

Bluster Strike and Beyond

Commentary on the Impeachment Trial of the Decade

Jean-Marc LeBouquin

Copyright © February 27, 2020 Jean-Marc LeBouquin

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# Table of Contents

### Bluster Strike and Beyond;  
Commentary on the Impeachment Trial of the Decade

Chapter 1 – Morning-After Aftermath;

Chapter 2 – Burisma and Pressure

Chapter 3 – of Several Built-in Escape Clause Probabilities;

Chapter 4 – The Fiction of Assistance Withheld

Chapter 5 – Proper Quorum; or Odium

Chapter 6 – Appendix 1 – The Procurement Working Group and its mandate to expedite Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

Chapter 7 – Appendix 2 – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran

Chapter 8 – Appendix 3 – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

Chapter 9 – Appendix 4 – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex

Chapter 10 – Appendix 5 – Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

Chapter 11 – Appendix 6 – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause

Chapter 12 – Appendix 7 – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"

Chapter 13 – Appendix 8 – Sham Dispute Resolution Mechanism

Chapter 14 – Appendix 9 – Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25

Chapter 15 – Appendix 10 – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress
[Chapter 1  
– Morning-After Aftermath](tmp_1547445aa8df85f930070e5e40a52247_KnuFvg.ch.fixed.fc.tidied.stylehacked.xfixed_split_001.html#ref_a01) –

Even if it was getting stale, the political culture and climate of the political movement formerly known as the Democratic Party machine would allow for no deviation from it. A rule most petty which no one willingly would politically let go of; and of which party apparatchiks deigned not transgress with any outward sign of acceptance of the notion that maybe;

Just maybe it wasn't the Russians, and it wasn't due to the dark horse candidate; that Democratic Party presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton failed to capture the hearts and minds and votes of even a third of the eligible voting population in 2016.

Over 71 million out of the 200 million eligible refused to vote for either candidate, so maybe;

Just maybe; candidate Hillary being the known article in the election (as opposed to dark horse Trump's being a mere suggestion) – maybe it could be conceded at some point that; given the daunting numbers against her; from the total population of eligible U.S. voters numbering 200,081,377 by October 2016:

Hillary Clinton's slice of the pie numbered: 65,853,514 – or 32.91%

The non-voting population of electorate resistant to holding their nose in favor of choosing either Hillary Clinton or Trump; those non-voter irregulars beat all at: 71,243,035 – or 35.61%

Dark Horse Trump managed to muster up: 62,984,828 – or 31.48%

Total population overwhelmingly decided against Hillary (Trump + non-voting resistance): 134,227,863 – or 67.09%

The entrenched leadership and general minion office holders of the national level Democratic Party pecking order asserted that the overwhelming popular distaste for the prospect of a Hillary 2016 Presidency must be due to interference from some outside force – which must properly be held accountable for keeping Hillary from the White House role everyone knew she deserved.

The Electoral College was definitely pointed out as a wrongful possible contributing factor to the debacle – and an encumbrance; that glaring mistake in the Constitution laid out over there on those pages in plain sight.

That Electoral College system is the archaic construction which had been devised to keep larger more centralized districts from unduly controlling the denizens' lives lived out in outlaying areas; those clodhoppers and bumpkins sidelined with different issues maybe not so well understood or maybe not sympathized with as much by the Big City gentrified moguls who wouldn't have time for it.

That system of the Electoral College put in place so long ago was clearly the thing that was, or is wrong; because Hillary controlled some pretty concentrated localized population centers – so she should have won with her extra smidgen of votes over Trump's if it wasn't for that stupid Electoral College thing.

It could have been the Electoral College was the reason for the overwhelming popular vote against the Democratic ticket and candidate.

But the other implausible reason that Party proselytizers really went for as explaining Hillary's dumbfounding loss was that it must have been the Russians conspiring with Trump to turn those 134,227,863 disenchanted souls away from Hillary which was the cause of all the disarray; regardless if innuendo pointing to collusion between the Russians and Trump was never shown as having any basis.

It must nevertheless have been the Russians, with the flamboyant Mr. Trump opening the gates from the inside; which had so successfully convinced critically vast numbers of the Democratic Party base to stay home on Election Day 2016 – thus disappointing partisan apparatchiks and depriving the Party of the votes everyone knew Hillary was entitled to.

Whatever it was; it couldn't have been the thing the Democratic machine was responsible for maintaining all through 2016; and pushing for through 2017 up until the spring of 2018, and then promoting even beyond then – the thing which Hillary was (at the time of the 2016 National Election) the preeminent spearheading voice in support of;

It couldn't have been that factor which contributed to a sense of odium regarding Hillary; because the electorate isn't supposed to know about it. So it couldn't have been that 'cause no one cares about it anyway.

* * * * *

Although the aspect hadn't been brought up in the Articles of Impeachment submitted to the Senate – the "House Managers;" those Lower House Congresspersons assigned to prosecute the impeachment case against Trump; decided to also use the venue of the Senate Trial as an excuse to further delve into the issue of Trump's alleged dirty tricks, his alleged collusion with Russia, designed to successfully derail the Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign in 2016.

The House of Representatives' Articles of Impeachment were voted in favor of strictly along party lines. Democratic Party Congress membership seeing majority control in the House of Representatives – the motion to set fires in the Republican camp controlled Senate was inevitably approved. It was widely anticipated that the Senate would also vote along party lines to douse inflamed synthetic passions and mock posturing; and to "acquit" the President of wrongdoings so alleged.

As a magical political taunt it couldn't lose. The Senate trial provided a field day venue for top quality anti-Trump rhetoric and when the Senate inevitably decided against impeachment the Democratic Party goers could always say they was robbed and that Trump should have been ousted on his ear but for the injustices of partisan politics and majority vote counts.

It wasn't necessarily the ouster of Trump from office that would count. The Senate trial could become the kick off to an exciting and unique presidential campaign, and would find its lasting full measure of justification by getting a Democratic Party contender hopeful elected as President in November.

And so, with the ripe opportunity fully in hand – the House Managers saw no reason to let the issue of Trump's alleged collusion with Russia be allowed to just disappear over the horizon of loneliest forgotten treasures. They brought it up in the Senate and this is how Counsel for the Defense, Jay Sekulow, responded in his Opening Argument:

Jay Sekulow: (00:00)

...Let's for a moment, put ourselves in the shoes of the president of the United States right now. Before he was sworn into office, he was subjected to an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation called Crossfire Hurricane. The president within six months of his inauguration, found a special counsel being appointed to investigate a Russia collusion theory. In their opening statement [of the Senate Trial], several members of the house managers tried to once again re-litigate the Mueller case.

Jay Sekulow: (01:06)

...this is part one of the Mueller Report: This part alone is 199 pages. The house managers in the presentation a couple of times referenced this for that. Let me tell you something. This cost $32 million. This investigation took 2,800 subpoenas. This investigation had 500 search warrants. This had 230 orders for communication records. This had 500 witness interviews. All to reach the following conclusion, and I'm going to quote from the Mueller report itself. It can be found on page 173. As it relates to this whole matter of collusion and conspiracy, ultimately, is the words of Bob Mueller in his report, " _this investigation did not establish that the campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election interference activities_."

The House Managers' team had earlier actually invented some pretty serious accusations against Trump without presenting any sources or supporting evidence providing a foundation for the baseless innuendo they went spewing about with on the Senate floor. Sekulow was responding to some of that. Here are a couple of snippets from the second day of the Senate Trial (25 January 2020):

Adam Schiff: (10:22)

...Russia too, has sought to support this effort to smear Mr. Biden. Reportedly hacking into the Ukrainian energy company at the center of the president's disinformation campaign only last week. Russia almost certainly was looking for information related to the former vice president's son so that the Kremlin could also weaponize it against Mr. Biden just like it did against Hillary Clinton in 2016 when Russia hacked and released emails from her presidential campaign. And President Trump has made it abundantly clear that he would like nothing more than to make use of such dirt against Mr. Biden, just as he made use of Secretary Clinton's hacked and released emails in his previous presidential campaign.

That above completely unfounded construction, put forth without any reference to any specific source – based on nothing; pretends singular knowledge of the motivation behind an event that isn't clear as having occurred. It's wild stuff – examining further:

Adam Schiff: (18:47)

...[this] was not the first time the president solicited foreign interference in our elections. In 2016 then candidate Trump implored Russia to hack his opponent's [Hillary Clinton's] email accounts, something that the Russian military agency did only hours later, only hours later. When the president said, Hey, Russia, if you're listening, they were listening. Only hours later they hacked his opponent's campaign...

It's amazing the influence Trump used to have over the Russians. Back in the day he apparently could snap fingers and the Russians would hop to with the obsequious scraping and bowing and the dutiful internet information hacking etc. It must be hard now for the President to get up in the morning these days without his much missed animal magnetism of yesteryear.

The special brand of malarkey and meager hysterics which has become so regrettably common in the Demo Party of today; did not immediately play well for the Biden Presidential Campaign in the Iowa Democratic Party presidential primary voted a few weeks after that 25 January 2020 scorching excoriation, memorialized in the records of the Senate trial.

In the Iowa primary; the first Democratic Party presidential primary of the campaign season, erstwhile clear front-running Biden landed in a very disappointing fourth place behind three other candidates who earlier in the campaigning season had notoriously lagged precariously in their seemingly unrealistic bid to become the next Democratic nominee for the presidency.

Unfortunately for the aspirations of previously hot-running presidential contender Joe Biden, there is no putting the Genie House Manager Adam Schiff back in the bottle...

IN THE SENATE TRIAL, House Manager Adam Schiff had not neglected to emphasize the need for Trump's immediate removal from office on account of a collusion which was documented as never having happened (as we shall review presently).

Below, Schiff explained how President Trump's continued presence on the scene would endanger election bids of legitimate candidates like former vice-President Joe Biden:

Adam Schiff: (17:49)

...we are here today to consider a much more grave matter and that is an attempt to use the powers of the presidency to cheat in an election. For precisely this reason, the president's misconduct cannot be decided at the ballot box, for we cannot be assured that the vote will be fairly won...

The ambitious partisan objective that Schiff refers to in mentioning the above " _cannot be decided at the ballot box_ " was that Trump should not only be impeached, but the Senate should also vote to have Trump permanently barred in future from being elected to a United States Government Office of Trust as it wouldn't be fair since he can never again be trusted to run against a Democrat.

The verdict of the Senate the House Manages requested in the House of Representatives' Articles of Impeachment was:

Wherefore, President Trump, by such conduct, has demonstrated that he will remain a threat to the Constitution if allowed to remain in office, and has acted in a manner grossly incompatible with self-governance and the rule of law. President Trump thus warrants impeachment and trial, removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.

We registered Democrats must remind ourselves to once again thank our lucky stars we have our own entrenched troglodyte party leadership protecting us from ourselves in their ongoing stand-up struggle defending our right to free and fair elections for all innocent bystanders not affiliated with unaccounted for poor taste in orthodoxy.

* * * * *

The House Managers' feeble excuse for Hillary's spectacular loss of the critical popular vote in the 2016 election; the excuse that the Russians were even capable of, and did turn 134,227,863 citizens, the vast majority of the eligibles, away from their Democratic Party presidential hopeful in 2016 is absurd, naturally;

Otherwise; it has to be the case that the keen observer of the human psyche, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, has outdone his nefarious Soviet predecessors.

It was now Putin's more advanced subsoil tendril minions infiltrating and subverting the U.S. population in large order which has successfully overwhelmingly convinced long-timer registered Democrats (like myself – who votes independently but nevertheless is, and has been a registered Democrat longer than the relative newcomer Obama); to finally get fed up with the same old crapola dished out by the high and mighty embedded in and in control of the Party machine;

It was now Putin and his henchmen of the deep who had saturated, captured and compelled the imagination of the electorate – spiting all the Democratic Party hired focus groups, advertisers and analysts, and the other whatnots who couldn't keep up with the overwhelming propaganda spewing foreign talent onslaught.

It turns out to be another "red scare" just like in the good old days before a lot of people now living wouldn't remember anymore. A "red scare" with the red washed out; but nonetheless again concerning _those people_ who go marching to the same seductive drumbeat broadcast, courtesy of Radio Kremlin.

And the Lower House proselytizers' dedicated accusation committee forum used this very scary story stuff concoction as a hopeful basis to gull civilian bystanders into mesmerized fascination with a narrative which simply won't allow that; given the irrefutable rebuke of the daunting election numbers against her – maybe the larger portion of the voting population refused to choose Hillary because they simply didn't want her over there in the White House; maybe it was simply because they didn't trust her or care to take her word for whatever; and felt they knew their own good reasons why.

Naturally disregarding any possible relevance of the total popular vote (includes eligible non-voter) numbers – in their December 2019 _roman-feuilleton_ novella presentation: " _The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry Report_ ," published in advance of their later edition " _Articles of Impeachment_ " – the accusers persisted way into end of 2019, in reasserting as fact their obsessive fictional spy-thriller styled dramatization of a Trump-Russia collusion as being the root cause for the tragic political downfall of sweet and innocent, clean hands Hillary Clinton. An example of the exercise is found on page 10 of that Lower House treasury-sponges authored, tax-payer funded work-out:

"In making the decision to move forward, we were struck by the fact that the President's misconduct was not an isolated occurrence, nor was it the product of a naïve president. Instead, the efforts to involve Ukraine in our 2020 presidential election were undertaken by a President who himself was elected in 2016 with the benefit of an unprecedented **and sweeping campaign of election interference undertaken by Russia in his favor** , and **which the President welcomed and utilized**."

Leaving the bit about Ukraine aside for the moment; The Lower House removers' squadron – as mentioned – first proposed the startling accusation in " _The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry Report_ ;" that Trump had colluded with some non-specific and unnamed Russian Agency or Agencies to suborn the 2016 election in his favor.

They submitted the false allegation that Russia had conducted a " _sweeping campaign of election interference...which the President welcomed and utilized_ " knowing full well that the " _Report of The Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate – on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election_ ;" which was released in the first session of the 116th Congress (2019) does not corroborate at all that characterization of the Russian cyber strike on U.S. election infrastructure.

Presenting excerpts of the Senate Report to give a sense of the overall assessment:

Report of The Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate – on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election

Russian Efforts Against Election In frastructure

I. Introduction

From 2017 to 2019, the Committee held hearings, conducted interviews, and reviewed intelligence related to Russian attempts in 2016 to access election infrastructure. The Committee sought to determine the extent of Russian activities, identify the response of the U.S. Government at the state, local, and federal level to the threat, and make recommendations on how to better prepare for such threats in the future. The Committee received testimony from state election officials, Obama administration officials, and those in the Intelligence Community and elsewhere in the U.S. Government responsible for evaluating threats to elections.

II. Findings

1. [censored material blacked out]... The Russian government directed extensive activity, beginning in at least 2014 and carrying into at least 2017, against U.S. election infrastructure' at the state and local level...[censored material blacked out]... The Committee **has seen no evidence that any votes were changed** **or** **that any voting machines were manipulated**.

Overall there is clear evidence of Russian scanning of and personal information associated with voter registration, often by non-State actors. Without going through the whole report I present the Report's summaries for sections "The Arc of Russian Activities;" " _Elements of Russian Activities_ ;" " _Russian Intentions_ ;" and " _No Evidence of Changed Votes or Manipulated Vote Tallies_ "

III. The Arc of Russian Activities

1. [censored material blacked out]... In its review of the 2016 elections, the **Committee found no evidence that vote tallies were altered or that voter registry files were deleted or modified** , though the Committee and IC's insight into this is limited. Russian government-affiliated cyber actors conducted an unprecedented level of activity against state election infrastructure in the run-up to the 2016 U.S. ...[censored material blacked out]... Throughout 2016 and for several years before, Russian intelligence services and government personnel conducted a number of intelligence-related activities targeting the voting process. ...[censored material blacked out]... the Committee found ample evidence to suggest that the Russian government was developing and implementing capabilities to interfere in the 2016 elections, including undermining confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and voting processes.

– The Committee found **no evidence of Russian actors attempting to manipulate vote tallies on Election Day** , though again the Committee and IC's insight into this is limited.

– In the years since the 2016 election, awareness of the threat, activity by DHS, and measures at the state and local level to better secure election infrastructure have all shown considerable improvement. The threat, however, remains imperfectly understood. In a briefing before Senators on August 22, 2018, DNI Daniel Coats, FBI Director Christopher Wray, then- DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, and then-DHS Undersecretary for the National Protection and Programs Division Christopher Krebs told Senators that there were no known threats to election infrastructure. However, Mr. Krebs also said that top election vulnerabilities remain, including the administration of the voter databases and the tabulation of the data, with the latter being a much more difficult target to attack. ^"Relatedly, several weeks prior to the 2018 mid-term election, DHS assessed that "numerous actors are regularly targeting election infrastructure, likely for different purposes, including to cause disruptive effects, **steal sensitive data** , and undermine confidence in the election.'"'

IV. Elements of Russian Activities

A. Targeting Activity

Scanning of election-related state infrastructure by Moscow was the most widespread activity the IC and DHS elements observed in the run up to the 2016 election.

• [censored material blacked out]... In an interview with the Committee, Mr. Daniel stated: "What it mostly looked like to us was reconnaissance.... I would have characterized it at the time as sort of conducting the reconnaissance to do the network mapping, to do the topology mapping so that you could actually understand the network, establish a presence so you could come back later and actually execute an operation."

• Testifying before the Committee, Dr. Liles characterized the activity as "simple scanning for vulnerabilities, analogous to somebody walking down the street and looking to see if you are home. A small number of systems were unsuccessfully exploited, as though somebody had rattled the doorknob but was unable to get in .. . [however] a small number of the networks were successfully exploited. They made it through the door..."

...Based on the Committee's review of the ICA, the Committee concurs with this assessment. The Committee found that Russian-affiliated cyber actors gained access to election infrastructure systems across two states, including successful extraction of voter data. However, **none of these systems were involved in vote tallying**.

V. Russian Intentions

1. Russian intentions regarding U.S. election infrastructure remain unclear. Russia might have intended to exploit vulnerabilities in election infrastructure during the 2016 elections and, for unknown reasons, decided not to execute those options. Alternatively, Russia might have sought to gather information in the conduct of traditional espionage activities. Lastly, Russia might have used its activity in 2016 to catalog options or clandestine actions, holding them for use at a later date. Based on what the IC knows about Russia's operating procedures and intentions more broadly, the IC assesses that Russia's activities against U.S. election infrastructure likely sought to further their overarching goal; undermining the integrity of elections and American confidence in democracy.

• [censored material blacked out]... Mr. McCabe told the Committee that it seemed to him like "classic Russian cyber espionage.. .. [They will] scrape up all the information and the experience they possibly can," and "they might not be effective the first time or the fifth time, but they are going to keep at it until they can come back and do it in an effective way."

• [censored material blacked out]... Mr. Daniel told the Committee:

While any one voting machine is fairly vulnerable, as has been demonstrated over and over again publicly, the **ability to actually do an operation to change the outcome of an election on the scale you would need to, and do it surreptitiously, is incredibly difficult**. A much more achievable goal would be to undermine confidence in the results of the electoral process, and that could be done much more effectively and easily. . .. A logical thing would be, if your goal is to undermine confidence in the U.S. electoral system— which the Russians have a long goal of wanting to put themselves on the same moral plane as the United States ... one way would be to cause chaos on election day. How could you start to do that? Mess with the voter registration databases.

VI. No Evidence of Changed Votes or Manipulated Vote Tallies

In its review, the **Committee has seen no indications that votes were changed, vote tallying systems were manipulated, or that any voter registration data was altered or deleted** , although the Committee and IC's insight is limited. Poll workers and voting monitors did not report widespread suspicious activity surrounding the 2016 election. DHS Assistant Secretary Jeanette Manfra said in the Committee's open hearing in June 2017 that "I want to reiterate that we do have confidence in the overall integrity of our electoral system because our voting infrastructure is fundamentally resilient." Further, all three witnesses in that hearing—Ms. Manfra, Dr. Files, and **FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Bill Priestap—agreed that they had no evidence that votes themselves were changed in any way in the 2016 election**.

So those above are some excerpts of the overall; and the consensus is that there is _No Evidence of Changed Votes or Manipulated Vote Tallies_ in the 2016 election. Mr. Daniel's observation that: "... _the ability to actually do an operation to change the outcome of an election on the scale you would need to, and do it surreptitiously, is incredibly difficult_ ;" is clear, and it makes perfect sense.

The nut house accusation that it was Donald Trump in collaboration with the Russians who were responsible for hypnotizing the over two thirds majority – 134,227,863 thereabouts – of the population of eligible voters into not thinking well enough of Hillary Clinton to want to get stuck with her being in the White House for four years; that is just example of the jaded politicians' cynical perspective that if they toss the public some notion that seems like it might be fairly easily digested, then maybe if the politicians setting the bait are lucky enough it gets spread around – and then people will kind of hear about it and maybe start to get the impression that everybody seems to believe it so it's probably true without really having time to think about it, and without taking a look at it.

Once exposed to the fact of the matter however, and getting a chance to consider it for just a second one realizes it's wacky, and silly and stupid. Yet wacky and silly and stupid is what's great for charlatan office holders in general; 'cause the electorate is kept off balance when large numbers take it for granted that there must be some merit to what these bogus soothsayer politicians have to say just because they said it (and as everyone knows; heaven forbids they should go around unexpectedly spewing about just any unrestrained nonsense their positions entitle them to);

And when large numbers take it for granted that there must be some merit to what these office holding opportunist quack clairvoyants have to say just because they said it – then the myth-maker campaigners of the partisan political elite have good cause to feel great comfort with the wacky and the silly and inane twisted from the latest edition American lexicon of deviating tawdry nonsense; provided they are sufficiently confident in being believed in for whatever absurdity they care to put across;

It is they, after all, who in a sense control the public microphone – the almost exclusive attention of news-media outlets which promote the credibility of the respective outlets' most favored and talked about topical politician object-of-conversation of the day.

Hitching their commercial wagon to the politician's star – the news media outlets promotion of the credibility of topical politicians is also a known marketing means of reflexively promoting their own respective news-media credibility image and status with the public. Hence, whichever Enchantment Genie Vaporous Politician is on occasion let escape out the bottle with enough time for vaporous politician fumes to coalesce in ambient room barometric pressure – they're bound on appearance to get good media copy review from some recognized outfit not wanting to be left behind on a scoop.

Meanwhile, the most absurd unexamined notions get accepted and passed around as though these are truth be told – and the preposterous notion that the Russians (whichever among them) were able to surreptitiously infiltrate and alter the views of the 134,227,863 U.S. voters because there he was, Mr. Donald Trump live; and colluding as the Trojan Horse perfidiously opening the gates from the inside; as long as that any kind of screwball notion remains unchallenged by comparison with the known facts or reasonableness; it is in this manner that the farce becomes the fabled, out of proportion juicy gossip fully accepted and accredited out of hand.

In the process of promoting this piece of 2016 election-explanation partisan promotional propaganda blather in question; politicians and media pundits necessarily must ignore and discount the non-voter as an irrelevant non-playing nonentity because the 71,243,035 – or 35.61%, the biggest block of eligible voters at the time – because they didn't vote so they don't count;

And if you look at it that way; Hillary won the "popular vote" by a smidgen so she should have won the election but for the ungainly yet nevertheless stealthy Russian interference colluded in by Donald Trump; it must have been that which necessarily swayed the fraction of necessary voters who stayed home but could have otherwise made a difference had it not been for famed Russian heavy cream pancakes' induced indolence.

Such a view denies the humanity and the numbers of the voters and the integrity of their right to their overwhelming choice not to have Hillary as President. In the event, there was no academic fiction of a small fraction of voters that might have made a difference in favor of Hillary. And the non-voter is not the irrelevant nonentity the politicians publicly disdain them (us, me included) to be; and the maligned and ignored non-voter certainly was of account in that not even close popular decision by the electorate where the bad-ass non-voting bloc irregulars whomped all over Hillary's misguided and co-opted loyalist aficionados' faction by a wide margin – and there are righteously virtuous good reasons for it.

