[steam whistle]
♪ [“Ramblin' Wreck from Georgia
Tech”] ♪
>> I’m Steve McLaughlin,
dean of the Georgia Tech
College of Engineering,
and this is
The Uncommon Engineer.
Archived recording: We’re just
absolutely pleased as punk
to have you with us.
Please say a few words.
[applause]
♪ [music] ♪
Archived recording:
But the process
of making electricity
with nuclear fuel
takes place behind protective
walls of concrete and steel
and, therefore,
can’t be seen.
What we can’t see we sometimes
don’t understand
until we look from
a different perspective.
Steve McLaughlin: The 2019
award-winning HBO
series Chernobyl
tells the story of the 1986
nuclear plant explosion,
which took the lives
of 28 workers
and inflicted radiation symptoms
on approximately
3.5 million people.
Nuclear energy is
a powerful proposition
that can create clean energy
for our planet.
But as the landscape
for nuclear power
and the proliferation
of nuclear technology
and the threat of nuclear war
remain constant,
the public remains wary.
Welcome to another episode of
The Uncommon Engineer podcast.
I’m Steve McLaughlin,
dean of the Georgia Tech
College of Engineering.
The Uncommon Engineer discusses
how Georgia Tech engineers
make a difference
in our world,
in our daily lives, and
in ways you might not expect.
Our guest today
is Doctor Anna Erickson.
She’s a professor of nuclear
and radiological engineering
within our Woodruff School
of Mechanical Engineering
here at Georgia Tech.
And she’s an expert
on nuclear security.
Welcome to the program, Anna.
Anna Erickson: Thank you
for inviting me, Steve.
Steve McLaughlin: It’s nice to
have you here today.
We’re going to talk about
nuclear power, nuclear safety.
I think almost everybody
is—when we think of
nuclear power and safety,
we think of things like
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island,
you know, things that happened
quite a while ago.
A lot’s happened
between now and then.
I think we’re going to
talk about that.
But can you just start
by talking about
some of the disasters
that have occurred?
What technology is involved,
maybe why some of them occurred,
and then we’ll get to
where things stand today.
Anna Erickson: Well, this is
a great question
and I think you’re captured
that precisely,
that disastrous is what became
that defining moment
when we talk
about nuclear power,
which is both frightening
and unfortunate
for us as nuclear engineers.
So let me start perhaps with
that recently released HBO
series, mini-series, Chernobyl.
It is interesting that,
historically,
there was not a lot
of information about Chernobyl
because of Soviet Union and how
closed off the information was.
And that mini-series tried
to really fill that gap,
the vacuum
of information we had.
And it did two things:
It really allowed us to see
why disasters
like that could happen.
And in part, that was the
Soviet Union culture to blame
and also the effects
of the nuclear disasters.
Nuclear disasters is what gives
the nuclear power
the negative attitude
from public.
And this is something that we
consistently had to battle
in our field.
Steve McLaughlin: Between
the time of those disasters
and now,
you know, the world has become
much more aware
of the effect of hydrocarbons,
you know, on the atmosphere
and the environment.
And so it seems
that nuclear power
has become more acceptable.
It’s viewed now
in a more positive light
as a clean energy source.
And I think the reputation
around nuclear energy—
But as we said, you know,
I think people still have
those disasters in the mind,
but I think the reputation
of nuclear energy
has impressed—has
improved a great deal.
And so can you talk about
maybe how that’s happened?
And also you know what—
What’s going to happen in the
next 10 years for nuclear power?
Anne Erickson:
Well, you are spot on there,
that in the past two years,
the reputation of nuclear energy
is changing.
And I think
the fundamental reason
is the existential threat
that we face right now
as humanity
of global climate change
and the battle with the
hydrocarbon sources of energy.
Now, I think this is common,
that for something
to change your reputation,
you need to have some sort of
existential threat
associated with it.
And we experience that now.
So one example I can give you,
a couple rather,
what’s going on
in the United States
is the construction
of Vogtle power plant,
which of course has been
going on for a few years,
but it’s here in Georgia,
it’s local, it’s happening,
and we’re hoping the
construction will wrap up soon
and we’ll be able to use
the nuclear power.
And then the second is a little
more exotic example.
It’s called
“versatile test reactor.”
And this is something
the Department of Energy
initiated a few years ago
to create
a new generation reactor
to show the benefits of not only
the traditional technologies
but also technologies
of the future.
Of course, as I may preempt
the question that might follow,
how do we safeguard
the technologies of the future?
How do we make them safe
and proliferation-resistant
still remains a big question
to answer.
