Good afternoon.
Welcome to MIT'S
Compton Lecture.
I'm delighted that so many
of you have joined us today.
After the lecture our Vice
President for Research,
Maria Zuber, will
lead a conversation
with Professor Moniz
and will ask questions
drawn from the MIT
committee members
that were submitted in advance.
So let me put some context.
In 1957 MIT established
the Compton lectures
to honor the memory of MIT's
10th president, Karl Taylor
Compton.
He had led MIT for
almost a quarter
of a century in two roles,
first as president for 18 years.
Where is Susan?
18 years.
From 1930 to 1948.
And then as chairman
of the MIT Corporation.
He guided MIT through the Great
Depression and World War II.
In the process he helped
MIT transform itself
from an outstanding
technical school
for training,
hands-on engineers,
to a great global university.
A distinguished physicist,
President Compton
brought a new focus on
fundamental scientific
research.
And he made science an equal
partner with engineering
at MIT.
During the war he helped
invent a partnership
between the federal government
and America's research
universities.
And as a result of all these
efforts and under his watch,
MIT was awarded its first
Nobel Prize in physics in 1944.
Today we celebrate
Dr. Comptons legacy
by honoring another
distinguished physicist who
embodies MIT'S tradition of
service, the Cecil and Ida
Green Professor of Physics and
Engineering Systems Emeritus
and, very importantly,
Special Advisor
to the MIT President,
Ernest Moniz.
Professor Moniz has a record
of accomplishment that
would stand out in any context.
But for this
audience I would like
to frame it as an MIT ideal.
According to Ernest's
calculations,
precise calculations
I would add,
he was an active member of the
MIT faculty for 39.89 years.
In that time he achieved
the kind of excellence
we expect from faculty.
He did groundbreaking work in
theoretical nuclear physics.
He served as the head of
the physics department.
He directed the Bates
Linear Accelerator.
He also served the White House
and the Department of Energy
under President Bill Clinton.
And then in 2006, MIT's 16th
president, Susan Hockfield,
focused the MIT community
on the great global problem
of inventing a
sustainable energy future.
She knew that the MIT
Energy Initiative, or MITEI,
would require a founding leader
with exceptional intellectual
depth and breadth,
outstanding political skill,
and unlimited personal energy.
The obvious choice was Ernie.
In partnership with
President Hockfield,
Ernie put MIT at the center
of the national conversation
on energy.
So it was no surprise when
President Obama nominated him,
nominated him, Ernie,
to serve as the 13th US
Secretary of Energy.
And it was no surprise,
at least to us,
when the Senate voted
to confirm him 97 to 0.
At DOE Professor Moniz
led the implementation
of an all of the above
energy strategy, accelerating
innovation in renewable energy
technologies, advanced energy
storage, and next
generation nuclear power.
He led an international
initiative
to make sure that the global
response to climate change
was grounded in energy science
and technology innovation.
And he made great
strides in stabilizing
the nation's nuclear
strategy and security,
including working with
Secretary of State, John Kerry,
to negotiate the historic
nuclear agreement with Iran.
A native Massachusetts,
Professor Moniz
is a committed global citizen
and an extraordinary citizen
of MIT.
And we're deeply
grateful for his service
to the nation and the world.
And we're thrilled
that he has come home.
Please welcome the
13th US Secretary
of Energy, Ernie Moniz.
Thank you, Rafael,
for those kind words.
And it is good to be home and
to see so many familiar people.
It's great.
But I also want to thank
the entire community
for, I don't know, tolerating
the behavior of the last 40
years of being here
sometimes, being away,
wandering off to Washington
three times, actually,
for serving the administration.
You talked about
Compton, obviously,
and I just want to note that
when I came to MIT, '73,
Jerry Wiesner was the President.
In my own department,
many figures
who had played major roles
after World War II, 50s and 60s,
in terms of public
service, while
of course serving the Institute
and the students and faculty.
But one in particular, Herman
Feshbach, was really a mentor.
He was founder of the Panel on
Public Affairs and the American
Physical Society.
And so I guess I can't
resist telling a story that
came up at lunch today.
I hadn't thought
about it but, which
was when I was here just
two or three years, Hermann
who was then head of the
Department of Physics,
as well, Herman
said, well, you know,
at this Panel on
Public Affairs we're
starting a new study, a big
study on nuclear fuel cycles
and waste management, and I want
you to be on the study group.
Even though it was filled with
people like chemical engineers
and the like, you know.
So it was the first exposure
to this multi-disciplinary
activity.
So I told Herman that I
actually didn't know anything
about this subject
and didn't make sense.
He said, that's perfect.
Then I said, well, you know,
my real argument, you know,
there is this little
tenure thing coming up
in two or three years.
And he said, if you don't do
this, you're not worth it.
Yes, sir.
But it actually, it
was a great experience.
And it really was the
beginning of a trajectory
in terms of studying a
number of these issues.
But more important,
I think, with Jerry,
with Hermann, and with so
many others that I could name,
this place had just such a
dedication to public service.
And I think that really
is a major part of, again,
for better or worse, the
trajectory that I have been on.
I do want to note, I'll come
back and mention a few others,
but do note that I actually
have a couple of colleagues
from the administration here.
Sally Jewell here
was the, in contrast
to the 13th Secretary
of Energy, you
must have been like the 200th
the Secretary of the Interior.
It's such an old department.
How many?
51?
51st.
And that's great
for Sally to come.