* * * * *

While the Senate Impeachment Trial fiasco was being carried on with in late January 2020 – and earlier all through the late summer months of 2019 to end of 2019; during the onslaught period of preliminary Lower House scurrilous impeachment priming invective designed to stir ire and steamy momentum in the lead-up to the big event;

Iran was happily launching the latest phase in its so far four years long successful expanding development of a domestic nuclear weapons capacity; including presumed development of its delivery systems and warhead manufacturing capabilities.

Since early to mid 2016, a Procurement Working Group bureaucracy, established under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) – which is the official United Nations designated title of Obama's Iran nuclear deal (not the "JCPOA," as some who would misinform and draw attention away from the genuine instrument pretend); began to openly seek out vendors world-wide, inducing those to present sales proposals offering Iran procurement packages of either nuclear weapons associated goods, support services and technologies as found on the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9 and Rev. 10/Part 2 rosters – or procurement packages bundling INFCIRC/254/Rev.__/Part 2 listed assets with ballistic missile weapons associated inventories found on the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_. The Procurement Working Group had posted the advertisement below, embedded in the group's United Nations Security Council sponsored document: _Information on the Procurement Channel_ ;

Information on the Procurement Channel

B. Further questions and answers

18. Can a proposal include items which are set out in _S/2015/546_ as well as in _INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part_ _1_ or _INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2?_

[Answer] A proposal may include items which fall both under _S/2015/546_ , as well as one of the _INFCIRC_ s. Such a proposal should be submitted for review as an activity falling under Paragraph 2 of Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council will decide on such proposals based on a recommendation of the Joint Commission.

The United Nations issued document " _Information on the Procurement Channel_ " which is recovered from the United Nations website page: **http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml**

The page directly accessing the document in question (English Version) is: **https://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/Information%20note_EN.pdf**

As is well documented by U.N. Security Council official progress report publications – and as allowed and established by the text of Obama's "Iran nuclear agreement" worked out with the Ministers of the Government of Iran; the first Security Council; expedited sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets; or sales to Iran of procurement packages bundling nuclear weapons and ballistic missile systems associated assets; were approved as of November 2016, in the last months of Obama's tenure in office [See Chapter 6 – Appendix 1: _The Procurement Working Group and its mandate to expedite Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories_ []].

And also See Chapter 7 – Appendix 2: _Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran_ [].

Allowed sales to Iran under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group could include nuclear weapons associated material goods as well as:

Technology (means specific information required for the "development", "production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance");

Technical data (such as: blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories);

Technical assistance ("Technical assistance" in such form as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services. Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".)*

*[See Chapter 8 – Appendix 3: _Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)_ [].]

As indicated in the _Information on the Procurement Channel_ section " _B. Further questions and answers_ ;" sales to Iran of ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services off of the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ * [the Missile Technology Control Regime is code named _S/2015/546_ for the purposes of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231] are also expedited and approved of under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group so long as these are acquired in procurement packages bundling the desired ballistic missile associated systems along with nuclear weapons associated, or nuclear energy associated inventories listed in the INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2** inventory rosters per the previously mentioned _Information on the Procurement Channel_ ; B – _Further questions and answers_.

*[See Chapter 9 - Appendix 4: _Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_. []]

**[Again, see Chapter 8 – Appendix 3: _Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)_ ]

As a matter of procedure, the exact contents of procurement packages sold Iran under the INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 aspect are kept from public knowledge [See Chapter 10 - Appendix 5: _Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories_ []].

That being the case; International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors must be, and are, prohibited from verifying contents or end use or end use location of INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed procurements made through the that aspect of the Procurement Working Group procurement channel;

The IAEA is prohibited from inspection with a view towards verifying these are not being diverted to development of nuclear weapons capacity. [See Chapter 11 - Appendix 6: _The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause_ []]

All this clandestine activity is naturally in violation of Article III; Clause 1; and Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive **purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices** ...

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and **not in any way to assist,** encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to **manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices** , or **control over such weapons or explosive devices**.

This has all been allowed to go on presumably because of the speculative exorbitant profits which may be gleaned from the sales to Iran of the contraband weapons systems associated items endorsed by the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

And there are more exorbitant than ever profits to be gained when, as of 18 October 2020 the Iranian market on conventional weapons, which includes big ticket items such as combat aircraft, battle tanks, etc., opens up and this means exciting fresh new business opportunities for enthusiastic arms suppliers internationally;

Except that sadly, U.S. arms enterprising weapons purveyors are left out of the picture on account of spoil sport President Donald Trump's having pulled the U.S. out of the deal – a misdeed which also marks him as an international spoil sport nuisance too, since Trump also threatens to lay sanctions on international suppliers that want to make a go at the Iranian conventional weapons market. Trump's foreign interference into illicit international contraband weapons dealing isn't making him any friends in some quarters – critics are often quick to point out.

There is that; and there is the fact that as of 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day) Iran has been allowed, per Resolution 2231 provisions, to engage in activities " _which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device_ " with the assurance that the IAEA is prevented from verifying that such undertakings are not being diverted to use in the development of nuclear weapons capacity.

[See Chapter 12 - Appendix 7: _Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"_ of this book []. Or Chapter 5 - _The Disappointing Six Month Indefinite_ ; of the previous book _Ignoring Zelenskyy_ ; which examines the issue in more detail.]

THE NATIONAL LEVEL DEMOCRATIC PARTY solution to Trump's reckless withdrawal from Obama's Iran nuclear deal, so the Democratic Party claims, has been to continue pretending the allowances for contraband weapons sales to Iran don't exist – never have; and that Obama's iron-clad Iran nuclear deal will prevent Iran from ever achieving nuclear weapons capacity and so it must be returned to. The utterly specious 2020 Democratic Party election campaign platform maintains the same malfeasant promotional lie as has been carried on with ever since the summer of 2015:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because, as it is vigorously enforced and implemented, it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without resorting to war. We reject Donald Trump's view that we should have walked away from a deal that peacefully dismantles Iran's nuclear program...

* * * * *

So bearing all that in mind for starters – and that these sorts of sales to Iran have been carried on with since late 2016:

Iran had begun, in the summer of 2019, building to its latest phase in its so far successful expanding development of a domestic nuclear weapons capacity. This latest phase has culminated in Iran's 5 January 2020 declaration that it would now begin enriching uranium to whatever degree of concentrated radioactivity, and in whatever quantities suits it.

Therefore, at current point in the story, the only properly functioning part of the Iran nuclear deal still intact is the most important, the essential part – the integral Procurement Working Group procurement channel with its mandate to facilitate and approve sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated inventories.

Even if no one's showing up at the Procurement Working Group door for business just now (and no one is), the promise of future sales revenue is still there once this whole mess with Trump gets cleaned up;

Although with the predictable failure of the impeachment maneuver to oust Trump from the White House – the new recent ownership of the national level Democratic Party (the new ownership being the partisans in favor of the contraband weapons sales campaign); this pro-proliferation political movement embedded in and in control of the national level Democratic Party now has to take its chances at gaining the White House in 2020.

That aside, this escalating situation in Iran is of course the easily predictable consequence and outcome of the five official nuclear-weapons-States agreeing to assist Iran with procurement activities relating to nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed items – while preventing IAEA inspection measures intended to verify that the acquisitions are not being diverted to the development of domestic nuclear weapons capacity; as documented and explained.

The Iran 5th of January declaration turns out to be a potential obvious political embarrassment to established European political parties favoring the policies of proliferation which may yet yield profitable returns as a practical result;

Yet which nevertheless may appear to some in the unappreciative civilian population; those harboring uncharitable anti-proliferation sentiments; as though the whole predictable Iranian weapons expansion project is nearing entrance into the palpable final stages on the journey to Iranian domestic nuclear weapons capability begun not so long ago with the Monday, 20 July 2015 vote, at the 7488th meeting of the Security Council in New York; favoring the manifestly illegitimate policies and provisions implemented under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (Obama's Iran nuclear deal).

The palpable, yet somewhat still tenuous appearance on the horizon of the final _dénouement_ , the last unraveling leg of the journey's cycle towards Iran's achieving domestic nuclear weapons capacity, undoubtedly has proven a political embarrassment to the political parties and the political bosses who may seem to some as having been speaking with their fashion plate shoes stuck in their mouths by their unrelenting promotion of the deal.

And so, in a furtive effort to grace the world with an appearance of an accountable response – the European Union members', the political leaderships of France, Germany and the U.K. wrote a letter to the European Union High Representative Joseph Borrell in his capacity as _Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism_ ; telling High Representative Borrell that they were invoking the Dispute Resolution Mechanism found in Annex A: JCPOA of Security Council Resolution 2231.

[See Chapter 13 - Appendix 08: _Sham Dispute Resolution Mechanism_ [] for an explanation of the "Dispute Resolution Mechanism.]

The following presents salient excerpts of the 14 January 2020 letter:

Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (14 January 2020)*

We, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, share fundamental common security interests, along with our European partners. One of them is upholding the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and ensuring that Iran never develops a nuclear weapon. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) plays a key role in this respect, as our Leaders have just unambiguously reaffirmed. The JCPoA is a key achievement of multilateral diplomacy and the global non-proliferation architecture. We negotiated the JCPoA with the conviction that it would decisively contribute to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, as well as to international peace and security.

Together, we have stated unequivocally our regret and concern at the decision by the United States to withdraw from the JCPoA and to re-impose sanctions on Iran. Since May 2018, we have worked together to preserve the agreement. The E3 have fully upheld our JCPoA commitments, including sanctions-lifting as foreseen under the terms of the agreement. In addition to the lifting of all sanctions, required by our commitments under the agreement, we have worked tirelessly to support legitimate trade with Iran, including through the INSTEX special purpose vehicle.

Following Iran's announcement in May 2019 that it would cease meeting some of its commitments under the JCPoA, we have sought to persuade Iran to change course. The E3 have worked hard to address Iran's concerns and bring it back into compliance with its commitments under the nuclear agreement. We have also undertaken and supported diplomatic efforts, such as France's initiative, to deescalate tensions and to bring Iran and the US to the negotiating table for a comprehensive negotiated solution. The E3 remain fully committed to this diplomatic effort and intend to resume it as soon as conditions allow.

However, in the meantime Iran has continued to break key restrictions set out in the JCPoA. Iran's actions are inconsistent with the provisions of the nuclear agreement and have increasingly severe and non-reversible proliferation implications.

We do not accept the argument that Iran is entitled to reduce compliance with the JCPoA. Contrary to its statements, Iran has never triggered the JCPoA Dispute Resolution Mechanism and has no legal grounds to cease implementing the provisions of the agreement.

We publicly stated our concerns, along with the High Representative of the European Union, on 11 November. At the Joint Commission on 6 December, we made clear to Iran that unless it reversed course, we would have no choice but to take action within the framework of the JCPoA, including through the Dispute Resolution Mechanism.

Instead of reversing course, Iran has chosen to further reduce compliance with the JCPoA and announced on 5 January that "the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the fifth step in reducing its commitments, discards the last key component of its limitations in the JCPOA, which is the 'limit on the number of centrifuges'", and that "the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program no longer faces any operational restrictions", including on enrichment and enrichment-related matters.

We have therefore been left with no choice, given Iran's actions, but to register today our concerns that Iran is not meeting its commitments under the JCPoA and to refer this matter to the Joint Commission under the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, as set out in paragraph 36 of the JCPoA.

We do this in good faith with the overarching objective of preserving the JCPoA and in the sincere hope of finding a way forward to resolve the impasse through constructive diplomatic dialogue, while preserving the agreement and remaining within its framework. In doing so, our three countries are not joining a campaign to implement maximum pressure against Iran. Our hope is to bring Iran back into full compliance with its commitments under the JCPoA.

France, Germany and the United Kingdom once again express our commitment to the JCPoA and our determination to work with all participants to preserve it. We remain convinced that this landmark multilateral international agreement and its non-proliferation benefits enhance our shared security interests and strengthen the rules-based international order.

We are grateful to the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China, with whom we remain in close consultation, for joining us in our common endeavor to preserve the JCPoA. We also thank the High Representative of the European Union for his ongoing good offices in this regard. Given recent events, it is all the more important that we do not add a nuclear proliferation crisis to the current escalation threatening the whole region.

*[Letter can be found at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-france-germany-and-the-united]

Of key importance is to bear in mind the objective behind the diplomacy-speak. To bear fruit; that is, to reinstate a functioning Procurement Working Group mandate expediting and approving of nuclear weapons associated assets for sale to Iran; U.S. sanctions must be dropped for business to be carried on with as usual. Hence important sounding rhetoric such as: " _The JCPoA is a key achievement of multilateral diplomacy and the global non-proliferation architecture_ ," must be put to practice.

Naturally the interests of keeping up appearances regarding the uranium enrichment window dressing exercise is essential to solidifying a sense of legitimacy necessary to getting the Procurement Working Group contraband weapons sales scheme back up and running smoothly without business entities fearing backlash from the United States for dealings carried out in the clandestine quiet of the Procurement Working Group secured environment.

The world – or whoever is listening, possibly the U.S. electorate – must be convinced that that the U.S. Government position on sanctions is unacceptable and a detriment to peace in the Middle East; whereas the U.S. position is actually a detriment to clandestine contraband weapons sales profiteering by corporate arms dealing entity suppliers.

THE EUROPEAN UNION High Representative Joseph Borrell's response to the European Union Leaderships' letter invoking the Resolution 2231 _JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism_ is along the same lines. His rejoinder is respectfully presented, again in clearly enunciated, fluent written Diplomatese; whereby he announces:

Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism

I have received today a letter by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom referring a matter concerning the implementation of Iran's commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to the Joint Commission for resolution through the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, as set out in paragraph 36 of the agreement.

As Coordinator of the Joint Commission, I will oversee the Dispute Resolution Mechanism process. The aim of the Mechanism is to resolve issues relating to the implementation of the agreement within the framework of the Joint Commission. In this respect I note the Foreign Ministers' intention "to preserve the JCPOA in the sincere hope of finding a way forward to resolve the impasse through constructive diplomatic dialogue".

The Dispute Resolution Mechanism requires intensive efforts in good faith by all. As the Coordinator, I expect all JCPOA participants to approach this process in that spirit.

The JCPOA is a significant achievement of sustained multilateral diplomacy following years of negotiations. In light of the ongoing dangerous escalations in the Middle East, the preservation of the JCPOA is now more important than ever.

[https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/72993/statement-high-representative-borrell-coordinator-joint-commission-joint-comprehensive-plan_en]

Whoa Gus Gerrymander! Who all does His Excellency Borrell think he's taking for a wild ride Sunday Driving with a remark like that: " _In light of the ongoing dangerous escalations in the Middle East, the preservation of the JCPOA is now more important than ever_?"

It's not like nothing but sweet and innocent has been going on over the past four years. Iran hadn't negotiated for nothing to be empowered by the weapons concessions it received courtesy of U.N. sponsorship. Anticipated results of the arrangement are starting to show; and Authorities' refusal to identify, account for or mention the INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 inventories sold Iran through the Procurement Working Group over the duration; pretending they don't exist or that their current unknown whereabouts or end use aren't important does not to contribute to an overall sense of optimistic outcome.

The leaderships of France, Germany and the U.K. pretend the grotesque malfeasance carried on over the past four years+; of assisting and encouraging Iran to procure INFCIRC/254/Rev.9 or 10/Part 2 listed nuclear weapons associated materiel – and then allowing Iran to hide its end use location and end use from IAEA inspection so that it might be verified that none of this materiel is in any way being diverted to nuclear weapons development;

The leaderships of France, Germany and the U.K. along with their E.U. have behaved as though they'll be no consequences for this utterly immoral; direct and flagrant abrogation of that fundamental international multilaterally signed on to treaty;

As though tiny little fraction of the total 190 or so signatories to the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ are authorized and entitled to put a suspend on it at whim maybe because those insular little European despots usurping their unauthorized bogus commission to change whatever they want however they want it; know better what's good for everyone else in the world than any and all of the vast majority of States remaining faithful (so far, anyway) to the treaty.

So now these tin plated little dictators, who might one day have to face up to it on an election day, invoke the sham " _Dispute Resolution Mechanism_ " set forth in _Annex A: JCPOA_ of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 – publicly posturing they're going to get anywhere with that ruse. And they do that on 14 January 2020.

And ouch – guess what? What a surprise; Iran threatens to walk out of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ (which is no great turnaround change, since Iran and all the others have long since committed to implement procedures entirely repugnant to the treaty anyway).

A 20 January 2020 article from Mehr News (corroborated by other sources) quotes Iran's response to the invocation of the "Dispute Resolution Mechanism." Mehr has it that Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif declared:

"The European's statement is in no way legal. If the Europeans take another step, Iran will consider leaving the NPT according to a letter by the Iranian president in May 2019,

"Tehran has taken the fifth and the last step to reduce commitments to the nuclear pact, and it is not going to take another step to reduce its commitments...;"

"But If the Europeans continue to play more political games, we will have many options,"

"Iran is designing a new and more effective step that will be taken in case the Europeans do not fulfill their responsibilities to the deal and continue their claims before leaving NPT..."

[https://en.mehrnews.com/news/154750/Tehran-to-leave-NPT-if-EU-takes-Iran-s-nuclear-case-to-UNSC]

Iran's threatening to move on out of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty doesn't look good politically for the leaderships of the EU member States. Nevertheless, having invoked the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, the first thing that's supposed to happen in the multiple stage process, is:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, 14 July 2015

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have **15 days** to resolve the issue, **unless the time period was extended by consensus** ...

So the Resolution Mechanism was invoked 14 January 2020 – and it's now mid February, long past the end of the first 15 day resolution period; and so far not a peep about any action taken one way or another – not even an indication that the _time period was extended_ indefinitely _by consensus_.

It would be no surprise if the first phase time period were to be extended by consensus indefinitely until hell freezes over; because the EU member States have once again discovered themselves completely at the mercy of the decision making authority of Iran. And Iran has threatened: "... _If the Europeans continue to play more political games, we will have many options_ ... _Iran is designing a new and more effective step that will be taken in case the Europeans do not fulfill their responsibilities to the deal and continue their claims before leaving NPT_ ;"

Iran threatens and the Europeans are forced to stand down. Explaining how this works:

The political leaderships of France, Germany and the U.K. agreed to involve their respective Governments in an arrangement recognized as illicit under Article 2 of the _Vienna Convention on the law of treaties_ :

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART I. INTRODUCTION

_Article 2_. Use of Terms

1. For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States **in written form and governed by international law** , whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and _whatever its particular designation_ ;

Obama authored a counterfeit in his Security Council resolution which declares that the Security Council is entitled to make its own rules and Member States are obligated to accept whatever comes out of the Council; and to carry out any decree of the Council:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Underscoring that Member States _are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions_ ...

Article 25 doesn't say that at all [See Chapter 14 - Appendix 09: _Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25_ [] for the text and an explanation of the meaning of Article 25.].

But what Obama's counterfeit diktat decrees is that Resolution 2231 authorizes the Security Council to invent and then enforce any obligation it chooses. This necessarily asserts that the Resolution is contemplated as outside of the jurisdiction of peremptory norm of general international law.

The Obama administration Iran nuclear weapons sales deal, elaborates on the theme in Resolution 2231 section " _Other Matters_ :"

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Other Matters

27. [the Security Council] ... Decides that **all provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran** and **should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State** or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices;

In that Section, Resolution 2231 establishes that Iran and the Security Council resolution itself are an exceptional case. The phrase "... _provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State_ ..." is to be interpreted in the context of the provisions it refers to.

And the provisions it refers to – such as the establishment of the Procurement Working Group mandate intended to egregiously violate treaty – are repugnant to the Charter of the United Nations, which declares in the 3rd clause its preamble that the United Nations is founded in part: "... _to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained_ ...;"

And Security Council Resolution 2231 is repugnant to peremptory norm of general international law in that it discards the legally binding Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. That being the case – this next follows:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 2. INVALIDITY OF TREATIES

Article 53. Treaties Conflicting With a Peremptory Norm of General International Law ("Jus Cogens")

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

Resolution 2231 was void at the time of its conclusion at the 7488th meeting of the Security Council on 20 July 2015. However, States Party to the arrangement must pretend the agreement is legally binding. But since it's not – the agreement lacks anyone apparent having final say over how implementation of the provisions of the arrangement is to be interpreted.

And so we are confronted with two views; the first presented in the letter from the EU States:

We do not accept the argument that Iran is entitled to reduce compliance with the JCPoA. Contrary to its statements, Iran has never triggered the JCPoA Dispute Resolution Mechanism and **has no legal grounds** to cease implementing the provisions of the agreement.

And then the Iranian rebuttal:

_"The European's statement **is in no way legal**. If the Europeans take another step, Iran will consider leaving the NPT_...

...If the Europeans continue to play more political games, we will have many options,"

"Iran is designing a new and more effective step that will be taken in case the Europeans do not fulfill their responsibilities to the deal and continue their claims before leaving NPT..."

Both sides are inventing what is and is not legal as they go along;

And both sides claim to be the final interpreter of what is the "legal" approach to implementation of the Security Council resolution – when there is no legal approach to be found within that instrument which memorializes malfeasance as a practical utilitarian means to a malfeasant end.

And so the EU States find themselves without recourse because whatever Iran threatens – such as withdrawing from the NPT – Iran can easily do it; and drop kick every IAEA inspector out of the country while it's at it.

And this possibility is perceived as a political embarrassment of catastrophic proportions to EU States' political leadership who have lauded the illicit arrangement as the definitive measure preventing Iran from ever getting a nuclear weapon. And the Ministers of the Government of Iran know it; and everybody knows it – and so the leaderships of the EU States have to give in; or feel they had to give in; because as long as they remain participants in the contraband weapons sales to Iran scheme they are demonstrably at mercy of Iran's having the final word every time.

It is at this point that, almost immediately upon invocation of the "Dispute Resolution Mechanism," the EU States' Governments find themselves still mired in the first phase of the process, perhaps indefinitely until hell freezes over, as a consequence of their malfeasance carried on with over the last four+ years, including as well as the shrill and vacuous promotional lies they've imposed on the public.

And the U.S. Democratic Party wants to drag the U.S. back into the mischief and try and regain some footing in the fiasco by dropping U.S. sanctions that hamper the proper functioning of Procurement Working Group activities, and the contraband weapons of war sales' profiteering interests that bureaucracy supports.

And so I submit again: the remedy to the travesty is to bring petition before the International Court of Justice seeking remedy and redress for the wrongs imposed under Resolution 2231, and to have it be recognized that the Security Council resolution was void upon its conclusion, the conclusion of the vote taken at the 7488th meeting of the Security Council in New York on 20 July 2015.

HAVING ROUNDED OUT somewhat what had been concurrently happening in the outside world – it is time to return to chronicling the Senate Trial.

* * * * *

Chapter 2  
– Burisma and Pressure –

Of the many odious tasks Trump is attributed as having undertaken, was that of a prideful and ambitious attempt to seduce the Government of Ukraine as tool to his bidding. The President was alleged to have planned to wreck havoc on 2020 presidential campaign of rival former vice-President Joe Biden by having Ukraine President Zelenskyy announce investigations into Joe Biden or his son Hunter or both.

The first of the two Articles of Impeachment asserted:

Using the powers of his high office, President Trump solicited the interference of a foreign government, Ukraine, in the 2020 United States Presidential election. He did so through a scheme or course of conduct that included soliciting the Government of Ukraine to publicly announce investigations that would benefit his reelection, harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and influence the 2020 United States Presidential election to his advantage...

...In so doing, President Trump abused the powers of the Presidency in a manner that compromised the national security of the United States and undermined the integrity of the United States democratic process...

President Trump engaged in this scheme or course of conduct through the following means:

(1) President Trump-acting both directly and through his agents within and outside the United States Government-corruptly solicited the Government of Ukraine to publicly announce investigations into-

(A) a political opponent, former Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. ...

The above allegation was naturally difficult to prove as it has nothing to do with anything that ever happened in this world.

But the facts of the matter wouldn't apply, as this and other accusations supplied as fuel for this "Senate High Court of Impeachment Trial," are exactly representative of what apologists for the shambles strenuously deny; that the public speaking exercises practiced as presentation of argument were all about the political priority of partisan theatrics over every day common experience or reason.