Steve McLaughlin: I’m assuming
safety has improved,
but maybe safety
has been there all along
and we just haven’t
really appreciated it.
Right? Nuclear power plants
are still out there.
Tremendous amount of power
is being generated by it.
We kind of have forgotten
maybe how safe
nuclear power really is.
And so is that a true statement?
Anne Erickson: This is
a very true statement.
And I thank you
for bringing this up.
And I want to point out
that there’s a difference
between safety
and proliferation, right?
So safety is related to how well
can you run the reactor safe,
meaning not affecting the public
health or the reactor health.
And if I may highlight
the fundamental difference
between the current reactors
in the United States,
which we have 98
as of this January I believe,
generating about 20 percent
of our electricity
versus what happened
in Chernobyl.
And allow me to circle back
to that design again.
Chernobyl design was not light
water reactor based.
It was designed
with a dual purpose in mind:
to produce clean plutonium
for weapons program
and generate electricity
for a civilian program.
Now, we all know after the
1986 Chernobyl disaster
what happens
when you mix the two purposes.
And that reactor, from a safety
standpoint, was very different.
It had what we call “positive
reactivity coefficient.”
And I’ll explain
what that means.
What that means is, as the
reactor gets hotter and hotter,
the neutrons that you produce
the reactions—the main driver
of the reaction
becomes more and more intense.
So instead of shutting down
because it’s getting hotter
and less safe,
it actually instigates
to further reactions.
Light water reactors here
in the United States
operate on a different
principle.
What happens
when you heat up the water?
It expands because
its temperature goes up,
density goes down.
When the density goes down,
the neutrons don’t become
as active.
So you actually shut
down the reactor
as you’re getting it hotter.
And that is
the fundamental principle
of design features
of reactors here.
We make them safe and safer
as they get out of control.
So that doesn’t mean
that accidents cannot happen.
But we design those systems with
such safety coefficient in mind.
I think it’s safe to say
that nuclear reactors
have one of the safest records
among many industries
in the States.
Steve McLaughlin: And so I know
that you’re interested—so
I’d really like
to talk about the research
that’s going on in your group
and some of the projects
that you’re involved in.
And so we’ve talked a little bit
about nuclear safety.
Can you say some things
about your work,
the work of your students
and colleagues
around nuclear safety?
Anna Erickson:
This is a great question.
The name of our research group
is Laboratory
for Advanced Nuclear
Nonproliferation on Safety,
so you see there are
two key words there:
nonproliferation and safety.
So far we’ve discussed safety,
so if you don’t mind,
I say a few words
about nonproliferation
and what that means.
Nonproliferation is limiting
the spread of nuclear material
and nuclear weapons and limiting
the effects around the world.
So my group is mostly focused
on bridging that gap
between production
of nuclear material and
disposition of nuclear material
and every step in between
and ensuring
that every step
is both safe
and secure from
a proliferation standpoint.
So we are interested
in every subcategory of that.
We are interested
in the reactor design
and ensuring
that they’re inherently safer
and proliferation-resistant.
And my recent paper
on antineutrino monitors
is a highlight of that.
And we're also interested
in once the nuclear weapon
is out there,
how do we find it?
And how do we pinpoint
who might have done it?
So from a nonproliferation
forensic standpoint.
We were proud to get awarded
a new grant
from the National
Nuclear Security Administration,
which is part
of Department of Energy,
and the new initiative
is called
Consortium for Enabling
Technologies and Innovation.
And this is a very large
group of people.
We have 12 universities
and 10 national laboratories
who are interested
in understanding
how we can create
technologies of tomorrow
to solve
the proliferation problems
that may not even
be known to exist yet.
And I’ll give you some examples.
For example,
one of our initiatives
is to look at advanced
manufacturing.
Why would we care about that?
Well, the proliferation,
if I may use that word,
of additive
manufacturing technologies
is so widespread today,
we don’t know who may be
using it and for what purposes.
There are some conceptual
designs of microreactors
and mini-reactors
that are floating around.
So how do we safeguard
those future technologies
from falling
into the wrong hands?
And how do we predict
what kind of problems
we may anticipate
in the future?
Another example is
artificial intelligence.
Machine learning,
in particular,
has been receiving
a lot of attention.
We see it on every corner
of every discipline.
In no different than other
disciplines we are interested
in both leveraging the machine
learning technologies
to our advantage
and also to understand
how it can be used
by our adversaries to create
and proliferate nuclear weapons.
So let me wrap up
with the saying
that we have three thrust,
a total of three thrust
in that consortium.
The third one is investment in
novel nuclear instrumentation,
meaning not the instruments
that have been around
since 1950s but something
that’s fundamentally different,
some materials that have
not existed 10 years ago.
