite
troops in the Persian centre, which had held
the Greek centre until then. Marathon demonstrated
to the Greeks the lethal potential of the
hoplite, and firmly demonstrated that the
Persians were not, after all, invincible.
The revenge of the Persians was postponed
10 years by internal conflicts in the Persian
Empire, until Darius's son Xerxes returned
to Greece in 480 BC with a staggeringly large
army (modern estimates suggest between 150,000-250,000
men). Many Greeks city-states, having had
plenty of warning of the forthcoming invasion,
formed an anti-Persian league; though as before,
other city-states remained neutral or allied
with Persia. Although alliances between city-states
were commonplace, the scale of this league
was a novelty, and the first time that the
Greeks had united in such a way to face an
external threat.
This allowed diversification of the allied
armed forces, rather than simply mustering
a very large hoplite army. The visionary Athenian
politician Themistocles had successfully persuaded
his fellow citizens to build a huge fleet
in 483/82 BC to combat the Persian threat
(and thus to effectively abandon their hoplite
army, since there were not men enough for
both). Amongst the allies therefore, Athens
was able to form the core of a navy, whilst
other cities, including of course Sparta,
provided the army. This alliance thus removed
the constraints on the type of armed forces
that the Greeks could use. The use of such
a large navy was also a novelty to the Greeks.
The second Persian invasion is famous for
the battles of Thermopylae and Salamis. As
the massive Persian army moved south through
Greece, the allies sent a small holding force
(c. 10,000) men under the Spartan king Leonidas,
to block the pass of Thermopylae whilst the
main allied army could be assembled. The allied
navy extended this blockade at sea, blocking
the nearby straits of Artemisium, to prevent
the huge Persian navy landing troops in Leonidas's
rear. Famously, Leonidas's men held the much
larger Persian army at the pass (where their
numbers were less of an advantage) for three
days, the hoplites again proving their superiority.
Only when a Persian force managed to outflank
them by means of a mountain track was the
allied army overcome; but by then Leonidas
had dismissed the majority of the troops,
remaining with a rearguard of 300 Spartans
(and perhaps 2000 other troops), in the process
making one of history's great last stands.
The Greek navy, despite their lack of experience,
also proved their worth holding back the Persian
fleet whilst the army still held the pass.
Thermopylae provided the Greeks with time
to arrange their defences, and they dug in
across the Isthmus of Corinth, an impregnable
position; although an evacuated Athens was
thereby sacrificed to the advancing Persians.
In order to outflank the isthmus, Xerxes needed
to use this fleet, and in turn therefore needed
to defeat the Greek fleet; similarly, the
Greeks needed to neutralise the Persian fleet
to ensure their safety. To this end, the Greeks
were able to lure the Persian fleet into the
straits of Salamis; and, in a battleground
where Persian numbers again counted for nothing,
they won a decisive victory, justifying Themistocles'
decision to build the Athenian fleet. Demoralised,
Xerxes returned to Asia Minor with much of
his army, leaving his general Mardonius to
campaign in Greece the following year (479
BC).
However, a united Greek army of c. 40,000
hoplites decisively defeated Mardonius at
the Battle of Plataea, effectively ending
the invasion. Almost simultaneously, the allied
fleet defeated the remnants of the Persian
navy at Mycale, thus destroying the Persian
hold on the islands of the Aegean.
The remainder of the wars saw the Greeks take
the fight to the Persians. The Athenian dominated
Delian League of cities and islands extirpated
Persian garrisons from Macedon and Thrace,
before eventually freeing the Ionian cities
from Persian rule. At one point, the Greeks
even attempted an invasion of Cyprus and Egypt
(which proved disastrous), demonstrating a
major legacy of the Persian Wars: warfare
in Greece had moved beyond the seasonal squabbles
between city-states, to coordinated international
actions involving huge armies. After the war,
ambitions of many Greek states dramatically
increased. Tensions resulting from this, and
the rise of Athens and Sparta as pre-eminent
powers during the war led directly to the
Peloponnesian War, which saw further development
of the nature of warfare, strategy and tactics.