Ukraine President Zelenskyy had spoken before the U.N. General Assembly on 25 September 2019, and later that day met with President Trump for a joint press conference broadcast interview – I believe Zelenskyy's first, as Ukraine President, before an American audience.

The 116th House of Representatives Articles of Impeachment were published on 13 December 2019; several months after Zelenskyy had delivered his so dreadfully anticipated anti-corruption announcement in that broadcast, joint Zelenskyy-Trump press availability of 25 September 2019.

The Articles were authored by the House of Representatives committee with full knowledge of what Zelenskyy had announced during the press meet several months before;

And the Articles of Impeachment were presented to a political body, the 116th Senate; every member also certainly aware of what had been said.

But that everyone was familiar with what President Zelenskyy had spoken of in September 20119; this would be of no concern in this later December-January performance of a political farce; as the dramatic presentation was to be carried on with before a sympathetic or detached grouped mix of party peers dedicated to voting along partisan lines.

So ultimately whatever was alleged in the presence of that austere gathering didn't matter if whether real or not to those spewing the accusations. Many of the Senators sitting in attendance as Jurors perhaps had necessarily followed the riot in the Lower House all along; and thereby probably had already made up their minds on the account anyway.

An argument presented before the "Senate High Court of Impeachment," especially by the accusers who had instigated the proceedings, evidently mattered only in so far as to what extent it might have been perceived by the authors as potentially leaving a memorable impression, perhaps favorably influencing the public conduct in the upcoming election.

As early Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story observed in Book III – _The Constitution of the United States_ ; Chapter X – _The Senate_ ; of his _Commentaries on the Constitution_ :

**§ 385**. ...the [impeachment] power partakes of a political character, as it respects injuries to the society in its political character ; and, on this account, it requires to be guarded in its exercise against the spirit of faction, the intolerance of party, and the sudden movements of popular feeling. The prosecution will seldom fail to **agitate the passions of the whole community** , and **to divide it into parties** , more or less **friendly, or hostile** to the accused. The press, with its unsparing vigilance, will arrange itself on either side, to control, and influence public opinion ; and **there** **will always be some danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real proofs of innocence or guilt** ...

As previously noted: after speaking earlier before the U.N. General Assembly, 25 September 2019, on the topic of Russian military incursion and action on Ukraine territory; Zelenskyy met Trump at the InterContinental New York Barclay for the above mentioned broadcast interview, which was accompanied by a religious circling roundup of fastidious news-media outlet sponsored journalist bounty hunters complementing the affair in their attendance. This is some of what was discussed on the occasion:

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : Thank you very much, Mr. President. And, you know, now we need — I want to tell you that we now (inaudible) the new country. And, I'm sorry, but we don't need help; we need support. Real support. And we thank — thank everybody, thank all of the European countries; they each help us. ... **so only together, America and EU** — **only together we can stop the war**. And, you know, we are ready. We just want to tell that we are ...

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : Well, you know, you have great people in Ukraine, and you have very talented people —

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : Very smart.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : — in terms of manufacturing, in terms of some of the things they do. And we'll be doing — we're doing trading already, but we should be doing a lot more trading with Ukraine. But you have very talented people. They make great things. You're at the top of the line, really. So that's very important.

And the other thing is I've heard you actually have — over the last fairly short period of time, you've really made some progress with Russia. I hear a lot of progress has been made. And just keep it going. It'd be nice to end that whole disaster.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : First of all, I want to tell you, before — before the relations with Russia — I will prolong, just one minute — I mean, you have to know — I want world to know that now we have the new team, the new parliament, the new government.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : Right.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : So now we (inaudible) about 74 laws, new laws, which help for our new reforms: land reform, ... They did the law about concessions. Did — we (inaudible) general for security, and we launched the Service Secretary.

Is it right Service Secretary?

**AIDE** : Yes. Anti-corruption court, as well.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : An anti-corruption court. As we came, we did — we launched the anti-corruption court. It began to work on the 5th of September. It was — you know, it was — after five days, we had the new government.

So, we are ready. We want to show that we ... just come. And if somebody, if you — if you want to help us, so just let's do businesses cases. We have many investment cases. We're ready.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : And stop corruption in Ukraine, because that will really make you great. That will make you great personally, and it'll also be so tremendous for your nation, in terms of what you want to do and where you want to take it.

Thank you very much. It's a great honor.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : Thank you very much, Mr. President.

With Zelenskyy's fearful anti-corruption announcement come and gone and out of the way – the Lower House accusers published their _Articles of Impeachment_ several months afterwards, on 13 December 2019; which allowed them the opportunity to present their view rebuking the raw ugliness characterizing the event. Once fully developed and published, the impeaching articles were, after some unexplained delay, finally submitted to the Senate in mid-January 2020.

The Articles of Impeachment instrument acknowledged that something was to be announced by the Ukraine President; and whatever it was, it had clearly been squeezed out of Zelenskyy by forceful exertion of undue duress.

Given what Zelenskyy had said in the joint press conference; this allegation of his being pressured to talk about the issues faced by his Government is difficult to imagine for anyone somewhat familiar with the Ukraine experience of the day.

The Zelenskyy administration had been voted into office on an anti-corruption platform by a landslide margin of about 73%, with his Party subsequently gaining an uncompromising majority in the _Verkhovna Rada_ ; the Ukraine Parliament.

It is generally well known that the Russian Federation had seized control of substantial sections of east Ukraine territory; and had claimed annexation of Crimea. What might not be so well known perhaps; is that rich deposits of rare earths, indispensable to the manufacture of key technological components, are thought to permeate the eastern geology of Ukraine; hence a possible factor motivating Russian belligerent resource grabbing expansion into the area.

Hence the Ukraine petition before the U.N. General Assembly earlier on that day requesting assistance in putting a halt to the deliberate one-sided aggression. Just to give an example of why a United Nations response should be expected of the U.N. General Assembly regarding Russian armed expansionism:

Charter of the United Nations

*CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

*CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles:

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or **use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence** of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Russian got nasty aside; there is the issue of corruption which is a well known feature saturating Ukraine society. Zelenskyy was manifestly eager for a news-maker opportunity to present the more positive risk analysis profile his administration is developing in the country to the U.S. public and to the any of the U.S. business investment community anticipated to be watching. And there was Trump, himself a known tycoon, staged alongside sitting right there in support endorsing the notion:

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : Well, thank you very much, everybody. We're with the President of Ukraine, and he's made me more famous, and I've made him more famous. (Laughter.) I will say he's got a great reputation. He's very, very strongly looking into all sorts of corruption and some of the problems they've had over the years. I think it's one of the primary reasons he got elected. His reputation is absolutely sterling. And it's an honor to be with you...

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : Thank you very much, Mr. President. Thank you very much. It's a great pleasure to me to be here, and it's better to be on TV than by phone, I think.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : Yeah. (Laughter.)

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : And, Mr. President, thank you very much. And I'm not the first time to stay in New York —but I know that you've never been in Ukraine.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : That's right.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : And your predecessor also — how do you say it in English? — didn't find time; I mean that. (Laughter.)

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : Right.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : So, can you give me a word that you will come to our great country?

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : Well, I'm going to try. (Laughter.) And I know a lot of people — I will say this: I know a lot of people from Ukraine. They're great people ... I owned something called the Miss Universe pageants years ago ... we had a winner from Ukraine, and ... — we got to know the country very well in a lot of different ways. But it's a country, I think, with tremendous potential.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : Yes, I know it, because I'm from this country.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : Right. (Laughter.)

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : Thank you for your support, especially now when — you know, when we have two — really, two wars in Ukraine. The first one is with corruption, you know. But we'll fight — no, we'll be winner in this fight, I'm sure...

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : ...Well, you know, you have great people in Ukraine, and you have very talented people —

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : Very smart.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : — in terms of manufacturing, in terms of some of the things they do. And we'll be doing — we're doing trading already, but we should be doing a lot more trading with Ukraine. But you have very talented people. They make great things. You're at the top of the line, really. So that's very important.

And the other thing is I've heard you actually have — over the last fairly short period of time, you've really made some progress with Russia. I hear a lot of progress has been made. And just keep it going. It'd be nice to end that whole disaster.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : First of all, I want to tell you, before — before the relations with Russia — I will prolong, just one minute — I mean, you have to know — I want world to know that now we have the new team, the new parliament, the new government.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : Right.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : So now we (inaudible) about 74 laws, new laws, which help for our new reforms: land reform, ... They did the law about concessions. Did — we (inaudible) general for security, and we launched the Service Secretary.

Is it right Service Secretary?

**AIDE** : Yes. Anti-corruption court, as well.

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : An anti-corruption court. As we came, we did — we launched the anti-corruption court. It began to work on the 5th of September. It was — you know, it was — after five days, we had the new government.

So, we are ready. We want to show that we ... just come. And if somebody, if you — if you want to help us, so just let's do businesses cases. We have many investment cases. We're ready.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP** : And stop corruption in Ukraine, because that will really make you great. That will make you great personally, and it'll also be so tremendous for your nation, in terms of what you want to do and where you want to take it.

During the famous 25 July 2019 Zelenskyy-Trump phone call eavesdropped by an outside interloper squawk gossip, the call made much the matter of as grounds for Trump's removal from office, and subsequent _disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States_ ;

During that famous tête-à-tête telecommunication utilized by the impeachment committee to peg Trump as the social outcast due to be deservedly driven into shaming reclusive ostracism and political exile; it was actually Zelenskyy who had requested of Trump U.S. assistance in Ukraine contemplated domestic investigations into _Burisma Holding's_ corporate corruption. Burisma Holding was Ukraine's second largest energy exploration company; which had incidentally enlisted a Mr. Hunter Biden – son of former Obama administration vice-President Joe Biden – to sit on its Board of Directors.

The essential fact of President Zelenskyy's having requested U.S. assistance in investigation of the energy entity stronghold was strangely missed by Trump's defense team (which just goes to show, even the tip-top attorneys don't always catch all); but nevertheless – it's right there in the transcript of the currently famous intercontinental call. Zelenskyy said:

The issue of the investigation of the case is actually the issue of making sure to restore the honesty so we will take care of that and will work on the investigation of the case.

On top of that, I would kindly ask you [President Trump] **if you have any additional information that you can provide to us, it would be very helpful for the investigation to make sure that we administer justice in our country**.

ZELENSKYY WAS RIGHT to make such a request of the U.S. Government. U.S. concerns over Burisma stretch back to the Obama administration which had spent over half a million dollars pulling together a file on the corrupt corporate entity. This is what came up in the deposition of prominent U.S. envoy George Kent:

Rep. Stefanik: (01:11)

... Shifting gears to corruption, one of the themes here today is that of rooting out corruption, which is an important tool for the president as we provide taxpayer-funded aid to foreign countries. Mr. Kent, you would characterize Ukraine as having longstanding corruption issues, correct?

George Kent: (01:31)

I did.

Rep. Stefanik: (01:32)

And in fact, you testified. " _I would say that corruption is part of the reason why Ukrainians came out to the streets, in both 2004 when somebody tried to steal the election and again in 2014 because of a corrupt kleptocratic pro-Russian government which eventually collapsed. The Ukrainians decided enough was enough_." Is that your testimony?

George Kent: (01:52)

It remains so.

Rep. Stefanik: (01:53)

And you testified that you first came to learn about Burisma in 2015 when you were the senior anti-corruption coordinator, correct?

George Kent: (02:01)

Correct. Detailed to the embassy in Kiev as the acting deputy chief of mission.

Rep. Stefanik: (02:07)

And you testified that the issue of corruption in Burisma was in the US interest because, and this is from your deposition, " _We had made a commitment to the Ukrainian government in 2014 to try to recover an estimated tens of billions of dollars of stolen assets out of the country_." Is that correct?

George Kent: (02:26)

That is stolen assets that were in the name of the owner of Burisma, Mykola Zlochevsky. He was the one who we believed had stolen the money.

Rep. Stefanik: (02:34)

Sure. So the first case, this was ... the first case that the US, the UK, and Ukraine investigator worked on was against the owner of Burisma.

George Kent: (02:44)

That's correct.

Rep. Stefanik: (02:45)

And this was during the Obama administration.

George Kent: (02:48)

That's correct.

Rep. Stefanik: (02:48)

So for the millions of Americans viewing, the first investigation against the owner of Burisma was under President Obama's administration.

George Kent: (02:57)

That's correct.

Rep. Stefanik: (02:58)

You testified also, " _We spent roughly half a million dollars of State Department money in support of the FBI and this investigation, to build capacity and track down stolen assets_." Is that correct?

George Kent: (03:09)

That's correct. It was launched in May 2014 by the Attorney General of the US and UK, in conjunction with the World Bank.

Rep. Stefanik: (03:16)

And in fact, by 2016, you were so concerned about corruption questions related to Burisma that when there was an effort by Burisma to sponsor an essay contest with USAID, you asked USAID to stop it.

George Kent: (03:31)

That's correct.

Bearing that testimony in mind; the corrupt business entity Burisma Holdings is also a known tax evader. Burisma Holdings had previously been convicted of tax evasion in 2016. Some 1.9 million dollars in fines above back taxes were paid out by _Burisma_ to avoid further prosecution;

And thereby, tax evasion serves as one more powerful incentive for the Ukrainian Government to keep an eye on _Burisma_ ; or to review past audits of the company with a view towards affirming that previous investigations had been carried on with in due diligence. And as a potential added featured bonus adding cupcake icing to the incentive; the Obama administration already had a file put together on past shenanigans of the fiendishly grasping energy entity. The world would become an even happier place if only this smudged and dusty file could be unearthed, extracted and recovered from the fearsome talons of the Trump American regency.

Given all the good luck charms incentives favoring an opportunity to openly stress the concerns, interests and endeavors of the Ukraine experience and his administration – it's hard to understand what forceful inducement would have needed to have been applied to the naturally cooperative President Zelenskyy; already a sucker for seizing opportunities offered up by conspicuously favorable kismet.

There is that; and there is the irrefutable fact that Zelenskyy never made any announcement about any investigation into the Bidens.

For one thing – as explained in the previous book; _Ignoring Zelenskyy_ – announcements of investigations falls under the constitutional role of the Prosecutor General's Office, which is independent of the Executive under the Ukraine Constitution; and is more closely (though not exactly) akin to the concept of a "Judicial Police" which we don't have under our U.S. Constitution; but which exists in France, and Quebec and elsewhere. Here is the designation of the Prosecutor General under the Ukraine Constitution:

Constitution of Ukraine

Title IV - The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

Article 85

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall have the following powers:

25. to grant consent for the appointment and removal from the office by the President of Ukraine of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine; to declare no confidence in the Prosecutor General of Ukraine resulting in his resignation from the office;

Title VII – Public Prosecution

Article 122

The public prosecution of Ukraine shall be headed by the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, appointed to or removed from the office by the President of Ukraine subject to consent of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine may express the non-confidence in the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, which shall entail his resignation from the office.

The term of powers of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine shall be five years.

Title IV - The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

**Article 92.** The following matters shall be determined exclusively by laws of Ukraine:

14) the judicial system, judiciary, the status of judges, the principles of judicial expertise, the organisation and operation of the prosecutor's office, the bodies of inquisition and investigation, the notary, the bodies and institutions for the enforcement of punishments; the fundamentals of the organisation and activity of advocates;

Regardless that an announcement on investigation of the Bidens was never made – and would have been improper for a Ukraine President to make (the Prosecutor General's Office announced investigation into Burisma in mid-October; after the Zelenskyy-Trump meeting. No mention of the Bidens was ever made in those announcements either);

Another thing explained and documented in the previous book; _Ignoring Zelenskyy_ – not only was there no mention of any "announcements" regarding the Bidens in the 25 July 2019 call; but deposition testimony confirmed that there was no mention of any such announcement contemplated anywhere else.

There was the episode where U.S. diplomatic corp. envoys managed to weirdly convince themselves that somehow announcements of a certain character were to be made. But that was a misunderstanding they had come by completely on their own having nothing to do with any information or directive coming from Zelenskyy or Trump. That is a story already told in _Ignoring Zelenskyy_.

Disregarding the facts of the matter – the Lower House Managers worked to find some evidence that some political crime had been committed somewhere which might be made to stick resoundingly in the public imagination long after the bid for Trump's removal from office failed in the Senate.

The first Article of Impeachment alleged that Trump had squeezed Zelenskyy by telling the Ukraine Government that a meeting at the White House between Trump and Zelenskyy was contingent on Zelenskyy's publicly announcing investigations into the Bidens:

(2) With the same corrupt motives, President Trump-acting both directly and through his agents within and outside the United States Government conditioned two official acts On the public announcements that he had requested-

(B) ...a head of state meeting at the White House, which the President of Ukraine sought to demonstrate continued United States support for the Government of Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.

The allegation is manifestly absurd, and a preposterous misrepresentation of the constitutional role of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. The U.S. Constitution plainly enumerates:

United States Constitution

Article II - The Executive Branch

*Section 3 - State of the Union, Convening Congress

...he [the President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers...

Naturally it's the President who makes decisions on who visits the White House whenever, or for whatever reason. But because a meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump got rescheduled to coincide with Zelenskyy's speech before the General Assembly in New York all the better to bring the blight of Russian armed aggression against the Ukraine to the further attention of the sympathetic U.S. Citizen – House Manager Adam Schiff wants to portray that as evidence of Trump's successful, or unsuccessful as the case may be, attempt at an extortion of cooperation from the Ukraine Government.

AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, somehow U.S. envoys Volker and Sondland managed to convince each other, without any directive from the President; that _they_ were supposed to tell Zelenskyy or help Zelenskyy with his speech writing.

So Volker transmitted to Ukraine ambassador Andrey Yermack a draft they thought might be useful to Zelesnkyy. This following is the actual exchange of emails regarding the quote which Schiff presented to the Senate out of context:

[8/13/ 19, 10:26:44 AM] Kurt Volker:

Special attention should be paid to the problem of interference in the political processes ofthe United States especially with the alleged involvement of some Ukrainian politicians. I want to declare that this is unacceptable. We intend to initiate and complete a transparent and unbiased investigation of all available facts and episodes, including those involving Burisma and the 2016 U.S. elections, which in tum will prevent the recurrence of this problem in the future.

[8113/19, 10:27:20 AM] Gordon Sondland:

Perfect. Lets send to Andrey after our call

However it was expressed – the envoys' intended contribution was eventually politely rejected by the Zelenskyy administration.

Nevertheless; in all this keeping busy trying to figure out what to do or what to write or what Trump was supposed to have wanted done; Sondland finally came up with the brilliant notion of trying out what should have been done in the first place. Sondland brainstormed that maybe the Diplomatic Corp. specialists stranded in indecision should actually ask the President what he wanted Zelenskyy to say. So Sondland set himself to the task; and as it turns out under deposition, the President responded to Sonland's query with:

[Sondland (01:07:11)]

"I want nothing. I want no quid pro quo. I just want Zelensky to do the right thing, to do what he ran on"

Also during the Sondland deposition; House of Representatives member Mr. Castor drew out some further insight in this area;

Mr. Castor: (01:11:38)

Okay. Stepping back a page to your email to the state department on August 11th, you emailed Secretary Pompeo and you say, " _Kurt and I negotiated a statement from Zelensky to be delivered for our review in a day or two_." And the question I have here is that, I mean that statement never was issued. And in fact, Ambassador Volker has testified that he didn't think it was a good idea and ultimately the Ukrainians didn't think it was a good idea. And so the statement never reached a finalized state.

Gordon Sondland: (01:12:17)

That's correct.

Mr. Castor: (01:12:19)

But even if it had it doesn't talk about Biden's or Barisma or anything insidious.

Gordon Sondland: (01:12:26)

Correct. Well, the statement as I recall, would have mentioned the 2016 election slash DNC server and Barisma.

Mr. Castor: (01:12:35)

Okay.

Gordon Sondland: (01:12:35)

It would not have mentioned the Bidens.

Mr. Castor: (01:12:37)

And have you heard Ambassador Volker how he talks about what might be an investigation into Barisma?

Gordon Sondland: (01:12:43)

No.

Mr. Castor: (01:12:43)

Okay. I mean he has said that if there were Ukrainians engaged in violations of Ukrainian law, then the prosecutor general with the new administration ought to investigate that. Did Ambassador Volker ever relate that to you?

Gordon Sondland: (01:13:03)

No, we just talked in generic terms about quote investigating Barisma.

Mr. Castor: (01:13:08)

Okay. But it had nothing to do with the Vice President Biden.

Gordon Sondland: (01:13:10)

I had never heard Vice President Biden come up until very late in the game.

Mr. Castor: (01:13:15)

When?

Gordon Sondland: (01:13:16)

I don't recall the exact date. But when it all sort of came together, maybe after the transcript of the July 25th call, I don't know. I don't know the exact date when I made the connection.

Mr. Castor: (01:13:26)

Okay.

Gordon Sondland: (01:13:28)

Apparently a lot of people did not make the connection.

Mr. Castor: (01:13:31)

Okay. I want to turn to the letter from Senator Johnson. When he heard about some of these issues in the hold of the aid he wanted, he called the President. He called the President on August 31st it's page six of his letter. Senator Johnson states or he rights, "I asked him, the President whether there was some kind of arrangement where Ukraine would take some action and the hold would be lifted. Without hesitation, President Trump immediately denied such an arrangement existed." And Senator Johnson quotes the President saying:

_"_ No, _"_ _and he prefaced it with a different word_. [Presumably something like "@&%#"]

" _\---- NO! No way. I would never do that. Who told you that?_ "

_"I have_ ," Senator Johnson says, _"I have accurately characterize the President's reaction is adamant, vehement and angry_. _"_ Senator Johnson's telephone call with the President wasn't a public event. It was capturing a genuine, you know, moment with the President. And he had at this point in time on August 31st he was adamant, vehement and angry that there was no connections to aid. There were no preconditions.

The above deposition was all known and done with at the time the Articles of Impeachment were written – and the case to bring to the Senate was decided upon. But it really didn't matter – because this was all about having a venue opportunity (the Senate Trial) for some political rabble rousing; a chance to leave a memorable impression with the public; perhaps favorably influencing the public conduct in the course of the upcoming election.

During the 26 September 2019 (Lower House Impeachment inquiry) deposition of _Acting Director of National Intelligence_ Joseph Maguire taking place the day after the Trump-Zelenskyy press conference in New York – the day after the transcript of the Trump-Zelenskyy phone call had been released to the public; Schiff took the opportunity to bust into a well-prepared totally rant fabrication tirade rewrite of the 25 July 2019 Zelenskyy-Trump phone call:

"We've been very good to your country. Very good. No other country has done as much as we have. But you know what? I don't see much reciprocity here. I hear what you want. I have a favor I want from you, though. And I'm going to say this only seven times, so you better listen good. I want you to make up dirt on my political opponent, understand? Lots of it. On this and on that. I'm going to put you in touch with people, not just any people. I'm going to put you in touch with the attorney general of the United States, my attorney general Bill Barr. He's got the whole weight of the American law enforcement behind him. And I'm going to put you in touch with (presidential attorney) Rudy (Giuliani). You're going to love him, trust me. You know what I'm asking and so I'm only going to say this a few more times, in a few more ways. And by the way, don't call me again. I'll call you when you've done what I asked."

https://www.rev.com/blog/joseph-maguire-testimony-transcript-intel-chief-testifies-before-congress

After finishing his pure fantasy version of what had transpired over the phone between the two presidents, Chairperson Mr. Adam Schiff concluded:

"This is, in sum and character, what the president was trying to communicate with the president of Ukraine. It would be funny if it wasn't such a graphic betrayal of the President's oath of office. But as it does represent a real betrayal, there's nothing **the president says here** that is in America's interest after all."

Chairperson Schiff's rewrite was challenged during the deposition.

Mr. Turner: 01:28:43

... We now have the complaint and the transcript and people can read that the allegations in the complaint **are not** the allegations of the subject matter of this conversation...

Mr. Turner: 01:29:32

...What else it's not, **it's not** the conversation that was in the Chairman's opening statement. While the Chairman was speaking, I actually had someone text me, "Is he just making this up?" And yes he was because sometimes fiction is better than the actual words or the texts, but luckily the American public are smart and they have the transcript. They've read the conversation. They know when someone's just making it up.

