- I'm very honored to be
on this panel with you,
your Excellency, Husam,
and I'm looking forward to
trying to disentangle a bit
what the conflict is actually about,
where it has come,
where it has reached to,
and where it's headed,
and then also trying to
see what is the way forward
from a Palestinian perspective
and where do you see a role for Germany
and for the Europeans
sitting here in Berlin
I think that would make some sense.
My name is Muriel Asseburg,
I work at Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik
the German institute for
international and security affairs
here in Berlin,
I've been working amongst other issues
on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict for the last 25 years
and Husam, ambassador is a practitioner,
so he is currently the head
of the Palestinian Mission
to the UK in London,
he is also an advisor to the
President on strategic affairs,
before he went to London,
he headed the Palestinian
Delegation in the US
before that was shut down,
he is also a politician,
so he is a member of Fatah,
and has been dealing with foreign
affairs in the Fatah party
he is also an academic,
so he holds a PHD in economics
from the University of London,
he's been teaching and
doing research in London,
in Harvard and also in the
Palestinian University,
Birzeit University.
When we look at the
situation in the Middle East,
we can see that it is
connected to what happened here
almost 30 years ago,
the developments, the global developments
that lead to the fall of the Berlin wall
also gave a push to
developments in the Middle East
at the time,
and lead to the
negotiations, or contributed,
made it possible for
negotiations to take place
first in Madrid and then in Washington,
and lead also then to the Oslo Agreements.
So when we go back to 1993,
when the Israelis and the Palestinians
signed onto the so-called
Declaration of Principles
it seemed as if the two
parties to the conflict
were on a path to peace,
peace filled on the model
of two states coexisting
next to each other,
and that was what was
supposed to be achieved
in an interim period.
Now, in 2019, this is
definitely not where we are,
and this is not as it seems
where we're headed to.
Rather, what we are confronted with today
is a one-state reality,
a reality in which Israel actually
controls directly or indirectly
the whole of the land between
the river and the sea,
where it controls not only the territory
but also the air space,
the electromagnetic sphere,
the borders, the sea, the coast,
and where the PA, and for that matter,
also the de facto government in Gaza
is limited to self-administration.
We also see that, and that refers, again,
to the subject or the
theme of that forum here,
where since and in reaction
to the second Intifada,
Israel has built a
so-called separation wall
or separation barrier,
which in parts really is a high wall,
that really cuts very
deep into the territory
that was supposed to be the territory
of the Palestinian State,
which de facto annexes some
8% of West Bank territory.
We haven't seen any peace
efforts, peace talks taking place
since April, 2014, when the
last talks that were mediated
by the US broke down,
what we have seen since
then, is an effort,
by the government of Israel
to entrench the occupation,
to push forward creeping
annexation in the West Bank
and in Jerusalem,
we have seen the continued
locate and isolation
of the Gaza strip,
leading to a very grave
humanitarian situation there
and a complete dependency
of the population
on international aid,
we have now, or we are now witnessing
a Palestinian authority
which is ever closer
to the brink of financial collapse
and the original aims
of two states of peace
between Israel and the Palestinians
and the realization of
the Palestinian goal
of self-determination seem to be elusive.
It also seems that the
so-called Deal of the Century
that the Americans have announced
but not put forward,
doesn't hold a lot of promising content
for the Palestinians.
So let's try to look them.
(laughter)
Why does the situation
look the way it does today
and what is a possible
way out of this conundrum?
Husam, maybe we start
by looking back first
and see what has actually gone wrong
over the last 30 years,
without going into every detail,
what went wrong and what does that tell us
also about the conflict,
what makes the conflict
so intractable, actually?
- Thank you very much, Muriel,
and thank you for the
very generous introduction
of viewers and allow me first
to express my absolute gratitude
to the University of Chicago
and to the Pearson Institute
for giving me and us
this honor for the
second time in this year,
the first was really
being privileged, honored
to give the third annual lecture
of the Pearson Institute,
this last April,
unfortunately I couldn't be in person,
but I felt as if I was there
with the faculty and the students
and for sustaining the discussions
about conflicts worldwide,
but particularly Israel, Palestine
in such a time when there
is a deliberate effort
to marginalize the issue,
and to actually push it down the ladder
comes to Pearson Institute
and the University of Chicago
to keep the discussion.
And thirdly, for choosing Berlin
to be the place for our gathering,
and really it could
not be better location,
better timing, the 30 years
of the fall of the Berlin wall,
you don't need to study
conflict resolution,
you just need to come to Berlin
to know and to come to terms with the fact
that it's all about openness,
it's all about unity,
it's all about inclusive approach,
that Berlin offers and
frankly I will spend
the whole day tomorrow walking around,
just to learn the fruits
of the falling of walls
and the falling of
segregations and separations.
And allow me also to express
my absolute humbleness
and gratitude,
for her excellency, our
ambassador Dr. Kholoud Daibes,
for being here with us,
she honors us.
And finally, before I answer
your very easy question,
or questions (laughter),
Yusuf whom we had the honor
of actually recruiting in Washington,
a couple of years ago,
and he was a, what is Yusuf,
he was our congress affairs officer,
Yusuf is one of 13 million Palestinians
but Yusuf's story, Yusuf's
father, Yusuf's mother
is the story of the 13
million Palestinians.