Now we are trying to tailor them
for detection of radiation.
Steve McLaughlin: I kind of have
two questions.
One is I’m curious to learn
a little bit more
about
how artificial intelligence
connects with nuclear safety
or nuclear reactors.
And second is a lot of things
that come about in artificial
intelligence really worry me,
because they can
be used for good,
but not all our algorithms
are accurate
and not all algorithms
make the right decisions.
And so do you want
to talk a little bit
about the artificial
intelligence space
and what you’re working on?
Anna Erickson: Well,
that’s a great question.
I should make a disclaimer
that I’m not an expert
on artificial intelligence
and machine learning,
but I rather work
with the experts
to make sure
that we connect them
with the problem
of nuclear nonproliferation.
And in particular, there are
a few different instances
where machine learning
becomes quite useful.
Think about a distributed
network of sensors
around the globe.
Maybe you're monitoring
radio-xenon to make sure
that there’s no nuclear
explosion that’s happening.
How do you share
that information
in the most efficient way?
How do you ensure that hundreds
of sensors communicate
and make a decision globally,
as opposed to drawing data
from each individual sensor
and then report it
to a human operator?
So this is where we see machine
learning being the most useful,
as far as application
to radiation detectors,
analyzing hundreds of data
streams simultaneously,
drawing patterns
and drawing conclusions
that would not be
possible otherwise.
And also for monitoring patterns
and changes in patterns
from day to day,
month to month to ensure that we
have the maximum information.
Another example of machine
learning
is application
to the systems that are mobile.
For example, how do you make
a swarm of robots work together,
especially when they are
outfitted with radiation sensors
and they collect data
from various points spatially
and temporally?
How do you coordinate them?
How do you know where to look
for a potential threat?
So all these questions
are really difficult to answer
without artificial
intelligence and machine
learning in
nonproliferation activities.
Steve McLaughlin: The team that
you described as being
very, very diverse is
so incredibly important for A.I.
like systems to work properly.
We just have to have the maximum
number of diverse perspectives,
whether scientific, whether it’s
gender, whether it’s ethnic.
All of those perspectives
need to come to the table,
because if we don’t have
all those perspectives,
we don’t consider
all those possibilities.
And so that’s seems to be one of
the real powers of your team,
as you describe,
this really diverse set of folks
who don’t work together
and so on.
You make me more optimistic,
not just about your project,
but about all projects,
you know,
that we need
to keep that in mind.
Was that one of your goals?
Anna Erickson: Yes, I think
that’s a pretty
good description.
And in particular,
any discipline is a black box
to each other, right?
If you think of
radiation detector,
it’s probably a black box.
It may be making noise or it may
be telling you some numbers,
but what does it really mean?
Where’s the threat?
Where is the good operating
point for nuclear reactor
if this is a sensor
associated with the safety?
You need people to come together
and work on the problems
in order to get
the best benefit.
Before I started working
on our consortium,
artificial intelligence was
nothing but a black box to me.
It was a set of algorithms
or methods
that we could use
to do X, Y, Z.
But once you start working
with the experts,
we can really power up the cause
and effect of those algorithms,
because we know
what applications
we could use them the best
and they know how
to implement them the best.
Same goes for pretty much
every engineering discipline.
That’s why being part
of the engineering team
at Georgia Tech
is fascinating,
because we have five different
faculty from this campus,
including aerospace,
materials science,
E.C., electrical
and computer engineering,
nuclear engineering,
and of course
mechanical engineering
working together to tackle
those uncommon problems.
Steve McLaughlin: Well,
you know,
it seems impossible
to talk about nuclear power
without talking about global,
what it means internationally
and whether it’s
the collaboration,
whether it’s the technologies,
whether it’s the use
and policies.
Can you talk a little bit
about nuclear power
and its international aspects
and where that fits in
with your work?
Anna Erickson:
That’s a great question.
Let me start with the quote that
is familiar to all engineers
because we are geeks, right?
So with great power
comes great responsibility.
This is an excellent
representation of nuclear power.
Remember how nuclear power
started in 1945
with the deployment
of a nuclear weapon.
But what it’s evolved into
is with the help
of President Eisenhower
and his program Atoms for Peace,
it evolved into peaceful use
of nuclear energy
that we harvest today.
And why would the US
be the only one to use it?
There are multiple countries
around the world
that want to exploit
the positive effects
of nuclear energy.
And there are two questions,
of course,
that are always on the mind:
Are they doing it
for peaceful purposes?
And if you suspect
it’s not being used
for peaceful purposes,
what do you do about that
and how do you monitor for that?