=== The Peloponnesian War ===
The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), was fought
between the Athenian dominated Delian League
and the Spartan dominated Peloponnesian League.
The increased manpower and financial resources
increased the scale, and allowed the diversification
of warfare. Set-piece battles during this
war proved indecisive and instead there was
increased reliance on naval warfare, and strategies
of attrition such as blockades and sieges.
These changes greatly increased the number
of casualties and the disruption of Greek
society.
Whatever the proximal causes of the war, it
was in essence a conflict between Athens and
Sparta for supremacy in Greece. The war (or
wars, since it is often divided into three
periods) was for much of the time a stalemate,
punctuated with occasional bouts of activity.
Tactically the Peloponnesian war represents
something of a stagnation; the strategic elements
were most important as the two sides tried
to break the deadlock, something of a novelty
in Greek warfare.
Building on the experience of the Persian
Wars, the diversification from core hoplite
warfare, permitted by increased resources,
continued. There was increased emphasis on
navies, sieges, mercenaries and economic warfare.
Far from the previously limited and formalized
form of conflict, the Peloponnesian War transformed
into an all-out struggle between city-states,
complete with atrocities on a large scale;
shattering religious and cultural taboos,
devastating vast swathes of countryside and
destroying whole cities.From the start, the
mismatch in the opposing forces was clear.
The Delian League (hereafter 'Athenians')
were primarily a naval power, whereas the
Peloponnesian League (hereafter 'Spartans')
consisted of primarily land-based powers.
The Athenians thus avoided battle on land,
since they could not possibly win, and instead
dominated the sea, blockading the Peloponnesus
whilst maintaining their own trade. Conversely,
the Spartans repeatedly invaded Attica, but
only for a few weeks at a time; they remained
wedded to the idea of hoplite-as-citizen.
Although both sides suffered setbacks and
victories, the first phase essentially ended
in stalemate, as neither league had the power
to neutralise the other. The second phase,
an Athenian expedition to attack Syracuse
in Sicily achieved no tangible result other
than a large loss of Athenian ships and men.
In the third phase of the war however the
use of more sophisticated stratagems eventually
allowed the Spartans to force Athens to surrender.
Firstly, the Spartans permanently garrisoned
a part of Attica, removing from Athenian control
the silver mine which funded the war effort.
Forced to squeeze even more money from her
allies, the Athenian league thus became heavily
strained. After the loss of Athenian ships
and men in the Sicilian expedition, Sparta
was able to foment rebellion amongst the Athenian
league, which therefore massively reduced
the ability of the Athenians to continue the
war.
Athens in fact partially recovered from this
setback between 410-406 BC, but a further
act of economic war finally forced her defeat.
Having developed a navy that was capable of
taking on the much-weakened Athenian navy,
the Spartan general Lysander seized the Hellespont,
the source of Athens' grain. The remaining
Athenian fleet was thereby forced to confront
the Spartans, and were decisively defeated.
Athens had little choice but to surrender;
and was stripped of her city walls, overseas
possessions and navy. In the aftermath, the
Spartans were able to establish themselves
as the dominant force in Greece for three
decades.
==== Mercenaries and light infantry ====
Although tactically there was little innovation
in the Peloponessian War, there does appear
to have been an increase in the use of light
infantry, such as peltasts (javelin throwers)
and archers. Many of these would have been
mercenary troops, hired from outlying regions
of Greece. For instance, the Agrianes from
Thrace were well-renowned peltasts, whilst
Crete was famous for its archers. Since there
were no decisive land-battles in the Peloponnesian
War, the presence or absence of these troops
was unlikely to have affected the course of
the war. Nevertheless, it was an important
innovation, one which was developed much further
in later conflicts. Sileraioi were also a
group of ancient mercenaries most likely employed
by the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse
=== Spartan & Theban hegemonies ===
Following the eventual defeat of the Athenians
in 404 BC, and the disbandment of the Athenian-dominated
Delian League, Ancient Greece fell under the
hegemony of Sparta. The peace treaty which
ended the Peloponnesian War left Sparta as
the de facto ruler of Greece (hegemon). Although
the Spartans did not attempt to rule all of
Greece directly, they prevented alliances
of other Greek cities, and forced the city-states
to accept governments deemed suitable by Sparta.