It is the story of the
ability of our parents
and our society and our nation
to raise in us not resentment, not anger,
not negative energy,
but positive energy,
the ability to forgive,
the ability to move forward,
the ability to be resilient,
and actually I salute him here today
for what he had to say in his book
and his ability to convey our story
in such a very effective way,
but also Yusuf's father was so resilient,
it wasn't just about forgiveness,
it was about resilience,
staying right in the middle of all these
colonial settlements, all these years,
and refusing any attempt at removing him
and his family from their own home,
and that is the story of Palestinians,
the ones who wonder why we
have withstood the pressure
of the last 100 years,
it's the Yusuf story, it's
the hundreds of thousands
of families who invest
in the human capita,
by the way we have one
of the highest per capita
PHD graduates worldwide,
because our parents, the parents of Yusuf,
and many of them,
have diverted the energy
of the Nakba of 1948,
of the catastrophe that has happened
and to that energy that
brings Yusuf and many others
to the fore of international volume.
Answering your question,
you know, only couple of weeks ago,
I went to my friend, the german
ambassador to London, Peter,
who was the ambassador
in Washington, actually,
and we were friends there,
to celebrate the 30 years of
the fall of the Berlin wall
in London,
and we also should have
celebrated, the Palestinians,
the fall of another wall,
almost around the very same time.
It was only one year before back in 1988
there was a major wall
that did fall in that time,
which is the psychological, political,
narrative wall between us,
and it was a momentous
transformational moment,
in 1988, when we, the
Palestinians, the PLO,
the Palestine Liberation Organization
finally recognized the
fact that there will
have to be a solution,
and that we cannot achieve
or we cannot call for
absolute justice, it
must be relative justice.
And then recognizing that
we will have to build
two states by declaring an
independent state of Palestine
in the West Bank in Gaza.
It was a major wall before that,
because before that, we would
never engage in a discussion
of sharing our land.
Before that it was a one-state reality,
a one-state solution, a democratic state.
And also that moment brought
other wars to fought,
an Israeli main wall for,
by recognizing the PLO,
recognizing the legitimate aspirations
of the Palestinian people.
So it's important to remind people
that we have not been regressing
and it's important to remind people
that while we have all these issues,
we have moved a long
way during these years.
And what followed after
1988 decision by the PLO
to actually call for
the two-state solution,
ally itself for the
international legitimacy
international resolution
was immediately the
Madrid Peace Conference,
and then the Oslo peace forces.
And these were two important milestones
in our history.
Oslo produced the Oslo peace process
for us and for the international community
Oslo was about implementing
the two-state solution.
For Israel, may I say,
for the post-Rabin Israel,
because Rabin was assassinated in 1995,
and in 1996, Netanyahu won,
actually as early as that time,
for Israel, the interpretation was
a little bit different.
The interpretation was an ability
to manage the status quo
in a way that is a
deteriorating status quo,
i.e. status quo minus
with the continuation of the status quo.
Then comes the questions,
answering your question,
what went wrong?
Why did we get where we are now,
with all the very accurate description
that you described the current reality?
The number one answer is that
we, the Palestinians have
made couple of mistakes.
The first mistake is entering into
such an important historic agreement
that is Oslo, after that
historic moment of 1988,
recognizing Israel.
We made some mistakes,
including accepting to
enter into a process
that was not reciprocal.
We recognized the state of Israel
in writing, in 1993,
signed by the founder of
our national movement,
the president of Palestine, Yasser Arafat,
we haven't received a
reciprocal recognition.
I think that was a major mistake
because we should have agreed
on the final outcome
before we started the job.
And it's changed, we got a
letter, recognizing the PLO
as the legitimate sole
of representative of the
Palestinian people.
A good step in the right direction,
but that maybe we should have reciprocated
either by recognizing
the Israeli government
as the representative of Israeli people,
but there was a problem there.
Also, we should have
been much more serious
about the text of the agreement,
particularly in the arena
of the colonial settlements.
We made mistakes and it's
important that we learn
from our mistakes.
The second source of mistake,
and I'm not gonna here bring Israel,
because Israel has made
up its mind since 1996.
Not to head in the direction
of a two-state solution.
And Netanyahu has made a public promise
as early as 1996 only two years after
the beginning of the Oslo accords
that he is there to derail the
Oslo peace forces publicly.
So let's not even bring
Israel in to why we failed
because it's a constant factor there.
Second reason is the mediator.
The sole mediator since the
Madrid Peace Forces was the US.
And I'm not even going
to mention Trump now
and the Trump administration,
I'm talking about the US
for the last 30 years,
which was the sole
arbitrator, mediator, broker.
And without going into much
details why the US has failed
but the US did absolutely
fail its part of the deed.
Because why did we recognize
the state of Israel
without Israel recognize us?
Why did we engage in
a non-violent campaign
and renouncing violence,
why did we endorse the two-state solution
and endorse international legitimacy?
For one reason, because the US said,
"Should you do that,
"we will deliver the two-state solution."
That was the contract.
That was the contract.
Now the question is, did the US fail
because it didn't want to or it can't?
I think it did want to,
I think the US had, they
wanted to reach an agreement
because it serves the
strategic interest of the US.
