

The Future of the Middle East

Edited by Hugh Miles and Alastair Newton
Copyright

The Future of the Middle East

Edited by Hugh Miles and Alastair Newton

Published by Global Policy Journal and Arab Digest at **Smashwords**

Copyright 2017 Global Policy Journal jointly owned by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd (Company no. 641132), whose registered office and principal place of business is at The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK and The University of Durham (established under Royal Charter with Company Number RC000650) whose registered address is The Palatine Centre, Stockton Road, Durham, DH1 3LE (together "the Owners"). Wiley-Blackwell is a trading name of John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Contents

1 Making Revolution Islamic Again: Protest and Rebellion from '79 Iran to the Arab Spring - Andrew Hammond

2 In the Shadow of the Kingdom - Saad al-Fagih

3 In Anticipation of the Next Cycle of Arab Revolutions - Azzam Tamimi

4 Translating the Informal into the Formal - George Joffé

5 The US, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf - David B Roberts

6 Egypt, the Arab Spring and the Duping of Liberalism - Tom Dinham

7 Future Challenges Faced by Iran - Meir Javedanfar

8 The Changing Fortunes of Saudi Arabia - Nick Stadtmiller

9 Peering Ahead in the Middle East - Anthony Harris

10 Turkish Economy as a Motor of Growth in the Mediterranean Rim? - Mina Toksoz

11 The New Neocons and the Middle East - Alastair Newton

12 The Future of Yemen - Helen Lackner

13 US-Iran Relations: From Nuclear Deal to Renewed Tensions? - Christopher M. Davidson

14 Algeria: Will the Failure to Reform Economically further Fuel Islamism? - Kahina Bouagache

15 Global oil and the future of OPEC - Mehdi Varzi

16 An Impulsive Actor in the Middle East - Bitte Hammargren

17 Islam and the West: Recognition, Reconciling, Co-existence or Collision - Ashur Shamis

18 The Intersection of Wahhabism and Jihad - Mohammed Al Jarman

19 Lebanon: Losing the Peace? - Nadine Windsor

20 Political Islam Diminished - Robin Lamb

21 Prerequisites for Peace in Palestine/Israel - Alaa Tartir

22 Living Together in Tunisia - Khadija Arfaoui

23 Requiem for BICI - Bill Law

24 GCC States and Social Media Disruption in an Era of Transition - Alanoud Al-Sharekh

25 Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa - Nadereh Chamlou

26 The Future of the Middle East - Hugh Miles

Acknowledgements

About Arab Digest

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Making Revolution Islamic Again: Protest and Rebellion from '79 Iran to the Arab Spring

Andrew Hammond

18th January 2017

The 1979 Iranian Revolution was revolutionary on a number of fronts, but it had two particularly profound consequences in terms of Western discourse on Islam and political change. On the one hand, it signalled the death knell of modernization theory's rejection of religion as an organizing force in society, which still retained currency at that time in scholarly discussion of the Islamic world. What was termed "radical alterity" became the rage as anthropology took its "cultural turn" and Middle East Studies, and other disciplines focussed on the Islamic, refracted into various approaches, from the reduction of Islam to unsalvageable fundamentals to the search for an Islamic liberalism (viz. Leonard Binder's  Islamic Liberalism).

On the other hand, historians and social scientists began to look anew into questions of radical change and responses to oppressive power systems, from James Scott's "peasant resistance" to Asef Bayat's notion of "everyday resistance" in urban Iran. "Most subordinate classes throughout most of history have rarely been afforded the luxury of open, organized political activity," Scott wrote in Weapons of the Weak (1985), and since rebellion invariably fails, it would be wiser to focus on "everyday forms of peasant resistance – the prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them." Similarly declaring that he wants to "deemphasize the totalizing notion of 'the revolution' as the change par excellence", Bayat argued in  Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran (1998) that in their drive for autonomy non-elite groups may succeed in subverting the domination of the modern state.

As Iran came to replace one form of repressive system with another, its popular revolt became paradoxically emblematic of all that was wrong with violent change. Marxist and post-colonial studies scholars influenced by Michel Foucault's theories on knowledge and power did not like this new trend, which was at one with ascendant neoliberalism and its treatment of man as a consumptive rather than political animal, but the fact is that from that time revolution became distinctly unfashionable in how the Arab world was discussed in Western public discourse.

These two developments – renewed emphasis on the essence of Islam and questioning the efficacy of violent revolt – came sharply into focus again with the popular uprisings that spread across countries of the Middle East region in late 2010 and throughout 2011, collectively referred to in media as the Arab Spring. Against the grain of policy discourse and social and political science theory, masses of ordinary people risked their lives in taking to the streets to effect forms of political and economic change that it had not been possible to realize through the established means within state structures. Moreover, they did so as "Arabs", a flexible taxonomy propagated by 19th century European politicians and scholars in the imperial metropole whose many, contradictory characteristics included, as Edward Said so lucidly outlined in Orientalism (1978), both passivity and propensity to violence. As they staked their place as global citizens (speaking the universal language of rights espoused by the West), there was little to be gainsaid about the hundreds of thousands who engaged in protest in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen, Oman, Kuwait, Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Morocco once their popular mobilizations had made their way into international media and tapped into the universal discourse.

But this was no small feat. The array of coercive, economic and discursive forces ranged against the protesting Arab were considerable, and the success of these mechanisms, which were lodged in processes of globalization, seemed to be both long-term and consistent with the notion of the submissiveness of the political culture. Brutal police states were sustained through extensive political and diplomatic, military and security, and economic support from Western powers, whose first concern when protests broke out in Tunisia was to preserve order in the World Bank's model Arab economic reformer. The reform narrative was so prevalent that it took a news agency such as Reuters several weeks to move beyond dismissing protesters as damn meddling kids and passé leftists from the interior wastelands. The French foreign minister of the time Michèle Alliot-Marie even offered to help the regime restore order, then spent a Christmas holiday in the outremer province as the uprising unfolded.

However, Orientalism's other Arab – the barbarian given to violent urges – was to return in the strange case of Western revival of the defunct category of violent revolt. After the initial confusion over how to compute popular revolt against regimes understood as Western allies and made respectable through narrative artifice, the 2011 movement shifted towards militarization under the guidance of outside forces. The process began with Libya, where then US Secretary of State  Hillary Clinton saw an opportunity to install a regime more appealing to US interests through the cover of Arab League sanctions for NATO operations in which Qatar and the UAE played a key role. While for the UAE this was the first try out for a new policy of Little Sparta extensions, for Qatar it was the continuing roll-out of a wider project to bring to power political groups whose ideological lexicon was based in the "Islamic reference". The innocence of a region-wide popular movement, untainted by foreign manipulations and agendas, that would win or lose and live to fight another day in other forms and contexts, was lost.

The basics of that model were to be reproduced in Syria where a provincial protest movement that braved the worst forms of repression from a regime too paranoid about collapse and accountability in the face of an emboldened populace was fatally transformed into an armed uprising dominated by the  Islamic reference. This was not the work of domestic forces alone, but produced by their backers, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States, guided by the crude and parvenu notion that "majority Sunnis" were determined to reclaim their historical patrimony from the manufactured secularism of rule by minorities. Organized opposition forces abroad where secular voices were prominent formed a convenient front for what was increasingly sold in the Gulf arena where the money was coming from as unofficial jihad against an infidel regime. Of the dozens of fighting groups, some emerged from the Brotherhood fold, others from the diverse ideological movement referred to widely in Arabic since 1980s Afghanistan and in English since 9/11 as "Salafism", and it was Salafism that was to win out in Western media and policy circles as the normative ideological descriptor of choice for this Islamic moment.

So in the face of a regime with no red lines in terms of the type of warfare it would engage in to retain control, protesters were replaced with insurgents, both Syrian and foreign. Violent revolution was suddenly in vogue and Islamic again. Yet no thought was given to the death, the displacement and the destruction of neighbourhoods that was inevitably going to ensue. The lessons of the Lebanese civil war, the Iraq war, the Russians in Chechnya or Israeli wars in Gaza were not enough to stop the madness in its tracks: where Hamas has never fought beyond one month because it knows Israel will continue flattening urban districts one by one, the insurgency continued inexorably in the constant hope that the regime was just one atrocity away from a new US war. To prosecute such a strategy against a regime of consummate cruelty with a proven track record stretching back over decades (the CIA didn't send suspects there for nothing) was by one reading an unethical act of striking naivety. For affluent Gulf states the jihad functioned as a diversion from the dangers of the Arab Spring, which touched in different ways Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Cheerleaders among the think tank community lobbied for a cause rather than rationally ponder the consequences of policy and action.

With the tragedy of Syria, Islam as the key vector of identity for Arabs and Muslims has been reinforced in the English and Arabic public arena. The secular nature of Syrian society under the Baath regime is presented by pro-rebel politicians and commentators as an aberration from the norm of Arab countries returning to their Islamic self after the failed experience of secular Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 60s. Countries with a simplistically tabulated "Sunni majority" must be ruled by "Sunnis", and if Syrians, with their mosaic of confessional communities, don't think of themselves in such a manner, that simply reinforces the deviant character of Assad family rule (which in simplistic sectarian terms is described as "Alawi"). The opposition groups appealed to Islamic themes, the argument goes, because these express the true nature of the culture. What has been striking, however, is the articulation of this Orientalist essentialism through the new discourse of Salafism. Classified in burgeoning scholarship on the topic as a transnational movement encompassing "jihadists", political activists and "quietists", Salafism is becoming the paradigm du jour for understanding Islam in the 21st century. Posing as the ideological champion of Salafism – a term which serves to supersede Wahhabism with its negative connotations – Saudi Arabia in particular has in broad terms promoted the quietists at home and the jihadists abroad, from Afghanistan to Syria, though it has in reality propagated all three globally at different times and in different contexts since the 1970s.

Salafism aligns with the Orientalist imagination of a monolithic Islamic civilization that can be reduced to a paradigm of early (Arab) generations, the period of True Islam, "after which the authenticity of the original article is progressively corrupted", as Shahab Ahmed writes in What is Islam?: The Importance of Being Islamic (2016). Western scholarship, on the one hand, and the clerical class who administer Sharia law, on the other, are perhaps oddly at one in sharing this thinking. Both seek to emphasize categories such as the early Islamic period, Islamic jurisprudence and Arab authenticity over a putative wave of corrupting foreign ideas, and both exhibit the scripturalist obsession with producing fixed knowledge from divine texts. Against this narrative, subsequent eras and Islamic cultures will only ever come up wanting; the immense influence, for example, of Sufism on both intellectual life and the lived experience of Muslims over centuries becomes marginalized and belittled. A default position establishes itself in both Islamic and Western scholarship placing law rather than the practice of theological reasoning (kalām), or philosophy, or logic, or other side-lined disciplines at the heart of what is narrated as "Islam". In the media dialectic between journalism and the commentariat, "Salafism" is becoming the West's ideal Islam – legalistic, prescriptive, delineable, suitably Other.

To be clear, Salafism's semantic victory in defining Late Orientalism's  constitution of Islam is not yet assured. Ideological and political disputes between Brotherhood Islamism and the Salafi trends, and their various Gulf Arab backers, is complicating the process. But the conflict is indicative of Islam's continued domination of the social and cultural imaginaire in Middle East politics. A typical example of this is  Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam is Reshaping the Middle East (2016) by Brookings Institution researcher Shadi Hamid. The book could well have been titled Islamic Essentialism since it's as succinct a description of the faddish essentialist position as you'll find anywhere. Offering a potted history of Islam that goes briskly from the Islamic tradition's rendering of Muhammad's life to Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, who is posited as Islam's great reviver extraordinaire, Hamid declares that Islam has been in a "struggle to establish a legitimate political order" since the demise of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, which has apparently exercised the minds of all the world's Muslims ever since because Islam "is different".

The central conceit is that societies still holding religious belief dear require explanation for a liberal American audience that is imagined to find this odd, despite the Evangelicals, the Mormons, the Creationists, the Christian Zionists, et al. who populate the American project as it forges ahead through its third century. Islam is of course equated with Arabs throughout, and historical and anthropological understandings of Islamic culture are shunted aside for simplistic two-dimensional normativity: executed Sudanese intellectual Mahmud Muhammad Taha's ideas are dismissed as uninteresting, the Qur'an is declared in a breathless mix of wonderment and defiance as "God's actual speech", the author reveals allegedly telling details such as that his Islamist informants prefer to meet in restaurants where alcohol isn't served, and the reader is assumed to find it exceptional that members of a ruthlessly suppressed political movement would want to die for their cause.

Hamid posits himself as the insider apologist making comprehensible the incomprehensible. We are to be shocked that opinion polls (with which think tank pontificators on Islam are notably fixated) show that zero percent of British Muslims think  homosexuality is morally acceptable, though placing this in global historical perspective I don't think many African societies, the Chinese, East Europeans and others are too hot on homosexuality (defined here, presumably, as a lifestyle choice and identity) and neither were the liberal Western societies too long ago to boot. Which gets to the second major problem with Hamid's thesis: if "not all peoples, cultures, and religions follow the same path to the same end point" – in other words, if modernity does not have a uniform cast to it – then what's so unique about "the Muslims", across all their cultural and geographical diversity, even if we accepted they were the 7th century-obsessed monolith presented by the author? Most egregious is the constant referencing of Shahab Ahmed in support of his arguments despite that fact that his work was dedicated to challenging the very essentialism Hamid trades in.

As for the notion of the caliphate as the fulcrum of Muslim existence without which life has no true meaning, it comes straight from the pages of German and British Orientalists whose mystical belief in the dangerous power of Muslim unity produced the infamous damp squib of Ottoman "jihad" announced in 1914 at the prodding of the Kaiser, who thought he could thus activate the Muslim mind for Axis Power ends. Hamid is hardly the first to push these ideas. In  L'exception  islamique (2004) French politics professor Hamadi Redissi argues Islam is exceptional because it is the only major civilizational bloc he sees to have failed to enter modernity, even in a moderated form that would preserve traditional elements. This is because, he argues, there is no separation between religion and state, which fatally hobbled the efforts of the modernist reformers and allowed the clerics inordinate influence over society and individuals.

In Voyous: deux essais sur la raison (2003) deconstructionist philosopher Jacques Derrida saw in Islam the only religious or theocratic culture that "can still, in fact or in principle, inspire and declare any resistance to democracy", while suggesting the failure of Muslim philosophers to translate Aristotle's Politics as a possible reason.  Samuel Huntington, who Hamid also discusses, also felt that Muslims across the board were too locked in their ways for (undefined American or Western) democratic norms. This impulse to produce a unified discourse of Islam has been one of the fundamental characteristics of Western engagement with various peoples through colonialism including Arabs, Turks, Persians and Indians, all the way up to Marshall Hodgson's celebrated notion of the "Islamicate", which, as his 1974 work  The Venture of Islam stated in its subtitle, set itself the grandiose aim of describing "conscience and history in a world civilization".

The Islamic turn was never solely, or perhaps at all, an internal development in Muslim political-intellectual culture. It was poked and prodded into existence by Western powers and their regional allies (Saudi Arabia under King Faisal, Egypt under Sadat) to create a bulwark against communism and Arab nationalism. As Ian Johnson has written (A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA, and the Muslim Brotherhood in the West), three decades before the Afghan jihad, the US government State Department was hosting Muslim Brotherhood and other figures at a 1953 colloquium at Princeton University on "Islamic culture", and the CIA was subsequently primed for casting Islam and categories such as jihad as inspiration for the Arabs to fight Soviet influence. The turning point in the Arab sphere came in fact some 12 years before revolution in Iran: the moral collapse of the Nasserist project with the defeat to Israel in 1967. Secularism henceforth became a dirty word in Arab politics, and it's curious to imagine that Richard Mitchell's celebrated 1969 study of the Muslim Brotherhood (The Society of the Muslim Brothers) was seen at the time as a foray into recondite religious politics. It is similarly clear that a movement such as the Islamic State (or "ISIS") cannot be understood fully as either the result of internal political evolution or outside machination: there is a complex historical interplay between the two that must be uncovered in the telling.

That the discourse on a religion, a people or a culture could be manipulated by external agency at all rarely features in the essentializing literature on Islam today, in which Brotherhood-mired analysts like Hamid or the host of commentators on ISIS and Salafism riff around themes of violence/non-violence, peaceful/non-peaceful rebellion,  jihad yay/jihad nay. Whether Muslims are legitimated to rise or stay silent, revolt or protest politely is only ever a political opportunity away for these writers, contingent upon the analyst's interest in aligning with the shifting winds of policy and funding. Hamid is right about one thing, however: Islam, in one way or another, is indeed going to play an "outsized role in Middle East politics for the foreseeable future" and that's because, intellectual trends and political machinations being what they are, the Islamic paradigm  isn't going away anytime soon. Indeed, the role of state players in propagating and/or repressing Islamic groups has become starker today than ever, as states such as Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia extend their hand far and wide with moral and material support for their favourites. The Trump administration has indicated it will take a hostile view of the Brotherhood and its calques, but whether it regards the Salafis, despite Gulf protestations about the "quietists" among them, as little better remains to be seen.

Andrew Hammond is a doctoral candidate at St Antony's College, Oxford University, and author of Popular Culture in the Arab World (forthcoming in 2017).
2

In the Shadow of the Kingdom

Dr. Saad al-Fagih

25th January 2017

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is, to the untrained observer, a bastion of stability in a sea of turbulent revolution. But if one delves just a bit deeper, one will soon realise that it is on the cusp of a major crisis which could lead to the very  downfall of the kingdom. This is due to the disintegration of the main players that bind the kingdom together. The Ulama class which the royal family used to rely on has long been emasculated. With a senile king on the throne, it is riven by political fissures. This combined with a collapsing economy, a costly war in Yemen and confused foreign policy adventures means that the Saudi royal family is fast losing the core of its power. The royal family has for so long skilfully managed to control various components of the Saudi society and kept the Kingdom's integrity, but now due to the reckless actions of Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) this integrity is slowly but surely unravelling. Things would have continued as before had it not been for the kingdom's subjects awakening from their long slumber. Saudis are  great users of new media and live in an interconnected world that is no longer willing to accept the norm. And this is the point; Saudi citizens are no longer willing to accept the old order. As this chapter will show, all the elements are there for Saudi Arabia to undergo a major change which might lead to the collapse of the current regime.

Royal family

The royal family is the sole power broker in Saudi Arabia. They appoint high officials, shape policy and take the country in the direction they want. Whilst it is true that the Ulama, the religious classes, are still present, they have long been rendered impotent. Currently they are  appointed and sacked at will and by so doing the regime has lost an important tool to tame the people.

However, fissures and cracks within the royal family are no longer managed effectively. During the conflict between King Faisal and Saud in the 1960s the royal family resolved internal disputes in a disciplined way. Under the capable Muhammad bin Abdel Aziz, the dean of the family, the dispute was managed and he could appoint the heir incumbent. The family also kept their harmony and discipline during the era of King Khalid, Fahd and Abdullah. But this discipline has perished with the arrival of the senile King Salman on the throne. Under his kingship power has been divided between two figures; Muhammed bin Nayef (MBN) and Muhammed bin Salman (MBS). No one in the family has any greater power than the post he holds.

On paper MBN, the Crown Prince, the heir incumbent, is the most senior royal post and in theory the most powerful after the King. He fits the mould of the classic Saudi royal family member turned politician. He is shrewd and subtle and knows how to operate in the shadows. He follows a tried and tested Saudi policy. He also has considerable clout in the West due to his success in defeating Al-Qaeda in the country. And yet whilst he is in control of the Interior Ministry his remit does not extend to the economy, Foreign Ministry, national security or defence.

These briefs rest in the hands of MBS who the king in his dotage has designated his favourite. This is a typical characteristic of Alzheimer's disease sufferer: the king has showered him with important positions leading to an extraordinary accumulation of power.

MBS is ambitious to the point of recklessness. He knows that his time is limited and his fortunes depend on the longevity of the King Salman. His power can be swept away the moment MBN inherits the throne. Thus, he is on an urgent race to trump MBN and secure his position permanently before his father's demise. He knows very well that MBN will end his ambitions decisively and so is taking advantage of his royal favour.

As a result of securing his power indefinitely, he has taken dangerous decisions which have not been liked by the royal family nor the people. Example of such actions include the floating of Aramco, imposing heavy taxes and reducing salaries. MBS has completely re-jigged the Kingdom in ways it has never operated. To secure western support he has also clipped the wings of the Ulama, moving away from Islamist authority and reducing the remit of the religious police in the Kingdom. In short, to prove his "progressive credentials" he has taken on the very linchpin that secured the kingdom's authority in the first place - Islam. Indeed, he is tinkering with the raison d'être as to why the Kingdom exists.

He has also moved closer to Israel openly and secretly. In a controversial move he allowed a retired army officer, Anwar Ishqi and a team of Saudi officials to  visit Israel. He worked with the Egyptians and Israelis to turn the Tirana Straits into international waters making it easy for Israeli shipping to pass through. This is aside from the secret and unofficial meetings that he or his representatives had with the Israelis.

Thus, the royal family are faced with a dilemma, both MBN and MBS are disliked but they are leaning towards the former. In a bizarre turn of fate they are in the same situation as American voters faced with two bad choices: the recklessness of Trump or the corruption of Clinton.

If MBS goes for the throne, MBN already has a strategy in place to deal with MBS's overtures. The royal family knows very well a public confrontation between the two groups will prove to be fatal. The 'aura' of the royal family will be damaged in the eyes of its subjects and once that happens there is nothing left that can uphold the regime.

Hints of these fissures are already apparent. For example, three members of the royal family have  defected to Europe, Saud bin Sayf Al Nasr, Turki bin Bandar and Sultan bin Turki, and all three have criticised MBS's policies. Some of the criticism has been from a political and economic perspective, whilst some has been of a personal nature.

What is worse, however, is that there is not a senior royal family member who is capable of handling the crisis. Among the senior members of Abdel Aziz' sons, the only healthy ones left are Ahmed and Muqrin. The latter is politically weak due to his slave ancestry and the former is like Shakespeare's Hamlet, hesitant to take decisive action despite his effective weight in the family. All Ahmed needs to do is to declare that the King is ill and that he will be stewarding the country on his behalf but his hesitant nature does not let him do it. In summary, there is no single person who can stop the nightmarish scenario that faces the royal family.

Economy

80 to 90 percent of the Kingdom's wealth comes from oil revenue. Indeed, the kingdom has got used to high oil prices. However, when prices recently went down from 140 dollars per barrel to 70 and even 30, it came as a complete shock to the royal family.

In fairness, 8 million barrels at 50 dollars a barrel would have been sufficient for the Kingdom if you removed the kick backs to the royal family. Even five million barrels a day at low prices would suffice. But, the fact remains that the royal family is living beyond their means and needs revenue in the range of eight hundred billion riyals a year, and is currently short by four hundred billion riyals. The situation is so dire that MBS has started to raid the country's financial reserves. However, it has not been enough. Thus, MBS has also begun to borrow internally, raising taxes and selling state bonds. It is indicative of the how bad the situation has become for the Kingdom.

But perhaps the most dangerous decision taken by MBS as head of the economic board is cutting the salaries of government employees. MBS has tried to do it through the back door by cancelling the bonuses and benefits government workers enjoy (including the security services and military). These cuts constitute about forty percent in a normal wage packet, which can have massive consequences in a Saudi household.

The economic crisis is also having an impact in the private sector. The government has so far failed to pay major contractors 300 billion riyals. This has led to construction workers being laid off, and the haulage, cement and other industries related to construction being forced to make similar changes or go bankrupt. Even if some of the 300 billion is paid the damage is permanent and many  contractors will not recover.

It is, therefore, unsurprising that the stirrings of dissent have begun. People are aware and have gone on social media asking why the excessive profligacy of the royal family continues when ordinary people are facing cuts. As one  social media user asked: how can MBS buy yachts and islands in the Maldives when ordinary people are suffering from government cut backs?

One of the country's most prominent economists has made a solid critique of the economy which went viral. His use of the Kingdom's official statistics to show that one trillion riyals have disappeared has not prevented MBS from playing a game to criminalise him. But dissent is continuing and will not stop.

Yemen

In the last two years Yemen has become a major issue in the country. The Houthis in alliance with the former President Ali Saleh took over Yemen disrupting the power balance there. The Saudis accused them of being Iranian proxies and began an air campaign against them. However, their strategy went horribly wrong when the two partners that they were relying on,  Pakistan and  Egypt, refused to embark on a protracted land campaign in Yemen.

The Kingdom had also bargained on defections from the Yemeni National Army but very few did, perhaps only as few as ten percent. So instead of turning to the most reliable partner on the ground, the al-Islah movement, they relied on recruiting Yemenis in an ad-hoc manner. The Saudis are deeply suspicious of relying on Islamist movements as a means to gain ground in the region, because the success of these movements would expose the hypocritical way Al Saud uses Islam to opiate the masses so they can keep their hold on power. So the Saudis have looked elsewhere for reliable allies, at the cost of a competent fighting force ready to combat the Houthis.

To make matters worse, the UAE, an important ally in the campaign, convinced MBS to leave south Yemen to them. They were not fighting the Houthis, but by  collaboration with the separatist Al-Hirak movement, effectively separated south Yemen. This separation is contrary to the very aim of the campaign and a very unpopular objective. In the meantime the Saudis are stuck in the  Yemeni quagmire, fearful of the very real threat of Houthi border incursions into Saudi territory.

Popular support for the campaign in Yemen has virtually disappeared in the Kingdom. The suspicious action by the Emiratis, the threat of invasion by a seemingly ragtag army able to manage their areas of control better, Jizan and Najran coming under threat, and now a Yemeni famine conveyed in shocking images; the situation has become an embarrassment for the ruling elite and MBS is being blamed.

The other side effect of the Yemen war is a revival of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). They have  exploited the chaos, recruited more people and confiscated huge amounts of weapons. Although they abandoned two cities recently these moves were tactical withdrawals with almost no loss of fighters. They have learned a lot from their mistakes and are now acting with more caution, exploiting the hegemony of the Emiratis in south Yemen against Islamists and preparing themselves to be the saviours.

Foreign relations

Despite the public outcry that the Saudis are supporting ISIS the truth is far from it. Saudi policy has always been in line with US policy and has remained thus ever since the Iraqi invasion in the 1990s. Examples include the Saudi's full and unconditional support of the twelve year US embargo of Iraq, and again later upon the invasions of  Afghanistan and Iraq. All the Saudi's resources - land, air, military bases, ports, oil and money - were made available to the Americans.

It is a misjudgment to think that Saudi-American relations are waning. In terms of realpolitik, the US needs to control the oil in order to secure its 'petrodollars'. The US wants the dollar to stay as the reference international currency and there is no better way to secure that than to peg it to petrol. Being the most important commodity in the world petrol is very efficient in that regard. With its mounting national debt, the US economy  needs help from the petrodollar to maintain the dollar's supremacy.

Geopolitically, controlling Saudi Arabia and the Gulf means that the US controls a  substantial portion of the world's oil production and hence world energy. That essentially makes them the major powerbroker in the world, able to hold Asia and Europe to ransom if they so wish since both are heavily reliant on Gulf oil for their industrial needs.

The US also recognises the influence of the two holy cities on the imagination of the Muslim world. With its economic and spiritual resources Saudi Arabia could be an Islamic powerhouse with the potential to become a world superpower through mobilising Muslims using this unique combination. This is dangerous to US interests in general and to the security of Israel specifically, and so such an eventuality has to be prevented.

The only way to achieve that is to make sure that the rulers of Saudi Arabia are totally under US control. This can happen only if the rulers are authoritarian, secretive and corrupt. Authoritarian because any domestic power sharing will erode obedience to US. Secretive so its shadowy trade deals and political machinations cannot be exposed and stoke anger against the ruling class. Corrupt as an uncorrupted dictator would be difficult to manipulate and hence cannot serve US interests.

These three elements can only exist in the shape of Al Saud, so Al Saud and the USA become intrinsically tied to one another, whatever the US administration. The US then is left with no choice but to put its eggs in this basket, which is why Bandar bin Sultan and indeed Adel al Jubeir said regarding the US elections that whoever takes office, Republican or Democrat, once (s)he is made aware of the private relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia (s)he will decide to support us.

If the Trump administration breaks this tradition, turns isolationist and withdraws US forces from the Middle East altogether, this will be a major concern for Al Saud.

Nonetheless, the Saudi obsession with pleasing the Americans has lead to their policy in Iraq and Syria becoming confused and backfiring. They intend to limit Iranian hegemony whilst their actions are facilitating it. This is because they have never developed a comprehensive strategic foreign policy based purely on national interest.

More broadly, Al Saud  does not wish the Arab Spring to succeed, nor do they want any Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood to  rise to power because both would undermine their legitimacy. Thus, in Egypt, Al Saud are keen on supporting President Sisi and his generals. So keen in fact that they are even prepared to make unguarded statements to that effect. Recently the Saudi ambassador stated that the Kingdom's support to Egypt is such that they would fund it in spite of its own deficit. What is remarkable here is that the internal plan of Al Saud to combat the Arab Springs movements have become so public. The Kingdom's immense support for Egypt slowed down only when President Sisi started expressing support for Damascus and Tehran.

The Saudi public

Since the Gulf War the Saudi public has become increasingly aware of the direction the Kingdom is taking. The rise of opposition groups followed by the the birth of satellite news heralded a new awareness of politics which mushroomed with the internet and social media. Saudi citizens are world leaders in their consumption of social media and it has provided them with an avenue to express themselves unlike anything in the past.

Over the years the position of the public has gradually shifted from complete wholehearted approval of the political system to frank resentment. Until recently people would tolerate the regime, even though they are discontented, in the belief that the royal family is at least an umbrella providing unity for the country. But with the economic crisis now entering every home and MBS's reckless policies threatening the unity, safety and integrity of their country, resentment is growing and people are becoming bolder in how they express their feelings.

Despite immense disappointment and anger with the government, the psychological barrier has not been broken yet. This is evidenced by the huge number of anonymous [pseudonym] accounts on social media venting their opposition to the Kingdom. Only a few dare use their real names to make bold and open opposition statements.

Saudis have very little political experience so it takes time for public discontent to manifest itself. There is a lack of political organisation to translate public grievances into action. Nevertheless unless the Kingdom changes direction drastically, clandestine opposition activity will gather momentum and start to surface very soon, as is the zeitgeist around the world.

Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia and other Opposition Groups

Opposition groups in the kingdom used to cover a wide spectrum, from the most militant groups like ISIS, to the most moderate, like the ِِِSaudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA). The regime succeeded in undermining popular support for militant groups and it performed a comprehensive crackdown on ACPRA and similar groups, imprisoning all their activists.

All that remains from this spectrum of opposition groups is the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) and a few other individual opposition activists, all in exile. These individuals are active, popular and influential, but their activity is limited to criticism of the regime's oppression and corruption in the media. MIRA on the other hand operates on a different scale in terms of its program, history and size.

Established in 1996, MIRA aims at a comprehensive political change, meaning power sharing, accountability, transparency, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Whilst its ideals are viewed by the West as the normal aims of any nation state, MIRA is viewed by the both the people and regime as revolutionary. MIRA's methods are peaceful and rely heavily on the media, communication and occasionally public civil action to galvanise the people, highlight the need for change, and push for it.

Although MIRA is based in London, its real presence is inside the country. The movement consists of a network of activists whose levels of commitment varies from loose affiliation and sympathy, to active participatory membership. Almost every citizen knows of MIRA, and few disagree with its message. Most are sympathetic. Although the number of 'card carrying members' is small, they are influential, and the number of latent or passive supporters are probably in their millions.

Using technology and the media to initiate change, MIRA's strategy is firstly to raise awareness of the crisis in the country, a crisis for which the regime must bear total responsibility. The second stage is the solution:  a complete reform program which is in no way compatible with the continuation of the royal family.

MIRA has succeeded in achieving its primary goals of raising political awareness. It is now working on the second and final stage of its programme: bringing about change.

Risks to the Saudi regime

Currently, the biggest risks to the Kingdom are the following:

\- The dispute between MBN and MBS. A sudden eruption or a Mexican stand-off between the two in public will result in the psychological aura of invincibility of the regime being shattered and that will open the door to civil unrest or revolution. Once it has been unleashed, neither the religious classes nor the US will be able to intervene to control it; the former is impotent and the latter will be seen as an invader ready to install another puppet.

\- The economic crisis is causing many business insolvencies. Deepening unemployment and a failure to pay salaries could lead to civil unrest. The failure of the royal family to stop their confiscation of much of the public revenue and their massive squandering makes it impossible for the regime to persuade the public to accept austerity measures.

\- There is a renewed risk of violence from, and new public support for, jihadi groups inside the Kingdom. The threat from jihadi groups was contained in the Kingdom in 2000s, the regime was able to galvanise public support against the jihadists. Whilst the threat of sleeper cells is real, they are neither strong enough to change public opinion nor constitute an existential threat to the regime. That is unless economic grievances come increasingly to the fore or the royal family commitment to Islamic values is irreparably compromised. If this happens it will refuel these radical groups and their activities inside the Kingdom.

\- In Yemen, despite the failures of Saudi policy the situation is still relatively under control. The Houthis will not advance into Jizan or Najran for fear of angering the US, but if they should throw caution to the wind and proceed it will shatter the myth that the regime is protecting the people and their fate will be similar to that of the Romanov dynasty. If the conflict continues it will drain already limited resources. Any peace can only be achieved through concessions which will at best humiliate the royal family and in the worst case undermine them.

\- AQAP has the potential to gain a foothold in Yemen and then use it as a bridgehead to target the royal family. If AQAP is shrewd and realises that they should concentrate on hitting only the royal family not civilians it could see a surge in popularity. The opposite is of course also true.

\- Arguably ISIS only becomes a problem if the current campaign in Mosul and Raqqa fails. ISIS was initially popular in the Kingdom due to being perceived as the only defenders of Sunnis in Iraq. However, when they turned to brutality against their fellow Sunnis their support diminished. Regionally ISIS is contained and unlikely to reappear in the Kingdom in the way for example the Pakistani Taliban have done in Pakistan.

What should Western policymakers do?

The problem for Western powers is that they have put all their money on the royal family, although admittedly Europe has been slightly more cautious. Nevertheless, there is not a single Western government that considers a collapse of the Saudi regime a possibility. They believe that the Saudi regime is capable of containing the royal family dispute, absorbing the economic crisis and preventing any uprising whether peaceful or violent. In short, they expect the regime to stay in power indefinitely. Consequently, they have not prepared for its collapse nor the consequences which will inevitably have repercussions for Western countries both economically and in terms of security.

Western media and academia has compounded this misunderstanding by focusing ignorantly on myths such as that the Kingdom is promoting Wahhabism and promoting ISIS. These widespread falsehoods force Western governments to act in ways which do not reflect the current reality. Instead, what Western governments should do is, realising the gravity of the above-mentioned threats and the rising political awareness and resentment of the people, consider striking a new bargain with the people and not with Al Saud. That effectively means opening channels with influential groups, whether inside the country or opposition outside, and taking stock of the real situation on the ground. If they do this, it will pave the way for Western countries to play a constructive role in facilitating peaceful change in Arabia with minimal chaos for all parties involved.

Dr Saad Alfagih is the leading Saudi opposition figure. A surgeon by profession, he is currently the head of the opposition group, Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia.

3

In Anticipation of the Next Cycle of Arab Revolutions

_Azzam Tamimi_

3rd February 2017

I had just been appointed a senior lecturer at the UK-based Markfield Institute of Higher Education in the autumn of 2000 when the newly appointed director, Dr. Zaghlul Al-Najjar, summoned me to his office. He spent the first few days of his tenure in office acquainting himself with the academic staff. On that day, it was my turn.

After a few introductory remarks, he handed a copy of my CV over to me and said: "I want you to correct the mistakes in it and then bring it back to me." Curiously, I flipped through the few CV pages only to find that he had crossed with red ink every single "Middle East" phrase within my CV. Politely, I asked him: "But what is wrong with the Middle East?" He said: "It does not exist, it never existed."

This, at the time, seemed like a joke. For how could I change the title of my book "Islam and Secularism in the Middle East" or change the titles of some of my papers as well as of the many conferences and seminars I organised or attended? However, the rejectionist sentiment expressed by Dr. Al-Najjar, who is not a political scientist anyway, is shared by many activists and intellectuals of his generation who regard the Middle East a colonial invention. For them, it expressed the vision of the colonial powers of a region that was, for centuries, until the onset of colonialism the very heart of the Ummah, the Muslims' global community.

In as much as the creation of the Middle East was the  product of a change in the global and regional balances of power, another historic change could, indeed, lead to the disappearance of this category and the emergence of a new reality.

The struggle for undoing what colonialism did to this region never ceased. However, reform and national liberation projects aimed at accomplishing this objective have mostly reached a dead end. Reversing the process that saw the creation and consolidation of the mosaic of modern territorial states across the region proved to be a formidable, even near impossible, task.

The elites governing these territorial states seemed to inherit from the colonial powers their contempt for the populations under their rule. Most of these post-colonial entities, notwithstanding the claims of independence, ended up being some sort of feudal properties exclusively owned by Mafias, whether dynasties or some military juntas, that seized absolute control of almost all material and human resources.

As the ruling classes grew richer and richer the ruled, especially in densely populated states, grew poorer and poorer. Dissent, or mere criticism, was always suppressed and brutally punished. The majority of prison populations consisted of political activists and opponents. The two most common features across much of the Arab despotic Middle East were corruption and lack of respect for basic human rights.

When the Arab uprising of 2011 succeeded in bringing down four dictators who tormented their populations for decades in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and seemed to threaten so many others, hopes were raised that a new order was perhaps in the making. Jubilant masses took to the streets in many other places in the hope of bringing about similar changes to their own communities, sending alarm bells ringing in the palaces of horrified kings and presidents. A new Middle East seemed to be in the making.

How would such a new Middle East have looked like?

Well, to start with governments would have been representative of the people and government functions and institutions would have been supervised by, and checked and made accountable to, elected parliaments. There was absolutely no need to reinvent the wheel; representative democracy had already been in place and functioning fairly well for centuries in the West. Indeed, this was what Egypt and Tunisia headed for. Had democratic transition in those two countries been successful and complete, other entities in the region would have enthusiastically followed their example.

Imagine for a minute what would have happened had the three neighbouring countries Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, who had just rid themselves of their dictators, been fully democratic. The people of Algeria next door, followed most probably by Morocco and Mauritania, would have not settled for anything less. One can easily imagine, from then onwards, that the peoples of those 'democracies' would have wanted their representative governments to remove the obstacles that were put in place by defunct dictatorships and that for so many decades limited freedom of movement and divided with artificial lines drawn in the sand by the old colonial powers a people who to a large extent spoke the same language, shared the same heritage, hailed from the same ancestry and followed the same religion. One could easily envisage that, within few years, confederations, or federations, or even full unions, would have formed.

Moving to the Arab east, and using a similar intellectual exercise, imagine what would have happened had Syria and Yemen, both of which rose after Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, had become democracies. The young and educated in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the in rest of the ultra-rich Gulf 'principalities' would have not settled for anything less than genuine political reform, to say the least. It is no wonder that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the State of Kuwait paid billions of dollars to fund the Egyptian army's coup against the nascent regime and the arrest of democratic transformation not only in Egypt but also in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen.

Looking farther into the more distant future, had democratic transition been successful, one could envisage the creation of what might have become known as the United States of the Middle East, a formidable power with enormous resources, both human and material, and with considerable potential.

The impact of such transformation would have been unprecedented. It would have been no less significant and history-making than the American and the French revolutions. The emergence of such a magnificent regional power would have immediately put an end to Iranian expansionist and imperial ambitions in the region. It is no wonder that Iran, which today has a regime that claims to have been itself the product of a popular revolution against tyranny, was a staunch opponent of the popular Arab Spring revolutions. The emerging power would not have just been more genuinely democratic but it would have also been Sunni. It would have had the immediate impact of inciting the oppressed peoples of Iran, many of whom happen to be Sunnis or Arab Shiites, to rise and seek emancipation from a Shiite theocracy disguised as some kind of 'democracy'. Iran's endeavour to self-promote as the model for the oppressed peoples of Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East to follow would have been dealt a fatal blow. The emergence of a successful Sunni democratic model would have signalled the beginning of the end of the self-proclaimed role of global Muslim leadership by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On another front, the emerging new regional power would, for the first time since Israel was created in Palestine in 1948, radically tilt the balance in the chronic Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or what used to be referred to in the old days as the Arab-Israeli conflict, in favour of the Palestinians. Arab unilateral peace treaties concluded with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians and without the consent of the Arab populations would, out of necessity, be revisited. It is no wonder that Israel seemed most concerned when the Egyptian people delivered to power, through the ballot box, a leader belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and why it seemed most pleased when the Egyptian military toppled him in a bloody coup that almost fatally crushed the Islamic group.

So, the success of the Arab uprising would have eventually delivered a Middle East that is free from despotism, free from Iranian influence, free from division and free from Israeli occupation.

The 3 July 2013 military coup against the first democratically elected civilian president in the history of Egypt brought to an end what felt like a sweet dream. Since then, the Middle East has been living through a nightmare.

One may produce a list of reasons why the Arab Spring revolutions ended up in a mess. The most obvious reason has been the counterrevolution. The deep state, representing the interests of individuals and groups that were likely to lose as a result of change and reform, joined hands with regional powers and players, such as Iran, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, that were  horrified at the prospect of democratisation succeeding in the neighbourhood as well as with some world powers, such as the United States, the EU and Russia, that feared the rise of Islamic groups to power via the ballot box. While the  Russian attitude was not surprising, the betrayal of Middle East democracy by the world's leading democracy in the West was scandalous.

Not only did this alliance bring to a standstill the dynamic that promised a better future; in fact, it contributed directly to the empowerment of the most radical elements within Middle Eastern societies and to the radicalisation of a large numbers of young men and women who swelled the ranks of ISIS. (From Deep State to Islamic State, The Arab Counter-Revolution and its Jihadi Legacy by Jean-Pierre Filiu; OUP, 2015.)

So far, the cost has been astronomical.  Much of Syria is in ruin and nearly half of its population has been displaced internally or forced into exile.

The sectarian conflicts in Iraq and Yemen are pulling both countries toward the same abyss. Libya is already divided and is having its own 'light' civil wars while Egypt, which is being  led by the coup authorities from one disaster into another, has never been worse.

The countries that  funded the counterrevolution and contributed to the mess are showing signs of strain too. This is particularly true in the case of Saudi Arabia, which squandered billions over a series of misadventures from Egypt to Yemen forcing it to impose austerity measures on its own population at home.

Indeed, today, the mayhem prevails across the region and the crisis is only likely to grow deeper for a while. The war on terrorism has invariably only begotten more terrorism and is only destined to generate more of the same so long as political and economic reform is non-existent. All signs indicate that the Middle East will never be the same.

Yet, sometime soon – perhaps in a few years or at most in a decade or two – the next cycle of revolutions will begin. Revolutions that change the course of history usually come in cycles and achieve their objectives when their successive cycles manage to change not only regional and global balances of power but also the mindset and attitude of the people concerned.

Despite the heavy blow suffered by mainstream Islamic movements across the Arab world, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, they continue to be the most credible and most popular political parties in the Middle East. Leftist, nationalist and liberal opposition groups that initially identified with the Arab Spring and cheered on as its revolutions erupted one after the other  soon afterwards jumped ship and joined the counterrevolution when it became apparent to them that free and fair elections were being won by the Islamists in one country after the other.

The repressive measures used to marginalise or exclude the Islamists have always succeeded only briefly. It does not usually take long before they come back and rise once more. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who won the presidential elections and the parliamentary elections in 2012 were previously almost completely annihilated twice, in 1954 and in 1965, by Egypt's former military dictator Gamal Abd Al-Nassir. As they bounced back several times before, they will bounce back again simply because their persecution and their steadfastness coupled with their moderate and tolerant interpretation of Islam only add to their credibility and popularity.

The counterrevolution has now all but been fully exposed for what it is, even to many of those who were deluded by it. Wherever one travels in the Middle East today, nothing, not even terrorism, supersedes people's concern about the deterioration in living conditions and the deepening crises at all levels. Many people see terrorism as an outcome rather than a cause whereas they believe the source of all evils to be despotism.

There is one obvious reason why change is inevitable and is definitely on its way. The counterrevolution has  made things much worse than what they used to be when the Arab Spring revolutions erupted.

The pressure cooker will once again explode and a new generation of young men and women will take to the streets to resume the dynamic. Just like before, they will look for leadership and will find it nowhere but with those who have been truthful to the cause, those who paid with their lives and wealth, in order to bring about a new Arab dawn.

Azzam Tamimi is a British Palestinian writer on Islamic affairs. His books include: Power-Sharing Islam, 1993; Islamic & Secularism in the Middle East, 2000; Rachid Ghannouchi a Democrat within Islamism, 2001; and Hamas Unwritten Chapters, 2007.

4

Translating the Informal into the Formal

George Joffé

15th February 2017

I have spent a large part of my professional career observing the more formal end of the political process, particularly in connection with foreign policy issues in the European Union and the Middle East. In that domain, the issue of the informal – the way in which public opinion or civil society manages to influence formal policy outcomes – is rarely overtly recognised. It is, as it were, the spectre at the feast, whether as initiatives from civil society or as 'Track II' diplomacy, a ghostly presence which is consciously ignored, even if sub-consciously it influences outcomes.

In the context of the European Union, that may not be so surprising, given the complexity of the process of policy-making there. After all, inter-governmentalism, externalisation and subsidiarity leave little room for civil society initiatives, even if European normative values involve a conventional recognition of their formal importance. Beyond that, the elevation of the Union's common foreign and security policy into the proprietary realm of the European External Action Service in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon distances policy formation and articulation even further from direct democratic engagement, despite the dreams of the neo-functionalists. It is this sense of popular irrelevance to policy formation, no doubt, that drives a large part of the growing disenchantment with the European project.

As far as the Middle East is concerned, the picture is far less clear although it is quite evident that public disenchantment with the outcomes of formal policy lay behind the Obama administration's desire to disengage from Middle Eastern affairs, even if, in practice, this was to prove to be extremely difficult to do. In a similar way, Europe's acute anxiety over the migrant and refugee crisis is an equally acute reflection of the concerns of European statesmen over public reaction to the realities of absorption and integration of non-European minorities into the European body politic and social. Yet there have, in the past, been occasions when informal engagement has directly and positively influenced formal policy-making, even if the final outcome has not fulfilled the hopes and ambitions spurred by the initiative itself.

Israel and the PLO

One such example, it seems to me, is provided by the negotiating process between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1993, after the American initiative at Madrid in October 1991 and Washington thereafter, in the wake of the expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait, had failed so comprehensively. Although in the end the initiative itself also failed with the collapse last year of the Oslo Process, it did initially represent a surprising breakthrough in what had been a barren confrontation over the previous fifty-five years. Equally surprisingly, it was based on what was, in effect, interfaith dialogue – albeit between secularist Israeli intellectuals and their Palestinian counterparts, mediated by Norwegian academics – although interfaith dialogue had proceeded for years before between the two sides and between Jews and Palestinians in Europe without apparent success.

The real point of this engagement was that it did eventually produce a pathway from interfaith dialogue to formal diplomatic agreement and an outcome from which, in dialectical fashion, formal policy could be constructed. As such, therefore, it should provide pointers as to how the links between the informal and formal negotiating processes can be forged. And its failure, too, may tell us something about why such transitions are so difficult to achieve successfully for, as T.S. Eliot has told us, "In my beginning is my end." I would, therefore, like to take a little time to examine how those negotiations took place to see what general lessons we can extract from them about how informal discussions can result in formal diplomatic outcomes – or not, as the case may be!

The initial contacts arose from a household survey that the Norwegian foreign affairs institute, FAFO, had been conducting on the West Bank. Its researchers discussed informally with a group of Israeli academics ways in which the failing American-led negotiations in Washington between Israeli diplomats and Palestinian representatives could be revived. It is, perhaps, important to note that failure there was a consequence of several factors which illustrate the dangers of formal diplomacy! Firstly, the basic principles for negotiation had been laid out at a conference in the Carter Center in Atlanta in April 1990, the first flush of the impending end of the Cold War. There it had been concluded that the United States was the only power capable of bringing Arab and Israeli negotiators together to resolve the long-standing crisis in the Middle East but that only the actual parties to the dispute could properly decide its outcome.

That was a principle that the Clinton administration, newly arrived in office, chose to ignore by trying to impose its own vision of what the outcome should be on the negotiators. Its mistake was compounded by another, namely that the negotiations took place in the full glare of public scrutiny, thereby ensuring that delegates to them enunciated maximalist positions from which they could not subsequently resile. There had been a further, understandable error in the way in which the original negotiations had been constructed, in that, at Israeli insistence, the PLO had been deliberately excluded from them. That had meant that, in the context of the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (there were two other negotiating tracks as well – bilateral Israeli/Arab state relations and multilateral negotiations between states on regional issues), the Palestinian representatives from the Occupied Territories (the only Palestinians with whom Israel was prepared to engage – Palestinians in the wider diaspora being completely excluded) eventually took their direction from the PLO in Tunis in order to ensure a cohesive Palestinian position.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the ground was implicitly prepared for an informal alternative and, even though the participants in that separate initiative may not have been consciously faith-based, their objective locations paralleled those of the endless interfaith dialogues of the past. On the Israeli side, the initial discussions were led by Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik who engaged, first, with Mariana Heiberg, the leading Norwegian researcher for FAFO in the West Bank, who was married to Johan Jørgen Holst, then Norwegian defence minister. She then facilitated contacts with interested Palestinians who also had access to the PLO leadership in Tunis. Each side was able to convince its political leaders that more formal but secret negotiations might offer a path to the success that had eluded the formal negotiators in Washington, with the result that such negotiations did begin. The Norwegian role was vital because, unlike the United States, those directly in charge of the process – Terje Rød-Larsen, the director of FAFO, and Monica Jul from the Norwegian foreign ministry – did not attempt to dictate an agenda but simply provided neutral, secret and secure venues in which the two sides could engage in confidence.

Ironically enough, in that lay the weaknesses of the initiative which would ultimately destroy it, for the negotiating process involved yet another principle of asymmetric negotiation, as Johan Jørgen Holst, by then the Norwegian foreign minister in charge of the negotiating process, pointed out in a prviate communication. This was that, in any negotiation, it is the weaker side that must be prepared to make concessions to the stronger, in order to persuade the latter that the negotiating process in itself would be a worthwhile undertaking. In the Oslo process, this meant that although Israeli negotiators came fully supported by teams of experts, the Palestinians were denied such support at Israeli insistence so that their chief negotiators, Abu Ala and Hassan Asfour, lacked access to appropriate expertise. This was, of course, to prove the truth of T.S. Eliot's insight, for, in that asymmetry, lay the cause of the eventual collapse of the Oslo process itself. That collapse may have taken a long time to achieve, but it was probably an ineluctable consequence of the way in which the negotiating process itself had evolved.

Implications and consequences

This narrative, it seems to me, highlights some of the massive problems in opening up formal diplomatic negotiation to meaningful informal 'Track II' participation. I think that there are at least nine issues, which are often interrelated, that need to be considered. These we could label professionalization, process, empathy, ownership, access, engagement, asymmetry, secrecy and trust:

1) Professionalization: Chronic unresolved issues in international relations have a tendency to generate endless debate at both the formal and informal levels. Over time, however, the two levels become increasingly isolated from one another and the informal dimension is progressively marginalised as practitioners and commentators take over. These 'professionals' are not just diplomats but increasingly include think-tank communities and academic networks in which the issue generates an endless round of discussion, rather than practical attempts at its resolution. I have bitter-sweet memories of precisely these issues in an academic network in Europe and the Mediterranean which I helped to manage on behalf of the European Union in the first decade of this century. Discussions over the Israeli-Palestinian peace process eventually led one frustrated participant to demand, "Just do the deal, we'll sort out the problems afterwards!" Nobody, of course, was prepared endorse such an undiplomatic approach.