...Now we've seen this movie before, we've been here all year on litigating impeachment. Long before the July 25th conversation happened between the President and the President of Ukraine and we've heard the clicks of the cameras in this Intelligence Committee's room where we've not been focusing on the issues of the national security threats, but instead of [but instead on] the calls for impeachment, which is really an assault on the electorate, not just this president...

The Chairman quiescently responded:

Adam Schiff: 01:34:33

...my summary of the President's call was meant to be at least part in parody. ...Of course, the President never said, "If you don't understand me, I'm going to say it seven more times." My point is, **that's the message that the Ukraine president was receiving** in not so many words. Mr. Carson.

Another challenge followed:

Dr. Wenstrup: 01:43:09

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you Mr. Maguire for being here today. You know, I think it's a shame that we started off this hearing with fictional remarks. The implication of a conversation that took place between a president and a foreign leader, putting words into it that did not exist, they're not in the transcript. And I will contend that those were intentionally not clear and the Chairman described it as parody and I don't believe that this is the time or the place for parody when we are trying to seek facts...

It wasn't a parody. Schiff had stated implicitly or explicitly twice that Schiff was paraphrasing President Trump's words in the course of this September 26 deposition. During dramatic performance of his personally scripted fabrication Schiff first asserted:

"... _there's nothing_ _the president says_ _here that is in America's interest after all_."

Schiff clearly means to assert that Trump did say those things – " _the President says here_." Later on, in his on-the-shallow-face-of-it "apology," he spells out the "message recieved:"

Adam Schiff: 01:34:33

...Of course, the President never said, "If you don't understand me, I'm going to say it seven more times." My point is, **that's the message that the Ukraine president was receiving** in not so many words...

But the Ukraine President was not receiving any such message " _in not so many words_ " or any other kinds of words because the conversation was between two people, Zelenskyy and Trump, who were in agreement; and words of the dour sort Schiff ascribes were never part of the vocabulary. Schiff was purposefully attempting to taint the character of the conversation. But if there's any problem with clarity of interpretation of what the call was about; we have the authoritative assessment of the President of Ukraine to help calm things:

**PRESIDENT ZELENSKY** : I think you read everything. So I think you read text. I'm sorry, but I don't want to be involved to democratic, open elections — elections of USA.

No, you heard that we had, I think, good phone call. It was normal. We spoke about many things. And I — so I think, and you read it, that nobody pushed — pushed me.

* * * * *

House Managers had argued strenuously that there was no cause for concern regarding the Bidens' relations with Burisma; and Trump didn't have any business delving into matters that didn't concern the nation.

On day 7 of the Senate Impeachment Trial, Counsel for the Defense Pam Bondi contested the premise:

Pam Bondi: (00:00)

...Senators, members of the Senate. When the house managers gave you their presentation, when their submitted their brief, they repeatedly referenced Hunter Biden and Burisma. They spoke to you for over 21 hours and they referenced Biden or Burisma over 400 times and when they gave these presentations, they said there was nothing, nothing to see. It was a sham. This is fiction. In their trial memorandum the house managers describe this as baseless. Now, why did they say that? Why did they invoke Biden or Burisma over 400 times?

Pam Bondi: (01:02)

The reason they needed to do that is because they are here saying that the president must be impeached and removed from office for raising a concern and that's why we have to talk about this today. They say sham, they say baseless because they say this because if it's okay for someone to say, " _Hey, you know what? Maybe there's something here worth raising_." Then their case crumbles because they have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no basis to raise this concern, but that's not what public records show.

Pam Bondi: (01:49)

Here are just a few of the public sources that flagged questions surrounding this very same issue. The United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office, deputy assistant secretary of state, George Kent. Hunter Biden's former business associate and ABC white house reporter. Good morning America, ABC, the Washington Post, the New York Times, Ukrainian Law Enforcement, and the Obama State Department itself. They all raised this issue. We would prefer not to be talking about this. We would prefer not to be discussing this, but the house managers have placed this squarely at issue, so we must address it.

Pam Bondi: (02:47)

Let's look at the facts. In early 2014 Joe Biden, our vice president of the United States, led the United States foreign policy in Ukraine with the goal of rooting out corruption. According to an annual study published by Transparency International, during this time, Ukraine was one of the most corrupt countries in the entire world. In Ukraine, there's a natural gas company called Burisma. Burisma has been owned by an oligarch named Mykola Zlochevsky.

Pam Bondi: (03:22)

Here's what happened very shortly after vice president Biden was made US point man for Ukraine. His son, Hunter Biden ends up on the board of Burisma working for and paid by the oligarch Zlochevsky. In February 2014 in the wake of anti-corruption uprising by the people of Ukraine, Zlochevsky flees the country fleas, Ukraine. Zlochevsky the oligarch is well known. George Kent, the very first witness that the Democrats called during their public hearings testified. So Zlochevsky stood out for his self dealings even among other oligarchs. House managers didn't tell you that.

Pam Bondi: (04:17)

Ambassador Kurt Volker explained that Burisma had a "very bad reputation as a company for corruption and money laundering." House managers didn't tell you that. Burisma was so corrupt that George Kent said he intervened to prevent USAID from cosponsoring an event with Burisma. Do you know what this event was? It was a child contest and the prize was a camera. They were so bad, Burisma that our country wouldn't even co-sponsor a children's event with Burisma.

Pam Bondi: (05:07)

In March 2014 the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office opened some money laundering investigation into the oligarch Zlochevsky and his company Burisma. The very next month, April 2014 according to a public report, Hunter Biden quietly joins the board of Burisma. Remember early 2014 was when vice president Biden began leading Ukraine policy. Here's how Hunter Biden came to join Burisma's board in April 2014. He was brought on the board by Devon Archer, his business partner, Devon Archer was college roommates with Chris Heinz, stepson of secretary of state, John Kerry.

Pam Bondi: (05:54)

All three men, Hunter Biden, Devon Archer, and Chris Heinz had all started an investment firm together. Public records show that April 16th, 2014 Devon Archer meets with vice president Biden at the white house. Just two days later, on April 18th, 2014 is when Hunter Biden quietly joins Burisma according to public reporting. Remember, this is just one month after the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office open a money laundering case into Burisma, Hunter Biden joins their board. And not only 10 days after Hunter Biden joins the board, British authorities seizes $23 million in British bank accounts connected to the oligarch Zlochevsky, the owner of Burisma.

Pam Bondi: (06:57)

Did Hunter Biden leave the board then? No. The British authorities also announced that it had started a criminal investigation into potential money laundering. Did Hunter Biden leave the board? No. What happened was then only then did the company choose to announce that Hunter Biden had joined the board after the assets of Burisma and its oligarch owners Zlochevsky were frozen and a criminal investigation had begun.

Pam Bondi: (07:38)

Hunter Biden's decision to join Burisma raised flags almost immediately. One article from May, 2014 stated the appointment of Joe Biden's son to the board of Ukrainian gas firm Burisma has raised eyebrows the world over. Even an outlet with bias for Democrats pointed out Hunter Biden's activities created a conflict of interest for Joe Biden. The article stated the move raises questions about a potential conflict of interest for Joe Biden.

Pam Bondi: (08:20)

Now even Chris Heinz, Hunter Biden's own business partner had grave concerns. He thought that working with Burisma was unacceptable. This is Chris Heinz. He was worried about the corruption, the geopolitical risk and how bad it would look. So he wisely distances himself from Hunter Biden and Devon Archer's appointments to Burisma. He didn't simply call his step-father secretary-of-state and say, "I have a problem with this." He didn't tell his friends, "Hey guys, I'm not getting on the board. I want nothing to do with this." He went so far as to send an email to senior state department officials about this issue. This Chris Heinz?

Pam Bondi: (09:17)

He wrote, apparently Devon and Hunter have joined the board of Burisma and a press release went out today. I can't speak to why they decided to, but there is no investment by our firm in their company. What did Hunter Biden do? He stayed on the board. What did Chris Heinz do? He subsequently stopped doing business with his college roommate, Devon Archer and his friend Hunter Biden. Chris Heinz spokesperson said the lack of judgment in this matter was a major catalyst for Mr. Heinz ending his business relationship with Mr. Archer and Mr. Biden. Now the media also noticed the same day and ABC news reporter ask Obama White House press secretary Jay Carney about it. Here's what happened.

Speaker 1: (10:14)

Hunter Biden has now taken a position with the largest oil and gas holding company in Ukraine. Is there any concern about at least the appearance of a conflict there? The vice president's son taking-

Jay Carney: (10:28)

I would refer you to the vice president's office. I saw those reports. Hunter Biden and other members of the Biden family are obviously private citizens and where they work does not reflect an endorsement by the administration or by the vice president or president. But I would refer you to the vice president's office.

Pam Bondi: (10:52)

The next day the Washington Post ran a story about it. It said, the appointment of the vice president's son to a Ukrainian oil board the vice president's son to a Ukrainian oil board looks nepotistic at best, nefarious at worst."

Pam Bondi: (11:03)

Again, "The appointment of the vice president's son to a Ukrainian oil board looks nepotistic at best, nefarious at worst." And the media didn't stop questioning asking questions here. It kept going, here's ABC:

Joe Biden: (11:27)

You have to fight the cancer of corruption.

Pam Bondi: (11:32)

But then something strange happened. Just three weeks later, a Ukrainian natural gas company, Burisma, accused of corruption appoints hunter Biden, seen here in their promotional videos, to their board of directors, paying his firm more than a million dollars a year.

Pam Bondi: (11:52)

Here's more from ABC. Continued on.

Speaker 2: (11:55)

Ukraine wasn't the only country where Hunter Biden's business and his father's diplomacy as vice president intersected. It also happened in China.

Pam Bondi: (12:03)

This video shows Chinese diplomats greeting Vice President Biden as you arrived in Beijing in December of 2013. Right by his side? His son, Hunter. Less than two weeks later, Hunter's firm had new business, creating an investment fund in China involving the government controlled bank of China with reports they hoped to raise one $1.5 Billion.

Pam Bondi: (12:29)

In fact, every witness who was asked about Hunter Biden's involvement with Burisma agreed there was a potential appearance of a conflict of interest. Multiple house Democrat witnesses, including those from the Department of State, the National Security Council, and others unanimously testified there was a potential appearance of a conflict of interest. These were their witnesses.

Pam Bondi: (13:03)

How much money did Hunter Biden get for being on the board? Well, you start looking at this bank records. According to reports, between April, 2014 and October, 2015, Burisma paid more than $3.1 million to Devin Archer and Hunter Biden. That's over the course of a year and a half. How do we know this? Some of Devin Archer's bank records were disclosed during an unrelated federal criminal case, having nothing to do with Hunter Biden. These bank records show 17 months that Burisma wired two payments of $83,333, not just for one month, for two months, for three months, but for 17 months. According to Reuters, sources report that of the two payments of $83,333 each, one was for a Hunter Biden and one Devin Archer.

Pam Bondi: (14:09)

Now, Hunter Biden was paid significantly more than board members for major US Fortune 100 companies such as Goldman Sachs, Comcast, Citigroup. The typical board member of these Fortune 100 companies ... We know they're titans of their industry, they're highly qualified, and as such, they're well compensated. Even so, Hunter Biden was paid significantly more. This is how well he was compensated. Hunter Biden is paid over $83,000 a month while the average American family of four during that time, each year made less than $54,000, and that's according to US Census Bureau during that time.

Pam Bondi: (15:06)

And this is what's been reported about his work on the board. The Washington post said, "What specific duties Hunter Biden carried out for Burisma are not fully known." The New Yorker reported, "Once or twice a year, he attended Burisma board meetings and energy forums that took place in Europe." When speaking with ABC News about his qualifications to be on Burisma's board, Hunter Biden didn't point to any of the usual qualifications of a board member. Hunter Biden and had no experience in natural gas, no experience in the energy sector, no experience with Ukrainian regulatory affairs. As far as we know, he doesn't speak Ukrainian. So, naturally, the media has asked questions about his board membership. Why was Hunter Biden on this board?

Interviewer: (16:02)

If your last name wasn't Biden, do you think you would have been asked to be on the board of Burisma?

Hunter Biden: (16:07)

I don't know. I don't know, probably not.

Pam Bondi: (16:11)

So, let's go back and talk about his time on the board. Remember he joined Burisma's board April, 2014, while the United Kingdom had an open money laundering case against Burisma and its owner, the oligarch Zlochevsky. On August 20th, 2014, four months later, the Ukrainian prosecutor general's office initiates a money laundering investigation into the same oligarch, Zlochevsky. This is one of 15 investigations into Burisma and Zlochevsky.

Pam Bondi: (16:48)

According to a recent public statement made by the current prosecutor general, on January 16, 2015, prosecutors put Zlochevsky, the owner of Burisma, on whose Hunter Biden sat on his board, on the country's wanted list for fraud, while Hunter Biden's on the board. Then a British court orders Zlochevsky's $23 million in assets be unfrozen. Why was the money unfrozen? Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent testified to it.

George Kent: (17:29)

Somebody in the general prosecutor's office of Ukraine shut the case, issued a letter to his lawyer, and that money went poof.

Steve Castor: (17:37)

So, essentially paid a bribe to make the case go away?

George Kent: (17:39)

That is our strong assumption. Yes, sir.

Pam Bondi: (17:44)

He also testified that the Ukrainian prosecutor general's office's actions led to the unfreezing of the assets. After George Kent's confirmation, that prosecutor was out. Victor Shokin becomes the prosecutor general. This is the prosecutor that you'll hear about later, the one that Vice President Biden has publicly said he wanted out of office. In addition to flagging questions about previous prosecutor's actions, George Kent also specifically voiced other concerns, this time to the vice president's office about Hunter Biden. In February, 2015, he raised concerns about Hunter Biden to Vice President Biden's office.

George Kent: (18:32)

In a briefing call with the national security staff of the office of the vice president in February of 2015, I raised my concern that Hunter Biden's status as a board member could create the perception of a conflict of interest.

Pam Bondi: (18:46)

But House managers didn't tell you that. This is all while Hunter Biden's sat on Burisma's board. Did Hunter Biden stop working for Burisma? No. Did Vice President Biden stop leading the Obama administration's foreign policy efforts in Ukraine? No. In the meantime, Vice President Biden is still at the forefront of the US Ukraine policy. He pledges $1 billion loan guarantee to Ukraine contingent on its progress in rooting out corruption. Around the same time with the $1 billion announcement, other people raised the issue of a conflict. As special Obama administration special envoy for energy policy told the New Yorker, it raised Hunter Biden's participation on the board of Burisma. He raised it directly with the vice president himself. This is a special Envoy to president Obama, and the media had questions too. December 8, 2015, the New York Times publishes an article that Prosecutor General Shokin was investigating Burisma and its owner, Zlochevsky. The Times report, here's their quote. "The credibility of the vice president's anti-corruption message may have been undermined by the association of his son, Hunter Biden," with Barisma and its owner, Zlochevsky.

Pam Bondi: (20:24)

And it wasn't just one reporter who asked questions about the line between Burisma and the Obama administration. As we learned recently through reporting on Fox news, on January 19th, 2016, there was a meeting between Obama administration officials and Ukrainian prosecutors. Ken Vogel, journalist for the New York Times, asked the State Department about this meeting. He wanted more information about the meeting, "where US support for prosecutions of Burisma holdings in the United Kingdom in Ukraine were discussed," but the story never ran.

Pam Bondi: (21:07)

Around the time of the reported story, January, 2016, meeting between the Obama administration and Ukrainian officials took place according to a Ukrainian press report, as translated says. "The US Department of State made it clear to the Ukrainian authorities that it was linking the $1 billion in loan guarantees to the dismissal of prosecutor general Victor Shokin."

Pam Bondi: (21:39)

Now, we all know from the Obama administration and from the words of Vice President Biden himself, he advocated for the prosecutor general's dismissal. There was ongoing investigation into the oligarch, Zlochevsky, the owner of Burisma, at the time. We know this because on February 2nd, 2016, the Ukrainian ...

Pam Bondi: (22:03)

... 2, 2016, the Ukrainian prosecutor general obtained a renewal of a court order to seize the Ukrainian oligarch's assets. A Kiev Post article published on February 4th, 2016 says, the oligarch Zlochevsky is, quote, suspected of committing a criminal offense of elicit enrichment, end quote. Over the next few weeks, the vice president had multiple calls with Ukraine's President Poroshenko. Days after the last call on February 4th ... 24th, 2016, a D.C. consultant reached out to the State Department to request a meeting to discuss Burisma. We know what she said because the email was released under the Freedom Of Information Act. The consultant explicitly invoked Hunter Biden's name as a board member. In an email summarizing the call, the State Department official says that the consultant quote, noted that two high profile citizens are affiliated with the company, including Hunter Biden as a board member, end quote. She added that the consultant would, quote like to talk with Under Secretary Of State Novelli about getting a better understanding of how the U.S. Came to the determination that the country is corrupt, end quote.

Pam Bondi: (23:28)

To be clear, this email documents that the U.S. government had determined Burisma to be corrupt. And the consultant was seeking a meeting with an extremely senior State Department official to discuss the U.S. government's position. Her pitch for the meeting specifically used Hunter Biden's name, and according to the email, the meeting was set for a few days later. And later that month, on March 29th, 2016, the Ukrainian parliament finally votes to fire the prosecutor general. This is the prosecutor general investigating the oligarch, owner of Burisma, on whose board Hunter Biden sat. Two days after the prosecutor general is voted out, Vice President Biden announces that the U.S. will provide $335 million in security assistance to Ukraine. He soon announces that the U.S. will provide one billion dollars in loan guarantees to Ukraine. Now let's talk about one of the Democrat's central witnesses, Ambassador Yovanovitch. In May 2016, Ambassador Yovanovitch was nominated to be Ambassador in Ukraine. Here's what happened when she was preparing for her Senate confirmation hearing.

John Ratcliffe: (24:49)

Congresswoman Stefanik had asked you how the Obama, Biden State Department had prepared you to answer questions about Burisma and Hunter Biden specifically, you recall that?

Amb Yovanovitch: (25:02)

Yes.

John Ratcliffe: (25:03)

Out of thousands of companies in the Ukraine, the only one that you recall, the Obama, Biden State Department prepared you to answer questions about was the one where the vice president's son was on the board, is that fair?

Amb Yovanovitch: (25:15)

Yes.

Pam Bondi: (25:20)

So she's being prepared to come before all of you, all of you, and talk about world issues, I'm going to be in charge of the Ukraine, and what did they feel the only company, the company that it was important to brief her on in case she got a question, Burisma. Ambassador Yovanovitch was confirmed July, 2016 as the Obama administration was coming to a close. In September, 2016, a Ukrainian court cancels the oligarch Zlochevsky arrest warrant for lack of progress in the case. In mid January, 2017, Burisma announces that all legal proceedings against it and Zlochevsky have been closed. Both of these things happened while Hunter Biden sat on the board of Burisma. Around this time, Vice President Biden leaves office. Years later now, former Vice President Biden, publicly details what we know happened. His threat to withhold more than a billion dollars in loan guarantees unless Shokin was fired. Here's the vice president.

Joe Biden: (26:35)

I said, I'm not going to, or we're not going to give you the billion dollars. They said, "You have no authority. You're not the president. The president said ..." I said, "Call him." I said, "I'm telling you, you're not getting the billion dollars." I said, "You're not getting a billion, I'm going to be leaving here." And I think it was what, six hours. I looked and I said, "I'm leaving in six hours. If the prosecutor's not fired, you're not getting the money." Well, son of a bitch. He got fired and they put in place someone who was solid at the time.

Pam Bondi: (27:06)

What he didn't say on that video, according to the New York Times, this was the prosecutor investigating Burisma, Shokin. What he also didn't say on the video was that his son was being paid significant amounts by the oligarch, owner of Burisma, to sit on that board. Only then does Hunter Biden leave the board, he stays on the board until April, 2019. Now in November, 2019, Hunter Biden signs an affidavit saying quote, he's been unemployed and has no other monthly income since May, 2019. This was in November of 2019, so we know from after April, 2019 to May, 2019 through November, 2019, he was unemployed by his own statement.

[ **LeBouquin** : Just to clarify the time frame; because I think it's probably a little vague in the Defense Counsel's statement. It's it's worthwhile to catch the full Biden quote to better deduce at what point Biden's threat was made (if the boasted threat was indeed made at all). This is what Biden was recorded as having said:

"I'll give you one concrete example. I was—not I, but it just happened to be that was the assignment I got. I got all the good ones. And so I got Ukraine. And I remember going over, convincing our team, our leaders to—convincing that we should be providing for loan guarantees.'

'And I went over, I guess, the 12th, 13th time to Kiev. And I was supposed to announce that there was another billion-dollar loan guarantee. And I had gotten a commitment from Poroshenko and from Yatsenyuk that they would take action against the state prosecutor. And they didn't.

'So they said they had—they were walking out to a press conference.

'I said, nah, I'm not going to—or, we're not going to give you the billion dollars. They said, you have no authority. You're not the president. The president said—I said, call him. (Laughter.)

'I said, I'm telling you, you're not getting the billion dollars. I said, you're not getting the billion. I'm going to be leaving here in, I think it was about six hours. I looked at them and said: I'm leaving in six hours. If the prosecutor is not fired, you're not getting the money. Well, son of a bitch. (Laughter.) He got fired. And they put in place someone who was solid at the time."

Cross-checking the time frame I believe that Biden's speaking of discussions with former Ukraine President Poroshenko in December 2015. But even if I'm wrong: the Verkhovna Rada secured the Prosecutor General's resignation in March 2016. So the event Biden describes occurred at the very latest in March.

Pam Bondi's statement: " _What he also didn't say on the video was that his son was being paid significant amounts by the oligarch, owner of Burisma, to sit on that board. Only then does Hunter Biden leave the board, he stays on the board until April, 2019_ ;" might confuse the reader as to the time frame.

So vice-President Biden allegedly made the threat at the latest in March 2016 – and Hunter Biden remained on the Board through till April 2019. I'm not suggesting any particular conclusion be drawn from that. This comment was just to clarify what might be perceived as a confusing ambiguity.] Continuing with Defense Counsel's statement:

Pam Bondi: (28:17)

April, 2019 to November, 2019, despite his resignation from the board, the media has continued to raise the issue relating to a potential conflict of interest. On July 22nd, 2019, The Washington Post wrote, the fired prosecutor general Shokin quote, believes his ouster was because of his interest in the company, end quote, referring to Burisma. The Post further wrote that, quote, had he remained in his post, he would have questioned Hunter Biden. On July 25th, 2019, three days later, President Trump speaks with President Zelensky. He says, " _The other thing, there's a lot of talk about Biden's son, that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of people want to find out about that, so whatever you can do with this attorney general would be great_. Biden went around bragging that he stopped the prosecution" ... " _If you can look into it. It looks horrible to me_ ," end quote. The House managers talked about the Bidens or Burisma 400 times, but they never gave you the full picture.

Pam Bondi: (29:39)

But here are those who did. The United Kingdom serious fraud unit, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State, George Kent. Chris Heinz, the ABC White House reporter, ABC, Good Morning America, The Washington Post, The New York Times, Ukrainian law enforcement and the Obama State Department itself. They all thought there was cause to raise the issue about the Bidens and Burisma.

Now the House managers might say without evidence that everything we just have said has been debunked. That the evidence points entirely and unequivocally in the other direction.

That is a distraction. You've heard from the House managers, they do not believe that there was any concern to raise here, that all of this was baseless and all we are saying is that there was a basis to talk about this, to raise this issue, and that is enough. I yield my time.

* * * * *
Chapter 3  
– of Several Built-in Escape Clause Probabilities –

As of 18 October 2020, just a few weeks before the U.S. National Election in November; the Iranian market on conventional weapons will officially be opened to unrestrained international business; and not only may Iran buy – but it may sell or transfer those classes of weapons falling under the conventional weapons category to whichever Agency it pleases.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex B; Statement

As provided by a resolution so deciding, the following provisions would apply on the date on which the IAEA Director General submits a report verifying that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA [the above specification describes "JCPOA Implementation Day – which landed on 18 October 2015];

5. All States may participate in and permit, provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any **battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems,** as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, and the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in this subparagraph...