And then Dan Poneman
was the Deputy Secretary
when I arrived at DOE.
But he and I, and
actually, even John Deutch,
we have a even a
publication record
going back into the early
part of this century.
So anyway, now I'm back.
And what Rafael didn't say
is that I am a, my official,
on the contract it actually
says Professor Post Tenure,
which reminds me of the words
on the official proclamation
of presidential nominees that
you serve for the time being.
In other words, I
continue to serve
at the pleasure of a president,
but certainly looking forward
to it.
So let me just say
a couple of things
about the Department of Energy.
It's kind of a background
for the discussion
because being there
these last four years
really was a very
special opportunity.
And I'll explain that.
First of all, I think
many, many probably
don't really know,
understandably,
the scope of the department's
activities, what we whimsically
label the missions of
the Department of Energy
as weapons and windmills,
corks and quagmires.
And that's serious, actually.
The weapons means that we are
the repository, essentially,
of nuclear security
knowledge, technology,
and the like, nuclear weapons,
nuclear nonproliferation
issues, nuclear Navy,
propulsion, windmills.
Obviously, we are, the
Department of Energy
I should say.
If I say we I mean we of eight
months ago, or whatever it is.
The department is the lead
for clean energy technology
innovation and other elements
of energy technology and policy.
The corks is something MIT
people feel at home with.
The corks are to represent the
fact that the department is
the largest supporter of the
physical sciences in the United
States, and in particular,
at most of its 17
national laboratories supports
the major facilities that many,
many of the scientists
here, faculty
and students, and post-docs,
and the like, and staff,
are using all the time,
accelerators, and neutron
sources, and light sources.
And the quagmires is the relic
of the Cold War in cleaning up
what can only be called the damn
mess left behind by the weapons
production.
So it's very diverse.
But what I want to emphasize is,
for every one of the missions
it's fundamentally
about applying
science and technology.
So DOE is at its core a science
and technology organization,
a very powerful one.
And that's really what we do.
Now, the reason that I said it
was a very special opportunity
to be at the department
in these last years,
specifically in the second
term of President Obama,
was that he put the clean energy
climate agenda and the Nuclear
Security agenda really very
high in the set of priorities.
So frankly, we had just
a very, an opportunity
to fail or succeed.
But an opportunity to
be engaged in really
major presidential priorities.
And that is reflected in
two of the major episodes,
certainly that I had a
chance to be part of,
and that was the Road to Paris
for the climate discussions,
the climate agreement,
and the Iran negotiation,
as mentioned earlier,
both of which
took place in 2015, which
I'll never forget 2015.
It was a hell of a year.
But on the Nuclear
Security side let's
just say that the president
very early in his term,
within months, April of 2009,
in a well-known speech in Prague
laid out a big nuclear security
agenda, kind of soup to nuts.
It was nuclear materials,
nuclear weapons,
nuclear proliferation,
et cetera.
And that was not a common
thing for the president
to come out and put that
as a high priority there.
Secondly, on the clean
energy and climate,
I think I can say
that, well, first
of all, even in the first
term, in 2009, many of you
may recall there was a little
thing called the Recovery Act.
We had some economic
problems at the time.
There was an enormous
Recovery Act.
For the first time the
president in that situation
made enormous new
expenditures in clean energy,
including establishing programs
like ARPA-E. There are probably
some awardees here.
Programs like the Energy
Frontier Research Centers,
which look at basic science
challenges for future energy
technologies.
Those were all funded as
a priority in the recovery
package, again, another kind
of unusual step forward.
Fast forwarding, at the
beginning of the second term,
in June, then came
the announcement
of the Climate Action Plan.
And I think that was
copyrighted, Rafael,
even though you've chosen
to copy the term here.
But anyway, but again,
it was a statement
that this was going to be a real
priority in the second term.
And frankly, when I
had my job interview
both of these subjects came up.
Frankly, it was like 30
minutes on climate and energy
and 15 minutes on the
Nuclear Security issues.
And so it was kind of
like in the wheel house.
So that was really great.
So it was a, again, really
a special time to be there.
So today I'll make
some remarks that
derive from the Paris
and Iran activities
in climate and nuclear security.
The phrasing of
reducing global threats
is the way we are
looking at this.
And by global
threats I mean areas
where there is a potential
for mass destruction
and or disruption, and both
climate and nuclear security,
I think, fit in there.
They require also global,
or at least multilateral,
responses in both cases.
And they are very different
in the nature of the threat.
I mean, climate change
and global warming,
I would say it's kind of
like a slow motion train
wreck that threatens major
environmental, economic, and
national security problems.
Whereas nuclear weapons, or
the use of nuclear weapons,
obviously would be
a very different,
we hope a very low
probability but very high
consequence, a
singular kind of event.
But again, some commonalities
in terms of how to replace it.
Now 25 years ago, so let's
say 1992 as a benchmark year,
you know, it seemed that we
were on the path to managing
both of these major problems.
For climate, and therefore
having the chance
to really focus on
economic, environmental,
and other kinds of
needs, including
developments in less developed
countries and the like.
And in fact, I would say,
in those years, in the 90s,
and I did serve in the
Clinton administration twice,
there was a period of that.
But also lurking problems
that would then come around
to bite us, like the development
of terrorism with global
reach for example.
And when it came time to
the Kyoto discussions,
even though there was
nominally agreement,
you could see plenty of
seeds of problems to come.