2) Process: This marginalisation, in turn, generates a further blockage to practical resolution, for the process of professional discussion, in itself, gradually substitutes for the political issue seeking some pragmatic, practical outcome. It becomes, in short, an end-in-itself. I have sat through – even organised – repeated discussions and analyses over the years of, for example, the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian disputes, conducted by professionals and academics, without ever seeing any real progress towards practical outcomes but after each meeting, the participants have either congratulated each other on 'clearing the air' or on furthering their understanding whilst those directly affected are merely depressed by the inevitable lack of progress.

3) Empathy: One of the most common reasons for this lack of progress is a lack of empathy on both sides of the table; ironically enough, informal engagement, such as inter-faith dialogue, is intended to counter precisely this problem although, in my experience, it rarely succeeds. There are good reasons for this at both the formal and informal levels. One is a kind of mutual incomprehension, arising from the fact that the narratives enunciated by each side are often mutually contradictory and are, therefore, rejected since each narrative threatens the other, as Zionism and Palestinian nationalism demonstrate so clearly. There is rarely sufficient empathy on either side for the opposing narrative to be recognised as legitimate, even if it could not be accepted, so compromise, in itself, becomes impossible as it would endanger the credibility of each narrative. At the formal level, such mutual rejection becomes political as any concession is perceived to mark a weakening in the validity of the claims being pursued.

4) Ownership: One of the major reasons for excluding the informal level of engagement in conflict resolution is that, as the negotiating process becomes institutionalised, so it becomes a 'possession' of those engaged in it. As a result, other potential contributors are excluded from it for they would threaten proprietary control. It is an issue that is a particular vice of the professional! I well remember an occasion when academic advice was offered to British ministers over the consequences of an invasion of Iraq, advice that was comprehensively ignored despite its accuracy, largely because those who proffered it were not part of the in-group controlled by government! And the Quartet Initiative, designed to save the Arab-Israeli peace process, was comprehensively discredited for Palestinians when Tony Blair became its principal representative.

5) Access: This is a problem which is related to the previous point. It is extremely difficult for the informal level of debate over conflict resolution to gain access to the formal level in order to influence it. This difficulty of access increases in direct proportion to the degree of professionalization to which the process of conflict resolution has been exposed. It is also intensified by the depth of ownership felt by the professional participants in the process, particularly if the process has tended to become an end-in-itself. Thus, Warren Christopher, the then secretary-of-state who had known beforehand about the Norwegian track which paralleled the formal Washington negotiations but believed that it was condemned to irrelevance, was stupefied to learn of its success in late August 1993 largely because, in his eyes, valid negotiations could only occur in the formal negotiating arena. President Clinton, however, who was intensely politically aware, responded by embracing the Oslo Process and converting it into an American triumph in the White House rose-garden, although he, too, was to come unstuck some seven years later in the Camp David II negotiations!

6) Engagement: The primary reason for his failure was that, having embraced an informal process, he tried to 'own' it and tailor its outcomes to his own political ends. Thus, anxious to crown his presidency with a successful conclusion to the Palestinian issue, he sought to compel Yasir Arafat into concessions that the Palestinian leader knew would not be acceptable to his own constituency. When he refused, he was then publicly blamed for the failure, even though he had warned the president of the 'red-lines' he could not cross beforehand and had extracted a promise that he would not be blamed if the negotiations failed.

7) Asymmetry: Although the Camp David negotiations were hardly an example of the relationship between informal and formal levels of negotiations, they did highlight a problem that had bedevilled the linkages between the two since the original Oslo negotiations. It is a problem that seemingly contradicts the principle that the weak must concede to the strong in order to persuade the latter to negotiate at all, for such asymmetry can fatally weaken any agreement unless there are gate-keepers who can ensure that excessive concessions are not made. This is, in essence, what the United States has consistently failed to do but it also reflects one of the dangers of informal 'Track II' diplomacy for, there, such concessions are far more difficult to police without betraying another negotiating principle, namely that the gate-keeper must not try to determine the substance of negotiation.

8) Secrecy: We have seen the consequences of publicity in maximising demands and minimising compromise in the Washington peace process in the early 1990s, so the security offered by secrecy to the negotiating process seems the obvious alternative. However, that too has its dangers for, under the cloak of secrecy, concessions can be made that would fatally weaken the final outcome, particularly if the negotiations take place at the informal level.

9) Trust: In some ways, this seems the most unlikely condition for success, for trust is what is essentially lacking in any dispute. Indeed, Bill Zartman argues that success only comes when both parties are locked in a 'mutually-hurting stalemate' – hardly a recipe for trust! Yet, without a modicum of belief that both sides want a solution and believe that their opponent does too, success will be elusive, if not impossible. Nor can coercion compensate for its lack, not least if one of the partners to the dispute believes that the allegedly coercive third party ultimately lacks the ability to make coercion effective. That, after all, is the situation that bedevilled John Kerry's herculean yet vain attempts to push Israel along the tack to a two-state solution.

The future

Many of these issues, of course, apply to any negotiating process, whether formal or informal and perhaps the most important of them – and one that can best be fostered by its informal dimension – is the issue of empathy. The imaginative acceptance of an opponent's narrative without adopting it as one's own makes it possible to see what concessions could and should be made for the negotiating process to succeed. And that is something for which informal negotiating is ideally suited for, in theory at least, nothing is vested in a formal political outcome. And, as such, it can set the scene for formal diplomacy by establishing the terms under which the latter should proceed.

Sadly, it seems unlikely that such an approach will not be tried in the near future, with respect to the stagnant Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, at least, even though, quietly, some Arab states have begun to court informal links with Israel and might, therefore, be thought to be potential facilitators. The Trump administration seems to believe that all that is required is a 'great deal' achieved by a skilled commercial negotiator, such as Mr Trump's son-in-law, despite the fact that he supports the more extreme aspects of Israel's settlement programme, as does the Trump administration itself – hardly a basis for empathy or trust. If the president is right, then fifty years of familiarity with the intricacies of formal and informal diplomacy will have been rendered comprehensively irrelevant. And, if he is wrong, he will, no doubt, blame the Palestinians for not making the calamitous compromises inherent in the construction of the 'great deal'. We shall see!

George Joffé researches and teaches the international relations of the Middle East and North Africa at the University of Cambridge.

5

The US, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf

David B Roberts

2nd March 2017

'Beginnings are sudden, but also insidious. They creep up on you sideways, they keep to the shadows, they lurk unrecognized. Then, later, they spring.'

Margaret Atwood, The Blind Assassin

It is a miracle that the US-Saudi relationship has survived this long. The enduring nature of this relationship is an ode to the realist school of international relations and a triumph of realpolitik overcoming cavernous differences in the very nature of state, society, religion, politics, international relations, and outlook. Initially bound together in a fraught oil-for-security pact, the elites in the two states remained reluctantly but enduringly committed to upholding their ends of the relationship. But reality has increasingly intruded. The 10th September 2001 will likely come to mark the zenith of the bilateral relationship. The pertinent question now is how fast the inexorable deterioration of relations is and how relations may settle to a new norm more reflective of their polar opposite realities.

Trade Trumping Values

Since the meeting of Saudi and US leaders on the evocatively named Great Bitter Lake in Egypt in 1945, the two states have been umbilically linked together. In the early years, the US was interested in the increasingly large oil deposits found in the Kingdom. From a situation of significant self-sufficiency at the beginning of the 20th century, foreign supplies were increasingly required as the 1940s and 1950s wore on, driven primarily by the exigencies of World War Two and then burgeoning numbers of personal motor vehicles. Worried that the UK would use its long-standing regional relations in the Gulf to sew up the markets, the US sought a relationship of exclusivity with Saudi Arabia. When the scale of oil deposits in the wider region became ever more apparent in the 1950s, Saudi Arabia became yet more important. With the US entanglements in Vietnam of the 1960s and 1970s, deploying significant forces to the Persian Gulf was politically impossible and resulted in the Nixon Doctrine: fostering a reliance on Iran and Saudi Arabia to secure the region. Indeed, the US was forced to act swiftly by the UK's 1968 decision to retire 'East of Suez' by 1971, leaving – from the US perspective – a potentially worrisome security vacuum in the region.

The two states were fortified with astonishing amounts of US arms and equipment. By 1975, over 45% of worldwide US arms exports was going to the Gulf,  compared to only 10% in 1970. But more than mere arms shipments, the US relationship with Saudi Arabia in particular revolved around equipping the state with a modern military infrastructure. Part of this referred to equipping and training the Saudi military: approximately 70% of worldwide US government and civilian contractors linked to sales and commercial exports under the Arms Control Export Act  were based in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, by 1977, the US Army Engineers Corps was in line to undertake work valued at approximately $500bn in 2016 dollars. They were, in effect,  building from the ground up military cities and bases to international standards.

Despite such close relations, Saudi leaders were abidingly concerned that the depth of the US role remain as unseen as possible, such was the unpopularity of the US with domestic Saudi audiences. The US close relations with Israel were, unsurprisingly, a key bone of contention. Other local elites in Saudi Arabia  actually feared US motives. Henry Kissinger had alluded to taking control of the oil fields in Saudi's eastern provinces years before should Saudi-US bilateral relations deteriorate significantly; something that was only exacerbated by the US's build-up of forces in Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, and (albeit to a smaller degree) in Bahrain. Nevertheless, closer relations were incrementally boosted despite these contradictions and issues.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution ruined this modus operandi with the US's core regional ally becoming avowedly hostile to US interests and allies in the region. At the same time, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. This showcased the USSR's enormous airlift capacity and wider ability to deploy 20 divisions in its near-abroad. Now its forces were only 800 miles from the Persian Gulf, while US forces were 7000 miles away. Also forgotten today is that this was but one example (albeit by far the largest of its type) of a wider era of Soviet expansion, which included regional discussions, agreements and anchorages as in Aden (with up to 12 submarine pens), a large floating dock on Socotra Island off Southern Yemen and other potential bases in Madagascar, the Maldives, on the islands of Dahlak, which since Eritrean independence from Ethiopia in 1993 have belonged to Eritrea, and Perim which belongs to Yemen.

The US responded with the Carter Doctrine, a promise to secure the Gulf region from external aggression. Backfilling this promise with US capability proved to be essentially impossible. Concepts of a 'Rapid Deployment Force' were mooted in the US, but the US-Israeli relationship was, as ever, deeply unpopular and riled local Gulf populations to the point where Gulf states refused to entertain any serious US basing requests. Moreover, given that the US had just shown itself unwilling or unable to stand by a critical regional ally – Iran – Gulf leaders wondered as to the benefits of closer US relations.

Security Trumping Values

Today, of course, we are used to seeing cheek-by-jowl relations between the Arab Gulf monarchies and the US. The region has, for a quarter of a century, been festooned with military bases all-but given over to the use of western allies like the US. While the monarchies seldom advertised these bases – one could live in Kuwait or Qatar and have essentially no interaction with or knowledge of the (at times) tens of thousands of western troops based a few kilometres up the road – the cat of close military-to-military relations has long been out of the bag.

The pressing need for more direct US military assistance grew throughout the 1980s. The need for the re-flagging of oil tankers was an important step towards normalizing the presence of US warships in the Gulf. Though monarchies feared the domestic reactions of their citizens, they feared more a serious escalation of the Iran-Iraq War and continued attacks on their lifeblood: oil exports by tanker. Then, but a few years later, Saddam Hussein easily overran Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. The military forces of the monarchies neither individually nor in the guise of their regional cooperative security force – The Peninsula Shield – were trusted to confront Iraq. In Saudi Arabia, the government had to seek the permission from the religious establishment to legitimise Operations Desert Shield and Storm, such were the government's concerns of the popular reaction of basing three quarters of a million foreigners in the Kingdom. The clergy acquiesced but demanded a high price, greater control of educational and social spheres: a 'descent into bottomless Islamization' as Giles Kepel put it.

Subsequently, the new security realities changed the status quo. The US had a foothold in the region that it had been seeking for at least a decade and that it, in some ways, had been preparing for since the 1950s. And the Monarchies saw what devastation could be wrought as with the war in Kuwait. Moreover, Saddam was still in power, and though no one thought something like Kuwait's invasion would happen again, no one saw the 1990 invasion of Kuwait coming either.

Status Quo Trumps Values

A new normality thus emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. The overt security role of the US and its western allies was apparent. The domestic tensions that had for so long prevented exactly such a set of relations were forgotten, though they did not disappear. There were, of course, many reasons for the attacks of 11th September 2001, but, as Osama bin Laden noted on many occasions, he was motivated at least in part by the desire to remove western troops from the Arabian Peninsula. The unprecedented attack looked for a time at least like it could finally break the bilateral US-Saudi relationship. But, the status quo ante resumed soon enough.

The only real sign of the difficult shifts under the veneer of the public bilateral relationship was the Saudi government's request that the US remove its most significant military presence from the Kingdom. Thus, in 2003 the US moved its Air Operations Centre – the nerve centre of its command and control apparatus for forces around the wider Middle East – from Prince Sultan Air Base near Riyadh to al-Udeid in Qatar. And the war in Iraq was run from Doha despite protestations from Riyadh and elsewhere in the region that unseating Hussein would be a mistake leaving Iraq open to untrammelled Iranian influence. That Iran was able to exert far more influence in Baghdad and elsewhere after the invasion was a key factor in souring the relationship between the Arab Gulf monarchies and the US. From their perspective, the US and its allies had just made their region far more insecure. They had invaded a Muslim state, destroyed key infrastructure, stood by as lawlessness descended, not planned effectively to support a new government's rise, thus sowing chaos in a pivotal regional state. As far as the leaders around the Arab Gulf are concerned, this led near-directly to Iran's expanding influence at the north end of the Gulf and the rise of Da'esh (Islamic State) in the ruins of the Iraqi state.

Such issues were exacerbated by the actions of the Obama Administration, and a gulf between the US and its regional allies increasingly opened. In the Arab Spring, just as with the Shah of Iran in 1979, the US did not intervene to prop up a regional strong-man (Hosni Mubarak in Egypt) who had been a key US ally for decades. This was an acutely disturbing issue for the Arab Gulf monarchies, exacerbated when the US seemed – from their perspective at least – not to offer assiduous support for the al-Khalifah monarchy in Bahrain as Arab Spring-inspired riots increased in Manama. Seemingly long-standing relations with the US were not necessarily enough to guarantee US support in the event of a serious disruption.

At much the same time, Obama's 'Pivot to Asia' aggravated the problem. Though in reality the US was expanding its military footprint in the Gulf (as in Bahrain) and, if anything, it was a pivot from Europe and not from the Gulf, the perception remained that the US was increasingly disinterested in the Gulf region. Then, the sum of all Gulf fears came to fruition, and the US did a 'nuclear deal' (i.e. the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) with Iran. It is difficult to overemphasize how betrayed the monarchies felt by this deal. The concept that the US would eventually do a deal with Iran at the expense of the Arab Gulf monarchies had, for decades, been a fatalistic conspiracy theory permeating the Gulf. And then Obama made it so.

Security Trumps Enduring Hesitation

The reaction of the Arab Gulf monarchies to this smörgåsbord of burgeoning issues with their US relationship culminated in the 2015 military intervention in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the UAE led an unprecedented Arab coalition to push back the expansion of the Houthi forces in Yemen. Neither state was willing to countenance the reality of the Houthis controlling the Yemeni capital and key port cities. The core concern with such a state of affairs was that, with consolidated power and such a vastly expanded infrastructure, the Houthis would find it easier to obtain supplies of weapons and other such support from Iran that they could use to consolidate their power. There is little doubt that Iran has supplied the Houthis with weapons over the years. The only debate is how significant these supplies were. The Arab Gulf monarchies view them as of critical importance, whereas  most academic writing on the subject tends to argue that, on the contrary, the Houthis power stems far more from indigenous factors.

The Arab-led Yemen  intervention can be broadly split into three: the air campaign, the Saudi battles on their border with the Houthis, and the UAE-led campaign in the south of Yemen. The air campaign from Saudi Arabia was, logistically speaking, an impressive coordination and sustainment effort from a large multi-national coalition, even if the US air force operated hundreds of air-to-air refuelling sorties, and British and US advisors helped in the targeting process. The on-the-ground realities of the campaign, however, have been disastrous in terms of their humanitarian impact. In the north, Saudi forces have struggled to secure their border with the Houthis having faced similar issues as with the border conflict the two sides fought out in 2009-2010. In the south, the UAE have undertaken some impressive technical military operations, notably a surprising and successful amphibious landing near Aden. This operation led to the wider 'liberation' of Aden and laid the groundwork for wider UAE-led counter-terrorism operations in Maarib province to re-exert control over al-Qaeda-type groups that had profited handsomely from the interventions wiping out central governmental control.

Overall, the Yemen operation is far from a success. Saudi is still struggling with the Houthis on their joint border and the group remains encamped throughout the central regions. While the Houthis are no longer the state's central power, and thus the coalition has achieved one central aim, this has been achieved at extraordinary humanitarian costs and it may not even last such is the fragmented and brutalised state of the country. From a wider geostrategic perspective, this intervention is a key inflection point highlighting the willingness of the monarchies (in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE) to deploy their forces in significant numbers. This new development is evidently a key part of the planning in the monarchies for their post-US future. This is not to say that the US will immediately cease to be a core actor in the Gulf. The shortcomings of the Gulf militaries were brutally highlighted on occasion in Yemen, and the critical supporting role of the US (and allies) was also demonstrated, filling niche capabilities that the monarchies do not have in abundance (e.g. air-to-air refuelling). Moreover, by virtue of the military-to-military ties through equipment sales, training, and supplies, the US will necessarily remain intimately involved in the regional politico-military industrial complex. But the region is nevertheless entering a new era. Trust in the US has been deeply dented. And, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the monarchies are asserting themselves regionally as never before.

Trump

And what now? The monarchies are thrilled that Obama is no longer the US President and are reassured with initial suggestions that Trump is not a fan of the Iran deal. Indeed, those in the Trump camp seem to be archetypal Iran hawks. But it would be foolish to rejoice. The hallmark of Trump's presidency in its early days is a deeply erratic streak. The monarchies have sought to ingratiate themselves with the new President. For example, Qatar's investment authority proposed investing in US infrastructure and will purchase F-15s in a deal that looks to have more to do with currying favour with the US administration than with meeting a military requirement. Such ploys make sense. But to bet on such a capricious leader would be an exercise in hope over expectation. The evolution of the military forces of the Arab Gulf monarchies has seen various false dawns before, where vast acquisitions have not led to an appreciable development in capability. But, as in Saudi Arabia or in the UAE, the more modern iteration of acquisition has been complemented by an emerging desire to take an active role in deploying forces. This has been driven at least in part by growing misgivings as to the utility and trustworthiness of their US alliances. Developing indigenous capabilities with US assistance increasingly at arm's length is, at the very least, their current modus operandi. And this reflects far better the natural disposition of each side.

Dr David B Roberts is a Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at King's College London. He is the former Director of RUSI Qatar and author of 'Qatar: Securing the Global Ambitions of a City State'.

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6

Egypt, the Arab Spring and the Duping of Liberalism

Tom Dinham

13th March 2017

Six years after what became known as the Arab Spring revolutions convulsed the Middle East and North Africa with their inspiring affirmation of liberal and democratic values, the scale of liberalism's defeat has been astonishing. National publics that revolted in support of democracy now yearn for peace and stability. Egypt, in the midst of an  economic crisis and a  festering  islamist insurgency in the Sinai peninsular, is no different. Where once the middle class demanded personal rights and accountable government, now an exhausted public are reminded by President Abdul Fatah al-Sisi to be grateful that Egypt has not collapsed into the internecine bloodletting of Syria, Libya or Iraq. Whilst disappointment at the political demands of the 25th of January revolution has been total, the inability of the Egyptian political system to accommodate discontent means that further instability is highly likely. Exhaustion and fear are sufficient grounds for government legitimacy for the time being, especially against the background of regional chaos Egyptians currently see around them. Exhaustion and fear of the further instability on their own, however, cannot form a durable replacement for the failed social contract of the Mubarak regime.

The liberal current and the 25th of January revolution

Whilst analysing how Egypt came to its present state of reversal it is important to first characterise what the 25th of January revolution was, what political currents and groups drove it and, more importantly for a Western audience, islamist attitudes towards this political platform after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak.

The 25th of January revolution, as conceived by the activists that catalysed it in its first days was, in the broadest sense, a political platform that rejected the status quo of corrupt authoritarianism in favour of a democratic civil state. The lightning-rod issues that brought people onto the streets before the revolution gained popular momentum all shared this theme. First among them was the brutality and lack of accountability of the security apparatus, an issue symbolised by the  police murder of Khaled Said in Alexandria in 2010. The 25th of January was chosen as a day of protest as it was Eid al-Shurta, a national holiday celebrating the police. The second issue was that of political corruption, namely the blatant rigging of elections in favour of Mubarak's National Democratic Party, an issue brought to a head by the  2010 parliamentary elections. Finally, the nexus of political and financial corruption that might loosely be termed predatory capitalism formed the third target of popular anger. This issue manifested itself most prominently in fears that Gamal Mubarak, champion of neoliberal economic prescriptions and son of the President Hosni Mubarak, was being  groomed as a successor to the ageing President.

The civic platform of the revolution can easily be seen by the slogans employed by the protesters, which stressed national unity, the fall of the regime and the hoped-for state that would replace Mubarak. The slogans of the revolution and its songs are notable for the total absence of islamist imagery and demands. Popular islamist slogans such as "Egypt is Islamic", "Islamic, Islamic" and "Islam is the solution" made no appearance whatsoever, whilst the most prominent slogan articulating a vision for a post-Mubarak reality was "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice!".

The activists involved in mobilising around these issues might broadly be termed liberal civil society and non-governmental organisations. Groups like Kefeya and 6th of April formed the backbone of anti-government protests in the first days of the 2011 revolution in partnership with individual activists such as Wael Ghonim, Head of Marketing at Google for the Middle East and North Africa and administrator of the Facebook page "We Are All Khaled Said". These liberal activists, with their articulate spokespeople, global outlook, savvy use of social media and capacity to communicate were crucial to bypassing the state media and reaching a mass audience. The capacity of these individuals to mobilise on a mass level was not just a symptom of their skill at exploiting a ripe political environment, however, but also the result of the inoffensive and inclusive nature of their political demands: the downfall of a corrupt, authoritarian political regime and its replacement by an accountable civil state that respected individual rights. These demands ensured that the protests had a near-universal appeal capable of accommodating most of Egypt's opposition currents, including islamists who came to see in calls for democracy and Mubarak's downfall a means to ending their oppression and political exclusion as well as a means of enacting their ideological agenda. The Nasserite left, liberal democrats, the religious right and political malcontents of all descriptions could all unite around calls for the end of Mubarak's political system and the establishment of democracy.

Whilst islamists  as individuals played an undeniable role in the mass protests that led to the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, islamism as an organised political current did not formulate the political platform of the revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood only came out in public support of calls the downfall of Mubarak at the very last moment. Crucially, the demands and platform of the 25th of January revolution were not generated by the islamist political current and were not islamist in tone or content. Islamists in Egypt never developed the capacity to mobilise on a mass scale outside of their sectional support base in support of their political platform, with the liberal civic current in Egypt alone retaining the capacity to stage protests of a truly national character. The inability of the islamists to mobilise outside of their base was due to the reactionary and exclusionary nature of their political platform, based as it was on identity politics and a narrow conception of what Egypt should look like totally alien to the social and political reality of what Egypt actually is.

Perversely, however, the transition period that followed the overthrow of the Mubarak regime was not shaped in any significant way by the liberal coalition responsible for its downfall. Liberal groups totally failed to transform the popular enthusiasm for their revolutionary, democratic platform into organisationally powerful political parties or institutional frameworks capable of influencing the formal political process. Liberals, in short, did not have a seat at the table. Instead, revolutionary civil society groups were restricted to the role of provocateurs, repeatedly mobilising huge demonstrations throughout the period from 2011 to 2013 around issues related to democracy, transitional justice and personal rights, but with no single spokesperson or party machine to formally channel these demands. These mobilisations were in effect treated by the politically organised forces, the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, as an external factor to be opportunistically used to bring pressure to bear on the other in a zero-sum game of realpolitik bargaining.

The Muslim Brotherhood in power: From a civic to a theocratic state

The failure of Egypt's liberal political current to translate mass discontent into institutional power meant that the transition period was shaped by other, better organised forces: the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian military. Neither has an ideological, values-based interest in establishing a civil democratic state. The struggle between the Egyptian military and the Brotherhood has fundamentally been one over power rather than democratic principle. In this struggle Egyptian liberals have been dupes brought in from the sidelines to mobilise when one camp or the other required the legitimacy that cross-sectoral mobilisation by liberal activists could provide. Promises of democratisation and security sector reform were made, and broken, by both.

Tragically for Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership did not view the 25th of January revolution as mandating a democratic reformation of the state apparatus. Rather, the revolutionary moment was seen as an opportunity to seize that apparatus for themselves and exploit the transition period to set parameters for changing Egypt into a theocratic islamic state. The Brotherhood's attempts on the constitutional drafting committee to move the basic law of the state from a civil to an  explicitly religious basis eventually led to the withdrawal of every non-islamist delegate on the committee. Such a change, had it been passed, would have had drastic consequences for what would be politically permissible for non-islamist political currents if their vision of society conflicted with a narrowly-defined version of Sunni sharia jurisprudence. In effect the Brotherhood and their islamist allies sought to enshrine a religious veto of anything that contravened the letter, rather than simply the spirit, of sunni jurisprudence based on the Quran and Sunna into the basic law of the state. Time and again, whether on the issue of drafting a unifying, inclusive constitution for the country or reform of the security forces, the Brotherhood chose to ignore other opposition political currents and either try to win over the state or go it alone using its popular mandate as a blank cheque to irreversibly mould the future polity and the rules of the political game in service of their ideological agenda.

It can be argued that the Brotherhood were set up to fail through a transition process that went ahead with popular elections before the constitution and character of the state had been settled. This left the polarising issue of the future character of the state to electoral politics in which the well-organised Brotherhood was bound to do well when compared to the loosely-organised network of activists that mobilised the 25th of January revolution. This outcome, however, was actively  sought by the Brotherhood. Parliamentary elections prior to the formation of the constitutional drafting committee was an option campaigned for by the Brotherhood in a 2011 referendum held on constitutional amendments organising the transition process. Moreover, once in a position to dictate terms, the Brotherhood showed no interest in reaching compromises with non-islamist groups. Islamist domination of the electoral process led the courts to continually frustrate the islamist current by, for example,  dissolving the freely-elected parliament in which the Brotherhood and its islamist allies held a large majority on the eve of Mohammed Morsi being elected president. Court decisions clearly reflected a politicised attempt by a secular judiciary to prevent the islamist trend from using its popular mandate to capture all centres of decision making. On the eve of Morsi's election on June 30 2012 the Brotherhood, which had previously  promised not to contest the presidency, looked set to control the parliament, the presidency and the constitutional committee drafting the country's new constitution.

The Brotherhood and their islamist allies, with their winner-takes-all attitude with regard to the character of the future Egyptian polity, quickly united all other political forces in the country against them. Had the Brotherhood played a better hand, they could have used the transition period not as the moment to take a stand on the explosive issue of their vision of an islamic polity, but rather to institute neutral rules of the democratic game and find common cause with other political currents against the security state. Instead, they expended political capital on  divisive identity issues rather than popular revolutionary causes such as a reformation of the security state, a consensus-based transition democracy and transitional justice. Within five months of Mohammed Morsi taking the Presidency, the Brotherhood had totally alienated non-islamist political currents and lost any ability to form broad-based coalitions against the security state. Indeed, the signals being sent by the Brotherhood were so alarming to liberal, urban opinion in Egypt that virtually all major cities began seeing  large mobilisations against attempts by the Brotherhood to use their electoral majority to impose a theocratic state by plebiscite, a vision in stark contrast to the political platform of the 25th of January revolution.

Liberal dupes and the return of the security state

The horror induced in liberal civil society by islamist attempts to frame the future Egyptian polity on a theocratic basis led to a tacit alliance between liberal civic forces and the security state to end islamist rule. That these civic forces failed to predict that this confrontation would lead to the return of a Mubarak-style security state rather than a transition to a civic democracy will forever be a stain on Egyptian liberalism. Nevertheless, islamists carry the lion's share of the blame for re-imagining the 25th of January revolution as an opportunity to swiftly impose an islamic state by majoritarian plebiscite before liberal forces had a chance to organise and a democratic system had time to settle in. There can be no doubt that a necessary step for this to happen would have been a liberal-islamist alliance against the security state. Instead, the Brotherhood attempted to  win the state for themselves in order to impose their theocratic agenda and irreversibly change the basic law of the polity. The Muslim Brotherhood, as a vast faith-based political organisation with millions of members, had the capacity to win votes and influence formal politics in a way the amorphous liberal civil society groups could not. Islamist electoral success was not, however, a true measure of the popularity of the islamist agenda, as events were to prove.

 Millions protested to end the rule of Mohammed Morsi and the Brotherhood in the summer of 2013. These protests, of a  scale unprecedented in Egyptian history, were mobilised by the same coalition of liberal civil society activists behind the 25th of January revolution. Liberal activists found temporary common cause with the security state and international backers in the Gulf to stave off the spectre of an islamist theocracy. Ultimately, despite the Brotherhood's abandonment of the 25th of January political platform and attempts to appease it, the security state was biding its time for a comeback. The fall of Mohammed Morsi in 2013, as that of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, was  facilitated in the last instance by the military, who used the masses in the streets as a mandate to remove the President in both cases.

Unfortunately, the liberal forces that mobilised in June and July 2013 were not organised enough to ensure the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi would mark the return of a transitional period. Indeed, the summer of 2013 marked the end of formal politics in Egypt. By the time the  Rab'aa and Nahda massacres of islamist protesters had occurred, the islamist political current had so thoroughly alienated itself from the Egyptian mainstream that these events were met by non-islamist publics with indifference or a schadenfreude-like glee. Attempts by the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatari-owned interests such as Al-Jazeera to mobilise the Egyptian public against the military overthrow of Mohammed Morsi were a total failure. Throughout the period between 2011 to the summer of 2013, the Brotherhood's mobilisational capacity had been characterised by two things: the highly sectarian, identity-based nature of the mobilisations, and the organisational infrastructure deployed to ensure a high turn-out. Islamist mobilisations were highly sectarian affairs with participants literally bussed into the cities from the provinces, viewed by many of the citizens of Cairo with suspicion and, by the summer of 2013, murderous disdain. Sectional appeals to a platform based on explosive identity issues could never hope to replicate the scale and spontaneity of the mass mobilisations of the 25th of January and the anti-Brotherhood mobilisation of 30th of June, with their calls for a civic, democratic state.

That islamists in Egypt have been on the receiving end of horrendous oppression, past and present, is a matter of historic record. The mere fact of oppression, however, does not make the Brotherhood martyrs of a democratic cause. Quite the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood are the carriers of a deeply sectarian and problematic ideology that, if implemented, will not result in free democratic societies. The Brotherhood in Egypt has a long history of political violence and terrorism against both the state and intellectuals with which it disagrees. Wherever islamists have gained power in the absence of a restraining security state, the result has been a theocratic replica of the secular dictatorships they replaced or majoritarian authoritarianism with a theocratic twist. Even Erdogan's Turkey, once held out as a model for the region, has slipped into neo-fundamentalist authoritarianism. Tunisia, often branded the only success of the Arab Spring, is locked in an uneasy war of position between islamists and a wary alliance of leftists, liberals and the security state. The fact that the Tunisian Brotherhood stepped back from the brink in the summer of 2013 can in large part be explained by the exemplary fall of the Egyptian Brotherhood at a time when  Ennahdha was itself facing a crisis of legitimacy in Tunis. The problematic nature of Ennahdha's agenda for human rights and a civic state have not been resolved.

The problem Arab publics face in the Middle East is that of al-bedeel al-mustaheel, literally "the impossible alternative." Islamism is so anachronistic and hopelessly divisive an alternative to the secular security states of Arab dictatorships that islamists cannot hope to command a societal consensus. The beauty of islamists, a Baathist explained to me in Damascus as I prepared to flee in late April 2011, is that the sheer bizarreness of their vision of a theocratic polity where sovereignty belongs to God, and the ease with which they adopt terrorist violence, allows the political space to be securitised and governments to kill their way out of political binds. Once the islamists bare their fangs, he argued, the urban middle classes and minorities can be relied upon, however reluctantly, to swing behind the state in a popular war against terrorism.

For those that share the political platform of the 25th of January revolution, however, the problem is that a secular security state is potentially as odious as theocracy. The moment that the 30th of June revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood represented was sabotaged by the Rab'aa and Nahda massacres, which securitised the political space by inciting anti-state terrorism and provided the necessary cover for the security state to abort any free formal political process. Whilst the current President and former Defence Minister Abdul Fatah al-Sisi enjoys genuine patriotic legitimacy amongst the majority of Egyptians, the return of the Mubarak-style security state which he has overseen is unsustainable.

Between religious and military authoritarianism

The political platform of the January 25th 2011 and June 30th 2013 revolutions has been utterly defeated. The liberal civil society activists instrumental in mobilising both are now either silenced, in jail or dead. Liberals have to face the stark reality that their genuine and well-founded fear of the theocratic project of the Muslim Brotherhood has delivered them into the arms of a brutal security state that has closed off any hope of democratic progress just as comprehensively as any islamist theocrat could have done. Politics as a genuine competitive enterprise between independent political parties free to participate in the public space does not exist in Egypt today, and has not existed since the summer of 2013. The civil space has been closed to independent groups and the media and parliament have been brought under the influence of the security services to an extent unheard of even under Mubarak. There is a bitter irony in sitting with liberal friends who once sought to rationalise the massacres of the summer of 2013 as an ugly necessity to preserve democracy but who now live under the constant harassment and threat of the security state. The demented drive by the present government of Egypt to control every facet of the public space and eliminate contrarian voices will only provoke further unrest and offers no convincing answer to the historical earthquake that began on the 25th of January 2011.

For those who wish to see a free and democratic society in Egypt, a clear-eyed diagnosis of what went wrong between 2011 and the summer of 2013 is a pressing necessity. To be clear, no group comes out of this period well. Liberals can justifiably be accused of cheering from the sidelines whilst their compatriots were killed by the state. Islamists can be condemned for condoning or participating in political violence against Egyptians in events from the  Itihadiyya protests of December 2012 or the  Maspero incident of October 2011. The tragedy of the Rab'aa and Nahda massacres does not expunge the gross sectarian rhetoric and incitement  to violence broadcast by the Brotherhood and its islamist allies from these very locations and in  Sinai, nor the wave of islamist terrorism that gripped the country after their dispersal.

Western observers need to understand that a large part of the current predicament faced by the liberal forces behind the revolutions of 2011 and 2013 is that islamists are not unproblematic, or even acceptable, partners for those seeking a democratic future for their country. Only dishonesty or ignorance can lead an observer to be fooled by the discourse of democracy and civil rights used by the Brotherhood whilst addressing a Western audience. Naked religious prejudice and sectarianism is the language with which the Brotherhood addresses and mobilises its base, its history is characterised by political assassination and terror against opponents, and its time in power was spent trying to win over the security state and impose a theocracy by plebiscite. Yet the theocratic extremism of the Brotherhood does not excuse state violence employed against those members not involved in promoting violence, and islamist groups remain a powerful political fact on the ground that cannot be ignored. For the time being Egyptian society has chosen a secular security state over theocracy imposed at the ballot box, yet if Egypt is to enjoy a democratic future, a path will inevitably have to be plotted between these two extremes.

Tom Dinham is an analyst and writer specialising in political and security issues in the MENA region, and has written extensively for both English and Arabic-language publications. Tom began his career as a journalist covering the Arab Spring in 2011, and was present in Egypt from May 2011 to October 2013, during which most of the events referred to in this article occurred. He has a BA from the University of Oxford and an MA from the University of Exeter.

7

Future Challenges Faced by Iran

Meir Javedanfar

21st March 2017

In the short to medium term, the biggest threat emanating from inside Iran which should concern the international community is increased factionalism and factional infighting.

Why should the international community care about factional infighting in Iran? After all, this is a domestic, internal matter for Iran and its politicians. Such an answer is correct, but only partially. In Iran, foreign policy, especially Iran's behaviour towards other countries, is greatly impacted by domestic political developments within the country.

The three 'Rs' — Republicans, Reformists and Revolutionaries

The main factions in Iran today are the Republicans and the Revolutionaries. The former, a majority of whose members belong to the moderate camp of Iranian politics, believes that 37 years after the revolution, Iran should now normalise and focus on its "Republic", meaning domestic issues such as unemployment, poverty and corruption. This is in addition  to focusing on dialogue with the international community including the West, instead of confrontation.

The current political leader of this faction is President Hassan Rouhani himself, while the political Marja-i Taqlid (source of emulation) for this movement is former president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani (1934-2017). They both believe in reducing tensions with both the West and Iran's regional neighbour Saudi Arabia. They even believe that Iran should also reduce tensions with Israel. In an amazing, yet largely un-noted, speech September 2015, President Rouhani is reported to have stated to a group of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers: "Today, the main enemy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not America and Israel, rather it is unemployment, inflation, sandstorms, lack of water and the environmental disaster facing the country, for which we have to urgently think of solutions and to apply them". In the context of Iranian politics, this is a monumental statement to make by any Iranian president, and even more important that he made in front of a group of senior IRGC officers.

The Reformists, who saw their power greatly diminish within Iran's political balance of power after the 2009 uprising, are aligned with the Rouhani/Rafsanjani so called "moderate" faction.

The Revolutionaries, a majority of whose members belong to the Conservative camp of Iranian politics, believe that Iran must remain true to its revolutionary goals of 1979, meaning first and foremost focusing on the fight against the US, as well as the Saudis and Israel whom they consider as American 'puppets'. According to Hujatulislam Ali Saidi, should Iran stop being a revolutionary state, it could meet the same fate as the USSR, ie it could collapse. According to this appointee of the supreme leader to the all-important IRGC, the USSR collapsed the moment it started its rapprochement with the US, instead of following its revolutionary anti-American path as it had done previously. The same could happen to Iran.

The head of the revolutionary camp in Iran is the supreme leader himself, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; he is followed by the head of the IRGC, Mohammad Ali Jaafari, and the leaders of other important factions such as the Principalist Osulgarayan, as well as the head of both the powerful Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.

Nuclear deal deepens the divide domestically...

These two camps clashed over Iran's nuclear strategy well before the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was finalised. However, they are likely to clash even more in the wake of the deal. An important reason behind this is the expected uptick in the economy, or foreign investment to be exact. For the foreseeable future, the IRGC, mainly its massive Khatam Al Anbiya business conglomerate, will have to watch foreign business invest in Iran, while avoiding dealings the IRGC and its companies like the plague. The reason? Existing sanctions. Foreign companies understood fully, even before the change of Administration in Washington earlier this year, that if they invest any any IRGC companies or its affiliates, they could — almost certainly would — incur the wrath of the US Treasury department with inevitable damaging consequences. So, while other non-IRGC companies, which will most probably also include Rafsanjani-affiliated companies, enjoy foreign investment and all the financial and technological benefits that go with it, the IRGC will be left out. This is likely to increase resentment and conflict between the Republicans who are currently in charge of the government, and the Revolutionaries who are in charge of the most important institutions of the regime. Rouhani's outreach to the Revolutionaries  by recently awarding an important energy project to a supreme leader affiliated company is unlikely to reduce tensions between the two sides.

The other factor which is likely to increase the infighting even more is the upcoming presidential election of 19 May 2017. It seems that the Conservatives do not have a candidate who could beat Rouhani. One of their best bets was the current Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf; but he recently became embroiled in a massive corruption scandal where the Tehran municipality which he heads was accused of selling real estate to corrupt officials at a 50% discount. The other heavyweight candidate was the current speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani,  but he recently announced that he won't be running. Meanwhile former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (who also, some believed, could be a contender for the conservatives) was told by the Supreme Leader not to run as his campaign could "divide the country".

The absence of a viable candidate to take on Rouhani could mean that the Conservatives could instead switch to the strategy of making life as difficult as possible in the immediate run-up to the elections in order to make him look like a lame duck. Such a strategy could gain strength if Rouhani wins, as was the case when Reformist former President Mohammad Khatami won his second term in 2001, meaning more obstacles could be placed in Rouhani's way to implement his policies.

...and on regional policy

An important consequence of such tensions could be Iran's policies in the region, especially with regard to Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Israel. The Revolutionaries know that the Republicans want to reduce tensions on all these fronts, in order to increase foreign investment into the ailing economy. The latter also know that they have the people behind them. An important sign showing how isolated the Revolutionaries' regional policies, especially those regarding Syria, are among the people of Iran is that  no public criticism of Assad (or Hamas and Hezbollah) is allowed. A clear example was seen in 2013 when Ayatollah Rafsanjani mentioned Assad's use of Chemical weapons. His  comments  were soon  altered by the official news agency which had reported them.

And this is where the international community should worry. Realising how moderates want to ease tensions with the US and Saudi Arabia, in order to isolate them at home, the Revolutionaries have been and will continue to do the opposite, ie look further to inflame tensions. Some of the Conservatives openly accuse Reformists of backing the Syrian opposition and thus see the war in Syria as a war against the "seditionists" of the 2009 Green uprising as well.

Consequently, even though Iran has other strategic reasons behind its current regional policies (such as helping Assad to stay in power in order to maintain its supply routes from Syria to Hezbollah forces in Lebanon), domestic tensions in Iran also play an important part in its current regional strategy. And they will continue to do so for the short- to medium-term. How can we expect otherwise when the Supreme Leader himself has stated openly that he has  requested that a "Revolutionary" figure is chosen as his replacement. Similarly, he requested the Assembly of Experts, which is in charge of choosing his successor, "to stay revolutionary, to think revolutionary and to act revolutionary".  The Supreme leader stated that ensuring these characteristics in choosing his successor is one of the most crucial tasks of the Assembly, meaning that the Revolutionary front will continue to rule over the Republicans and to challenge them during the current and, most probably, the future supreme leader's term.

Water-related risks

One of the the biggest long-term challenges which Iran is facing which the international community should take note of is the drought. Again, although this is an internal matter, it will have consequences on Iran's long-term strategy and behaviour in the region.

The Middle East is becoming drier. Iran is not alone in facing the drought challenges which numerous countries in the region are facing. However, the seeming lack of preparation, and the deteriorating situation, make it a problem of significant magnitude.

The alarms are ringing all over Iran regarding the impact of the drought. One recent warning was from Dr Isa Kalantari, chief adviser on water, agriculture and environmental affairs to Iran's current deputy President Eshagh Jahangiri. According to him, should the status quo regarding Iran's drought continue, "approximately 70% of Iran's total population, meaning the equivalent of a 50 million population, could be forced to migrate abroad in order to stay alive".

Let's say his assessment is greatly exaggerated and only a tenth of the population in Iran has to move abroad for the search of water. That's still five million Iranian. Who will host them? Afghanistan? Iraq? Turkey? Which regional country will have the resources to host such a large population, when all of Iran's neighbours are struggling with their own economic as well as environmental challenges? And if they don't accept them, what will happen then? The problem of internal migration is one which is already confronting Iran. Some of the population of cities such as Zabol in Iran's Sistan and Baluchistan region, are already abandoning their  homes and possessions because of the drought and migrating elsewhere. This is in addition to 200 villages in the same province whose population also migrated because of water issues.

The capital city of Tehran could only take a limited number of water refugees, as it is facing its own water and pollution challenges. And there is an even more daunting related challenge: parts of the city are are grappling with sinkholes. This problem is created by illegal water drilling and water wells which are extracting below-the-surface water resources, thus making the ground above more susceptible to sinkholes. There have already been a number of sinkholes appearing in the middle of Tehran.  In a recent conversation with the  E'etemad newspaper, the head of the housing commission for Tehran stated that one major sinkhole has been appearing in the streets of Tehran every month. Meanwhile some of the  homes in Tehran's Shahr-e Rey  neighbourhood are having to be sold because of cracks created by land subsidence.

The problem of subsidence is also affecting the areas around Tehran. The plains around Tehran called Dasht-e Tehran, have subsided by as much as 36 centimeters. According to Javad Meybodi, Director of Water and Wastewater Systems Utilization and Protection of Water at the Ministry of Energy, this is a world record. The other concern for Tehran is that if there is an earthquake, its damage will be magnified by the land subsidence problem. This is a valid concern as Tehran sits  on an earthquake fault line.

Meanwhile moving to other major Iranian cities is unlikely to offer much of a solution as they are also facing their own environmental problems, including land subsidence challenges. According to the Ministry of Energy's findings, the Qazvin fields situated around the city of Qazvin, population 1.2 million people, have subsided by 24 centimeters. Meanwhile the surrounding desert area around the city of Mashhad, home to 2.7 million inhabitants, has subsided by 25 centimeters, while the desert fields around the city of Kashan have subsided by 30 centimeters. These are important open areas surrounding some of Iran's major urban population centres. According to some estimates land subsidence is impacting 297 fields and deserts around Iran. The general physical instability and, at times, the sinkholes created by such subsidence mean that such areas can no longer be used for agriculture or construction purposes.

The Rouhani government has taken a number of initiatives to address the problem of drought. These include signing an  agreement with the German Consortium inter 3 in 2013 to manage Iran's water resources. This is in addition to plans to work with French and South Korean companies to reduce water wastage.

However there are grave concerns as to whether these will be sufficient to address what is a monumental challenge facing Iran's long term future, one which could and most probably will impact how Iran sees itself and its role in the region in the long-term. These massive challenges posed by the drought could have two consequences in this area: they could make Iran look more inward, or more outward and aggressive than before.

Considering the case for greater inwardness, many of the drought affected areas are situated around its borders where many of the minorities live. This could mean inflaming existing tensions in such areas. The Arab residents of Khuzestan province, where most of Iran's Arabs live, have already seen such tensions. In fact, some Arab residents of the province have dubbed the Karkheh damn which has reduced the water flow of Karkheh river in that province as the "Arab Killer" damn. Furthermore, major migrations within Iran because of the drought could create economic as well as security-related strains on Iran's economy and security services as massive migrations could create tensions between residents and migrants. Such challenges could mean that Iran will have to dedicate much of its security and economic resources inwards, instead of elsewhere in the region.

Alternatively, such challenges could encourage Iran to take a more aggressive stance abroad in order to direct attention away from domestic challenges at home. A case in point is that of Pakistan: although the country is facing massive water challenges, which some believe is a threat  bigger than the threat posed by militancy,  in addition to an energy crisis, nevertheless it continues to challenge its neighbours in Afghanistan and India.

Between these two scenarios, the scenario that Iran may in fact become more aggressive in the region because of its drought related challenges is one which is very realistic and one which all countries in the region, especially Iran's immediate neighbours as well as its regional rivals, have to take into consideration. One thing which this region has taught us is that lack of resources creates tensions between neighbouring countries, even if the challenges are exacerbated by domestic mismanagement.

Economic drivers

Last but not least, the other long-term challenge faced by Iran is that of its economy. The world is already trying to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels. This is a trend which is likely to gather strength over the next 20 – 30 years. Oil and gas constitute Iran's biggest exports. Meanwhile Iran's economy continues to be weighed down by massive corruption and mismanagement, a problem which is unlikely to be resolved in the near- or long-term future. So, while its regional neighbours such as Saudi Arabia embark on a massive privatization campaigns and invest in a $100 billion technology fund with the Japanese firm Softbank, the question remains: what is Iran doing to prepare for its economic future?

With dwindling water resources, it could face serious challenges in this area as agriculture products make up an important part of its non-oil exports. Should its tensions with the West continue, investing in massive funds like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar will prove to be difficult. Meanwhile should its notable 'brain drain' problem, as well as its strained relations with the Iranian diaspora community, continue in its current format, a scenario which is quite probable, it will be more difficult for Iran to develop an indigenous, export driven high tech industry similar to that of Israel. Such uncertainties regarding Iran's economic future, and more importantly, the seeming lack of planning mean that the scenario that Iran will in fact be a poorer country in the region than it is now is one which is realistic.

Such a scenario could also impact Iran's policies in the region. An economically poorer Islamic Republic, with fewer water resources and at the same time free to develop its nuclear industry once major restrictions are lifted 15 years after the current nuclear deal could mean that the Islamic Republic may project its power abroad with more vigour.

The next supreme leader?

This is especially true if the country continues to be ruled by the Revolutionary front in its politics, rather than the Republicans. A quick look at all suggested replacement candidates for the role of supreme leader suggest that this is likely to be the case. Ayatollahs Shahroudi, Sadegh Larijani, the newly anointed 'Ayatollah' Seyyed Ibrahim Raisi, as well as Khamenei's own son Mojtaba who some believe could also be a viable candidate, all belong to the Revolutionary wing.

The only Republican candidate who some believe also has a chance is current president Hassan Rouhani. His chances of being elected to this role are low, as all presidents who have served under Ayatollah Khamenei's term as Supreme Leader have subsequently fallen out with him, and the all-powerful Revolutionary Guards. The need for good relations with the IRGC is likely to have a strong impact on the selection of Iran's next supreme leader leader. Judging by its current strained relations with President Rouhani which have only gotten worst since his election in 2013, his chances of being elected supreme leader do not seem to be very high.

Meir Javedanfar teaches Iranian politics at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya. He is also a researcher  at the Meir Ezri Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies at the University of Haifa.

8

The Changing Fortunes of Saudi Arabia

Nick Stadtmiller

27th March 2017

The oil tides of fortune are receding for Gulf Arab countries. The six oil-rich nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) enjoyed large fiscal and current account surpluses as oil prices remained strong through the early years of the 21st century, allowing these countries to build massive reserves. After oil prices plummeted from lofty levels in 2014, those surpluses turned into deficits, forcing countries to tap the wealth accumulated during the boom years.

The years of Gulf sovereign wealth funds splashing cash on flashy international investments seem destined to taper off. Instead GCC countries will be more focused internally, developing economies that are less reliant on oil while trying to maintain the prosperity to which GCC citizens became accustomed during the oil boom years. This transformation will, in many cases, require a radical restructuring of the social underpinnings of the economies and change citizens' economic relationships with the state. GCC countries will also require significant foreign investment, which will force these nations to modernise their economies and their legal underpinnings.

Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most useful illustration of the scale of changes set to take place. The Kingdom is the largest country in the GCC, accounting for roughly half of the bloc's economic output and 60% of its population, and the most socially conservative. Falling oil prices strained Saudi public finances severely in 2015, and in response the Kingdom announced the following year a raft of measures to restructure the economy.

Long-time observers of the region will no doubt point out that these countries weathered multi-year slumps in oil prices through the 1980s and 90s and were able to muddle through with austerity measures. There was no grand effort to overhaul the economy, or risk societal disruption in the process. In short, the previous response to low oil prices was to batten down the hatches and wait out the storm. Three dynamics in place today make this approach insufficient for today's challenges.

First, Saudi Arabia has a young and growing population. Nearly one-half of the Saudi population is under the age of 25, per  UN Population Division estimates. The number of under-25s in Saudi Arabia, 14 million as of 2015, is over 70% higher than in 1985. The Saudi government must ensure its young citizens have economic opportunities to maintain social stability. There are simply too many youth in the Kingdom to absorb them into bloated government payrolls, especially when government finances are already strained.

In addition, Saudi oil consumption is rising at an alarming rate, reducing the amount left to be exported – and hence crimping foreign earnings. Between 2001 and 2015, Saudi Arabia's domestic oil consumption grew by at a compound annual growth rate of 6% per annum, based on data from the  BP Statistical Review of World Energy. For comparison, world oil consumption grew only 1.4% annually during that same time period, while consumption in OECD countries actually fell modestly. As a result, Saudi oil consumption as a share of domestic production rose to over 32% in 2015. Saudi Arabia consumed just one-sixth of its oil output during the 1980s and 90s, when previous oil price gluts occurred.