This paragraph shall apply **until the date five years after** the **JCPOA Adoption Day** or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

That above entitles that conventional arms sales or transfers to and from Iran shall legitimately begin without any Security Council surveillance five years after _Adoption Day_ – this will be 18 October 2020; occurring, as noted, just a couple of weeks before the 2020 national election;

So by the time the next Democratic President of the United States were to take Office in late January 2021; conventional arms sales business venture opportunities in Iran are recognized as allowed and permitted to have already been ongoing by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China – the greatest arms suppliers world-wide save for the United States.

Each of the Democratic Party presidential hopefuls have declared in both the Iowa and New Hampshire primary debates that they support renegotiating a re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal.

Without, at this point in the narrative, going into a discussion of the other provisions agreed to by the Obama administration associated with ballistic or nuclear weapons, and the other outlandish concessions made by that administration which have already been indicated; and sticking only to the obvious issues arising from the opening of the Iranian market on conventional class weapons:

None of the Democratic Party candidate pretenders have referred to or even acknowledged that by the time the Democrats are once again in control of the Government in late January 2021;

None have addressed that by that time; the Obama administration had promised Iran the United States Government would already be committed as of 18 October 2020 to unquestioningly accepting and allowing that Iran – a State recognized by the United States as a State Sponsor of Foreign Terrorist Organizations – is permitted under the Iran nuclear and other classes of weapons agreement, to engage in these conventional arms exchanges free from any threat of U.S. sanctions or other retaliatory exercise.

This isn't discussed or shared with the electorate by proponents of the deal; yet nevertheless, Iran's expectation is that the United States shall accept and honor Obama's commitment; and not study to replace it with the most current U.S. politicians' most recent fashionable attempt at avoiding a political embarrassment.

Iran's expectation is clearly a priority with the Government of Iran; and the stated point of view coming from that quarter is there is nothing therefore for the U.S. to tiresomely try and regurgitate through a "re-negotiation."

Iran has already declared that it will not allow the United States to renege on or cheat pm those previous commitments promised under the Obama administration.

Should the determination then be made by a Democratic Party President elected in 2020; that the United States will reenter the deal – then the weapons sanctions against Iran reestablished by the Trump administration must by definition be dropped as a precondition for United States reentry, or even as a precondition and starting point in any discussion.

IRAN'S REASONING is based on the notion that Obama's Iran nuclear deal – United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 – is a legally binding instrument; and arguing from that perspective; the Iranian position has become stridently clear.

As pointed out however in Chapter 1 – the Iran nuclear deal can not be considered a legally binding instrument under the internationally understood definition provided for in Article 2; _Use of Terms_ ; of the _Vienna Convention on the law of treaties_ ; presented previously in Chapter 1:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART I. INTRODUCTION

_Article 2_. Use of Terms

1. For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States **in written form and governed by international law** , whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and _whatever its particular designation_ ;

Naturally the Security Council resolution, with all of its gross and fundamental violations of treaty cannot be construed as being made under the Authority of the _Charter of the United Nations_ – itself a multilaterally signed Constituent Treaty which declares in the third clause of its preamble:

Charter of the United Nations

We the People of the United Nations – [are] Determined:

[3] ...to establish conditions under which justice and **respect for the obligations arising from treaties** and other sources of international law can be maintained...

The Charter of the United Nations stipulates under Article 24; 2nd clause:

Charter of the United Nations

*CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 24

2. In discharging these [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations...

The Security Council resolution discards the Articles of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty in favor of its own opportunistic provisions. Obviously that's not a decision which can be justified as Authorized under the Charter of the United Nations – and so the Security Council decided it had assert the "authority" of the Security Council resolution by inventing a counterfeit maxim which does not exist in the Charter.

As previously noted, the Security Council resolution asserts the intentionally false claim that U.N. Member States "... _obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions_."

It's preposterous to construe the Charter of the United Nations as authorizing the Security Council to supersede the Charter itself in carrying on with implementation of defined Procurement Working Group activities expediting and approving contraband weapons sales to Iran prohibited by treaty – and then prohibiting the IAEA from verifying that these Iranian acquisitions are not being diverted from peaceful use to the development of nuclear weapons capacity.

And it's obviously absurd to construe that the permission given Iran through Obama's deal with the Ministers of the Government of Iran, to undertake experimentation in activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, again while preventing IAEA inspectors from looking into this – all of this in violation of Articles I and clause 1 of Article III of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty; can be considered as Authorized under the Charter of the United Nations when clearly Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that it is the Security Council which is accountable to the Charter;

And it is not the other way around: that the Charter is to be construed as so inherently malleable as to be subject to any alteration excused by whatever opportunistic and whimsical notion the Security Council cares to assume.

The Charter of the United Nations was never conceived of as allowing that rogue political movements arising in one or several States – such as the rogue fascist political movements in the Germany and Italy of the 1930's, which were joined with the contemporaneous Japanese imperialist warlords of the era in their bid for world conquest or domination – the Charter of the United Nations was not conceived of as an instrument to be easily perverted through the combined efforts of such associations.

It is the obvious case that the proponents of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 favoring reentry into the deal must fraudulently contend, and have fraudulently contended by their acceptance of Obama's intentionally counterfeit deceit that U.N. Member States are "... _obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions_ ...;" that the agreement forged between the Ministers of the Government of Iran and the Obama administration is a legitimate binding force superseding the restrictions of treaty.

By conceding the fraud – which is an unstated precondition to re-entering the deal – the proponents distinctly agree to play by Iran's rules; as opposed the rules imposed by treaty and peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted.

So when a partisan administration consigns the United States to a return to the Iran nuclear deal; then that administration casts the country back into the same wallowing trough the Europeans have famously claimed as theirs to make a stand in. _They_ have agreed to play by Iran's diktats and so, as events have shown, the European political leaders are now entirely subject to whatever discretion the Iranian Government cares to favor them with.

In ponderous insolence West European leaders thought to pretend themselves the masters only to discover once again – after the experience of many earlier disputes with Iran always resolved in Iran's favor* – that they are merely the useful when servile play things left dangling when they misbehave.

*[See Chapter 9 – _Adjudication and Diktat_ , of _Ignoring Zelenskyy_ , for more detailed explanation and another example of Iran coming out on top of a dispute with the European Union.]

The EU States Party to the Obama Iran nuclear deal decided they would invoke the sham "Dispute Resolution Mechanism" laid out in Annex A of the Security Council resolution. And once having done so, they predictably found themselves immediately ensnared – unable to make it through even the first fifteen day round of the "dispute resolution" schedule laid out in the program. As noted, it took only the slightest prodding suggestion by the Ministers of the Government of Iran, and the European "diplomatic" initiative collapsed like the house of cards it is. And with that, the leading European politicians responsible for initiating the effort have quietly withdrawn from their high point precipice perhaps hoping no one had noticed the gaffe and sudden departure.

Caught in their preoccupation with maintaining the political structure supporting the promised contraband weapons sales opportunities; they have abdicated any superior position on the field of negotiation regarding the details of the Obama Iran nuclear weapons sales initiative. They had abandoned treaty and now discover themselves in negotiation without recourse of any reference to established norm of international law.

It being the as indicated case that the European Union politicians currently find themselves unavoidably entangled and completely at the mercy of any absolutist decree issued by the Ministers of the very Government the Europeans had pretended themselves in control of; the partisan leaderships of France, Germany and the U.K. may currently be hoping to hold out for the life-line a Democratic Party President elect in 2020 would assuredly throw them.

* * * * *

But they could beat the snare they're caught in if they were to bring the Security Council resolution before the International Court of Justice for review and adjudication. There's no mention of any political will coming out of Europe or the United States to pursue that option. Taking the issue to Court entails a binding determination which would most likely result in an order that the contraband weapons profiteering scheme be dismantled; and with that the books on whatever had been sold to Iran and by whom would need see their way to being opened among the other things that might be decided.

So what if Iran might decide not to cooperate?! It wouldn't matter – the books at the other end of transactions are in the hands of the respective other Governments which would necessarily comply with a Court order.

However, petition brought before the Court would obviously mean an end to accommodating domestic arms supplier speculative interests with respect to this particular Middle East arms build up. As well, the results of a Court decision could indirectly bring to bear insupportable political embarrassment and ill-tidings to political careers which had sought advancement in aggressively promoting the legendary "historic diplomatic breakthrough" status of the Iran nuclear deal.

The unpopularity of the approach among proponents of the Iran nuclear weapons deal is obvious.

IT CAN BE expected that a United States President promising to re-impose the scheme of things upon the U.S. citizen by dropping sanctions which have to some extent stymied Procurement Working Group activities and hampered weapons sales to the region; would naturally be lauded as a hero by the leading politicians of Germany, France and the U.K.; having possibly bolstered or salvaged several grasping politicians' ongoing careers in office at least for the short while;

But a U.S. President carrying out the threat of re-insinuating the United States Government back into the travesty; would be an effective blight on future anti-proliferation efforts and consequentially as well the welfare of the U.S. Citizen, and a blighting burden on the Citizens of the other nations.

Many might well look back on the confusion of this era with interest; wondering how it came to be that Iran, a nation undergoing such claimed apparent scrutiny at the time – managed to come by such advanced nuclear weapons capacity under everyone's' noses seemingly in the blink of an eye.

* * * * *

During this last four and a half years, throughout the course of the ongoing fiasco – the Congress of the United States has managed to develop not the slightest inkling of a notion of what weapons technologies Iran has been able to accumulate through its some thirty completed acquisitions made under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group (the great majority of these purchases pertaining to INFCIRC/254/Rev.9 0r Rev. 10/Part 2 nuclear weapons associated inventories); transactions which had been facilitated and approved of by representatives of France, the U.K., and Germany; with Russia and China; and yes – initially with the United States taking part.

The chairpersonships of the House of Representatives' _House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence_ , Adam Schiff; and _House Committee on Foreign Affairs_ , Ehot L. Engel; along with _House Judiciary Committee Chairman_ Jerry Nadler and Lower House Speaker Nancy Pelosi – the partisan collective spearhead of the impeachment pogrom;

These key national level Democratic Party shakers and movers responsible for Lower House "Intelligence" gathering with respect to foreign entanglements; all voted in favor with everyone else in passing, on 26 October 2017, the House of Representatives Act – HR 1698; which was an act intended in part to officially recognize and condone United States approvals of sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated inventories bundled with ballistic missiles systems associated inventories; provided these contraband weapons sales were made through the Security Council sponsored Procurement Working Group.

The embarrassing House Bill having been passed nearly unanimously in the Lower House; was unabashedly submitted to the Senate. But it never made it out the other end of the process in that body. The Senate thought better of having the pill brought to prominent public attention by an attempt to pass it on to the President's desk.

The Senate read the thing out loud twice on the Senate floor and subsequently decided to allow the Lower House initiative to be quietly disappeared into committee – never to be heard of again.

Nevertheless, the vote stands as memorial to the intransigent posture of the pro-proliferation political movement of the day (which persists even through this 2020 national election period).

The sordid details of that October 2017 voting episode are documented and explained in Chapter 8 – _Trump's Original Issue_ ; of my preceding book, _Ignoring Zelenskyy_ ; and so that won't be reiterated further here.

Disregarding the October 2017 setback, the noise maker 116th National Assembly proponents of proliferation are sustained, this election season, in the docile tranquility of ignorance; utterly unconcerned that no one in Congress has any clue as to the exact contents of Iran's many nuclear weapons associated assets acquired through Procurement Working Group bureaucracy procedure;

Without that – no matter how much the pretended expertise; no one in Congress can have the slightest idea of how far along Iran is in any dedicated project aimed at developing advanced nuclear warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems.

And without that having any exact notion of anything salient given or sold Iran over the course of the last some four and a half years; and without a fragment of any insight as to how much Iran has accomplished with whatever it has accumulated, and how far it may have advanced its aspirations;

None of the membership of the national level pro-proliferation political movement now in control of Democratic Party in Washington can suppose any system of reasoning which might apply to the situation they can but admit they know nothing of.

Regardless; they relentlessly impose upon the public their indulgent unexplained premise that the handing off of nuclear weapons capacity to Iran in the manner documented; that expediting and approving INFCIRC/254/Rev.9 or 10/Part 2 listed nuclear weapons associated stuff for sale to Iran under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group; all the while keeping IAEA inspectors out of the picture courtesy of the Iran nuclear deal: "... _verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb_ ..."

* * * * *

The 2020 Democratic Party presidential hopefuls contend that it's because of President Trump's having imposed somewhat of a braking effect on Procurement Working Group initiatives; his having put a bridle to transactions earlier, after only some thirty successful Iranian unexamined acquisitions; rather than later, after maybe a hundred or however indefinite many more Iranian procurements were to be suffered;

They contend Trump to be the root cause of all distemper as naturally, had he simply let free-market _laissez-faire_ contraband weapons bad-player corporate capitalism run its course – the hornets nest of Iranian ire should never have been stirred.

Iran would presumably never have been forced into its desperate last resort summer of 2019 assaults on Gulf oil shipping – or its concurrent missile attacks which regrettably set fire to key Saudi oil refineries; had not Trump interfered with the "Historic Diplomatic Breakthrough" to end all "Historic Diplomatic Breakthroughs," consequently driving Iran to its dire last ditch cry-for-help summer of 2019 armed peace making actions.

Naturally failure to keep the peace certainly would have nothing inherent to do with provisions of the scheme itself; it is Trump's misgivings and stubborn refusal to see this deal through which has placed the world on such precarious footing vis-à-vis Iran.

* * * * *

THE easy to come by perspective doesn't take into account the many escape clause self-destruct measures written into the Iran nuclear deal which are designed to derail the whole experiment and leave Iran free to walk with all collected goodies in tow.

The sham " **Dispute Resolution Mechanism** " is one; and is perhaps the mildest of the self-destruct mechanisms in the program. If the direct Parties to the agreement don't toe the line precisely, or don't agree with some aspect Iran's conduct in the affair – then it doesn't matter, because Iran is the final interpreter come what may. And if other Parties don't like it – the results, as we have seen, are in – Iran's response speaks for itself; evasion, complaints and posturing on the part of the EU member States Party to the Security Council Resolution 2231 nuclear deal notwithstanding.

* * * * *

**Ceding U.S. Jurisdiction over Ports and Shipping Services** :

The next built-in escape clause self-destruct opportunity lands on " _JCPOA Transition Day_." That milestone is scheduled for 18 October 2023. Obama had promised Iran that on that date the United States is committed to terminate sanctions "... _With Respect to the Provision of Vessels or Shipping Services to Transport Certain Goods Related to Proliferation or Terrorism Activities to Iran_ ..."

Chapter 6 – _Lifting Terror Bans; Assuming a Presidential Prerogative_ , of _Ignoring Zelenskyy_ tells the story in more detail; but the short version is that by of 18 October 2023, a year before the 2024 National Election, the Congress is required under Resolution 2231 to have already passed a law terminating Section 2(a) of the _Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of_ 2012 as of 18 October 2023. The Section in question follows:

Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012

Title II — Expansion of Sanctions Relating to the Energy Sector of Iran and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Iran

*Subtitle B — Additional Measures Relating to Sanctions Against Iran

*SEC. 211. Imposition of Sanctions With Respect to the Provision of Vessels or Shipping Services to Transport Certain Goods Related to Proliferation or Terrorism Activities to Iran.

(a) IN GENERAL.— Except as provided in subsection (c), if the President determines that a person, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly sells, leases, or provides a vessel or provides insurance or reinsurance or any other shipping service for the transportation to or from Iran of goods that could materially contribute to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support for acts of international terrorism, the President shall, ... block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the persons specified in subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(b) PERSONS SPECIFIED.—The persons specified in this subsection are—

(1) the person that sold, leased, or provided a vessel or provided insurance or reinsurance or another shipping service described in subsection (a); and

(2) any person that—

(A) is a successor entity to the person referred to in paragraph (1);

(B) owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the person that owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph (1) had actual knowledge or should have known that the person referred to in paragraph (1) sold, leased, or provided the vessel or provided the insurance or reinsurance or other shipping service; or

(C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the person owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with (as the case may be), the person referred to in paragraph (1) knowingly engaged in the sale, lease, or provision of the vessel or the provision of the insurance or reinsurance or other shipping service.

***** The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (H. R. 1905) can be found as a pdf file at:

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/hr_1905_pl_112_158.pdf (last accessed June 14, 2016).

So whomsoever is elected in 2020 – in deference to Iran and Obama's Iran nuclear agreement – will have to convince Congress to terminate Section 211(a) above and remove from a President's list of duties the current requirement that a President make a determination as to whether sanctions be placed on a person determined to be using U.S. ports or shipping services as "prosecution free zone" staging areas available for furthering the logistical needs of international terrorism ("... _provides ... any other shipping service for the transportation to or from Iran of goods that could materially contribute to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support for acts of international terrorism_ ...").

Obama had agreed the law would be terminated as 18 October 2023 – and a failure of Congress to fulfill that commitment would constitute another example of non-compliance, United States non-performance on the agreement. Per the logic of Obama's Iran nuclear agreement, this would necessarily entitle Iran to invoke the "Dispute Resolution Mechanism;" with the evident consequences.

Iran can walk out on performance of JCPOA commitments regarding uranium enrichment just as easily in 2023 as it does now. And as long as a U.S. administration pretends that the Iran nuclear deal is a legitimate instrument; the U.S. will always be at the tender mercies of whatever interpretation Iran claims.

Currently Obama party Democrats, acolytes of the deal sycophantically lie claiming that Resolution 2231 is not about terrorism when it clearly is about lifting prohibitions on terrorist activities. A couple of examples of the proponents' mendacious characterizations:

Senator Van Hollen, on the floor of the Senate, 5 October 2017, falsely claimed:

The truth is, if the United States had tried to expand the nuclear agreement to also address Iran's ballistic missile tests and its regional terrorism, there would simply be no deal.

...This when the United States did clearly "... _expand the nuclear agreement to also address Iran's ballistic missile tests and its regional terrorism_ " in the most favorable terms to Iran.

At a 13 March 2018 session of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) interviewing two generals on the topic of " _The Posture of U.S. Central Command_ " in the Middle-East; Democratic Senator Jack Reed from Rhode Island and leader of the Democratic Party political wing of SASC spoke up:

...Let there be no doubt, Iran continues to be a state sponsor of terror and an abuser of human rights. Iran continues to destabilize the region through its development of ballistic missiles and its support for proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere.

The JCPOA was not intended to address all of Iran's bad behavior, just the nuclear aspect...

[Transcript of the 13 March 2018 Senate Armed Services Committee interview can be found at: http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Votel-SASC-Testimony-13-MAR-2018/]

And the deal is most certainly about lifting prohibitions on terrorist activities also in that it never punishes Iran for its active support of its terrorist proxies. Iran has shown over the course of the last four years that it does what it wants in that area – and naturally no remaining Resolution 2231 participant dared to pull the plug on the Procurement Working Group in response. That response is simply not allowed in the Iran nuclear agreement.

Obama's promise to the Ministers of the Government of Iran that the U.S. Congress will terminate Section 211(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is one of the flash points built in allowing Iran to withdraw from the agreement in the future when or if turns out that whoever is in charge in 2023 doesn't have the political stomach to try ditching the provision at that time.

And the presidential candidates of the Obama party pro-proliferation political movement in control of the national level Democratic Party agenda – those seeking "renegotiation" and "re-entry" into the deal which demands they play by Iran's rules; have no response to yet another issue which the candidates again ignore to their own satisfaction.

* * * * *

The United States approach to Iran shall be required to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.

Also as of "JCPOA Transition Day" the United States is required to accredit Iran with a new status. The Obama administration promised this:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231;

Annex A. – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, 14 July 2015

SANCTIONS

**23**. Eight years after Adoption Day ... the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, **to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT**.

The details of this are also explained more thoroughly in _Ignoring Zelenskyy_ ; this time in Chapter 10 – _Predatory anti-Representation Opportunism_.

That said; the sanctions referred to above pertain mostly to this following:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex II – Sanctions-related commitments

B. United States

4. The United States commits to cease the application of, and to seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, all nuclear-related sanctions as specified in Sections 4.1-4.9 below, and to terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622 and 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628, in accordance with Annex V.7

On to 4.9 and 4.9.1 ...:

4.9. Nuclear proliferation-related measures

4.9.1 Sanctions under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA [are to be terminated as stipulated in subparagraph 21.1 previously indicated above], **to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT**.

The above open-ended phrasing "... _to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT_ ..." could mean anything.

Iran demands that Iran shall be recognized with, and granted a new status by the United States. Currently the United States lists Iran as a State Sponsor of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Iran might as well demand that status be changed in order that it be more clearly affirmed that provisions in the _Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013 - H. R. 893_ ; those imposing sanctions on Iranian acquisitions " _of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities_ " are entirely dropped.

This would not be outrageous or unexpected. As noted, Iran has already demanded that the United States Government change law to effectively cede an essential aspect of its sovereign jurisdiction; that is to terminate the law at the order of the Ministers of the Government of Iran, and thereby to hand over U.S. ports and shipping services so to implement the agreed upon exclusions allowing U.S. ports and shipping service resources be utilized as "prosecution free zone" ports of call, staging areas made available for furthering the logistical needs of Iranian sponsored proxies' international terror activities.

It being already the case that the Obama administration had persuaded the Ministers of Iran of the delusion that this request of theirs would willingly be carried out by a future 117th or 118th Congress so that by 18 October 2023 the afore mentioned Section 211(a) would have been terminated;

Iran could just as easily logically maintain that the phrasing written in the text of Resolution 2231 promising the U.S. approach to Iran's acquisitions of nuclear related commodities and services shall be consistent with U.S. policies regarding _other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT_ ; means that the U.S. may no longer advertise it regards Iran as a State Sponsor of Terror; but must deal with, and promote Iran as a proper legitimate business partner.

This is exactly what the U.S. would be doing anyway by returning to the deal, agreeing to promote Procurement Working Group mandated activities of expediting and approving Iranian nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed assets while prohibiting IAEA inspection-verification measures.

IRAN can demand anything it wants – because it's the final interpreter of the meaning and of the implementation of the deal; and so it can do as it pleases.

All through the summer of 2019 Iran continued harassing and firing on Gulf oil shipments; and is alleged to have been responsible that summer for the missile attacks setting fire to two key Saudi oil refineries.

The EU doesn't respond with "Okay, that's it; no more Procurement Working Group weapons sales sponsorship for You Mr. Iran. Not until you, Mr. Iran cut it out and start playing ball! No more Mr. Iran; because now these latest antics attacking key energy sector choke points in the middle-east are seriously screwing with and undercutting the world economy; and it's not funny anymore."

No indeed the EU did not – the EU member States leaders Party to the Iran nuclear deal certainly did not respond in any manner like that. They treated with the infringements as though this was some sort of legitimate Iranian cry for help because Trump is an ass (and flogging the effigy excuses everything else anyone other carries on with); and that the Iranians had understandably been driven to retaliate with desperate measures – so we should all stop crying about it and help put out the fires and remember to signal out on whose lap the blame should rightfully fall when the lights go out and we have to eat our toast raw.

And then, after the summer shooting spree; Iran asserted the latest development that it will enrich however much uranium it wants; to whatever degree of radioactivity it chooses. And at that point, when Iran announced that new blatant policy; the EU States' leaderships thought they'd reached their limit, and it was finally time to put the pressure on by calling the vaunted "Dispute Resolution Mechanism" out of the garage.

But engaging as the venture momentarily seemed; in practice the attempt fell apart really quick because as it turned out the leaderships of the EU States party to the nuclear deal, living in the puffed up creamery enhanced world of high gloss pomp and show, had gotten a hold of some pretty big ideas about themselves...

...Which didn't hold up. And when it came down to confronting the issue in the real world, cohesion and resolve abruptly deflated with a quick pop upon sickeningly remembering that Iran mustn't be antagonized because there's always Russia and China having shown ready willingness to sell Iran weapons associated goods, services and technologies – and maybe even on the sly outside the Procurement Working Group official Iran nuclear deal staging area;

The danger that the competition would get the unabashed edge could have been a quite sobering thought; for if that were allowed, the EU leaders would have been letting the side down on their own respective domestic contraband arms suppliers' interests. The risks inherent in trying to prevail over Iran by an unmanageable attempt at closing down or interrupting access to the Security Council sponsored procurement channel were too great to be ignored.