And I'll come back
to that a little bit.
But in June of 1992 is when
the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change was adopted.
And we have forgotten and
it's important to remember
in the current context,
I think, that that
was ratified in the Senate.
It is a treaty.
And I'll just quote
the commitment in there
to stabilize greenhouse
gas concentrations
in the atmosphere
at a level that
would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.
That is something to which we
are committed in that treaty.
The same kind of period,
beginning of the 90s,
on nuclear security
side, of course
the Soviet Union had
disintegrated peacefully.
There was the orderly
delivery of nuclear weapons
to Russia from Kazakhstan
and Belarus and Ukraine.
There was a focus on
securing and eliminating
both nuclear weapons and
nuclear materials that
could be used for WMD and D.
So again, global
threat reduction
looked to be in good shape.
But events of the
last year and months,
the June announcement by the
President on the Paris Accord,
and even in the last days, such
as the discussion, the speech,
at the UN General
Assembly two days ago
on Iran and North Korea,
obviously have painfully
displayed kind of the
forces of regression,
was the only thing that
I could say about that.
So again, terrorism
a global risk
in the 90s, the
nature of the NATO EU
expansions, the dizzying
advances in technology
that hold so much
promise but yet potential
for peril, those were
all in that time period,
I think, kind of harbingers
of some of the challenges
that were to come and
that we still face.
I just want to add one other
global threat that I will not
discuss today in
detail, but that
is in the life sciences,
synthetic biology developments,
things like global travel,
pandemics, et cetera,
it's another area clearly
where there's a global threat
to be addressed.
But again, I think today
I'll just stay with these two
and make some comments on the
climate and nuclear security
agendas.
These I will be personally
pursuing through MIT,
through an organization called
the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
and another called the
Energy Futures Initiative.
But of course at MIT
there's lots and lots
of work addressing all of these.
Certainly a very distinguished
set of faculty and students
contributing in
the climate regime,
and have been and will
be for a long time.
MITEI, the MIT
Energy Initiative,
in terms of facilitating an
enormous amount of research
on campus to advance solutions.
And on nuclear threats, I
just saw today from Course 22,
Do You Want Nuclear Security?
And I was wondering,
is it a trick question?
I've been thinking
about this a long time.
And I think the answer is yes.
But anyway, I guess
that's what you'll learn
if you sign up in Course 22.
So let me make some comments
in the climate arena.
I already noted the UN Framework
Convention is in place.
Now that framework,
of course, does
need an interpretation of
what the words dangerous
anthropogenic activity are.
But such an interpretation
is meaningful only
when it's based on science.
And there has been a remarkable
international scientific
progress that is part and
parcel of that convention.
So, you know, bluntly,
especially from the point
of view of a policy maker who
has to make prudent judgments
and risk management
in a certain sense,
in my view it is
completely laughable to say
that the state of the science is
not one that says that we must,
in fact, have a strong, prudent
response in the climate arena.
A second issue, and by
the way, I should say,
you know, 197
countries are signed up
to that Framework Convention.
So, you know, there
is a commitment
to address this issue
globally going back 25 years.
The second issue also contained
in that Framework Convention,
was the famous phrase about
common but differentiated
responsibilities,
another thing to be
interpreted and implemented.
And then at Kyoto, let's just
say the differentiation part
was emphasized quite
strongly and were the seeds
of the problems there.
Indeed, Congress again
spoke in that time period.
There was the
Byrd-Hagel Resolution
that was unanimous and said that
the US commitments could only
come together with developing
world commitments--
read, China there.
In other words, they
emphasized the common
in terms of the common
but differentiated
responsibilities.
But guess what, anybody
look at the Paris Accord?
It's victory.
There is in fact
shared responsibilities
between developing
and developed worlds.
In fact, I would
argue with commitments
that are in many, many
in just about every
sense comparable in
terms of the scale.
I mean, obviously,
there are variations.
But in fact, this path has led
us to where we wanted to go.
In addition, the administration,
including Administrator Pruitt
from EPA, has made it very
clear that the Supreme Court has
spoken and that there
is an obligation
to regulate carbon dioxide
under the Clean Air Act.
So how you implement
it is one thing.
And the administration,
after much work,
and another of our
colleagues, Gina McCarthy,
another Boston
based person, really
was the point person on that.
And so that went forward.
So really a 25 year
process kind of really
holds together with
the only real argument
being quantitative.
You know, is the
target 27%, or 29%,
or 24%, this kind of thing.
So in that context
we really need
to evaluate where we stand in
terms of the uncertainty that's
now been cast into the system
by the President's June
announcement.
But first, before
I turn to that let
me make a second
point about Paris.
It was made earlier,
that mission innovation
was another agreement at Paris.
Mission innovation
was an agreement
by 20 countries at the
time, it's a little bit more
now, who committed to doubling
clean energy innovation
investments, resources,
over a five year ramp
up period in parallel with a
group of investors represented
in Paris by Bill Gates,
representing investors
from 10 countries
who were prepared
to put in big
dollars with patience
to advance that innovation
agenda into the marketplace.
Unfortunately, administration's
actions have not only
led to the statement about
withdrawing, or starting
the process of withdrawing
from the Paris agreement,
but it also,
unfortunately, proposed
a budget that would address this
pillar of innovation as well.
Specifically, the factor of
two in mission innovation
is now appearing
in the denominator
instead of the numerator
in the budget proposal.
Now, I don't think Congress is
going to go along with that.