Because there is a majority
of the Jewish community
in the US who are liberals, democrats,
and who really wanted to see a solution
fearing the future of Israel,
but it can't, simply can't,
because Israel in the US
is not a foreign policy issue.
It is a domestic issue.
Domestic issue.
And if we want to go through
the heart of the matter,
it isn't about the strategic
interest of America,
it's written in stones
that they want to see a Middle East
that serves the interests
of the US and the region
whereby the core conflict is a result
that is Israel Palestine.
And I should have said
that throughout these 30 years,
there was no other conflict on Earth
that had the clarity of the destination.
There was a consensus.
Two states, 67, it didn't need much,
it's not as complicated
as other conflicts.
And that international
consensus was sustained,
there was never a conflict
that had the interest
of the sole super power
as long as we did.
America was set on it,
every administration,
early on in their terms.
Including Trump, by the way.
There was never a conflict
where the majority of the two sides
agree on that international consensus
so we had it all in the right place.
So the failure was never
a failure of strategy,
interest, legality,
international legality,
or even national legalities,
be it in America, be it in Europe,
the failure was purely political.
Because the political dynamics in America
could not actually match its own interest.
That's the bottom line.
Now the third of the last,
and I think that's the 80% of the failure,
it's not only us, it's not only the US.
The third of the lesson, the
biggest share of the blame,
is the international order.
The Oslo accords was the product
of an international equilibrium.
We were told in the '70s
through great statesmen,
here in Europe,
that should we align ourselves
with internationalism,
with international legitimacy,
should we shift from
revolutionary legitimacy
to international legitimacy,
this is details,
the international order,
international system
will deliver.
If you want my opinion,
80% of the blame is on
our international order.
The first brick that was
built in an illegal settlement
after Oslo should have been a cause
of international consequences immediately.
Because it isn't about Oslo process,
it isn't about Israel,
it isn't about Palestine,
it's about the premise
of internationalism.
It is about the heart of
the international order,
what is the heart of international order,
which was established in
this continent, in Europe,
it was drafted by you.
And it was established in
the post-second world war era
because of the never again,
because of the horrors
that happened in Europe.
Because of the horrors of the Holocaust
and Hiroshima and everywhere.
And it was drafted by
European legal brains
no Palestinian was involved
in the drafting process
of the international resolutions,
the international provisions,
but the premise of that order
is the inadmissibility of acquiring land
by force, full stop.
The inadmissibility of
acquiring land by force.
And therefore the direct
hit since the 1993 was
on that premise and on that order
and the consequences today is
not just Netanyahu, three
days before the elections
looking all of you in the eyes and saying
he vows to annex the Jordan valley
and to annex almost 60%
of the occupied Palestinian territories.
But the result of that is that
many Netanyahus around the region
without mentioning names,
that now hold official position.
Or finding it exactly the opportune moment
to wreak havoc at last territory by force
annex territory by force,
we are upon the demise of
the international order.
- Thanks, Husam.
When we look at the current situation
and we state that Israel Palestine --
- It is about Israel Palestine.
- Absolutely.
I just don't want to go
into other cases now,
but stay there.
The issue that I would
like to ask about, is,
where do you see the main impediments now
moving forward?
And I think you've mentioned
one important factor right now
and that is the international consensus.
Now when we listened
to the representative,
at the moment still representative
of the US government
in front of the security
council in September
speaking about the
international consensus,
it seemed to me that he said
there is no international
consensus on Israel Palestine,
and he also said that
international law wouldn't be
helpful in resolving the conflict.
So maybe you can try
to be a bit systematic
and seeing where are actually
the concrete barriers to peace
now in the international environment,
but also when you look at
the two conflicting parties,
Israel and the Palestinians.
- In addition to what I have just outlined
in terms of the major barriers
over the last 30 years,
but in these 30 years, we
had a US administration,
successive administrations that were
absolutely interested in the vision,
that was the two-step solution,
committed to the vision.
And we had a US
administration as a mediator
committed to the investment
towards that vision
i.e. the Palestinian authority,
the institutions, on
and well, what have you,
the civil society in Palestine,
that formed a basis,
the pillars, if you may,
of the state of Palestine to come.
But in the last two, three
years, that has ended.
So we have another problem
of the mediator themselves
abandoning that vision.
So what you have seen
over the last three years,
was not just a tactical steps
by the Trump administration
to try and pressure us,
as he keeps saying on his tweets,
that we must be pressured
then come back to negotiations,
no that was a very
deliberate, strategic moves
to actually de-recognize
the Palestinian leadership.
The Palestinian people,
the Palestinian issue.
Why would they close our mission
and send Yusuf unemployed for
the last couple of months?
It's not about Yusuf, it's
not about the ambassador,
it's not about, it's about the flag,
the flag's there which represents
a collective Palestinian.
Why would they shatter
the US Consulate General
that was there since 1884?
I mean it was there long
before the state of Israel.
And it was there to
serve as the key contact
between the people and the governments
of the US and Palestine.
Guess what they call it now,
they closed it, they shut it, but they now
moved the staff within
the US Embassy to Israel.
And the call it Palestinian affairs unit,
it's a unit.
So what does that tell you?
It's a strategic move.
By the way, ambassador
Friedman, David Friedman,
the US Ambassador was so
obsessed about this move
because he is the ideological,
strategic mind behind this.