Finally, trends in the global energy market threaten the Kingdom's previous dominance in this arena. New oil finds, most notably shale oil in the United States, are reducing demand for oil imports in the world's largest economy and elsewhere. The growth of alternative and renewable energy sources, driven largely in response to climate change, will likely lessen the world's dependence on petroleum-based energy sources in the coming years. All this casts doubt on the long-term reliability of Saudi Arabia's revenue stream from oil exports, a point that applies to other GCC nations as well.

Saudi authorities realise the need to reform their economy and have announced plans to undertake changes in that direction, spearheaded by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, the current king's son. The overarching strategy was laid out in  Vision 2030, released in early 2016. More specific plans were released shortly thereafter in the  National Transformation Plan, which includes quantitative targets to be met by 2020. Taken broadly, these two documents provide a roadmap for lessening the nation's dependence on oil, growing the private sector, and improving government efficiency whilst maintaining fiscal discipline.

Saudi authorities need to cut wasteful spending and find alternative revenue sources in order to place government finances on a sustainable footing. On the revenue side, the Saudi budget is extremely dependent on oil. In the latter years of the oil boom, between 2012 and 2014,  oil revenue accounted for approximately 90% of government revenues. Those revenues have fallen in line with the drop in oil prices. Total government revenues in 2016 were just 40% of their 2012 level, underscoring the volatility of a commodity-dependent income stream.

The government has planned two main sources of additional non-oil revenue for the coming years – a value-added tax (VAT) and increased levies on expatriates in the Kingdom. A 5% VAT is slated to be phased in from 2018, in line with other Gulf countries. Additional fees for sponsoring expatriate labour will arrive in stages over the coming years,  reaching up to SAR 9,600 (USD 2,560) per worker, per annum in 2020, with further fees for non-working expatriate dependents. These fees will be especially burdensome on businesses dependent on large numbers of low-wage, low-skilled workers, whose annual take-home salaries are not far away from the proposed fee increases. Authorities pledged not to implement income taxes on citizens or roll out broad-based corporate taxes in the future, so they appear limited to additional taxes on consumption and expatriates if further revenue is required.

Years of bumper revenues during the last oil boom allowed the government to splurge on benefits for its citizens. Saudi citizens currently pay  some of the cheapest prices in the world for petrol thanks to government subsidies. Utility bills are also heavily subsidised. This has benefitted not only households but also businesses in energy-intensive manufacturing, which have used cheap energy rather than efficiency to drive profitability. Authorities reckoned these benefits cost the government SAR 300bn (USD 80bn) in 2015.

As part of its Fiscal Balance Programme, the government aims to cut most energy subsidies and bring prices to international market levels by 2020. Cash grants to low-income households will help citizens most affected by the subsequent price rise. For businesses, the government has promised to support industries in the transition to market-based costs through various funding schemes and capacity-building efforts to promote efficiency. However, it seems dubious to expect companies that benefitted from decades of subsidies to become internationally competitive in just a few short years.

Another important area of expenditure overhaul concerns the government wage bill. For years, many Saudi citizens entered the government payrolls in jobs of questionable economic value to the country. Over 35% of all working Saudi citizens were employed in public administration or defence in 2016 – more than 1.8 million people. Public-sector work is also lucrative. A 2015 report by the McKinsey Global Institute estimates that the average wage of a Saudi citizen in the public sector is two-thirds higher than their private-sector counterpart.

Government payrolls were once considered sacred, a practice through which the government shared the oil wealth with its citizens and promoted political stability. The intense pressure on public finances from plunging oil prices in 2014 forced authorities to reconsider this notion. In 2016,  a royal decree announced cuts to the salaries of ministers and other high-level officials, as well as scrapping bonuses and other perks for government employees. The National Transformation Plan envisages reducing salaries and wages from 45% of the budget to 40% by 2020, and a slight reduction in the overall nominal wage bill.

All these changes will hit many Saudi nationals hard. Companies face increased labour costs and a rising cost base for energy-intensive industries. Furthermore, with spending on public projects under increased scrutiny, previously lucrative government contracts may no longer be counted on to maintain profitability. Households will see costs rise through the rollback of subsidies and new taxes – even if these are partially offset by targeted cash payments to low-income households. Meanwhile citizens dependent on public-sector salaries will see incomes remain stagnant at best. The hardship to be faced by businesses and individuals may breed enough discontent to make the population restive and resist further changes to the status quo.

It should be clear that the government is not imposing such drastic fiscal tightening simply to attain some ideal of modern economic orthodoxy. Instead the changes were forced on the country as the result of years of profligate government spending followed by a sudden reversal in global oil prices. The Saudi government ran a  fiscal deficit of nearly 16% of GDP in 2015, forcing authorities to deplete reserves at an alarming rate. Reforms that could have been rolled in over a decade if implemented during the boom years will now be implemented in less than half that time. There is nothing unique about a government postponing difficult reforms during good times, but that will do little to assuage citizens who must now swallow the bitter pill of austerity.

While the Saudi economy faces a difficult few years ahead, the greater challenge to the society will be to create new economic opportunities to replace the traditional sources of wealth – oil and government. In short, that means improving economic productivity.

Two important reforms could improve the Saudi labour force's economic potential: increasing the participation of women and educational reform. The labour force participation rate of women in Saudi Arabia is just 20%  according to the World Bank, whereas the average for OECD nations is over 50%. Saudi authorities have set a goal to increase the share of women in the labour force to 28% by 2020.

Getting more women into the workforce might appear low-hanging fruit if not for Saudi Arabia's extremely conservative society. This is a nation where gender segregation is strictly enforced, and non-related men and women are forbidden from mixing in public – creating  awkward arrangements where the two sexes are placed in separated workspaces. Women cannot drive in the Kingdom, creating logistical problems over how they would get to and from work. Furthermore, women remain dependent on male-relative guardians, who wield wide authority over them. Families will have to overcome deeply ingrained biases against women working in order for this transition to occur. One thing is certain; bringing more women into the workforce will entail social change as much as economic. Once more women gain economic independence through employment, it is doubtful they will settle for their traditional social position in Saudi society.

Saudi Arabia's education system needs reform to ensure that young citizens have the right skill sets to enter the private sector in economically meaningful roles. The current system places strong emphasis on religious studies and Arabic, to the detriment of instruction in English, mathematics, and the sciences. Critical-thinking skills are lacking in the curriculum, in favour of rote memorisation. Global benchmarks of standardised test scores show Saudi students far behind their peers in other countries at similar levels of development. As long-time Gulf observer  Theodore Karasik opined, 'The education system is stagnating, producing graduates who do not meet international standards of excellence... But it may take a generation at the very least to rectify the situation.'

Any efforts towards education reform will need to overcome opposition from religious and social traditionalists who will object to the resulting changes in young people's worldview under a new system. The government has set targets to improve standardised test scores in Saudi schools, but no comprehensive strategy to improve the system has been discussed publicly. Furthermore, even if the education system miraculously reformed overnight, it would take decades for these improvements to feed into economic performance, considering the lag between early education and entry into the workforce.

Saudi authorities have set a goal of creating 1.2 million private-sector jobs for citizens by 2020. This effort runs in parallel with other attempts to boost the non-oil private portion of economic output,  which accounted for just half of 2016 GDP. Inevitably entrepreneurship will play a role in creating many of these jobs. While the government is planning initiatives to support small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the current operating environment is not conducive to this economic activity. Saudi Arabia ranked 94th globally in the  World Bank's 2017 Doing Business survey. For starting a business, the Kingdom ranked 147th; in trading across borders, 158th; and in enforcing contracts, 105th. Clearly much needs to be done on legal and institutional reform to incentivise entrepreneurship.

Another adjustment impacting the Saudi economy concerns its nascent need to attract foreign capital. After nearly twenty years of consecutive current account surpluses, the largest Gulf economy has become synonymous with exporting capital through investments in developed nations. Since 2015, the Saudi current account has been in deficit, and the  IMF forecasts this situation will persist for at least the next five years. The laws of international economics require that current account deficits be financed through foreign investment. There are three principal areas in which Saudi Arabia will require foreign capital: privatisation, debt, and foreign direct investment (FDI).

Perhaps the boldest plank of the transformation programme announced so far is the sale of a minority stake in the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, popularly known as Aramco, the national oil company. If the crown jewel of the country's petroleum resources is open to foreign investment, then it is hard to imagine any other state-owned enterprise off-limits.

 Current plans call for a dual listing of a minority stake in Aramco on the local bourse and one or more international exchanges. Listing on a foreign exchange will force Aramco to comply with international practices in dealing with shareholders, even if they are minority owners. The Aramco privatisation will also herald a new era of transparency for the oil giant, as its oil reserves will likely have to be independently audited for the first time. Aramco stands to become an important test case for further privatisations of state-owned enterprises. Any public company selling stakes to foreign investors will need to open up their finances and decision-making processes to outsiders, when for years management were accustomed to dealing privately with a small, closed group of stakeholders.

Saudi Arabia has recently stepped into the international debt markets, selling  dollar-denominated bonds and  borrowing from global banks in 2016. This trend will only gather momentum as borrowing needs persist. Saudi authorities plan to quadruple the government debt-to-GDP ratio in the coming years to 30%. While the Kingdom's early forays in global borrowing were successful, it is unlikely to be smooth sailing forever. As other emerging markets have learned through experience, international investors are notoriously fickle, and free-flowing cash can suddenly dry up if and when global risk appetite wanes.

In addition to selling financial securities abroad, Saudi Arabia needs FDI. A 2015 analysis by the McKinsey Global Institute identified USD 4 trillion of investment opportunities through 2030 for the Saudi economy, across eight sectors, to supply the private-sector jobs and growth necessary to wean the Kingdom off its oil dependence. Inevitably much of this capital will come from foreign sources. The Saudi economy requires foreign cash to make investments of this magnitude, and it needs foreign know-how to develop new industries and modernise existing ventures.

Foreign investment in Saudi Arabia will only be successful if investors find an amenable business environment. Up until now, much of the FDI into Saudi Arabia has been limited to large-scale ventures between multi-national companies and big national enterprises – foremost in petrochemicals. Private-sector driven growth will require a bottom-up approach and likely entail many smaller-scale investments. Unfortunately Saudi Arabia is a  notoriously difficult place to secure government approvals for business unless one knows the right people, and personal relationships usually trump procedures written on paper. Foreign companies may see the system as a hidden tax and ensure they have the right locals on the payrolls to grease the wheels of commerce. However, it will be difficult to attract widespread investor attention unless procedures for permits are made more transparent and implemented in practice.

Clearly there is no quick or easy way for Saudi Arabia to modernise its economy. Years of oil surpluses gave authorities little incentive to strive for efficiency, leaving a legacy of byzantine institutions and a population dependent on government munificence. The old order also allowed society to remain extremely conservative and resist foreign influence. Economic reform for Saudi Arabia also means social reform; many social ties underpinning the old economy will inevitably be transformed in the process of modernisation.

On a deeper level, the fundamental relationship between the state and the citizen requires rethinking. The so-called ruling bargain between Gulf monarchs and their populations calls for the rulers to provide and the citizenry to acquiesce, a system that has seen decades of largely uninterrupted stability. Saudi Arabia's reform plans envisage – and indeed require – citizens taking personal responsibility for their own livelihoods and economic futures. It is difficult to imagine a more educated, worldly population in control of their own economic destinies continuing to accept the old political and social mores.

Nick Stadtmiller is a US-based analyst focusing on economic trends impacting the GCC. He worked in the region for eight years, including two years as an advisor with a branch of the Dubai government and a six-year stint with one of the UAE's largest banks. Nick has a BA from Northwestern University and an MSc from Kings College London.

9

Peering Ahead in the Middle East

Anthony Harris

2nd March 2017

Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future. When  Niels Bohr, the famous physicist, wrote this he was not of course thinking of the Middle East, but it is good advice there too. No one saw the "Arab spring" coming, despite all the world's think tanks and intelligence services. Since 2011 the governments of Syria, Libya and Yemen have collapsed. Iraq is similarly a failed state, having had its dictatorship removed by the US-led alliance in 2003. Sudan is a mess and South Sudan has descended into civil war. Peripheral states like Afghanistan and Somalia have very weak central governments, and spread violence into other states. In the core ME region, countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are trying to implement far-reaching economic reforms, which risk provoking social unrest. In none of these countries is a solution to the unrest likely to be quick and in the failed states, wars could continue until 2020 and beyond.

The West, particularly Europe, which is suffering from waves of refugees and economic migrants from the wider Middle East and Africa, has to decide how to deal with the multitude of problems that constitute the ME region. Direct intervention is a largely discredited policy. The US was convinced, following 9/11, that if governments that they considered hostile, corrupt and fossilized were removed, then the people of these countries would be liberated and would welcome the imposition of western systems. This sunlit upland would lead to participation by all in the governing process, to economic development and to beneficial side-effects like the protection of minorities. The signal collapse of that policy in Iraq, and President Obama's determination to pull America back from involvement in any further costly wars aimed at nation building in the ME, has meant that the West is now looking for new ways to address the question: what to do about the Middle East, which is widely in a state of collapse, riven by wars and facing economic disaster? We must peer into the fog and try to lay down some guiding principles.

Arab Human Development Report

The omens for a renaissance in the region are very poor. I began by reading the  Arab Human Development Report 2016, a study, the first since 2011, and the sixth in the series, which is prepared by Arab academics for the UN. It is a respected source of statistics and analyses of the Arab world, in this case concentrating on the problems faced by Arab youth. The Arab world is the only region the only geographical region that is regressing steadily in terms of the UN's human development index, which measures elements like longevity, health, education, corruption levels and the standard of living. It seems, according to the index, that the region is soon to be overtaken in broad economic terms by Sub-Saharan Africa. The report calculates that to absorb the number of work-force entrants and stabilize youth unemployment, the region needs to create over 60m new jobs by 2020. The Arab region is home to 5% of the world's population, but in 2014, it created 57.5% of the world's refugees (including the Palestinian refugees), 68.5% of the world's battle-related deaths and 45% of global terrorist attacks. Giving the young men and women of the Arab world a decent future in these conditions is spectacularly hard.

The report points out that young Arab people, by which they mean those between 15 and 29, and who number about 105m, or one third of the total population, are better educated, more active and aware of what is going on in the world than ever before. Governments however, instead of regarding youth as a resource in which to invest for the future, have generally employed repression as a way of keeping young people in check, without addressing the root causes of their demands. No way has been found, in the core Arab countries that are now experiencing such massive instability, to draw young people into any kind of political process, so as to create a measure of trust and cooperation between the ruling classes and the people. This is a key element in building solid institutions in Arab countries that can outlast political change. States that depend on one man and a political clique around him, are unlikely to survive a sudden change of leadership.

The report demonstrates that the economic model being followed by most Arab states is not working: job opportunities are shrinking across the region, and many countries are badly affected by poverty, made worse in many countries by the fall in the price of oil, poor health and education services and widespread corruption. Over 60% of the Arab world is under 30 years of age. However, the rate of participation of Arab youth in the workforce is the lowest in the world, particularly among women, and the rate of youth unemployment is the highest in the world. The  Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are doing better, blessed as most of them are by smaller populations and high oil incomes, even after the sharp price fall since 2014. Their stability is based on accepted institutions, especially their monarchies, growing prosperity, and better education and health services than elsewhere in the region. It is true that most of them have large foreign workforces, mainly from South Asia, which in some cases outnumber the native populations, but by allowing them to make remittances to their home countries, and by generally improving their working conditions, Gulf governments have avoided instability or serious unrest. In short, if we have Iraq, Syria and Yemen at one end of the spectrum, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and some if its GCC colleagues are perhaps at the other end, representing what most other Arab states would like to become.

The Slow Motion Revolution Speeding Up

Twenty years ago, observers of the Arab world, like  Gary Sick, were predicting that the pressures exerted on the Arab states by the rising tide of youth would force governments to liberalise their economies and give their peoples a say in the way they were governed. Sick described what he saw as a slow motion revolution in the Arab world. Many therefore saw the Arab Spring six years ago as evidence that the revolution had in fact speeded up and concluded that governments would be forced to adapt to the demands of the middle-classes and modern-minded youth and to reform. It was not initially apparent that the pressures would explode into widespread extremism, violence, the collapse of institutions and states, and mass migrations of peoples, though Iraq was there as a case study. Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Spring, and of Mohammed Bouazizi, whose suicide unwittingly launched this traumatic process, perhaps gives us faint hope that evolutionary change can be made by rational people.

When I was a young Diplomatic Service officer fifty years ago, we regarded the Arab world as a region of hope and great possibilities. Saudi Arabia I was told, was economically about as prosperous in per capita terms as South Korea, which was emerging from the effects of the Korean War. We clearly expected the Kingdom, with its vast oil reserves, to grow faster than the impoverished South Korea. (The latter's per capita GDP is currently around 20% higher than that of Saudi Arabia.) Iraq I learned, was one of only two countries in the world that had everything to enable them` to be prosperous and self-sufficient: mineral resources, water, good productive land, and trained people. (The other was Argentina.) I was able to drive freely and alone around most of the Arab countries in my short-wheel base Land Rover. Arabia and North Africa were in general peaceful, content and optimistic. I learned about Arab nationalism, and the fact that though all Arab countries comprised different tribes and races, they were all part of Al Umma Al Arabiya, the Arab Nation, which as a united force would be unstoppable.

The Breakdown of Arab States

Let us look more closely at what has changed a group of countries which were stable and full of promise fifty years ago into the most chaotic region on earth. The Arab region was divided into nation states a hundred years ago following the First World War. These states were established largely as a result of western colonial interests and borders were drawn that reflected western ambitions or convenience rather than the interests of the Arab peoples. (The Gulf States were fortunate in that their borders have mainly followed natural boundaries between tribes and peoples.) The chaos in the Arab heartland is calling some of these borders into question, but I believe that if Arab governments in Baghdad and Damascus are able to reassert control over most of their territories, they will try to re-establish the borders that they have recognized for the past hundred years. All states find it hard to re-define borders, even in favorable circumstances. The key area of interest will be Kurdish territories, in the light of their historic desire to secure more independence from the Iraqis, Syrians and the Turks, and the leading role the Kurds have played in promoting political change in these countries. Some borders and nations will inevitably change.

However Arabs do not in general see themselves as part of nation states, particularly if the state fails to deliver basic needs and suppresses all opposition. Egypt is the principal exception to this rule, though Egyptians will often claim to be different from the Arabs. In many Arabs states, if the central government cracks or disappears, society rapidly breaks down into family and tribal groups, which form militias, and into religious sects. Me and my brother against my cousin, I was told; me and my cousin against the world. State institutions, including parliaments, are distrusted or, in the case of most Interior Ministries, feared. States which were never real states, like Libya, Iraq or Syria, break down into their smallest parts which start fighting among themselves. Added to this explosive mix is religious hatred, which Arab leaders like Gamal Abdul-Nasser, the Assads, and Saddam Hussein understood well and successfully repressed for many years. It was western naivety and conceit that led George W Bush to believe that removing Saddam Hussein in Iraq would set a good example, leading to the adoption of western political systems and herald a new era of sweetness and light.

The Rise and Fall of IS

Hardline Sunni movements had been waiting for their chance. IS, which grew out of Sunni militants operating in Northern Iraq and across the border in north-eastern Syria, took Fallujah and Ramadi in the early months of 2014, and captured Mosul in June of that year. The world suddenly took notice of the way that 1500 insurgents drove 30,000 Iraqi troops out of the city and captured huge quantities of mainly US military equipment. For the first time in modern history, a major insurgency in the Arab world led to the occupation of large areas of Iraq and Syria, and forced around 6m people to live under IS control. The Islamic State was born. Its days may now be numbered: the battle to recapture Mosul in now under way and the city will most likely be liberated before the third anniversary of its capture. That may not be the end of IS altogether. They have been looking for somewhere else to use as a base, so that the Caliphate will not be extinguished. IS tried to establish a base in Libya, and they have looked at other regions, like Mindanao Province in the Philippines and areas in Central Africa. The movement may resort to Al Qaeda-type tactics and promote terrorist attacks across the world, relying on "lone wolves" rather than any central organization (the recent attack near the Houses of Parliament in London is but the latest example). The West has been trying to lower its profile in the final struggle against IS in Syria and Iraq, and for example let Iraqi Government forces play the leading role. However there are constant arguments over how best to deploy Shia militias in the liberation of Sunni Mosul, and I note that it has now been admitted that US and British Special Forces are involved in the battle for the city.

President Trump claims to be against US involvement in wars like this in the Middle East, though he seems to be susceptible to the argument that IS (or ISIS as the Americans call it) may remain a threat to the west for many years to come, if not extinguished as quickly as possible. Iraqi friends tell me that they fear what will happen once Mosul is recaptured, since there is a danger of a vacuum being created which extremists could fill once again, as happened twice before in Fallujah. This is a serious risk, if the Shia-dominated Iraqi government fails to govern the Sunni regions fairly and bring them stability and prosperity. Some would like the Americans to stay to guarantee stability, but that now seems highly unlikely, and is, I would argue, undesirable.

There has been an interesting debate over the real origins of IS. They claim to be the successors of the Caliphate, and trace their origins back to the time of The Prophet, and their message to the Quran and the Hadith, which they are extremely adept at quoting. Some Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, as I know from attempts by the EU to engage the Saudis in a dialogue about Islamic extremism, point out that IS is not Islamic: Islam is a religion of peace - IS cannot by definition be Islamic, and the problems that are caused are therefore not Islamic problems. I would add that IS's obvious skill in deploying Islamic justifications for their actions and quoting illustrations from Islamic history, make it harder for scholars in other Arab countries to contradict them. I have just read an interesting study of modern Jihadist and Salafist beliefs,  The Way of The Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State, by an American journalist Graeme Woods who spent two years interviewing jihadi fighters who have been in Syria and Iraq, or who are supporting the jihadist cause in the Middle East and in other countries like the US, Britain, Australia and the Philippines. Wood leaves the reader in no doubt that IS is regarded by all its adherents as a deeply religious movement, which will continue, even if the Caliph, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, is killed. Francis Fukuyama, the celebrated American philosopher, believes, as he explains in his recent book  Political Order and Political  Decay, that IS is a product of identity politics rather than outright religiosity, and he believes that IS will not last long. He attributes its rapid rise to the weakness of Arab Governments in the region, rather than because it has an inherently strong political model of its own. He may be right about IS's origins and its longevity, but I believe that he has underestimated the fires that the religious wars have started, setting Sunnis against each other and against the other regional sects, such as Shia, Zaidis, Alawites and Druze, not to mention the Christians, which I expect to burn for many years to come.

The Need to Find a Policy of Holding Back

What then can the West do? In the central Arab world, we have a large region where development has gone backwards, where the youth are in many cases not engaged, educated or motivated, and where the absence of solid institutions has meant the collapse of half a dozen states, which can only be resurrected with foreign help variously from the Europeans, Americans, Russians, Turks and Iranians. Yet history shows that foreign interference can have dire effects.  Hussein bin Ali, the Sherif of Mecca told Lawrence of Arabia in 1916 that foreign meddling in the Arab World would have tragic consequences. (Hussein, by the way, proclaimed himself Caliph after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, but was unable to maintain his authority for long. The Saudis ended the Caliphate when they conquered the Holy Places in 1925.) The invasion of Iraq by the US and their allies in 2003 led to one of the longest and most catastrophic wars in US history, so the west would be well advised to make it a central plank of their policy to stay out, at least militarily, and to concentrate on defending themselves from jihadist terrorist attacks at home, which are likely to continue for some years to come. Yet huge military machines tend to get used, sooner or later. Presidents who stop and think, as Obama did in Syria, get pilloried for weakness.

Furthermore western governments should try to avoid being identified with any particular Arab governments or movements, and deal with each of them with as few preconceptions as possible. If that means doing business with strongmen, as we were once happy to do out of a desire for a quiet life and stability, we should be prepared to do so again. We should avoid giving the impression that we prefer any particular stripe of regime: non-interference means just that. To Arab politicians who say that the west should favour Islamic governments, since that is what most Arabs want, I would argue that this may not in fact be the case, and that Islamic parties have no monopoly on competence or stability, as we saw with the  Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. We should support measures that make the Arab world more competitive and economically sturdy. We must help Arab states deal with the vast range of problems listed in the Arab Human Development Report. The Brotherhood for their part have so far failed to demonstrate that there is an Islamic solution to an economic crisis, youth unemployment or a food shortage.

Once IS has been defeated in Iraq and Syria, the west should leave it to the Arab countries to deal with religious wars themselves. The west can discreetly assist with intelligence and training. The US and Europe should provide help in building institutions in the region, through education and technical assistance. The Americans may find it hard to bear if Russia takes a prominent role, in cooperation with the Turks and Iranians, in trying to broker peace, for example in Syria. This is what happened in January this year, when these three regional powers held a conference on Syria in Astana, to which the Americans were invited as observers. However I would judge burden sharing and spreading the risks to be a better policy than one of direct intervention and nation building by force. By any rational analysis, the causes of the unrest in the Arab world are very deep, and we will have to live with the consequences for decades to come. Enunciating a new western policy of self-restraint will be very difficult, yet it is time to take a long look at the way ahead and avoid the urge to send in the Airborne Division.

Anthony Harris has spent most of his career in the Gulf. He is currently based in Dubai where he manages a Lloyd's-based regional reinsurance brokerage, RFIB whose regional office he set up. Prior to his move to Dubai, he served in the British Foreign Office, where he had eight jobs connected with the Arab World, culminating in his appointment in 1994 as Ambassador to the UAE. On leaving the Diplomatic Service, he joined Robert Fleming, in their Middle East Corporate Finance Department. When Flemings were taken over in 2000, he left to set up a consultancy business in Dubai, and continues to advise various companies operating in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. During his time as a diplomat, he was variously involved in UK-GCC defence relations, the technical security of Missions abroad, the management of the BBC World Service and the UK's commercial efforts in the Gulf, particularly in the oil and gas sector. He is a keen observer of the Gulf scene and travels regularly in the region.

10

Turkish Economy as a Motor of Growth in the Mediterranean Rim?

Mina Toksoz

7th April 2017

Turkey is often portrayed as a country on the "edge" of somewhere: edge of Europe, edge of the Slavic world, edge of the Arab World. But the one place it has incontestable physical and geographical presence and historical belonging is the Mediterranean. Yet, except for a few years prior to the Arab Spring, Turkish governments have tended to focus on relations elsewhere: the EU, Central Asia, Russia, GCC, or Africa. Nor is Turkey alone in neglecting the Mediterranean. In contrast to its central historic position, the Mediterranean mainly functions as a transport route between Europe and Asia – as underlined with China's purchase of Piraeus port as the end-point of its One Belt-One Road project. This article will briefly examine the current state of economic relations around the Mediterranean; trace the regional footprint and outlook for the Turkish economy and suggest that for conditions to improve regional growth engines are needed in line with the "flying geese" metaphor of the Asian model.

The neglected Mediterranean...

The wave of global integration in the 2000s mostly passed by the Mediterranean rim with the national economies on its shores looking elsewhere for growth. This was the case with the southern EU members which turned away from the Med as the centre of gravity of the EU single market shifted north. This process began with the southern enlargement of the EEC in the 1980s, followed by the EU eastern enlargement in the 2000s. More recently, the Eurozone crisis followed by lingering slow growth, high unemployment and debt in the southern EU economies have reinforced this negative dynamic.

Since the mid-1990s the Barcelona process, the EU-Med Association Agreements and the Union for the Med recognised these issues but the "Enlargement lite" model offered by the EU failed to reverse the centrifugal dynamic away from the Mediterranean. The agglomeration effects of the EU single market have continued to operate to widen the gap with the EU periphery. Outside of full membership, the EU has been unable to cohere constructive economic policies towards its periphery. In its place, there has been increased "securitisation" of EU policies towards the Mediterranean that has become its core feature since the 2015 migration crisis.

While the EU turned inwards and Turkey struggled to keep its foot in the single market with the EU/Turkey Customs Union, the Mediterranean Arab economic growth trends mostly tracked oil prices and looked to the rapidly growing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies. However, only a narrow section of the population benefited from the decade of growth in the 2000s due to the oligopolistic structure of the economies. The regime changes in 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia, have begun to chip away (more in the latter than the former) at this structure that limits competition in the domestic market, fosters corruption and keeps unemployment and social conflict high.

The many free-trade agreements (FTA) with the EU did succeed in increasing trade: exports to the EU from the non-EU economies around the Mediterranean rose to 30-60% of total goods exports. However, trade between the non-EU economies remain paltry at around 6-7% of total. This lack of integration between the smaller markets in the Mediterranean as well as weak rule of law and poor transport infrastructure and logistics have held back vital investments. Adding to the problems and blocking transport routes are the well-known long running regional conflicts and the more recent post-Arab Spring instability. Interference by powers external to the Mediterranean seeking spheres of influence have tended to further reinforce existing divisions. These conditions combined have thus created many sub-regional clusters that persist in fragmenting the region and undermining its economic potential.

...Looking for flying geese

The Mediterranean rim contains 20 countries, a population of around half a billion people or 7% of global population, and accounts for 10% of global GDP. The gap between per-capita income across the shores of the Mediterranean remains wide (France the highest has 5-times the per-capita income of Morocco the lowest). This region has had some of the fastest growing Emerging markets in the 2000s. But, the EU has lost market share to others, including the BRICS. The Mediterranean rim is an important market for the Southern EU-4 (SEU4) France, Italy, Spain, Greece. It accounts for 25-30% of total trade of SEU4; 10-15% of total trade is with each other and another 15% with the non-EU Mediterranean. The three biggest economies in southern Europe – Spain, France and Italy, would be expected to be engines of regional trade, investment and growth. This could follow the "flying geese" metaphor, where Japan, Korea and China's investments have rippled across neighbouring countries boosting economic development in South East Asia.

Yet, in southern EU, historically Spain has tended mostly to invest in Latin America and France to limit its focus on the Maghreb with finance and energy the main sectors. On the other hand, Italy has a wide regional and sectoral economic footprint spanning from North Africa, to Eastern Med and Turkey, to the Balkans. The Italian economy could be central to a revival of fortunes of the Mediterranean rim. Such a role for Italy could be strengthened if the identified structural reforms -- similar to those needed in many Mediterranean economies, are implemented. These include measures to loosen the hold of patronage relations, reduce corruption and barriers to competition, strengthen rule of law, and increase transparency.

Increased inter-industry linkages with southern-Med could help to restart a new cycle of investment and growth and to overcome SEU4 competitiveness problems. These links had begun in the 1980s/early 1990s, but the direction shifted as investment flowed into Eastern Europe. Since then, in its place, the EU has imported labour from the Med. But this option has become increasingly difficult to sustain politically. Given the negative demographics and rising labour costs in East Central Europe, this may be a time to revisit the southern-Med as an investment destination. The opportunities also include investment in this region as a base from which to reach the rapidly growing Sub-Saharan African markets, as China has discovered with its investment initiatives in Morocco.

For the economies on the southern and eastern shores, participating in global value chains (GVC) can increase productivity, help overcome middle-income trap barriers, and counter trends towards de-industrialisation. EU supply chain linkages are most developed with Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia. For example, Italian FDI in Tunisia in chemicals, electrical, and footwear industries employ 55,000. Indeed, among the southern and eastern-Med economies, Tunisia has the widest and most diversified trade relations with half its exports going to SEU4 and Turkey and Italy its main trading partners. In Morocco, the automotive sector has recently seen significant French FDI (Renault). Other sectors with more regional investment links include telecoms where France Telecom, Egypt's Orascom, Turkey's Turkcell, and Gulf telecoms are active. In Turkey, there is a broader range of inter-industry linkages. But even there, a recent OECD report highlighted the low level of GVC participation relative to its East European neighbours.

A major factor holding back GVC links is infrastructure. Although this is most developed in the energy sector which dominates north-south trade, there is still major untapped potential. Starting with the gas pipeline connecting Algeria via Tunisia to Italy in the 1970s, some 7,000 km of gas pipelines cross the region. The new gas field discoveries in the eastern Med could increase this connectivity possibly reaching the Turkish and Balkan markets. However, the lack of a pan-Mediterranean electricity grid was one of the causes of the failure of two ambitious EU backed multilateral projects -- the Desertec and the Med. It is still not complete: a project to link North Africa and EU electrical grids via Italy is ongoing, but the Syrian crisis is holding up connecting the Eastern Mediterranean grid to Turkey that would then link-up to the EU grid.

Turkish economy in the Mediterranean...

Of the non-EU Mediterranean economies, Turkey has the widest reach in the region. It is the one non-EU economy that trades, transports and invests the most in the Mediterranean rim and developments just prior to the Arab Spring showed that it could be the second growth node for the region. Around half of Turkey's total trade is with the EU; 10% with SEU4; 15% with Mediterranean rim as a whole. Uniquely, Turkish services exports are high including media and entertainment to construction and logistics, education, health, and tourism. For Turkey, this region is a natural economic hinterland. It offers opportunities to offset its energy imports deficit – the main component of the large current account deficit (excluding energy imports the current account is mostly balanced). It also helps offset loss of market share in EU markets to East/Central European new members and to Asian low cost producers.

Turkish governments took seriously the plan to establish a EUROMED free trade area by 2010. FTAs were agreed with every country (except Algeria) in addition to the 1995 Customs Union with the EU. In June 2010, a high level Strategic Council with representatives from Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon had met to move from bi-lateral FTAs into EU-style multilateral mechanisms. Yet the regional instability since the Arab spring protests in 2011, and the collapse of Syria and Libya has put these plans on hold blocking trade routes through Syria and Egypt. In addition, rising domestic political pressures since 2013 in Turkey translated into mis-steps on the foreign policy front, negatively affecting regional initiatives.

...could do with less political volatility...

For the Turkish economy to function as a driver of investment and growth in the region, there is need for domestic and regional political stability that allows for economic policy stability. Economic policy has turned reactive focused on fire-fighting domestic shocks and frequent crises with important regional trading partners such as Russia affecting the tourism sector (that contributes 13% of export receipts). Since 2015, the economy has had to cope with a repeat general election, the 2016 attempted coup and its aftermath, and multiple terrorist threats. Policy has had to sustain growth with consumer, credit, and investment incentives frequently handed out in the lead up to elections. Despite these props to domestic demand, GDP growth contracted in the aftermath of the July 2016 coup attempt. A rebound in consumption (in response to the consumer incentives packages) in the final months boosted GDP for 2016 as a whole to 2.9% although this was still half the average of 5-6% per year growth in the past decade (new series).

According to government economic spokesmen, short term prospects are positive. The economy bottomed out in the 4Q16; Syria solution is in sight; US President Trump is not a threat to Turkey; and relations with Russia are patched up. The economic policy team also believe that EU economic relations are set to deepen with the renegotiation of the Turkey-EU custom Union. Moreover, business have mostly welcomed the depreciation of the lira for reversing its real appreciation during 2003-2010. Supporting an economic recovery is the stronger growth in the EU, still low international oil prices, and a cautious pace of increase in US interest rates. This should help manage foreign payments pressures -- especially the onerous debt repayments on foreign currency debt of corporates. Thus, as long as a major global financial crisis can be avoided, the short to medium term outlook looks positive.

This is plausible. However, as we have seen in the past few years, there are significant downside risks to this benign outlook including possible further political shocks. Looking forward, there are also new risks that deteriorating political relations with the EU or the US could have negative economic impact on the Turkish economy. Downgrades of Turkey's hard-won investment grade sovereign ratings by international rating agencies in 2016 also cited weakened institutions as continued risks. Supporters of the AKP project for a presidential system argue it will help overcome the instability of the party/parliamentary institutions in Turkey. However, political volatility seems to have become an entrenched feature of AKP electoral strategy and it looks set to persist whether President Erdogan wins or loses the coming referendum.

Meanwhile, despite a tighter monetary policy, inflation topped 10% for the second month running in March – almost double the Central bank target, due to the pass through from lira depreciation. Given its large foreign currency payments burden (averaging around 25% of GDP), Turkish lira remains under pressure from the vagaries of international capital flows and US dollar gyrations. Central Bank policy -- caught between international markets looking for more decisive action versus domestic political pressures to maintain growth, seems to have opted to try to reduce speculative volatility but not resist depreciation of the TL arising from global forces. Meanwhile it is hoped that the firm fiscal stance and muted domestic demand will act to contain the pass-through inflation.

Since the global financial crisis, the domestic demand driven growth– as export growth slowed due to an appreciating lira and the Eurozone crisis, has also built up potential domestic imbalances. Although it was relatively subdued in 2016, credit relative to GDP has almost doubled in the past decade to around 80%. There is more scope for credit growth for an economy the size of Turkey. But, the rapid pace of growth holds risks in cyclical sectors such as construction and property. Indeed, recent reports of over-supply has led the government to step in late 2016 with tax discounts to boost house purchases. Although the public debt is low, the increasing state investment guarantees also suggest contingent liabilities need monitoring.

...less patronage...

More broadly, economic policy is likely to follow the new global trends: more statist, more crony capitalism. Although Turkish economy has done well out of the international liberalisation of trade, policy could also turn selectively protectionist. The ongoing centralisation of political power seems to have also brought a shift towards an Asian-style developmental state. As the state steps in, business circles which are close associates of the AKP follow – bringing with it the usual governance problems and corruption.

Patronage is a historic feature of Turkish and other Mediterranean cultures that have traditionally had weak rule of law and a large informal economy. The latter has grown in past decades with increased smuggling activity fostered by international sanctions on Iran and the collapse of Syria. Following a period of increased transparency in its first term when a major privatisation programme was implemented, AKP appears to have reverted to new forms of patronage. There are also echoes of Kremlin tactics, for example in the energy sector where President Erdogan's son-in law is the minister. However, unlike the resource based economies such as Russia with structures that facilitate oligarchic control, the diversity and by now complexity of the Turkish economy, as well as large holdings in key sectors that predate the AKP regime, could act to limit the reach of the Asian-Kremlin-crony model.

...and a new growth model

Turkish economy's evident resilience to high levels of volatility is owed to a number of structural strengths which are likely to continue to support economic prospects. These underlying strengths include its large internal market, diversified economy, relatively well regulated banking sector, and low public debt. Growth will also be supported by the large infrastructure investments in energy, transport, and health that are expected to be funded by PPP-type project finance, Islamic finance, and the new Turkish Wealth Fund.

Yet, longer term, for the Turkish economy to be a motor of growth for the Mediterranean region a new growth model that is less reliant on domestic demand is necessary. Drivers of growth need to change, from extensive growth (more resources used in the same way) to higher productivity/ higher technology growth. This requires increased global integration with GVC to overcome the "middle income trap" which in the case of Turkey could be led by strategic sectors identified as the defence industry, automotive, transport, telecoms, engineering and logistics. Policy recommendations to exit the middle-income trap highlight three broad necessary conditions: improved competition, technological upgrading, and macro-economic stability. There is a high risk that continued political instability, deterioration in transparency, weakening rule of law, traditional norms blocking increased participation of women in employment, and decreasing political accountability could undermine this project.

However, despite the fraught political atmosphere, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim's government and economic policy team do seem to have these developmental tasks in their sights. The past few years have seen difficult structural reforms passed including labour market reforms, pension reform and a national fund to boost the savings rate – although these will take time to have an effect. In December 2016 taking advantage of the powers under emergency rule also saw the passage of the Intellectual Property Rights legislation that had been languishing in parliamentary committees since 2013.

Conclusion

Despite the difficulties of doing business around the Mediterranean, the existential crisis of the EU, and the roller-coaster ride of the Turkish economy, there is no other alternative but for these littoral states to cooperate and engage in increased trade and investment. Given its internal political tensions, the Turkish economy is unlikely to be the poster-child of successful policy and steady growth. But it is likely to continue to be a growth pole of sorts making uneven progress towards a more productive economy. As discussed above and, given its size (some $850bn), along with Italy –the other big economy with a wide regional reach -- an upgrade of the Turkish economy could provide opportunities for a new round of cross-border investments establishing new supply chains across the Mediterranean. Prior to the Syrian crisis, Turkey had visa-free travel with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan which resulted in a doubling of trade volumes. Between 2004-10, the number of Turkish companies operating in Egypt had more than tripled and were employing 40,000 Egyptians. The conditions are not there yet for a major restart of this dynamic, but small steps are ongoing. Recent news from the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) reported several investments in the Balkans and a Turkish solar panel manufacturer investing to produce in Palestine. Today the "geese" leading the flight in South East Asia also include firms from Indonesia, Malaysia, or Thailand investing in Viet Nam or Cambodia. In East Central Europe, firms from Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic have taken flight to invest further east. It is time for a Mediterranean take on this metaphor.

Dr Mina Toksoz is an Honorary Lecturer at the University of Manchester Business School and an Associate Fellow of International Economics at Chatham House (RIIA). She is a specialist in country risk analysis, and an Independent Director on the Supervisory Board of the EIU Country Risk Service. Her book The Economist Guide to Country Risk was published in November 2014.This essay will be part of a panel at the BRISMES conference in July: "The Mediterranean Rim – looking for a growth engine".

11

The New Neocons and the Middle East

Alastair Newton

30th August 2017

The 'war' in the White House

"So whose advice will Mr Trump follow? The answer is unclear. Yet the stability of the world may depend on it."

The Economist, 25 February 2017

Shortly after this year's jamboree at Davos I was approached by one of my financial sector clients to write a piece on 'war risk', which seemed to be a recurrent theme at the Forum. The first substantive section of the resultant report was headed "The 'war' in the White House". It focused in particular on the 'world view' of President Donald Trump's then Chief Strategist, Steve Bannon, and whether it would prevail over the perspective of other senior members of the Administration sometimes referred to in the corridors of power in Washington as the 'adults' or 'grown-ups'.

Around that time, some White House watchers (eg Nate Silver and his team at FiveThirtyEight) were identifying as many as eight groups in the Administration, all struggling for influence. I don't doubt that this was — and probably still is despite Mr Bannon's recent departure — correct. But, for the purposes of my client base, it is really too granular. So, my personal focus had been on what I saw as the three main ones, i.e.:

  * The 'Breitbart Set', notably: Mr Bannon, Senior Advisor Stephen Miller, Deputy Assistant to the President Sebastian Gorka and (for economic purposes at least) Director of Trade Policy Peter Navarro;

  * The 'grown-ups', notably: Vice-President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Defence Secretary James Mattis, Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, Chief Economic Advisor Gary Cohn and National Security Advisor HR McMaster; and,

  * The 'family', ie: Senior Advisor Jared Kushner and his wife, Assistant to the President Ivanka Trump.

Although I am clear in my mind that the third of these groups, i.e. the family, is by far the most interesting and influential, I continue to be very cautious in offering any strong opinion about either Mr Kushner's or Ms Trump's substantive views on many of the major issues confronting the Trump Administration. However, 'events' in early April did to offer some clear pointers, at least as far as international security in general and the Middle East in particular are concerned. And, overall, these pointers have been firmed up by developments since then.

As a consequence, in this article I look to update the case for why the still evolving Trump Administration policy in the Middle East is reverting to something close to pre-Obama 'conventional' Washington thinking — in stark contrast to the nationalist "America First' policy espoused by many of Mr Trump's supporters and which was a cornerstone of his successful election campaign.

When 'fake news' is not so fake

"The purge of New Jersey Governor Chris Christie loyalists from the Donald Trump presidential transition team has little to do with Christie's Bridgegate scandal and everything to do with a battle between Bush-era neoconservatives and national security realists for control over key departments of the Trump administration."

Wayne Madsen, 16 November 2016

Anyone who follows the right-wing commentators in the US could legitimately argue that in April I belatedly came to an opinion similar to that which had been prevalent in that particular circle for some time, ie that Mr Kushner enjoys a world view which has much in common with that of the neoconservative members of the George W Bush Administration. Indeed, in many respects Mr Kushner personal 'political' history to date can be said to follow a similar (if somewhat accelerated) trajectory to the history of the neoconservatives as a group since its origins in the 1960s, not least in that, as the right-wing regularly points out, he was a committed Democrat until he joined his father-in-law's campaign team.

In the article from which the quote at the start of this section was taken, right-wing commentator Wayne Madsen claims that, during the transition, Mr Kushner was looking to fill the Trump Administration with neocons. If this claim was justified then it has to be said that, even though several neocons (perhaps most notably former US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton) were almost certainly considered for key posts, Mr Kushner was not really very successful. Indeed, no doubt under the influence of Mr Bannon, Mr Trump went as far as to block the appointment of Mr Tillerson's first choice for Deputy Secretary of State, Elliott Abrams, albeit not, on the face of it at least, because of his neoconservative leanings. At the time, this hardly seemed surprising given the stark contrast between Mr Trump's "America First" campaign keynote and contemporary neoconservative thought.

Instead, as the names in the 'grown-ups' column make clear, Mr Trump opted largely for individuals drawn largely from the mainstream, ie neither right-wing nationalists of the Bannon mould nor neoconservatives.

This being said, although the story really only burst fully into the open in the wake of Mr Bannon's early April departure from the Principals' Committee of the National Security Council (NSC/PC), it had been no secret in Washington for weeks that he and Mr Kushner had been at odds over a whole range of issues. Whether he jumped or was pushed, even though Mr Bannon's removal from the NSC/PC was primarily a victory for Mr McMaster, it was nevertheless one of several issues where, in my view, the National Security Advisor and Mr Kushner had common cause.

Furthermore, we can safely assume that, although the prime mover behind Mr Bannon's departure from the White House in mid-August was clearly the recently appointed Chief of Staff, General John Kelly, there can be no doubt whatsoever that Messrs Kushner and McMaster both strongly supported this second and even more significant ouster.

PNAC 1.0

"History may not repeat itself but it does rhyme..."

Joseph Anthony Wittreich, 1987

In so saying, I am struck by what I see as an echo of the alliance which formed in 1997 under the banner of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Founded by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, the PNAC was rightly labelled as a neoconservative think tank; but it included in its membership both Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld — respectively Vice-President and Secretary for Defence to George W Bush — whom I would not personally label as neocons.

I am sure some commentators would disagree with me over Messrs Cheney and Rumsfeld. And, to be fair, there is more than enough room for different perspectives here. For starters, how neoconservatives define themselves has evolved since the 1960s — and, indeed, since the first reference I can find of a neoconservative, Irving Kristol, applying the term to himself in print — in 1979. However, given that I draw comparisons in this article between the George W Bush Administration and the Trump Administration, I think it reasonable to apply the criteria of that era, chief among which was a willingness to pursue unilaterally US military interests, including through pre-emptive strikes (to which I shall return). This was enshrined and elaborated in a 20 September 2002 National Security Council text entitled National Security Strategy of the United States, subsequently commonly referred to as the 'Bush doctrine'.

This doctrine seems to me to be a somewhat narrower mandate than that proposed in the PNAC's 1997 statement of founding principles, which set itself up as a blueprint to "shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests". In addition to major increases in defence spending (to which Mr Trump has also committed himself), it argued for the promotion of "political and economic freedom abroad", strengthened ties with democratic allies (seemingly not a priority for Candidate Trump at least), extending "an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles" (ditto) and challenging "regimes hostile to our interests and values". The authors boiled this down to a call for "Reaganite...military strength and moral clarity".

Where I think the key difference arises between the 'true' neocons and Messrs Cheney and Rumsfeld is in the former's commitment to — if necessary, long-term — nation-building. In contrast, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Mr Rumsfeld's top priority — for which he had the backing of Mr Cheney — appeared to be proving what became known in the press as the 'Rumsfeld doctrine'. The essence of this was the use of high-technology combat systems, a high reliance on air power, and ground forces which were both light and nimble. It contrasts strongly with the use of overwhelming numerical force which had been one of the key elements in the 1990/91 liberation of Kuwait.

Unfortunately, although the Rumsfeld approach was successful as far as ousting the regime in Baghdad was concerned, it also ran contrary to all the received wisdom on securing the peace, which established doctrine made clear required far greater numbers than the US and its allies committed to the theatre not only in the early post-invasion days but throughout. This despite the fact that there were those in the Administration — notably the then Director of Mr Bush's National Economic Council, Larry Lindsey — who argued at the time that the Pentagon was severely underestimating the cost of peace-building. In common with several other members of the Bush economic team Mr Lindsey had previously been at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) which included leading neocons Michael Ledeen and Richard Perle in its ranks. Mr Lindsey felt strongly enough about this to go public, a move which cost him his job.

Although the history of the invasion and occupation of Iraq is clearly packed with policy (and other) mistakes, this breach with neoconservative thinking on nation building seems to me to come close to 'original sin' and to set its principal drivers apart from the 'true' neocons.

All this being said, the extent to which the PNAC per se influenced the foreign policy of the Bush Administration, in particular the invasion of Iraq, is a matter of academic dispute. But there is no disputing the fact that ten of the 25 original signatories to the PNAC's statement of founding principles served in that Administration; and that the triumvirate of Messrs Cheney and Rumsfeld plus Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz (whom I would classify as a genuine neocon) were very influential indeed in the wake of the September 11 attacks.

A Damascene conversion?

"Whether these ghastly images have put Donald Trump on a Damascene road is not yet knowable."

Thomas Donnelly, 7 April 2017

Today the PNAC is defunct; it was wound up in 2006 and replaced by the Foreign Policy Initiative, also founded by Messrs Kagan and Kristol, in 2009. And, in any case, even adding Mr Mattis to the mix (as I think one can reasonably do), a Kushner/McMaster alliance hardly amounts to a new PNAC. Nevertheless, it is, as I shall explore later in this article, a powerful and potentially dominant new triumvirate.

Furthermore, although one cannot be sure given her public coyness about her views, it reasonable to assume that Ivanka Trump shares at least some of her husband's perspectives, augmenting the neocon heft in the President's inner circle. Certainly, the right-wing bloggers think so.

Then there is Deputy National Security Advisor Dina Powell. She was a top aide to Ms Trump during the transition and, although not noted as a neocon herself, may have been pivotal in bringing Mr Kushner together with Mr McMaster. It is very relevant to note that, together with Mr Kushner (and Gary Cohn), she was the focus of ire among the right-wingers even before the Syria strike; and her position has undoubtedly been strengthened since then by the removal of fellow deputy KT McFarland from the national security team.

Consistent with the principle that 'every picture tells a story', the photograph of the Trump 'war room' in the aftermath of the Syria strike speaks volumes. Even though there are several cabinet members present who would not normally be involved to this extent in national security because this meeting took place in the margins of the Trump/Xi Jinping summit, Mr Kushner is front and centre. Mr Bannon, on the other hand, is sitting completely out of the President's line of sight and too far behind him easily to whisper in his ear. Ms Powell too is in the second row; but she is sitting right behind Mr Tillerson and Mr McMaster (and next to Mr Cohn).

Overall, it is well worth noting that the neocon journal, The Weekly Standard, in the article from which the quote at the start of this section is taken, has been quick to praise Mr Trump's decision to launch airstrikes against Syria and to ask whether a strategic shift was "afoot". As the author, Thomas Donnelly, makes clear, it was still early days. But Mr Donnelly was correct in pointing out that, to judge from the statement the President made to the press announcing the airstrikes, Mr Trump was moved to action by the horror of a gas attack by which "...Assad choked out the lives of helpless men, women, and children". Hardly the reaction of a man committed solely to furthering American interests, even though it is undoubtedly the case that the US does have a major interest in preventing the spread and use of WMD.

Of course, the cynics may claim that Mr Trump was driven largely by a desire to differentiate himself from President Barack Obama — as he has on several other issues. I don't doubt that there was indeed an element of that. But my personal belief is that it would be selling the current President short not to acknowledge the genuineness of his upset during the press conference, which came through despite his obvious discomfort at having, under-rehearsed, to use a teleprompter.