But it is a real issue.
I might add that the clean
energy transformation,
of course, is the core, is
the biggest piece if you like,
of responding to
greenhouse gas emissions.
But especially with my
friend Sally Jewel here,
we have to say another big
piece is around land use
and forestry and the like.
And so it's certainly a
broader set of activities.
Now going to the science--
I mean, again, so
the announcements
by the administration on both
Paris Accord and innovation
really take you to the science.
By the way, I should have added
just in case some may not know,
that the actual date at
which the United States could
withdraw, given the
President's announcement,
is actually November the 4th,
2020, which is essentially
the end of this term.
But you can make of
that what you wish.
But certainly thinking about
the underlying science, which
we mentioned briefly
earlier, it's
very hard to say that and
kind of resist the temptation
of commenting on hurricanes.
Although Kerry, is
Kerry Emanuel here?
I don't know if Kerry is--
Kerry spoke about
this yesterday,
the recent hurricanes, etc.
Kerry, a quote from
Kerry Emanuel in EAPS
quotes we would expect
a significant increase
in the extremes of
storm intensification.
So what I would emphasize is
that, you know, in many ways
it's always about water.
And water is higher.
Water is warmer.
The air carries more water
because of the warming.
And it certainly is no
surprise that there's
an amplifier on the effects
of these tropical storms
that unfortunately we have seen
recently in Texas and Louisiana
and Florida and other places.
It's also a question
of adaptation.
And actually, can we can we just
show, I have just two slides,
these two little pictures.
This is a picture, David
Sandalow provided these to me.
This is just a
picture of nothing
but sea level rise
with two degrees
centigrade of
warming in Shanghai.
And the next one is 4 degrees.
Gives you an idea.
Now obviously in
Shanghai they're
going to be able to
afford some adaptation.
And this is not a storm.
This is just regular sea
level rise with Shanghai.
But adaptation, to give you
a benchmark, one utility
in Florida that you've been
reading about quite a bit
recently with Hurricane
Irma, Florida Power and Light
has spent almost $4 billion
just in their service territory
doing things like
hardening assets,
preventing floods in
substations, et cetera.
$4 billion at one utility.
So you get an idea
how this can scale
and why the scientific and
analytical communities have
been emphasizing long term
it's a lot cheaper to mitigate
this and work hard on mitigation
than it is on adaptation.
But we will have to do both.
It also reminds
me, you know, this
is roughly the
thousandth anniversary
of King Knute ordering
the waves off the beach.
But, you know, there's
often a misinterpretation
that somehow King Knute
was vain in ordering this.
It's actually the
opposite according
to legend, that he
was humble and wanted
to show his court
that even he could not
order the waves off the beach.
A little more humility
today would not
be a bad idea in this context.
But anyway, that's
a separate story.
So the issue really
is, so what happens now
with the announcement
on June 1st.
The thing I would say, number
one, is there's no going back.
We are heading to a
low carbon future.
I think it's clearly
there in the cards.
And therefore, if we don't
pursue the kind of trajectory
that we were on I
think we're going
to end up in more or less
the same place down the road.
But it will be a rougher
road to get there
without federal leadership.
Secondly, that development
means that there will be
a multi-trillion dollar market.
It's developing now.
It's going to develop further.
And no matter what you
think on the climate side,
the fact is decreasing our
innovation programs just
don't make a lot
of sense in terms
of where we're going to be
in that future marketplace.
And indeed, one of the
most encouraging aspects
of the aftermath of the
President's announcement
was the way mayors, governors,
and business leaders,
almost 1,400 business leaders,
stepping forward to say, well,
that's fine announcement.
We're on our track.
We're staying on our track.
And I think the issue
is, they recognize
that they have to make capital
allocations, et cetera,
with decadal time scales.
They agree we're not going back.
Frankly, a lot of disappointment
that when the planning
environment for them looked
to be pretty settled, now
it's kind of a little bit
scrambled, but the reality
is continuing the path forward.
So that's really important.
And in that path forward
innovation will be critical.
And I mean innovation in
technology, in policy,
and in business models.
Now on the technology side,
and actually I should say,
we're talking here, also
I want to emphasize,
not just about the Paris goals,
let's say 27% reduction 2025
for the United States, but we're
talking about what you really
need to do, especially in
the industrialized economies,
for deep decarbonization let's
say in the mid-century time
frame.
To get there, on
the technology side,
there were two elements
that are absolutely
common to any credible,
or nearly credible,
explanation of getting to
the deep decarbonization.
And that is, there has to be
a demand side success, energy
efficiency and the like,
across the board, buildings
transportation, industry.
And we have to effectively
decarbonize the electricity
system where there are
many options to do that.
I'm not saying it's easy.
But if we don't get
the electricity system
decarbonized nuclear power,
renewables, carbon capture
and sequestration, certainly
for a while, coal substituted
by gas, which has been a big
part of our carbon reductions
in the last years.
All of those have to be pushed.
And we have to succeed in
decarbonizing the electricity
sector if we have any chance
of a broader, economy wide,
decarbonization.
But what follows from that
then is if you decarbonize
the electricity
sector then you want
to electrify as much else as
you can, so like duty vehicles,
for example, many, many
opportunities there.
However, there is
the hard truth.
It's very hard for me to see how
electrifying the transportation
sector, electrifying
the industry sector,
is going to get us all the
way to where we want to go.
And that's where the arguments
that some use that stop,
you know, stop this
innovation nonsense.
