The stated reason for dropping the bomb, which
has become what I call the official narrative,
really to this day, as we’ve seen again
with the media coverage of the past month,
was that it was the only thing that could
end the war, it saved a million American lives,
the Japanese would not have surrendered, we
would have had a costly invasion of Japan,
and we really needed to drop the bomb, it
was the only thing that worked.
This came out in Truman’s initial statement,
where he called Hiroshima a military base.
So, from the beginning, it was important to
communicate to the American people that this
was a decent and necessary act.
And, of course, evidence has emerged over
the decades which shows that there were alternatives.
For example, Truman had just gotten Russia
to declare war on Japan,
to promise to declare war on around August 9th.
And there are many people who believe that
Japan — including Truman — believed that
Japan would have surrendered quickly after
the Russian declaration of war.
And so, there’s all sorts of evidence that
has emerged that the use of the bomb was not
necessary, could have been delayed or not
used at all.
But what was important was to set this narrative
of justification.
And it was set right at the beginning, and
by Truman and his allies, and with a very
willing media, and then, following that, suppression
of evidence from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, confiscation
of film footage, photographs, censorship office
in Tokyo.
My book picks up carrying the story to Hollywood.
And I think it tells the whole story of this
period and what happened in this crucial turning
point, oddly, through this rather entertaining
story about this movie, because the way that
Truman and the military intervened to make
— to adjust the movie and totally get revisions
in the script to reflect this official narrative,
rather than raise questions about the bomb.
And then, ultimately, when the movie came
out, it was nothing more than propaganda.
And so, really, the story of this movie, and
as I tell in the book, it really reflects
so much about this turning point in America,
where we are set on this path to endorsing
the use of the bomb, by most in the media
and by many among the public, right to this day.
What's really driven my work for almost four
decades now is, you know, people say, “Why
does Hiroshima matter today?” or, you know,
“You can’t change history, even if you could.”
But the simple fact is that America continues
to have what’s called a first-use policy.
It means any president is enabled to order
a preemptive nuclear strike — in other words,
in response to a conventional war or, as you
just mentioned, a threat, a perceived threat,
from a rival or an enemy.
I think most people still think America would
only launch in retaliation, but that’s not true.
We’ve had a first-use policy or first-strike
policy.
And there have been efforts to change it.
It’s not happened.
So we still have a first-use president.
Now we have a president in the White House
who, you know, many people are very fearful
of what he might do in a crisis, or in response
to a tweet even.
He’s not exactly the “stable genius”
that he claims to be.
And so, we have this policy still in effect.
And that’s why I keep coming back to Hiroshima
every year and in books and articles, is because
the media, particularly, continues to endorse
the use back then.
Certainly, no president has really come out
against it.
Top officials continue to endorse it.