Because for this administration,
the Palestinian issue,
I should not have said
for this administration,
for Netanyahu, who has his
allies in this administration,
the Palestinian issue is not
an issue between two different
national counts,
it's an issue that is
internal with Israel.
And then the second stem from that,
they should not be talking
to us, the Palestinians,
they should be talking to the region,
to resolve that, some parts
of that internal issue in Israel.
Now, and I'm saying this
because it is very important
to understand all the
steps that has been taken
and why they are being taken.
There are so many misperceptions.
The first misperception is
that we boycotted the US.
We started a policy of no contact.
Absolutely not true.
It's the US that boycotted us.
I mean, how can anybody,
and allow me two minutes
to say this story,
I was appointed to Washington
on the first of April, 2007,
that was two months
after the inauguration,
or three months, of President Trump.
So that was a decision by our leadership,
our president, President Abbas,
to actually engage the US administration.
And since that, I arranged
for the first visit
of our president, President
Abbas, to Washington,
on the third of May, 2017.
The engagement between us
and the US administration
was at the highest level, was sustained,
and let me stick my neck
out and say, was positive.
The discussions with President
Trump over four times
in few weeks were promising.
Even the chemistry was not bad.
At the very height and every time
we would meet President Trump,
or even some of his team,
we would be feeling that
actually it's not as bad
as it looks,
we might get somewhere.
At the height of that engagement,
at the height of the honeymoon,
I must have visited the White
House at least 36 times,
I counted that I met the team.
At the height of that honeymoon,
I receive a phone call
from the State Department
on the, at 5:35 p.m. on
the 16th of November, 2017.
And there was a mumbling voice,
I couldn't really, and
he was a friend of mine,
who was the head of the
Middle East Department,
Near East and North Africa Department,
and the state department.
A good friend, Michael Ratney,
he was the US Consul General
before that, you know him.
And Michael wanted to
tell me bad news (laughs)
which was surprising most
likely to him, and also to me.
And he said, "Your
office is to be closed."
I really thought he was
referring to an office
in Ramallah or, and I'm
saying at the very height
of our honeymoon.
There was no issue, there
was no tension, was not --
How would you destroy a relationship,
what is the one act that
would destroy a relationship?
Closing the embassy.
I mean, if you close the embassy,
so somebody in the White House,
somebody in the administration,
by the way a foreign
policy issues in the US
is purely an executive matter.
There is a wavering.
Somebody in the administration
decided to destroy,
dismantle what we built
over the few months before.
Now I don't, I cannot
go much further because
I was told we are live.
And at the restriction of time.
But Netanyahu has learned
that the relationship
is being built in a constructive way.
He has learned that what our leadership
has been able to present to
us logical was convincing.
And he thought the continuation
of that discussion,
and he'd up his guys
right in the middle of
that process abruptly.
I'll mention one name, Sheldon Adelson,
do you know who's Sheldon Adelson?
The casino guru?
Because the previous engagement
with the Trump administration was also
because of the pressure of
the majority of the Jewish
community in the US who
really want to see a solution.
The majority.
But then the minority
got in in full force.
And then the rest is details.
The moment they informed me
that our mission will be closed,
in no time, in two, three days,
the declaration on Jerusalem,
moving of the embassy,
cutting funding to UNRWA,
shattering the US consulate
general in East Jerusalem,
cutting all funding to
the Palestinian authority,
cutting all US aids even
to the civil society,
put all these things together,
then you'll come our borders.
It was about the dismantlement
of the entire basis
of the peace forces that
we have been engaged
for the last 30 years.
It was about attacking the vision,
which is the two-step solution,
because if you are talking
about two-step solution,
you need Palestinian
representatives in Washington,
you need American
representatives in Jerusalem,
you need this to support
the central authority
that is the nucleus of the state
that is the Palestine authority,
you need UNRWA to sustain
the right of the refugees
until we resolve that
very important issue,
and you need to sustain the
Palestinian civil society
which employs 27 Palestinian,
27 thousand Palestinians
that is a backbone for us,
if you hit all those,
then you are de-nationalizing
the Palestinian issue.
So it wasn't tactical, it was strategic.
Now, not everything is fate,
especially if it comes from Mr. Trump.
We resisted and we took
a very clear position,
and we believe that their
assumptions were free
and they were mistaken, they were wrong,
the first assumption is
that we the Palestinians
are the weakest link, the weakest party,
and we will come back to
the US table no matter what.
It didn't happen and read my lips,
it will not happen.
We are the weakest party
but we are the party
that has had nothing to lose.
Except our rights, of course.
Number two assumption
is that the Arab world
is going to sell us off.
That's not true and it will not happen.
Because the relationship
between us and the Arab world
is not just a political relationship.
It is a kinship relationship,
it's about civilization,
religion, history,
and it didn't happen.
And it will not happen
and I can break the news
of the meeting between
our president and the king
of Saudi Arabia only two
days ago was excellent.
We are identic.
And all down the line says that.
And the third assumption is
that the international community
is so fatigued and tired,
and we will recruit
Nikki Haley to dismantle
the international framework that governs
the Palestinian issue.
And Germany will not
defend its own position
and the rest of the world will
not defend their position,
that was also a wrong assumption.