However, from the very beginning, it was clear
that the Spartan hegemony was shaky; the Athenians,
despite their crushing defeat, restored their
democracy but just one year later, ejecting
the Sparta-approved oligarchy. The Spartans
did not feel strong enough to impose their
will on a shattered Athens. Undoubtedly part
of the reason for the weakness of the hegemony
was a decline in the Spartan population.
This did not go unnoticed by the Persian Empire,
which sponsored a rebellion by the combined
powers of Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos,
resulting in the Corinthian War (395-387 BC).
This was the first major challenge Sparta
faced.
The early encounters, at Nemea and Coronea
were typical engagements of hoplite phalanxes,
resulting in Spartan victories. However, the
Spartans suffered a large setback when their
fleet was wiped out by a Persian Fleet at
the Battle of Cnidus, undermining the Spartan
presence in Ionia. The war petered out after
394 BC, with a stalemate punctuated with minor
engagements. One of these is particularly
notable however; at the Battle of Lechaeum,
an Athenian force composed mostly of light
troops (e.g. peltasts) defeated a Spartan
regiment...
The Athenian general Iphicrates had his troops
make repeated hit and run attacks on the Spartans,
who, having neither peltasts nor cavalry,
could not respond effectively. The defeat
of a hoplite army in this way demonstrates
the changes in both troops and tactic which
had occurred in Greek Warfare.
The war ended when the Persians, worried by
the allies' successes, switched to supporting
the Spartans, in return for the cities of
Ionia and Spartan non-interference in Asia
Minor. This brought the rebels to terms, and
restored the Spartan hegemony on a more stable
footing. The peace treaty which ended the
war, effectively restored the status quo ante
bellum, although Athens was permitted to retain
some of the territory it had regained during
the war. The Spartan hegemony would last another
16 years...
The second major challenge Sparta faced was
fatal to its hegemony, and even to its position
as a first-rate power in Greece. As the Thebans
attempted to expand their influence over Boeotia,
they inevitably incurred the ire of Sparta.
After they refused to disband their army,
an army of approximately 10,000 Spartans and
Pelopennesians marched north to challenge
the Thebans. At the decisive Battle of Leuctra
(371 BC), the Thebans routed the allied army.
The battle is famous for the tactical innovations
of the Theban general Epaminondas.
Defying convention, he strengthened the left
flank of the phalanx to an unheard of depth
of 50 ranks, at the expense of the centre
and the right. The centre and right were staggered
backwards from the left (an 'echelon' formation),
so that the phalanx advanced obliquely. The
Theban left wing was thus able to crush the
elite Spartan forces on the allied right,
whilst the Theban centre and left avoided
engagement; after the defeat of the Spartans
and the death of the Spartan king, the rest
of the allied army routed. This is one of
the first known examples of both the tactic
of local concentration of force, and the tactic
of 'refusing a flank'.
Following this victory, the Thebans first
secured their power-base in Boeotia, before
marching on Sparta. As the Thebans were joined
by many erstwhile Spartan allies, the Spartans
were powerless to resist this invasion. The
Thebans marched into Messenia, and freed it
from Sparta; this was a fatal blow to Sparta,
since Messenia had provided most of the helots
which supported the Spartan warrior society.
These events permanently reduced Spartan power
and prestige, and replaced the Spartan hegemony
with a Theban one. The Theban hegemony would
be short-lived however.
Opposition to it throughout the period 369-362
BC caused numerous clashes. In an attempt
to bolster the Thebans' position, Epaminondas
again marched on the Pelopennese in 362 BC.