We have all the tools we need.
I just don't buy it.
I think we're going to need
some very deep innovation
to get to deep decarbonization
across all of these sectors.
Too often when you are shown
some wonderful graphs that
show carbon emissions going down
to almost nothing, what they're
showing you is the
electricity sector and not
the full economy, which
leads to another thing.
That I think we have to do more.
Therefore, we also have to
look at other greenhouse
gases besides CO2,
methane, very important.
Another very important
agreement in 2015
was extending the
Montreal Protocol
to get rid of hydro
fluorocarbons.
That's worth probably a
half degree centigrade
of warming in this century.
And we need large scale carbon
management as a supplement
to all of these.
I might say that at DOE we
had a Secretary of Energy
advisory board, [? CM. ?]
The distinguished Professor
Deutsch was the Chair of that
board, which did yeoman's
work on many, many subjects.
And I might say that
President Hockfield
took part in one of
those activities as well,
and others here.
But their last
report of SEAB was
in fact answering the
question about what
were pathways, both
engineered pathways
and biological pathways,
to large scale carbon
management, et cetera.
So I think there's a tremendous
science and technology
deep innovation agenda that
we don't have a lot of time
to waste in pursuing that.
I also mentioned innovation in
policy and in business model.
I think it is not a
time to discuss this.
But I'll just say
there are movements
such as from a group
of conservatives,
excuse me self-named, George
Shultz, Jim Baker and others,
talking about a
so-called carbon neutral,
a revenue neutral carbon tax,
which is progressive but also
would entail a trade of
some elements of regulation
and subsidy being removed.
I think that's a very
interesting discussion.
And one that could go forward.
That's the kind of
innovation we need.
And let me say that with that
kind of innovation we can see,
at least models tell
us we can see, really
accelerating the clean
energy transformation.
Because it's really the synergy
between technology progress
and policy to give the price
signals that can really help
accelerate the deployment
of these technologies.
And business model innovation
will also be critical.
Again, given the time I don't
want to spend a lot of time
on this.
But an obvious case would
be in urban environments,
autonomous personal mobility
devices and different ownership
models, all kinds of issues
linked into the grid.
And in fact, the
full integration
of IT so-called
behind the meter is
going to be a very,
very important area.
And frankly, there can
be a collision here
between the utilities and
the big data companies,
the big five data companies.
I say as a joke, the biggest
energy story of the last months
was Amazon buys Whole Foods
to indicate how the big data
companies can really move
in in the commodity space
and do all kinds of
linked activities.
How the regulatory
process plays out
will be critical in shaping how
that possible competition turns
out.
So anyway I think that
there are, again, there's
reasons for concern obviously.
But there's also lots of
reasons to be hopeful.
Again, the mayors,
the governors,
the business people behind it.
The technology opportunities
are going forward.
And the fact that we are seeing
things like these business
model innovations
being experimented
with all over the place.
It's got to get pulled together.
And it's got to get moving
quickly because we don't have
a whole lot of time to waste.
OK.
Let me just make, and now for
something completely different,
nuclear security, a few
comments on nuclear security.
And I have to say
the bad news is,
in my view, the risk
of miscalculation,
of misunderstanding,
leading to the possible use
of a nuclear weapon
for the first time
since World War II, I
think, is higher today
than probably any time since
the Cuban Missile Crisis.
That's whether you look at
North Korea, India-Pakistan,
NATO-Russia, there are
all kinds of opportunities
for misunderstandings
right now that
could lead to bad outcomes.
Iran now is a different case
not having nuclear weapons,
verifiably without a program.
Although, again, the
speech a couple of days
ago suggests that, you know,
we've got three big problems,
why not make it four.
But we will see.
So let me just make a
few comments on Russia.
These will just be specific
comments on Russia, Iran,
and North Korea.
And then we can go
to the discussion.
On Russia I just want to note
one recent development that
is a cause of concern, but could
be turned into an opportunity.
And that is that,
as many of you know,
the Congress recently
passed a sanctions bill
in which it
essentially took some
of the prerogatives
traditionally placed
with the President.
There is not a good history
of this encouraging dialogue.
For example, there
was something,
I won't go into detail, called
the Jackson-Vanik sanctions
in the 1970s, 1976.
And after the
President certified
that, then it was Russia,
no longer the Soviet Union,
but then Russia
was in compliance.
It still took Congress 15 more
years to lift the sanctions.
Kind of got tied up
with chicken exports.
And I'm not making it up.
So but that's the kind
of political dynamic
that one gets in when you
get into the congressional
political.
So we can understand
why that occurred
in the current situation.
But what we've proposed, and
this is with former Senator Sam
Nunn, we proposed to use a
model that was successfully
used in the 1980s during
the Reagan administration.
First of all, we feel that
it is absolutely essential
that we resume serious
discussions with Russia
on these nuclear
security threats.
It's too important.
It was too important in the Cold
War to stop those discussions.
They are essentially stopped.
Military to military
conversations
are way, way down.
And so that's what can
lead to miscalculations.
So we need to have that.
The action by the
Congress, in our view,
essentially eliminates
the political space
if the Department of State
or the Department of Defense
want to have those
discussions, especially given
the history that I mentioned.
So what we propose is
that a model used, again,
as I said in arms control
negotiations in the 80s,
get re-implemented with a
liaison group from the Congress
to the administration
invited by the Secretary's
of State and Defense to act
as an ongoing liaison group
so that if the
opportunity is there
to use some political space it
gives political space to them
for the discussions.