Pre-emption and Pyongyang...

"Particularly in the past decade or so, we have lived in a society increasingly marked by belief in the use of force as a first and only option."

Ron Paul, 9 February 2013

It is, I think, uncontroversial to say that neither in his election campaign nor in his first 18 months or so in office, President George W Bush exhibited few, if any, signs of neoconservatism. Indeed, even though he was by no means as extreme as Candidate Trump, Mr Bush's leaning towards a more restrained foreign policy could be said to be a milder version of a key Trump campaign theme. But the 9/11 attacks brought about a dramatic change, leading to the so-called 'Bush Doctrine' and its justification of 'pre-emptive war'.

Notwithstanding the US's extensive and increasing use of drones, the general consensus is that the doctrine of pre-emption was quietly dropped during the Obama presidency. And I don't think it would be reasonable to view the 7 April strike against Syria as in any way pre-emptive. But, considering the heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, it is, I believe, an open question as to whether pre-emption is now back on the table. Indeed, in an article published byGlobal Policy on 5 April I went further, opining that the Trump Administration "may well conclude ultimately that a preemptive military strike would be preferable" to a genuinely nuclear-capable North Korea — a view which is consistent with the recent statement by the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford to the effect that the Pentagon is actively exploring military options.

...and more in the Middle East?

"There seems to be no central guiding brain behind the evolution of the Trump team's foreign policy. The US president himself has failed to articulate any clear approach."

Jonathan Marcus, 11 April 2017

Without wishing to dismiss for one moment North Korea (which I firmly believe to be the biggest current threat to international security), what seems to be a very dramatic shift in thinking in Washington has implications potentially at least as significant for the Middle East. The problem was though that, although the Obama stance appears to have been abandoned, as the BBC'sJonathan Marcus rightly judged around the time of the cruise missile strike against the Assad regime, it was uncertain exactly what had taken its place.

In the April version of this paper, I accepted that it was still early days, not only since the strike against Syria but also — truth be told — in the settling down generally of the Trump Administration, which remained beset internally by conflicting forces. Furthermore, and accepting Mr Marcus's concern that a lack of clarity in US policy in the region could yet "prove catastrophic", I questioned whether Mr Trump himself, who promised that his foreign policy would be "unpredictable", found this particularly worrisome.

Nevertheless, I felt able even at that 'early' stage in the Administration to offer what I saw as some clear pointers to help to assess how US foreign policy was likely evolve. These have, if anything, been confirmed by events since then.

First, I opined in April that the 'Breitbart set' was still very much part of the team, even though Mr Bannon's influence over Mr Trump seemed to have waned. Now, as I have already noted, Mr Bannon has departed. But his ouster was certainly not for ideological reasons; indeed, his world view is still almost certainly closer than anyone else's who has served this Administration to the President's. So, even if some of Mr Bannon's allies still in the White House rapidly follow him through the exit (indeed, one in particular, Sebastian Gorka, departed just a week later), it is safe to assume that much of what he stands for will recur in the Administration's internal deliberations. Furthermore, in being probably the strongest voice on behalf of many of those who voted Mr Trump into power, Mr Bannon is still likely to have the President's ear via various media portals.

Second, we can reasonably assume that (barring seriously damaging revelations from the ongoing investigations into Russian interference in the US election) 'the family' will remain not only firmly on the team but right at its heart for the foreseeable future. Mr Kushner will therefore continue to be highly influential.

Third, among the 'grown-ups' although the amount of clout which Mr Tillerson wields remains open to question, Messrs Mattis and McMaster seem to have established themselves firmly in key positions. Add Mr Kelly to the mix and we have a powerful overlapping 'triumvirate', this time of generals.

Fourth, a Kushner/Mattis/McMaster triumvirate, aided and abetted by Mr Kelly and Ms Powell, is likely to get the better of the 'Breitbart set' far more often than not.

Fifth, the key to establishing what this means for the Middle East may be Mr Kushner, who formally has lead responsibility for the region in the White House hierarchy.

As Jodi Kantor wrote in The New York Times just prior to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's February visit to Washington, Mr Kushner's views on the region have, to date, been formed much more on his personal experience than any professional engagement there. Ms Kantor goes on:

"When Mr. Trump ran for president, his son-in-law's stances on Israel helped shape the campaign. Mr. Kushner helped script a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and consulted with Netanyahu officials behind the scenes. When he brought the candidate and the prime minister together for a meeting, his father, Charles Kushner, was invited to join them. Thanks in part to the younger Mr. Kushner, Mr. Netanyahu will arrive [for his 14 February meeting with Mr Trump] at a White House that has already adopted many of the prime minister's perspectives on the region."

Pulling all this together and in the light of recent events, I think we can reasonably extrapolate as follows.

  * Traditional allies: If Mr Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia in May told us anything, it is that his Administration is going to side firmly — and certainly more firmly than did the Obama Administration — with America's traditional allies in the region. Putting to one side the issue of major arms deals with Saudi Arabia itself (to which there remains much less than Mr Trump has claimed), there are clearly two main drivers at work here. First, Mr Trump is not alone in Washington in his hawkish stance on Iran (see below). Second, Mr Kushner sees Saudi Arabia as a potential ally in his efforts to broker an Israel/Palestine peace deal (again, see below).

The extent to which Mr Trump personally encouraged ex-ante Saudi Arabia and the UAE subsequently to lash out at another close US ally, Qatar, remains unclear. But his public statements after the start of the crisis were certainly not helpful to its (still outstanding) resolution. What this — together with the removal of Prince Mohammad bin Nayef from the line of succession — probably tells us, however, is that (now) Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) has done a very good job of winning over the US President personally as an ally.

What is clear is that Qatar's — in my view, entirely predictable — decision to reestablish formal diplomatic ties with Iran in response to the continuing impasse in its relations with Saudi Arabia will not have been welcomed by Washington.

It appears that Mr Trump has also struck up a sound relationship with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt. I think this is likely to be sustained, not only because of Egypt's own struggle with Islamist terrorism (counter-productive though its approach may ultimately prove to be) but also because of the Sisi regime's generally supportive stance towards Israel, which would likely see Cairo playing an important role in any attempt to relaunch the Middle East Peace Process. However, and despite Mr Trump's pledge not to lecture America's Arab allies, this has not stopped the US reportedly deciding to withhold and cut aid to Egypt over alleged human rights issues and links to North Korea.

  * Iran: Although the focus on the Middle East generally has recently been diluted by events on and around the Korean peninsula, it is, I believe, only a matter of time before the Trump Administration turns back directly to Iran. This fits not only with both Mr Trump's and Mr Kushner's world view but also with the well-documented hawkishness on Iran of both Mr Mattis and, if perhaps somewhat less so, Mr McMaster.

Even since April, we have seen both the Administration and Congress bring in new (non-nuclear-related) sanctions against Iran. And it has been widely reported that Mr Trump has ordered his staffers to find ways which would allow him to walk away from the nuclear deal. Especially following Mr Bannon's ouster, I think the President will continue to be persuaded not to fulfil this particular campaign pledge. But he is likely to try to find other (non-military) means to provoke Iran into abandoning its commitments, which will certainly make President Hassan Rouhani's task in holding the line domestically even more difficult than it is already.

Furthermore, the hardliners in Tehran will have to be very careful if they are not to risk provoking the US into direct military action of some sort (granted that they may be tempted to do just that in an effort to shore up support for the regime at some stage). 'Harassment' of US warships and, more especially, continued testing of ballistic missiles are both possible triggers. However (and just to be absolutely clear), I would put a very low probability indeed on an Iraq-type wholesale invasion of Iran.

  * Syria: For now at least the top priority for the US remains ousting Islamic State (see below) from Raqqa and trying to secure peace there thereafter.

Beyond this, I tend to accept more or less at face value Mr Trump's stated desire that the US will not get drawn further into the Syrian civil war. Indeed, despite the recent marked deterioration in Russia/US relations, it does seem at present as if the US is prepared to an extent to play second fiddle to Moscow, perhaps especially in the south of the country.

A legitimate concern here is that one (presumably unintended) consequence of the Russia/US ceasefire agreement in the south could be an Iranian (and/or pro-Iranian) military presence onIsrael's de facto border on the Golan Heights. This is clearly something which Israel could not tolerate, risking a conflict which would almost certainly spill over into renewed war withHizbollah in Lebanon.

As far as the interests of Russia are concerned, President Vladimir Putin's top priority will be to keep the Russian people convinced that the rodina is not only a major player in the region but is also not being pushed around by the US. To try to ensure this, I reckon that Mr Putin would ultimately be willing to sacrifice Mr Assad personally, provided that a Moscow-friendly regime remains firmly in situ in Damascus. Regrettably, this would not be an outcome which, in my view, would bring peace and stability to a reunited Syria; indeed, as David Gardner intimated in a 30 November 2016 article in the Financial Times (subscriber access only), an Alawite regime of any description imaginable in Damascus is only likely to continue to act as a valuable recruiting tool for IS.

  * Islamic State (IS): Despite Mr Trump's rhetoric I am sure there are plenty around him who realise that IS will not be 'destroyed' by military means alone even if, as now looks inevitable, its so-called caliphate is eradicated. IS will simply melt away into the 'badlands' and operate as an insurgency in Iraq and Syria, as well as looking to set up in other troubled states and continuing to export terrorism (in its name at least) to the wider world.

  * Iraq: Although, as previously noted, I do not expect significant US engagement in 'post-caliphate' Syria, I do think this is much more likely in Iraq — in other words, a reversion to nation building. There are already reports of Saudi Arabia looking to mend fences with Baghdad, which both Riyadh and Washington presumably see as a key step in undercutting Tehran.

This being said, pushing Iran out will not be easy. Not only is the government in Baghdad very close to Tehran but the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has played just as major role as the US in boosting Iraq's own military (including the Shia militia) to the point where it has been able to push back successfully against IS's caliphate. Now that the common cause of shoe-horning IS out of Mosul has been achieved, the tactical rapprochement between Iran (which recently sent a new ambassador to Baghdad who is a senior advisor to Quds commander General Qassim Suleimani) and the US may quickly fall apart. As the 15 April article 'Who runs Iraq' in The Economist (subscriber access only) concluded: "Iraq, like Syria, is a theatre where Mr Trump badly needs a clear policy" — something which, in my view, is still notably absent but which may be easier to agree following Mr Bannon's ouster.

A possible 'wild card' lies in recent reports (highlighted by fellow e-book author Meir Javedanfar) that Riyadh has sought help from Baghdad towards some measure of rapprochement with Tehran. On the face of it this seems unlikely; but it may be that MBS is looking to cut his losses having been damaged personally by the Kingdom's military adventurism (in Yemen in particular), which has failed to prevent Iran from tightening its grip regionally. In the (in my view) unlikely event of this coming to something, it is not at all clear how Washington would react; but it could certainly be a worthwhile step towards bringing some greater stability to Iraq.

  * The Kurds: As a counterweight to Iran if nothing else, the Trump Administration will want to bind the Kurdistan Region firmly into the Iraqi state. Although the independence referendum due to be held on 25 September is non-binding it will not be helpful in achieving this objective if it goes ahead and the vote goes as expected.

The situation in Syria is likely to prove even more complicated, for all of the pledges by both Mr Tillerson and Mr Lavrov that it must remain a unified entity (at least de jure). Balkanisation to a greater or lesser extent seems to be highly likely, which would mean the continuation of some sort of at least quasi-autonomous Kurdish entity in the north of the country, ie 'Rojava' on the border with Turkey.

Ties between the US-backed Kurdish People's Protection Unit (YPG) in Syria and the (terrorist-designated) PKK more or less guarantee continued cross-border tensions, especially if Turkish President Recipe Tayyip Erdoğan persists in playing to the nationalist gallery at home. Furthermore, even putting to one side other causes of friction between Turkey and the US, I think the 'Kurdish question', which dominated Mr Tillerson's visit to Ankara earlier this year, ensures no 'reset' in Turkey/US bilateral relations of the sort Mr Erdoğan appeared to have been hoping for immediately after the US election.

  * Yemen: By all informed accounts Yemen is at least as big a disaster as Syria, albeit one which gets much less attention. Like it or not, the growing presence of both IS and, more especially, al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) there more or less ensures that the US will remain engaged and probably increasingly so, even if mainly through drones/airstrikes and support for (and guidance of) Saudi Arabia's campaign. Washington will also want to counter Tehran's influence there (which has grown significantly since the Saudi intervention).

  * Israel/Palestine: Reverting to the article by Jodi Kantor to which I referred earlier:

"Mr. Kushner is helping Mr. Trump and Mr. Netanyahu craft a strategy to recruit Sunni Muslim countries that oppose Iran to help foster an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. The approach is a long shot: Negotiations are dead. The Israeli right is pushing for more settlement in the West Bank as talk among Palestinians turns to a single state in which they have equal rights."

Without meaning any disrespect to Mr Kushner, it would be quite astonishing if he were to find a widely acceptable solution to a problem which has confounded seasoned statesmen and diplomats for over 25 years (ie since the 1991 Madrid Conference). Even if Riyadh, as Mr Kushner appears to hope, can be persuaded to put its weight behind a revived process of some sort. As yet, I have seen nothing emerge from his late August mission to the region which encourages optimism.

More likely, in my view, is that any initiative which does emerge as a result of his efforts quickly runs into the sand; and that Israel continues to consolidate its physical presence on the West Bank towards the point where a two-state solution becomes completely non-viable. At the same time, I see, if anything, an even lower probability of an agreement being reached involving a unitary state in which the Palestinians would have equal rights.

Pivoting back?

"...there's a good case to be made that, at least in regard to the Middle East, a coherent approach is emerging from the administration. This represents both a reversal from the Iran-first gambit of the Obama years and a reaffirmation of the traditional US strategy that held sway from Jimmy Carter in 1979 through George W Bush in 2009."

Thomas Donnelly, 7 April 2017

Pulling all this together, I sense that (not unlike Mr Trump seems to be doing) I am about to back-track on a long-held conviction. I have argued for some years that the Clinton/Gates 'strategic pivot' to Asia, adopted but only partially implemented by Mr Obama, would accelerate in the latter part of the current decade. And that, especially in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal and given the US's move towards energy self-sufficiency, this would likely be in part at the expense of the US military profile in the Gulf region. However, I am now leaning firmly towards the view that, while avoiding the sort of major on-the-ground engagement to which George W Bush committed America in Iraq, the Trump Administration will retain a high military profile there for the foreseeable future, working closely with the US's traditional Sunni allies. This view is certainly one which seems to be prevalent among Arab leaders and it is one which has done much to boost Mr Trump's personal popularity among Arabs.

At the same time, Israel will once again enjoy strong, if not more or less unquestioning, support from Washington.

In short, I tend to agree with Gideon Rachman, writing in the Financial Times on 10 April (subscriber access only) that:

"...the Trump Administration may ultimately turn out to be more conventional than his critics feared, and his nationalist supporters hoped".

As Mr Rachman goes on to make clear, this is not without its risks. First, the boost which the Syria strike gave Mr Trump's (now sagging) approval ratings may encourage him into more military adventurism. Second, there is the risk of serious escalation in the Middle East per se.

How great either of these risks are is near impossible to say at this time. As I have intimated earlier, with IS's caliphate rolled back, Washington's focus is likely increasingly to be on countering Iran's wider regional aspirations. To this end, as yet there is no sign that the Trump Administration is willing to countenance engagement with Tehran as the way forward, suggesting that military means — albeit largely through proxies (including, possibly, Israel) — will be very much to the fore. This clearly is not without its dangers. And it is not at all clear that, come what may, it would achieve long-term stability given the deep-rooted and long-standing historical rivalries involved here.

If anything, this trajectory now seems even more likely to be followed than was the case when I first put pen to paper in April. That this is so is rooted on the ouster of Mr Bannon, a firm disciple of Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis who believes that the Judeo-Christian West (in which he includes Russia) is now engaged in an existential struggle against Islam. Nevertheless, albeit from the wings, Mr Bannon will continue to remind Mr Trump of why he was elected, promoting views, including on Islam, which are shared by voters on whom Mr Trump will depend again if he is to secure a second term.

As I have opined in several articles over the past nine months or so, Mr Trump's entire career to date suggests that he divides what he sees as a 'zero sum' world into two categories of people, ie 'winners' and 'losers'; and that for him being firmly in the former category is the be all and end all. The ultimate definition of a first-term president who ends up a 'loser' must surely be failing to win a second term of office, a trap into which Mr Trump will surely do everything he can not to fall. Herein lies, perhaps, Mr Bannon's strongest lever to push back against my emerging new 'triumvirate'.

Perhaps especially if this assessment is correct, Mr Trump faces some much tougher decisions in the future than deciding whether to strike at the Assad regime over the use of chemical weapons. And nowhere more so than in the Middle East.

Alastair Newton, is a professional political analyst who was based in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. As such, he sought to anticipate, analyse and explain political and geopolitical events worldwide which may impact on financial markets. In addition to regular commentary on current political "issues" he is also co-author of major studies on China, India, Indonesia, Israel/Iran and North Korea. Prior to his move to the City, Alastair spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. He served in Sub-Saharan Africa, Paris (at the OECD) and in the United States. In London, he worked in intelligence co-ordination (including during the 1990/91 gulf War), policy planning and economics relations, as well as running the Prime Minister's G7/8 team from 1998 to 2000. He was on secondment from the Diplomatic Service to the City from 2000 to 2002. This piece was originally published online in April and updated in August.

12

The Future of Yemen

Helen Lackner

1st May 2017

Even before the outbreak of the internationalised war now more than two years ago in March 2015, the medium to long-term future of Yemen was bleak. The country's prospects were marred by a number of fundamental challenges which would jeopardise the prospects of the best governed nations, let alone one poor in natural resources which is also ruled by a small kleptocratic elite. The challenges all remain, even if currently overshadowed by the immediate issues of the fighting, aerial bombing and famine.

Water

One third (1.4 billion cubic metres) of the water currently used is 'mined' from  non-renewable fossil aquifers. Water scarcity is the most fundamental threat to Yemen's very existence as a populated area. While this is in part due to climate change aspects (discussed below), many of its causes and consequences are related to other factors. Yemen has suffered from water scarcity for centuries: In the past 300 years, thousands of its people emigrated to east Africa, south and south-east Asia and elsewhere to escape from drought-related famines. The introduction of diesel pumps for irrigation in the twentieth century exacerbated the problem although it had initially been perceived as a magical solution enabling the cultivation of high value crops like fruits, vegetables and qat instead of the subsistence rain fed cereals of the terraces. Expanding vastly in the late 1970s and early 1980s the negative consequences of deep pumping became all too apparent in the early years of this century: with shallow wells drying up as a result of over-extraction, only those able to drill to greater depths were able to continue irrigating. As a result only the larger, wealthier landowners can sustain irrigated agriculture, while smallholders no longer have access to water and either have to sell their land, or revert to rain-fed cereal cultivation. Moreover the depletion of the aquifers has not only concentrated land ownership in fewer hands, and worsened poverty for those who were forced to become sharecroppers or daily labourers, but also initiated the forced abandonment of villages once they ran out of domestic water.

In the cities, the dreams of constant running water which encouraged people to build houses with numerous bathrooms in the 1980s, are now full of containers filled with water on the few days a week when water does come through the taps. Many urban areas, even wealthy ones, are simply not connected to the network. Sana'a, predicted to be the first capital to run out of water in coming years, is far behind Taiz in this respect where water [when connected to the network] arrived every 40 days in 1996 and about every 60 days in 2015 just before the war started.

The high population density highlands and mountains are where water is likely to run out first, driving more people to the coastal areas. These will, in future, only be able to cope if desalination is introduced as the source for all domestic water and the limited aquifers are protected from over-extraction. Otherwise these areas which are agriculturally important, will suffer even more from saline intrusion, killing off agriculture altogether. The situation differs from one area to another: Hadramaut has a major aquifer which should save it from these problems.

Many parts of Yemen are likely to become uninhabitable within a few decades unless prudent measures are urgently taken and enforced to manage water, prioritizing human and animal drinking needs, followed by other domestic needs. Although agriculture remains a major source of income for over 60% of the population today, this may drop to 50% or so within a generation but this will still mean a large number of people in view of population growth. If agriculture is to remain a viable source of income for rural people, a totally new approach is essential and requires the development of high value rain-fed crops and irrigation systems which maximise the value obtained from any water, while only using the surplus annually renewable supplies. In plain English the amount of water used in irrigation must be dramatically reduced to allow basic human needs to be addressed. Desalination for coastal areas is inescapable. In the absence of such measures, the likely 50 million Yemenis in the middle of this century will have no alternative but to become refugees. Regardless of barriers and minefields, they are likely to force their way into the territories of their wealthy neighbours overland, given that climate related problems in East Africa are unlikely to make that area attractive.

Other climate related challenges

Overexploitation of Yemen's water resources is worsened by other climate-related issues, some of which also affect the availability of water. With more unpredictable and violent rain fall episodes, crop yields are all the more unreliable, aquifers cannot absorb the flow and replenish. Violent flows wash away top-soil, destroy river banks and generally cause major damage. Desertification is also increasing and causing the loss of about 3% of cultivable land each year, as well as reducing pasture land.

Rising sea levels will affect much of the fisheries and coastal infrastructure, as well the living conditions for three of the country's major cities: Hodeida, Aden and Mukalla. Mitigating this will require considerable financial investment, just at a time when many highlanders will be moving to these coastal areas and thus putting more pressure on resources there.

Limited Natural Resources

While there is talk of a 'resource curse' for some states which have plentiful mineral resources, such as Congo, Nigeria and the big oil exporters of the Arabian peninsula, this concept is highly debatable as the real issue is not the availability of the resources but their management. Seen from the point of view of a state which has insufficient natural resources, the problem would be welcome. Short of unlikely discoveries of additional oil or gas, Yemen will run out of oil within the coming decade unless military activity completely prevents its extraction;  production has fallen from its peak in 2001 of over 400 000 barrels/day to only about 130 000 b/d in 2014 just before the crisis expanded into full-scale war, and the overall trend is firmly downward.

While natural gas was expected by the previous regime to compensate for the decline in oil revenues, regardless of the political situation it is unlikely to provide significant revenue to three reasons: first the considerable competition from other larger producers which keeps prices low, second the limited supplies and third the massive investment costs in infrastructure will take years to be covered.

Population

Yemen's population continues to increase at a rapid rate, still estimated at close to 3% per annum, which implies a doubling of the population in twenty years. While this could be an asset, in the current context of limited resources and very low educational standards, it is no advantage. By 2050, Yemen is likely to have more than 50 million people. Unless they are able to operate in the 21st century economic environment, most of them will, at best, survive in dire poverty. To prevent this, it is essential to undertake major fundamental reforms to the education system to focus it on the economic needs of a modern economy, including high quality training policies; this needs at least 15 years of implementation, in addition to the design time.

Potential sectors of growth

Yemen has potential: as discussed, agriculture could continue to maintain a significant proportion (possibly up to a quarter) of the population, while its mineral resources could be used to finance infrastructure and the social sectors essential to the emergence of a modern economy. The large population could also be a major asset provided adequate investments are made in education and enterprises. Aden port could also be an important port, though it is most likely to serve Yemen itself, as in future it will have to compete with other regional ports managed and owned by Dubai Ports World (Berbera, Djibouti, and possibly others in Eritrea) while Hodeida is nearer to the Yemeni densely populated highlands and Mukalla covers Hadramaut.

A major potential growth sector could be tourism. With reasonable security and effective governance, Yemen could be a paradise for a number of different types of tourism: cultural for its historical, archaeological and architectural heritage, natural for its wonderful landscapes and sceneries, mountains which make it perfect hiking territory as well as its coast and beaches which are far superior on the Arabian sea than many other world-renowned locations. At this point in history it is impossible to predict whether such wise policies might prevail over a vision of standardised resorts of modern multi-star hotels which reduce every location to a mere copy of another on another continent as implemented elsewhere in the Peninsula and advertised throughout the world. Alternative equally depressing prospects include the re-emergence of sex-tourism which started in the first decade of the century as well as of mass beach tourism based on isolated tourist complexes removed from local culture and people, preventing visitors from interacting with Yemenis and their culture. However, as things stand in 2017, none of these prospects are likely to materialise in the near future. This brings us to the political situation.

Internal political situation

As readers are certainly aware, there are  two major elements to the current war. The first is the internal situation characterised by a visible conflict between two parties, each in an alliance: based in Sana'a, the Huthi-Saleh team brings together the elite military forces and the political organisation (General People's Congress) of former president Saleh with the Zaydi revivalist Huthi movement against which Saleh fought 6 wars between 2004 and 2010. This alone demonstrates that they are not held together by shared worldviews, but by the single common objective of their own survival and the defeat of their enemies. Indeed, there are already frequent political skirmishes between supporters of one or the other side, propaganda spats and occasional military clashes. There is no doubt that, should their external enemy disappear, they would engage in a struggle to the death against each other.

On the other side is Hadi's internationally recognised government composed of rival factions including dissidents from Saleh's party, the Islah which is a conglomerate of Muslim Brother ideologues and northern tribesmen and plenty more. The misleading description 'liberated territories' for the areas which are not under Saleh-Huthi control is often linked to the equally misleading suggestion that these areas are governed by Hadi's government. In reality, this government is mostly based in Riyadh [capital of Saudi Arabia]; while some of them, mostly the Islahis, spend a lot of time in Mareb and others are in Aden. Actual control on the ground is an entirely different issue, as this government has not even been able to pay more than a few of its staff in recent months.

The internal Yemeni conflict is often described as one between two rival elite factions, which implies the absence of the people. With respect to the country's future political development, it is important to realise that in the past two decades Yemen had democratic elections which were not the farce found in other autocratic regimes. All the factions involved do have some genuine popular support, Saleh's General People's Congress, functioning since the early 1980s, has built up a strong following, largely through its patronage system, but also building on achievements such as Yemeni unity and modern features such as telecoms etc. The Islah is not only supported by Hashed tribesmen, but also throughout the country by thousands who believe in the Muslim Brotherhood programme, while the Huthis' support is more based on status ascribed by birth, ie it is widely supported anywhere in Yemen by sada or descendants of the prophet. None of these allegiances prevent the vast majority of Yemenis from fury at the widespread corruption of political leaders, something on which no faction has a prerogative and all share in the disgrace.

A simple list of the different entities which currently vie for control of different parts of the liberated areas is essential to provide the bases for understanding the issues likely to emerge in the future. The first point to be made is that what little 'national' police and military control exists in the southern areas takes the form of 'Security Belts' and 'Elite Forces' both types organised, managed, trained, deployed and paid by the United Arab Emirates. So if they have any loyalty beyond factional and regional, it is to their paymasters. There are frequent clashes between these and others, ranging from official government forces to dissident jihadis.

Second, Aden the official temporary capital is an example of the situation just described, where actual clashes have occurred between Hadi's personal guard and the UAE-supported forces for  control over the airport. Generally Aden and most southern governorates are under the influence of a range of rival separatist groups which are so fragmented that even counting them is difficult. Only Hadramaut retains a certain unity, and that is through an emerging process of preparation for al 'all Hadramaut' conference, including expatriates, which may well call for Hadramaut independence in the foreseeable future.

Third, popular hostility against 'northerners' has emerged throughout the southern governorates and has already resulted in serious aggressions against people from the country's central areas around Taiz, Ibb and Dhamar, including  mass expulsions from Aden in 2016. This is a particularly insidious development which started more than a decade ago and seriously undermines the possibility of future unity of the country. While there is much talk of increasing sectarianism in Yemen with tensions between the Sunni Shafi' majority and the 'Shi'a' Zaydi minority, such assertions forget that followers of both sects prayed and lived together in harmony for centuries, and the sectarian split is largely created and imposed from above by political leaders who are totally discredited in the eyes of the majority of the population. By contrast the hostility to northerners found throughout the south is far deeper and ingrained. It is unlikely to disappear quickly and is likely to have serious consequences for the future.

Fourth, the all too often publicised expansion of the jihadi movements in different parts of the country, needs to be treated with far more scepticism than it gets. There are jihadi fighters as well as numerous and various Salafi movements of both quietist and aggressive hue, but their independence from existing political elites is far more questionable. While there is no doubt that some of the individuals involved believe the ideology under which they operate, in both the cases of foot soldiers and leaders, two other motivations are more important, allegiance to one or another of the political/military factions leading the fighting, and the need for cash. The majority of young men join primarily to earn a living and keep their families. These groups include salafis working with the coalition forces, while many have questioned why the coalition has taken so little action against al Qaeda.

In brief, the fragmentation which the country is undergoing this decade, much of which started prior to the war, will affect Yemen's future. While its political shape and internal organisation are difficult to predict at this stage, there is very little likelihood that the country will remain a single political entity recognisable to those who knew it in the 1990s, or even two states of the 1980s. The UN's attempt to bring about negotiations between the 'official' opponents fail in the short-term due to the total unwillingness of either party to compromise in any way, one demanding complete surrender ignoring the strength of the other on the ground. However, in the medium-long term, no such negotiations can achieve peace given that they ignore the vast majority of political and military forces and tendencies which have emerged throughout the country, particularly in the 'liberated' areas but also elsewhere.

The international dimension

Foreign involvement in Yemeni politics is by no means an innovation of 2015, though that year marked a remarkable change in its nature. It is widely believed that those in Saudi Arabia who decided to launch the 'Decisive Storm' operation in March 2015 believed that they would achieve  an easy and rapid victory. After all they had a very powerful air force equipped with modern aircraft, personnel trained by the US, and had spent billions on defence for decades. They faced an ill-equipped, badly paid force, with outdated equipment from the poorest country in the Arab World. Hubris included the ingrained belief of their own superiority over a nation they regarded as inferior and populated by people who, when working in Saudi Arabia, were considered lesser beings. It was in that spirit that it declared 'Decisive Storm' over barely a month later and replaced it by 'Restoring Hope'.

Reality on the ground 25 months later has shown that, despite support from 9 or more states joining the coalition, let alone the logistical and in-flight refuelling from US forces the war is far from won. Only Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have significant political objectives and the differences between them indicate their own rivalries. While Saudi Arabia claims to be fighting a proxy war with Iran in Yemen, regardless of the minimal involvement of Iran in the war to date, there is a far more obvious proxy competition going on in Yemen between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, each promoting their favoured political groups on the side of Hadi's internationally recognised government, thus enabling it to remain intransigent and uncompromising. It would be unwise to minimise Iran's future role: while it has been limited during the first two years, with the advent of a more aggressive anti-Iran policy in the US under Trump, the war will probably continue and expand, and thus bring about a far deeper and stronger involvement of Iran in future.

Through their actions, the UAE demonstrate that they are planning a long-term involvement and connection with some parts of Yemen, where they are increasing their implantation, and that covers most of the area of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Not only do they control the newly-established military/security militias, but they are also beginning to invest in  military and other infrastructure beyond Yemen. Saudi Arabia is more closely involved with the forces operating in the north of Hadramaut and in Mareb, which are aligned with Islahis including both the tribal and the Muslim Brotherhood branches, though the latter are also supported by Qatar in a competition which is not entirely clear. Incompatible positions concerning the role of Islah are the focus of disagreements as it is seen as a partner by Saudi Arabia and Qatar while the UAE equate it with the Muslim Brotherhood which it regards as a clear enemy.

The USA in the past has demonstrated little concern for Yemenis and their development, and its strategy in Yemen has operated in the context of its 'war against terror' with al Qaeda as the prime enemy. Tactics used have successfully increased al Qaeda recruitment locally through indiscriminate drone and air strikes, most recently expanded under Trump. The immediate future here is not clear, but is highly likely to involve  increased support for the Saudi-led coalition, despite some voices of wisdom in Washington itself. In the medium term, wisdom should not be expected during the current administration, or indeed beyond, if past records in Afghanistan and Iraq are any indication of US policies. While the UK's role is less at the military level, it also has participated in major arms sales to the coalition: the judicial review of their legality may well declare them illegal but is unlikely to stop them. Focused on Brexit and strengthening its relationship with the GCC, Britain is unlikely to take positions on Yemen which clash with the will of GCC states.

Despite the remoteness of any agreement, the UN and other international parties busy themselves preparing a post-war democracy with reconstruction and development investment plans. The GCC states  are expected by the 'international community' and by the Hadi government to finance the reconstruction and development of the country in future. Actual financing is highly unlikely to involve anything like the sums requested or even those pledged at the various reconstruction conferences which have taken place in the last year, let alone the many more which will take place in the foreseeable future before the war ends, regardless of the hopes of the likes of the World Bank and the UN which look forward to being designers and supervisors, let alone those of contractors, whether companies or NGOs. However much or little financing finally materialises, once the war is over, will be determined by the priorities of the funders on the well-known principle that 'who pays the piper sets the tune'. More likely than not another well-known principle will prevail: to whom that has, shall be given.... Reconstruction is likely to seriously challenge Yemeni architectural and other culture and do its best to destroy as many of Yemen's national and cultural characteristics as possible, a national asset which the GCC states regard with ambiguity.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is difficult to be optimistic about Yemen's future. The GCC states which lead the military intervention, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE will certainly do their best to control the country politically and economically. They are unlikely to allow Yemen to have an independent foreign policy or a strong military structure, though Yemenis have proven that they are far more effective fighters than the coalition forces. The GCC states are also unlikely to be able to exercise the level of control which they expect: Yemenis are very independently minded, and this, among other features, is likely to lead to the breakup of the country into a multiplicity of entities, unlikely to be the six regions of the draft constitution emerging from the transition. Despite being highly dependent on financial support from its wealthy neighbours, Yemeni leaders have often resisted political pressures, taking initiatives in internal and foreign policy which were not to the taste of the GCC, or indeed the US. This fragmentation is not desired by the GCC: although their actions suggest that the UAE might be happy to restore a state within the borders of the former PDRY, Saudi Arabia would see this as a major setback, leaving the northern highlands with their Zaydi [Shi'a] population majority on their borders and presumably some kind of Zaydi government opposed to Saudi supremacy. This level of analysis is relevant in the medium term, assuming that the war ends, somehow or other, within the next decade, through negotiations imposed on the parties, including the coalition.

Although completely ignored by the politicians involved in the struggle, or indeed their international sponsors, the issue of water and other environmental aspects are, in the longer term, likely to drive millions out of Yemen unless effective governance and firm policies are initiated within the coming decade with respect to water management, climate change mitigation, education and investment. A wise alternative would be the inclusion of Yemen, fragmented or otherwise, within the GCC, enabling a few million Yemenis to be employed in the GCC states and thus support their families back home, thus obviating the need to join jihadi groups and giving the Yemeni state the time and possibility to develop social and economic policies which would enable the majority of the population to live in Yemen with reasonable living standards, above the poverty line.

Helen Lackner worked as a consultant in social aspects of rural development for four decades in over thirty countries, mostly in the Middle East, Africa and Europe. She has been involved in Yemen since the early 1970s where she lived in all three Yemeni states for over 15 years. She now focuses on analysis and writing, trying to promote commitment to equitable development and peace in Yemen. Her most recent publications include Yemen's Peaceful transition from autocracy: could it have succeeded? (International IDEA 2016) and Understanding the Yemeni Crisis: the transformation of tribal roles in recent decades (Durham, Luce Fellowship Paper 17, 2016). In 2014, she edited Why Yemen Matters (Saqi). She is currently working on Yemen in Crisis: autocracy, neo-liberalism and the disintegration of a state to be published by Saqi in October 2017.

13

US-Iran Relations: From Nuclear Deal to Renewed Tensions?

Christopher M. Davidson

5th May 2017

For those hoping for smoother and more prosperous US-Iran relations, numerous developments over the past few years have given grounds for cautious optimism. At the very least, it seemed, both the Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani administrations had been making considerable headway in turning important domestic events in Iran into some sort of mutually beneficial arrangement. Very recently, however, at least some of the pillars underpinning this tentative rapprochement would appear to be eroding, as evidence builds that indicates the US ultimately prefers to see no all-powerful regional hegemon emerging in the Middle East, and instead seeks to manage a new and perhaps more sectarian 'competitive balance of rivalries' between Iran and longstanding Western allies such as Saudi Arabia.

Opening up the economy

Long-planned, and firmly in the pipeline well before the recent bouts of turmoil, powerful elements of the US, British, and other Western governments had been pursuing an opening up of the Iranian economy under the pretext of a 'nuclear deal'. If signed and ratified, this was to lead to Iran agreeing to abide by various limits and restrictions on its civilian nuclear energy programme in exchange for sanctions being lifted. Justifying it best was a British minister, who as early as 2007  stated that 'we want Iran to be much more engaged, because Western Europe needs Iranian gas very badly' and 'there are sixty-eight million people in Iran, and it is a market that the Chinese are positively slavering at. I do not think that any of us want to isolate Iran.'

Given the vagaries of Iranian leadership and its troubled history with Washington, not least with the Israel lobby and the heavily  AIPAC-influenced US Congress, the White House could never have been sure everything would work out. But with Tehran emerging as a relative oasis of stability in an increasingly destabilized region, and with Rouhani's ostensibly more moderate presidency focused on delivering improvements in standards of living and thus preventing a second 'Green Revolution', a sufficient chunk of the US political and economic elite had begun to see only a 'win-win' situation in bringing Iran in from the cold. In this sense, an important US 'wild card' seemed to be turning up trumps, as long before the deal finally went through and the sanctions began to come off in January 2016, a veritable gravy train of Western officials and businessmen had  already begun to arrive in Iran.

Amidst numerous pieces in Western newspapers extolling Iran's distinguished culture and advertising luxury tours of its ancient wonders, as early as Spring 2015 reports also began to circulate that  ExxonMobil was engaging lobbying firms to monitor all political activity relating to the nuclear deal and Iran's negotiations with the US government. Soon after, it transpired that several European oil companies  had begun to send their executives to Tehran, with the CEO of Italy's Eni SpA stating that investments in Iran could begin very soon and that Iran's national oil company had an 'outstanding credit position'. By the summer, Royal Dutch Shell was  similarly establishing a presence, while Russia's Lukoil kept quietly meeting with Iran's oil minister on his trips to Vienna.

Industry analysts soon reasoned that Iran 'represented an easy path to growing production... you could get a pretty good bump pretty quickly', while one senior Western executive described Iran as a 'multibillion-dollar candy store ready to open its doors'. Even better, Iranian experts had begun to indicate that Rouhani wanted to make the investment environment as favourable as possible by treating the oil multinationals as 'partners' in long-term thirty-year joint ventures that would 'look and smell like production-sharing deals'. According to Iran's deputy oil minister, there would be  as many as fifty such projects worth over $185 billion 'up for grabs' including many in the huge and mostly undeveloped North and South Pars gas fields and others in some of the world's biggest oil fields containing hundreds of billions of barrels of oil.

With the nuclear deal continuing to build momentum, the final months of 2015 saw things really take off, with Royal Dutch Shell and Total announcing they would each build a hundred fuel stations across Iran as soon as the sanctions lifted, and with British Petroleum having  dispatched its own fact-finding mission to Tehran. After Iran claimed that $2 billion worth of European investments had already been agreed, France's foreign minister visited in person and promised that hundreds of French business leaders were due to follow in his footsteps to 'cash in on oil and cars', and that Rouhani was going to be invited to Paris for a state visit.  Even Japan's deputy trade minister turned up for what the Japanese media described as a mission 'to avoid [Japan] being beaten by European and US companies'.

With the lifting of sanctions almost a certainty, more than  five hundred European executives arrived in Geneva at the end of September 2015 to meet with delegates from Iran's national oil company, the Tehran stock exchange, and several other entities. As the conference's organizer explained, the event was not just about oil and infrastructure, but was also about 'the biggest prize... to access Iran's eighty million population'. As the representative of a Western drilling company  remarked, 'the nuclear agreement with Iran has effectively opened up a sleeping giant and the last major untapped emerging market economy... Iran has the potential to become a G20 country within a short space of time.' This was definitely no exaggeration, as within days of the nuclear agreement going through, Iran began to reveal details of dozens of mouth-wateringly huge contracts that were being prepared, including  a massive $25 billion purchase of 118 new Airbus passenger jets to replace its national carrier's aging fleet.

A new Iran, a new balance of power?

Although so-called 'secondary sanctions' on Iran have remained in place, as have sanctions on institutions connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and a general ban on US trade with Iran, some of the recent deals have nonetheless been just as good as those that Western companies had been signing with the Gulf monarchies during their heyday, or under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's regime in the 1970s. Certainly by 2016 it seemed Iran had once again become a sort of respected, albeit this time discreet, partner. With such big investments at stake, and the promise of much more to come, it was becoming essential that the new Iran should never be directly attacked or significantly destabilized by its regional rivals, including Saudi Arabia and its other Western-armed neighbours. For Washington, the best way to safeguard against this, it seems, has been to return quietly to the older, tried-and-tested strategy that seeks to ensure that neither of the Middle Eastern hegemons will ever be able to defeat the other. In this context, with direct lines to both Riyadh and Tehran, and long before the ink had dried on the nuclear deal, the US had already begun to try to manage and contain something of a stalemate between the two camps. Ideally neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran would be able to press home advantages in their various proxy wars, while both sides would have to commit indefinitely to heavy military spending and the strengthening of their security apparatuses.

In many ways the US's new position on the Saudi–Iran stand-off is reminiscent of Harry Truman's views on Nazi Germany before the US entered the Second World War. After all, as his  well-documented remarks on Adolf Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union reveal, he and others did not really want to see either side winning, while any long-drawn-out fight between the two sides was seen as ultimately suiting US interests. In the Middle East itself, the desire for such similarly balanced conflicts is of course nothing new, with the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s having helped cancel out the two major powers of the day, while the rest of the region was left to cower under the West's protection. After all, even though the US had officially banned arms sales to both combatants, Baghdad was being heavily armed by the Western powers, while creative covert mechanisms were developed to ensure that Iran still got what it needed. As historian William Blum  notes, this had the effect of 'enhancing the ability of the two countries to inflict maximum devastation upon each other and stunt their growth as strong Middle East nations'.

With Iran's predominantly Shia population and Saudi Arabia's Sunni majority, sectarian politics sadly also seems to having been playing a role in this. The usefulness of encouraging and promoting such religious divisions in the region of course also has much pedigree, not only to help spur and sustain such conflicts but also  to prevent any shared senses of community or common identities forming, in this case between Sunni and Shia. As a British secretary for India once noted, 'This division of religious feeling is greatly to our advantage,' while another British official once  observed, 'The better clashes of Muhammadans are already a source to us of strength and not of weakness.' Fast-forwarding to the late twentieth century, as Columbia University's Mahmood Mamdani  explains of the Ronald Reagan administration's Middle East strategy, it was not only about trying to push Sunni extremists into a holy war against the Soviet Union, but was also aimed at developing 'a religious schism inside Islam, between minority Shia and majority Sunni, into a political schism... thereby it hoped to contain the influence of the Iranian revolution as a minority Shia affair.'

Even in the wake of 9/11, as the US began to launch its largely successful Saudi Arabia blame-deflecting strategy, it seems a main backup plan also relied on stoking up sectarianism. Notably, when George W. Bush's first chairman of the Defense Policy Board co-published his memoirs on the War on Terror with a prominent Bush speechwriter, it was revealed that the White House had already identified the Saudi Arabia's Shia minority as potential agents provocateurs in the event that the US needed to turn publicly against Riyadh.  As they put it, 'independence for the eastern province would obviously be a catastrophic outcome for the Saudi state... and this] might be a very good outcome for the US. Certainly, it's an outcome to ponder. Even more certainly, we would want the Saudis to know we are pondering it.' Making much the same point, the Hudson Institute's Max Singer [ argued that the secession of the Shia... might well accelerate the fall of the Saudi regime, and if that was the case then 'so be it'.

More recently, the largely beneficial prospects of a worsening sectarian fault line were also raised in a  substantive 2008 report commissioned by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command's Army Capability Integration Center. In rather chilling terms the possibility of a 'sustained Sunni–Shia' conflict is discussed, along with predictions of an 'upsurge in Shia identity and confidence' and the need for the US to walk a 'diplomatic tightrope' between its Sunni allies and the Iranian front. To a great extent, this future US role as sectarian arbitrator was also envisaged by Johns Hopkins University's Vali Nasr, whose influential 2006 volume,  The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, along with several  follow-up articles, argued that 'the character of the region will be decided in the crucible of Shia revival and the Sunni response to it,' and that this situation would offer both the US and Iran the opportunity to 'manage future tensions between Shia and Sunni'.

Writing in 2012, Columbia University's Hamid Dabashi could see things more clearly in the post-Arab Spring context and demonstrated that the spectre of a 'Shia crescent' had indeed been brought back to the region with a vengeance, 'especially by the West's allies, most of which are Sunni-led dictatorships'. In his words, this was going to become a 'manufactured sectarianism... which can divert attention from the main issues afflicting the region's people'. Returning to the issue in early 2016, Nasr got even closer to the truth, as although he still framed the worsening sectarianism as part of a 'great power rivalry' between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with little attention given to any external manipulation of these states by the Western powers, he nonetheless correctly observed that the 'manipulation of sectarian interests had] divided opposition movements and shattered the hope for cosmopolitan politics'. Looking into the rather grim future [ he also warned that 'sectarian interests are now too tightly interwoven with regional politics, high and low, to subside any time soon.'

Conclusions

Putting all this into practice, the US's 'diplomatic tightrope' has clearly led to some remarkable U-turns since the opening up of Iran's economy. Washington has softened its stance considerably on Iran's regional allies, including Hezbollah – which has been deemed more of a liberation movement than a terrorist organization by the CIA – and even Bashar al-Assad, notwithstanding what seems to have been a  one-off US missile strike on a Syrian airfield in April 2017. Indeed, senior members of the new US administration have made few explicit calls for al-Assad's removal with some even  hinting at future cooperation and engagement.

Moreover, the US and other Western powers have done very little to ensure that Saudi Arabia actually wins against the Iran-linked Houthi movement in Yemen, as although  British advisers are understood to have been helping with target acquisition and there have been a 'very small number' of  US troops in the country, there is little real evidence of any further assistance. The US, for example, at one point even sponsored a UN Security Council session that drew attention to the  'dire consequences' of the conflict, while in summer 2015 senior US envoys reportedly began to  meet secretly with Houthi leaders in discussions brokered by Omani officials. While much of the conversation was likely focused on prisoner swapping, the US envoys admitted that the Houthis were 'acting like a legitimate government' and that possible political transitions were also being explored.

With regard to Riyadh's recent ramping up of sectarianism, however, there has rather predictably been little condemnation,  with  US  and other Western officials having done nothing to prevent the kingdom's beheading of several Shia activists, including the very prominent Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, on 2 January 2016. Moreover, when the gruesome news hit the international media, the US government was among only a handful in the world not to condemn the killings, with the Department of State's spokesperson instead trying to  focus attention on the retaliatory burning down of Saudi Arabia's embassy in Tehran.

Moving forward, there is clearly little real incentive for the US to dismantle the Iran deal, even under the new administration, especially as it is already proving so lucrative for major US and other Western companies. Certainly, there are few serious indicators that this will happen, and already some  strong indicators that it will be more or less left in place. At the same time, however, it seems likely that the proxy, sectarian war with Saudi Arabia and other such longstanding US regional allies will continue to underpin the US's efforts to impose checks and balances on the re-emerging Iran. While this is undoubtedly very bad news for those in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere caught up in the conflict, it is nevertheless good news for those who simultaneously seek to contain a more hegemonic Iran while also maximising trade and investment opportunities as its economy continues to open.

Christopher Davidson teaches Middle East politics at Durham University. He is the author of several books on the Gulf states and the wider region, most recently Shadow Wars: The Secret Struggle for the Middle East.

14

Algeria: Will the Failure to Reform Economically further Fuel Islamism?

Kahina Bouagache

18th May 2017

Bouteflika and the 'Black Decade'

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the fifth President of Algeria, assumed office on 27 April 1999. President for over 17 years, he is now serving his fourth – and controversial — mandate. Controversial because of his major health issues in the wake of the stroke he suffered in 2013. Today the 80 year old President doesn't even appear in a wheelchair in public, nor in public meetings or making speeches at a time when the country needs a major economic shift following the protracted crash in oil and gas prices.

A dynamic diplomat and well-known international figure as the youngest Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1963 and 1979 under the President Boumedien, Bouteflika  was designated as the President of the 29th UN General Assembly in 1974.

As president, arguably his greatest achievement was to put an end to the "Black Decade" after his election in 1999. His first step was to push for the adoption of the "Concord/Clemency Law". This law, inspired by the 1995 document "Sant'Egidio Platform", which was an attempt by most of the major Algerian opposition Parties to put an end to the internal conflict with the Islamist party that was consuming the country. This initiative was very criticized by the Algerian government calling the main opposition leaders as traitors for sitting and negotiating with the Islamist leaders.

However and in 1996, the President Liamine Zeroul decided to start looking onto the platform as a ground for potential solution for the crisis. The President Bouteflika's inspired by his predecessor, President Lamine Zeroual, pushed for the adoption of the  Concord/Clemency Law.

Bouteflika's plan aimed to end a painful chapter of Algeria's history, a terrible civil conflict (war) that cost, by some estimates; over 200,000 dead, over 120,000 'disappeared' and over a million displaced between 1991 and 2002. Its origins lay in the late 1980s and early 1990s which saw the birth of the  Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the militarised wing of the  Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) which won the first round of the first ever truly free parliamentary election in Algeria on 26 December 1991 with 47%. Feeling threatened by the growing power of the Islamists and keen to uphold the values (including secularism) of the Republic, the military put a stop to the democratic process which would almost certainly have seen the FIS secure a second round victory. As a consequence Algeria was thrown in its worst internal war, pitting the army, the official security agencies and government-backed militia against the Islamist militants.

The Concord/Clemency law aimed to end any resort to the prosecution against former terrorists who surrendered to the authorities before a set deadline and abandoned the conflict. It was inevitably highly controversial, especially with the families of victims of the conflict for whom it was hard to see perpetrators of crimes that took their beloved ones could just get back their freedom, their civic rights. Nevertheless, it was approved on 16 September 1999 by over 98% of voters in a referendum (which, in retrospect, can be seen as an even more remarkable in the light of the recent referendum outcome in not totally dissimilar circumstances  in Colombia).

Countering the terrorism threat...

As previously intimated, the clemency law allowed Algeria to close a sad chapter of sorrow and hate. However, it failed to end the violence totally. A splinter group from the GIA, the leading Islamist militant group of the 1990s, the  Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) pledged to continue the flight, aligning itself with Al-Qaida in 2006 and changing its name to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

It is something of an aside but nevertheless worth recording that during a visit to Damascus by Algeria's Minister of Maghreb Affairs in 2016, African Union and League of Arab States Abdelkader Messahel, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria compared his country's war against rebels to the conflict which devastated Algeria in the 1990s. Messahel responded by emphasising the "danger of terrorism and the importance of uniting efforts of all countries to fight" terrorism while underlining Algeria's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and support for 'political solutions'.

Arguably, this is broadly consistent with Algeria's efforts to take a leading role in a range regional and international initiatives undertaken in order to fight terrorism, notably: the  Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF); and EU-Maghreb  counter-terrorism cooperation, part of the EU's  European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Furthermore, it was an Algerian initiative which led to the setting up of the  African Centre  of  the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which is based in Algiers and which operates under the banner of the African Union (AU). The ACSRT is overall responsible for assessing the terrorism threat in Africa and promoting AU-wide cooperation including on database building, developing training programs, and conducting field studies in the field and promoting the criminalization of ransom payments to terrorists.

Domestically, Algeria seems to be dealing pretty well with controlling its borders and in applying its policy of non-interference, after the  attack on a gas plant in Tiguentourine/In Amenas.

...but at what cost?