Germany did defend its position,
and I must salute the German position
and Chancellor Merkel's position,
and Europe did defend its position,
and the US position
remains to be isolated,
yes they got Honduras,
couple of months ago, and you know,
it did it before in the
'80s, with Costa Rica,
and then they shifted back to Tel Aviv,
if you know the history.
But they did not and they will not so far
get any international
aquirance with that approach.
So we are not in the worse of bases
but we are in a very uncomfortable place
and I think at this point in time
the only possibility is that we look for
international mechanisms for peacemaking.
The US cannot be the sole mediator,
and not only because of
the Trump administration.
It's because of the situation in the US,
it's crucial that we keep focusing
on creating an international mechanism
for peacemaking,
international peace conference,
internationalizing
negotiations rather than
just being stuck in a
process that has failed
for the last 30 years.
- Hmm, thanks Husam,
maybe we can look at this
in a bit more detail.
First, I think, it would be
helpful if you can explain,
you talked about the decision
that the PLO took in 1988,
is this still the vision
that you're following,
is this where the Palestinians are headed?
When we look at opinion polls
in the Palestinian territories
it doesn't seem so,
I mean, the majority of Palestinians now
don't have any hope in
the two-state approach,
and they're turning ever more,
even though that hasn't a majority either,
but they're turning ever more towards
a struggle for equal rights
in one political entity.
Does that affect where the official
Palestinian leadership wants to go?
Connected to that is who
is actually representing
the Palestinians today.
I mean, you wouldn't discount, I guess,
that there is a severe lack of legitimacy
in the current leadership,
and that there needs to be a renewal.
Now the president has been
speaking about elections,
but we've also heard that kind of before,
so will there be elections
and if there are elections,
what entity will be elected,
and what kind of environment
do we actually need
for elections to make sense?
And then go back to the question of
what's the strategy, how do we get
from where we are now
to where we want to be.
- You have six hours?
- No, no we have, well,
you still have some time,
and you know that we also want
you speaking about Germany later.
- Also.
- So leave some time.
- I'll leave her Excellency
to speak about Germany.
I'll speak about Britain and Brexit,
if you want to discuss Brexit.
(laughter)
Okay, about the two-state solution,
let me explain something
that I think is missed
in the discussion.
People think the two-state
solution is a Palestinian demand.
Wherever we go now they tell us,
"Oh I know, you demand two-state solution,
"you aspire, the territory
you claim to be used"
Language like this.
Even in major newspapers,
that the Palestinians
want to be their state,
the land, the territory
of the Palestinians
want to be used.
This is really really, it must end.
Number one, the Palestinian,
the two-state solution
was never a Palestinian demand,
it was a Palestinian concession.
And it was a Palestinian concession
towards becoming allied with
international legitimacy.
For Palestinians, it doesn't
make sense that early on,
the starting point of foregoing 78%
of what was right to use,
you don't start there,
you start somewhere else.
Having said that, for
us, the Palestinians,
let me confirm, we have two
possible acceptable options
for the future.
The first is,
two states, on the 1967 borders,
a state of Palestine, sovereign,
we're not talking about
Mickie Mouse State,
sovereign, independent, East
Jerusalem is our capital,
not a capital in East Jerusalem.
Not shared capital in Jerusalem.
Not the fantasy and the fallacy
that we will establish
the capital in Abu Dis.
East Jerusalem from the exact
line, you know road one?
And this is final, by the way.
It's final.
One of the biggest mistakes
that people thought
that us accepting and recognizing
the two-state solution
was the beginning of our concessions,
no, no, no, it was the
end of our concessions.
It was the maximum we could offer
and it's the minimum we could accept
and that's why you, Israel has tried
so hard over the years,
with Yasser Arafat,
and with President Abbas,
and maybe with another, that's
the national equilibrium
we've been.
State, living in peace, and we mean it,
and security, if we can
coordinate under occupation,
let alone what we can do in
a post-conflict scenario.
And we realized the huge potential between
us and Israel.
We know that should we
dissolve the conflict,
on that basis, the partnership
will create a blast
in the positive sense,
because Israel has the
most high-tech economy,
very well exposed connected to the US,
the Silicon valley, and
we have the most educated,
youthful society, and we both set
in a region that need us,
the Israelis need us to
connect them eastward
and we need them to connect us westward,
and the bridge will certainly create
a crossroad of civilizations,
and we realize that potential.
Now, Israel is trying to play smart
and go to East without us,
it's not gonna work.
It's an exaggerated attempt by Netanyahu.
And we think we can just
penetrate westward everywhere
without Israel also we
need to assess that.
The second option is,
one person, one vote, one
democratic, egalitarian state
that provides for all of its citizens,
regardless of your
language, your religion,
your color, your height, your width,
a state in the meaning of a state
and I say it maybe on behalf
of my Palestinian side,
we will accept either.
It's not like we are obsessed,
we are obsessed about the solution.
But we know that the second
option is not on starter
in Israel, we know that.
And you know why?
Do I need to dwell on it?
Because Israel see us,
the Palestinians primarily
as a demographic threat.
Because the dream of establishing a state
of all of its citizens
might be generations away.