So it’s actually interesting
that a few days ago,
we celebrated 62nd anniversary
of International Atomic
Energy Agency,
which is the main body
that allows us to monitor
what happens around the world
at the nuclear power plants
and to ensure that
the nuclear material
is being used
for peaceful purposes.
So the IAEA has been established
as a result of the global
Atoms for Peace program.
It was inaugurated
by President Eisenhower.
And to this day
we use it to our benefit.
So how do we know that
nuclear power is being used
for peaceful purposes?
The agency sends its agents
around the world
and they inspect
nuclear power plants,
sometimes periodically
and sometimes unannounced,
and they ensure that nothing
nefarious is happening
at the reactor sites
and other facilities associated
with nuclear materials.
Unfortunately, there are
certain states
that are not signatories
to Nuclear Proliferation Treaty,
which is what allows
those inspectors
to go around the power plants.
Some of the examples include
well-known North Korea
who withdrew from
the Treaty in 2003.
Steve McLaughlin: So in places
like North Korea
where the inspectors
can’t show up, what do you do?
Anna Erickson: 
This is a great question,
and I wish
I had all the answers.
But it’s a very valid question,
and not just with respect
to North Korea,
but other plants as well.
The inspectors are not
present there 24/7.
So how do you ensure
that things run continuously?
And there are a number of things
that have been implemented
over the years:
seals and detectors
associated with IAEA
that continuously read out the
data from reactor operations.
But one of the more
novel technologies
that my group in particular
is working on is antineutrino
monitoring devices.
I think I mentioned earlier
that we just had a paper
came out
in Nature Communications
with an intent to show people
how those antineutrino devices
can be used to monitor
the reactor continuously,
even when the inspectors
are not on the ground.
Steve McLaughlin: And so
say more about
the antineutrino devices
and how they fit in.
Anna Erickson: So every reactor
emits copious
amounts of antineutrinos.
It’s just a byproduct
of nuclear fission reaction.
So we can
correlate antineutrinos
with the number
and types of fissions.
Hence, we can monitor for both
the evolution of the fuel
in the core and any type
of tampering with the core.
Of course it has its limitations
and,
in particular,
the amount of material
that people tamper with
could be limited.
But you brought up a good point:
How do you do it remotely?
So antineutrinos
are such small particles,
you cannot shield them.
That means that they can travel
very, very far distances.
In fact, there are millions
and hundreds
of millions of antineutrinos
going through your body
right now
and you have no idea
that it’s happening.
The entire Earth
to antineutrinos is nothing.
They don’t even notice
that they exist.
They just go through.
So we can exploit
that to our effect.
We can build
very large detectors
and place them far away
from nuclear reactors.
And there are
a number of projects
going on around the country.
And one notable example
is the WATCHMAN Project,
which is led by the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory.
But you can also think
about positioning
those detectors
near a nuclear reactor
but outside perhaps
the boundary of the reactor
and really get
the maximum information
from the nuclear fuel cycle.
Now, I should point out
that nuclear radiation,
the traditional radiation in the
form of neutrons and gamma rays,
that can be shielded
quite easily.
So satellites will be
oblivious to nuclear radiation,
but other technologies
can be exploited
to monitor those reactors.
As far as radiation
detection technologies,
we work on a number
of different techniques.
So one of our concerns,
of course, is making sure
that there are eyes
on the reactor at all times,
so boots on the ground, right?
So antineutrino monitor
is a good example of that.
You cannot change the signature
of nuclear reactor
in the form of neutrinos.
The only way to do it
is to build another nuclear
reactor right next to it.
So if there is tampering
with nuclear fuel,
we should really know that,
we will take note of that
using the antineutrino monitor.
So that’s one aspect
of radiation detectors
that we work on,
the technology
that’s relatively exotic.
The other aspect is how do you
track the movement
of nuclear materials?
I’m shifting gears a bit here
from monitoring
the reactors
to monitoring the material.
And one big area of concern
is from Homeland Security,
right, Department
of Homeland Security.
Their particular concern
is 40-foot containers
crossing the country’s
boundaries and arriving by sea.
How do you know what’s going on
inside of those containers?
And keep in mind
that those containers arrive
to the busiest sea ports
in the country,
such as Los Angeles
and New York.
So if something devastating
were to happen
in one of these containers,
we would feel the effect.
So the Department of
Homeland Security
is concerned with uncovering
special nuclear materials
while it’s en route
to the country,
and a big part of my research
is to build systems
that allow us to sense
those type of threats
inside of large objects
like containers.
We call it the active
interrogation method
for nuclear material.