Although Algeria is making important efforts to manage its domestic security and minimize cross-border threats, it has been much less successful at building up its economic strength, in particular by diversifying away from a high dependence on hydrocarbons. Prior to the 2015 crash in the price of oil, hydrocarbons accounted for 95 percent of export revenue and 60 percent of the state budget (which fell from US$59bn in 2014 to US$34bn in 2015). Today, with Brent crude still hovering around US$50pb despite recent Opec efforts to  push up the price, the Algerian finance ministry is grappling with falling export revenues, a depreciating currency (pushing up the cost of imports) and a fiscal deficit well into double-digit territory (i.e. 16 percent of GDP in 2015).

Bouteflika's immediate response was to urge his team to find quick solutions to boost the economy by spurring more foreign investment through tax incentives,  tourism promotion and boosting agricultural production. But this was insufficient to stave off what many experts consider to be in-any-case overdue austerity measures introduced in December 2015. Most notable is a freeze on public sector recruitment which accounts for 60 percent of employment in the formal sector. Additionally, the 2016 budget calls for 9 percent cut in expenditure (mostly investment) and a 4 percent increase in tax revenue based on a 36 percent hike in gasoline prices and higher VAT rates on electricity and on car registrations included in 2017 finance Law.

That efforts to drive up inward investment have not yielded great results should come as no surprise when the Ministry of Finance still insists that foreign investment requires a minimum Algerian ownership of 51 percent, consistent with the 2009 Financial Law for foreign investment. Furthermore, the government is instituting  even more restrictive licensing for foreign trade and services, which is also a disincentive, not only to foreign but also domestic investors.

However, all of this arguably sidesteps the real issue which is facing Algeria (in common with many other economies), i.e. the urgent need for wide-ranging structural reforms despite the urging of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to grasp this nettle if the country is to avoid chaos. The efficacy of the IFIs' stance is underlined by Algeria's currently being ranked by the Heritage Foundation at 154th among 178 countries and considered as "mostly unfree" economically. Algeria's average tariff rate is 12.1 percent, and its trade and investment policies are less open than the global average. Screening of foreign investment has been reduced; but foreign investors are, as previously noted, limited to minority status. Capital markets are underdeveloped — the number of private banks has grown, but the  financial sector remains dominated by public banks.

All talk...

There is no shortage of discussion in Algiers as worries mount over the possible — some would say inevitable — consequences of a significant decline in real incomes. However, when Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal reaffirmed the commitment in June 2016 to boosting investment it was just the latest in a series of speeches which have not been matched by significant concrete steps. This is compounded by excess bureaucracy weighing on day-to-day business, which is driving some established companies to lay off staff (despite the heavy costs involved) and even to consider closure. It remains to be seen whether the sacking in mid-2016 of ministers responsible for four key sectors — i.e. agriculture, finance, oil and gas, and tourism — will make any significant difference to the reform reality in the short-term, let alone in addressing the medium- to long-term challenges which the economy faces.

In short, Algeria — while enjoying considerable potential in terms of land capacity and demographics in particular —, remains a very tough environment in which to do business with difficult access to credit, a weak banking system, a complex regulatory environment, corruption, consuming bureaucratic procedures and barriers created by powerful vested interests. How significant these are can be highlighted by one simple example, i.e. Algeria's failure to achieve membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) despite nearly three decades of (admittedly spasmodic) negotiations.

...and no 'walk'

To blossom beyond building the  biggest minaret in the world, Algeria needs to undertake deep economic reforms, in particular to boost its private sector and attract foreign investment. It needs to start considering both private sector and civil society as a partner in development, and allow them to be part of this reform process, opening more research centres and focusing on alternatives to hydrocarbon-based activity, perhaps particularly given its deep roots in the energy sector, solar power. And, perhaps above all, it has to deal with its heavy bureaucracy and poisoning corruption; and to redirect its education sector consistent with the demands of a modern economy if a potential demographic dividend is not to become a demographic disaster.

While the Algerian constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and association, the exercise of those rights is severely controlled and shows an honest mistrust of the role of civil society in Algeria's development. Associations Law of 1990, was often criticized for its restrictive nature, and conditions to create NGO's and have them playing a positive role within the society, where citizens and NGO's must obtain permits from local authorities to hold any public meetings, but those approvals are very often delayed to impede the events' publicity. The amendment of the Association Law in 2012, came to confirm the restrictions and shows a complete mistrust on NGO's role in playing an active role in Algeria's human development. In fact, the 2012 law Nº12-06 of January 12th, 2012, brought many restrictions in terms of control and foreign funding's

As part of the reforms, and with regards to the Education, Mrs Nouria Benghabrit-Remaoun was appointed in 2014 to undertake several challenges in order to reform education. Considering that the failure rate is 30% and that 32% of the students leave school before the age of 16 years, she believes that a Reform is mandatory step. In this regards, she appointed a National Commission of 200 Algerian education experts. Her objective is to improve the training of teachers and professors through the use of modern methodological tools. However, her approach may encounter resistance from the conservatives that see her and her program as a  threat.

Failure to do all these things (and more) — and now at a 'run' rather than a 'walk' — will inevitably lead to further weakening of the economy even if oil and gas prices return to levels last seen in 2014. This will lead to more unemployment and increasing openness of disaffected youth in particular to radicalization. And this, in turn, seems only likely to encourage the present generation of powerbrokers around President Bouteflika to resort to more repression, thereby plunging Algeria deeper into a vicious circle which is already increasingly evident and will become more so as memories of the 'Black Decade' and its consequences fade.

Which path will Algeria choose?

In 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has revised upwards its growth forecasts to 3.6% against 3.4% forecast planned last April. More optimistic, the IMF board in its biannual report on global economic prospects released early 2016 in Washington DC, on a country's economic growth of 3.6% in 2016 and 2.9% in 2017.

Also, the Bretton Woods institution has consolidated its estimates for real GDP growth in Algeria in 2015 to 3.9% against 3.7% projected in April. This growth, however, will be accompanied by a slight inflation; in fact the Fund expects inflation to be 5.9% in 2016 against 4.8% in 2015.

At the same time the figures, published by the IMF on the eve of its annual meetings provide, moreover, a significant drop in unemployment in Algeria in 2016, the unemployment rate is expected to fall to 9.9% in 2016 against 11.2% in 2015, before increasing again in 2017 to 10.4%.

It's clear that Algeria has a lot of potential in terms of youth, education, geopolitical position, show a leading roles by insisting on two main principles of non-interference on domestic issues of its neighboring countries as well as counties right's to decide on their internal politics.

While Algeria is also taking the lead in rather few important initiatives; a) women empowerment and counterterrorism, by playing a huge role in promoting women at political positions and decision making process, thanks to the amendment of the election law in 2012, women constitute a third of elected members of parliament, which is truly impressive given that the global average is only 20 percent, and b) reinforcing its capacities in facing counter violent extremism, not just by developing new methods but also by believing in the necessity of change, and the promotion of youth and the Algerians' daily life as a way to protect itself from radicalization.

No matter how this good will can be, only reforms can help the country avoiding a second and a massive social and political crisis or appraisal. While the opinion might focusing its attention on the current president successor, I believe that the main issue doesn't reside in the succession per say, because Algerian and at the end of the day its main objective is the social and political stability which won't happen without a clear vision based on developing its potential, its fascinating youth, including but not limiting to tourism, handcraft, hotels, encourage investment, help building strong SMI's, we will otherwise have to face its terrible consequences.

Kahina Bouagache is a corporate lawyer with North Afri-ca/Maghreb expertise. Women's rights activist and a member of the "Women Legal Group ME", an international law firm focusing on women's and children's rights, which also provides pro-bono support for women's rights NGOs. As an AMIDEAST contractor programs in Algeria promoting Youth Education. She has held political positions at both national and international levels. She has been in the American Bar Association for five years as a legal advisor and Program Manager alongside the Algerian & Moroccan Judicial Training Centers, emphasizing women's rights under family law and strengthening the capacity building of Bar Associations and Judges, as well as the Ethical Code for Judges. As a coordinator for Amideast programs in Tunisia and Algeria, she brings together young professionals from MENA with training, grants opportunities, and conferences.

15

Global oil and the future of OPEC

Mehdi Varzi

8th June 2017

The link between oil and politics

Over the past decade, the global oil industry has been buffeted by major international and regional developments, many of which have been beyond its control. International recession, turmoil in the Middle East, a resurgent Russia and China, growing nationalism, rising environmental awareness and the inexorable rise of renewables have all had an impact on both consumers and producers and raised concerns about the long-term prospects for the oil market.

In the modern industrial age, oil has never been just an economic commodity. Oil and politics have been indelibly intertwined ever since Great Britain decided in the early twentieth century to turn away from coal to oil to fuel its mighty navy. Its decision to become a shareholder in the Iranian oil industry paved the way for a century of outside interference in the Middle East which continues to this very day.

At times, when oil prices have declined, many commentators have been all too ready to signal the declining importance of geopolitics in the oil market, failing to understand that political influences are never far from the scene. The Holy Grail of price stability in the case of commodities has been shown to be an unachievable objective. The prices of commodities by their very nature are prone to regular fluctuation. However, no commodity is as affected by political developments as oil. Regular economic models are created to forecast oil prices but are invariably undermined by extraneous factors or unexpected developments. So why is oil such an intensely political subject?

For a start, oil has played a key role in the global industrialization process. Governments have, therefore, tended to exert influence over their domestic oil industries and major powers have tried to gain control of oil reserves abroad both in peace time and at time of war. Following the end of the First World War and the division of the Middle East between Great Britain and France, the former went to great lengths to ensure that the major potential oil-bearing areas came under its control. Access to growing oil reserves was deemed as essential for ensuring prosperity of the domestic economy and preservation of the British Empire.

Oil plays a vital role as a source of fuel for the modern military machine, whether on land, at sea or in the air. For example without oil, it is questionable whether either the First or Second World War would have lasted as long or have seen such a revolution in military mobilisation and tactics. Attempts have been underway to substitute oil as a military fuel but so far with little success. Oil is expected to retain its indispensable military role for the foreseeable future.

Politicisation of oil has been encouraged by the fact that the really big oil reservoirs in the world are overwhelmingly concentrated in the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf. The massive arms deal just concluded between the United States and Saudi Arabia is as much about exerting political control over Saudi oil as it is about the struggle against terrorism as espoused by the United States.

No commodity is traded as much globally as oil. Moreover, the use of fuel oil has been vital for the expansion of international trade. Control of international sea lanes by major powers has always been a primary consideration.

Some 40–50% of the global trade in crude oil and its derivatives is in the hands of OPEC, all of whose members depend heavily on oil revenues. Oil prices have a direct impact on their political fortunes, so they cannot afford to leave oil prices solely to the whim of the spot and futures markets.

Oil at times has had a major influence on international currency movements and affects both equity and bond markets. It is thus never far away from political and economic discussions among decision-makers and market participants.

OPEC defies the doomsayers

There is a view among some observers that if OPEC had not been created, the global oil market would have had to find a substitute as a kind of oil price reference point. As the demand for oil grew inexorably in the 1950s and 1960s and spread across the globe, the oil market seemed too important to be left to the vicissitudes of the oil market.

OPEC was established in September 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Its creation came after more than a decade of falling oil prices and rising resentment towards the international oil majors. The latter group at one time controlled up to 90% of the global trade in oil and alone decided the level of oil prices and in effect the revenue stream of oil-exporting nations. OPEC's stated initial objective was to coordinate and unify the policies of member countries not only on the crude pricing issue but on a whole range of problems arising from the unequal relationship between host countries and foreign companies who owned concessions over vast tracts of land. These objectives were outlined in greater detail in the OPEC Statute adopted in 1961. The principal aims were to include "unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively...........devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations..........(give) due regard at all times to the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries.........(ensure) an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations and a fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry". The Statute has been amended fourteen times over the course of the Organization's 57-year history with the aim of updating OPEC's key objectives and pursuing them in a more effective manner. However, the key twin objectives, preserving the revenue of member countries and maintaining oil price stability, have remained at the very core of OPEC's ambitions.

From the very beginning of OPEC's existence, the Persian Gulf area has been OPEC's producing heart although Venezuela's decision to join as a founding member followed by entry of other non-Gulf members has provided OPEC with a welcome psychological boost and additional market influence. In subsequent years, the number of members reached a maximum of 13 including countries in Africa and Asia. Today there are 12 members with the Persian Gulf producers accounting for around 75% of total current output. Saudi Arabia is by far OPEC's biggest producer with output at or above 10 million barrels per day (mmb/d) per day on a regular basis.

OPEC's downfall has been predicted all too regularly by outside observers throughout the near-six decades of its existence. As the oil price collapsed in early 1986, former President Reagan claimed to have brought OPEC to its knees. In fact not long after President Reagan's statement, the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil went from around $10 to $18 per barrel in the second half of 1986 as Iran and Saudi Arabia called a halt to their ruinous price war. Since then, prices have fluctuated hugely rising to well over $100 per barrel and falling to under $30 per barrel. Yet OPEC continues to survive.

Over the years, OPEC's key members have shown an incredible ability to withstand outside shocks such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, the Persian Gulf tanker war in the early to mid-1980s, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, expansion of sanctions against Iran, the Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen and other instances of major turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa which continue to this very day. However, one of the extraordinary features of OPEC is that all members tend to attend ministerial meetings almost irrespective of outside factors.

In fact, heightened tensions among the key members have failed to prevent the continuation of diplomatic exchanges and regular consultations about oil market developments. Throughout the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflict, both countries sent delegations to OPEC meetings although it was decided to sit them apart from one another, with the Indonesian delegation often sitting between the two parties. (In fact, Iran and Iraq maintained embassies in one another's capitals during the war although the embassy staff were confined to their respective embassy buildings). Similarly following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, both countries attended OPEC meetings. Of course such meetings are often tense reflecting underlying political tension in the region. However, from the start there has been an implicit, collective decision by OPEC members to focus on oil and related technical and economic issues while avoiding discussion of non-oil related matters.

Even today, as the United States attempts to build an anti-Iranian alliance including Saudi Arabia, other Sunni states and Israel, and despite the fierce anti-Iranian statements recently uttered by senior Saudi leaders, the two countries continue to consult on OPEC production ceilings and the role of non-OPEC members in curbing global production. Thus many years of oil diplomacy have kept war and conflict away from the OPEC conference table.

The key challenges facing OPEC

The challenges facing OPEC today are perhaps unprecedented in its long history. While previous challenges have been essentially of an oil supply/demand nature involving the establishment of a quota system to offset short-term market imbalances, the threat facing the organisation today is arguably existential. On the one hand, the cost of non-OPEC crude oil production has been curbed by significant technical advances in the field of shale oil (especially in the United States) and globally via the use of the latest computer technology and drilling techniques. After falling to just over 5 mmb/d in 2007, the lowest level since 1949, total US crude oil production reached an average level of 9.4 mmb/d in 2015 before dipping to 8.9 mmb/d last year as a result of falling prices. (Source: Energy Information Administration, EIA). Most of that rise was due to higher shale oil output.

Since January this year when OPEC decided to limit output with the help of certain non-OPEC producers especially Russia, the trend has reversed and US output has rebounded to around 9.2 mmb/d in April according to the EIA. Most of the recent rebound has been due to long-term non-shale field investments in the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska. The huge rebound in the US rig count (up nearly 120% since its recent low and set to rise further still) is likely to result in further production growth. In fact, the EIA forecasts production to rise to over 9.6 mmb/d by end-2017.

This higher than expected rise in US output has confounded most market observers and undermined OPEC's attempts to rebalance the oil market. Since 2014, the cost of US onshore drilling has declined by an estimated 40% (25th May Financial Times article entitled, "A changing oil market threatens Saudi reform") raising concern about how oil prices can stay much above $50/bl. In recent months key producers led by Saudi Arabia have been forced to seek an extension of the current production cuts into 2018. Even so, there could be major problems ahead. Iraq has failed so far to curb output to the agreed level and Iran is continuing its efforts to increase production capacity although much will depend on the lifting of US sanctions. Other smaller but significant wild cards include Libya, Nigeria, Angola and Kazakhstan. Should, for example, Libya's political situation stabilise in the coming months, output could rise by well over 500,000b/d short-term.

However, a far greater threat is facing OPEC – the worldwide campaign against fossil fuels, especially coal and oil which are considered the main sources of greenhouse emissions. Focusing on oil, until recently the key area where oil faced little competition was as a fuel for land and air transportation. At the heavy end of the product barrel, the global demand for residual fuel oil has been on a long-term decline falling by a third from 12.3 mmb/d in 1986 to just short of 8 mmb/d today (BP Statistical Review of World Energy). The middle range of products (middle distillates) has faced growing competition from natural gas especially as feedstock for major industrial plants, although the (perhaps misguided) support for diesel especially in Europe has proved to be a partially offsetting factor. This may, however, no longer be the case given the growing anti-diesel movement in Europe which could eventually spread worldwide. In the case of gasoline which has seen consistent global growth for many years, greater engine efficiency and the rapid rise of hybrid and electric engines are likely to provide a growing threat in the years to come. Electric cars accounted for just 1% of total global sales in 2016. However sales rose by 42%. Unfortunately, there are few indications that OPEC are thinking long-term. The latest Ministerial Communique issued on 25 May this year stated blandly as follows: "Member Countries confirmed their commitment to a stable and balanced oil market, with prices at levels that are suitable for both producers and consumers".

Meanwhile renewables demand has been surging in recent years, albeit from a fairly small base. The surge is likely to continue and even accelerate over the coming decade. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA)'s Medium-Term Renewable Market Report, "renewables are expected to cover more than 60% of the increase in world electricity generation over the medium term, rapidly closing the gap with coal. Generation from renewables is expected to exceed 7600 TWh by 2021 -- equivalent to the total electricity generation of the United States and the European Union put together today". This trend is not only being driven by government policy in a growing number of countries but also by rapid advancement in technology which has been reducing the cost of renewables.

Given this growing long-term threat to oil, one wonders whether OPEC's traditional policy of curtailing production to underpin oil prices is the right approach. Short-term, it may well underpin oil revenues but long-term it will serve not only to underpin production from non-OPEC producers but also encourage alternative energy sources thereby undermining the prospects for world demand growth. Clearly, OPEC members need to diversify away from their dependence on the oil sector and some of them are already doing so. Ironically, Iran (possibly because of sanctions which are often the mother of invention) has progressed the fastest among OPEC members along this route with the oil sector accounting for less than 20% of Gross Domestic Output (GDP) in 2016 and with petrochemical exports booming in recent years.

Saudi Arabia, by far the biggest producer in OPEC, faces particularly sensitive challenges. Its dependence on oil revenues has made it the prime mover behind the current OPEC production accord and forced it to reduce production to even below its implied quota – something that in the past it vowed never to do. Clearly the tepid oil price recovery to just over $50/bl is causing it ongoing concern and raising long-term questions about its economic and, by implication, political stability.

There are many challenges but clearly the most important one is the pressing need to reduce the level of unemployment, currently officially put at 12% but almost certainly higher given that less than 50% of the Saudi work force is currently deemed as employed. (Chronic under-employment is another key problem). The state sector dominates the economy accounting for 70% of total employment, (the same FT article quoted above). According to UN data, the Saudi population grew by an average rate of 2.3% from 2010-2015, equivalent to an additional 600,000 persons per year. While the rate appears to be declining, the authorities will continue to face major challenges. Above all, with plans currently underway to shrink the state sector, the private sector which accounts for 30% of the domestic economy will have to undergo an unprecedented rate of expansion. To put matters into perspective, according to a report issued by the McKinsey Global Institute in December 2015 ("Saudi Arabia beyond oil: The investment and productivity transformation"), in the best case scenario there would still be some 800,000 unemployed in Saudi Arabia by 2030. In the worst case, the figure could rise to 2.2 million.

It is difficult to see how the best case scenario outlined above can be achieved or even approached. In January this year, the IMF cut its forecast for Saudi GDP growth to just 0.4% this year, possibly rising to near 2% in 2018. Under these circumstances, Saudi unemployment is almost certain to rise further. According to www.gulfbusiness.com, most of the private sector is involved in export-import, finance, investment and services for state. Moreover, this sector to a large extent depends on state contracts. In any case, in terms of employment, these are low-intensive labour activities. Their expansion is hardly likely to have an appreciable effect on the level of unemployment.

Clearly, implementation of the officially announced Saudi Vision 2030, while praiseworthy in its objectives, depends very much on the will power of the Royal Family. Recent evidence is hardly encouraging, given the decision to restore government salaries to previous levels. The fear of widespread social dissent or disaffection remains foremost in the minds of senior members of the royal family.

The problems facing Saudi Arabia are not unique. Other key OPEC members with large and growing populations including Nigeria, Venezuela, Iran and Iraq face similar social, political and economic challenges. Moreover, given the growing global anti-fossil fuel lobby, OPEC members need to undertake some serious heart-searching. Focusing largely on just defending oil prices with or without some non-OPEC co-operation could prove to be OPEC's undoing.

OPEC members need to address the question of how they intend to exploit their massive oil reserves as the world gets weaned away from oil. Too much time continues to be spent in some of the key OPEC capitals on the sterile debate about control of national oil reserves and a reluctance to undertake measures to boost investment and technology transfer with the assistance of major international oil companies. Such attitudes are perfectly understandable given the role of outside powers in the past. However, time is now of the essence. OPEC needs to move the debate on. Otherwise it could be overwhelmed by irreversible events and several decades into the future could be sitting on billions of barrels of reserves without the demand to exploit them.

There are many issues that OPEC members could address other than the oil price. These could include the role of foreign private companies in upstream activities, privatisation of midstream (pipeline) and downstream projects via joint ventures involving both domestic and foreign companies, reduction in duplication of docking, shipping and tanker facilities, especially in the Persian Gulf, and regional co-operation in all aspects of the energy business.

However, at the moment, OPEC shows no such inclination to evolve into a more business friendly rather than diplomatic or political organisation. To reverse course would be to grant the Secretariat many more powers to initiate and propose rather than act as a bureaucratic go-between among members. Greater co-operation would also require an improvement in relations among its key members, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran, of which there is little sign at the moment of writing.

OPEC is a turning point. The world is gradually weaning itself away from fossil fuels. Unless it rises up to the challenge it will become increasingly an irrelevance.

Mehdi is an independent Global Energy Consultant. From 2001-2017, he was Director of Varzi Energy Ltd, an independent international energy consultancy, during which time he sat on various oil company boards either as non-executive director or adviser to the chairman. Prior to that, he had a 20-year career in the City of London. He is also a former Iranian diplomat and executive at the National Iranian Oil Company. He has been a regular speaker in international oil and gas conferences and has written extensively on strategic and political issues relating to global oil and gas.
16

An Impulsive Actor in the Middle East

Bitte Hammargren

28th June 2017

Turkey's role as a player in the Middle East has changed dramatically during the last years, as it has gone from being viewed as a role model to a problem maker in the region. This is intertwined with president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's growing authoritarianism.

Whereas Erdoğan follows a compass in domestic politics – always aiming at strengthening his power – his foreign policy is characterized by impulsiveness and lack of understanding of the MENA region. Many of today's problems in Turkey – Erdoğan's quest for a one-man rule, the corruption scandals, the civil war with the outlawed Kurdish guerilla PKK (Kurdistan's Workers Party) and the Salafi jihadist terror that has hit the republic numerous times – can be traced back to the same roots: Ankara's fatal miscalculations on Syria after the eruption of the Arab spring in 2011. Erdogan's way of rallying behind Qatar in the summer of 2017 is another example of his impulsiveness.

But one red thread can be found in his Middle East policy: His attachment to the Muslim Brothers and its backers. Unlike many branches of the Muslim Brothers, however, he lacks a strategic thinking when he tries to navigate between reefs in the Arab world.

No longer a role model

Today's Turkey is a traumatized country. The republic, which some years ago appeared like a vibrant example for citizens of the stagnant, authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, nowadays has lost its gloss and is heading towards the consolidation of a despotic rule.

Turkey is suffering from many wounds and a collective post-traumatic stress syndrome, which will take years to recover from. The failed coup in July 2016 and the referendum in April 2017, which will give president Erdoğan almost unlimited presidential powers, are only two explanations to this trauma.

There is another one: the disastrous geopolitical miscalculation in 2011 when the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government made an abrupt U-turn, away from its former foreign policy doctrine "zero problems with the neighbors", and ended up having problems with an increasing number of neighbors. Syria became the most calamitous example, but not the only one.

Most people in Turkey admitted some years later that serious miscalculations were made in Syria. Even the deputy prime minister Numan Kurtulmuş admitted "big mistakes" and talked of the need of correction. But one man refuses to acknowledge that Turkey did anything wrong across its southern border: the almost omnipotent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

When peaceful demonstrators took to the streets in Syria in March 2011, Ankara was hoping that Bashar al-Assad's dictatorship in Damascus would crumble and give way to a government led, or at least shared, by the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brothers, favored allies of the ruling AKP.

But Turkey's government proved to have poor analysis on Syria, as well as on other Arab countries. Even though Turkey carries the legacy of the former Ottoman Empire, for centuries a colonial power in the Levant, today's Turkey has few Arabic speaking diplomats, insiders lament. You can easily hear both Turkish analysts as well as Arab scholars and diplomats argue that Ankara's outlook towards the Arab world is arrogant.

Hubris in Ankara

When the Syrian crisis erupted in March 2011 Ahmet Davutoğlu had been foreign minister for almost two years. When he was newly appointed, in May 2009, he launched his doctrine 'zero problems with the neighbors'. He explained it to a group of visiting European journalists, of whom I happened to be one, during his first week as foreign minister. Davutoğlu claimed that this meant that Turkey was able to speak like the Europeans in Brussels and like the Arabs in Baghdad. But neither Davutoğlu nor Erdoğan, who was prime minister at that time, could grasp the situation in Iraq or Syria. The AKP government failed to understand that the spine of the Assad regime was its security branches with their long tentacles and utter savagery and that the Syrian regime was intent on survival at any cost.

Before the Syrian uprising president Erdoğan had fostered close relations with president Bashar al-Assad and tried to act as a mediator between Israel and Syria. In February 2010, when I interviewed Assad in Damascus, he talked at length about Turkey's role as a mediator.

Erdoğan and his wife Emine had also spent holidays with Bashar al-Assad and his spouse Asma. Turkey's strong man obviously thought he could maneuver the Syrian president. But he failed.

When civilians in Syrian cities took to the streets in the spring of 2011, Ankara first asked Assad to open the door for the Syrian Muslim Brothers, so that they could play an influential role in Damascus (a). But the Muslim Brothers were anathema for Assad. After an Islamic uprising in Hama in 1982, the Syrian Muslim Brothers had been ruthlessly crushed by his father, Hafez al-Assad. Membership in the organization was punished by death, under the Syrian emergency law 49. Damascus lifted the emergency laws in April 2011, in a cosmetic move, but the merciless crackdown against the protesters and as well as the draconian punishment of the Muslim Brothers was unaffected.

Breaking relations with Damascus

When the schemes of Ankara did not work, Turkey in August 2011 took an impulsive step and broke its relations with Damascus. This proved to be a core mistake. Turkey acted without deeper analysis and contributed to what soon became a wildfire. With Pandora's Box wide open, the Syrian crisis soon became a proxy war with many actors – from Iran to Saudi Arabia – who were all driven by their own agendas. Turkey committed itself to a regime change by military means in Syria, not listening to seasoned voices in Ankara who argued that this was not feasible. One well-placed Turkish source describes to me the disastrous policy mistakes:

"For a regime change policy to succeed by external military intervention (apart from the international law aspects of the issue), two conditions are required: Firstly, a strong opposition is needed which could take over when the ancient regime falls. If that condition is not met, even if the existing regime falls in some way, it is almost obvious that a new power struggle between various opposition groups, maybe an even more bloody one, would follow. A second condition for a regime change policy to succeed is, there should be a minimum amount of consensus among the relevant international powers. None of these two conditions were met in Syria. Please also note that Turkey had no previous experience of a regime change policy in other countries. So we can say, Ankara engaged itself for a policy it had no experience of, and that without making any proper analysis.

Deaf to criticism Ankara opened its southern borders for weapons and foreign fighters who were willing to join a militarized rebellion, supported by two Gulf rivals, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who both wanted to have the upper hand in Syria. Inside Syria, Turkey and Qatar by the time started to fund Ahrar al-Sham, one of the biggest armed groups in the north, while the Saudis funded the rebels of Jaish al-Islam, which has its stronghold in the countryside around Damascus (Eastern Ghouta).

Assad's cynism

In the early summer of 2011 Damascus released hundreds of diehard Salafi jihadists from the Sayidnaya prison. The cynical plan of Assad was to make them become key actors in the killing fields. Assad and his security apparatus knew the Salafi jihadists in its own prisons well after the Iraq insurgency, when Syria for some years became a 'rat line' for jihadists who volunteered to fight the Americans. In early 2003, at the start of the US invasion in Iraq, Syria's top Sunni authority, the 92 year old Grand Mufti, Ahmad Kaftaro, encouraged suicide bombings in Iraq. ''I call on Muslims everywhere to use all means possible to thwart the aggression, including martyr operations against the belligerent American, British and Zionist invaders,'' he said in a statement, which by no means was prevented by the Syrian regime.

While reporting from Damascus in March 2003, I saw young Syrian Sunni men lining up in front of the Iraqi embassy, still controlled by Saddam Hussein. These young men came to join the fight against the US invaders in Iraq. As I and a photographer talked to some men from the queue, Syrian police officers in uniforms stood idly by. This traffic to help the insurgency in Iraq was at its height in 2005-2007. It did not, however, prevent the US from extraditing suspect Al Qaida members to the Syrian torture chambers. When Assad wanted to improve its relations with Washington in 2009, he hosted visitors like John Kerry, a senator at that time, and sent scores of jihadists to prison – only to release them when a civilian and peaceful protest broke out in Syria some years later.

In 2011 Assad wanted to create "the perfect enemy" inside Syria, fighters who would scare the West from intervening. He expected that it would not last long until the Salafi jihadists would take the lead in the opposition. Damascus got what it wanted – ironically with indirect help from Turkey and Sunni Gulf states who provided the fighters with weapons, money and a free passage into northern Syria. The jihadists in the Nusra Front and ISIS after some time got the upper hand in the rebellion, whereas moderate rebels in the Free Syrian Army were devoured by hardliners or targeted by the regime's barrel bombs.

The result became a disaster for Syria – and to a lesser degree for Turkey which soon had three million Syrian refugees on its soil and no sight of a political solution in its neighboring country. Syria became a battle zone with many fronts and interests. A Turkish scholar, Hakan Güneş, has compared the situation with how Pakistan once enabled the Taliban to grow inside Afghanistan, only to discover that the Taliban soon became an internal problem for Pakistan. Robert Fisk came to a similar conclusion: Turkey has taken on Pakistan's role as an arms funnel and rest-and-recreation centre for Syria's mujahedin, asking if Turkey would soon become the Pakistan of the Middle East.

Turkish journalists in the opposition paper Cumhurieyt, who tried to uncover details about secrets arms transfers across the border, were soon targeted by the AKP regime, like the former editor-in-chief, Can Dündar. In June 2017 a member of parliament from the main opposition party CHP, Enis Bergeroğlu, was sentenced to 25 years in prison for espionage, i. e. for handing over a video film to Cumhuriyet which was said to show how Turkey's intelligence agency was transporting weapons into Syria.

A Kurdish quest for autonomy

While this was taking place on Turkey's southern border, another drama was unfolding in the Syrian north: A Kurdish quest for autonomy started to grow in places where the Assad regime had withdrawn its troops. Here again Assad was the shrewd, calculating player, while Turkey acted out of impulse.

By withdrawing the Syrian Army from northern Syria, Assad wanted to let the Syrian Kurds create problems for Turkey and possibly destabilize it. Ankara did not understand Assad's tactics of using non-state militant actors for his own interest – although the Syrian regime had been an expert in this field for decades.

One Turkish foreign policy expert, who wishes to remain anonymous, comments dryly that Assad succeeded with his aims, both in the release of the jihadists and in the withdrawal of his army from Syria's border to Turkey. The expert continues:

"Since AKP's priority in Syria was the overthrow of the Assad regime, one would rationally expect that Ankara would act to preempt these tactics of Assad. However, the AKP did just the opposite! Assad succeeded in both these two critical tactics almost perfectly, I suppose, even beyond his own expectations, very much thanks to the policies implemented by the AKP. While Assad opened the doors of the prisons for jihadists, the AKP opened Turkey's borders for them."

Many Turkish foreign policy experts prefer not to be named, but their messages often point in the same direction: To protect Turkey's interests, Ankara should have cooperated with the Kurds in Syria, not demonized them, they argue. "There were many ways to find a common ground with the Kurds in northern Syria", one source who used to be close to power circles tells me. Nowadays the Syrian Kurdish PYD (Democratic Union Party) is declared as a terrorist organization by the AKP, "because it is a branch of PKK, which is true, therefore unfit for any contact and cooperation", as one Turkish analyst puts it. However, not so long ago, AKP made several cooperation attempts with PYD. A well informed source says:

"The AKP government even flew PYD's leader Salih Müslim by government jets to Ankara several times for negotiations. Ankara insisted very hard on Müslim that PYD should participate in the fight to take down the Assad regime. But the PYD did not agree. I don't want to go into details of these negotiations. But just imagine if Salih Müslim had accepted Ankara's proposals and joined the fight with other AKP supported groups to knock down the Assad regime, would PYD still be demonized by the AKP today?"

When the fighters of PYD's military wing, YPG (People's Protection Units), fought against ISIS in Kobane in 2014, Turkey's army remained passive and did nothing to help the Kurds. This outraged not only Kurds in Syria, but also Kurds in Turkey, including Islamic conservatives who used to vote for the governing AKP.

In July 2015, after a parliamentary election that shocked president Erdoğan, the pro-Kurdish party HDP, People's Democratic Party, managed to get even Turkish votes and reached well above the ten percent threshold to the parliament. After that it did not take long before Ankara broke the peace process with the PKK.

Erdoğan chose the war, instead of paving the way for peace with the Kurds. He felt a threat from the charismatic young HDP leader, the lawyer Selahattin Demirtaş, a Kurd whose message appealed to many Turks in 2015. Demirtaş wanted to be the leader of all peoples of Turkey and was not willing to give Erdoğan the presidential powers he was yearning for. Demirtaş also held a defiant tone against the PKK hardliners in the Qandil mountains in northern Iraq:

"We called on the PKK to stop fighting against Turkey. I repeat this call every day. The two sides should take their fingers off the trigger and the weapons should be silenced."

But the leftist Kurdish guerilla jumped into the war in 2015, even though both sides knew after the devastating conflict in the 1990's that this is not a war that can't be won. I remember from travels in Turkey's south east how both Kurdish civilians and mayors used to talk about the peace process as promising but hard to reach. And suddenly it was laid in ashes, by both Erdoğan and the PKK.

When jihadi terror attacks also struck vital interests in Turkey, Ankara started to rein in jihadists and tighten the republic's approximately 900 km long border to Syria. But this was too little, too late. The genie was already out of the bottle. ISIS not only had declared its infamous Caliphate in north west Iraq and north east Syria, but had active cells in Turkey. When the offensive against ISIS intensified, the jihadists answered with new attacks on civilian targets in Turkey.

Turkey's downing of a Russian fighter jet in November 2015 by the time led to another example of Erdoğan's impulsiveness, as he made a shift on the ground inside Syria and started to patch up with the Russians, as was seen during the fall of Eastern Aleppo, and as Turkey became one of the key players in the talks in Astana. The Syrian opposition felt increasingly abandoned by Turkey

But the primary focus for Erdoğan now became to quash the Syrian Kurds of PYD/YPG. Turkey's military intervention in Jarablus, as part of its Euphrates Shield Operation, resulted in a Turkish buffer zone that prevented the PYD from linking up two enclaves. Turkey's control of the buffer zone looks increasingly like an annexation project, a European observer notes. Electricity grids are joined to Turkey. Erdoğan also started to criticize the the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which had given Turkey its modern borders. Pro-government media followed in the footprints of the president and showed maps of a 'greater Turkey', Misak-i milli, from 1920, between the end of World War 1 and the Lausanne Treaty.

On the Syrian battlefield tensions have grown between Turkey and United States, two NATO allies who support different fighters. In Turkey the government's frustration was mounting as the US chose to partner with the Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF. Even though the group has some Arab elements within its ranks, its command lays under the YPG and the backbone of of the fighters are Kurds trained by the PKK. In the eyes of the AKP government this meant that their NATO ally was empowering terrorists. But for Washington, Turkey's 'Euphrates Shield' was not a viable alternative in the offensive against Raqqa, the stronghold of ISIS. As a Swedish expert on Syria, Aron Lund, underlined, a flare-up of violence between Turkish and Kurdish forces in northern Syria in April 2017 threatened to delay the US led campaign on Raqqa. The sense from another European observer is that Turkey would increasingly want to see Damascus in charge of Raqqa, once liberated, rather than the PYD.

Aftermath of a failed coup

If you look into Turkey's illness that followed after the disastrous Syrian mistake, the worst blow was the failed coup that started on a warm Friday evening in July 2016 and led to a death toll of more than 260 and the bombing of the Parliament. The putschists were amazingly amateurish and were suppressed after a night of fighting when thousands of civilians heeded the calls from the minarets and president Erdoğan's message via a FaceTime talk with CNN Türk to protect the nation.

After that he not only hunted down suspects within the military. He also began widespread purges against civil servants and university teachers, who were likely completely innocent from involvement in a plot to overthrow the government. Having a bank account in Bank Asya, previously owned by the Turkish-Islamic Gülenist movement, was in many cases the sole reason for losing a job. Bank Asya used to provide bank services following Turkish laws and regulations. The Bank's inauguration ceremony was honored by AKP dignitaries, including Erdoğan himself and the former president Abdullah Gül – a sign of how strong the ties used to be between the AKP and the Gülen movement. But the leader of the movement, Fethullah Gülen, a preacher who has been exiled in Pennsylvania since 1999, is now designated as a terrorist leader by Ankara. Until the first cracks started to show in 2013, during the Gezi protest, Gülen's schools, universities, business and media empire were allies to the AKP government. Today the Gülen movement is called FETÖ – an acronym for 'Fethullah terrorist organization', and blamed for being behind the attempted coup.

Since the failed coup more than 100 000 persons have lost their jobs and income, and scores of sacked civil servants and teachers have been blacklisted in an official gazette. Few dare to hire the blacklisted. In Istanbul in the spring of 2017, I met university teachers who tried to collect money to help their unfortunate, destitute colleagues – but raising money for them could also be dangerous, so this has to be done in a cautious way.

Another feature of Yeni Türkiye, or the New Turkey, as Erdoğan labels the republic, is the silencing of media outlets and journalists who are not government loyalists. Turkey is said to be the country in the world where most journalists are held behind bars.

Some of those behind bars are foreign journalists, and others are high profile Turkish writers. In this witch hunt journalists can get apprehended for articles that were published perfectly legally some years ago, but that are now, on dubious grounds, called 'terrorist propaganda'. One veteran journalist in Istanbul told me with sadness in his eyes that 'democracy is dying in the dark'.

At the same time ministers or government officials in the highest echelons, who cooperated with Gülenist some years ago, can go on as usual. But the noose gets tightened against circles in the AKP who are acting against Erdoğan's one man rule.

The Turkish strongman doesn't want critics around. Turkish observers argue that president Erdoğan started to show signs of paranoia during the Gezi protests in 2013, when hundreds of thousands of protesters contested an urban development plan for the Taksim Gezi Park. But the protest, to which people from various political trends gathered, was more than that: It was also a rally against Erdoğan's authoritarianism.

Many losers in Turkey

When you try to identify the losers in today's Turkey, you find that president Erdoğan is one of them, even though he was the victor in the referendum on constitutional changes in April 2017. He will now formally have extensive powers – control of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government – that he already implemented in practice before the referendum. The entirety of the constitutional amendments will be implemented after the next presidential and parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for the same day in November 2019.

For the anti-Erdoğan camp there seems to be only one way to get back to a Turkish republic with checks and balances: if Erdoğan loses the next elections. The results of the 16 April 2017 referendum, where the Yes (Evet) campaign got only 51.4 percent, has given the anti-Erdoğanists some hope.

In order to defeat the incumbent president in 2019 the anti-Erdoğan camp needs a candidate who will not be labeled as a secular leftist, since that would lead to a predictable loss. Therefore someone from the old and internally divided Republican People's Party, CHP, seems to be excluded. A candidate who could beat Erdoğan has to appeal to both conservative, Islamic AKP voters, who don't like Erdoğan's style, as well as to anti-Erdoğanists of different kinds: secularists, the old elite, Kurds, Alevites, some nationalists and some segments of the Islamic conservatives.

A person who is named too early is likely to be crushed by Erdoğan's powerful apparatus long before the next elections. So before designating a challenger, the various oppositional forces need to build a broad-based platform. Turkey's failed policy on Syria, plus the corruption scandals, are points for a common ground. But there is also huge divide between the Turkish nationalists of MHP and the pro-Kurdish voters of HDP as to how the policy mistakes in Syria should be assessed and corrected.

However, without a broad-based platform for the oppositional factions there seems to be no remedy in sight against a one-man rule in Ankara. Turkey's role as an inspiration for democratic forces in the Arab world – and in the region at large, including Caucasia, Iran and Central Asia – therefore risks being an image from the past.

Support of the Muslim Brothers

Turkey, which used to have considerable business contracts in Muammar Gaddafi's Libya, started to support the revolt in the north African 'jamahiriya' in 2011 only after some hesitation. Just like in Syria, Ankara bet on a horse with connections to the Muslim Brothers (MB). This angered MB's Sunni Arab opponents in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates even further.

In Palestinian politics Erdoğan has fostered relations with both Hamas, a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brothers, in Gaza and President Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. After Operation Cast Lead, Israel's war with Hamas in the winter of 2008–2009, Turkey's strongman sided with Hamas and the victims in Gaza. At World Economic Forum in Davos he neglected the diplomatic protocol and said, sitting on stage with Shimon Peres, that "when it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill" about Israel. He was well aware that he scored points at home by this outburst and by abruptly leaving Davos.

After Israeli commandos' deadly assault in 2010 on Mavi Marmara, a convoy which was set to break Israel's blockade on Hamas ruled Gaza, he lambasted Israeli politicians again – only to change his tone in 2016 when Turkey normalized its relations with Israel and relatives of the Turks who died in the attack could get compensation in a deal worth 20 million dollars.

Like Turkey, the current the Emir of Qatar, sheikh Tamim, and his predecessor and father, sheikh Hamad, have been staunch supporters of Hamas – Qatar even gave a safe haven to the former Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal. As the crisis on Qatar unfolded in the early summer of 2017, president Erdoğan once again acted out of instinct – and rallied behind sheikh Tamim Al Thani, a supporter of the Muslim Brothers in the Arab world. Turkey promised to send troops to back up the Emir, to prevent a palace coup or an invasion by Qatar's Big Brother, i.e. Saudi Arabia. This caused new frictions in the region. The governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia were frustrated to see Turkey, a NATO country, siding with Qatar in the Gulf, "while Iran is nodding in approval", as one well placed source in Cairo commented to me. The source continued:

"Qatar will not easily surrender; they have money and they have Al Jazeera. Turkey and Iran, two of the most powerful non-Arab countries in the region, are on their side. If the US does not make a firm decision, why should Qatar change? But Qatar has to make some changes, otherwise they will be kicked out of GCC. And then they will discover that Turkey and Iran are even nastier to be dependent on than KSA."

An impulsive gambler

Turkish observers followed the crisis from a different angle, seeing how Erdoğan once again acted as an impulsive gambler in his foreign policy. Turkey had already had a standoff with Egypt, a Sunni rival on the other side of the Mediterranean, since the coup against the former president Mohammed Mursi in 2013. But when Ankara sided with Qatar, it looked as if Turkey took the risk of losing Saudi Arabia, an investor in the Turkish economy, as well. Observers from Turkey concluded that their country quite likely would come out as one of the losers of the crisis. If the Saudi led blockade against Qatar would lead to a palace coup in Doha, Turkey would lose not only Saudi Arabia but also its friendship with Qatar. If, on the other hand, the blockade of Qatar, a conservative (Sunni) monarchy, would push the small emirate closer to the (Shiite) Islamic republic Iran, Turkey would find itself cornered again in the Arab world, like it was in when it lost its relations with Egypt after Erdoğan's strong support for the ousted Mohammed Mursi and the Muslim Brothers.

(a) I have written about this in Swedish, in a book (anthology) to which there is now a hyperlink

Bitte Hammargren is the Programme Leader of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

17

Islam and the West: Recognition, Reconciling, Co-existence or Collision

Ashur Shamis

20th June 2017

It is all about history, or how you read it. A question. Where do the roots of conflict between the West (formerly referred to as Christendom) and the world of Islam, really lay? For, it is this conflict that has shaped and bedevilled world history over the last millennium, fuelling mistrust, giving way to conspiracy and counter-conspiracy on both sides, and leading to subjugation and armed resistance. In this paper, I will argue for a proposal for a non-political forum in which intelligent, enlightened and well informed individuals from the western and the Islamic worlds can share in dialogue and debate to arrive at solutions that can make a difference. By doing so, it is hoped that the idea itself will be honed and developed by others. However, before we can do that, it is necessary to provide a historical overview.

A new power is born

Barely two decades after the death of prophet Mohammed (570 – 632), the Islamic conquests exploded in all directions. In its first century, Islam swept over North Africa, the Levant and Asia Minor, meeting varying degrees of resistance. It reached Spain by 711 AD and crossed over to France in 730 AD. In all the regions that Islam went to, it was adopted by people of all colours, race, or ethnicity. The majority of the new societies and populations also adopted Arabic as their lingua franca. Within less than two generations, it became the language of daily transaction, laws, philosophy, literature, arts, commerce and sciences, from Spain to Iran and from Tajikistan and Bukhara to central Africa.

The Muslims built up a multifarious civilisation and an empire that brought together different ethnic and racial groups including Asian, Indian, Chinese, Persian, European, Turk, Balkan, as well as Arab. Islam created a truly global identity where one could travel, and settle, from the Indian to the Atlantic Oceans without any restrictions. The Abbasid Caliph, Harun al-Rashid (763 to 809 AD), seeing a cloud in the sky was reported to have said "let your water fall where it may, the benefit shall be mine".

Nonetheless, the Muslim empire, or caliphate, had its share of divisions and internal civil strife. The vast majority of these internal conflicts were due to political and economic greed, and the ambitions of powerful men. Nevertheless, the underlying body of Muslims largely remained intact, representing what is called in Arabic, al-Ummah, the nation of Islam.

Professor Albert Hourani sums it up, saying: "the political changes did not destroy the cultural unity of the world of Islam; it grew deeper as more and more of the population became Muslims and the faith of Islam articulated itself into systems of thought and institutions".

The contribution of Muslims, of every genre, to the world during that period is undisputed, even in the West. It is due to this human heritage, which was partly inherited by Muslims from the classical world, that human civilisation was able to progress through some tough times. It was the tremendous translation movement, initiated and cherished by the ninth-century Muslim Caliph al-Ma'moun (786 – 833 AD) that paved the way for major developments in Europe including the Enlightenment, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the scientific and the industrial revolutions.

The advantage of these developments was that they adopted a secular approach, totally divorced from the Church. Freed from dogma, thinkers focused on human achievement: they studied classical texts, including Arabic and Persian ones, history, literature, science and philosophy. Thus, a creative mix of Islamic, Western and classical cultures occurred.

Zealots turned Crusades

However, before these developments could take place a darker chapter in Christian-Muslim relations was opened early in the 11th century. In 1095 European Christians, mainly from France and Italy, arrived in Palestine bent on taking the city of Jerusalem back from the Muslims, whom they called 'pagan Persians'. They came to be known as 'crusaders' and they were fuelled by religious zealotry. Their arrival was a monumental event based on a sustained European propaganda campaign of misinformation, distortion, and manipulation, lead by heads of Churches from Western Europe. They sowed the seeds of animosity between Islam and Western Europe, and they started something whose ripples are still with us today.

Following roughly 400 years of crusades, the conquest of Constantinople, now called Istanbul, in 1453 gave Islam a crucial toehold in Europe once again. The resulting rise of the Ottoman Caliphate, a symbol of Islamic rule, gave the Muslims a new impetus to pursue their goals and expand far and wide. This allowed for a crucial new energy for Islam to keep going for another four centuries or so.

The West turning the table on Islam

By the late 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had self-destructed. Then in the early 20th century Europe and the United States vied with one another to carve up and share out the lands of Islam. The 'sick man of Europe' was dying. India and most of Mesopotamia went to the British. The Arab Maghreb fell to the French. Egypt went from the French to the British. And in 1916 the notorious Sykes-Picot agreement put paid to Islam's central power in Istanbul, tearing most of the land under its control to pieces.

In many ways, the newly fashioned Muslim/Arab world has been in a state of fluid transformation ever since. It has never seemed to take control of its social, political and economic destiny. Internally, it has been in a constant state of turmoil, with factionalism, sectarianism, dictatorships, political disunity and military coup d'états. Externally, it has not been able to decide what direction to take. Divisions, foreign interference, and chasms of all description have been visited upon it. The propensity to subjugation is arguably as palpable today as it was during the years of colonisation.

A century of disasters

Over the last 100 years the break-up of the Muslim world has proceeded at an unprecedented scale. During the period of the two World Wars, which should be called the European wars (1914-1943, with 57m dead and more than 100m maimed), the Muslim world was still, in the main, under the direct dominance of the West. By the end of the second war Muslim countries started gaining a sort of token 'independence' from their colonial masters. However, in 1948 the creation of the state of Israel added another complicating factor to the Muslim world.

The fifties and the sixties were the years of the oil boom, which proved a double-edged sword. It brought numerous advantages; a game-changer that propelled some Muslim countries to the forefront of modernity. But some consider it a curse that brought the evils of corruption, profligacy, excess, and the squandering of wealth on an unprecedented scale. For example, it made the whole of Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Algeria the focus of the West, for whom oil and gas are so critical. And a new geopolitical strategy was developed in order to secure control over the Middle East. In those oil-producing countries differences between rich and poor were quickly accentuated, resulting in huge social and economic problems. This dichotomy continues to bedevil the Arab / Muslim psyche until today.

Throughout the fifties to the nineties the Muslim nations were plagued with military take-overs and the emergence of dictatorships. Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Libya, the Sudan and Tunisia all were under such regimes for years. They have often proven catastrophic, with the plunder of national wealth on a colossal scale, the degradation of freedom, governance, human injustice, and a total distortion of the Arab and Muslim character.

The 1980s were particularly determinantal. The Iranian Revolution (1979), the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1980), the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt (1981), the rise of Jihadism and so-called 'political Islam', the emergence of al-Qaeda (1989), and Iraq's war with Iran.

Fractured but resilient

The Muslim world at the moment looks fragmented and hopeless; impossible to be able to put together again for all the goodwill in the world. Its most vexing internal division is between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Throughout the Muslim world this division plays itself out through discrimination, local conflicts, interstate warfare and regional rivalries. It also provides opportunities for the West and others to interfere in the affairs of sovereign Muslim states. If Muslims are to move forward, they have to tackle this aspect of their being.

Emblematic of this is the contemporary tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the stance of influential allies such as the US and Britain. However, for Saudi Arabia to open a new front with Iran, encouraged by the West is clearly foolish. It would represent the continuation of a historic pattern in which the West has had undue influence in the region. For example, America and Britain colluded in 1953 to overthrow the elected national government in Iran. Following this, it took the Iranians nearly thirty years to wrest their country back from dictatorship and forge their own future.

The West writ large

Is the West's attitude toward Islam and Muslim nations the result of deliberate policy or misunderstanding? Is it a 'clash of civilisations' born out of a fundamental mismatch between the two, or is it a product of greed, jealousy, and hatred.