Because only few months after
the Israeli state nation
state law that discriminated against
the Palestinian citizens of Israel,
and deliberately told them
that they can never have the
right of self-determination,
it's exclusive to Jews,
in such an environment,
to aspire to that is
really to be almost like
wanting to fight a heavy weight boxer
when you are unable to
even defeat a lightweight.
And that's why we are more
in the arena of possibility
rather than desirability,
and from a possibility point of view,
we remain to be convinced
that the two-step solution
is still possible.
It's possible.
And we remain convinced
that it is the best course
towards the immediate future.
We remain to be convinced
that takes some political will
in the part of Israel,
our part and then the part of
the international community
to implement.
We have invested so much over a long time
to build the structures
of the state to come.
So we should not be like, you know,
children who get bored of
their toys and destroy it.
And I can now confirm our official policy.
We will defend the vision
of the two-state solution
because when Trump has broken the contract
between the Palestinians and the US,
Germany did not, Britain did not,
the EU did not.
And by the way, the EU's investment
in the two-state solution is way more
than the US investment in
the two-state solution.
We will respect that.
We will respect our
international commitments,
we will respect the vision
and we will defend it
and by the way,
if you see every act
that our president does,
the Palestinian president,
the Palestinian leadership,
the Palestinian institutions,
every act is to confirm
the vision, which is a two-state solution.
And every act we do is to
preserve the investments we made
towards the two-state solution.
Now, I don't know for how long
that can sustains but I
can tell you in a short,
it's a comment.
Having answered that for us,
the two-state solution cannot be achieved
with the common dynamics.
Because there is one word that is missing,
if we really want to achieve
a two-state solution.
And more of you know,
you can tell the audience
what you saw in Palestine last week,
when you visited.
We are already in the one-state reality,
we are already in the
apartheid reality, already.
It's not like we are going into,
when you have one government,
one government in Tel Aviv,
the Israeli government that
controls the entire land,
from the Jordan river
to the mediterranean,
and operates three distinct
separate legal systems,
one for Israeli Jews,
one for the Palestinian
citizens of Israel,
and one for the Palestinians
under military occupation.
If you go to the UN and
often the definition of that
operating of three different
systems, it's apartheid.
So we know what's the alternative
to the current reality,
to break away from the current reality,
equals one, what?
One what?
Consequences.
Consequences.
For too long, there was no consequences
of actually deviating from this vision.
That's it.
And these consequences
could be done so easily,
so easily.
Try, try, just try to
ban settlement for Jews.
And this is not a Palestinian demand,
it's a German and European
and international legal responsibility,
because it's you who
have decided and told us
that Israel's expansionism
beyond the 1967 border is illegal.
Would you, so the European
Union engaged some 15 years ago
of labeling settlement produce.
Which did not actually materialize,
it never happened.
Stop somewhere.
But literally, like
bank robbers, you know,
they go to a bank, you cash them,
then you just put a stick to them,
these are bank robbers.
No, no, they've committed and illegal act.
Try the banning of, and
I don't think this is a
big big deal to actually apply the law.
Your law.
Try to ban settlement produce.
And go and read all Israeli studies,
you'll find out that the
majority of Israeli settlers
that are the key obstacle
to the two-state solution
are there not for ideological reasons,
not for political reasons,
for economic reasons.
At least two-thirds of the
settlers and the settlements
are there for economic
and financial reasons.
Banning settlement produce
would immediately create
a dissent incentive, it will be violent,
and spiral.
Try to see the legal and
social responsibility
of European and international companies
who illegally operate
in these settlements.
Help us.
If you really want a two-state solution.
We got resolution two, three, four,
from the UN security council resolution,
and Europe voted with us the two seats
in the security council,
France and the UK,
with the support of Germany,
to release, to clearly state
the illegality of settlements
and to build consequences,
and I have the honor, the
privilege of being part of the
teamwork in all that.
Because we knew we have
to build consequences.
Excellent.
Obama allowed us to get,
the Obama administration,
to get a UN security council resolution
that talks about
international responsibility
and talks about consequences finally.
And that resolution called
for the release of a database
just a database of international companies
that illegally operate
in these settlements,
illegally operate in these settlements
since then we have been hitting our heads
against all walls to release that database
which is ready, by the way.
The UN was mandated by
the security council
to put together that list, it's ready.
And it's unreleased until now.
Why?
You know the reason, you
know the answer to why.
I'm not gonna engage in it.
There are so many examples that one can do
we can do together to apply the law.
Number two.
If we, if you really want to implement
the two-state solution,
because many people are saying,
"What can we do?"
There are so many small
but significant steps
that could be done and it will get us
where we all want to get.
Number two.
Why is it that Germany
or Britain or France,
why you don't recognize
the state of Palestine,
what is the logic?
What is the logic?
I asked my British colleagues
in the foreign office
in Number 10 street, the government,
the government, the
parliament, and they say,
"We will, it's not a matter
of if, it's a matter of when.
"We definitely recognize
the legitimacy and the need
"to recognize the state of Palestine,
"but we will do it when
it serves the peace forces
"and when it is an outcome
of a final agreement."
And I look at them,
I said, "Okay, fine,
fine, fine, excellent.
"Why did you recognize Israel then,
"if it's an outcome of a final agreement?
By recognizing one state of
the two states you expose,
you give that one state a
license to encroach, right?