At the Battle of Mantinea, the largest battle
ever fought between the Greek city-states
occurred; most states were represented on
one side or the other. Epaminondas deployed
tactics similar to those at Leuctra, and again
the Thebans, positioned on the left, routed
the Spartans, and thereby won the battle.
However, such were the losses of Theban manpower,
including Epaminondas himself, that Thebes
was thereafter unable to sustain its hegemony.
Conversely, another defeat and loss of prestige
meant that Sparta was unable to regain its
primary position in Greece. Ultimately, Mantinea,
and the preceding decade, severely weakened
many Greek states, and left them divided and
without the leadership of a dominant power.
=== The rise of Macedon and the end of the
hoplite era ===
Although by the end of the Theban hegemony
the cities of southern Greece were severely
weakened, they might have risen again had
it not been for the ascent to power of the
Macedonian kingdom in the northern Greece.
Unlike the fiercely independent (and small)
city-states, Macedon was a tribal kingdom,
ruled by an autocratic king, and importantly,
covering a larger area. Once firmly unified,
and then expanded, by Phillip II, Macedon
possessed the resources that enabled it to
dominate the weakened and divided states in
southern Greece. Between 356 and 342 BC Phillip
conquered all city states in the vicinity
of Macedon, then Thessaly and then Thrace.
Finally Phillip sought to establish his own
hegemony over the southern Greek city-states,
and after defeating the combined forces of
Athens and Thebes, the two most powerful states,
at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC, succeeded.
Now unable to resist him, Phillip compelled
most of the city states of southern Greece
(including Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos;
but not Sparta) to join the Corinthian League,
and therefore become allied to him.
This established a lasting Macedonian hegemony
over Greece, and allowed Phillip the resources
and security to launch a war against the Persian
Empire. After his assassination, this war
was prosecuted by his son Alexander the Great,
and resulted in the takeover of the whole
Achaemenid Empire by the Macedonians. A united
Macedonian empire did not long survive Alexander's
death, and soon split into the Hellenistic
kingdoms of the Diadochi (Alexander's generals).
However, these kingdoms were still enormous
states, and continued to fight in the same
manner as Phillip and Alexander's armies had.
The rise of Macedon and her successors thus
sounded the death knell for the distinctive
way of war found in Ancient Greece; and instead
contributed to the 'superpower' warfare which
would dominate the ancient world between 350
and 150 BC.
==== The innovations of Phillip II ====
One major reason for Phillip's success in
conquering Greece was the break with Hellenic
military traditions that he made. With more
resources available, he was able to assemble
a more diverse army, including strong cavalry
components. He took the development of the
phalanx to its logical completion, arming
his 'phalangites' (for they were assuredly
not hoplites) with a fearsome 6 m (20 ft)
pike, the 'sarissa'. Much more lightly armored,
the Macedonian phalanx was not so much a shield-wall
as a spear-wall. The Macedonian phalanx was
a supreme defensive formation, but was not
intended to be decisive offensively; instead,
it was used to pin down the enemy infantry,
whilst more mobile forces (such as cavalry)
outflanked them. This 'combined arms' approach
was furthered by the extensive use of skirmishers,
such as peltasts.
Tactically, Phillip absorbed the lessons of
centuries of warfare in Greece. He echoed
the tactics of Epaminondas at Chaeronea, by
not engaging his right wing against the Thebans
until his left wing had routed the Athenians;
thus in course outnumbering and outflanking
the Thebans, and securing victory. Alexander's
fame is in no small part due to his success
as a battlefield tactician; the unorthodox
gambits he used at the battles of Issus and
Gaugamela were unlike anything seen in Ancient
Greece before.
== See also ==
Phalanx formation
Phalangite
Hoplite
Hippeis
Peltast
Ancient Macedonian army
Hellenistic armies
Cretan archers
Toxotai
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== External links ==
The Place of Archery in Greek Warfare
The Five Great Battles of Antiquity by David
L. Smith, Symposion Lectures, 30 June 2006.
