Paradigm
In science and epistemology , a paradigm /ˈpærədaɪm/
is a distinct concept or thought pattern.
Scientific paradigm
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the
basic meaning of the term paradigm as "a typical
example or pattern of something; a pattern
or model". The historian of science Thomas
Kuhn gave it its contemporary meaning when
he adopted the word to refer to the set of
practices that define a scientific discipline
at any particular period of time. In his book
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn
defines a scientific paradigm as: "universally
recognized scientific achievements that, for
a time, provide model problems and solutions
for a community of practitioners, i.e.,
what is to be observed and scrutinized
the kind of questions that are supposed to
be asked and probed for answers in relation
to this subject
how these questions are to be structured
how the results of scientific investigations
should be interpreted
how is an experiment to be conducted, and
what equipment is available to conduct the
experiment.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
Kuhn saw the sciences as going through alternating
periods of normal science, when an existing
model of reality dominates a protracted period
of puzzle-solving, and revolution, when the
model of reality itself undergoes sudden drastic
change. Paradigms have two aspects. Firstly,
within normal science, the term refers to
the set of exemplary experiments that are
likely to be copied or emulated. Secondly,
underpinning this set of exemplars are shared
preconceptions, made prior to – and conditioning
– the collection of evidence. These preconceptions
embody both hidden assumptions and elements
that he describes as quasi-metaphysical; the
interpretations of the paradigm may vary among
individual scientists.
Kuhn was at pains to point out that the rationale
for the choice of exemplars is a specific
way of viewing reality: that view and the
status of "exemplar" are mutually reinforcing.
For well-integrated members of a particular
discipline, its paradigm is so convincing
that it normally renders even the possibility
of alternatives unconvincing and counter-intuitive.
Such a paradigm is opaque, appearing to be
a direct view of the bedrock of reality itself,
and obscuring the possibility that there might
be other, alternative imageries hidden behind
it. The conviction that the current paradigm
is reality tends to disqualify evidence that
might undermine the paradigm itself; this
in turn leads to a build-up of unreconciled
anomalies. It is the latter that is responsible
for the eventual revolutionary overthrow of
the incumbent paradigm, and its replacement
by a new one. Kuhn used the expression paradigm
shift (see below) for this process, and likened
it to the perceptual change that occurs when
our interpretation of an ambiguous image "flips
over" from one state to another. (The rabbit-duck
illusion is an example: it is not possible
to see both the rabbit and the duck simultaneously.)
This is significant in relation to the issue
of incommensurability (see below).
A currently accepted paradigm would be the
standard model of physics. The scientific
method would allow for orthodox scientific
investigations into phenomena which might
contradict or disprove the standard model;
however grant funding would be proportionately
more difficult to obtain for such experiments,
depending on the degree of deviation from
the accepted standard model theory which the
experiment would be expected to test for.
To illustrate the point, an experiment to
test for the mass of neutrinos or the decay
of protons (small departures from the model)
would be more likely to receive money than
experiments to look for the violation of the
conservation of momentum, or ways to engineer
reverse time travel.
Mechanisms similar to the original Kuhnian
paradigm have been invoked in various disciplines
other than the philosophy of science. These
include: the idea of major cultural themes,
worldviews (and see below), ideologies, and
mindsets. They have somewhat similar meanings
that apply to smaller and larger scale examples
of disciplined thought. In addition, Michel
Foucault used the terms episteme and discourse,
mathesis and taxinomia, for aspects of a "paradigm"
in Kuhn's original sense.
Paradigm shifts
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
Kuhn wrote that "Successive transition from
one paradigm to another via revolution is
the usual developmental pattern of mature
science." (p. 12)
Paradigm shifts tend to be most dramatic in
sciences that appear to be stable and mature,
as in physics at the end of the 19th century.