Professor?
And that's exactly what has been happening
for the last 52 years.
So you must live indifferent,
either you de-recognize
one and then you wait
for the final agreement
to recognize the two,
or you recognize the second.
I think the first is very difficult.
We call for the second.
You could not imagine the shock
waves in the positive sense
the energy, the hope this would instill,
the seriousness of the world,
if should this happen.
Sweden did it, we thought
the sky will fall on Sweden,
no it didn't, it just proven
to be gutsy, brave, principled,
the Pope did it.
Only couple of years ago.
And yes we vow for him
with his moral authority
and why not the rest of Europe do it
if we really want to deliver
a message to these settlers,
to the Netanyahu vowing
to the spiral, cancerous,
end of our hope for at
least a two-state solution,
why don't we send this message now?
What are we waiting for?
And I can see some officials
from the German side,
what are we waiting for?
I'd like to say this and
then end the discussion.
It is no longer if it's not now, when.
We are at a moment when we can surely say,
if it's not now, never.
Why would I want the recognition
after two, three years?
It's over.
And number three and finally,
if we want to reach a two-state solution.
Do not leave it all to the US.
We have to help the US.
Even in a post-Trump era.
Because we don't believe Trump can really
have the credibility
to deal with our issue.
Don't leave the US alone.
And don't believe anybody who says
"This is not the core of the issues,
"that there are other
issues that concern us,
"Syria, is on fire."
Yes, of course, it's a major thing,
and the suffering is big, it's acute.
But it is the core of the
conflict in the region,
from many aspects,
which issue keeps coming
to your Bundestag?
Which issue is always in the Congress?
Laws against us, with
us, the Palestinians.
Which cause still sends
tens of thousands of people
to the streets?
It's the issue of Palestine,
because it's an issue that has
to do with people's identity,
so no matter what you want to
or some want to argue that
this is not the core of all,
no it is in the region and
every Arab would tell you that.
So the third if we don't want to leave it
to the US,
and it was a structural
mistake actually to accept
that there is one country
that is the mediator,
because you are experts
of conflict resolutions.
Name me one conflict, name me, please,
one conflict over the last
hundred years, how's that,
that was not resolved via
international mechanism.
Name me one.
East Timor, South Africa, Northern Island,
the Balkans, Kosovo, each one of them
was via heavy, sustained internationalism.
The deal with Iran?
You know, if the deal with
Iran was only mediated
by the US, it would
have exploded long ago.
So the question is not why
should the Palestinians
have international negotiations,
and international peacemakers,
the question is why were
we made the exception?
That's the question.
Why we were made the exception.
And the answer is the Israeli pressure,
that they do not want to see
the well of the international
community on the negotiation table
and their condition is only the US,
which Israel believes
is to its absolute side,
will deliberate this.
This is an opportunity
and I just want to say
that Trump has caused
so much damage, President
Trump and this administration
has caused us so much damage
but it also gives us
opportunities, opportunities.
One of these opportunities is
to internationalize mediation
and to build a process
that could actually achieve
that outcome we are talking about.
Elections that our president has announced
the convening of connections
on the UN podium.
So it couldn't be more
global, more serious,
and it couldn't be a better moment.
And the announcement is
because the realization
that we Palestinians
could wage many struggles
at all fronts but our
home front is a key point
and we realize that we must
renew our democratic process.
We must.
We have not done so, not
because we didn't want to,
and I assure you that
every Palestinian chiefly
among them is President
Mahmoud Abbas realizes
that 90% of our part is
our democratic process.
And we know that we have
survived all these years
because there has been a
democratically elected leadership.
And democratic institutions.
Who else do we represent
if we sit on this seat or any other seat?
And the PLO has managed to
get its own form of democracy.
And when the PLO returned
back to Palestine,
we were able to convene
an election in 1996,
yes Arafat could not only lead us via
the historic legitimacy
of founding our movement,
or the revolutionary legitimacy
of starting our revolution,
he had to gain his legitimacy
via the ballot box.
Yasser Arafat, and I tell you,
he didn't need it (laughs).
So did Abu Mazen.
And then when Abu Mazen
was elected in 2005,
the first step few months
later is to convene elections
for the parliament, that is the PLC.
Now the rest is history.
- I don't know what they did,
they just told us five minute
- The rest is history.
- Five minutes.
- The rest is history.
And I know you want to talk about Germany
and I'm happy to do that
in the last five minutes.
The rest is history because
unfortunately Gaza has been
in 2005, when so many
people were discussing
the Israeli disengagement from Gaza,
many were saying, this
is going to be a trap
to create a void and
the void will be filled
by what happened actually
a year and a half later.
It happened and that has created its own
negative dynamics on our political system.
The Hamas called ETA and the division
that has lasted all these years.
But the decision by our president
and I know that is to convene
elections despite that.
And to find always and any alternative
to refer back to the people.
And we have two major obstacles here.
The first is not actually Hamas,
the first is Netanyahu
because without convening
elections in East Jerusalem,
we will have a problem.
We cannot convene national
elections without our capital.
And we have 300000 Palestinians including
her Excellency, our ambassador here,
from East Jerusalem.
And we cannot convene national elections
without two million of our people in Gaza.