* * * * *

THERE IS NO WAY around it. With Russian and China backing it – Iran has positively demonstrated it can do and does as it pleases. So why wouldn't Iran demand satisfaction of the United States by claiming that Obama had promised the official denotation of Iran being recognized as a State Sponsor of Foreign Terror Organizations be dropped as of 18 October 2023?

And if the U.S. Government at that time refused – oh well; it would be another example of predictable U.S. treacherous non-performance; another reason for Iran to bug out on the deal with all goodies gained over the course of it in tow.

Putting that option to withdraw aside; there is the more obvious alternative method for Iran to elegantly walk out on the deal – this one based on the fact that Iran has not stipulated which provisions the Ministers of Iran want terminated in the _Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013 - H. R. 893_.

The text of Resolution 2231 clearly indicates that provisions in the HR 893 Act indicated above have to be terminated – that's for certain. Beyond that apparently the President elected in 2020 has to guess what needs to be cut out of the Act in order for it to be perceived and affirmed by Iran that the United States approach to Iran is _consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT_.

It leaves a lot to the imagination, and one might guess at the future circumstance that could make for great "what-if" headline news copy. Here's the scenario:

The President approaches the Congress – rather sheepishly one might add – and well, like he says: Gee, I don't know; there's something we need to talk about guys. There's this _Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013_ that we really haven't thought about for a while because that was before the Iran nuclear deal got started and all in 2015 and we've all been so busy since, and...

And they, Iran that is, want stuff cut in the Act. It's like they want it trimmed down sort of so that it looks like we're treating Iran the same way we treat everyone else. They said something about the U.S. Government approach to Iran has to be _consistent_ _with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT_.

But like ... does that mean Iran is saying we shouldn't have been making all those exceptions for Iran that we haven't and don't make for anyone else? They're not giving us much to go on here – but I don't want to look stupid. None of us do – right? So which are the nuclear weapons associated provisions do ya think Iran would like done away with anyway? Maybe we could put our heads together on this – you know – in a nice bi-partisan sort of way and I'm sure we could come up with something that'll make Iran happy.

Maybe here are some things Iran would like us to get rid of:

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013 - H. R. 893 (113th Congress)

*SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ''Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

it shall be the policy of the United States to fully implement and enforce sanctions against any person, entity or country that assists the proliferation activities or policies of Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

SEC. 3. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN FOREIGN PERSONS

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the day of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose, for a period of not less than two years, the sanctions specified in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the person—.

(1)(A) on or after September 1, 2007, transferred to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria—

(i) goods, services, or technology listed on—

(I) ... Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular **INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 2** , and subsequent revisions);

(ii) goods, services, or technology not listed on any list specified in clause (i) but which nevertheless would be, if such goods, services, or technology were United States goods, services, or technology, prohibited for export to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, because of the potential of such goods, services or technology to contribute to the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems or destabilizing types and amounts of conventional weapons;

(2)(B) with respect to the transfer of goods, services, or technology, knew or should have known that the transfer of goods, services, or technology, to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, would contribute to the ability of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, to—

(i) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies...

(6) on or after August 10, 2010, provided a vessel, insurance or reinsurance, or any other shipping service for the transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria for purposes relating to the nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile development programs of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be.

And maybe here's another provision from the _Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of_ _2013_ which Iran might like to have cut out of the picture. This one has to do with ports and shipping services; just like that Section 211(a) from the _Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012_ that Iran wants terminated. I think they might really like it if we got rid of this one too:

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013 - H. R. 893 (113th Congress)

Sec. 10. Prohibition on certain vessels landing in the United States; enhanced inspections.

''(a) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date of enactment of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013, before a vessel arrives at a port in the United States, the owner, charterer, operator, or master of the vessel shall certify that the vessel did not enter a port in Iran, North Korea, or Syria during the 180-day period ending on the date of arrival of the vessel at the port in the United States.

''(2) FALSE CERTIFICATIONS.—The Secretary shall prohibit from landing at a port in the United States for a period of at least 2 years—

''(A) any vessel for which a false certification was made under section (a); and

''(B) any other vessel owned or operated by a parent corporation, partnership, association, or individual proprietorship of the vessel for which the false certification was made.

''(b) ENHANCED INSPECTIONS.—The Secretary shall—

''(1) identify foreign ports at which vessels have landed during the preceding 12-month period that have also landed at ports in Iran, North Korea, or Syria during that period; and

''(2) inspect vessels arriving in the United States from foreign ports identified under paragraph (1) to establish whether the vessel was involved, during the 12-month period ending on the date of arrival of the vessel at the port in the United States, in any activity that would be subject to sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013.''

But why keep guessing at it – why not cut out the whole damn thing just to be on the safe side? Now that's the way to let Iran dictate how U.S. statutes should get rewritten don't you know! And we wonder how wild conspiracy theories get started. We've got a fresh one budding right under our noses here:

Homesteading moles dug into Congress or the Executive Branch getting their marching orders tuning in to radio Tehran; they have taken control of Our U.S. Government and are letting the Iranian tell us how we should be rewriting our laws to make them happy.

It really is too stupid to be believed but it's true. Obama left this idiot test guess work hanging out there for someone else to pick up. So whoever's responsible for being in charge in 2023; provided the U.S. gets back into the deal, has to try and figure out how Iran wants the law changed; because Obama promised the Iranians the United States Government would do it, would do something to make the Iranian Government happy when the time came. It's now up to whoever's in the Presidential spotlight in 2023 to figure out what the open-ended something is going to look like.

During the Iowa Democratic primary presidential debates – contending hopeful Pete Buttigieg was asked by the moderator if he thought Iran should be allowed the bomb:

Abby Phillip [moderator]: (24:21)

Mayor Buttigieg to be clear, would you allow Iran to become a nuclear power? Yes or no?

Pete Buttigieg: (24:26)

No. Our security depends on ensuring that Iran does not become nuclear...

Grasping politicians get ahead answering inanely rigged questions with inane responses. But a pertinent real world question which will have to be answered in a couple of years by whoever is intent on trying to reestablish a U.S. foothold in the Iranian weapons market is:

"Mayor Buttigieg, if Your Honor pleases; which nuclear weapons related provision or provisions of the _Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013_ would you have terminated to reassure Iran that we have Iranian nuclear arms aspirations foremost in our hearts so that they won't set out to embarrass whoever is in office in 2023 by bugging out on the deal which allows the international community to engage in contraband weapons sales profiteering vis-à-vis the Iranian weapons market?"

Whatever is "renegotiated" with Iran in the hypothetical circumstance; based on the fact that; despite the public impression to the contrary; Obama's Iran nuclear deal was never even transmitted to Congress for review, and was never even discussed in the 114th Congress much less put to a vote [see Chapter 3 – _Impeachment Selectivity; Weapons Development and Expansion_ , of _Ignoring Zelenskyy_ for the detailed proof of the assertion. Or Chapter 15 – Appendix 10: _Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress_ [] for a more encapsulated telling of the story surrounding the famous non vote fiasco of September 10 and 11, 2015);

It's almost a cinch that the face-saving arrangement won't be put on paper before the public for review – just like the real Obama's Iran nuclear deal was never transmitted to Congress despite what the legend pretends.

* * * * *

Iranian Parliament Refuses to Ratify.

This following is also scheduled to occur on "JCPOA Transition Day" (18 October 2023:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

iv. Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and **Iran will seek** , consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, **ratification of the Additional Protocol**.

[This next is taken in large part from my earlier book _A Singular Charter in Perpetuity_. It's placement here is most pertinent.]

It is essential to understand the difference between application of the "Provisional" IAEA Additional Protocol; and acceptance, or ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol itself.

The IAEA Additional Protocol is a legally binding document, by which Iran contracts with the other Parties to the multilaterally signed _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , to guarantee that Iran will promise to perform on certain aspects of IAEA inspection routines.

The "Provisional" application of the Additional Protocol asserts that Iranian compliance to the Additional Protocol is strictly voluntary, entirely at the discretion of Iran.

Reviewing the _Vienna Convention on the law of treaties_ to get a better sense of the difference between being bound by agreement – and not being bound by agreement:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART III. OBSERVANCE, APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 1. OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES

_Article 26_. "PACTA SUNT SERVANDA"

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART I. INTRODUCTION

_Article 2_. USE OF TERMS

1. For the purposes of the present Convention:

(b) "Ratification", "acceptance", "approval" and "accession" mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty;

Bearing in mind the concept of being bound by agreement, by consent – the following from the standard IAEA Additional Protocol describes how the protocol can be enforceably, or nominally, be brought into play:

MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article 17

a. This Protocol shall enter into force

on the date on which the Agency receives from .......... [Iran] written notification that ..........'s [Iran's] statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met.

OR

upon signature by the representatives of .......... [Iran] and the Agency.

The conditions upon which the Additional Protocol can justifiably be internationally considered as having the signatory's consent to be bound by the agreement of the Additional Protocol are enumerated in the above bullet point "a."

This following bullet point "b." describes how the non-signatory, although not internationally recognized as consenting to being bound by the Additional Protocol; nevertheless agrees to acknowledge it, and comply with it nominally on a completely voluntary basis when it chooses to do so:

b. .......... [Iran, the signatory] may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that it will apply this Protocol provisionally.

In "b." the signatory does not refuse to accept the Additional Protocol outright. The signatory reserves the right to agree to comply with the protocol's directives voluntarily as the signatory sees fit. The signatory does not give consent to ultimately be bound by the Additional Protocol.

Examining the Diplomatic Language of the IAEA Board of Governors' Reports on inspections of the Iranian Nuclear Project; one finds the phrase "Iran _continues to_ _provisionally apply_ _the Additional Protocol_ ..." constantly reappearing. For example:

**IAEA Board of Governors: (** Report **) GOV/2017/35 –** Derestricted 13 September 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

24. **Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol** to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, [listed above] pending its entry into force. The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran's declarations under the Additional Protocol and to conduct **complementary accesses** under the Additional Protocol to sites and other locations in Iran.

An appreciation of the established legal definition of binding and non-binding is necessary to understanding what is meant by the above diplomatic phrase in the IAEA Report, paragraph 24; section _E. Other Relevant Information_ ; the phrase declaring that: " _Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol_ ..." That phrase establishes that Iran has continued to voluntarily, as a courtesy, allow the IAEA some inspections of the Iran nuclear program.

Consensual, binding acceptance of the IAEA Additional Protocol would, for Iran, would mean this for example:

MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS

Article 5

.......... [Iran, the Signatory] shall provide the Agency with access to:

a. (i) Any place on a site; [a nuclear project associated site]

By that above does not apply; as of yet Iran has not consented to be bound to the Additional Protocol and is not required to provide the Agency with access to "Any place on a site." It is quite clear that allowing such a thing would conflict with the secrecy agreement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 nuclear weapons associated inventories.

The first time the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament is scheduled to consider the Additional Protocol for ratification is on 18 October 2023.

There is no definite amount of time stipulated for the Majlis to take on debate of whether or not to ratify; nor is it even required that the Majlis ratify the Additional Protocol at all. There is no penalty if the Iranian Parliament does not.

The implications of this becomes clearer in the next self-destruct escape clause protocol written into the provisions of Resolution 2231.

* * * * *

Nuclear Warhead Development or Manufacture: 18 October 2030.

We are now in 2030. This is when Iran is given implicit permission to make its own nuclear warheads:

IRAN may begin to trade in weapons grade plutonium, and weapons grade uranium in 2030.

Iran is allowed to fashion this material into any form it wants; with the IAEA naturally kept out of reviewing the end product of any forming, casting or machining of plutonium or uranium. This is how and where this JCPOA procedure is announced:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.

25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years...

The above restraint continues for fifteen years only; after that, anything is acceptable. There is no provision that, once Iran is allowed to acquire and work with the special fissional materials required to produce fissile nuclear weapons; there is no provision stipulating that Iran is restricted from forming or casting these materials into configurations favorable to creating a high yield fissile chain reaction explosion.

The special fissional materials under discussion here; highly enriched uranium, and plutonium (isotope forms of plutonium are not clarified in Resolution 2231; there is nothing in Resolution 2231 prohibiting use of weapons grade plutonium); these materials do fall in the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 category of inventories (as opposed to the Rev. 9 category of inventories), and we recall that INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 inventories are designated for use the production of nuclear energy. Therefore, one may assume that the IAEA does have reasonable knowledge of end-use, location and quantities of these materials allowed to float around Iran.

Article 57 of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and Iran places safeguards on nationwide quantities of plutonium over a total of 1kgm. Aside from that, there is this:

Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards In Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Article 13

Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used in non-nuclear activities

Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the Government of Iran shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such material may be terminated.

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES

Article 14

If the Government of Iran intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) The Government of Iran shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:

(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the Government of Iran may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and

(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded material in Iran and of any export of such material; and

(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as, inter alia, temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval [of] or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.

*[The text of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and Iran is identified as IAEA Information Circular document number listing: INFCIRC/214. It is dated 13 December 1974 and its status of accessibility is listed as GENERAL Distr. – which means: for general distribution. Its original language is English. Web address access is: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1974/infcirc214.pdf [Last accessed June 24, 2016].

UNDER ARTICLE 13 (above), we see that when safeguarded material is used in the production of [metallurgical] alloys, safeguards are terminated. Article 13 does not indicate any prejudice or controls concerning the precise composition of the alloys to be formed or cast; nor does it make any distinction as to the configuration in which these alloys are to be formed – once radioactive metals are cast or formed, they are hardly, any longer, subject to outside scrutiny.

Furthermore, under Article 14(c), IAEA approval of the activity regarding whatever it is that the alloys are to be used for is not required; and, the IAEA is not allowed any classified knowledge of nuclear related military activity that the alloys may be applied to.

However, as a concession from Iran, under 14(a)(ii), Iran concedes that "... _That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices_ ..."

Without ratification of the Additional Protocol; International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors are not allowed access to "Any place on a site." And that is the point of not placing a contingency requiring the Majlis ratify the Additional Protocol before Iran could get its nuclear weapons associated goodies through the assistance rendered, and by approval of the Procurement Working Group.

That aside; Iran promises once in possession, nevertheless not to weaponize its uranium or plutonium metallurgical alloys while these are in the discrete and watchful custody of the Iranian military – _that_ is the reassurance that the Government of Iran offers the world.

But still in all, Iran has the final word on however Resolution 2231 is carried on with, including as regards inspections or non-inspections.

* * * * *

Whatever the 2020 Democratic Party challengers say – and they say a lot – they nevertheless do indeed not so surreptitiously support the aspirations of the Iranian Government to develop domestic nuclear weapons capabilities; as is so diligently testified to and affirmed by the very provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) agreed to between Obama and the Ministers of the Government of Iran, and which they promote.

And however much they might loudly protest the notion, they do represent U.S. domestic contraband weapons profiteering interests (whether sought or unsought).

But even were the United States Government to be brought back into the deal, with a President elected into office to see to it the sanctions on Iran were dropped. The administration which had consigned itself to the task couldn't be assured of being able to hold the thing together in the face of the various built in escape clauses the Iranian Government has at its disposal if it would.

As is evident, Obama didn't work out a deal with the Ministers of the Government of Iran which was ever intended to prevent Iran from getting the bomb. The deal was negotiated to give Iran what it wanted; and it incidentally also gave Obama the chance to return to the U.S. a hometown hero.

The international popularity of the Security Council resolution with the great arms producing nations most reasonably may naturally be construed as due to the prominent characteristic of its allowing for great profit making opportunity – with all the while the amoral criminality of it being shielded with a façade of diplomatic respectability.

Were it that those 2020 presidential candidates agitating for re-entry into the deal truly are as intent on preventing Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capacity as they pretend – they would be screaming for the Court to shut operations under the menacing Security Council resolution down.

But that option is so frightening and so far from the purpose of the deal and the objectives of the promoters – that they dare not even utter, and have never uttered a whisper of the possibility's existence.

Instead they have rallied to intimidate the public, issuing in various wordings that tiresome proclamation which asserts the "all options on the table" as being either: the Iran nuclear deal – or war!

* * * * *
Chapter 4  
– The Fiction of Assistance Withheld –

Of the Opinion of the Court handed down by Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland in the 1936 case of _United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp_. (which I had discussed in Ignoring Zelenskyy in chapter 2 – _Origin of Federal Power Over External Affairs_ , I submitted this observation of Mr. Justice Sutherland as noteworthy and applicable to Trump's implementation of the disbursement of congressionally appropriated funds to Ukraine:

It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment -- perhaps serious embarrassment -- is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, **congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved**.

Moreover, _he_ , not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Articles of Impeachment scurrilously accused Trump of wrongfully "withholding" funds urgently needed by the Ukraine to buy anti-tank weapons systems. Trump was accused of withholding funds in this regard in order to pressure the Ukraine Government into investigations of former vice-President Joe Biden and son.

It was asserted by the libellants that the delay on dissemination of the funds was impeachable.

The notion itself has no constitutional merit. In general, as indicated by the Court's Opinion cited, the implementation of the legislation, the legislation being the appropriation of funds intended to be put at the disposal of the Ukraine Government); the implementation, the carrying out of the disbursement of the funds falls within the purview of the Executive Branch. And since Trump had got the funds to the Zelenskyy within the time frame allotted by the Legislature – there could be no malfeasance attached to the timing of the disbursement itself.

That above is a point of general consideration; Counsel for the Defense, discussed particulars. On day four of the Trial (25 January 2020) pointed out that the funds in question, on which a temporary hold had been placed; had nothing to do with the funding appropriated by Congress for Ukraine defense – as had been alleged in libellants' complaint:

Michael Purpura: (10:46)

...The content of the July 25 call was in line with the Trump administration's legitimate concerns about corruption and reflected the hope that Presidents Zelensky, who campaigned on a platform of reform, would finally clean up Ukraine. So what did President Trump and President Zelensky discuss in the July 25 call? Two issues, burden sharing, corruption. Just as importantly, what wasn't discussed on the July 25 call?

Michael Purpura: (11:38)

There was no discussion of the paused security assistance on the July 25 call. House Democrats keep pointing to President Zelensky's statement that, "I would also like to thank you for your great support in the area of defense." But he wasn't talking there about the paused security assistance. He tells us in the very next sentence exactly what he was talking about, Javelin missiles. "We are ready," Presidents Zelensky continues, "to continue to cooperate for the next steps, specifically, we are almost ready to buy more Javelins from the United States for defense purposes." Javelins are the anti-tank missiles only made available to the Ukrainians by President Trump. President Obama refused to give Javelins to the Ukrainians for years. Javelin sales were not part, were not part of the security assistance that had been paused at the time of the call.

Michael Purpura: (12:33)

Javelin sales have nothing to do with the paused security assistance, those are different programs entirely. But don't take my word for it. Both former ambassador to Ukraine, Maria Yovanovitch, and NSC Senior Director, Timothy Morrison, confirmed that the Javelin missiles and the security assistance were unrelated. The house managers didn't tell you about Ambassador Yovanovitch's and Tim Morrison's testimony...

Michael Purpura: (13:03)

Why not? They couldn't have taken two to five minutes out of 21 hours to make sure you understood that the javelin sales being discussed were not part of the pause security assistance. This puts the following statement by President Trump in a whole new light, doesn't it? I would like you to do us a favor though, because our country has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it. As everyone knows by now, President Trump asked President Zelensky to do us a favor and he made clear that us referred to our country and not himself. More importantly, the President was not connecting. Do us a favor to the javelin sales that President Zelensky mentioned, it makes no sense in the language there...

Michael Purpura: (13:46)

...the javelin sales were not part of the security assistance that had been temporarily paused. I want to be very clear about this. When the House Democrats claim that the javelin sales discussed on the July 25 call are part of the pause security assistance, it is misleading. They are trying to confuse you and just sort of wrap everything in, instead of unpacking it the right way. There was no mention of the pause security assistance on the call, and certainly not from President Trump...

Defense Counsel is referring to a line of testimony in the Volker-Morrison Deposition of 20 November 2019:

Mr. Conaway: (42:10)

...All right. The impact of the pause that occurred, the 55 day pause in the lethal assistance, or the security assistance, none of us had really understood exactly what happened during that timeframe. No one knew about it other than internal US folks until late August, and so the Russians would not necessarily have known about it. The potential impact, and I agree with on Russia's interpretation of our support for Ukraine wasn't known until those last 14 days, but the impact on the lethal aid that they already had, should Russia had tried to move the line of contact further West with their tanks, would the lethal assistance that we'd already given been available to them to push back on that?

Kurt Volker: (42:52)

Yes, it would.

Mr. Conaway: (42:52)

Mr. Morrison, comments?

Morrison: (42:55)

Sir, I agree with that, but I would also add the hold, as I understood it applied to Ukraine security systems, UASI, UASI and FMF, it did not apply to FMS, and the javelins were provided under FMS.

Mr. Conaway: (43:10)

Okay. So the most lethal weapon that President Trump provided to the Ukrainians ... was available to them, should the Russians have pushed their tanks west. The javelins?

Morrison: (43:25)

Yes sir.

Mr. Conaway: (43:26)

Throughout that process, even with the pause, even with all the stuff that was going on?

Morrison: (43:30)

Yes sir.

Mr. Conaway: (43:31)

Okay. Associated Press reporting that, Ambassador Volker, you mentioned it earlier, that the Russians in an act of war took two gunships, and a tug, and 24 sailors last November. And yet the Russians have now given the 24 sailors back in September, and the Associated Press is reporting today that the they've given the gunboats and the tug back, does that sound like Ukraine is inept at being able to negotiate with the Russians because they're wounded in some way by our actions?

Kurt Volker: (44:02)

No, I would not say that the Ukrainians are inept.

FROM DAY 7 of the Senate Impeachment Trial (27 January 2020); Defense Counsel (Purpura) discusses allegations of Trump exerting undue pressure:

Michael Purpura Defense Argument

Michael Purpura: (00:00)

... On Saturday, we walked through some of the evidence that the House managers put forward and didn't put forward during their 21 plus hours of presentation. That evidence that we recounted was drawn directly from the House manager's own record, the case they chose to submit to this chamber. To echo my colleague, Mr. Sekulow, briefly, the House managers own evidence shows that President Trump did not condition anything on investigations during the July 25 call with President Zelensky and did not even mention the paused security assistance on the call. President Zelensky said that he felt no pressure on the call. Presidents Zelensky and the top Ukrainian officials did not learn of the pause on the security assistance until more than a month after the July 25 call.

Michael Purpura: (01:38)

And the House manager's own record, their record that they developed and brought before this chamber, reflects that anyone who spoke with the President said that the President made clear that there was no linkage between security assistance and investigations. There's another category of evidence demonstrating that the pause on security assistance was distinct and unrelated to investigations. The President released the aid without the Ukrainians ever announcing any investigations or undertaking any investigations. Here is Ambassador Sondland.

Elise Stefanik: (02:21)

And the fact is the aid was given to Ukraine without any announcement of new investigations.

Gordon Sondland: (02:29)

That's correct.

Elise Stefanik: (02:30)

And President Trump did in fact meet with President Zelensky in September at the United Nations, correct?

Gordon Sondland: (02:35)

He did.

Elise Stefanik: (02:36)

And there was no announcement of investigations before this meeting?

Gordon Sondland: (02:40)

Correct.

Elise Stefanik: (02:40)

And there was no announcement of investigations after this meeting?

Gordon Sondland: (02:44)

That's right.

Michael Purpura: (02:48)

So while the security assistance was paused, the administration did precisely what you would expect, it addressed President Trump's concerns about the two issues that I mentioned on Saturday, burden sharing and corruption. A number of law and policy makers also contacted the President and the White House to provide input on the security assistance issue during this period, including Senator Lindsey Graham. The process culminated on September 11, 2019. On that day, the President spoke with Vice President Pence and Senator Rob Portman, the vice president, in NSC senior director Tim Morrison's words, was armed with his conversation with President Zelensky from their meeting just days earlier in Warsaw, Poland, and both the vice president and Senator Portman related their view of the importance of the assistance to Ukraine and convinced the President that the aid should be dispersed immediately. After the meeting, President Trump terminated the pause and the support flowed to Ukraine.