At that time, a statement generally attributed
to physicist Lord Kelvin famously claimed,
"There is nothing new to be discovered in
physics now. All that remains is more and
more precise measurement." Five years later,
Albert Einstein published his paper on special
relativity, which challenged the very simple
set of rules laid down by Newtonian mechanics,
which had been used to describe force and
motion for over two hundred years. In this
case, the new paradigm reduces the old to
a special case in the sense that Newtonian
mechanics is still a good model for approximation
for speeds that are slow compared to the speed
of light. Philosophers and historians of science,
including Kuhn himself, ultimately accepted
a modified version of Kuhn's model, which
synthesizes his original view with the gradualist
model that preceded it. Kuhn's original model
is now generally seen as too limited.
Kuhn's idea was itself revolutionary in its
time, as it caused a major change in the way
that academics talk about science. Thus, it
may be that it caused or was itself part of
a "paradigm shift" in the history and sociology
of science. However, Kuhn would not recognize
such a paradigm shift. Being in the social
sciences, people can still use earlier ideas
to discuss the history of science.
Paradigm paralysis
Perhaps the greatest barrier to a paradigm
shift, in some cases, is the reality of paradigm
paralysis: the inability or refusal to see
beyond the current models of thinking. This
is similar to what psychologists term Confirmation
bias. Examples include rejection of Galileo's
theory of a heliocentric universe, the discovery
of electrostatic photography, xerography and
the quartz clock.
Incommensurability
Kuhn pointed out that it could be difficult
to assess whether a particular paradigm shift
had actually led to progress, in the sense
of explaining more facts, explaining more
important facts, or providing better explanations,
because the understanding of "more important",
"better", etc. changed with the paradigm.
The two versions of reality are thus incommensurable.
Kuhn's version of incommensurability has an
important psychological dimension; this is
apparent from his analogy between a paradigm
shift and the flip-over involved in some optical
illusions. However, he subsequently diluted
his commitment to incommensurability considerably,
partly in the light of other studies of scientific
development that did not involve revolutionary
change. One of the examples that Kuhn used
was the change in the style of chemical investigation
that followed the work of Lavoisier on atomic
theory in the late 18th Century as an example
of incommensurability. In this change, the
focus had shifted from the bulk properties
of matter (such as hardness, colour, reactivity,
etc.) to studies of atomic weights and quantitative
studies of reactions. He suggested that it
was impossible to make the comparison needed
to judge which body of knowledge was better
or more advanced. However, this change in
research style (and paradigm) eventually (after
more than a century) led to a theory of atomic
structure that accounts well for the bulk
properties of matter; see, for example, Brady's
General Chemistry. This ability of science
to back off, move sideways, and then advance
is characteristic of the natural sciences,
but contrasts with the position in some social
sciences, notably economics.
This apparent ability does not guarantee that
the account is veridical at any one time,
of course, and most modern philosophers of
science are fallibilists. However, members
of other disciplines do see the issue of incommensurability
as a much greater obstacle to evaluations
of "progress"; see, for example, Martin Slattery's
Key Ideas in Sociology.
Subsequent developments
Opaque Kuhnian paradigms and paradigm shifts
do exist. A few years after the discovery
of the mirror-neurons that provide a hard-wired
basis for the human capacity for empathy,
the scientists involved were unable to identify
the incidents that had directed their attention
to the issue. Over the course of the investigation,
their language and metaphors had changed so
that they themselves could no longer interpret
all of their own earlier laboratory notes
and records.
Imre Lakatos and research programmes
However, many instances exist in which change
in a discipline's core model of reality has
happened in a more evolutionary manner, with
individual scientists exploring the usefulness
of alternatives in a way that would not be
possible if they were constrained by a paradigm.
Imre Lakatos suggested (as an alternative
to Kuhn's formulation) that scientists actually
work within research programmes. In Lakatos'
sense, a research programme is a sequence
of problems, placed in order of priority.
This set of priorities, and the associated
set of preferred techniques, is the positive
heuristic of a programme. Each programme also
has a negative heuristic; this consists of
a set of fundamental assumptions that – temporarily,
at least – takes priority over observational
evidence when the two appear to conflict.
This latter aspect of research programmes
is inherited from Kuhn's work on paradigms,
and represents an important departure from
the elementary account of how science works.