And last year in 2018,
me and a colleague of mine
from University of Michigan,
Igor Jovanovic,
we published the very first book
on using active interrogation
for nuclear security
applications
and all the details of the
technology that goes in there.
Steve McLaughlin: I’m really
curious how you do that.
Anna Erickson: It’s almost
mind-boggling
because we have a dual problem,
triple problem I suppose.
First we need
to find the material.
But second,
we must not slow down
the movement of the containers.
The Port Authority would really
not allow you to do it.
So you have about 40 seconds
to two minutes
to inspect
a 40-foot container.
That’s not a lot of time
to find anything.
And then the third problem is
the responsible use of radiation
when you do that.
We know examples of human
stowaways in containers,
and the last thing
we want to do
is to hurt a human being
that may be present,
or to hurt a human operator
that’s operating our machines.
So we have to combat this
a triple-pronged problem
and to be effective
at doing so.
So typically, what we do
is we use
an external source of radiation,
just like x rays
in the dentist office,
to what we call “interrogate”
an object,
for example a container.
And on the other side
of the radiation source,
we have a set of detectors
that will read out
what happens
inside of the container.
So our problem is to not
only create detectors
that are capable of reading out
fast and recreating the objects
but also create
a set of algorithms
that allows us to reconstruct
what’s inside.
Steve McLaughlin: You know,
if there’s a technology or area
that generates all kinds
of really strong opinions,
positive and negatives,
you’re saving humanity,
you’re killing humanity.
You know, nuclear energy,
nuclear power, nuclear weapons,
nuclear nonproliferation,
all of those.
You’re right in the middle
of all that.
So how did you decide that that
was the area you wanted to study
and make your life’s
work about it?
Anna Erickson: Well,
first of all,
my life is never boring.
Thank you to the field
that chose me.
So I think the question
is how did I decide?
I think that was decided for me,
because I saw no other field
that would be so interesting
and so diverse
in its application.
I still remember reading about
Chernobyl when I was a kid.
This was a fascinating area
for me from childhood.
And I know how cliché
that sounds,
but it’s so true
that nuclear technology
is one of the most diverse
and controversial subjects.
And just think of the breadth
of that field
from we started as
a nuclear weapon field, right?
That’s the inception point.
But today, the human lives
that they saved
because of radiation
cannot be counted.
A recent example is Proton
Center right here at Emory
that is designed
to save human lives
and to make the treatment
much safer
than it could be
with other technologies.
So I think being right
in the middle of that
and trying to take the best
out of this technology
for the humanity is what makes
my day the most exciting.
And as far as the research
and my students,
we cover a broad scope
of students.
I have medical physics
students as well as students
working on
nonproliferation issues.
And you know what unites us?
We have a common goal.
We want to use the radiation
for the best of humanity
and we want to ensure
that when the technology
falls in the wrong hands,
we know about that
and we want to prevent that.
And that goes from
creating nuclear materials
all the way
to medical products,
for example accelerators and
technologies related to that.
Steve McLaughlin: Well,
one of the questions
we always ask our guests
on The Uncommon Engineer
is what makes you
an uncommon engineer?
Anna Erickson: Well, I think
we covered that.
Steve McLaughlin: I think
we did.
Anna Erickson: Let me point out
that the uncommon part
of being a nuclear engineer
is that we can’t do
the problem ourselves.
We interact with every kinds
of engineering
to make sure
that we solve the problems
that may seem common
on the surface,
but they have
really great defects.
I started with the quote of
“With great power
comes great responsibility,”
and I’d like to end
with that as well,
because this is so true
in our profession.
What’s uncommon
is the amount of energy
and the impact that we deal
with on everyday bases
and being able
to tame that impact
and knowing the effects
and being able to control it
is what makes us uncommon.
Steve McLaughlin: Well,
I can’t tell you—I’ll thank you
on behalf of all of humanity
for that,
because we need people
who are willing to tackle
the most challenging
and most difficult,
both scientific as well
as signed a societal, problems.
We’re lucky to have you here,
we’re lucky you came today
and that you do the work
that you do and that you are—
I really love that perspective
of, for now the third time,
“With great power comes
great responsibility,”
and it sounds like you
take both of those
extraordinarily seriously
and we’re really thankful
to have you here
and thank you for everything
you do for our students
and for Georgia Tech.
So thanks for coming today.
Anna Erickson: Thank you
for inviting me.
And I want to highlight
that Georgia Tech
is a wonderful place
to be a nuclear engineer,
and I think we have
one of the top student cohorts
among all universities
and I’m very proud
to be a Yellow Jacket.
♪ [“Ramblin' Wreck from Georgia
Tech”] ♪