And it tells Russia,
in this case,
that if they talked they're
not wasting their time.
That there's an opportunity
to move something forward.
Because right now
in this situation,
and in other situations,
it's getting to the point
where if we start out of Paris,
out of Iran, out of everything,
question trade, et cetera, who's
going to want to talk to us?
What's the point?
Right?
So anyway, that's
an example of trying
to think of some kind
of creative approaches
that we can get
ourselves out of this box
and have kind of dialogue.
Let me talk about Iran.
And obviously there's
a big decision
by the President
coming up in October.
It's very important to
understand what the Iran
deal is and what it's not.
It is only about nuclear.
It is not about Hezbollah and
Yemen and Syria and missiles
etc.
And it is about very
strong verification.
And it is about
buying, if you like,
a decade or 15
years of time, which
should be used wisely
rather than just
used as a period of complaint.
So pulling out of that deal,
if that is where we go,
is very inimical
to our interests.
Particularly because
it's almost certain
that the three European
countries in the negotiation,
the EU, Russia, and China,
and Iran, will quote,
all stay in the deal.
And then where do we go?
If the issue is that
the President refuses
to certify compliance,
even though the IAEA says
they're doing everything
they're supposed to do,
and the Congress puts on new
sanctions, which actually would
be the deal breaker,
our European friends
are not going to be very happy.
And it would be one more
opportunity, quotes, in fact,
to further put a wedge
between us and our allies.
A structure that's been
built up with the United
States in the lead ever
since World War II.
So this is a big deal if
there really is compliance.
As opposed to complaining
about Iran's, justifiably
complaining, about Iran's
behavior in other dimensions
that are not part of the deal.
We've got to address
those dimensions.
So let's work with the
partners on those things
more aggressively.
And let's plan
for quote, the day
after, when elements of
the agreement expire in 10,
12, 15 years.
What do we want?
For example, maybe the
way to do this is, I'll
speak one example, they have
unique verification measures
in the Iran deal.
A lot of those would
be great to have
more broadly, others
following them,
giving an incentive
also for Iran.
There's a lot of thinking to
do, a lot of ground to prepare.
And all we're doing
is wasting time
with these arguments in a
situation in which there
is compliance.
And I might add, the
time part is not trivial
because the young
generation in Iran
is clearly going to be
very helpful in terms
of charting a path forward.
Finally, a few comments
on North Korea.
In Iran, as I said,
the negotiation
was focused strictly
on nuclear issues.
In my view, the focus on
only nuclear weapons in Korea
is the wrong strategy.
That this is a question now
of looking at the underlying
realities of security for North
Korea, South Korea, Japan,
and China.
We have not had a serious
dialogue with China.
All we do is tell them stop
buying coal, stop sending this.
We are not addressing
all the issues
that China is really
concerned about in security.
And frankly, a
reason is because it
would require us to discuss
some hard issues that maybe we
don't want to
discuss particularly,
missile defense, reunification
in the peninsula,
all kinds of issues.
So I think that,
and not only me,
others, we think that
what we need to do,
we need to start diplomacy.
And diplomacy does not consist
of choosing the most colorful
words that you can think of.
And that diplomacy starts
with China and South
Korea and Japan.
So that we can get--
Which is very analogous to the
Iran negotiation in the sense
that, although the United States
was the face to face negotiator
with Iran, it was
representing a group convened
by the EU of three
European companies, Russia,
and China countries.
And so we need to get
a framework together
with our allies and with
China so that we can then
start a dialogue with North
Korea that is meaningful
and addresses the overall
security concerns that
maybe with time will lead to
success in the denuclearization
goal that we have.
But a common thread in all
three of those discussions,
obviously, is a strongly held
view, certainly on our part,
that we have got to get back
into the business of diplomacy
and really make serious
progress on these issues.
So that's what I guess
wanted to ramble on about.
But again, going back
to the beginning,
to say that it really
was a great time
to be at the
Department of Energy,
carrying on with the
essential activities in terms
of basic science, et cetera, but
also having these areas where
we can make great progress.
And now all of us in
civil society hopefully
can sustain some
of that progress
and build on it going forward.
So thank you very much.
Ernie, thank you for that
wisdom and for your commitment.
Let's see.
So we had a whole lot
of questions submitted
from the MIT community.
And I put them into groups.
And I'll ask one or two
from every category.
And my categorization--
And I haven't seen them.
You have not seen them, correct.
And in fact, they're
in approximately
the opposite order from
where your speech went.
So I'm just going to start.
So let's start with Iran.
OK?
So politicians as
well as the media
seem to talk or worry
about possible deviations
of Iran's nuclear activities
from being peaceful.
But they don't seem
to be as worried
about the many nuclear
weapons that already
exist all around the world.
And for that matter, why
are the United States
nuclear weapons don't seem to
be as much of a concern either?
Well, first of all, the use of
any nuclear weapon by anybody
again, the primary objective
is to prevent that use.
And I want to, this is
not quite the question,
I'll come back to that.
And I want to distinguish
that from the disarmament
discussions.
Disarmament is a good thing.
But we, and certainly the
organization that I'm with now,
but we say, yeah
that is important.
However, right now,
what's really important
is to make sure a
weapon isn't used.
Right?
So that's kind of the framework.