According to this, science proceeds through
repeated cycles of observation, induction,
hypothesis-testing, etc., with the test of
consistency with empirical evidence being
imposed at each stage. Paradigms and research
programmes allow anomalies to be set aside,
where there is reason to believe that they
arise from incomplete knowledge (about either
the substantive topic, or some aspect of the
theories implicitly used in making observations).
Larry Laudan: Dormant anomalies, fading credibility,
and research traditions
Larry Laudan has also made two important contributions
to the debate. Laudan believed that something
akin to paradigms exist in the social sciences
(Kuhn had contested this, see below); he referred
to these as research traditions. Laudan noted
that some anomalies become "dormant", if they
survive a long period during which no competing
alternative has shown itself capable of resolving
the anomaly. He also presented cases in which
a dominant paradigm had withered away because
its lost credibility when viewed against changes
in the wider intellectual milieu.
Concept of paradigm and the social sciences
Kuhn himself did not consider the concept
of paradigm as appropriate for the social
sciences. He explains in his preface to The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions that he
concocted the concept of paradigm precisely
in order to distinguish the social from the
natural sciences (p.x). He wrote this book
at the Palo Alto Center for Scholars, surrounded
by social scientists, when he observed that
they were never in agreement on theories or
concepts. He explains that he wrote this book
precisely to show that there are no, nor can
there be any, paradigms in the social sciences.
Mattei Dogan, a French sociologist, in his
article "Paradigms in the Social Sciences,"
develops Kuhn's original thesis that there
are no paradigms at all in the social sciences
since the concepts are polysemic, the deliberate
mutual ignorance between scholars and the
proliferation of schools in these disciplines.
Dogan provides many examples of the non-existence
of paradigms in the social sciences in his
essay, particularly in sociology, political
science and political anthropology.
However, both Kuhn's original work and Dogan's
commentary are directed at disciplines that
are defined by conventional labels (e.g.,
"sociology"). While it is true that such broad
groupings in the social sciences are usually
not based on a Kuhnian paradigm, each of the
competing sub-disciplines may still be underpinned
by a paradigm, research programme, research
tradition, and/ or professional imagery. These
structures will be motivating research, providing
it with an agenda, defining what is - and
what is not - anomalous evidence, and inhibiting
debate with other groups that fall under the
same broad disciplinary label. (A good example
is provided by the contrast between Skinnerian
behaviourism and Personal Construct Theory,
PCT, within psychology. The most significant
of the many ways in which these two sub-disciplines
of psychology differ concerns meanings and
intentions. In PCT, these are seen as the
central concern of psychology; in behaviourism,
they are not scientific evidence at all, because
they cannot be directly observed.) These considerations
explains the conflict between the Kuhn/ Dogan
view, and the views of others (including Larry
Laudan, see above), who do apply these concepts
to social sciences.
Handa, M.L. (1986) introduced the idea of
"social paradigm" in the context of social
sciences. He identified the basic components
of a social paradigm. Like Kuhn, Handa addressed
the issue of changing paradigm; the process
popularly known as "paradigm shift". In this
respect, he focused on social circumstances
that precipitate such a shift and the effects
of the shift on social institutions, including
the institution of education. This broad shift
in the social arena, in turn, changes the
way the individual perceives reality.
Another use of the word paradigm is in the
sense of "worldview". For example, in social
science, the term is used to describe the
set of experiences, beliefs and values that
affect the way an individual perceives reality
and responds to that perception. Social scientists
have adopted the Kuhnian phrase "paradigm
shift" to denote a change in how a given society
goes about organizing and understanding reality.
A "dominant paradigm" refers to the values,
or system of thought, in a society that are
most standard and widely held at a given time.