Michael Purpura: (04:13)

I want to take a step back now and talk for a moment about why the security assistance was briefly paused. Again, in the words of the house managers own witnesses, witness after witness testified that confronting Ukrainian corruption should be at the forefront of United States foreign policy toward Ukraine. They also testified that the President had long standing and sincere concerns about corruption in Ukraine. The House managers, however, told you that it was laughable to think that the President cared about corruption in Ukraine. But that's not what the witnesses said. According to Ambassador Volker, "President Trump demonstrated that he had a very deeply rooted negative view of Ukraine based on past corruption and that's a reasonable position," according to Ambassador Volker, "Most people who know anything about Ukraine would think that." And Dr. Hill testified, "I think the President has actually quite publicly said that he was very skeptical about corruption in Ukraine. And in fact, he's not alone because everyone has expressed great concerns about corruption in Ukraine."

Michael Purpura: (05:37)

The House managers have said that the President's concern with corruption is disingenuous. They said that President Trump didn't care about corruption in 2017 or 2018 and he certainly didn't care about it in 2019, that was their words. Not according to Ambassador Yovanovitch, however, who testified that President Trump shared his concern about corruption directly with President Poroshenko, President Zelensky's predecessor, in their first meeting in the Oval Office. When was that meeting? In June of 2017, 2017. The President also has well known concerns about foreign aid generally. Scrutinizing and in some cases curtailing foreign aid was a central plank of his campaign platform. President Trump is especially wary of sending American tax payer dollars abroad when other countries refuse to pitch in. Mr. Morrison and Mr. Hale both testified at length about President Trump's longstanding concern with burden sharing in foreign aid programs. Here's what they said.

Tim Morrison: (06:58)

The President was concerned that the United States seem to bear the exclusive brunt of security assistance to Ukraine. He wanted to see the Europeans step up and contribute more security assistance.

David Hale: (07:11)

We've often heard at the State Department that the President of the United States wants to make sure that foreign assistance is reviewed scrupulously, to make sure that it's in truly in U.S. national interests and that we evaluate it continuously to meet certain criteria that the President's established.

John Ratcliffe: (07:27)

And has the President express that he expects our allies to give their fair share of foreign aid as evidenced by a point that he raised during the July 25th phone call with President Zelensky to that effect?

David Hale: (07:38)

The principle of greater burden sharing by allies and other like-minded states is an important element of the foreign assistance review.

Michael Purpura: (07:47)

The President expressed these precise concerns to Senator Ron Johnson, who wrote, "He reminded me how thoroughly corrupt Ukraine was and again conveyed his frustration that Europe doesn't do its fair share of providing military aid." The House managers didn't tell you about this. Why not? And President Trump was right to be concerned that other countries weren't paying their fair share. As Laura Cooper testified, U.S. contributions to Ukraine are far more significant than any individual country and she also said E.U. funds tend to be on the economic side rather than for defense and security. Senator Johnson also confirmed that other countries refused to provide the lethal defensive weapons that Ukraine needs in its war with Russia.

Michael Purpura: (08:48)

Please keep in mind also that the pause of the Ukraine security assistance program was far from unusual or out of character for President Trump. The American people know that the President is skeptical of foreign aid and that one of his top campaign promises and priorities in office has been to avoid wasteful spending of American taxpayer dollars abroad. Meanwhile, the same people who today claim that President Trump was not genuinely concerned about burden sharing were upset when as a candidate, President Trump criticized free-riding by NATO members. This past summer, the administration paused, reviewed, and in some cases canceled, hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid to Afghanistan, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Lebanon. And these are just some of the reviews of foreign aid undertaken at the very same time that the Ukraine aid was paused.

Michael Purpura: (10:07)

So what happened during the brief period of time while the Ukraine security assistance was paused? People were gathering information and monitoring the facts on the ground in Ukraine as the new parliament was sworn in and began introducing anti-corruption legislation. Not withstanding what the House managers would have you believe, the reason for the pause was no secret within the White House and the agencies. According to Mr. Morrison, in a July meeting attended by officials throughout the executive branch agencies. The reason provided for the pause by a representative of the Office of Management and Budget was that the President was concerned about corruption in Ukraine and he wanted to make sure that Ukraine was doing enough to manage that corruption. In fact, as Mr. Morrison testified, by Labor Day, there had been definitive developments to demonstrate that President Zelensky was committed to the issues he campaigned on, anti-corruption reforms. Mr. Morrison also testified that the administration was working on answering the President's concerns regarding burden sharing. Here's Mr. Morrison.

Steve Castor: (11:26)

Was there any inner-agency activity, whether it be with the State Department or the Defense Department, coordination by the National Security Council to look into that a little bit for the President?

Tim Morrison: (11:35)

We were surveying the data to understand who was contributing what and sort of in what categories.

Steve Castor: (11:46)

And so the President [inaudible 00:11:48] concerns, the inter-agency tried to address them.

Tim Morrison: (11:52)

Yes.

Michael Purpura: (11:57)

How else do we know that the President was awaiting information on burden sharing and anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine before releasing the security assistance? Because that's what Vice President Pence told President Zelensky. On September 1, 2019, Vice President Pence met with President Zelensky. President Trump was scheduled to attend the World War II commemoration in Poland, but instead remained in the U.S. to manage the emergency response to Hurricane Dorian. Remember, this was three days, three days after President Zelensky learned through the Politico article about the review of the security assistance. Just as Vice President Pence and his aides anticipated, Jennifer Williams testified that once the cameras left the room, the very first question that President Zelensky had was about the status of the security assistance. The vice president responded by asking about two things.

Michael Purpura: (13:03)

The president responded by asking about two things, burden sharing and corruption. Here's how Jennifer Williams described it. The VP responded by really expressing our ongoing support for Ukraine, but wanting to hear from president Zelensky, you know, what the status of his reform efforts were that he could then convey back to the president and also wanting to hear if there was more that European countries could do to support Ukraine. Vice President Pence knows president Trump and he knew what president Trump wanted to hear from President Zelensky. The vice president was echoing the president's two recurring themes, corruption and burden sharing. It's the same consistent themes every time. Ambassador Taylor received a similar readout of the meeting between the vice president and President Zelensky, including the vice president's focus on corruption and burden sharing. Here's ambassador Taylor.

Amb. Taylor: (14:05)

On the evening of September 1st I received a readout of the Pence Zelensky meeting over the phone from Mr. Morrison, during which he told me that President Zelensky had opened the meeting by immediately asking vice president about the security cooperation. The vice president did not respond substantively, but said that he would talk to President Trump that night. The vice president did say that President Trump wanted the Europeans to do more to support Ukraine and that he wanted the Ukrainians to do more to fight corruption.

Michael Purpura: (14:38)

On September 11, based on the information collected and presented to President Trump, the president lifted the pause on the security assistance. As Mr. Morrison explained, our process gave the president the confidence he needed to approve the release of the security sector assistance. The House Managers say that the talk about corruption and burden sharing is a ruse. No one knew why the security assistance was paused and no one was addressing the president's concerns with Ukrainian corruption and burden sharing. The House Managers' own evidence, their own record, tells a different story, however. They didn't tell you about this, not in 21 hours. Why not? The president's concerns were addressed in the ordinary course. The president wasn't caught as the House Managers allege, the managers are wrong. All of this together with what we discussed on Saturday demonstrates that there was no connection between security assistance and investigations. When the House Managers realized that their quid pro quo theory on security assistance was falling apart, they created a second alternative theory. According to the House Managers, President Zelensky desperately wanted a meeting at the White House with President Trump and President Trump conditioned that meeting on investigations. So what about the manager's backup accusations? Do they fare any better than their quid pro quo for security assistance? No. No, they don't.

Michael Purpura: (16:36)

A presidential level meeting happened without any preconditions at the first available opportunity in a widely televised meeting at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 25, 2019. The White House was working to schedule the meeting earlier at the White House or in Warsaw, but those options fell through due to normal scheduling and a hurricane. The two presidents met at the earliest convenience without President Zelensky ever announcing or beginning any investigations. The first thing to know about the alleged quid pro quo for a meeting is that by the end of the July 25 call, the president had invited President Zelensky to the White House on three separate occasions, each time without any preconditions. President Trump invited President Zelensky to an in-person meeting on their initial April 21 call.

Michael Purpura: (17:37)

When you're settled in and ready, I'd like to invite you to the White House.

Michael Purpura: (17:42)

On may 29, the week after President Zelensky's inauguration, President Trump sent a congratulatory letter, again, inviting President Zelensky to the White House.

Michael Purpura: (17:55)

As you prepare to address the many challenges facing Ukraine, please know that the American people are with you and are committed to helping Ukraine realize its vast potential. To help show that commitment, I would like to invite you to meet with me at the White House in Washington DC as soon as we can find a mutually convenient time.

Michael Purpura: (18:18)

Then on July 25th President Trump personally invited President Zelensky to participate in a meeting for a third time.

Michael Purpura: (18:27)

Whenever you would like to come to the White House, feel free to call, give us a date and we'll work that out, I look forward to seeing you.

Michael Purpura: (18:35)

That's three separate invitations for a meeting, all made without any preconditions. During this time and behind the scenes, the White House was working diligently to schedule a meeting between the presidents at the earliest possible date.

Michael Purpura: (18:56)

Tim Morrison, whose responsibilities included helping arrange head of state visits to the White House or other head of state meetings, testified that he understood that arranging the White House visit with President Zelensky was a [do out 00:06:09] that came from the president.

Michael Purpura: (19:13)

The House Managers didn't mention the work that the White House was doing to schedule the meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky, did they? Why not?

Michael Purpura: (19:26)

Scheduling a presidential meeting takes time. Mr. Morrison testified that his directorate, which was just one of several, had a dozen schedule requests in with the president for meetings with foreign leaders that we were looking to land and Ukraine was but one of those requests. Due to both presidents' busy schedules, according to Mr. Morrison, it became clear that the earliest opportunity for the two presidents to meet would be in Warsaw at the beginning of September.

Michael Purpura: (20:04)

The entire notion that a bilateral meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky was somehow conditioned on a statement about investigations is completely defeated by one straightforward fact, a bilateral meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky was planned for September 1 in Warsaw, the same Warsaw meeting we were just discussing, without the Ukrainians saying a word about investigations. As it turned out, President Trump was not able to attend the meeting in Warsaw because of Hurricane Dorian, President Trump asked Vice President Pence to attend in his place.

Michael Purpura: (20:50)

But even that scheduling glitch did not put off their meeting for long. President Trump and President Zelensky met at the next available date, September 25, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. As President Zelensky himself has said, there were no preconditions for his meeting with President Trump. Those are his words. No conditions.

Michael Purpura: (21:15)

So you're probably wondering, how could the House Managers claim that there was a quid pro quo for a meeting with President Trump when the two presidents actually did meet without President Zelensky announcing any investigations? Well, the House Managers moved the goalposts again, they claimed that the meeting couldn't be just an in-person meeting with President Trump, what it had to be was a meeting at the Oval Office and in the White House, that's nonsense.

Michael Purpura: (21:51)

Putting to one side the absurdity of the House Managers trying to remove a duly elected President of the United States from office because he met a world leader in one location versus another. This theory has no basis in fact.

Referring once again to Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland's handing down of the Opinion of the Court in the 1936 case of _United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp_. Justice Sutherland wrote:

...In this vast external realm [the realm of foreign affairs], with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the **President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation**.

He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. **Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it**.

ARTICLE II - _The Executive Branch_ ; Section 3 - _State of the Union, Convening Congress_ , of the United States Constitution stipulates: "...he [the President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers..."

It is the President who receives public Ministers – which means it is his duty and at his discretion who to meet with, when and where. Defense Counsel Purpura is referring to that basic fact of the Constitution; and he notes the manifest absurdity of impeaching a President on the basis of his having met with the foreign President just after the Ukraine President's speech to the U.N. General Assembly, instead of on the lawn of the White House rose garden or inside the Oval Office.

* * * * *

That above presentation by Defense Counsel explains, and discredits the thrust of the phony allegations put forth in Impeachment Article I. It had falsely been alleged that crucial military aid to Ukraine had been withheld on condition that the Zelenskyy administration develop information smearing the character and credibility of Joe Biden or his son.

But critical the military aid referred to hadn't been withheld at all – the accusation was another complete fabrication.

It was already known to the authors when formulating the Lower House Articles of Impeachment; that no military aid as such had been withheld; and that announcements concerning the Ukraine Government conducting investigation of the Bidens had never been made; nor, as testimony under oath revealed, had any been contemplated.

The accusers are the archetype of the gang of opportunistic zealot rumor mongers hastening towards the edge, anxious to fish and gain from troubled waters they'd stirred. Bristling and indignant that unfavorable interest might be drawn to their elite front-running 2020 presidential candidate; they swore themselves a pact to defend – and so, settled conclusively to fix and maintain, for the sustained duration, public scrutiny upon the unfortunate recipient of their industrial affections and protection.

Apparently the strain would have been too great for the accusers' shared maliciously paranoid sensibilities to bear – the strain of taking the risk of allowing to fall by the wayside un-remarked and unremembered Trump's mere mention, during the course of a private conversation, of son Hunter Biden's already somewhat well-known association with Burisma.

This affront; that the proprietary name of the son of Obama's former vice-President, along with the famous name of Joe Biden itself, had been uttered in a private and diplomatically protected conversation was not to be countenanced; it demanded full vengeful reprisal with a view towards repatriating Joe's undisputed reputation. And so they decided to "criminalize" the conversation after a fashion.

And if the thing weren't criminal, then maybe the private discussion between Zelenskyy and Trump was a sort of crime against the public – a seditious conspiracy of a kind; as had been asserted in Impeachment Article I:

...President Trump abused the powers of the Presidency in a manner that compromised the national security of the United States and undermined the integrity of the United States democratic process...

The accusers moved to make of the matter a federal case without merit; and in so doing, prolonged the objects of the affront (Joe and Hunter) as front page headline news for several months all the better to alert private civilians who hadn't yet heard of the ruckus; so that many who otherwise wouldn't have known could have a chance to catch their breath in the sanctuary of their own domiciles that a connection had been made between clean living son Hunter and a corrupt foreign corporate entity.

Child of woe presidential candidate Joe Biden for his part inauspiciously endorsed the stratagem that tied him to the debacle which was destined to provide more media coverage of his or his son's association with _Burisma Holdings_ than Trump probably could ever have conceived mustering.

The early returns on the impeachment venture are well known. Biden entered into the Democratic Party presidential primaries with an unbeatable lead. Since the Senate Trial, in the events of the early primaries, he had fallen terrifically behind those who formerly couldn't on average get close enough to eat his dust.

Biden's circumstantial self-sacrifice for the greater good fortune of the Party provided the means for the political assault on the character of the Trump administration and the spiteful personal attack endeavoring to taint Trump's integrity; the integrity or the "sanity" of the unappreciative madman, who had pulled the United States out of the expediency of the Iran nuclear weapons trade agreement and sent an historic arms specialists' aspiration spiraling into disrepair.

The impeachment spectacle was the attention-getter; pointing to how Trump simply was not to be trusted in his approach to international machination;

With the big international machination issue of the day on everyone's mind being Iran; and with it the said Iran Nuclear weapons deal of preeminent central concern; then this was, is the gnarly business issue the candidates demonstrably have pinned their hopes on as the spiked scourge destined to deflate the promise or threat of another four years of liveliest Trump tenure.

So with that I'll lay out what was asserted on the issue in the Iowa Democratic Party Primary – samples of grasping politicians promising the world, and as always with nothing to give and not knowing how:

Pro-nuke pawn Buttigieg is asserting the same lie as many in Congress, that Trump's having ignored the law a couple of times under pressure from congressional Democrats is tantamount to an "admission" that the deal is "working."

Pete Buttigieg: (23:47)

In order to get that done, we've got to work with our partners. The Iran nuclear deal, the technical term for it was the JCPOA, that first letter J stood for joint. We can't do this alone. Even less so now after everything that has happened, which is why it will be so critically important to engage leaders, including a lot of new leaders emerging around the world and ensure that we have the alliances we need to meet what I believe is not just an American goal, but a widely shared goal around the world, to ensure that Iran does not become a nuclear armed country.

Abby Phillip [moderator]: (24:21)

Mayor Buttigieg to be clear, would you allow Iran to become a nuclear power? Yes or no?

[What's he supposed to do; say yes? It's questions feeding media spotlight give-away time.]

Pete Buttigieg: (24:26)

No. Our security depends on ensuring that Iran does not become nuclear. And by the way, we've got a lot other challenges with nuclear proliferation around the world. Despite this President's coziness with Vladimir Putin, we actually seem to be further away from being able to work with Russia on things like the renewal of START. We've got to move toward less, not more nuclear danger, whether it is from States, from stateless potential terrorist actors or anywhere else around the world.

Bernie Sanders: (11:07)

... what we need to do is have an international coalition. We cannot keep acting unilaterally. As you know, the nuclear deal with Iran was worked on with a number of our allies. **We have got to undo what Trump did, bring that coalition together and make sure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon**.

Joe Biden: (11:33)

I was part of that deal to get the nuclear agreement with Iran, bringing together the rest of the world and including some of the folks who aren't friendly to us and it was working. It was working, it was being held tightly. There was no movement on the part of the Iranian government to get closer to a nuclear weapon. And look what's happened, he went ahead and it was predictable from the day he pulled out of the agreement, Trump, what exactly would happened. We're now isolated. We're in a situation where our allies in Europe are making a comparison between the United States and Iran, saying both ought to stand down, making a moral equivalence. We have lost our standing in the region, we have lost the support of our allies. The next President has to be able to pull those folks back together, re-establish our alliances and insist that Iran go back into the agreement, which I believe with the pressure applied as we put on before we can get done.

Abby Phillip: (24:56)

Thank you Mayor Buttigieg. Senator Klobuchar, if you become President, it's very possible there won't be an Iran nuclear deal for the United States to rejoin. Given that, how would you prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon?

Amy Klobuchar: (25:08)

I would start negotiations again and I won't take that as a given, given that our European partners are still trying to hold the agreement together. My issue is that because of the actions of Donald Trump, we are in a situation where they are now starting, Iran is starting to enrich uranium again, in violation of the original agreement. So what I would do is negotiate, I would bring people together just as President Obama did years ago, and I think that we can get this done. But you have to have a President that sees this as a number one goal. And an answer to the original question you asked the mayor, **I would not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. And then you have to get an agreement in place**.

Amy Klobuchar: (25:54)

I think there are changes you can make to the agreement, better sunsets and changes to the inspections, but overall that is what we should do. And I am the one person on this debate stage, on the first night of the very first debate, when we were asked what we saw as the biggest threat to our world, I said China on the economy, but I said Iran because of Donald Trump. Because I feared that exactly what happened would happen, enrichment of uranium, escalation of tensions, leaving frayed relations with our allies. **We can bring them back, understanding this is a terrorist regime that we cannot allow to have a nuclear weapon**.

The same general message of the candidates was delivered in the New Hampshire Primary – but I don't think it necessary to belabor the point. So I'll leave it with the above as example.

* * * * *

Chapter 5  
– Proper Quorum; or Odium –

So what is up with all this? Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi falls out of bed one morning and says: "Hey fun; let's have an impeachment party!" She rounds up the boys who've already let it be known they've got a hankering...

...Or maybe it was the other way around – some of the bright fellows came crawling from under their respective rocks and got together to go knocking on her door with a "Are we good for it?! How about you – you ready?"

Whichever way it got urged first, it took only the word of the Honorable House Speaker Herself to get things underway – and with that, these in-a-jiffy motivated no balking baked in cheese rolls had it set up automatically to start calling people at their house; officiating the invitation about how you'd better show up and by the way, write yourself some showpiece good opening statement material to be deliverable at the time penciled in on the lower right hand corner of the showpiece subpoena because...

Now you, yes _you_ just got handed one of these requests to Stand and Deliver; and this order is made _under what and by whose authority_ you might ask?

On second thought, often one might not feel secure getting prompt about putting in a request for such forbidden knowledge from the unauthorized committee bureau of uncertain foreclosure. Sounding out wrong asking for a show of credentials could mean getting pegged on some contumacy charge and winding up in solitary dieting on hard tack salted-down biscuit and tap water or something. Who knows the extent they'll try to make your life not worth living were some unauthorized committee approved squealer to suggest that there's been some potential stepping out of line on your part.

The question stands however: can a shrill hysterical House Speaker simply summon up a cabal of three or four guys; pull them away from the regularly congressionally scheduled typical routine manner of goofing off; with the tearing of the pages out of the Congressional Record so we can see who can float the paper airplane the furthest from the dais...

Can just any old shrill vindictive mouthful of a Speaker simply pull a few guys out of class; remove these erstwhile two-bit ordinaries to the higher plane status of being the suddenly most feared little gang of national attention grabbing interlocutors on a mission to impeach the President of this great nation?

They say she can.

They say: "Oh but the Constitution says: 'The House of Representatives shall have the _sole_ Power of Impeachment.'" And they repeat the mantra over and over as if it were the be-end of all enlightenment.

But the Constitution says:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article VI - Debts, Supremacy, Oaths

[Clause 2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, **any Thing in the Constitution** or Laws of any State **to the Contrary** _notwithstanding_.

And the Constitution says:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article 1 - The Legislative Branch

*Section 5 - Membership, Rules, Journals, Adjournment

[First Clause] Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and **a Majority** of each **shall constitute a Quorum to do Business** ; but **a smaller number may adjourn** from day to day, **and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members** , in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

What is Ordained in the Constitution shows up the promiscuous claim of the grasping charlatan House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and her trollopy Lower House acolyte minions as false. The cabal sought to get away with another near version of the formidable McCarthy era prolonged Senate inquisition scam – when interlocutors got to feeling really big of themselves calling people out and scaring the tarnation out of everybody 'cause there's no recourse in sight and you've got to show up before the audience just to let everybody know _notorious you_ is not sporting red pajamas underneath the superhero tights you hide under your outer gear daily wear. The Constitution Ordained by the People tells Nancy Pelosi she is not empowered on her only under OUR Constitution to enact her personal vendetta business of staging a political election year theatrical farce – and her opportunist minions are not authorized to pretend she is. They all knew compelling witness testimony under the circumstances wasn't legitimate. Why didn't she just go ahead and call for a vote on it like any rational responsible person in her position person should do?

**Of the Old Country English system** : it used to be such that a few big shots could just start with Parliamentary business when no one else was around looking to see it. Next thing you know you're the last to hear that the whole system's gone underground, completely changed direction on account of the numbered few peers moving furniture around unannounced, changing the floor plan on their own. And watch out because soon as you put your socks on you could be first to trip over something not usually found in the way; and yesterday's shallots are today's potatoes and what was two shillings now goes for four, and all that with an added tax on browsing make you no mistake about it.

That's the way it truly was back when.

Hence the earlier British example gives one good reason* for the requirement of a majority quorum being necessary to have it be recognized as legitimate any business conducted in either House. Without that there's no binding legitimate business at all under discussion by the few party goers still sitting around after hours chewing the fat. All what any activity undertaken without a quorum amounts to at best, is just shooting the breeze with a chance to get a response on some maybe good constructive ideas. Or at worst as in this case, it becomes a self-commissioned usurpation when whatever discussed then put into action without quorum is pretended as an authoritative binding determination.

*[Another reason was that without the requirement of a majority quorum – some States' could easily be shut out of legislative determinations. ~ Author]

The impeachment of a President was once thought to be a top priority kind of business; and it's still not necessarily smiled upon for a few guys to on their own gather snickering in a corner with a "hey, let's toss the Government out on its ear today... the nation will be cheerfully grateful and accept whatever we decide on account of us having bravely met with the challenge;"

The un-condoned cabal's act of issuing worthless counterfeit paper resembling pretend subpoenas; that was in fact a successful media attention grabber – but as far as authorizing any legitimate enforceable power to compel testimony – the tactic of tiny group going off on its own to rule the nation isn't as functional as it once was like to be in the Hail Britannia of some long time ago yesteryear.