On the other hand, is the Muslim image of the West the outcome of religious fanaticism, or a deep-seated animosity and mistrust that goes all the way back to the crusaders and their misguided sojourn to 'free' Jerusalem from 'the pagans'?

Is this 'clash of civilisations', which has in our time given birth to Islamophobia, inevitable or imaginary? The political elite, the Church officials and the tycoons of international media have played a central role in this sordid narrative, fuelling an aversion to Islam and the spread of Islamophobia. Is there a way that these two gigantic sections of the human race can be reconciled? Or, are they condemned to a war of attrition against each other in which one is a loser and the other a winner, a zero-sum game, for generations to come? Is this collision inevitable?

Arab Spring and its aftermath

In 2010 the so-called Arab Spring came sweeping over the Arab world. Coming suddenly and without proper leadership or a considered strategy, the Arab world was thrown into unchartered territory - a black hole the limits of which no one seems, as yet, to be able to fathom. However, the Arab Spring has achieved one thing.

Now, in 2017, looking at what is unfolding in Europe and the US, one cannot help but notice the repercussions of Arab Spring playing in this part of the world. The Arabs rose against their dictators demanding their freedom back, while in Europe and the USA people turned away from their elites and 'professional' politicians and political parties demanding their countries and their tribal identities back. The 'wind of change' is already blowing throughout the West and the Muslim world.

The rise of populism in Europe and the election of Donald Trump as president of the USA, in the wake of the UK decision to withdraw from the European Union (Brexit), was the inevitable response. We all seem to have rediscovered our identity, each in our own way, and gained a newfound desire to assert it. What we are witnessing, both in West and in the Arab world, is a rejection of elitism and the monopoly of political ruling cliques, be they military or one-man style regimes. What we want is 'politics for the ordinary man'.

What we need is to rationalise this belief. It is also innovative and self-confident. In the Muslim world these feelings are very strong, and tempered with a certain degree of inferiority complex towards the West, a love-hate relationship. With such demeanour on both sides, it is perhaps naïve to expect very much in the way of tolerance and reconciliation. It runs contrary to the ideas, banded about in recent years, of the 'end of history' and the dreaded 'clash of civilisation'. That indeed would be the end of human civilisation, as we know it. Even the concept of Western liberal democracy, the bedrock of modern Western civilisation, as a universal system of governance, has become a matter for debate and controversy. A tense situation affected with hostility and conflict and mistrust is not conducive to reconciliation or understanding.

The Kipling paradigm

As the poet Rudyard Kipling once said: 'east is east and west is west and never the twain shall meet'. This is rather superseded by the rest of the phrase: 'But there is neither East nor West... When two strong men stand face to face'. This is the juncture of history, where Islam and the West are 'face to face'. They in fact not only stand face to face, but they often blend and coalesce one with the other. Therefore, they, more than anything, need to recognise, respect and tolerate each other. That could very well be the key to world peace, in future. The past century was mainly taken up with Christian-Muslim dialogue, as a means of bringing about understanding and conciliation. But, to no avail. What is required now is to launch and empower reconciliation and dialogues between Islam and the West.

These two giant human forces, the West and Islam, are in control of unsurpassed moral and material powers, in differing degrees, one supported by science and technology, the other underpinned by morals, durability and resilience. Geo-politically, they occupy more than half of the physical world. Peaceful engagement and interaction between these two blocs of mankind offer the best prospects for peace and progress.

A sleeping giant

The Muslim populations in Europe (around 13m) and in the USA (around 3.5m) are the fastest growing in the world. Apart from a few twisted and criminally minded individuals they, on the whole, are well-positioned, educated, assimilated, and living in peace. The Muslims have now become a part and parcel of the fabric and the lifestyle of Western society in the USA and Europe. It is this relationship we must work at and cherish. Those anti-social elements must be uprooted and treated as either criminals or psychologically imbalanced, mostly the first. The media has to deprive them of the glorification that was their greatest aim.

History has played the Muslims a wrong hand. It left them in a state of shock and stagnation. It looks as if they lost their pride and mislaid the purpose that drove and motivated them in the seventh century to go out and offer their human resources and spread their ideas.

Muslims have to look into their system of governance with serious attention so that they can give more participation to their citizens. Their political and economic situations must be viewed with much fairer and improved distribution of their wealth, their human rights and their governance.

Foreign intervention, penetration and manipulation continue to plague the Muslim/Arab world. This state of affairs is unjustified and unjustifiable. The west claims to 'police' the world and to be the custodian over this part of the world and, therefore, has the right to control its politics, economic resources and moral destiny. A large section of humanity is bereft of the ability to determine its own future. This loss of control by the Arabs and Muslims has left them a victim and a laughing stock in the world.

Islam is a global way of life that is adopted by all human groups. Globalism is here to stay, and Islam is ready for it. Therefore, there ought to be a worldwide campaign or initiative, a remedy, for this universal misapprehension, this historical travesty. The Muslims have fallen victim of this great fallacy that reflected negatively on their life and existence. The vast swathes of people are being judged by the acts of a few extremists. Their life and history are being interpreted under a wrong to be righted. It is paradoxical how the Muslims never branded Christianity as terrorist when the Christian world was inflicting violence upon them, while the West (the Christian) today brands Islamic as terrorism.

The West has to stop intervening in Muslim and Arab countries by force and at will. It does not even have the right to intervene, willy-nilly, for purposes of goodwill. The Muslims have to be allowed to sort out their own differences and problems. What happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya over the last four decades is a form of colonisation by a different name. Under the mantra 'our vital interest' the West has justified interference in, and manipulation of, the affairs of Muslim countries.

This love-hate relationship between the West and Islam has to lead to some sensible compromise. Many people see the West's intervention as necessary, but what has to be done is to remove the arguments that lie at the root of it that have made intervention justified and acceptable. All interventions in the recent past, under the humane-sounding "responsibility to protect" have proven disastrous, from Afghanistan to Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The interpretation of international law must not be left to the powerful nations. Just look at the sixty-year record of countries like Israel, a pivotal ally of the USA and Britain, and its abuse and total disregard for international law. An honest and rational debate has to take place, urgently, between the West and Islam.

NATO and the intervention in Libya

Of the recent interventions we can look at Libya, my own country, as an example. NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011, was to protect civilians and impose a no-fly-zone to prevent Gaddafi's forces from gaining advantage over unarmed civilians. It worked for the first nine months when Gaddafi was killed and his regime decimated. But the Libyans then were left to their own devices, hanging in the air after 41 years of dictatorship. A perilous political vacuum was created. Those who interfered earlier did not either have the stomach to pursue their task or simply ignored the facts on the ground and withdrew from the scene. They completely failed to understand the post-Gaddafi Libyan mentality. All the efforts by the European Union and the United Nations at dialogue to carve up a political solution, ended in failure. The so-called 'international community' underestimated the perilous situation and left a huge ungoverned space in Libya.

Their biggest snag was a lack of understanding of the society they were dealing with. The Libyans were made up of various groups, all of whom had no political experience for decades, the main one of which may be called the 'Gaddafi generation'. These were brought up and educated, and conditioned, under Gaddafi's xenophobia and self-centred, self-serving persona. They were the product of Gaddafi's 'rule of the people' during which they were constantly bombarded with fake ideas such as 'people are the masters', the 'power is in the hands of the masses' and that 'power, wealth, and weapons' belong the people. They were convinced that they are the ruler. All the means of power and the resources of the country are in their hands and under their control. A new political dynamic was in the making. This group is the largest and the youngest of all groups and it began, based on this self-belief, to grab and accumulate power and wealth by all means. From this group emerged the militias and the armed factions.

Another group is the exiles and expatriates who flooded in from outside the country. These are mainly well-educated, who spent between ten to thirty years outside the country. They saw freedom in some of the democratic countries like the USA, Britain and other European countries. Of course they did not participate in the democratic process but were keen observers of it. They went into Libya with high hope of sharing in the building of a democratic country similar to the ones they lived in abroad. Not bothering to understand the society they have left many years ago and now had returned into, they gave the impression that they were overbearing and cocky. They were detested by the 'Gaddafi generation' group and seen as a threat to their own power and future standing in the new dynamic. They were dubbed 'double chip' because they had earned another nationality, or passport, having lived abroad for so many years. They were treated with suspicion and derision, and accused of opportunism and therefore branded not fit to take office in Libya.

A third category is that of people who spent long terms of incarceration in prison for political reasons. These were thousands of young educated people who spent long terms of various type of confinement inside and outside of prison. They saw the toppling of Gaddafi and the ending of his regime as a once in lifetime chance to exact their vengeance and revenge.

The NATO intervention is an example gone wrong due to lack of understanding or conflict of interests. Not understanding the temperament and the culture of the people you are dealing with could lead to disaster.

The need for a cultural, civil initiative

What is needed at this juncture is to think carefully along the following broad outlines:

To organise cultural programmes and joint activities at international level involving lecturers, university professors, academics, thinkers, cultural icons, artists, journalists, media figures, social experts, luminaries, and role models from different disciplines on both sides, must be brought together to hold talks and discuss all the major issues of the day.

The aim would be to narrow the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims by continuous contact and interaction at the highest intellectual and educational levels. Similarly, there are several areas on which the Muslims do not trust the West that must be introduced to the debate.

The West views Islam as backward, cruel, repressive and restrictive, while the Muslims view the West with doubt tinged with fear. They believe the West is constantly plotting and harbours conspiratorial policies against them. Seeds of doubt and mistrust were sown between the two camps and a great effort is needed to clear this mistrust and mutual lack of confidence. Both the areas of agreement as well as the differences must be discussed.

A non-governmental approach is required. One or more top international universities, or international Think Tanks, have to take up the initiative and propose the formation of an international forum or network to devise and conduct dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. This effort should be sponsored by civil society organisations or Think Tanks. The political approach has failed us, and we must go the cultural, or the civil society, approach.

The dialogue can take place in the form of seminars, lectures, workshops, discourses, symposia, and conferences. It can be developed into short courses and exchange programmes.

We need a common understanding on cultural differences, religion, and historic interpretation. We need to agree on the redefinition of certain terms such as Jihad, Ijtihad, Hijab, Shariah, Kufr, Khilafah, democracy, human rights, liberalism, modernity and freedom. We need to be speaking the same language instead of speaking at cross-purposes.

There is a need for a sober, deliberate approach that leads to a workable pragmatic vision. There has to be a process of transformation through this vision that the Muslims view themselves as they really are, and restore that positive outlook toward the role they can play in the world.

The aim is to devise a programme for engaging in global, open and frank discussion and dialogue about all the subjects that are causing much consternation, stagnation, suspicion and friction between Muslims and the West. In the process the religious, cultural, and social differences must be identified and recognised. Each side is to be given the benefit of the doubt, to readjust its view of the other. We have to modify the mindset, built over centuries of prejudgments and prejudices, about the West and Islam, for the sake of future generations of all mankind.

World leadership is in crisis, in the West as well as the East. With the rise of China as a power aspiring to be equal to the United States, not necessarily militarily, but in a number of other areas, both sides need to understand the common grounds on which they stand. They will need to highlight the positive aspects of their historic relationship and build on it. Let us not focus on the few extremists who are bent on spreading fear and mayhem amongst us. Let us give prominence to the millions of Muslims, all over the world, who do not participate in these vile acts.

It is Rudyard Kipling again, who was reported to have said: "History doesn't repeat itself but it often rhymes". We certainly can see it rhyming today. We can learn from it, if we approach it with honesty and a view to building a future of harmony, recognition, tolerance and peaceful co-existence, rather than one of destruction and annihilation.

Ashur Shamis is a distinguished Libyan writer and long-time political activist. When Gaddafi came to power in 1969, he was studying Aeronautical Engineering in the United Kingdom. In 1977 he obtained an MA in Middle Eastern studies from the University of Birmingham. Since 1971, he lived in exile in the UK. He turned to journalism and political activism. From 1980, he was a target for Gaddafi's physical "liquidation squads", and, with others, instrumental in founding one of the most effective opposition groups, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. He went on to oppose the Libyan regime until its fall in 2011. From 2002, he was founder and editor of the influential website 'Akhbar Libya' until his return to Libya in 2011, after 40 years in exile. He has a long record of political and human rights activism on Libya. He is also an associated editor of http://international.minbarlibya.com/

18

The Intersection of Wahhabism and Jihad

Mohammed Al Jarman

6th July 2017

This paper is an attempt to outline the different paths Wahhabism has taken and examine how they intersect with the global Jihad phenomenon.

It argues that Wahhabism is not a monolithic vision, but is in fact comprised of three distinct tracks which have in turn produced multiple currents and sub-currents. A fuller appreciation of these dynamics is crucial to developing an understanding of the complex relationship between Wahhabism and the global Jihadi movement.

Wahhabism's three tracks can be described as the academic, the historical and the inherited track. Each path had a distinct evolutionary momentum and would inevitably clash with the others later on.

There have been previous attempts to differentiate between the original Wahhabi school and the contemporary Saudi clerical establishment. In this article however, a more detailed map of Wahhabi branches is drawn with a view to drawing clear distinctions between these tracks. The construction of this intra-ideological taxonomy makes it easier to understand the contradictory behavior among many Wahhabis and the connection of Wahhabism to Islamic groups, the Saudi government and the wider world.

This taxonomic approach also applies to understanding the story of the Egyptian and global Jihadis; namely which direction each has taken; where they intersect; how they exchanged intellectual concepts and military, political and media experiences. Furthermore, this approach enables a comparative study of ISIS and al-Qaeda in the context of their respective relationships with Wahhabi ideology. It finds that Wahhabism on its own would not have created a Jihadi movement and that the expansion of global Jihad is connected more to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, US support for repressive Arab regimes and the over-protection of Israel, than it is to Wahhabi dogma.

Since the emergence of al-Qaeda and the "Islamic State", there has been an explosion of interest in the role of "Wahhabi" thought in the formation, evolution and legitimization of the Jihadi trend. Interest in the ideological roots of the Jihadi trends started at the beginning of the 1990s, but the insistence on linking Jihad to Wahhabism only came after the 11 September, 2001 terrorist attacks. This grew even more following the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).

The debate, however, has been overshadowed by two complex obstacles which either forced researchers astray or propelled them toward hasty conclusions. The first of these was the dearth of information available to scholars. The second is the immense political and sectarian pressure that impacted heavily on academic objectivity and neutrality. Hence, some researchers adopted a non-evidenced based approach and jumped to conclusions to satisfy academic requirements in this field.

Information on these topics does exist, it is just in a raw form that requires effort to extricate. Most Wahhabi literature and commentary on the Wahhabi movement and the First and Second Saudi States, and the beginning of the Third Saudi State, is in Arabic. Most of what is written on these subjects in English is either deficient or prejudiced.

What compounded this effect was the non-academic, commercial publishing world, including newspapers and books, which tends to lack discipline and scrutiny. The proliferation of commercial or quasi-academic products and commentary on al-Qaeda and Bin Laden poses a wide range of challenges to the integrity of academic research. These challenges are compounded by the fact some publications became best sellers.

Furthermore, researchers found themselves grappling with sectarian and political issues, brought to bear by strong forces working in the background. One such force is Iran which, due to its antagonistic attitude towards Wahhabism has spared no effort in drawing a structural relationship between Wahhabism and the Jihadi tendencies. Saudi Arabia has also expended great effort to exonerate its religious institutions, and thereby the Wahhabist school, from such a relationship. It is not surprising, therefore, that these two states, given their enormous resources, would throw their financial, political, and public relations services behind their respective agendas. The impact of their efforts would eventually prove to be tremendous on the neutrality and integrity of academic works. Both Iranian and Saudi authorities have great experience in manipulating the media and academic worlds. Many institutions claim immunity from political influence, but these countries are adept at methods which can deceive even the most vigilant institutions. The influence of foreign governments on research centers has often been reported in the media.

To maintain an academic standard one must consider these two challenges. Dealing with the first challenge mandates going directly to the original sources, be they books, personal documents, reports or oral narrations. As for the second, it is important to conduct a study of the forms, fundamental tenets and evolution of Wahhabism independent of the Jihadi movement.

Only by studying the two tracks independently, noting the points of contact and influence can we understand the multi-level cross-pollination of these two trends and reach an objective conclusion.

History of Wahhabism

Wahhabism is a term given to a religious trend or school which appeared in the eighteenth century in the central Arabian Peninsula, led by Sheikh Mohamed bin Abdulwahhab (M.B.A.) (1703 – 1791). This trend gave rise, in 1744, to what was known as the First Saudi State which continued until 1818 when it was brought down by an Egyptian invasion supported by the Ottoman empire. The Wahhabi ideas, teachings and culture, however, outlived the Saudi State, and its influence expanded with time. This was due to the spread of the writings and teachings of M.B.A. and the spread of his students and followers, both contemporaneously and then across the generations.

Supporters of M.B.A. claim that his primary motivation was the perceived departure from Islam and the pollution of its teaching with heretic innovations. He launched a social campaign, starting with a call on people to return to the basic first principles of Islam. He later succeeded in convincing a local chief (Ibn Saud) to adopt his message which transformed the plan into a full-scale expansionist political program, historically known as the First Saudi State. The Saudi State authority spread through the use of force upon all of Arabia.

This was accompanied by immense theological-oriented educational activities by M.B.A. and his students and followers. The intellectual influence spilled beyond Arabia to Iraq and the Levant and other parts of the Muslim World, including far-flung areas such as India and the Maghreb. This influence followed three tracks each differing in their nature, process of expansion and ideological substance.

The first track: Wahhabi academic discourse

This refers to the bulk of literature produced by M.B.A. and the subsequent writings, commentaries and addition supplied by his students and followers. This was the most effective track and most widely spread owing to the support and services of the Salafi schools in the Muslim world generally. The books themselves deal with fundamental questions such as the basic tenets of the faith, the concept of Tawheed (the oneness of God), Muslims' attitude towards non-Muslims, the stance of the Islamic state towards non-Muslim states and entities, Takfir (expulsion from Islam), the nature and sources of Islamic law, the importance of upholding it and related issues.

These publications were collected in a series entitled Addorar Assaniyah. The most important works were Kitab Attawheed by MBA himself and Fathulmajid by his grandson  ِAbdulrahman Bin Hassan.

This track does not, in fact, deviate a great deal from the so-called Salafism branch of mainstream Sunni Islam. Although very close in terms of concepts and methodology, Wahhabism and Salafism are not synonymous as many researchers claim. In short, every Wahhabi is Salafi but not every Salafi is Wahhabi. Fathi al-Husan discussed Wahhabi-Salafi links at length in his book Alfikr Assiyasi Littayarat Assalafiyyah (Political Thought of Salafi trends).

This affinity meant Wahhabism was immensely helped by the Salafi movement in general and men like Sheikh Mohamed Ali Shawkani, a 19th century renowned scholar from Yemen, and Ahmed Erfan Al-Barawli, a 19th century Indian scholar in particular. Others in Mesopotamia and the Arab world led to the dissemination of the Wahhabi thought outside Arabia. Among them was Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Ridha who ironically is considered a leading renaissance figure in the modern Arab world.

Wahhabism has spread most notably, however, in the wake of the contemporary influence of the present Saudi state and the establishment and growth of Saudi Islamic universities. Many non-Saudis flocked to study Islam in these universities from all over the world. In addition, Saudi religious authorities established and sponsored satellite universities in various parts of the world. Ordinary Saudi citizens contributed to this cause either as individuals or as organised charities.

This academic discourse track of the Wahhabi movement benefitted indirectly from other Islamic movements that advocate the revival of Islamic identity and glory, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Such groups are in fact accused by the Wahhabis of being lax in upholding true Salafism, but both found themselves in the same trench against the "enemies of Islam" such as communism, socialism, nationalism and liberalism. This undeclared accord was boosted by the large number of Brotherhood members who flocked en masse into Saudi Arabia to escape the tyranny of Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt in the 1960s. The exodus of Brotherhood members to Saudi Arabia during the Nasser regime opened new channels of communication with Wahhabism, influencing Brotherhood programs as the Brotherhood found itself obliged to comply with the prevailing salafi trend.

More specific inspiration for the academic track however was the publication in the 1960s and 1970s of a series of books written by the Egyptian intellectual, writer and activist Sayyid Qutb,which were widely distributed all over the Arab world, including his most illustrious works: In the Shade of the Quran (1951-1965) and Milestones (1964). Scholars agree that these books have had a tremendous influence on all the Islamist and jihadist movements ever since.

Qutb neither used Wahhabi methodology nor referred to it, but focused on a number of central questions that coincided with issues dear to the Wahhabi cause. The only mention of Wahhabis in his writings was in an article he published in Arrisalah Magazine in 1952 in which he regarded  the destruction of Wahhabism by the Egyptian army as a cause of a 100 years delay in an Arab revival.

The main issues he rigorously and seriously tackled were those of Islamic identity, loyalty and the superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims. He also addressed issues pertaining to the Shariah (Islamic principles of law), the necessity to refer to it as the supreme law and to reject any other system of legislation. Furthermore, he spoke of emulating the behavior of the Prophet Mohammed as the perfect individual role model and the first Islamic society as the ideal society.

Qutb also contended that although at a personal level present-day Muslims live according to Islam, at a social level they live a form of Jahilliyah i.e. an ignorant and non-Islamic way of life. This characterization is not at odds with the Wahhabi approach. In celebration of Sayyid Qutb's work came this leaflet by Sheikh Bakr Abuzeid which was distributed manually in 1992 and later published online on bulletin boards. It was also re-published following a rebuttal of Sayyid Qutb's Ideology by Sheikh Rabie al-Mudkhali.

Sayyid Qutb was perhaps, inadvertently, most influential in adapting Wahhabism towards the Jihadi trend. Noted for his literary prowess, he redacted many principles and ideas using a modern style and made them more contemporary, accessible, and in line with present-day usage. Despite the universality of concepts such as identity, superiority and ascendency, their influence on Jihadis remained local and limited to Egypt. The transformation of these ideas into a Jihadi movement with a global outlook did not come to fruition until 1990.

There appears to have been two factors which prevented the Jihadi movement from becoming a global movement earlier, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Wahhabism. The first factor was the third Wahhabi track, (discussed below), which succeeded in taming academic Wahhabi discourse; the second was the emergence of a relatively docile groups within Saudi Arabia which integrated the Muslim Brotherhood's and Wahhabist's approaches. This hybrid approach pursued Wahhabi fervor in a peaceful and education-oriented fashion. Above all, it succeeded in assimilating and absorbing the enthusiasm of the youth. This amalgam is discussed by Stephane Lacroix in his book Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia.

The academic Wahhabi track might have been a strong factor in inspiring global Jihad but reference to its literature did not appear in the Jihadi movement's writings until after its establishment. The Jihadi movement found what they were looking for in the Wahhabi-Qutb amalgam. Qutb provided the theoretical framework while the Wahhabis prepared the legal setting.

Thus, it seems, that the Jihadi mind was moulded into a more settled formula according to this Qutb-Wahhabi view, which in turn shaped its worldview of itself, other societies, authorities, Islam and the West. Understanding this complex integration and cross-pollination is crucial to understanding the Jihadi mentality.

Given that Qutb – perhaps unwittingly – created a coherent ideological framework for Wahhabist political concepts, it is a great irony that he is described as a heretic by one track of Wahhabism while another views him as a great scholar.

The second track: the Wahhabi historical record

This refers to real historical events in the first Saudi state as documented in two famous chronicles: Inwan Al-majd Fi Tarihk Najd (The History of Najd) by ibn Bishr and Tarikh Ibn Bisher (The History of Najd) by ibn Ghannam. These documents carefully record details of events, behavior, decisions and attitudes, together with the letters exchanged between M.B.A. and his military leaders and his enemies. Reading these reports and correspondences carefully, it becomes clear that the expansion of Takfir (excommunication) and the widespread and lax justification of homicide was the norm at the time. By contrast, the first academic track did not give enough clues as to the real situation on the ground as explained by Sheikh Hatim Aloni in this interview.

These chronicles were not widely distributed and remained strictly within the domain of researchers and historians until recently when interest grew as some researchers tried to link the practices documented in them to the practices of ISIS and other jihadi groups as explained in a series of lectures by the egyptian thinker Dr Mohamed Salim al-Awwa.

It was noted that the pattern documented in these chronicles was repeated at the establishment of the modern Saudi State when King Abdulaziz recruited "Ikhwan men Ta'allah" (The Brothers of Those Who Obeyed God), groups of Bedouin militia largely cut off from urban educated society, as warriors. Their story was extensively presented in Mohamed Jalal Kishk: Saudis and the Islamic Solution. These fighters were extremely preoccupied with Jihad and fighting for Islam and though they did not represent the bulk of the king's army their practice was similar to the Saudi army in the First Saudi state. The King utilised them to expand his kingdom before he wiped them out in two famous battles: Sabillah and Umm Ridhmah.

Having eliminated the "Ikhwan men Ta'allah" the Arab and Muslim lands were expunged of this kind of Jihadi practice until the Grand Mosque seizure in 1979. ِِAn armed cult stormed the Grand Mosque in Makkah and staged a sit-in. They claimed to be led by the Messiah, al-Mahdi, whose leadership would ensure the defeat of the Saudi regime.

This was a relatively small and parochial event, which while lasting only a few weeks, nevertheless had far-reaching repercussions, notably by forcing the Saudi authorities to radically review the Westernization program they had just embarked on. This group's foundations and jurisprudence was not similar to the historic trend of the Wahhabis, but it left a psychological legacy and caused a cultural shock that paved the ground for the clash that came later between the first academic Wahhabi track and the third inherited Wahhabi track (see below) in Saudi Arabia.

This phenomenon recurred in the activities and behaviour of ISIS which is known for its laxity in relation to takfeer and the spilling of blood. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the historic records themselves influenced or contributed to the formulation of ISIS's behavior. There has to be another explanation for the similarity of these two models as we will see below. ISIS was formed prior to the dissemination of these chronicles. ISIS supporters used second track literature retrospectively to justify and glorify their actions. Conversely, ISIS opponents used the same literature to demonize Wahhabism.

The third track: the inherited tradition of Wahhabism

This is a reference to the expansion of the Wahhabi school through the growth and the succession of generations of students and followers who claimed association with the Wahhabi school. Throughout the nineteenth century this track was similar to the first track and might even have been more extreme on issues relating to non-Muslims, non-Sunnis and the role of Sharia.

After the emergence of the third (current) Saudi state however, King Abdulaziz was able to contain the ulema and persuade them to amend their priorities to include issues such as social matters, the relationship of men and women, and personal behavior. Later kings succeeded in going further by making the job of Ulema to subjugate the public to their will and teach them to be totally obedient to them. In fact, Saudi Arabia has succeeded in inducing present-day Ulema to move away from defending the principles promoted by earlier generations of Wahhabi Ulema, opposing them without denigrating or in any way disparaging M.B.A. himself or the Ulema who came after him.

Doctrinally, although this third inherited track shares with the first academic track its approval for an unelected ruler (a well known school within the salafi trend), it differs from the first track in that it does not insist on the same conditions needed to legitimise his rule. The first track will accept an unelected ruler only on the condition that he guarantees the superiority of Shariaa, bases the state's relations with other states on Islam, and prohibits by force any non-Islamic practice within his domain.

Despite its blatant abandoning of the original Wahhabi principles, proponents of the third inherited track still insist that they are the true inheritors of the Wahhabi school. They hit back at critics by pointing to the succession of students and the large number of descendants of MBA still in the front ranks of the movement, including the present Mufti of Saudi Arabia. Today's official scholars in Saudi Arabia repeatedly claim that they are the natural and legitimate extension of the Wahhabi call and the most qualified to comment and explain its positions. This track is robustly supported by the Saudi authorities both inside and outside the country, through media, education, political and security resources, in addition to the repression of dissenters.The Saudi authorities have also persuaded other Arab and Muslim governments of the validity of this trend leading to its spread into a number of Arab countries under the name Jamyiah or Madkhaliyyah, after Mohamed Aman Jami and Rabi' Al Madkhali who both upheld this trend with enthusiasm.

This approach does not pose any threat to Arab and Muslim governments or western governments for that matter. The opposite applies in so far as many of its followers have devoted their energies to supporting their governments with a view to combating Jihadi groups as well as non-violent movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. It is interesting to note that the US State Department often publishes statements and fatwas issued by eminent figures from the official Saudi school on its website and its Arabic Twitter handle.

Jihadi trends

Jihad did not take global shape until after 1990. It started in Arab countries as a national mission with an underlying religious spirit to fight the colonialist enemy and drive out the invader. The movement did not have a global agenda, plans for hegemony, nor Sharia domination. Moreover, it did not pose any challenge to super-powers. However, modern Jihad is completely different, in its inception, ideology and strategies. The Urabi revolt in Egypt 1882, Rashid al Gilani in Iraq 1941, Al-Qassam in Palestine 1936, Prince Abdulqadir in Algeria 1832-1839, Omar Almukhtar in Libya 1911-1930 and Al Khuttabi in Maghreb 1921 - 1926 can all be considered as national revolts, albeit with an underlying Jihadi spirit.

The current Jihadi movement started as two independent trends both influenced by the salafi thought in general and Wahhabi ethos in particular. The first is the Jihadi movements in Egypt, and the other is the Jihadi movement in Afghanistan. The relationship between the two started tentatively but later transformed into a complete ideological and organizational merger. As for the relationship between the two jihadi trends and the Wahhabi thought and practice, we need to delve deeper into the detail.

Jihad in Egypt

The origin of armed activity in Egypt dates back to the formation of the military's 'special division' at the behest of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The division's supposed aim was to fight and expel the British from Egypt and Zionists from Palestine. But its commanders decided to exceed al-Banna's instructions by targeting figures in the then Egyptian government, which created a rift between the regime and the Brotherhood. The 'Special Division' was dismantled by King Farouk's government and subsequently dissolved by the Nasser regime.

The severe repression that followed and the harassment of the broadly peaceful Brotherhood movement led to the emergence of the Jihad Group in Egypt in the mid-1960s. This constituted the first group that openly adopted military force in confronting an indigenous regime as opposed to a foreign colonial force. Despite their actions being limited to Egypt, their philosophy harbored the essence of a global mission. It was the first group to endorse the salafi thought, based on fatwas of Ibn Taymiyyah, and was heavily influenced by Sayyid Qutb.

It is a historical fact that the founders of this group (Alawi Mustafa, Nabil Mar'i, Ismail Tantawi and later Ayman al-Zawaheri) were students of Sheikh Mohamed Harras who lived for a time in Saudi Arabia and was known for his enthusiastic embrace of Wahhabi thought. The influence of Wahhabism on Sheikh Harras's beliefs probably constitutes the first interaction of modern Jihadi trends with Wahhabi thought.

The first articulation of Jihadi thought in Egypt was a booklet entitled "The Absent Duty" written in 1980 by Mohamed Abduassalam Farag. The treatise lacked references to Wahhabi literature but it was replete with salafi quotations akin to Wahhabi writings. This booklet was followed by two more important books written by another Jihadi scholar; Abdulqadir Abdulaziz, known as Sayyid Imam. The first of which was Al-Jame' Fi Talab Al'ilm (The Compiler in Seeking Knowledge) which included numerous references to statements by Wahhabi scholars. It envisaged the books of Wahhabism as the most important references of Islamic 'aqeedah' (creed). The influence of Wahhabism was even more evident in his second book,Al-Umdah Fi I'dad Al'Uddah (The ultimate reference for perfect readiness) which contained extensive quotations from Wahhabi literature.

Towards the end of the 1970s, the Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya emerged, initially as a peaceful movement in Egyptian universities, later evolving into a radical Jihadi organization. The group did not publish books but issued many treatises and leaflets replete with references to Salafi works, especially those of ibn Taymiyyah, but crucially it did not rely on Wahhabi literature. However, there was an indirect link through the first head of the group Sheikh Omar Abdurrahman, who had spent several years in Saudi Arabia and established good relations with Wahhabi scholars there. He was not known for specific Wahhabi rhetoric but was well known for reiterating the same principles.

Both groups; namely Egyptian Jihad and Jama'a al-Islamiyyah carried out a number of operations inside Egypt targeting the regime, such as the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 as well as targeting foreign tourists in the Luxor Massacre. The regime, however, was able to smash both groups, by imprisoning its members and executing many of its leaders. Several years later many prisoners were released, some of whom travelled to Afghanistan where they forged the first link between the Jihadis of Egypt and those based in Afghanistan.

Global Jihad in Afghanistan

Jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s was primarily an indigenous resistance to Soviet invasion. However, it was manipulated and exploited by the US and its two allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to exhaust the Soviet Union with a view to ending its presence in Afghanistan. To achieve this, the gates were opened in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and many other countries for public incitement and recruitment via speeches, mosque sermons and media-orchestrated propaganda. By the end of the 1980s there was a huge presence of mujahideen from many Muslim and Arab countries who formed an international force for the sake of Jihad. How did this apparently 'benign' gathering evolve into a global mission which came to pose a credible challenge to the superpowers? This came about due to the following factors:

First: The inevitable result of this gathering was the formation of a deep belief among those who flocked to Afghanistan that they shared a universal responsibility towards other Muslims. This mentality, although focused on one country, naturally created a psyche of collective responsibility for Muslims the world over. As nationalist feelings receded, this feeling of 'universal responsibility' – and the political and cultural mission it embodied \- came to pose a pressing security challenge to the superpowers.

Second: The pioneering of this Jihadi mission by capable, articulate, charismatic and deeply learned figures led to this simple struggle being converted into a comprehensive mission with a cohesive body of theory, aims and methodology. Foremost among those was Sheikh Abdullah Azzam who utilised and even remolded the aforementioned Wahhabi-Qutb amalgam. During that period scholars like Azzam frequently visited Saudi Arabia and naturally leant more towards the Wahhabi trend. Other examples of important figures were Ayman al-Zawahiri and others from the Egyptian Jihad and the Jama'a al-Islamiyyah who fled Egypt to Afghanistan. Although they were more concerned with remotely directing Jihad in Egypt, nonetheless they contributed to the creation of the comprehensive global Jihadi mission. This documentary about al-Zawahiri's life is a useful introduction to his ideas.

Third: The enlisting of tens of thousands of Saudi youth in the Afghan Jihad with the blessing of the Saudi and US governments. These youths, graduates of the Saudi education system, adopted the Wahhabi academic discourse outlined above. Under focused leaders who were extremely successful in integrating Wahhabism with Qutbism, this became the dominant academic discourse amongst the Jihadi youth in Afghanistan.

Fourth: The Kuwait crisis of 1990 was the turning point which triggered the conversion of this relatively parochial process into an unlimited global mission. It brought Jihadi groups face to face with the Americans who had marched into the heart of Arabia in full military gear. This widely unpopular presence represented a practical 'case study' on whom to apply the ideas upheld in Wahhabi literature. Indeed, the American presence in Arabia was a special challenge to the integrity and efficacy of the Jihadis who went to Afghanistan to defend its people against the invader. How could they now be expected to turn a blind eye towards another invader who came to their own land which according to Islamic doctrine is considered the most sacred on Earth?

The Kuwait crisis was the first historic event that put the academic track of Wahhabism on a collision course with the inherited track (official scholars). The Jihadi trend, which is committed to the academic Wahhabi track, viewed the American presence as an aggression on the sacred land of Arabia. The inherited track considered the Muslim ruler, in this case King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, as having full right to invite any force, Muslim or non-Muslim, to help him protect his land. Although the Jihadis did not carry arms against the Americans or the Saudis during the Kuwait crisis, this was the main trigger for the review of ideas and principles of the Jihadi trend that led to its current form.

Over the intervening years a mass of new ideas and literature was added to the existing stock. Considerable theoretical work was established on a proper Islamic basis derived from Salafi literature generally and from Wahhabi academic sources in particular. The increase in the volume of literature widened the gap between the academic and inherited Wahhabi tracks. Consequently, the two parties entered an undeclared war of words. The inherited official track was the initial victor, due in no small measure to direct media and security supportfrom the authorities and the corresponding repression of its opponents.

With the spread of the Internet and social media the equation was reversed and proponents of the Jihadi trend were able to break the monopoly and restore the balance. As the basic points of references in this debate are Salafi and Wahhabi, it is natural that the Jihadi arguments would prevail. Indeed, the Saudi authority cannot disassociate itself from its genuine connection with the academic track, and its clergy cannot win if the advantage provided by the regime is neutralized. The unavoidable reliance of the Saudi regime on the legitimating qualities of Wahhabism, therefore, makes it vulnerable.

The Kuwait crisis was the reason for the merging of the modern Jihadi ideas and literature of the academic Wahhabi track. This was expressed in the early 1990s in a book by Mohamed al-Maqdisi entitled "The Faith of Ibrahim", followed by another book by the same author entitled "The Clear Disclosures of the Apostasy of the Saudi State" which was full of quotations from Wahhabi books and justifications for the repeal of the legitimacy of the Saudi state. It called for Jihad against that state based on Wahhabi literature belonging to the academic discourse. Both books were full of references to Wahhabi literature. Subsequent to their publication many public refutations were issued by the official religious authorities in Saudi Arabia.

The Internet and social media played a major role in furthering the academic track's influence on Jihadi trends. This began through anonymous contributors and aliases on bulletin boards and websites in the late 1990s. Online forums (bulletin boards) were extremely popular in KSA prior to the era of social media and were widely used by Jihadi theorists. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks Jihadi scholars started to speak and write publicly with their true identities using these forums.

The first to speak out was Sheikh Hmoud al-Aqla al-Shu'aibi who issued a long statement justifying 9/11. Many other scholars emerged after the American invasion of Iraq, among them was Sheikh Ali al-Khudair, Sheikh Nasser al-Fahd and Sheikh Ahmed al-Khalidi who were promptly imprisoned. They were followed by Sheikh Faris bin Shweel al-Zahrani who issued many statements and books full of academic-oriented Wahhabi rhetoric, before he was captured in 2004, sentenced to death and executed in 2016 for his vociferous opposition to the Saudi regime.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

The 'Islamic State' is seen as an extension of al-Qaeda but there is a clear difference in their ideology, methodology and vision. ISIS are more extreme in Takfir and less stringent in legislating against homicide. ISIS also believe in the creation of a real political entity with full legal, military, economic and social powers on the ground. Al-Qaeda's view, however, was to postpone the establishment of such an authority until the existing world order is dismantled. These and other differences were presented in testimony before the House Committee on US Homeland Security.

ISIS introduced its philosophy in stages, as explained by the prominent theorist Abubaker Naji in his book, Idarat Attawahosh (The Management of Savagery). Whilst it is true that the book contains no quotations from Wahhabi literature, the practices it calls for are rationalized using similar justifications found in the academic discourse. One careful reader of ISIS literature, al-Shareif al-Hasan al-Kattani, notes that ISIS's first launch in Iraq was associated with the rising popularity of the writings of the aforementioned al-Khudair, al-Fahd and al-Khalidi .

More broadly, it seems ISIS went beyond using the references of the academic track of the Wahhabi movement and sought to emulate the practices of the first Saudi state. ISIS justified many of its deeds with examples from the actions of the Wahhabi army and its leaders during the life of M.B.A. One pro-ISIS writer (Pseudonym Annabe') in an attempt to refute criticism summarized this close affinity in a detailed article. He considered the similarities as arguments in favor of ISIS's position.

 Another anti-ISIS writer highlighted the resemblance of the statements and practice of the earlier Wahhabis and ISIS, describing it as evidence of Wahhabi extremism rather than an argument in favor of ISIS.

However, many argue that ISIS extremism stems less from theories and related historical precedents, than it does from the sectarian conflict provoked by the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. ISIS's leadership needed to properly ground their methodologies rather than have them portrayed as a reflexive reaction to the invasion and subsequent humiliations inflicted on Sunni Muslims. This was evident in the speeches and statements of a senior ISIS cleric Turki Al-Bin Ali and articles in their official publication Dabiq. ISIS does not shy away from the fact that it cherishes the Wahhabi thought and that it went so far as to prescribe Wahhabi books in the schools under its administration.

There is another historical parallel in the geopolitical context of the emergence and spread of ISIS and the first Saudi state. There was a resemblance in the atmospherics and geography in which both states emerged, as well as the nature of the powers opposing them.

 The first Saudi state was facing a superpower in the form of the Ottoman empire which conducted war-by-proxy using the Egyptian army led by Mohamed Ali in order to militarily and politically to defeat the Saudis. However, this heavy defeat failed to eradicate Wahhabism. To press the historical parallel, presently ISIS is facing the might of the United Statesmilitary, not to mention Iraq, Iran and Turkey, in addition to other regional states. Whilst ISIS may be vanquished militarily, the foundational beliefs and doctrines that drive the movement will be much harder to uproot.

Current geographical distribution of Wahhabism

Wahhabism is currently practiced all over the Muslim world and also among Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries. The first academic Wahhabi and third inherited Wahhabi tracks are competing with each other in their prevalence. The first track has spread naturally under the auspices of Salafism. The third track has spread by sponsorship of governments. In addition to Saudi Arabia the third track increased its followers many fold in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Emirates and, interestingly, in some non-Muslim countries including among the Muslim community in the UK. The second track can be seen only among ISIS and the similar groups, Alshabab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria.

There are only two countries where Wahhabism is embedded in society in an institutional manner, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The difference between these two is that while the Saudi state adopts Wahhabism in its political system and regards the Wahhabi establishment as part of the state, Qatar does not. This commitment to Wahhabism in politics means the Saudi regime is exposed to continuous embarrassment as despite the state's immense support for the third inherited track, the followers of the first academic track see government practices as hypocrisy, stripping the government of its legitimacy. This does not apply to Qatar which, absent a similar commitment, feels under no obligation to adopt Wahhabism in government. In Qatar, although the community or people are Wahhabis, there is, for example, no Senior Council of Ulama, only a mufti. Furthermore, the judicial system is much less religiously orientated.

Future of Wahhabism and Jihad

The history of the relationship between Wahhabism and jihad helps us forecast its future.

Before the internet and social media, the official, government-controlled third inherited Wahhabi track had by virtue of its media monopoly the ability to lay claim to the Wahhabi legacy. But through globalization and the immense impact of modern communication tools, the inherited track is deprived of the main advantage it has enjoyed up to now: exclusive access to the media on account of state support. As the playing field levels, the struggle for authority between the different Wahhabi tracks is changing and the party closer to the original Wahhabi literature, the academic track, is likely to prevail.

The Jihadi track would not have been able to survive and later to establish its intellectual dominance had these means of communications not developed. It might have otherwise been vanquished, or taken much longer to entrench itself with a view to recruiting ideologues and fighters for its cause.

At the same time, these same modern communication tools are likely to enable the broader practice of Salafism slowly to eclipse Wahhabism. The current tendency for most Muslims - including jihadis - is to regard all credible Islamic sources as references. The sanctification of a certain school, even one from within the Salafi canon, is no longer a popular trend. Over time this will make Wahhabi academic literature (the first track) equal to any other credible Salafi literature and slowly dilute its effect, but its influence is unlikely to subside completely as long as it remains intertwined with Salafism. The relationship between Wahhabism and Salafism explains Wahhabism's endurance and influence in the wake of globalization. As Salafism derives its strength from an original religious text – and in view of this text's centrality to the Islamic faith - it is not surprising that globalization has been central to the spread of Salafism.

As regards the second historical track, history may repeat itself again. One thing the first Saudi state, Ibn Saud's Ikhwan min Ta'allah and the Grand Mosque seizure have in common is that they all ended abruptly and violently. That is probably because this trend acts like a cult, fitting the psyche and mentality of certain people in certain circumstances. ISIS will probably meet the same fate or find itself obliged to transform into a much more pragmatic group. The pressures of reality and the furious debates in social media will force Jihadi groups to soften their extremism as has happened with historical Wahhabism.

Regarding the third inherited Wahhabi track, this track will continue to clash intellectuallywith other moderate Islamic movements with which it is already at war and which play an important role in reducing jihad recruitment. In time, most governments will either stop sponsoring this inherited track or replace it with other moderate groups. This inherited track, which cannot rid itself of hostility to Shia and other non Sunni sects, nor a tendency towards what are widely seen as extreme social restrictions, will continue to create a public relations problem for the Saudi government.

Mohammed Al Jarman is a candidate for MS in Global Affairs at New York University and a senior graduate researcher at the Qatar Foundation. Email - maj514@nyu.edu. Further discussion and conclusions on this topic can be found here.

19

Lebanon: Losing the Peace?

Nadine Windsor

27th July 2017

Plus ça change...

"There is nothing like returning to a place that remains unchanged to find the ways in which you yourself have altered." Nelson Mandela

"Is the country still at war?" is the question Lebanese are most often asked when they meet other people, especially when living outside the region. While the answer is naturally "of course not, the war ended in 1990!", it is arguable that the events that have taken place ever since have left me and quite a few of my fellow citizens to wonder.

 The Taif Agreement, also known as the National Reconciliation Accord, was signed to give back the country its sovereignty in the south and to ensure Syria would withdraw within two years. If one looks back 28 years later what actually triggered the Syrian troops withdrawal from Lebanon was not the signed agreement but the Lebanese people's mobilization after the killing of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri by a car bomb in February 2005.

Then what is commonly called the "Arab Spring" started in December 2010 and, with no real warning, civil war erupted in Syria a few weeks later. As a result, the Syrians came back to Lebanon but, this time, civilians. According to Amnesty International, no less than one-in-five people in Lebanon today is a Syrian refugee.

The very fabric of society is under severe stress...

Even before the refugee crisis, the infrastructure of Lebanon was barely sufficient to provide for the needs of the country's citizens. The inflow has now created significant imbalances from the infrastructure perspective and as well as from an economic and financial angle. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that these people will ever return home even if the civil war in Syria were to end. A reasonable assumption, in my view, is that the longer the war goes on, the fewer Syrians will ultimately go home. And, even though the intensity of the fighting may decline in the foreseeable future as Islamic State is ousted from its last strongholds in the country, peace and stability in a reunified nation state still seem to be a very long way off indeed. Thus, the demographics of Lebanon have likely been significantly changed by the Syria conflict more or less in perpetuity.

...exacerbated by economic woes

For anyone not familiar with the Lebanese financial system, let me put it simply as follows. It is almost a miracle the country has not gone bankrupt even once over the last 74 years (independence was declared on 22 November 1943). It is a known fact that there are more Lebanese citizens living outside Lebanon than in Lebanon itself and remittances have been a significant factor in strengthening the local banking sector. In 2008, after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the country saw a historic surge of cash coming in, as demonstrated by the World Bank data.

Being a financier, I feel obliged to note that Lebanon is credit rated B-, along with Ukraine and Ghana just to name a few. Credit agencies use letters to evaluate the risk of a country defaulting on its financial obligations. A single-B rating, as it is the case for Lebanon, implies investors will look at Lebanon financial debt as "junk" with a relatively high risk of default. As was very well flagged by Steve Johnson in his FT article dated 9 June 2017, Lebanon has "the third most indebted public sector in the world" behind Greece and by 2022; it will beat Greece as the debt continues to grow. The key to the sustainability of high indebtedness (ie avoiding a default) almost certainly lies in ensuring strong continuing inflows of remittances from overseas.

Anyone who has worked with Lebanese in the financial sector will most likely agree if I say these people are usually pretty good at what they do and enjoy a high degree of creativity. After the 2008 events, the Banque Du Liban ("BdL") had to come out with something to boost remittances and foreign deposits. As accurately summarized in a Fitch recent report on Lebanon(2), the financial engineering operation launched by the BdL highly incentivized Lebanese banks in seeking non-resident deposits. And it worked. This was a successful operation; but the risk is that the resultant benefits end up disappearing.

Despite the undoubted challenges, I believe that Lebanon will find a way to continue to boost its foreign remittances into the country. However, what is unsure at this point is whether this will suffice to keep the country's financially situation from deteriorating to the point where something close to the status quo can be maintained, especially in the face of the additional pressures inherent in the refugee crisis. Failure on this count stands to have a profound negative impact on the already stressed politics of the country.

Offshore gas could be key...

In principle, there is an obvious route by which Lebanon could significantly ease its economic predicament, ie gas.

When the first offshore gas fields were discovered in in 2009, there seemed to be light at the end of the tunnel for the small (10,452km2 — and, yes, every "good" Lebanese citizen will know the figure by heart!) but very highly indebted country (the debt represents ~147% of the country's GDP].) The first wave of bids/tender offers was organized; and then...well nothing happened. No oil and gas auction actually took place although 46 companies had pre-qualified in 2013.

Corruption is engrained in the country and, as sad as it is to admit, such discoveries, even if they are successfully exploited, are hardly going to change the endgame, in my view. The country as a whole could end up being richer, more prosperous; but, as is so often the case in the Byzantine world of Lebanese politics, it is not that simple.

...or another source of potential conflict

As if the domestic challenges were not daunting enough, Israel is also keen to benefit from what could be one of the largest gas discoveries of the decade. The total reserves are estimated at 850m barrels of oil and 96trn cubic feet of gas, according to a recent article in the Economist and Israel is now disputing one of the Southern blocks that is due to be auctioned by Beirut.

That said, I would like to flag an article published in the FT by John Reed and Erika Solomon dated 28 March 2017 ("Israel and Lebanon clash over maritime border amid oil interest – FT premium access only). I thought that this article was particularly interesting for two reasons, ie: (a) it mentions how the Israelis say that "they aim to resolve [the dispute] through dialogue and mediation" which is something usually (and I do underline usually) unheard of when it comes to conflicts or disagreements in the region, especially when it comes to defining frontiers, whether these are maritime or not; and (b) Israel excluded the disputed area from an ongoing bidding process launched last year.

The question that naturally follows is how far Israel would really be ready to go to get a share of these gas discoveries in the event that mediation failed.

Water also poses risks

Access to water resources has long been recognised as a major cause of violent conflict and perhaps nowhere more so than in the Middle East. This too is very pertinent to Israel/Lebanon relations.

My personal view is that the regional hydro issues are an important angle that needs to be monitored much more closely, not least as a potential trigger for war. According to the International Institute for Sustainable Development Israel is one of several countries in the region which "falls well below the accepted threshold for water scarcity of 1,000 cubic meters of water per person per year", while Lebanon and Syria both enjoy a water surplus. The situation is expected to worsen, with water needs increasing at a very fast pace. Another good reason, perhaps not the main one but certainly one not to overlook, to trigger a serious escalation in tensions.

Is another war inevitable in any case?

The so called 'July War' of 2006 remains very much in Lebanese people's minds. The general consensus is that neither the Israeli Defence Force nor Hezbollah emerged as the victor; certainly, the former failed to achieve its stated objective of neutralising the latter.. However, Israel made it very clear in the aftermath that, in the event of a recurrence, a much more intensive and destructive ground war would be launched into at least the south of Lebanon. Equally — and despite huge Israeli investment in missile defence systems, Hezbollah is now much more able to strike at Israel than was the case in 2006 and could be boosted still further if Iran is successful in its ongoing efforts to take advantage of the chaos in Syria to secure a land corridor from Tehran to Beirut.

One might imagine that these two factors would weigh heavily against the probability of renewed conflict beyond low intensity occasional cross-border clashes. However, tensions are certainly not easing and no-one would put a zero percent probability on history not repeating itself. Is such a conflict close to happening? It is impossible to tell. But one thing we know for sure is that, if it does come, there will be little or no prior warning — it will just happen.

All this being said, if a war between Lebanon and Israel were to break out (again), I think there would be more than one reason behind it, albeit probably with a single 'proximate cause' acting as a trigger. At that point in time, however, the 'why?' may be of little consequence. All eyes will be on 'how?', 'for how long?' and 'how damaging?' — with the added complication, to judge from the ongoing conflict in Syria at least, that third countries could get drawn in.

Is there any cause for optimism?

"If you don't know where you are going, every road will get you nowhere". Henry Kissinger

Quite a lot of noise is being made around the changes to the Lebanese electoral system, the hope being that it could drag the country out of its deeply ingrained sectarianism.