So the discussion now are happening
about finding a mechanism or mechanisms
to allow us to convene
elections in East Jerusalem
and then Gaza.
And we are calling on
our international friends
and I was instructed to
ask the civil governments
to actually help us ensure
that Netanyahu will not,
or Israel will not prevent us
from convening elections to our people.
And also we are using
our regional partners
and brothers to help with
the Gaza and the Hamas.
We are serious about elections,
that's the answer.
- Husam, let's get back
for the last three minutes
to Berlin, to Germany.
When I follow the discussion
in our country here,
my feeling is that
talking about the conflict
has become very toxic.
Every criticism of
Israeli government policy
is very easily equated with antisemitism,
we had to do decision, demotion,
of the German parliament
in May that said that to be the S movement
the Palestinian non-violent civil movement
uses arguments and methods
that are antisemitic,
but of course it's about more
than just the BDS movement,
it's about de-legitimizing
Palestinian aspirations,
rights and actors.
That is the climate that
we're currently having
and it leads to a situation
where we don't have people
standing up actually for
what you are demanding.
And on the other side,
we do have a real problem
of antisemitism and we see
the violent consequences
of that happening in Germany.
So what is your way of dealing with that?
- That's a very tough question, really,
it's a very-very tough
question for a Palestinian.
But let me attempt to answer
it from a Palestinian.
Number one, antisemitism
is real, it's real.
It happened, it's happening,
no one else more than Germany knows that.
And Jews have suffered, they have suffered
throughout history.
We know that as Palestinians.
We do.
And fighting antisemitism
and eradicating antisemitism
is a must and I believe
it's a universal mission
for all of us.
And there is no but and there is no if.
Because I believe as a
Palestinian, I do believe,
that those who hate Jews
are those who hate Muslims,
they are the same.
You cannot have hatred in
your heart and discrimination
only to one group, you
just hate the other.
And I, as a Palestinian, also understand
the cost of discrimination, I really do.
I've lived it, all of my life.
By the way, I was born in
a tent in a refugee camp
as a consequence of
discrimination, of denial.
And I see no contradiction.
I see no contradiction between those
who fight antisemitism, including myself,
and those who fight Israeli expansionism.
In fact, there is no way
that one can convince me
that he or she fights antisemitism
and they will not fight
Israeli expansionism
and vice versa.
It's the very same fight.
It is.
And go all over the world and see
who are the main agency that
help us internationally,
you'll find them, it's the majority
of the Jewish communities everywhere.
I lived in the US before
I was an ambassador.
And I came to learn that the actual agency
that pushes for a real
solution is the Jewish
community in the US.
The 70% of them.
So we also need to build bridges
but there is a small minority
who are on purpose want
to conflict things,
this is the and, not the if
and the but, but the and.
Conflict things on purpose
to de-legitimize, to create
poisonous discussion,
toxic discussions, and to push further
the ability to reach a solution
because people would be fearing,
even engaging in the discussion,
antisemitism is a very serious charge.
And therefore, because we are in Germany,
because we are in Berlin,
this is an opportunity, really, to call
on the German government,
and the German Bundestag,
because Germany has done
so much good for us,
the Palestinians, it did.
Germany has done so much
good to Jews worldwide
and to Israel.
Germany has kept its promises
throughout the years.
Germany has lived up to
its commitments, it did.
In every sense, and I'm
not being a diplomat here.
But we know the difficulty
that Germany has gone through
and we are inspired by
the German experience.
This ability to come together
after all these wounds,
this ability to build
this source of good in the world
and source of prosperity.
But Germany has the ability to help us
redirect the discussion.
Because it has that
capital, it can help us
redirect that discussion.
A motion in the Bundestag, the people
who uses their pockets or their stomach
to mark illegality or antisemitic
is an illegal motion, not
even a political motion.
We must now enable us,
if you really want to reach a solution,
we must have the guts and the courage
to have this discussion
in a healthy situation.
Of course there is antisemitism
and we must fight it.
And of course there is Israeli
expansionism, colonialism
occupation, besiegement,
denial of basic rights,
which has nothing to do,
and by the way, Israeli
occupation does not mean
it's only Jewish soldiers,
Israeli army has Christian
soldiers and Muslim soldiers,
many Muslim soldiers.
And this is where I end.
Because there are two counts.
There is the count that want us to believe
and they are becoming very strong,
that this is a Jewish-Muslim conflict,
that this is a religious conflict.
Friedman, that is David,
that is the US ambassador,
in Israel, when he had
the tunnel underneath
Al-Aqsa mosque only few months ago,
opening the so-called tunnel was starting
that religious war.
That Armageddon.
That group is the cause of the conflicting
of these two issues here.
And there is the other group who believe
that these two issues are complimentary.
And if you truly want to fight hatred,
you'll fight it across the board.
If you truly want to apply values,
they cannot be subdivided.
Israelis, Palestinians, Germans,
we must live in a situation
whereby all these solved,
and I have a belief, that if we are unable
to correct this and to stand for this
and create a healthy
environment for the discussion,
I don't think the two-state solution
will be achieved within
the foreseeable future
because this toxic discussion
will definitely silence the very forces
that would enable us to get
to that final resolution.
- Thank you so much,
Husam, thank you everybody
for listening patiently,
and yeah, help me in applaud --
(audience applause)