With Iran, and,
you know, we also
should keep in
mind that there has
been a significant reduction
in the stockpiles of the United
States and Russia.
Secondly, that there has been
no testing of nuclear weapons,
of nuclear explosives,
in this century
other than by North Korea.
Right?
So some things are positive.
I can go into many
negative developments.
But with Iran, look, the
reality is that first of all,
there is a very
complicated history.
Certainly the United
States and Iran,
and I'm not going to
go through all of it.
But it starts with
the United States
being a hero to Iran
right after World War II.
Then comes the coup, not
so much of a hero anymore.
Then comes the revolution,
more complications.
Then comes Iran-Iraq
and chemical weapons.
I mean, it's a long, long story.
So one should not
expect that there
can be anything other than
very, very deep mistrust
between the countries.
However, there's also
a lot of mistrust
of Iran with the
international community.
And that is
evidenced by the fact
that the economic sanctions
were so effective.
Why were they effective?
Wasn't because the United
States had unilateral sanctions.
Because the world was
doing it because Iran
was caught doing activities
that were, at least, certainly
relevant to a nuclear
weapons program.
So look, there's a lot there.
And that's also one
reason why I think
that it's so important to use
the time of 15 years wisely.
The agreement, as far as I'm
concerned, stands on its own.
It's a highly
technical agreement.
Some have called
it anal retentive.
But that was the point.
So that quotes cheating
would be more constrained.
It stands on its own.
But I have to say it
would be disappointing
if it did not over a
15 year time period
give some opportunity
for a broader opening.
Unfortunately, now things are
going in the wrong direction
as even new problems
come up with Yemen
and Syria and the like.
So, you know, that's why
there's a great sensitivity.
And I can assure
you, the sensitivity
to their nuclear weapons
program is not something
that only the United States in
that negotiation was pushing.
Our partners were
all on the same page.
And I'll end by saying, in fact,
at the end of the negotiation,
which was July 14th, 2015,
one member of our country
group, a foreign minister,
noted that history might judge
the US-Russia agreement
in this negotiation
to be more remarkable than
the agreement with Iran.
Because, you know, this
was all during Ukraine.
And yet there was never
a wedge driven between us
on the negotiations.
So one more Iran question.
During the negotiations
there were MIT alums
on either side of the table.
How did this affect the
negotiating dynamic?
And I might add, three out of
the four principal negotiators
had American PhDs.
You have to figure out, of
course, who the fourth was.
And it wasn't an Iranian.
So Ali Salehi was my
negotiating partner.
He graduated PhD,
nuclear engineering here
in 1977 or 1978 maybe.
And he was a student.
I don't know if Mike Driscoll,
I don't know if Mike is here.
And I was very, very
close to Mike Driscoll
and to Mujit Kasemi,
our late dear friend.
Anyway, it was an
enormous advantage.
First of all, it was an
enormous advantage, frankly,
that both Salehi and
Zarif had American PhDs.
Meaning, they're familiar
with the country,
familiar with the--
We could do all the
negotiations in English,
which is an enormous, enormous
advantage for building
relationships.
With Salehi it was special
because we had common friends.
And although, again
as I said, I would
say I could not say the
countries have trust.
But I would say we
developed absolutely,
personal trust in what
we were talking about
that we could deliver.
We had the backing
we knew to deliver.
So it was very important.
And also, one story
that was in the paper,
but I can't resist
in saying is that,
and Naomi actually went and
bought the stuff at the MIT
bookstore, that in
the second meeting,
and it was very intense,
in the second meeting
his first grandchild
was born, a girl.
And we got him some MIT gifts so
that he could be in nerd heaven
again.
And you can't beat this one.
And for this audience
it should be easy.
A onesie, a pink onesie, with
two atomic element symbols
for copper and tellurium.
Get it?
Get it?
After that everything
went easily.
OK.
All right.
One question on North Korea.
So North Korea's nuclear
ambitions are not irrational.
It's a fact that
fully nuclear powers
enjoy a privileged status in
the global political discourse.
What's the best way to
address the uncomfortable fact
that possessing
nuclear weaponry does
in fact afford nations a more
prominent seat at the table?
I think by, and that was
implicit in what I suggested
in terms of a path forward.
Ultimately it's about convincing
and providing a pathway
to a more prosperous society
integrated with partners,
and secure.
And again, I said
earlier, I don't
think we have adequately
addressed the real security
needs of any of the
countries in the region.
And that's where
we have to start.
And again, there
are countries who
have given up nuclear weapons
and nuclear weapons programs.
And so, you know, part
of that is, in some cases
it's security guarantees
that we have to provide.
And other times it's economic.
Look, I was just in
Kazakhstan in August.
And you should remember,
Kazakhstan became independent
in 1991, the Soviet
Union's breaking apart.
They would have been, I think,
the world's fourth largest
nuclear power given the Soviet
nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan.
And it's very interesting.
President Nazarbayev,
sorry getting into stories,
but President
Nazabayev apparently
grew up in the region not too
far from the Soviet test site
in Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk,
which had well-known health
problems, shall we say,
for some of the residents
because of above ground
testing et cetera.
And he just feels
it in his bones.
And when they went independent
he just said, take the weapons.
He wasn't asking for anything.
He just, it's, I'm
worse off with them
than I am without them.
And so I think that's
where we have to go.
So there were a lot of similar
questions on nuclear power.
And they were all
along the lines of,
do you think the US will see
new nuclear power generation
in the coming decades?