At the risk of oversimplifying, the key changes have been a shift to a proportional representation system combined with a reduced number of electoral districts. (For those interested in more detail the rating agency Fitch recently published a useful summary of the main changes.) The next general election is expected to take place in May 2018, having been postponed (again) from 20 June 2017.

If (and it is a big 'IF', in my view) the new system implemented properly then there is a high likelihood that small, independent and cross-religious parties such as "Madinati" (translate "My City") could establish a stronger foothold and presence in forthcoming elections. However, I struggle to see how even sweeping alterations to the electoral system will structurally change a country where 18 different confessions are trying (or, in some cases, appear to have stopped trying) to cohabit harmoniously. The established political parties have traditionally been built around power families and passed on from generation to generation; despite the likes of Madinati, there is no sign that this is about to change, at least in the short- to medium-term. In the longer-term, one can only hope that the Lebanese next generation throws up a new wave of younger leaders who have the willingness and freedom to free the country from its vested interests and in-depth corruption.

Conclusions

While there are many other issues I could have explored in this essay, I selected the ones that I think most likely meaningfully to shape the landscape of Lebanon in the coming years. Based on these, my 'best case' scenario for this tiny but colourful country of 18 different confessionals is that, ten years down the line, we will look back and realize that, despite everything that could have been achieved, Lebanon will be in much the same shape as it is today. And the reality could be much worse even if "the war" as such is really over rather than simply in abeyance.

I shall therefore close with a quote of Winston Churchill that sums up extremely well, in my view, the fate of the Lebanese people: "If we open a quarrel between past and present, we shall find that we have lost the future".

Nadine Windsor is currently the Head of Credit Trading and Investments at First Abu Dhabi Bank, which is the second largest bank in the Middle East by assets. She has more than 12 years of experience in the Finance industry and started her career working for Lehman Brothers in London before moving to the United Arab Emirates in 2009. Nadine is French-Lebanese and lives in Abu Dhabi. She has a Masters, specialized in Accounting and Market Finance from HEC Paris, a leading European Business School. Nadine speaks, reads and writes fluently French, English and Arabic.

20

Political Islam Diminished

Robin Lamb

22nd August 2017

Proposition

Political Islam [1] has dominated political doctrine in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for the last forty years. But jihadi [2] violence has contaminated its image (but not the faith of most Muslims) and regional support across the Middle East and North Africa is receding in the face of recent experience. If political Islam has not run its course, it is diminished. Its alternative in most regional perceptions is not democracy but autocracy, including military regimes.

Background

The leap in oil prices and revenues during the 1970s transformed the status and influence of traditional Sunni monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. Among other effects, it generated funding for the spread of Saudi Arabia's strict and exclusivist brand of Islam across the Muslim world and beyond. At the end of the decade, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran underlined the resurgence of Islam as a political force [3]. The conclusion drawn by Western governments was that political Islam was a key factor in the region and had to be accommodated. This assessment was reinforced in the UK by the imperative of respecting the beliefs of British Muslims in a multicultural society.

Aside from the Gulf states, Morocco and Jordan, early C20th Arab attempts to assert national identity through monarchies presiding over parliaments gave way in the 1950s and 1960s to secular military/security regimes legitimized by Arab nationalism, socialist policies and fake democratic institutions. But first monarchies and then republics failed to deliver economic, social and, in the confrontation with Israel, national satisfaction. Moreover, both parliamentary democracy and socialism were imported ideologies which did not fit easily with the region's political, economic and (for some) religious traditions. Islam in contrast is home-grown, has a history of past military and intellectual superiority and offers lessons (but rarely uniform paradigms) for government, economy and society as well as personal belief.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 followed hard on the heels of the Iranian Revolution and presented the Islamic world with the prospect of another invasion of a Muslim country by an external power. Among other consequences, the invasion attracted foreign fighters from across the Muslim world and in due course enabled Osama Bin Laden, in 1988, to create Al Qaida (AQ). In 1991, a military coup in Algeria frustrated the election of an Islamist government and precipitated a lengthy civil war pitting Islamist irregulars against a military regime. This reinforced perceptions of the power of political Islam, further strengthened by massive growth in political support in Egypt for the Muslim Brotherhood (buoyed by well-funded social welfare programmes) which professed a non-violent, democratic approach to its relationship with government and Western society.

In this it departed from the jihadist ideology developed by Pakistani theologian Abul Ala al Maududi (d.1979) and the MB's own former ideologue Sayyid Qutb (d.1966). It also set itself at odds with AQ and other jihadist organisations, such as the Gama'at Islamiyya and Takfir wa'l Higra, and attracted their contempt. AQ's series of spectacular terrorist atrocities culminating in the 9/11 (2001) destruction of the World Trade Centre's Twin Towers in New York underlined the importance to policy makers of identifying representatives of political Islam offering adherents an alternative to jihad and willing to cooperate with regional governments and external powers. This combined with recognition of the need to avoid feeding into the AQ narrative or giving offence to Muslim populations susceptible to radicalization. The continued presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 did both which led to the eventual agreed removal of US forces from Saudi Arabia to Qatar in 2003.

Argument

Support for political Islam and jihadism has drawn strength from broader hostility to the West engendered by religious, social and cultural dissonance. This has included divergences on religion and its role in society [4], the norms of social behaviour (confusing some Muslim observers who accuse the West of immorality), the relationship between government and people, freedom of speech and association and the treatment of women. Politically, the Arab world has been offended by past colonial occupations and since the mid C20th by the absence of successful international action to protect the Palestinians from the existential threat posed by Israel to their aspirations to nation and statehood.

More recently, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and international military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan have fed a single narrative myth alleging uninterrupted Western hostility to Islam dating back to the Crusades (1096-1272 AD). The radicalising effect on some Muslims living in Western societies, including young people born and bred in Western countries (but faced with the complexity of reconciling competing cultures as they mature), has been widely reported.

But the Arab Spring of 2011 was notoriously instigated not by Islamist movements but by young people rebelling against repressive regimes. They were motivated by the urge to protest illiberal policies and the absence of economic and employment prospects. But experienced, organized and well-funded Islamist organizations were able to exploit events and fill a vacuum of revolutionary leadership.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won power by constitutional means – but failed to follow Turkish President Erdogan's (then) example of delivering stability, security, control of the military establishment and economic growth before (as now) pursuing an autocratic Islamist agenda. In contrast to the Algerian experience, the military coup which overthrew the MB in 2013 was therefore widely supported, obtained electoral endorsement and has been able to repress the Brotherhood without arousing serious popular opposition. The Egyptian government faces a security challenge from jihadi groups but not an existential threat.

In Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood and its local analogues did not even get as far as electoral success. Elections were held but Islamist candidates were roundly beaten.

They might have expected to do better: before 2011, Libyans provided a disproportionate number of recruits to AQ and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was one of the leading forces arrayed against the Qaddafi regime. In the event, although rejected by the electorate, they used their organizational and military strength, determination and battle experience to subvert the result of a succession of elections and impose their will on elected parliaments. But while they could, and did, help frustrate efforts to build a new Libya, they could not assert national control against the strength of opinion and the array of militias ranged against them.

UK and international policy in Libya has been to promote a reconciliation involving all factions to reduce the risk that excluding one could cause the collapse of the political process. Thirty years of accommodation with political Islam and Libya's story since 2011 have favoured inclusivity. But total inclusivity may now inhibit a successful political process if it gives any veto to Libyan organisations and individuals seen by the rest of the population as having placed political Islam ahead of their more secular and quotidian political and economic aspirations.

Conclusion

In short, the Egyptians have experienced a Muslim Brotherhood government and did not like it. The Libyans never wanted one and have seen the damage the imposition of political Islam by force can do to their own hopes and prospects.

But the Egyptians and Libyans are not the only Muslims to have blanched at regional examples of what political Islam in its extreme form can mean. The atrocities committed by the 'Islamic State' in Iraq and Syria (Daesh to give it its – rare – Arabic acronym) have traumatized the people of both countries and caused revulsion among governments and peoples across the region [5]. The Muslim Brotherhood, which had seemed to Western governments – and some Arabs – to be a moderate organization they could work with, has been tarred by association and by its failure in government. It is now one of the targets of the Saudi-led campaign against Qatar and seems to have few champions.

Implications

If Mao saw the revolutionary as a fish in a sea of sympathetic (or enforced) support, jihadism floats on a lake fed by a number of tributaries – doctrinal, financial and fanatical – without which it would dry out. Few of the parties involved in the dispute around Qatar's foreign and information policy can claim not to have fed that lake in one way or another.

They may exercise plausible deniability. Saudi Arabia may argue that the law of unintended consequences applied when they spread a theology that excoriated fitna (religious discord) and thought itself politically quietist (but is essentially takfiri); Egypt may point out that jihadi doctrine was developed by a political dissident but Sayyid Qutb's organisation was later rehabilitated and long tolerated; several Gulf countries may claim that funding was provided by private individuals including ruling family members who held no government position but formal and informal state controls failed to stem the flow of substantial funds.

In short, the roots of political Islam are more complex than the perceived misbehaviour of a single actor. But the experience of desolation inflicted by the jihadi extreme has driven most Arab governments and peoples to reject political Islam (but not their Muslim faith) and the risks of parliamentary democracy in favour of the security of military and traditional autocracy. This needs to be taken into account by Western governments in their interactions with the Arab world.

Robin Lamb was formerly British Ambassador to Bahrain and is now the executive director of LBBC. He is also a member of the Council of the RSAA.
21

Prerequisites for Peace in Palestine/Israel

Alaa Tartir

12th September 2017

The distorted peace process between Palestinians and Israelis assumed that the Palestinian‒Israeli conflict is solvable and will reach an end in the near future. This simplistic assumption needs to be reversed, this contribution argues, in an attempt to look for realistic and workable alternative solutions. What if the underlying assumption of the peace process was that this conflict is persistent, protracted and possibly unsolvable? How would this new assumption affect the available set of policy options and interventions? And how would a different starting point impact on the Palestinian and Israeli strategies?

These questions are not merely posed as an intellectual exercise but are inspired by the complex dynamics of the conflict, the embedded vested interests and realities on the ground, and the asymmetric power relations. Evidently, a just and lasting peace is very far off. Indeed, it is a myth to claim that a negotiated peace is around the corner, or that the two-state solution is the only viable option for a lasting peaceful settlement and the realization of fundamental rights. Realizing rights and the traditional two-state solution have proved to be incompatible spheres. Rather, any analysis should start from the one-state reality (State of Israel) – not to be confused with the one-state solution – its nature and policies, its apartheid structures and regime, and its colonial settler project in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

However, beginning the search for alternative strategies and visions from this starting point necessitates a number of prerequisites or pillars to allow the Palestinians and Israelis to engage in a process of positive change. For the Palestinians, the absence of a unified, representative and accountable political leadership, the absence of a culture of debate, and fragmentation on all fronts are some of the factors that define their weakness. For the Israelis, underpinning factors for the persistent impasse include an unwillingness and inability to recognize and feel the costs of the military occupation, the overall feeling of superiority, and the failure to address the demographic phobia ‒ and the associated phobias ‒ in the collective narrative.

Homework for the Palestinians

To address the leadership legitimacy gap, Palestinians are in desperate need of new intellectual leadership. It must revive and re-shape Palestinian political thinking and work towards intellectual cohesion in order to offer alternative strategies and visions that guide political actions. Indeed, it is a precondition for recreating the Palestinian political system. This intellectual leadership needs to be inspired by the people's voices and aspirations, by thinking outside the box towards creative and realistic – not in the conservative sense – solutions. The existing Palestinian political system marginalizes the Palestinian people, particularly the refugees, and pushes them to the periphery of the political system instead of bringing them to its core. Over the years it has also entrenched a personalized and neo-patrimonial style of governance.

The leadership should not be allowed to use the sacrifices and suffering of the Palestinian people to achieve narrow political and, sometimes personal, goals that benefit the few (elite) not the many (nation/society). This will only be possible when a culture of accountability becomes the rule rather than the exception, and when the Palestinian people decide to sit in the driver's seat of the governance processes by challenging and clashing with the multiple levels of internal and external forms of repression and injustice.

The Palestinian people's ownership of their political system will not only ensure public accountability, but it will also bridge the legitimacy and trust gap. The first question that any new Palestinian intellectual and political leadership needs to address is: where are the Palestinian people in their political system? This is not a utopian vision, but rather a very basic one if democratic rule is the objective. What is required is a new dedicated Palestinian leadership that rejects the fundamental pillars of the Oslo Peace Accords and the existing rules of the game (the matrix of control). Rejecting the Oslo Accords fundamentally is not a rejection of peace, but a rejection of slavery and oppression that has persisted for decades. Indeed, without confrontation with Israel, Palestinians will never escape the status quo, which is the favoured scenario for Israel. Confronting the occupier, colonizer or oppressor is the main lesson from the history of liberation movements across the world.

Currently, and after a quarter of a century of failed negotiations and peace processes, this confrontation strategy in local and international theatres, and at the micro and macro levels, for instance by using boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS), the International Criminal Court (ICC) or other forms of resistance to realize rights, is the only way to address the imbalances of power between Palestinians and Israelis. Unless the power asymmetry is addressed and the military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is ended there will never be a lasting and just peace. It is crucial to highlight that ending the occupation is necessary for either the one-state or two-state solution.

Homework for the Israelis

As for the Israelis, the continuous shift towards electing ultra-right-wing leaders, some of whom do not even consider Palestinians as fellow human beings or reject them as a nation, does not provide grounds for optimism. During the summer of 2015, I was able to spend considerable time exploring parts of historic Palestine, Israel today, and talk to many Israeli people from different backgrounds and levels of religiosity, without revealing my identity as a Palestinian. This exercise showed me how far removed the attitudes and beliefs of 'ordinary' Israelis are from the Israeli occupation, which in most cases is only 15–60 km away. In other words, it showed me how large and well-sealed the Israeli narrative bubble is in avoiding recognition of the occupation.

The Israelis I talked to either refused to consider the current situation as an occupation, or they really struggled to understand what I was referring to. How can it be that the biggest elephant in the room can be so easily missed? This remains an open question. However, answering this question may also provide part of the solution. Unless 'ordinary' Israelis recognize the occupation and acknowledge it as the main source of their insecurity, there is very little hope for peace. The role of the international community, particularly the European Union, is crucial here to start the process of recognition, through tactics of boycott, divestment and sanctions, but also by refusing to subsidize the Israeli occupation via the international aid industry in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Measures that have daily economic, political, moral and personal impact on 'ordinary' Israelis are necessary prerequisites for changing the future dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Another observation from my small, random and unrepresentative sample is the sense of superiority. Liberal, leftist, fundamentalists, secular, religious and progressive voices, from different generations living in different cities, shared the feature of superiority, which is problematic at the very personal and human level, before it extends to politics. Statements like 'we are God's chosen nation', 'we don't care about international law', 'we help those poor Palestinians to end the occupation', 'we offer Palestinians jobs and they work for us', 'Gaza is irrelevant', and 'I have Palestinian friends but would never trust them' characterized the discussions. Therefore, unless 'ordinary' Israelis perceive themselves as ordinary people and not superior to other nations it is impossible to imagine how a one-state or two-state solution could work.

Furthermore, just as the Palestinian people and leadership need to engage in a serious process of reforming their strategies, so do the Israelis. The Israelis need to reconcile internally a number of issues mainly related to apartheid structures, Jewish supremacy, the Jewish nature of the state, the demographic phobia and the return of the Palestinian refugees from exile. The status of Jerusalem, however, remains a key issue that needs to be tackled urgently due to its centrality in the current and future dynamics of the Palestinian‒Israeli relations. Israelis must not underestimate what Jerusalem means to the Palestinian people. Nothing can illustrate this better than the protests and acts of resistance that erupted in occupied Palestine in October 2015 and July 2017. It is a daunting task to address these issues and to debate them. However, these issues cannot be dismissed if the different actors are interested in finding realistic solutions.

Towards a Lasting and Meaningful Peace

This selected set of personal observations and broader themes may help assess the future of Palestinian‒Israeli relations. In short, I argue that a people-focused reflection and understanding is the missing element in the vast majority of analyses, and that without popular legitimacy, without bringing people back to the core of the political systems, and without the fulfilment of people's aspirations, peace will remain elusive and the conflict will remain unsolvable. The perceptions of the people, their fears and sufferings, their set of values and beliefs, and their powerful narrative can no longer be neglected if we are interested in achieving justice and equality. However, the conventional tools, assumptions and frameworks are fundamentally flawed. Moving to alternative frameworks and tools necessitates first and foremost a firm acknowledgment that the existing framework must be laid to rest.

Nearly a quarter of a century of failures reveals where the problems lie. Indeed, it exposes the deficiencies of an approach that dismisses the root causes of the conflict and supports the normalcy of domination and colonization. Moving beyond the cycles of failure and impasses requires serious engagement in a process of decolonization of Israel and Palestine, and new framings and new assumptions to understand why this conflict persists. Neither the old tools nor the current frameworks can serve as a catalyst for a positive future change. Only by addressing the imbalances of power and ending the Israeli occupation in the short term can future long-term and lasting solutions be discussed.

Dr. Alaa Tartir is the Program Director of Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network and a Research Associate at the Center on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Geneva, Switzerland. Amongst other positions, Tartir previously served as Visiting Scholar at Utrecht University's Department of History and Art History, The Netherlands, Post-Doctoral Fellow at The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), and Researcher in International Development Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), where he earned his PhD. Follow Alaa Tartir on Twitter @alaatartir and read his publication at www.alaatartir.com

Note: This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article (Palestine‒Israel: Decolonization Now, Peace Later), published in Mediterranean Politics, 2015, © 2015 Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1126391
22

Living Together in Tunisia

Khadija Arfaoui

17th September 2017

Tunisia is "...a melting pot, one where diverse elements melt to give birth to an original alloy that looks like all of its components without identifying with only one of them.

(Boulares, 2011-12:15) 
Introduction

There are not many sources writing about the early people that lived in North Africa. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1405) is the most well-known medieval Muslim scholar who wrote in detail about the first populations that lived in the Maghreb, the Berbers who: "... belong to a powerful, formidable and numerous people; a true people like so many others the world has seen—like the Arabs, the Persians, the Greeks and the Romans" (Calvert, 2015). Berbers are still part of the population today, together with other communities: Jews, Christians, blacks, Baha'is. Tunisia can boast of managing this diversity, avoiding the violence bestowed on religious minorities in the Middle-East such as Christians in Egypt, Iraq and elsewhere. Nonetheless, this diversity did come to the fore following the Arab Spring.

Who is Tunisian and who is not? The Islamists, with Ennahdha at their head, claimed Islam as the religion of the State. However, this ignored a large part of the population that want a complete separation of religion and politics, and it overlooked minorities like the Amazighen who have demanded recognition of their culture and language. Furthermore, it did not account for the Jews who have been in the country for over 3,000 years, before even the Arabs, the Christians and the blacks who had been brought to Tunisia as slaves. There are also Baha'is. How is Tunisia faring with these claims and how is it managing them? This is what I will deal with in this chapter.

The Amazighen

DNA analysis shows that the Tunisians are 88% North-Africans, 5% Western Europeans, only 4% Arabian and 2% Western and Central Africans. Yet, as Rahmani declares, history grants the Berbers a minor role in spite of the fact that they were in Tunisia long before Carthage. And yet, "Today, we generally ignore that Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia's populations are Berbers, whom we audaciously call Arabs. As to the natives, they identify themselves as Amazighen... which meant free men, then nobles and was applied to several tribes before the Roman occupation" (Julien, Book I, p. 10).

Since 2011, information has been slowly spreading that Tunisia does have a Berber population, mostly established on the heights of the Southern region where they have been able to safeguard their language, their ancestral culture and their way of life. Those of them that move about throughout the country mingle with the other populations and speak Arabic and/or French, while those that remain on their heights may speak only Amazigh or Tamazight. In any case, Berbers do not consider themselves Arabs. Indeed, if the existence of Berbers is established and recognized in Morocco where they represent between 40% to 50% of the population and in Algeria where they represent 25% to 30%, Tunisia holds "...only weak and minuscule tribes" (Charrad, 91), with less than 1% claiming a Berber identity. They are so few that many people are unaware of their existence. In Morocco and Algeria where many people speak Tamazight, they have their own TV and radio programs, but it is not so in Tunisia where their number has not stopped dwindling since the XIth and XIIth centuries as nomadic Arab tribes arrived (Pean, 1995).

This fact is not only due to the smaller size of the country compared to Morocco and Algeria, but to political reasons as well. Indeed, the father of Tunisia, the nation that emerged as a republic in 1956, saw divisions as a big threat to unity. He was able to manage diversity by imposing his benevolent dictatorship. Indeed, in the same way as he only allowed one political party, the Destour, and one official women's organization, he dismantled all tribal structures in order to realize his ideal of a "homogeneous and united nation". The structure of Amazigh society is tribal, the father being the head of the family while the mother plays an important role in the family, in agriculture and in handicrafts. Moreover, among the Amazigh even in the absence of an official contract an agreement "equals a moral and legal document" (Pean, 1995).

While Morocco, Libya, Algeria allowed this way of life to continue, Bourguiba put an end to it. Like Ibn Khaldoun, he believed that clan spirit represented a permanent threat to the state. The Numid demon, he argued, "drives to division, intestine struggles, infighting and rivalries". These people, however, had opposed fierce resistance to the Arab conquest as exemplified by Koceila, a Christian rebel chief and El Kahena, a Jewish queen, who for 5 years bravely defeated Arab attacks. Nonetheless, the year 654 was to be her end with victory of the Arab conquest. However, before dying, she asked her sons and the rest of the Berber Jews she ruled to convert to Islam. It was in 700 that Berbers converted to Islam en-masse. Hence the fact that, apart from their Amazighness, the majority are now Muslims.

Pluralism was managed thus, but it was at the expense of their religion and culture. That was the beginning of the 8th century. Despite the conversion that had been imposed on them, the Berbers throughout the region remained true to their country which they fought for in the three Maghreb countries during WWII and for independence in the 1950s. Indeed, "without their participation to the emancipating struggle, the towns would not have been able to face France" (El Hamma, 24 November 1958).

The 2011 Revolution and the identity question

The unity achieved by Bourguiba was shattered in 2011 with the revolution and the Islamist revival that brought about the issue of identity. This divided the bewildered nation into Muslims and apostates, as Salafists marked those that did not agree with the adoption of Shari'a. Unheard of violence was used against fellow-citizens because they did not share their radical views. Many Tunisians responded by putting forward their multi-culturalism, claiming the value they attributed to their diversity. Aren't we a blend of Punic, Roman, Byzantine, Spanish, Ottoman, Maltese, Italian, French, and Corsicans, in a country that shelters Muslims, Jews, Christians and, more recently, Baha'is, who have lived in harmony for thousands of years respecting one another they argued? This powerful response of Tunisian civil society was one way of protecting pluralism and the right to difference. Indeed, it is to be noted that this has been the work of civil society. In contrast, that of the government has not been as clear.

Being so few, the Amazighen are bound to mix with the other populations and learn their languages. Semi-Berber-speaking populations are to be found in the famous island of Djerba, a mosaic of races, and in other Southern small towns such as El May, Sedghiane, Mahboubine, Sedouikech, Guellala, Ajim, Majoura, Sened, Sakket, Taoujout, Seraoua, Tamezret, Chenini, Douiret, Matmata, Thala and Makthar. Only in the 20th century did Berber populations in Sened and Majoura start speaking Arabic.

Tunisian Amazigh populations are much smaller than those in Algeria or Morocco. It is difficult to make out their exact number because of their dispersion throughout the country but also because national statistics fail to report on that. They are mainly to be found on the heights in the southern region (Djerba, Matmata, Tataouine, Medenine, Kebili, Tozeur), but other groups, including between 100 to several thousand people are to be found on the Mediterranean coast and on the Western part of the country, along the Algerian frontier and in the region of Gafsa. Those of them who have migrated to the big cities and to Europe are often men who may go home once a year. In 2002, in a movie, "The Season of Men" (Maussim al-rijal), Moufida Tlatli depicted the plight of women in Djerba living with their in-laws while their husbands were either in Europe or in one of the big cities, selling carpets and artifacts. They could see their husbands once a year.

Tunisia and international treaties

The wave of democray that followed the 2011 Revolution has led to a diverse political landscape, bringing hope to many. In particular, it has emboldened peaceful minority groups who have been discriminated against in spite of a good constitution and the international treaties ratified by Tunisia.

On 13 January 1967, Tunisia ratified the International Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination adopted by the UN in Resolution 2106 of December 1965. However, the Tunisian government's weakness in managing pluralism and diversity remained an obstacle. As a result, in 2003 the UN recommended that Tunisia develops its advocacy against racial discrimination and other minorities further. Indeed, the UN refused claims that there was no racial discrimination in Tunisia, instead giving clear recommendations for the management of this problem.

So far, none of the minority groups have used violence. However, more recently, they have started to claim consideration to their status. In 2003, Tamazgha, a Paris-based NGO, sent a report to the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), at the UN to complain of the fact that Tunisia did not respect the Convention. Long ignored by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the air of liberty that swept over the country in 2011 gave them the courage to ask for recognition of an identity dear to them and which they are proud of. Their first NGO was the fruit of their endeavor: The Tunisian Association of the Amazigh Culture was founded in July 2011. In Chenini, a small village, the population does not exceed 200 Imazighen:

Imazighen are actually working on preserving the traditional aspects of their life. They speak Tamazight (their own language, with their own alphabet) and they pass to their children the same old houses they inherited from previous generations. Women are dressed in the traditional Tarefン (a colorful body wrap equipped with various metal jewelry). This village, Chenini, seems to have been kept away from civilization. (Ben Ghazi, 2011)

A TV presenter received death threats for presenting a programme on Amazigh claims to recognition (Ben Ghazi). At a TV debate, a young female Amazigh had a hard time explaining to an Islamist that learning Amazigh language was not "koufr" (blasphemy), that it was neither against Islam nor against Arabic as a national language. Her insistence on the fact that she was Muslim, that she read the Qur'an, and that learning and speaking Amazigh would harm neither Arabic nor Islam, was fruitless. And yet, Article 31 of the Tunisian 2014 Constitution states:

Freedom of opinion, thought, expression, information and publication shall be guaranteed. These freedoms shall not be subject to prior censorship.

Why are Amazigh children prevented from speaking Amazigh at school? Abdelhak Mahrouk, a young Tunisian musician, reports that when he went to school for the first time he had a hard time understanding his teacher as he did not speak Arabic: "I didn't even understand her when she talked to me. She thought I was a bad student and that I wasn't taking her seriously. So she hit me" (Ghribi, 2016).

I short, the wave of freedom that has swept over the country has opened the door and all sorts of grievances to be heard, protected by article 31. Yet, the process is slow and more is needed for this freedom to be effective.

Amazigh cnulture

The trend initiated under Habib Bourguiba has been to ignore the Amazigh identity. And yet, there is much that is appealing in Berber culture and philosophy. Nonetheless, it was arguably important for Bourguiba to do so in order to prevent the divisions prevailing in other neighboring countries. In fact, although the Amazighen had shown fierce resistance to Arab invasions, they gradually came to adopt the language of the region: Arabic. Yet, its uptake, remained weaker on the heights where several communities found refuge throughout the Maghreb and continued to speak Amazigh whilst maintaining their traditions. As a matter of fact, when asked about the language they use, they often say that they speak Arabic and/or French when they are in the villages or cities, but once at home, they speak Amazigh. They also demanded radio and TV programs in their language for their relatives who spoke neither Arabic nor French and who needed to be connected with the world. "In the past, we were stripped of our right to be who we are, to protect our identity, and to speak our language...They excluded us, marginalized us," activist Houcine Belgith declared (Ghribi, 2016). To fight off this discrimination, Mahrouk and his brother formed a hip-hop band, rapping about Amazigh life and their problems, singing Amazigh pride. "We're Amazighen and this is our country," they sing. "This was my country before Jesus came down" (Ghribi).

If there were any divisions in Tunisia among them, they melted away with independence in 1956. Indeed, Bourguiba would not tolerate any separatist claims and he made it so that national unity would be consolidated by linking religion and Arabic. That was not going to be very difficult as Amazigh was not taught and not given a chance to spread. Thus, living together was a fact but at the expense of Amazigh identity. Indeed, Article 1 of the 1959 Constitution (maintained in the 2014 Constitution) put an end to all divisions:

Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign State, its religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its system is republican.

Blacks in Tunisia

Tunisia's blacks represent around 15% of the population, but why is only one of their number in Parliament today? Furthermore, in some southern cities they live in segregated neighborhoods. In addition to the Tunisian blacks, there have been around 10,000 youth coming from 24 West and Central African countries as students or trainees in different cities.

With the advent of the Revolution of 1911, Tunisian blacks have been victims of racism and harassment, a practice rarely heard of before. One example of racism concerns the birth certificates of some upon which can read the word "chouchane" (is owned by), followed by the name Hamrouni, which means that the person is the "property of Hamrouni." Furthermore, in some cities, some blacks have the names of their ancestors' former masters. Some cities have segregated public school buses and Djerba still has a cemetery known as being one for slaves. This is something that many Tunisians themselves throughout the country are not even aware of. And that the current government considers to be a minor problem compared to the issues of corruption, unemployment and terrorism.

In addition, violence against Blacks has reached unprecedented heights. Thus, some black students have been stabbed and knifed, some seriously wounded. Their only crime is their color and their West African origin. NGOs for the defense of minorities for a better protection and representation of specific social groups were founded, like the Association of Defense of the Rights of Blacks that demands that the "Wassif" (used in Tunisia before the abolition of slavery in 1846) should not be used any more. The word is so commonly used that the Tunisians do not even know that its real meaning is not "black" but "slave." This fact is a sign of ignorance and it is the role of education, the media and the government to enlighten people. March 21, International Day for the elimination of racial discrimination is an opportunity seized by NGOs to express their grievances. Just like sexism, racism reflects the superiority of one group over another, men over women, whites against blacks.

Christians in Tunisia

Christianity is the second population with Roman Catholics, Protestants, Russian Orthodox, French Reformists, Anglicans, Seventh-Day Adventists, Greek Orthodox and Jehovah's Witnesses.

Certainly, the number of Christians has dwindled in recent decades. Furthermore, their places of worship are being used for other purposes, like the Cathedral of Carthage chaired by Cardinal Lavigerie and built between 1884 and 1890. Today, it is used as an Acropolys where several musical performances are given and also as a museum housing important Roman ruins. Nonetheless, the big Cathedral in the heart of Tunis on Habib Bourguiba avenue and also the Archdiocese of Carthage have remained as Christian places of worship. Other smaller churches are also to be found elsewhere, with an Orthodox church on Mohamed V Avenue in Tunis.

Some churches and graveyards were attacked and defaced after 14 January 2011 but, according to church representatives, the police did not make a serious investigation about such acts and failed to arrest anyone. Furthermore, the IBLA (Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes) is an organization of research founded in 1926 by the White Fathers to promote Tunisian culture. The intercultural and interreligious dialogue it established continues today with several conferences held at the diocesan set in the heart of the medina of Tunis and attended by people of different creeds. In 2010, a criminal fire at the library of IBLA led to the death of Father Gian-Battista Maffi and 60% of the books were burned down. However, the research library that belongs to the White fathers remains open to researchers.

The Baha'is

As to the Baha'is, they remain an invisible minority. Why invisible? Because if they are free to practice their religion, they are not authorized to do it publicly. Although freedom of religion is clearly stated in Tunisian legislation, there are some restrictions that prevent it.

The Baha'is came to Tunisia between 1910 and 1920. In the 1980s, they were not allowed to organize religious meetings and the media reported on them when they did. They consider themselves as true Muslims because they believe in all the preceding religions but as Islam is declared to be the last religion, they are considered as heretics. In other parts of the Arab world they are only allowed to work in certain sectors. It is not so in Tunisia. But discrimination is clearly rife, limiting their freedom of worship. Nonetheless, several notable scholars have spoken out for their right to be who they are. Among them, Amal Grami and Iqbal Gharbi who asked: "Is it possible for us to abandon our current cultural heritage that is full of great illusions and of denigration of the other?".

Homosexuals

One should also add to these communities that of homosexuals who were surprisingly granted recognition after the revolution and are represented by "Shams." Here again, Tunisia is the only Arab country to allow this activity. There are between 700 and 1,000 homosexuals in Tunisia. If they were granted recognition, they are still confronted by severe legislation. Indeed, article 230 of the Penal Code of 1913 condemns any homosexual activity and allows for the arrest of anyone suspected of being "different," that is in this context, homosexual, lesbian, bisexual, transgender or intersexual (Dridi, 2017). However, it is in contradiction with article 24 of the Constitution which declares that the state protects the right to privacy and the inviolability of the home, and the confidentiality of correspondence, communications, and personal information. It is also in contradiction with article 12 of the UDHR and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both ratified by Tunisia.

Conclusion

The communities presented in this research are thus discriminated against for three different reasons: the Amazigh for demanding recognition of their culture, the Christians, Jews and Baha'is for not being Muslim, and the blacks for their color. What is needed is a big push as Bourguiba did in 1956: equality of rights to all Tunisian citizens, whatever their sex, creed or color.

This equality had been established already in 1856 with the Fundamental Pact—the first Constitution in the Arab world, followed by the 1861 Constitution that lasted until independence in 1956. In 1959 a second Constitution was drafted, which was amended in 1999 and 2002, that put an end to discrimination, establishing equality of all whatever their religion or color. Importantly, Jewish and Christian subjects no longer had to either convert to Islam or pay a tax, the jizya for the Jews, in order to be allowed to practice their religion. As for blacks, there had already been an anti-slavery trend earlier in time. Indeed, Tunisia was the first country in the Arab world to abolish slavery in 1846. Since then, blacks have been living as free people, as free Tunisian citizens, with new generations often unaware that their black fellow citizens history as slaves.

What is the situation today? The 2014 Constitution gives the same rights to all Tunisians. Yet, in reality, Jews are careful not to go out with a kippah over their head to avoid becoming targets of violent aggression from intolerant and often ignorant Islamists. Ignorant because they only know what they have been told or taught by hard conservative Islamists who misinterpret the Qur'an at the mosque or at the Kuteb, or on propaganda TV channels or on the Internet. And because they do not bother investigating, reading, finding out by themselves, often because they are so sure that they have the truth and that all the rest is kufur (blasphemy). Indeed, the violence witnessed in Tunisia in the early days that followed 14 January 2011 has shown that what these Islamists really want is a sharia regime that would put an end to all the country's freedoms and rights, amongst which is that to be different in any way. The Islamists who appeared at the forefront claimed a return to the Sharia, to polygamy, to the hijab and niqab, as well as to the separation of the sexes.

To conclude, if laws are necessary, they are also not enough. It is the mentality that has to change and now probably more than ever. However, the current government has not been doing enough to bring this change. Instead, largely considering discrimination a minor problem. It must now respect its obligations as a member of many international conventions and treaties, and to tackle the issues they seek to address.

So far, more or less violent forms of discrimination against minorities are perpetrated by individuals and not by the State. The government's focus is on ensuring security and saving the economy which are presently in trouble. But it is not acceptable that they say discrimination is a minor problem. Two main things can be done that would not distract them from their main objectives:

Firstly, effort should be placed on harmonizing the penal code and the labor laws. This is currently being done as shown by a new 2017 law which strengthens women's protection against violence, in particular, putting an end to the clause that allowed rapists to evade prison if they marry victims.

Secondly, youth should be introduced to human rights from their first years at school where they should be taught about equal rights among people whatever their sex, creed, color, or difference. History school books should deal with diversity, as stated by Jacob Lellouche, president of the Association for the Protection and Enhancement of Jewish-Tunisian Heritage. Saadia Mosbah, a black Tunisian, president of Mnemti (My dream) makes the same claim because: "...minorities are the pillars of the national identity."

Bourguiba used education to change the mentalities and he succeeded, in spite of some resistance that remained silent until 14 January 2011. Tunisia should resume this process as recommended by the late Mohamed Charfi in his attempt to restructure the educational system while he was Minister of Education (1989-1994). Responsible citizenship will allow a harmonious and healthy development that will make for tolerance and respect for human rights for all.

A general education must also be reinforced together with a knowledge of the universal culture. Youth should learn their own history while learning about important events throughout the world. Civic education will allow the youth, Mohamed Charfi declares, to absorb "...the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination between human beings..." (Charfi: 233-234). As part of this, "Dhimmi" laws that are still in our books of jurisprudence must be eradicated and Islamic history must be taught "objectively," Iqbal Gharbi states, in reference to the sufferings of the Africans brought to Tunisia as slaves in the past.

To move toward a more pluralistic society and as Abdelfateh Mourou, Ennahda's vice-President at the National Assembly of the People, said "... Tunisia belongs to them [secular people] too. If you are in power, you have to behave as a family man! (Mourou, 2013). This is to say that the Tunisian government should not manage its efforts to ensure equal treatment to all its citizens. It is good to allow civil society to work in that direction, but more needs to be done in legislation and in education by the media to create cohesion and understanding among the different communities.

Dr. Khedija Arfaoui is an independent researcher, feminist, and former English instructor at the Higher Institute of Languages in Tunis. A long time actor and leader in Tunisian civil society, she has lectured and written widely on human rights and women's issues, and has been a frequent workshop leader at home and abroad.

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23

Requiem for BICI

Bill Law

8th March 2017

The Gulf island kingdom of Bahrain remains the only Arab state to undertake a comprehensive and independent review of abuses that occurred during what has come to be called the Arab Spring. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) was established by Bahrain's ruler King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa in June 2011 and examined events in February and March of that year during which 35 people died, hundreds were arrests and more than four thousand summarily dismissed from their jobs in the public and private sectors. Several hundred university and polytechnic students were expelled. Other students had their scholarships withdrawn. The vast majority of those affected were Shia Muslims, the majority population in a country ruled by the Sunni Al Khalifa family.

The commission was chaired by the Egyptian law professor M. Cherif Bassiouni who, when he presented the 503 page report to King Hamad on 23 November 2011, noted:

'This is a unique historic and social event because, for the first time, a government that is still in power, agrees to open all its files, subject itself to criticism, and to facilitate the work of those who seek to evaluate its performance and to identify its faults. This is despite the sensitivity of the situation in the country in which an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and social unrest prevails, and despite the consequences that could arise out of this inquiry.'

The report's findings were exhaustive and detailed. In all, it made 26 recommendations. BICI established beyond all doubt that government security forces, including the police and the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) acted within a culture of impunity and "perpetrated grave violations of human rights, including the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and arbitrary detention" in crushing a pro-democracy movement. One of its crucial recommendations was:

'To establish a national independent and impartial mechanism to hold accountable those in government who have committed unlawful or negligent acts resulting in the deaths, torture and mistreatment of civilians with a view to bringing legal and disciplinary action against such individuals, including those in positions of command, whether civilian or military, in accordance with the principle of superior responsibility.'

The report found that of the 35 deaths, five were police officers and the remainder civilians. While all deaths in such circumstances are regrettable and very sad, one in particular stands out. Karim Al Fakhrawi was the co- founder of Bahrain's only independent newspaper Al Wasat. When he went to a police station to complain that authorities were about to bulldoze his house, he was detained and a week later he died. The authorities initially claimed the death resulted from kidney failure. The truth was he was beaten to death. In December, 2012 two police officers were convicted of manslaughter and received sentences of seven years each, subsequently reduced to three years on appeal.

In the nearly six years since Professor Bassiouni released his report two versions of its impact have emerged. One narrative, that of the Bahrain government is to argue that all of the recommendations have been implemented in part or in full. For example, a police ombudsman's office, the first in the region was established. Sacked employees were allowed to return to their jobs and students to school. The government says that reform in the wake of BICI is a job in progress:

Our work is ongoing – the BICI implementation is only one part of a comprehensive reform project begun more than a decade ago. It will be continued well into the future. We are committed to achieving our reform with the approval of the Bahraini population. We will spare no effort in ensuring the highest standards of welfare and wellbeing of all of the Bahraini people so that Bahrain continues to remain a prosperous, pluralistic, tolerant, humane and inclusive society, remaining a steadfast partner to our regional and global allies.

However reform, the government states, has been made difficult by foreign interference from Iran. As noted in the February 2014 report Moving Beyond 2011: "the aim of this (Iranian) intervention is to keep the 'Bahrain crisis' alive, a situation that the Iranians see as strategically beneficial." The government argues that Iran is encouraging and fomenting unrest and violence in Shia communities in an attempt to undermine its authority and the legitimacy of the ruling family.

The other narrative, supported by government opponents and by international human rights organisation such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, argues that the culture of impunity continues unabated and that BICI provides convenient window dressing behind which the repression of opposition voices is unrelenting. Amnesty International in a report on Bahrain released in November 2016 said that since 2011 the use of torture and excessive force has continued, that freedom of speech, association and peaceful assembly has been severely curtailed and that the judiciary lacks independence while its courts continue to issue harsh sentences, including the death penalty, after unfair trials. Amnesty noted:

Five years after the King accepted the BICI recommendations, and despite the creation of new institutions, a culture of impunity still prevails. Although the authorities have brought criminal prosecutions against at least 93 members of the security forces for alleged involvement in perpetrating unlawful killings, injuries, torture and other ill-treatment since November 2011, only a minority have been convicted, mostly receiving sentences that failed to reflect the gravity of the crime. Most of those prosecuted were low-ranking personnel. No senior officers or officials have faced prosecution for the serious human rights violations committed during the suppression of the 2011 uprising, despite the BICI's call for further investigations and criminal prosecution of those suspected of being responsible.

Speaking in 2014 Cherif Bassiouni expressed his disquiet at what he called a "piece-meal" approach to reforms. While acknowledging that institutions such as the Ministry of the Interior (of which BICI was very critical), had made significant progress, he said:

The accountability mechanism leaves much to be desired. We're dealing with about 300 cases of torture, we were dealing with then-known deaths under torture, at least 5 cases that were completely documented. These cases have not been adequately investigated, they have not been adequately prosecuted. The two prosecutions and the one conviction that came about were very, very meagre and very modest. That leaves a great deal to be desired.

Three years on and facing little international pressure the Bahrain government appears to be moving inexorably away from the ideals of justice and reconciliation that the Bassiouni report sought to encourage. On January 5, the powers of the National Security Apparatus (NSA) to arrest and detain people suspected of terrorist offences were restored by royal decree. Human Rights Watch in a statement released on January 31 noted that the decree rolled back what it called "one of the few significant security sector reforms introduced after 2011."

Curtailing the powers of the NSA was a key recommendation of the BICI report which found that NSA officers were among groups of hooded, armed security forces who engaged in "terror-inspiring behaviour (which) could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure of the Interior Ministry and NSA." It also said that these agencies "followed a systematic practice of physical and psychological mistreatment, which in many cases amounted to torture, with respect to a large number of detainees in their custody."

Many of the most egregious human rights abuses occurred after King Hamad declared, on March 15, 2011 a State of National Safety, which is one of two categories of states of emergency provided for under the constitution of Bahrain. The decree effectively placed the country under martial law. As Professor Bassiouni noted " numerous violations of due process rights were recorded by the Commission during proceedings before the National Safety Courts, which were composed of a presiding military judge and two civilian judges." Martial law was lifted in June 2011.

However, on 21 February this year the lower house of parliament voted almost unanimously to drop a clause in the constitution that prevented civilians from being tried in a military court. The amendment goes before the royally appointed Shura or upper house for "urgent consideration." Should it, as expected, be approved, civilians may yet again face the rough and partial justice of military courts.

In the meantime ongoing legal cases continue to exacerbate anger and distrust within the Shia community toward the police and the judiciary. On 15 January three Bahrainis convicted of terrorism offenses in Manama were executed by firing squad, the first such executions in over 20 years. Two more men are facing the death penalty: Mohammad Ramadan and Husain Moosa. They were convicted of killing a police officer in December 2014. Both allege torture while in detention. They have exhausted all legal appeals and could be executed at any time. Citing the torture claims and the fact that the allegations were not properly investigated, Amnesty International has called for their death sentences to be commuted.

At the same time, a court case is proceeding against Ayatollah Isa Qassim, the highest religious authority in the Shia community. He has been charged along with two others with money laundering, harbouring terrorists and other violations that "threaten Bahrain's security." Last year the government stripped him of his citizenship, claiming that he used his position to "serve foreign interests and promote sectarianism and violence." He is now effectively under house arrest.

The money laundering charge is said to relate to Sheikh Qassim's role in the Shia Muslim practice of khums, a donation made to clerics, who then redistribute it to religious and charitable causes. Since June 2016, over 70 Shia clerics have been questioned by authorities, with nine currently serving prison sentences for violations of Bahrain's anti-terrorism laws.

Veteran human rights activist Nabeel Rajab has been held on remand since June of 2016, much of it spent in solitary confinement. Amnesty has declared him a prisoner of conscience. He is facing charges that could lead to jail terms of up to eighteen years. The charges relate to tweets he made objecting to the war in Yemen and that drew attention to allegations of torture in Jau prison where more than 1500 oppositionists and activists are held. He is also charged with "spreading false news" in a letter that was published in the New York Times in September 2016. Nabeel Rajab has already served more than two years in prison after previous convictions.

Sheikh Ali Salman, the leader of the now banned opposition political society Al Wefaq is serving a nine year sentence after being convicted of incitement against the government. Many other political and human rights activists are either in jail or risk detention and charges if they do not remain silent or they have fled abroad, most notably the pro-democracy Alkhawaja family. Abdulhadi Alkhawaja is serving a life sentence and his daughter Zainab was jailed on numerous occasions before joining her sister Maryam in exile.

All of these cases underline the fact that those within the Al Khalifa family who advocate a tough line against dissent have won the day. But it continues to come at a cost. Anger in Shia towns and villages is at its highest level since the 2011 uprising with near nightly protests and riots that in January, 2017 saw one off-duty officer killed and a protester left comatose after being shot in the head by police. With pro-democracy leadership jailed or in exile and criticism being ruthlessly put down, the sectarian nature of the conflict and the potential for greater violence grows by the day.

Now, with Donald Trump as president and Rex Tillerson, confirmed as Secretary of State, the future for human rights activists and opposition politicians in Bahrain appears very bleak. Neither Tillerson nor Trump have shown interest in or concern about human rights abuses in foreign countries. That, coupled with a quiescent FCO, is good news for government hardliners who will take silence from both the US and the UK as a sign of acceptance, if not approval of their continuing crackdown on opposition voices.

BICI when it was first published in November 2011 was rightly hailed as a seminal statement of intent, a roadmap unique to the Arab world that could take Bahrain out of unrest and division. Indeed it was even seen as an inspiring document that could potentially lead other Arab states onto a democratic path. Increasingly, though, as the years pass and the repression continues, BICI begins to feel little more than an historical relic, a near forgotten call to the better angels, one that grows fainter as Bahrain and the region hurtle towards a dangerous and uncertain future.

Bill Law has reported extensively from the Middle East for the BBC. In addition to numerous radio documentaries, his films have focussed on the Arab Spring and its aftermath. Before leaving the BBC in 2014, Bill was the corporation's Gulf analyst. He now runs TheGulfMatters.com providing analysis and journalism about the Gulf States and the wider MENA region. He is a regular contributor to Middle East Eye, Gulf States News, The Independent, the New Arab, BBC and Monocle Radio. @billlaw49

24

GCC States and Social Media Disruption in an Era of Transition

Alanoud Al-Sharekh

27th April 2017

Social media platforms are a well documented socio-political game changer in the GCC region, with individuals, institutions and governments using these channels to exert influence and manipulate perceptions to serve their interests. Even more so than the applications available on them, the high penetration of mobile phones has introduced fundamental changes in how people across the globe communicate, share stories and even organise protests. According to World Bank statistics Arabian Gulf countries have some of the highest mobile phone subscription rates in the world, which, coupled with the latest broadband technology, means access to new social media platforms is both convenient and immediate. This has caused a dramatic shift in the behaviours of the first generation to grow up alongside the new modes of online social interaction, the smartphone generation, for whom social networking sites have almost replaced even fairly new inventions like email, a generation used to voicing opinions on a daily basis and presenting an autonomous narrative of life from their unique perspective.

This demographic is particularly ubiquitous in the GCC where the majority of national populations is in the youth bracket (25 and under), which has forced those who want to remain relevant and influence these future leaders to have an active social media presence perhaps more so than in other regions of the world. Whereas statesmen in other countries are not so burdened with keeping up with social media platforms, the head of the Saudi National Guard, Prince Mit'ib Bin Abdullah al Saud, called a lack of social media knowledge the new "illiteracy". At the 2016 Misk Social Media Summit in Riyadh foreign and defence ministers from GCC states described their personal social media interactions as tricky but necessary. Now even foreign embassies in the Arabian Gulf states have a more overt social media presence, and engage directly with local youth through promotions by online influencers, eliminating the need for governmental or civil society assistance.

What is interesting about social media use is the interplay between formal and informal networks. This is a worldwide phenomenon with regards to how politics are played out online, but in the Gulf the absence of many voices, especially young voices, from socio-political debates has been upended by the frequency and prevalence of social media use. Opposition in the GCC is informal and with the exception of Bahrain consists of independent civil society movements.

According to the 2015 Arab Social Media Report, online sharing has become one of the "life values" of these youngsters and the region regularly tops world indexes for frequency of (per capita) use of these social media tools. Young people in the GCC have become adept at transforming key applications such as Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat to vehicles for social, economic and political expression that were not necessarily part of their inventors' original vision. Governments have quickly followed suit, both to regulate and to interact with a populace that is now engaging in public service critiques, inclusion demands and the creation of new commerce in ways that require immediate feedback.

The first mass adoption of these "self-expression" enabling technologies coincided with the Arab Spring protest movements, and meant that these platforms were used for unrestricted political discussions and mobilisations. The ability of opposition groups to disseminate information, organise and engage both local and global audiences was a challenge that GCC governments, with their traditional control of news agencies, were not prepared for. It not only up-ended the controlled status quo of ruling and governmental elites, the open exchange of ideas and opinions undermined many social taboos that prevented the young and the marginalised from having a voice. In terms of gender, social media has been viewed as a tool for inciting dangerous and deviant behaviour like demands for equality by some religious figures and traditionalists, especially in Saudi Arabia, because it has allowed women for the first time to engage in political and social spaces that have been the reserve of men. In many ways social media tools not only introduced governments and ruling elites to the true sentiments of their people, they also introduced nationals to each other and allowed them to cross the public/private divide in a way that was not possible offline. This has brought to light a multiplicity of narratives that challenge the homogenised national identity manufactured by governments that were predominantly Arab, Sunni and tribal by allowing different groups, ethnicities, and civil society organisations to share experiences that included texts and visual representations of alternative histories.

The continued existence of Ministries of Information tasked with "regulating the media and communication sector" within GCC states, an increasingly difficult task in the age of "citizen journalism" where everyone with a phone camera and an opinion is a movable information feed, is indicative of how intractable the official position on dominating communication channels remains. In most Arabian Gulf countries there has been a tripartite approach to regaining governmental control of the political narrative and curbing the appetite for defiant discourse. The reactionary laws attempting to break the habit of political chatter on Twitter by introducing fines and even jail time for "political" tweets is symptomatic of governments' need to control the flow of information through state run media agencies and state funded satellite channels.

The mass adoption of social media tools has not ended the hegemony of the state on communication channels, it merely complicated it. The introduction of laws that aim to enforce self-censorship on users was only one facet, another was the investing in sanctioned social media exchanges, either through encouraging government officials and entities to promote themselves online, or by focusing on cherry-picked "influencers" that would deliver a government friendly message. For example, the Emirate of Dubai regularly flies in young influencers from other GCC and Arab states to cover events, bestowing on them as much credibility, if not more, as traditional press. This also sends a clear message to those seeking online celebrity; remain pro-government, optimistic, upbeat and you will reap the rewards. These attempts to win over online support by encouraging only influencers who report favourably on governmental activities will become more insidious with time and as increasingly accurate data metrics make targeted ads more precise.