Dominant paradigms are shaped both by the
community's cultural background and by the
context of the historical moment. The following
are conditions that facilitate a system of
thought to become an accepted dominant paradigm:
Professional organizations that give legitimacy
to the paradigm
Dynamic leaders who introduce and purport
the paradigm
Journals and editors who write about the system
of thought. They both disseminate the information
essential to the paradigm and give the paradigm
legitimacy
Government agencies who give credence to the
paradigm
Educators who propagate the paradigm's ideas
by teaching it to students
Conferences conducted that are devoted to
discussing ideas central to the paradigm
Media coverage
Lay groups, or groups based around the concerns
of lay persons, that embrace the beliefs central
to the paradigm
Sources of funding to further research on
the paradigm
Etymology
Paradigm comes from Greek "παράδειγμα"
(paradeigma), "pattern, example, sample" from
the verb "παραδείκνυμι" (paradeiknumi),
"exhibit, represent, expose" and that from
"παρά" (para), "beside, beyond" + "δείκνυμι"
(deiknumi), "to show, to point out".
In rhetoric, Paradeigma is known as a type
of proof. The purpose of paradeigma is to
provide an audience with an illustration of
similar occurrences. This illustration is
not meant to take the audience to a conclusion,
however it is used to help guide them there.
A personal accountant is a good comparison
of paradeigma to explain how it is meant to
guide the audience. A personal accountant's
job is not to tell you what and what not to
spend your money on; however, they are there
to help guide you and your spendings based
on financial goals you may have. Anaximenes
defined paradeigma as, "actions that have
occurred previously and are similar to, or
the opposite of, those which we are now discussing."
The original Greek term παράδειγμα
(paradeigma) was used in Greek texts such
as Plato's Timaeus (28A) as the model or the
pattern that the Demiurge (god) used to create
the cosmos. The term had a technical meaning
in the field of grammar: the 1900 Merriam-Webster
dictionary defines its technical use only
in the context of grammar or, in rhetoric,
as a term for an illustrative parable or fable.
In linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure used
paradigm to refer to a class of elements with
similarities.
The Merriam-Webster Online dictionary defines
this usage as "a philosophical and theoretical
framework of a scientific school or discipline
within which theories, laws, and generalizations
and the experiments performed in support of
them are formulated; broadly: a philosophical
or theoretical framework of any kind."
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy attributes
the following description of the term to Thomas
Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions:
Other uses
The word paradigm is also still used to indicate
a pattern or model or an outstandingly clear
or typical example or archetype. The term
is frequently used in this sense in the design
professions. Design Paradigms or archetypes
comprise functional precedents for design
solutions. The best known references on design
paradigms are Design Paradigms: A Sourcebook
for Creative Visualization, by Wake, and Design
Paradigms by Petroski.
This term is also used in cybernetics. Here
it means (in a very wide sense) a (conceptual)
protoprogram for reducing the chaotic mass
to some form of order. Note the similarities
to the concept of entropy in chemistry and
physics. A paradigm there would be a sort
of prohibition to proceed with any action
that would increase the total entropy of the
system. In order to create a paradigm, a closed
system which would accept any changes is required.
Thus a paradigm can be only applied to a system
that is not in its final stage.
Beyond its use in the physical and social
sciences, Kuhn's paradigm concept has been
analysed in relation to its applicability
in identifying 'paradigms' with respect to
worldviews at specific points in history.
One example is Matthew Edward Harris' book
The Notion of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth
Century: The Idea of Paradigm in Church History.
Harris stresses the primarily sociological
importance of paradigms, pointing towards
Kuhn's second edition of The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. Although obedience
to popes such as Innocent III and Boniface
VIII was widespread, even written testimony
from the time showing loyalty to the pope
does not demonstrate that the writer had the
same worldview as the Church, and therefore
pope, at the centre. The difference between
paradigms in the physical sciences and in
historical organisations such as the Church
is that the former, unlike the latter, requires
technical expertise rather than repeating
statements. In other words, after scientific
training through what Kuhn calls 'exemplars',
one could not genuinely believe that, to take
a trivial example, the earth is flat, whereas
thinkers such as Giles of Rome in the thirteenth
century wrote in favour of the pope, then
could easily write similarly glowing things
about the king. A writer such as Giles would
have wanted a good job from the pope; he was
a papal publicist. However, Harris writes
that 'scientific group membership is not concerned
with desire, emotions, gain, loss and any
idealistic notions concerning the nature and
destiny of humankind...but simply to do with
aptitude, explanation, cold description of
the facts of the world and the universe from
within a paradigm'.