And is it possible to reach
deep decarbonization targets
without it?
Well, obviously it's possible.
But I think it's a lot harder.
I mean, you know, this is
not a simple job to get to,
especially deep decarbonization,
on a generational time scale.
And we need every
arrow in the quiver.
We also should recognize that
solutions, the low carbon
solutions, will
look very different
in different countries.
And they will look
very different
in different regions
of our country.
I mean, I believe
Germany absolutely
will get rid of nuclear power.
OK.
But other countries will
build nuclear power.
In our country, right
now the main problem
is the schedule and
cost performance
of the new plants, reactors,
that at least have been
being built in the southeast.
But, you know, in terms if
you look at decades again,
you know, I'm
guardedly optimistic
that the small modular
reactors can make a difference.
But they won't make a difference
if, frankly, there is not,
and John, actually
John Deutch, also
chaired a committee for SEAB
on terms of future reactors.
But it ain't going to happen
without a strong government
push to do it.
I don't mean handouts.
But I mean a strong
government push to do it.
And there are ways of doing it,
with purchase power agreements,
potentially, all kinds of ways.
That's up to them to pick the
right policy tools to do it.
But I certainly
think it's important.
OK.
Lots of questions
on climate change.
One other thing on that.
Just to say, without
getting into detail,
but we did a paper
on this recently.
That for the United
States there's
also a pretty strong
national security imperative
for wanting a strong,
domestic supply
chain in the nuclear business.
It is the foundation of our,
of much of our nonproliferation
activity globally.
And secondly, we
literally do not
have the capability today
to supply nuclear fuel
for example, for the Navy.
We're living off of
a stockpile of stuff
that will go for a while.
But our supply chain is
not, shall we say, a chain.
It's got a few links
here and there.
OK.
Let me do just a couple of
questions on climate change
and climate change policy.
So several questions about
the role of low tech changes
and human behavior
and cultural practice,
such as in the food
system and land use.
And what role do you
see those playing
relative to the high tech
innovation solutions?
I think actually
it's quite important.
And with efforts it's
surprising how effective it is.
This is going to be another
anecdote on an aside
but, I had the
pleasure of waving
the green flag, the starting
flag, for a NASCAR race.
And the reason is that we
had an agreement with them
in terms of energy
efficiency, clean energy,
and actually they require 15%
ethanol in the NASCAR races,
you know, etc.
But what was then interesting,
and I didn't know about,
that's all the stuff that we
collaborated with them on.
But what I didn't know
about is, in the Northeast
there probably aren't a whole
lot of big NASCAR fans here.
But they have an
educational campaign
on things like recycling.
And there have been polls
done that in the sports world,
the NASCAR fans are
the most recyclers.
So, you know, so anyway it
is education, it's behavior.
And so it's kind of interesting.
Given the critical role
for climate activism--
I waved the flag and there was
a crack up at the first turn.
It's true.
OK.
Given the critical
role for climate action
at state and local levels.
And given the lack
of leadership from
the federal administration.
Should MIT publicly
be advocating
for specific policies such as
carbon pricing at the state
level?
Well, OK.
MIT is one thing.
Faculty, students of
MIT is something else.
Right?
I mean MIT institutionally
is about doing hard,
fact based analysis.
And I think that's
the job of MIT.
And it's the job
of, I think when
we have faculty groups
putting out things,
future of studies, etc.
They have to be
well grounded, kind
of bullet proof in terms of
analysis and recommendations.
Now obviously then faculty
in their other roles,
look, including me
right now, I mean,
you know, obviously I do
things that I don't say,
this is MIT speaking.
But we will advocate
for specific policies.
And in this case, for example,
to me it's unambiguous.
A nice, simple carbon charge is
probably the most effective way
to go forward.
It could be that
revenue neutral.
It could be other
ways of doing it.
It may not be the
theoretically prettiest way.
But in the real
world of politics
I think it's probably
one of the best chance.
OK.
So we're going to come
close to closing it up here.
Let me just say again,
actually, and while, you know,
leadership from the
cities and the states
has been and will be
critically important.
The reality is,
in the end, we're
going to have to get some
kind of economy wide approach.
And that's just going to have
to have federal leadership.
OK.
The final category is other.
Your hairstyle--
Red Sox will come in first.
Your hair style--
10 games to go.
Say it again?
You're avoiding this question.
I don't like other.
Well, there's a good
reason for that.
Your hairstyle has
drawn comparisons
with a plethora
of famous figures,
including George Washington,
Beethoven, and the Quaker Oats
man.
Don't forget Sam Adams beer.
Did you consciously
choose a hairstylist
who was a student of history?
I'm a conservative.
I haven't changed
since graduate school.
OK The final question.
At your Senate
confirmation hearing,
you introduced Naomi as
your wife of 39.83 years.
Does marital success
in any way benefit
from tracking the
longevity of a relationship
to many significant figures?
Well, OK.
First let me tell the
rest of that story.
And that is that Al Franken,
known to have a sense of humor,
when it came around
to his turn, he
had been calculating
furiously what
that meant working backwards.
And he said, Dr.
Moniz, is it true
that you were married
on June the 10th, 1973?
And I said, no.
And it turned out I didn't have
enough significant figures.
It was a genuine ambiguity
between the June 9 and June
10th.
So Franken kind of had it right.
So anyway it's
good to keep count.
Because we're beginning to
think it might work out.
Ernie, thank you very much.
And welcome back to MIT.
