Last time, we talked about how the master
slave relationship works, and how the slave
sees benefit in accepting the lordship of
the master, that is because it allows the
slave to partake of his master’s glory.
The master accepts the position of lordship
because of his willing spirit trying to prove
itself, and thus choosing a position of excellence.
You see it all the time, especially in fans
of a particular sports star who themselves
feel happy or sad or have their worth established
based on the performance of the object of
their admiration, who in turn gains the recognition
of his excellence by acceptance of his fans.
Today, however, we will read Hegel in his
own words. Whatever I told you in these videos
does not make sense if I do not introduce
you to what Hegel himself wrote, so you can
be a judge for yourself about how he framed
this dialectic. There are various ways of
analyzing Hegel’s words, we will do it by
considering a situation in which one self-conscious
being comes into contact of other self-conscious
being.
In a chapter titled “Lordship and bondage”
in Hegel’s work “Phenomenology of Spirit”,
Hegel talks about the master slave relationship.
We will look at the English translation by
J. B. Baillie. The translation is merely for
reference purposes, so the problems it possesses,
if any, are irrelevant to the discussion as
it does not form the crux of the Hegel’s
view as outlined in the video. Yet, the presence
of it allows the viewers of this video to
get a hold of the actual content and how it
was written by Hegel, while simultaneously
allowing them to find the references in the
actual German work itself or other translations
as the case maybe.
The chapter starts by Hegel making an unequivocal
assertion about self-consciousness that it
exists in itself and for itself. That is pretty
understandable. The whole point of self-consciousness
is to be contained in self, it is not dependent
on the other for its existence. It exists
for itself in the sense that it is about itself,
the consciousness is directed towards the
existent self. The second part, however, where
Hegel says that it exists for another self-consciousness
is puzzling, because it seems to contradict
Hegel’s first assertion. But it does not
because it is about self-consciousness realizing
its own existence by presence of another,
which recognizes its existence. That is to
say that without any other being being present
to recognize the existence of the first self-consciousness,
the first self-consciousness is almost as
good as non-existent. This form of epistemology
puts Hegel at a different position than other
Western philosophers, for example, the scholastics
and follows from his idealistic leanings.
If the effect of existence of something and
the actions emanating thereof, is not felt
by any other thing, it is almost as if the
first thing did not exist or if it did, was
completely inert. However, here, even a complete
acceptance of idealism is not required. The
concepts like beauty, morality, serenity,
all abstracts like that seek recognition for
their truth to be evident. What is use of
morality, for example, if no one ever knows
it to exist? Similarly, consciousness, if
it is not material, must be recognized for
its existence to be meaningful.
Thus, when this self-consciousness must meet
another one, it must feel jubilated. However,
facing another person, puts the consciousness
in existential jeopardy. The self-conscious
sees the consciousness in another person,
yet still the other person is an object of
consciousness for him. The consciousness is
seeing a being who is actually a subject himself
but is an object of consciousness. This paradox
causes an existential strife in the self-conscious.
If I am self-conscious and I am here, who
is there? Of course, it is another person
who has self-consciousness but his self-consciousness
is directed to himself and not to me, like
my self-consciousness. This inherent problem
of the nature of subject-object distinction
causes conscious to become confused in a Hegelian
sense. The consciousness experiences two things.
First it seems to believe that part of its
own self has been lost to other person because
now there are two people having the self-consciousness.
Secondly, it believes that the other consciousness
is part of itself for, it is the same things
as itself and thus must have the same identity.
To establish certainty of its own existence,
the consciousness has to do two things. Firstly,
it has to see the other consciousness as part
of itself, because then it would be sure that
it is the being of which the other is part,
and then it sublates its own self into the
other, because by the same reasoning, the
self’s own actions must be justifiable in
presence of the other, if it is one complete
self.
The real self is the one self with which one
identifies. Everything important the consciousness
possesses must be contained in the expression
of self then. The other being then must comprise
of the unessential part of the consciousness.
Because the essential must lie with the one
who is prominent. The non-prominent thus appears
an anti-thesis to the prominent. He is a threat
to existential self for his prominence makes
self realise that he is not the one who is
prominent.
This is the life and death struggle Hegel
talks about. It is not about actual life or
death per se but about the act of sublation
and the act of being sublated. In either case,
one consciousness must lose identity in the
other. While we often miss it, often we are
put to the test ourselves, in which we figure
at each point of controversy why do others
believe in opinions different than us. Sometimes,
we accept our mentality is wrong and is merely
an ignorant part of their mentality, sometimes
the opposite is the case. In either case,
we try to establish certainty by act of rejecting
ourselves or affirming the self that we embody.
Hegel argues then the inevitability of the
dilemma and eternity of it by showing how
the very life and death struggle defeats the
recognition of certainty in one’s own self
existence. The one who survives, or the one
who successfully sublates the other, is again
left without anything to prove its consciousness
to and thus becomes apprehensive of reality
of his consciousness. The one who dies, or
gets sublated, obviously loses its sense of
self and is now dependent on the other for
its own sense, without first hand knowledge
of whether the other is alive. The latter
is more easy to understand. To understand
the first, imagine the consciousness as a
ray of light. The ray of light is invisible
until it is reflected off something and then
the light becomes known with certainty to
exist. Without an external object, the existence
of light cannot be certified for its properties
are known via interaction with what is not
light.
While from our perspective, as a third person,
the two consciousness did fight each other
and thus both must be alive, for both acted
and reacted, enacting two features of the
living, for them the struggle kills their
own identity for it is subsumed in the other
and becomes doubtful, for their interaction
results in sublation which causes more confusion
as the both the consciousness become far apart
from each other to maintain their ground.
You see this in case of a battle of ideologies
as the ideologies shift to more and more extreme
positions in order to maintain the principles
they are based on, differentiating themselves
in their struggle on several points of interest
to maintain their independent existence.
The one who, in this struggle realizes that
his life is eternal and consciousness indestructible
becomes the master with independence for his
existence, he realizes is not dependent on
the other, it is self-evident and necessary.
The other, by adopting a position far apart
from the master, adopts the position of the
slave, and the position of dependence. His
existence is for the other and not for himself.
This completes the formation of the Master
and the Bondsman and is the essence of, what
is known as the Hegelian dialectic.