In countries where citizens have never truly participated in power sharing social media has made it possible for the silent masses to exert some influence, however small, instead of being mere onlookers. From the Sultanate of Oman, where state controlled media makes it impossible for any dissent to be voiced, to the State of Kuwait where despite half a century of democratic engagement there has yet to be a national referendum taking public opinion into account before introducing legislative changes, being able to express an opinion, and being able to hold some entity or individual publicly accountable, has had a heady effect. How accountable is another story. Where videos leaked on social media have resulted in swift firings of ministers and officials in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, that type of consequence has yet to manifest elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf. Most GCC countries continue to suffer from high levels of corruption despite the supposed increase in transparency and the pressure that social media users are exerting on governments today, contributing to the disillusionment with online political discourse in the "post-truth" era.

As users of new media platforms continue to develop a parallel dialogue to the official one pushed by governments, it remains to be seen to what extent this will enforce social change, or delay it because of the gratification that comes from online participation. There has been global debate around the nature of online activism itself, and if "clicktivism", the act of venting online, has actually been detrimental to real life opposition movements because people feel that they have contributed to change while exerting a minimum of risk and effort. The morphing of WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook into political action tools during the height of the Arab Spring turmoil in 2011 and 2012, when protests were organised anonymously and through social media and mobile networks, has alerted governments to the need for more online presence, officially and unofficially in bots and tracking systems that use data mining techniques to uncover, persecute and to contribute to the overwhelming amount of contrary information online. The actual impact of social media campaigns varies greatly based on geographical location and socio-political context. The hashtag #IAmMyOwnGuardian reportedly garnered more than 15,000 signatories but it has not translated into increased emancipation for Saudi women on the ground. Similarly, in Qatar, online campaigns with a "moral" nature and domestic concerns, like those against the hosting of certain Western films or pop stars, are more successful in terms of invoking government action than political ones such as the campaign for citizenship rights for the children of Qatari women (#IAmHalfQatari).

The struggle for political authority over social media channels is reshaping the patronage agreement in GCC rentier state in one clear way that may have profound implications in future, especially when viewed alongside the challenges presented by the changing economic situation. As figures of the political, religious and ruling elite are forced to share and over-share in order to satisfy a growing appetite for online engagement, their actions and the actions of those in their personal and professional circles are being opened up to scrutiny as never before. The questioning, berating and diminishing of the halo of authority and mystery that surrounded these guarded stalwarts of the status quo in the past can not be maintained online unless their digital identity and that of their cohorts is meticulously managed; a nearly impossible act. Even though they continue to dominate social media celebrity lists in terms of the numbers of followers, the intellectual tyranny of religious figures, and their veneer of respectability, are being challenged on social media networks, with visual proof of materialistic and hypocritical behaviours.

The benign authoritarianism of leaders who are beyond reproach because they are above legal persecution also depends on the maintenance of a personality cult that is becoming increasingly fragile and difficult to protect online. The debate around the interactions of ruling family members that do not hold official positions and how far they can share as normal citizens do while retaining the privileges of their last names is a public relations headache for those who are in office. Members of the Saudi ruling family were instructed not to engage in political discourses online as far back as 2012, but elsewhere ruling family members can be the biggest social media stars in the GCC. Kuwait's Majed al Sabah and Sharjah's Sultan al Qasimi are both critical commentators and occasional endorsers of governmental agendas, and their growing numbers of local and international followers continues to cloud the issue. As does the presence of future rulers such as the Crown Prince of Dubai, Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashed al Maktoum, as a seemingly spontaneous user of social media platforms, with open accounts on Instagram, Twitter and Snapchat, a precedent for GCC leadership.

During times of painful transition such as the economic transformation that the GCC is undergoing with slashed public sector salaries and the inevitable introduction of taxes that is slated for early 2018, social media platforms can be an important vessel for making citizens feel included in the decision-making process. However, the message delivery has to be handled in increasingly sophisticated ways so that it does not feel like propaganda. The New Kuwait development plan is meant to herald a positive "rebranding" of the country. It has been started with Instagram and Twitter accounts where the latest infrastructure projects were displayed as evidence of progress and future prosperity. This project fell short of expectations because it failed to capture citizens' imagination and their buy-in. Over-reliance on flashy social media tools can contribute to creating a disconnect instead of fostering engagement if it is not done in conjunction with stakeholders' own outreach offline. The issue of how to translate "likes" into real life impact is complicated, and just as complicated is how to kill a popular online story. Ignorant or agenda-driven online commentators could hijack the narrative and derail it, which is what happened to Kuwait's Economic Reform Policy last year. The country's relatively high freedom of expression meant that the message that government officials are corrupt and not to be trusted gained momentum online, and became increasingly difficult to diffuse and counter with positive spin.

Many of the negatives associated with social media inaccuracy are inherited problems. The lack of transparency by governments created problems with finding credible sources for breaking stories and some sloppy journalistic standards have migrated online from traditional media. The echo chamber effect of repeating and retweeting has amplified the reach of leaked footage, inaccurate or unethical as it may be, and has brought the universal problem of "fake news" to scandal hungry audiences in the GCC. Kuwait's current House Speaker Marzouq al Ghanim dedicated much of his final rally speech in the 2016 elections to a social media smear campaign he claimed was fuelled by his opponent's deep pockets. The rise of divisive and racist discourse has been made more acute by the silo effect of following debates on social media, with people taking positions with little awareness or knowledge, and keeping stories alive far longer than their traditional media life span. Even the fault lines of intra-GCC competition on state funded satellite stations like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya have resurfaced online, with some countries accusing others of political interference in domestic affairs through official and unofficial social media channels. This collective muddling of social media reporting, and the overwhelming amount of contrary information online has led to people turning once again to traditional media sources for confirmation of news, thereby returning some of the power back to governmental and established media agencies.

Communication tools are being factored into the future plans of GCC states alongside economic reform, security concerns and managing a youth population that is markedly different in its expectations from that of their parents generation. Even the 2020 Dubai Expo aspires to be a "reflection of the modern world, connected as never before, and changing with great speed...made possible by new technology." As security measures tighten and penalties continue to de-politicise online discourse, it is unclear whether social media will be a reform tool or disrupt the status quo in ways we have not yet begun to predict. The change of social dynamics as young people bypass formal hierarchies within households by sharing online what they could not share with family members could translate into the disruption outside the home. The digital space has become a lucrative and somewhat unregulated new market for young people who are trading services and products in a way that has diluted the chokehold of merchant elite monopolies on certain industries, including media channels. The success of these influencers and the companies they started means that government channels have started aping their creative practices in their own media offerings. Yet, these efforts have had mixed success as they scramble to stay constantly vigilant not only for online infractions, but also to counter accusations and false stories. The biggest challenge for GCC leaderships will be how to manage these young people's expectations of immediate and effective responses in the era of instant gratification during the upcoming economic transition. The increased political awareness and perception of influence that voicing criticism on social media has given these young people must be carefully handled to ensure that their current frustrations do not harden into disobedient cynicism in future.

Dr Al-Sharekh is a Consulting Partner at Ibtkar Strategic Consultancy and a Research Associate at the London Middle East Institute at SOAS, and has held senior consultative and teaching positions in academic, governmental and non-governmental institutions in the Arabian Gulf and abroad. Her academic research won the Arab Prize for best publication in a foreign journal in 2014, and includes books such as The Gulf Family and Popular and Political Cultures of the Arabian Gulf States. She was awarded the knighthood of the National Order of Merit by the French Government in 2016 for her dedication to improving women rights in the region.

25

Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa

Nadereh Chamlou

3rd October 2017

In the last years of 19th century, three women would be born who would become trailblazers for their societies and a symbol of their husband's modernization drive. They were Latife Uşakizâde -- the future wife of Mustapha Kemal Ataturk of Turkey; Soraya Tarzi, the future queen of Afghanistan's Amanullah Khan, and Nimtaj Ayromlu, the future queen of Iran's Reza Shah Pahlavi. They became trailblazers not because of their personal achievements – though Latife was a Paris and London trained lawyer, and Soraya spoke several languages and received an honorary degree from Oxford University – but because of what they chose not to wear – the veil.

Dressed in Western fashion, they accompanied their husbands to official ceremonies and to predominantly male public events. They sat, conversed, shook hands with men who were not their mahram (explained later). For tens of centuries, women had not conducted themselves in this manner in Muslim countries. With their actions, they blurred the strict barrier between the male and female domains in their society that had secluded women. They paved the way for their countrywomen to demand more rights and opportunities. And, they succeeded – partially. In 1929, the Afghan constitution enshrined equal rights for women and men. In Turkey women gained the right to vote in 1934. And in Iran, women gained access to universities and became ministers and ambassadors. Over time, however, women would face a backlash and some of these gains would either fully or partially be reversed or are in the process of regressing.

Why was the unveiled appearance of these women so significant? What has been the track record of women's rights movements in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region? And, how do MENA women compare today with their peers elsewhere? This short paper elaborates on the various phases of women's quest for rights and equality in the MENA region and compares their struggles and gains of in the West.

Birth of women's movements

Until the 19th century, women across the world enjoyed by and large far fewer rights than men, though the way their inequality manifested itself differed from country to country. With few exceptional periods and few exceptional women, women were generally excluded from the domains of power throughout history, were relegated to be second class citizens, and were subservient to men. Slowly, women began to organize themselves to advocate seriously for greater rights. In Europe, these movements coincided with broader citizens' demand for voice and participation in government, which led to a series of republican revolts of 1848 and shook European monarchies. Even though the revolts failed, they launched the discourse about citizens' rights, using neutral terms, though largely still envisioning only men. When decades later constitutions were drafted, women pushed for inclusion in the concept of citizen and the right to vote. In the United States, similar women's movements took place. Though the US had a constitution and its wording was intended to be genderless and all encompassing, it was in effect written with white male property owners in mind. Other groups had to fight step by step to be included in the definition of citizen. The Seneca Falls Women's Convention of 1848 is widely referred to as a critical turning point for the women's movement in North America, which led to the passage of the 19th Amendment in 1920 to give women the right to vote.

These events naturally influenced the developments in the MENA. Additionally, faced with a decaying Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 19th century, thinkers and scholars across MENA began a process of introspection and soul-searching about the roots of their societies' stagnation while the West had seen considerable technological progress and economic growth. A contributing factor to this self-examination was Charles Darwin's book On the Origin of Species (1859) that had widely shaken up the intellectual thought worldwide in two ways. It discredited the creation theory, thus undermining religious teachings and establishments which had a stronghold on people's lives. This was like wind in the sails of secular intellectuals, who had often been at odds with organized religions – certainly the Abrahamic religions. And, secondly, it demonstrated that the natural course of events was that weakness of any kind would ultimately lead to extinction.

Muslim thinkers found a great deal of analogy between Darwin's naturalistic theories and the plight of their communities. Leading among such intellectuals was the Egyptian Qasim Amin. He saw the condition of the Muslim woman as one of the fundamental causes for backwardness. In his 1899 Tahrir al mara'a (The Liberation of Women), he wrote that women were the backbone of the society and associated the causes for Egyptian underdevelopment to women's lack of education, to the veiling and to their subservience to men. Joining hands with emerging women's associations, he began to advocate that elevating the status of women in Muslim societies was a nationalistic necessity and duty. "If Egyptians did not modernize along European lines and if they were 'unable to compete successfully in the struggle for survival they would be eliminated," he argued. He blamed the oppression of women on traditions rather than Islam and used Quranic texts to claim that women's rights were supported in Islam.

Muslim vs. Western Women's Rights and Constraints

But, how did Muslim women fare against the Western woman, when women throughout the world had few rights? Some scholars, like Timur Kuran of Duke University, suggest that Muslim women were in fact relatively better off, and had more economic rights than their peers in the Western Judeo-Christian societies or the Eastern Hindu-Buddhist-Taoist cultures.

Muslim women were entitled to inherit, albeit half of a man's share. Such rights were irrevocable and spelled out in the Quran. They could not be changed at will. In most Western societies men, and above all first-born males, would inherit the entire estate as the institution of primogeniture dictated. Women inherited only when there were no other direct male heirs.

Muslim women were also entitled to full independence from the husband or any male relative in the management of their wealth and finance. Furthermore, they signed contracts in their own name, and their property and earnings remained entirely theirs, with no need to share it with others if they so wished. The husband was responsible for the care of family, even paying his wife an allowance for being a wife (nafaqa) though in exchange for full obedience, and a quasi-wage (ojrat-ol-mesl) for any household work performed. The wife was not necessarily obligated to allocate her time or labor to the household. In such a case, the husband was required to arrange for someone to do the household work. The husband was to provide in principle for the same style of living as the wife had been used to in her father's home. i.e. if she came from a well-to-do background, the husband had to make sure that he furnished her a similar lifestyle. By way of a prenuptial agreement, women would also be assured to receive a predetermined divorce settlement. In case the husband would go bankrupt, the nuptial commitment to the wife would be considered the most senior debt, i.e. she would be paid first from the liquidation of the estate before other creditors could be paid. Such economic provisions were intended to prevent that a husband take his wife for granted. They ensured that she be adequately and financially taken care of in the husband's household, and be sufficiently empowered to care for herself.

The provisions were particularly important considering the institution of polygamy, whereby the husband could take multiple wives, if he could provide for all his wives equally, and could divorce them with ease. This was the flip side of the economic rights that Muslim women enjoyed, which disempowered them. The husband's unilateral right to divorce and the right to custody of children were ultimately forcing women into submission. Women's rights to initiate a divorce was considerably constrained or non-existent when the husband provided financially, performed his marital duties, and produced an offspring. When the wife wanted a divorce, she had to relinquish the right to the prenuptial financial settlement – a khol'a divorce. But, even this was not easy because the husband had to give his consent. Hence, while the Muslim woman had enviable economic rights as an individual, the unequal right of divorce within the marriage exposed her to an ever-present risk of repudiation, and the subsequent loss of her children.

For the Western woman, beyond the difficulty to inherit, as discussed above, she would essentially lose any ownership of any property upon marriage; it would become the husband's property. They, too, had to be obedient to the husband, but in a different context than their Muslim counterparts. What strengthened their bargaining power within the marriage was first that polygamy was not permitted and that both sides had the same rights -- or no rights, to be precise \-- to divorce. If divorce became necessary, it was a difficult and lengthy process for both, and had to be based on guilt or breach of marriage (such as adultery). The children would typically stay with the mother. In some denominations, divorced people were excommunicated and not permitted to marry again in the church, which de facto meant that they were shunned in the society.

A far more binding constraint on the Muslim woman to engage in the public sphere has been the concept of 'mahram.' A mahram is a relative with whom marriage/sexual relations would be illegal and forbidden (or haram). These were very specific close blood relations such as such as father, grandfather, great-grandfather, son, grandson, great-grandson, uncles, brother, sons of siblings, as well as certain relations by marriage such as mother's husband, husband's father, grandfather, husband's son, grandson. Women were free to mingle with these male relatives and could be unveiled; they could not move around freely and unveiled among men outside this very tight and restricted circle, or without the presence of a mahram. This impeded considerably the interaction of Muslim women in society, in the public sphere, and in circles of power, since they would inevitably be surrounded by men who were likely not their mahram relatives. Though the veil was supposed to facilitate women's access to the public, over time, women became more and more secluded and a considerable divide developed between women's quarters – the andaroun – and public spaces. Western women, by contrast, did not face this restriction and could easily engage in the public sphere.

Nationalist Phase

The post-WWI era and the breakup of the Ottoman, the German, the Austro-Hungarian, and the Russian empires, saw the birth of many new nations in Europe, during which constitutions were written and the rights of citizen vis-à-vis the state defined. With an already greater presence of women in the public circles, the natural course for Western women was to gain influence into the halls of power and have their voices heard in decision-making. Therefore, women suffrage became the main goal. By the 1920s, women in a dozen countries around the world had gained the right to vote, beginning with New Zealand, and others were on their way.

As mentioned above, the liberation of women became intertwined with nationalistic goals. Beginning with Turkey in 1934, by the 1950/60s, more and more MENA countries gave women the right to vote, and invested considerably in women's education. During the first half of the 20th century, most MENA countries also expanded their legal codes, often importing legal concepts and bodies of law from Western countries. However, while women were constitutionally equal to men in the West, most Western laws contained gendered language and resulted in even differential treatment between men and women in he West. In other words, at the time of their introduction into MENA legal codes, these Western laws discriminated against women. As will be explained later, from the 1960s onwards, these laws were adjusted in the West, reformed, and updated to remove any gender-discriminatory language or bias – this process that has not yet fully taken place in MENA. To sum up, the nationalist phase resulted in equality under the constitution and women's right to vote. But, the adaptation of Western legal codes imported laws largely remain as they were and are often in contradiction with the spirit of the equality under the constitution.

Modernization Phase

The second phase of the women's emancipation in the MENA came with the ambitious government policies industrialize, done largely done through large-scale state-owned enterprises and enlargement of the public sector. Since men work at nearly equal rates across countries, expanding the workforce can mainly be achieved by attracting women to work outside the home. However, this meant that women had to balance their dual roles as home-makers and workers, and that the work environments had to be respectful and dignified. A host of protective legislation was enacted that ranged from family policies such as maternity leave and childcare facilities, to restriction on the type of work that women could perform, the hours of work, and the surroundings in which they worked. For instance, night work was prohibited as was working in mines or around chemicals. Women's labor force participation in modern sectors rose considerably during this period. Entire sectors, such as textiles, became only competitive because they depended on female labor. And, foreign investors would flock to countries where they could be assured to find a sufficiently large pool of female workers.

However, while nearly all countries enacted similar types of protective legislation, largely modeled after recommendations by such international organization as the International Labor Organization, women's labor force participation in MENA did not grow as fast as in other regions. This was largely because women's labor force participation was still contingent on the husband's permission, which was frowned upon within prevailing social norms. Since the husband was financially responsible for the family, having the wife work was interpreted as his inability to care for the household. Even poorer families that often needed a second income found it difficult to overcome this tradition. However, from the 1950s to mid-1970s, with the increasing need to industrialize and the enlarge the labor force, MENA moved in parallel with the West by enacting protective legislation to facilitate women's participation, and this began to pave the way for a percentage of women to enter the non-agricultural labor market.

Neo-Islamization phase

The widening gap between women's rights in the West and in the MENA countries began in earnest in the late 1970s. A turning point in the global gender agenda was the first United Nations Conference on Women that took place in Mexico City in 1975. It shone the spotlight on a range of laws that, despite the right to vote, still constituted persistent discrimination against women. The Conference led to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979. Over the years, of the 194 UN member nations, 187 countries would ratify CEDAW, though curiously, two countries would still reject to do so ideologically – the US and Iran.

CEDAW caused a great deal of push-back within other Muslim countries. On the one hand, women's rights groups urged for ratification in parliaments since governments that had voted for the CEDAW adoption by the UN, on the other hand conservative groups raised the specter that CEDAW contradicted the Shari'a. In the end, most Muslim-majority countries ratified CEDAW with so many specified reservations that essentially made the convention meaningless. Slowly, however, women's rights advocates have been able to justify and push their governments to remove some of the reservations.

In most non-Muslim counties, however, CEDAW offered a platform and a comparative common denominator to guide gender-intelligent legal reforms. It also strengthened the hand of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who would mobilize the grassroots and generate an impetus for change. Many countries took the opportunity to review old laws in diverse fields, ranging from labor laws, to pension regulations, to social security provision, assess to credit which were redrafted to remove specific legal-based discrimination. The process would frequently entail that a law or regulation would be challenged through the judiciary for contradicting the spirit of constitution – the highest law in the land – that guaranteed all citizens regardless of sex, gender, age, race, religion, etc. equal treatment.

This process of harmonizing the body of laws with the spirit of the constitution has not fully taken place in most MENA countries. As mentioned above, even though a large body of civil codes is based on laws that were imported from the West in early decades of the 20th century, the discriminatory elements are now justified under religious codes. A good example is the nationality law. Throughout the ages, women and men intermarried from different parts of the Ottoman or other Muslim lands. The concept of citizenship was invented in the West. When the law was "imported" into MENA, women in the West could not pass on their nationality to their children. In the meantime, Western countries have removed this restriction; it still exists in MENA legal codes. A Lebanese woman from Beirut married to a Syrian man from Damascus cannot give the Lebanese nationality to her children. Despite its origin, the gender based discrimination is now justified in terms of the Sharia. Christian denominations are not any different. Little by little, though, some countries are finding ways to reform such laws, albeit with great difficulty.

Growing conservatism

Part of the growing disparity between the MENA countries and the rest of the world can be blamed on a growing conservatism since the end-1970s. While the 50s/60s/70s witnessed a secular outlook, the period since has been infused with an Islamic resurgence, in which the question of women's rights is challenged again. Several factors played a role. On the geopolitical front, the 1979 Revolution in Iran is perhaps the most visible pivot toward conservatism. It reversed most of the reforms of the Pahlavi regime. Another case is the growing conflict within the broader Middle East. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, in which the West fed and used extremist Islamist groups and ideology to fight communism. The continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fueled radicalism among Arabs. Therefore, from Afghanistan to Morocco, conservative movements gained ground because they provided a useful tool for people to identify against enemies. This was further augmented by the massive amounts of financial support from Wahabi sources that further engrained austere religious thinking that was misogynistic at its core.

A further development that could provide a partial explanation for the conservative tide since the 1980s is a disproportionately faster growth of the traditionally-inclined share of the population vis-à-vis to the modern and progressive segments. What does this mean? Female fertility rate declined from about seven children per woman in 1960 to three children in 2006. While this is good news, it is important to pay attention to the differential fertility rate within the population. Despite lower average fertility rates, religious/traditional families, in which gender roles were more pronounced, still had more children than the "modern" secular family. Larger traditional families are also more likely to discriminate between sons and daughters. In unitary small families the girl child is likely to be treated the same as her brother and both sexes to grow up with gender egalitarian experiences. Fast forward a generation, the differential fertility rate between the traditional and the modern segments of the society lead to conservatives outnumbering the seculars – and this tilts attitudes and politics accordingly.

There are frequently pictures of graduating classes of Arab universities between these two different points of time. They demonstrate perfectly the increasing conservatism of Arab societies. Above are two such examples.

Where do we stand?

The Mexico conference led to subsequent conferences in Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995) to monitor progress. In the West, the legal changes achieved creating a de jure level playing field for women. However, even Western societies still retained hidden sexism and implicit discrimination. Affirmative action for women and for ethnic minorities enabled women to make advances into fields that were previously male-dominated. However, affirmative action was regarded as benefiting women or minorities, and not necessarily the society at large. This perception began to change when in the late 1990s and early 2000s a series of academic articles quantified with robust methods the significant economic returns of gender and race diversity. The studies analyzed the performance of publicly traded Fortune-500 firms over an extended period. Controlling for various characteristics, those that embraced diversity in leadership showed a consistent track record of higher growth in earnings per share and better return on equity in comparison with firms that were led by only white men. Diversity was measured as having at least three women or minorities on board.

These studies were seminal and were replicated repeatedly in the US and in other countries – all with similar results and conclusions. The studies did not posit that by adding just a few token women to company boards earnings could be hiked up. The findings suggested that a company that managed and rewarded its diverse talent pool was likely to be more attuned to market changes, more agile to recognize and adjust to risks, and more likely to better manage its other tangible and intangible assets. Think-alike and uniform boards were less likely to see risks and opportunities.

These studies inspired a range of economic literature that set out to estimate the cost of gender inequality at the family, firm, and economy-wide levels. Universities, corporations, international organizations, and even management consulting firms were among the leading institutions to say that "empowering women is smart economics." This marked an effective departure from previous approaches in which women's rights and equality were a goal in themselves. Today, women's empowerment is not only important on its own but benefits everyone.

The Cost of Gender Inequality for MENA

The main cause of economic losses are the persistent legal barriers and sticky social norms that impede women to access employment, entrepreneurship, promotion, and innovation opportunities. Recent literature by the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, IMF, and various UN agencies demonstrate that the MENA region still has the widest legal disparities between men and women. Not only do these barriers and discriminations place most of the countries of the region at the bottom of any gender-based rankings, they also translate into considerably high gains that these economies could achieve in terms of increase in GDP if they were able to remove the barriers. For instance, women in Egypt face some 20 gender/sex-specific legal barriers in the economic sphere over and above the barriers that men encounter. If Egypt were to remove these gender-based barriers, its GDP is estimated to increase by as much as 39 percent. Similarly, if Iran is found to have 23 legal barriers. If removed, it could boost the GDP by some 41 percent. Similar analysis for the US, for instance, yield a potential increase of 13.7 percent, for Japan, 19.76, and for Germany 14.3 percent. In the long run, the region's combined GDP could be 37.8 percent larger solely by the removal of gender-based legal barriers. If not addressed, over time, the cumulation of the GDP loss among MENA countries due to gender barriers could lead to a considerable backwardness, as had been envisaged by the 19th century thinkers like Qasim Amin.

Conclusion

There are two main differences between early efforts of the women's rights movements and today's approach. The first distinction is that earlier approaches focused on rights-based arguments. This was best articulated at the Beijing Conference in 1995 when then-First Lady Hilary Clinton said that women's rights are human rights, and human rights are women's rights. Building on the concept, today's focus is to quantify the economic cost of gender-based discrimination – the loss of welfare to the entire society – when they fail to realize their potential and are held back. This approach provides new tools, fresh ideas, and innovative methods to create a level playing field for all.

The second difference is the argument that it is not simply enough to educate women and to bring them into the workforce. The real gain from gender-equality can only be achieved when women are involved at all levels of decision-making and leadership because they bring new and different perspectives and insights that are based on their experiences and needs. These insights can lead to better business decisions and better public policies that can ultimately lead to more efficient outcomes for the society. Fortunately, in several MENA countries, women have advanced in government and business position and it seems promising that they will have more opportunities to influence policies and process for more inclusive societies.

MENA countries made considerable progress during the 20th century to strengthen the capability of their female populations through education and healthcare. But, in terms of opportunity and empowerment, the gap between MENA and the West may not have been narrowing in the past 30 years. MENA has not been able to enact the types of legislative changes that are necessary to remove de jure sex-and gender-based barriers. The rest of the world has moved more systematically because the persistence of discrimination ultimately leads to loss of economic potential. This lethargy, and at times slowness and push-back, has been largely due to a rise in conservatism, which is partly due to demographic movements, partly due to rising conflict in the region, and partly to a rise in fundamentalist discourse and finance.

As to the fate of the three women at the beginning of this paper, sadly, their destinies seem to echo the efforts they launched. The reformist king, Amanullah Shah of Afghanistan, was forced to abdicate by conservative forces in 1929. His reforms were largely overturned, then gradually came back, then reversed by the Taliban, and since 2003 slowly reintroduced. Queen Soraya died in exile in 1968. The Queen of Iran, too, left during the 1979 revolution, which ended the secular Pahlavi monarchy. Most of the gender-based reforms of the 50-year rule of the Pahlavis were reversed, except women's right to vote. The queen died in exile in 1981. Latife, the wife of Ataturk, lived a low-key life and died in obscurity in 1975. Though recent times have seen a revival of conservative attitudes toward women by the Erdogan government, the reforms in Turkey were the most sustainable among the three countries. In the Arab world, there are positive signs, though. Many countries have appointed women ministers with important portfolios to break the glass ceiling. And, recently, women in Saudi Arabia were given the right to drive, to travel with the permission of a mahram, and to participate in elections. Perhaps, with all the ups and downs, forward and backwards, the women in the region are finally turning the corner. Muslim women have come a long way. They are not where they were, they are not where they want and need to be.

Nadereh Chamlou is a former Senior Advisor for the The World Bank.

26

The Future of the Middle East

Hugh Miles

12th October 2017

After decades of political stagnation the system of Arab states set up a hundred years ago by colonial powers is starting to fall apart. As the new era dawns countries across the region, as well as a host of non-state actors, are fighting over what the future is going to look like. Often this fight is violent, but it is also conducted by every other means.

The Arab world is cracking up because - as we have seen in this e-book \- the region is going backwards and the people living there simply will not tolerate this any more. The information revolution in the 90s and 00s gave them a rights-based mentality and an internationalist outlook. It was only a question of time before they started demanding basic freedoms and rights just like others all over the world. This manifested itself as the Arab Spring in 2010 - 2011 and it lead to the collapse of several long-standing Arab regimes.

Those events should not be viewed as isolated incidents, but more like events surrounding the French Revolution or the Thirty Years War, a long process characterised by several consecutive revolutionary waves. Currently the revolution is in retraction, a time for organisation and recruitment, but sooner or later the next wave will come and it is likely to be much more aggressive and radical than the last one.

Pillars of the Arab world

The two main pillars of the old Arab world are Egypt and Saudi Arabia, creaking giants who made it through the first wave and still dominate the region in just about every way. Despite past differences the regimes in these two countries now find themselves locked in a deep embrace, the twin poles of the counter-revolution, desperate that whatever the new Arab world looks like it will continue to look much like the old one i.e. with them still in charge.

In Egypt this plan is going just about as well as the Sisi regime could have hoped. The counter-revolution has worked, for now at least. The army has reestablished control over most of the country, the war in North Sinai and the armed insurgency drag on and are badly damaging the economy, but they are not an existential threat. Besides, peace would be worse as the regime depends on insecurity to justify its existence. The key is it has managed to stay in power with all privileges to which it is accustomed, always its overriding goal.

Now the threat of popular revolution has retreated and the Islamists are in check the Deep State and its allies are reverting to their preferred pastime: deepening and thickening their role in the Egyptian economy, especially in lucrative, strategic areas like energy, construction and the media. The Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters purged from business, their seats are being filled by army officers and Mubarak-era businessmen fresh back from exile, only this time with more oversight from the army. Notorious figures like Hussein Salem and Ahmed Ezz are back in business. The corruption is back as before.

The cost of enforcing this counter-revolution has been a military coup, the mass killing of protesters and a systematic state-run programme of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and torture which Human Rights Watch recently described as a crime against humanity. Almost 60,000 political prisoners and detainees are incarcerated in Egyptian prisons according to a report released last year by Arabic Network for Human Rights Information. We would know more about these crimes if Egypt, one of the world's biggest prisons for journalists, had not recently blocked hundreds of blogs and websites (including Human Rights Watch) as well as other online communications platforms and VPNs.

Saudi Arabia - the crackdown

Saudi Arabia emerged relatively unscathed from the 2011 revolutions but, seeing the writing on the wall, the regime there has also launched its own far-reaching pre-emptive crackdown on opposition of all kinds. In the Eastern Province the Shia are being subjected to a ruthless campaign of suppression, largely ignored by the outside world. At the start of September the regime arrested many of the kingdom's most influential clerics including Sheikh Salman Al Owdah (14 million followers on Twitter) and Awad al-Qarni (2.2 million Twitter followers) as well as others. Opposition groups had called for nationwide protests on September 15 to protest economic and social conditions, corruption and MBS converting the traditional Saudi Bedouin system of governance into one-man rule. The protests attracted huge interest online but were quelled by an overwhelming police presence like the last time in 2011.

Since MBS came to power there has also been an unprecedented attempt by the regime to silence dissent within the royal family itself. The whole family is under surveillance, no prince can leave Saudi Arabia without his permission, and anyone suspected of opposing his bid to become king is being locked up. Unknown numbers of princes are now under house arrest \- maybe a dozen or more - as well as a larger yet unknown number of princesses. He has reportedly installed a secret prison in his palace for special high-value prisoners. Among those recently detained is Prince Abdulaziz bin Fahd, son of a former king, who in August criticised the de facto ruler of the UAE Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and issued then retracted a suspicious tweet about being targeted shortly before he was taken. Even MBS's own mother, Princess Fahda bint Falah bin Sultan al-Hithlayn, has reportedly been detained at a luxurious farm in Al Kharj as her penchant for magic was proving a political liability.

But the most eye-popping example of MBS's crackdown on dissent in his own family this year must surely be the public defenestration and humiliation of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef that took place in June. Dethroned, denounced and placed under house arrest, the message was clear: I can do this to him, I can do it to you. Nobody is untouchable any more.

Opponents to the Saudi regime in the west are also being targeted. Like Col Qadhafi with his Stray Dogs programme or North Korea assassinating the ruler's half-brother the Saudis run their own state-sponsored abduction programme targeting dissidents and defectors living in the West. In the last two years they have abducted at least three royal family defectors and taken them back to the kingdom against their will. Their fate is unknown, although on 2 October Prince Turki Al Faisal confirmed for the first time that they are back inside the Kingdom where they are being treated like criminals.

In 2003 a similar spate of émigré dissident kidnappings occurred when within the space of a few months the Saudis drugged and violently kidnapped Prince Sultan bin Turki from Switzerland and then made attempts on two other well-known dissidents: Dr. Saad al Fagih was assaulted and stabbed at his home in London before managing to fight off the attackers. Prof. Mohammed Al Massary was targeted by a UK policeman who had been corrupted by an official at the Saudi embassy and subsequently had to enter a witness protection programme for his own safety.

The revolution will not be televised

No one can stop a revolution being propelled by such deep currents, but as we saw in 2011 one of the main factors driving this one is the explosion of the internet, where the revolution is already happening 24 hours a day.

As Dr Alanoud Al-Sharekh has noted, the Gulf region regularly tops world indexes for frequency of (per capita) use of social media tools and developments in new communications technology. These changes have dramatically levelled the playing-field.

Social media is toxic for totalitarian systems because it is by nature democratic and informal, with no respect for the kind of baroque regal antics and macho military posturing Arab regimes try and hide behind. Online, regimes are de-frocked and de-iconised, a brutal necessary psychological step before assailing the wall of fear.

Crucially as there are now many popular, credible alternatives to official government-approved media and religious establishments online, regimes have also lost of control of the Islamic message. This, combined with home-grown Arab social media stars broadcasting audio-visual evidence of regime members' penchant for sex, drugs and violence, has eviscerated any claim to religious legitimacy.

And the torrent of leaks keeps coming. Where once information about the internal workings of Arab regimes was scarce, now it flows in abundance with information from Wikileaks, the Panama Papers, even details of the UAE ambassador in Washington's email communications about prostitutes. Hundreds of thousands of pages of confidential documents now in the public domain provide a detailed insight into these regimes' inner workings.

In February 2015 the Egyptian regime was painfully hit when a pro-Islamist TV channel aired a leaked audio recording, later authenticated, showing Sisi and his inner circle discussing the Gulf states in disparaging terms while planning how to tap them for another $30bn to be diverted into banks accounts used by the Egyptian army. In minutes the conversation systematically dismantles the army's widely-propagated notion that it is the heroic protector of the nation and instead shows it to be what many long suspected: a shady private business enterprise which acts in its own interest with no proper oversight.

Determined to wrestle back control of the information flow the regimes are using every available means, from powerful lobbyists and PR firms, to robots and tracking systems, reactionary laws, fines and jail time for social media postings and "political" tweets.

On August 17 after the king's top media advisor Saud Al Qahtani, Adviser to the Royal Court and Supervisor General of the Center for Media and Affairs Studies had his darknet account hacked and correspondence leaked, it was revealed for years he has been recruiting hackers on a darknet forum to shut down or control online accounts belonging to opposition members, spy on dissidents using their own PCs and to buy thousands of fake Twitter and Youtubeaccounts which are used online to make fake "likes" and "dislikes", for electronic DoS attacks, and also for trumped up legal complaints to get opposition media taken down by moderators. These leaks are supported by previous leaks showing correspondence between Al Qahtani and the controversial Italian computer security company Hacking Team.

Hours before he was hacked Saud Al Qahtani had announced the formation of a blacklist (hashtag #القائمة السوداء ) on Twitter which he said the state would use to identify and hunt down opponents based on their online handle or IP address. He went on to quote a saying from the hadith "to kill a specific list of people even if they are found hiding under the curtains of the Holy Kaaba" which could be interpreted as a green light to kill anyone on that blacklist. To erase doubt the regime went on to issue some explicit personal death threats to specific opposition members, including the prominent Saudi political satirist Ghanem Al Dowsari who lives in exile in London. He was telephoned by Prince Abdulaziz bin Mashour, brother of MBS's first wife Princess Sara and subjected to several direct threats including that he would cut off Al Dowsari's head. Al Dowsari has since received other explicit threats including on 10 September when self-confessed Saudi hitman Majed Maliki, who claims to hold the current title in the Guinness Book of Records for eating the most live scorpions,threatened to come to London to kill and eat him. In the video Majed Maliki, who boasts he has already killed several other people in the past, proves his identity by showing his July 2015 certificate from the Guinness Book of Records when he beat the previous record holder by guzzling 22 live scorpions.

Since then the Saudi regime has continued to make more Orwellian calls urging people to monitor each other on social media and report critics.

Wrong side of history

Despite all these flagrant breaches of human rights and the rule of law these regimes remain close allies of Western governments and continue to receive vital economic and political support. President Trump recently withheld a symbolic $300 million worth of dollars in aid to Egypt on the basis of human rights, a relatively small amount and the US has already indicated this decision may be partially reversed. The same day UK minister Alistair Burt met Egypt's Foreign Minister Shoukry and gave him strong reassurances Britain was committed to Egypt's "war against terrorism".

A few days later Burt wrote a ground-breaking letter (in Arabic only) that was published in Egyptian state media which appeared to set out a newly hostile UK government policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Without mentioning human rights, the letter condemned the Brotherhood in unprecedented tones before going on to misleadingly equate the Egyptian regime's ongoing battle against armed political opposition with the UK's struggle against Jihadi militants. On 4 October the UK's Defence Senior Advisor for the Middle East Lt General Tom Beckett arrived in Cairo to discuss opportunities to expand UK-Egypt joint military collaboration, the latest in a series of high profile defence engagement visits between the UK and Egypt this year.

The West's love-in with the Saudis also continues to break new ground. Despite President Trump accusing the Saudis of masterminding 9-11 the US government is currently fighting to stop an international inquiry into atrocities in Yemen demanded by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and backed by China. The UK government, which has sold £3.6 billion worth of arms to Saudi Arabia since conflict with Yemen began and just signed a new military and security cooperation deal with Saudi Arabia, continues to suppress a Home Office report about Gulf governments promoting Islamist extremism.

As Angela Merkel said no one defends the Saudis without being bribed.

Despite high-sounding proclamations about human rights other Western governments are little better. Italy's arms exports to Saudi Arabia doubled to €14.16 billion this year, a more than fivefold increase since 2014 despite European Parliament resolutions calling for an arms embargo in light of violations of human rights and international law in Yemen. Canada just got caught out selling the Kingdom armoured vehicles which have been used to carry out human rights abuses in the Eastern Province.

The French and Swiss governments are still covering up their roles in the kidnapping of the Saudi princes who sought protection in their countries. In Switzerland the 15 year statute of limitations on the serious criminal charges filed by Prince Sultan bin Turki against two senior members of the regime for his kidnap in 2003 is quietly being allowed to run down, defeating the ability to pursue the prosecution even though as the Swiss authorities are well aware, and as the Saudis have now admitted the plaintiff has been abducted and taken back to Saudi Arabia again in the meantime. The French investigation into the abduction of Prince Sultan bin Turki on Feb 1 2016 when his plane was diverted to Riyadh after leaving a Paris airport also appears to be going nowhere.

Nor has any western government seen fit to criticise the Saudis for the kidnappings of US and European nationals who were members of Prince Sultan bin Turki's personal entourage and were abducted with him on the same flight on Feb 1 2016. They were taken to Saudi Arabia against their will, stripped of their electronic goods and detained for three days.

Non-western countries such as Russia and China also provide support to Arab regimes but not on the same scale as western nations. On 4 October King Salman paid a historic visit to Moscow, Russia already sells large quantities of arms to Algeria and some to Egypt and China is active in the same markets.

Return of the Jedi

Revolutionary waves are like penny-pushers - you just can't tell when they are about to drop. The last wave was totally unexpected but still Western governments carry on like there will be no sequel. Sooner or later though it will come and these regimes will enter the dustbin of history, just like Tunisia's Ben Ali, now living in Saudi Arabia, and Libya's Col. Qadhafi, pulled out of a sewage pipe and murdered by his own people.

In Egypt, having already experienced one wave followed by two years of unprecedented freedom and democracy including five plebiscites we are in a position to make an informed guess what the next wave is going to look like.

One lesson from last time was that unlike other Arab countries Egypt is not about to fall apart. Secondly, as Tom Dinham described, there are essentially three political forces struggling for control: disorganised liberal groups unable to transform popular enthusiasm for their democratic platform into organisationally powerful political parties; the army and the Muslim Brotherhood.

In 2011 the liberals started the revolution and made it a success, but then after a short period of freedom well-organised Islamist groups took over. It seems likely that a similar scenario will play out again next time too, as although the regime has done its utmost to smash the Muslim Brotherhood their roots in Egypt run deep. As Azzam Tamimi observed they have been almost completely annihilated twice before and came back both times. When the next wave comes they will inevitably seek to purge the Deep State - the army, judiciary, media and security services - since that was arguably their biggest mistake last time.

As the Deep State will be fighting for its life, so there is a grim possibility Egypt is heading towards an Algeria-style scenario of protracted civil war or worst of all, a Syrian scenario. This is what the Sisi regime holds up as the most likely or only possible alternative to his rule and out of fear many people accept this. It is easy to see why. Given Egypt's geopolitical importance a Syrian-style meltdown would obviously be a catastrophic disaster with far-reaching ramifications, one of them surely that Europe would be inundated with millions of refugees.

But it is easy to imagine a different scenario, similar to that which took place in Iran in 1979: military leadership paralyzed by indecision, rank-and-file soldiers demoralized and under constant call to defect. Mutinies take place in several barracks and officers are shot. Fearing further mutinies, many soldiers return to their barracks and quickly some provincial towns fall to the opposition. Before long the revolution is complete. Egypt's army is, after all, a people's army and so just as touched by Islamist thinking as everyone else.

Notwithstanding Robin Lamb's argument that political Islam has been diminished this is the least bloody and most optimistic of Egypt's possible futures, especially if Egypt were then to transition into some kind of peaceful Islamic democracy, like Tunisia, and other Arab countries copied it. This vision of a thriving democratic, Islamist Egypt is the one that Qatar is betting on and the one Al Jazeera propagates.

Given the Brotherhood's problematic, sectarian ideology, the big challenge for Western policy-makers is therefore to make it moderate its views before it comes to power so that it does not become a theocratic replica of the secular security state it replaces. This is best done through positive engagement, while trying to set the best possible example of freedom and democracy, like the US did during the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

Post-Al Saud Arabia

A collapse of the regime in Saudi Arabia is an even more alarming prospect than in Egypt because Saudi Arabia plays such a critical role in the global and regional economy and because the status quo ante was anarchy. Furthermore, since Saudi Arabia has been so predictable for such a long time and has never been a free country we have very little idea what kind of future the great Saudi public will choose when they finally get the chance, especially women. Another complicating factor is that whenever it comes to discussing the future of Arabia post-Al Saud usually loquacious foreign affairs institutions, think-tanks and media fall strangely silent and instead defer to the line dictated by the Saudi lobby: Arabia post-Al Saud is a taboo fantasy never to be spoken of and certainly never to be realised.

So what would it look like? As Anthony Harris quoting Niels Bohr wrote, prediction is very difficult, especially when it's about the future, but below are three possible scenarios for Arabia post Al Saud in no particular order. Liberal democracy is unfortunately not likely to break out on the Arabian peninsular any time soon and the reality is that one repressive system will probably be replaced by another, as occurred in Iran. As the rise of shale has diminished Saudi Arabia's global economic importance, so the chance of foreign intervention in any future conflict in the Arabian peninsular must also be diminishing.

1. Civil War

The Syria model: a messy attempted revolution leads to a civil war with proxy fighting by outside influences. This leads to some regional fall-out and causes considerable damage to assets, infrastructure, and transport options. The positions adopted by Saudi Arabia's neighbours would be important in this scenario.

Due to Saudi Arabia's desert geography and the international alarm caused by the disruption to oil production, the conflict would likely be short and intense, so any supply interruption of oil supplies would be limited. Downstream industries and organisational structure might be impaired for longer. Although major physical destruction of oil production capacity is technically possible historically it has occurred extremely rarely.

The Strait of Hormuz becomes dangerous to navigate at least for a period, with reduced capacity. If the Straits of Hormuz are threatened or closed Oman and Fujairah, the easternmost of the Emirates would become crucial, as happened in the first Gulf War.

Transport and insurance costs skyrocket, as in Nigeria during the Biafra war or the second Iraq war. Substantial physical oil supply interruption would last throughout the period of hostilities and much would depend on the allegiance of the regime that ultimately ended up in control of Saudi Aramco.

The civil war settlement may not be fully accepted and attempts would likely continue to reopen the conflict, kept alive from abroad. This would likely preclude a government with a high degree of legitimacy and stability. Saudi Arabia may become a failed state and explode into violence, institutional collapse and mass emigration. The littoral Gulf states could be badly affected and a high proportion of their indigenous population could become refugees. Qatar would be better placed than others due to the presence of the Al Udeid air base.

2. Salafi takeover

A second possible future scenario is a collapse of the present regime followed by a political takeover by a conservative-authoritarian Salafi government. This is the scenario that would involve the least change. Al Saud are swept away like the House of Romanov in 1917 and the Sunni Islamist opposition ride in like Lenin and scoop up the power lying on the streets of Riyadh. The country retains its territorial integrity and civil war is avoided.

This scenario would see a lot of policy continuity with the existing government. Economic growth would be managed at a low but acceptable level. Levels of corruption would improve and there would be higher official taxes and state expenditure. Anti-Shia discrimination would increase and the new regime would be even more conservative and Wahhabi than the one now. The new government would remain a reluctant ally of the West.

A royal family coup could open the door to any of these scenarios and a faltering post-coup attempt to implement a reformed or constitutional monarchy could trigger a second revolutionary wave and Salafi takeover, rather like the February and October Revolutions in Russia in 1917.

3. Shia takeover

A third possible scenario is one in which the Eastern Province is taken over by a Shia government, closely allied to Iran. The rest of the country follows scenario 1 or 2. The new government then reviews and renegotiates all agreements and partnerships, and a major technology and know-how exchange begins between "Shia Saudi" and the Iranian national oil, gas and chemical companies. A major re-orientation of political and commercial international partners follows. The renegotiation and transfer of agreements and interests in KSA would happen over a short period of time, proceeding in a more or less friendly way, with more or less compensation paid.

Since there has been a long-standing anti-Shia discrimination inside Aramco there would follow a clean-out of Saudi Aramco's top management, with key jobs moving mostly to Shia, and perhaps also to Shia-sympathisers. Iranian top-managers would then be moved in to compensate for the experience gap / talent shortfall, likely a difficult process that would have a destabilising effect on business, distract top management, and weaken company morale.

The wider international consequences in this scenario would be hard to predict. Iran might subsequently be invaded or attacked by western powers. A militaristic western response, as happened in Libya, cannot be ruled out. A new global Cold War could start between the US and China, with Iran and its allies aligned with China, or in a context of detente between the USA and Iran.

A clue as to which option the UK government is betting on can be found in the National Archives at Kew. One declassified document entitled "British policy in case of a coup" written by a UK foreign office official in 1963 but feels more recent concludes:

"The part of Saudi Arabia that matters most to us is the Eastern Province. In case of a coup, the situation is likely to take even longer to crystallise than in the Yemen. We should therefore probably have time to see what sort of picture was going to emerge before we needed to recognise one or more Governments in the country or otherwise take a position. We should almost certainly not wish to intervene on one side or the other, especially since the Americans are committed to the present regime and might carry the odium of successfully supporting them without us having to interfere. Our ultimate objective would be to establish good relations quickly with whatever regime controlled the Eastern Province. As the most likely coup would be a palace revolution or a revolt in the Hejaz, resulting in a regime more or less similar to the present one, we should have sufficient credit left from our provision of military advisers and technical advice of other sorts to render this objective reasonably easy of attainment."

Emancipation

Collaborating with dictators who do our bidding over Israel and pay us with petrodollars may seem like the cheap and easy option for the West. It has been policy for a long time and it has certainly worked out well for many western firms and governments, not to mention hookers, hitmen and hackers. The impending Aramco float is set to be a bonanza for investment bankers in London and New York. But it is not looking like such a good bargain for the rest of us any more.

There are several reasons why: above all, preventing other human beings from enjoying basic freedoms runs against core Western principles which is corrupting and destroys faith in democracy. It has lead to a rise of anti-Islamic populism in the West and the development of a two-tier system in which Arabs and Muslims are second class citizens.

As Henry Thoreau wrote in Walden in 1854:

"Practically speaking, the opponents to a reform in Massachusetts are not a hundred thousand politicians at the South, but a hundred thousand merchants and farmers here, who are more interested in commerce and agriculture than they are in humanity, and are not prepared to do justice to the slave and to Mexico, cost what it may.... There are thousands who are in opinion opposed to slavery and to the war, who yet in effect do nothing to put an end to them; who, esteeming themselves children of Washington and Franklin, sit down with their hands in their pockets, and say that they know not what to do, and do nothing; who even postpone the question of freedom to the question of free-trade..."

Secondly, depending on dictators to solve our security problems and tackle the Jihad phenomenon is self-defeating because as Mohammed Al Jarman explained it is these regimes' security services, clerics and media that caused this problem in the first place and so they just make it worse. This is why despite the West deploying astronomical quantities of resources since Al Qaeda first reared its head in 1998 Jihadi groups have expanded on every metric since. Back then the Jihad movement consisted of a few groups in Afghanistan at the far end of the Islamic spectrum. Today they are a spectrum in themselves, a rich and growing multitude spread all over the world, each more radical than the last, with better military capabilities, governance, public outreach programmes, media, finance and overall ability to recruit and kill than ever before. Europe is experiencing mounting waves of attacks. The bomb at Parsons Green Tube station on 15 September was the fifth in the UK this year and at least seven other significant plots are known to have been foiled, making it the most sustained period of terror activity in England since the IRA bombing campaign of the 1970s.

Clearly the West's colossal attempts to combat the problem of Jihad have been worse than useless. Worse still, siding with the counter-revolution puts the West directly in harm's way because it makes violence against western interests condonable. "Why?" many people still ask after each bombing, but the answer is clear: backing despots, as well as invading and occupying Arab countries, invites an armed response and if the shoe was on the other foot the West would do it back and worse too. It already does anyway.

The fact is Arabs and Muslims are too numerous and the world is too integrated for there to be a security-military-surveillance solution to the problem of Islamic militancy. Responding with violence just normalises violence and gives succour to exactly the kind of radical groups the West is trying to combat. The long-term psychological effect of western policy on Arab and Muslim society is creating a collective sense of anxiety and fear that will continue long after these regimes are gone. Just as North Korea became an anti-western dictatorship only after it was carpet-bombed by the US for three years and Iran became virulently anti-western only after the US instigated a coup d'état so the West is now building its worst Jihadi nightmare in the Arab world with its own hands.

The only long-term solution is a complete change of strategy. Jihad is a Sunni Muslim problem with a Sunni Muslim solution. It is political and it lies in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. If these two Arab giants had a more normal and democratically-inclined political environment and normal levels of freedom then there would be no room for organisations like IS and Al Qaeda and they would simply disappear. But before this can happen people in those countries need to be able to choose their own leaders, as in democratic countries around the world, and that requires a complete rethink of one hundred years of Western policy towards the whole Arab and Muslim world and Israel.

Hugh Miles is an award-winning author and freelance journalist. His recent work includes the BBC TV documentary "Kidnapped! Saudi Arabia's Missing Princes" which was broadcast last month. Please see hughmiles.com for more details.

Acknowledgements

The e-book's editors and Global Policy team would like to thank all the authors for their contributions and patience. This volume would not be possible without their time and thoughts on an evolving and fiercely debated issue.

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