Trump said he wasn't going to play along with the unlawful political theatre show stopper – and again, the whole charade was illegitimate and would remain unenforceable by constitutional standards until such time as the entire Congress came together for a vote on the subject.

Nevertheless to spite all, the impeachment cotillion carried on in the style of the famous _banditti_ from the film classic, _Treasure of the Sierra Madre_ whose response to character Fred Dobb's (Humphrey Bogart's) request to see some identification, was:

"Badges? Badges! We don't got no badges...we don't need no stinkin' badges! We're Federales! We don't need no stinkin' badges!"

And expressing that notion in their own way; the impeachment cotillion set about without the necessary authority collecting people – calling people up at their house or wherever they could catch them doing something at; and pulling people away from the peaceful gold fish feeding time all on account those some few number of tawdry charlatan politicians felt they'd got the axe to grind so righteously – and it was so important they do so _toot sweet_ immediately there wouldn't be any need to call up a quorum to vote in favor of anything even vaguely trying to define what a fair impersonation of a legitimate fact finding venture might look like.

Also, get this, included along with all that grabbing people up; was this bit about how those unfortunates summoned to get crab apple glared at – also weren't allowed to bring Counsel along to the picnic so to maybe help keep them from getting chewed up too bad in a brawl.

And that partisan behavior on the part of the activist promoters is what is supposed to pass for representative government and Bill of Rights styled Due Process in the U.S.A. of today. Now it's any handful of flustered bad product results of specifically shamed voting districts get to overturn the fact of the Constitution any day of the week big thanks that we're so lucky.

Trump threw the predictable sportsman's fit with the Lower House giving his administration the bad business like that. He told his people to forget it; nobody has to cooperate with that unkind style of wanton monkey business guff.

With that sort of response coming from the Executive, the illegitimate non-standard committee went bonkers screaming to the news media outlets about "Obstruction." This became the scripted outline basis for Article II which has sold so well in some favorite quadrant sectors.

Okay, so there's some background for you gentle readers. But let's remember in the following coming up; that the charge is " _Obstruction of Congress_." That's the topic of the brouhaha discussed here; and Counsel for Defense has much to say about it. It's in the public record, and it's long. Therefore I present excerpts from Defense Counsel Statements of Senate Impeachment Trial Day Seven following:

Ken Starr: (44:15)

With all due respect to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and all of her abilities and her vast experience, under our constitution, she was powerless to do what she purported to do. As has been said now time and again, especially throughout the fall, the Constitution does entrust the **sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives** , **but that's the House. It's 435 members elected from across the constitutional republic**. Not [the] one, no matter how able she may be. In the people's house, every congressperson gets a vote. We know the concept. One person, one vote.

Ken Starr: (45:12)

More generally, the president, as I've reviewed the record, has consistently and scrupulously followed the advice and counsel of the Justice Department, and in particular the office of legal counsel. He's been obedient.

...many of you have had your own experiences professionally with that office, is staffed with lawyers of great ability. It has a reputation for superb work. It has done such thoughtful work in both Democratic and Republican administrations. And the office is now headed by a brilliant lawyer who served as a law clerk to Justice Anthony Kennedy. The House may disagree with the guidance provided to the president by that office. The House frequently does disagree. **But for the president to follow the guidance of the Department of Justice with respect to an inter-branch legal and constitutional dispute cannot reasonably be viewed as an obstruction, and most emphatically not as an impeachable offense**.

Moving next to Attorney Patrick Philbin who addresses the bulk of the Article II "Obstruction" charge.

Patrick Philbin Defense Argument

Patrick Philbin: (00:00)

Mr. Chief justice, senators, majority leader McConnell, minority leader Schumer. The other day as we opened our presentation, I touched on two areas, some of the due process violations that characterize the proceedings in the house and some of the fundamental mischaracterizations and errors that underpin House Democrats charge of obstruction. And today I'll complete the presentation on those points to round out some of the fundamentally unfair procedure that was used in the house and its implications for this proceeding before you now. And also address in detail the purported charges of obstruction in the second article of impeachment. On due process, there are three fundamental errors that infected the proceedings in the house. The first is, as I explained on Saturday, the impeachment inquiry was unauthorized and unconstitutional from the beginning. No committee of the house has the power to launch an inquiry under the house's impeachment power unless the house itself has taken a vote to give that authority to a committee.

Patrick Philbin: (01:14)

I noted that in cases such as Rumely versus the United States and the United States versus Watkins, the Supreme Court has set out these principles, general principles derived from the constitution, which assigns authority to each chamber of the legislative branch, to the house and to the Senate, but not to individual members or to subcommittees. For an authority of the house to be transferred to a committee. The house has to vote on that. The DC circuit has distilled the principles from those cases. This way, to issue a valid subpoena, a committee or subcommittee must conform strictly to the resolution establishing its investigatory powers. That was the problem here. There was no such resolution. There was no vote from the house authorizing the issuance of subpoenas under the impeachment power. So **this inquiry began with nearly two dozen invalid subpoenas**. The speaker had the house proceed on nothing more than a press conference in which she purported to authorize committees to begin an impeachment ... under the constitution she lacked that authority.

Patrick Philbin: (02:25)

... So we began this process with unauthorized subpoenas that imposed no compulsion on the executive branch to respond with documents or witnesses...

Patrick Philbin: (13:16)

...In the second article House Democrats are trying to impeach the President for resisting legally defective demands for information by asserting established legal defenses and immunities based on legal advice from the department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel.

In essence, the approach here is that House Democrats are saying when we demand documents, the executive branch must comply immediately and the assertions of privilege or defenses to our subpoenas are further evidence of obstruction.

Patrick Philbin: (14:33)

We don't have to go through the constitutionally mandated accommodations process to work out an acceptable solution with the executive branch. We don't have to go to the courts to establish the validity of our subpoenas. At one point manager Schiff said that anything that makes the house even contemplate litigation is evidence of obstruction.

Instead, the house claims they can jump straight to impeachment. What this really means in this case is that they're saying for the President to defend the prerogatives of his office to defend constitutionally grounded principles of executive branch privileges or immunities is an impeachable offense...

Patrick Philbin: (15:39)

As professor Turley testified before, the house judiciary committee basing impeachment on this obstruction theory would itself be an abuse of power by Congress. And I'd like to go through that and unpack and explain some of that and I'll start by outlining ... what Trump administration actually did in response to subpoenas because there are three different actions, three different legally based assertions for resisting different subpoenas that the Trump administration made. And I pointed out on Saturday, there has been this constant refrain from the House Democrats that there was just blanket defiance, blanket obstruction as if it were unexplained obstruction. Just we won't cooperate without more. And that's not true. There were very specific legal grounds provided and each one was supported by an opinion from the Department of Justice's office of legal counsel.

Patrick Philbin: (16:41)

So the first is executive branch officials declined to comply with subpoenas that had not been authorized. And that's the point I made at the beginning. There was no vote from the house without a vote from the house. The subpoenas that were issued were not authorized. And I pointed out that in an October 18th letter from the white house counsel, that specific ground was explained and wasn't just from the white house council. There were other letters on the screen now as of October 15th letter from OMB, which explained, absent a delegation by a house rule or a resolution of the house, none of your committees has been delegated jurisdiction to conduct an investigation pursuant to the impeachment power under article one, section two of the constitution. And the letter went on to explain that legal rationale. Not blanket defiance. There are specific exchanges of letters explaining these legal grounds for resisting.

The second ground. The second principle that the Trump administration asserted was that some of these subpoenas purported to require the President's senior advisors, his close advisors to testify following at least 50 years of precedent.

Patrick Philbin: (17:58)

The Department of Justice's office of legal counsel, advised the three senior advisors to the President, the acting white house chief of staff, the legal advisor to the national security council, and the deputy national security advisor. Were absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony. And based on that advice from the office of legal counsel, the President directed those advisors not to testify. Administrations of both political parties have asserted this immunity since the 1970s. President Obama asserted it as to the director of office of political strategy and outreach. President George W. Bush asserted it as to his former counsel and to his white house chief of staff. President Clinton asserted it as to two of his counsels. President Reagan asserted it as to his counsel Fred Fielding and President Nixon asserted it. This is not something that was just made up recently.

Patrick Philbin: (19:03)

There's a decades long history of the Department of Justice providing the opinion that senior advisors to the president are immune from compelled congressional testimony. And it's the same principle that was asserted here. And there are important rationales behind this immunity. One is that the president's most senior advisors are essentially his alter egos. And allowing Congress to subpoena them and compel them to come testify would be tantamount to allowing Congress to subpoena the president and force him to come testify. But that under the separation of powers would not be tolerable. Congress could no more do that with the president THAN the president could force members of Congress to come to the White House and answer to him.

Patrick Philbin: (19:49)

There's also a second, an important rationale behind this immunity and that relates to executive privilege. The immunity protects the same interests that underlie executive privilege. The Supreme Court has recognized executive privilege that protects the confidentiality of communications with the president and deliberations within the executive branch is as the Court put it in the United States v. Nixon, "The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution."

Patrick Philbin: (20:25)

So the Supreme Court has recognized the executive needs this privilege to be able to function. It's rooted in the separation of powers...

Patrick Philbin: (21:02)

And why does it matter? It matters because the Supreme Court has explained the fundamental principle behind executive privilege is that it's necessary to have confidentiality and communications in deliberations in order to have good and worthwhile deliberations in order to have people provide their candid advice to the president. Because if they knew what they were going to say was going to be on the front page of the Washington Post the next day or the next week, they wouldn't tell the president what they actually thought. If you want to have good decision-making, there has to be that zone of confidentiality.

Patrick Philbin: (21:45)

And this is the way the Supreme Court put it, "Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks, may will temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decision- making process." That was also from United States v. Nixon. So those are exactly the interests that are protected by having senior advisors to the president be immune from compelled congressional testimony. Because once someone is compelled to sit in the witness seat and start answering questions, it's very hard for them to protect that privilege. To make sure that they don't start revealing something that was discussed.

Patrick Philbin: (22:27)

So for a small circle of those close to the president for the past 40 to 50 years, administrations of both parties have insisted on this principle. Now, the other night, the House managers, when we were here very late last week, they suggested that executive privilege was a distraction and Manager Nadler called it nonsense. Not at all. It is a principal recognized by the Supreme Court, a constitutional principle grounded in the separation of powers. They also asserted that this immunity has been rejected by every court that has addressed it as if to make it seem that lots of courts have addressed this. They've all said that this theory just doesn't fly. That's not accurate. That's not true. In fact, in most instances, once the president asserts immunity for a senior adviser, the accommodations process between the executive branch and the legislature begins and there's usually some compromise to allow perhaps some testimony not in an open hearing but in a closed hearing or in a deposition perhaps to provide some other information instead of live testimony, there's a compromise.

Patrick Philbin: (23:44)

But the only two times it's been litigated, district courts, it is true rejected the immunity. One was in a case involving a former counsel to President George W. Bush, Harriet Myers. The district court rejected the immunity, but immediately on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stayed that decision. And that decision means, to stay that district court decision, that the appellate court thought there was a likelihood of success on appeal, that the executive branch might succeed or at a minimum that the issue of immunity presented questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation. So the first decision was stayed.

The second district court decision is still being litigated right now. It's the McGahn case that the House has brought trying to get testimony from former counsel to President Trump, Donald McGahn. And that case was just argued in the D.C. Circuit on January 3rd. So there is no established law suggesting that this immunity somehow has been rejected by the courts. It's still being litigated right now. And it is an immunity that is a standard principle asserted by every administration of both parties for the past 40 years. Asserting that principle can't be treated as obstruction of Congress.

Patrick Philbin: (25:14)

The third action that the president took, the administration took, related to the fact that House Democrats subpoenas' tried to shut out executive branch counsel, agency council, from the depositions of executive branch employees. Now the Office of Legal Counsel concluded the congressional committees may not bar agency counsel from assisting an executive branch witness without contravening the legitimate prerogatives of the executive branch. And an attempt to enforce the subpoena while barring agency counsel, "Would be unconstitutional." The President relied on that legal advice here. As Judge Starr pointed out, the President was consulting with the Department of Justice, receiving advice from the very respected Office of Legal Counsel, and following that advice about the constitutional prerogatives of his office and the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch.

Patrick Philbin: (26:19)

Again, administrations of both political parties have recognized the important role that agency council plays. In the Obama Administration, the Office of Legal Counsel stated that exclusion of agency counsel, " _could potentially undermine the president's constitutional authority to consider and assert executive privilege where appropriate_." So why is agency counsel important? As I tried to explain the executive privilege of confidentiality for communications with the president for internal deliberative communications of the executive branch. Those are important legal rights. They're necessary for the proper functioning of the executive branch and agency counsel is essential to protect those legal rights. When an individual employee goes in to testify, he or she might not know, probably would not know, where is the line for what's covered by executive privilege or deliberative process privilege? Not things that employees necessarily know.

Patrick Philbin: (27:21)

And their personal counsel, even if they're permitted to have their personal counsel with them. Same thing. Most attorneys for personal for employees don't know the finer points of executive branch confidentiality interests, of deliberative process privilege. And it's also not their job to protect those interests. They're the personal lawyer for the employee who's testifying, trying to protect that employee from potential legal consequences. We usually have lawyers to protect legal rights. So it makes sense when there is an important legal and constitutionally based right at stake, the executive privilege, that there should be a lawyer there to protect that right for the executive branch. And that's the principle that the Office of Legal Counsel endorsed.

Patrick Philbin: (28:13)

This also doesn't raise any insurmountable problems for congressional investigations or finding information. In fact, just as recently as April 2019 the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform reached accommodation with the Trump Administration after the administration had declined to make someone available for a deposition because of the lack of agency counsel. And that issue was worked out an accommodation was made and there was some testimony provided in other circumstances. So it doesn't always result in the kind of escalation that was seen here straight to impeachment. The accommodation process can work things out. **House Democrats have pointed to a House rule** that excludes agency council, but **of course a House rule cannot override a constitutional privilege**.

Patrick Philbin: (29:12)

...The idea that asserting defenses and immunities, legal defenses and immunities in response to subpoenas, acting on advice of the Department of Justice is an impeachable offense is absurd and it is dangerous for our government. Let me explain why.

Patrick Philbin: (29:48)

...first and foremost because in a government of laws, asserting privileges and rights to resist compulsion is not obstruction. It's a fundamental right in [Bordernircher 00:30:04] v. Hayes, the Supreme Court explained, " _To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an agent of the state to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is patently unconstitutional_." ...

Patrick Philbin: (30:54)

...Minority Leader Schumer in the Clinton impeachment expressed the same view:

Charles Schumer: (31:12)

To suggest that any subject of an investigation, much less the President with [inaudible 00:31:18] to the institution of the presidency is abusing power and interfering with an investigation by making legitimate legal claims using due process and asserting constitutional rights is beyond serious consideration.

Patrick Philbin: (31:33)

And that was exactly correct then and it's exactly correct now. Now more important than simply the principle that asserting rights cannot be considered obstruction, when the rights the president is asserting are based on executive privilege, when they are constitutionally grounded principles that are essential for the separation of powers and protecting the institution of the office of the presidency. To call that obstruction is to turn the Constitution on its head, defending the separation of powers cannot be deemed an impeachable offense without destroying the Constitution...

Patrick Philbin: (38:03)

...And the House Committee even put it this way in their report... " _The House is the judge of its own powers because_ ," what they said was quote, " _The Constitution gives the House the final word_ ," end quote. That's on page 154 of the House Judiciary Committee report and what that is essentially saying, they point to the fact that article one, section two, it gives the House the sole power of impeachment and they claimed that because it's the sole power of impeachment, the courts have no role. The House is the final word.

Patrick Philbin: (38:44)

It's the judge of its own powers, but that's contrary to The Constitutional design. There is no power that is unchecked in The Constitution. The sole power of impeachment given to the House simply means that that power is given solely to the House, not anywhere else. The Constitution does not say that the power of impeachment is the paramount power that makes all other Constitutional rights and privileges and prerogatives of the other branches fall away...

Patrick Philbin: (42:19)

...Now, the House Democrats have given a few different justifications for this approach, but I would submit, none can be reconciled with The Constitution. They say that if we cannot impeach the president for this obstruction, then the president is above the law, not so.

As I think I pointed out, the president is staying within the law, asserting the law, relying on the legal advice from the Department of Justice to make his arguments based on long recognized constitutional principles and indeed is making the fundamental point with respect to the subpoenas that its Congress that is not above the law.

Patrick Philbin: (43:03)

It's the House has to follow the law as well. It has to issue valid subpoenas. And if the law isn't followed, those subpoenas are null and void and the executive doesn't have to comply with them.

The House Democrats say that they shouldn't go to the courts because the courts have no role in impeachment. I think I've pointed out that the House Democrats can't say that ... Just because of the provision of the sole power of impeachment, that it's the paramount power and that no other branch plays any role in providing a check on how that power is exercised...

Patrick Philbin: (44:14)

...The other day, one of the House managers actually said on the floor of the Senate that they had to get moving. They couldn't wait for litigation because they had to impeach the president before the election. That's not a valid reason to not pursue litigation in the courts. And I think it's relevant to bear in mind, what sort of delay are we talking about?

...when there is urgency to the case, when there is a reason for it, there can be expedition in the courts and a decision can be had in a timely manner. And the one case that actually arose from these impeachment proceedings, it was the House that derailed the case.

Patrick Philbin: (45:52)

This was the case involving Deputy National Security Advisor, Charlie Kupperman. Because when he received a subpoena, he went to court and asked the court for a declaratory judgment explaining what his obligations were. Should he take the directive from the president that he was immune and not go? Or should he obey the subpoena? Now, in that case, he filed suit on October 25th. The court, within a few days, set an expedited briefing schedule, but the House withdrew the subpoena on November 5th just 11 days later in order to moot the case.

Patrick Philbin: (46:27)

...I think litigation is a viable avenue along with the accommodation process as a first step. Then if the House believes that it can go to court and wants to litigate the jurisdiction and litigate the validity of its subpoenas, that's also available to them. But impeachment as the first step, doesn't make any sense. And I should point out in part when the House managers say they didn't have time to litigate, they didn't have time to go to the courts, but they now come to this chamber and say, " _This chamber should issue some more subpoenas. This chamber, she gets some witnesses that we didn't bother to fight about_."

Patrick Philbin: (47:10)

What do you think will happen then? That there won't be similar assertions of privilege and immunity? That there wouldn't be litigation about that? Again, this goes back to the point that I made. If you put your imprimatur on a process that was broken and say, "Yes, that was a great way to run things. This was a great package to bring here and we'll clean up the mess and issue subpoenas and try to do all the work that wasn't done,"...

Patrick Philbin: (47:38)

...that doesn't make sense for this body. Proper way to have things handled is to have the House, if it wants to bring an impeachment here ready for trial, it has to do the investigation. The information it wants to get, if there's going to be resistance, that has to be resolved and it has to be ready to proceed. Not transfer the responsibility to this chamber to do the work that hasn't been done.

Patrick Philbin: (48:10)

They also assert that President Trump's assertion of these privileges is somehow different because it's unprecedented and it's categorical. Well, it's unprecedented perhaps in the sense that there was a broad statement that a lot of subpoenas wouldn't be complied with, but that's because it was unprecedented for the House to begin these proceedings without voting to authorize a committee to issue the subpoenas. That was the first unprecedented step. That's what had never happened before in history. So of course the response to that would be in some sense unprecedented.

Patrick Philbin: (48:47)

And as the President simply pointed out that without that vote there were no valid subpoenas. And there have also been categorical refusals in the past. President Truman, when the House Committee on un-American activities in 1948 issued subpoenas to his administration, issued a directive to the entire executive branch that any subpoena or demand or request for information reports or files of the nature described in those subpoenas shall be respectfully declined on the basis of this directive. And he referred all such inquiries to the office of the President for such response as the President may determined to be in the public interest and the Truman administration responded to none of them.

Patrick Philbin: (49:35)

A last point on the House Democrats claimed that the privileges simply disappear because this is the impeachment power of the House. They've referred a number of times the United States versus Nixon, the Supreme Court decision suggesting that that somehow determines that when you're in impeachment inquiry, executive privilege falls away. Well, that's not true. In fact, United States versus Nixon was not even actually addressing a congressional subpoena.

Patrick Philbin: (50:04)

It was a subpoena from the special prosecutor. And even in that context, the court did not say that executive privilege simply disappears. Instead, this court said, quote, " _It is necessary to resolve these competing interests_ ... _in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch_." And it even held out the possibility that in the field of foreign relations in national security, there might be something approaching an absolute executive privilege, and that's **exactly the field that we're in, in this case; foreign relations and national security matters** ...

Patrick Philbin: (51:23)

...Ultimately, the House Managers argue that all of the problems with their obstruction theory should be brushed aside and the President's assertions of immunities and defenses have to be treated as something nefarious because as Mr Nadler put it, " _Only guilty people try to hide the evidence_."

Patrick Philbin: (51:55)

That's what he said last Tuesday night. And Mr Schiff similarly said in discussing the assertion of the executive branch's constitutional rights that quote, " _The innocent do not act this way_ ," end quote. Really? Is that the principle in the United States of America? That if you assert legal privileges or rights, that means you're guilty?

That the innocent don't assert their rights? That the President can't defend The Constitutional prerogatives of his office? ...

...At bottom, the second article of impeachment comes down to a dispute over a legal issue relating to constitutional limits on the ability of the House to compel information from the executive. No matter how House Democrats try to dress up their charges, a difference of legal opinion does not rise to the level of impeachment.

* * * * *

So what gives with Low House Speaker Pelosi – she couldn't call the mandatory quorum to discuss the issues and proceed to a legitimate vote maybe 'cause she's so sensitive about decorum she wants to avoid possibly stirring up an unpleasant scene?

Whatever the case, the Senate Trial resulting from the Articles drummed up in the House of Representatives turns out to be the ideal launching ground for the next political promotional coup. And the creature partisan movement formerly known as the Democratic Party produces some rugged individualists just chafing under the impediment of the Constitution; those who like to go their own way doing their own thing, thinking their own thoughts – sometimes one of them will discern an advantage others might not guess at when the opportunity comes imperceptivity knocking.

Self-styled privateer emissary to foreign despotism, Connecticut Senator Chris Murphy, proved himself not an exception to the higher standard. Seated inconspicuously, during the Senate trial, somewhere in the enclave niche provided by the taxpayer for gang member remnants making up of the association formerly known as the Democratic Party; the Connecticut Yankee Senator was already thinking and hatching where this could go from here. A surreptitious private meeting with the Foreign Minister of Iran is where – to hear him tell of it. This is Senator Murphy's account of the set up*:

In the middle of the impeachment process, I approached my friend, Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, on the floor of the Senate.

"Ron, are you going to the Munich Security Conference this year?" I asked.

"If the trial ends in time," he replied.

"I have an idea. I think you and I should go see Zelensky on the Friday before the conference. Wouldn't it be important for you and me to go there directly after impeachment, to send a signal that there is no distance between us, or Democrats and Republicans in general, on supporting Ukraine?"

*[The excerpts quoted here, ascribed to Senator Murphy, are self-published by Chris Murphy on February 18, 2020; found at: https://medium.com/@ChrisMurphyCT/behind-the-scenes-of-my-trip-to-ukraine-and-munich-c1398a06ff0b  
Observations and commentary are my own unless otherwise stipulated.]

[There is no copyright infringement reproducing this. The Senator is an Officer of the Federal Government and he's writing in that capacity even if he's not acting in it (as we shall soon learn). The sample presented here is a Public report to the Citizen. As is well known; what he writes in that capacity automatically falls under the public domain.]

So the Munich Security Conference is the great place to rub elbows with newsworthy international personalities we are given to deduce. Senators Murphy and Johnson (Republican) do meet with Zelenskyy – though not at the conference. They fly down to Kyiv (Kiev) to meet with the Ukraine President. After which they return to Munich.

On Saturday Senator Murphy meets with a "Middle East delegation." Murphy doesn't say which nation(s) are represented in this delegation:

My second objective is to make some waves within the large Middle East delegation that is in Munich. Trump's Middle East policy has been an unmitigated disaster...

...I have been invited to sit on a panel of Middle East Foreign Ministers. I am the sole U.S. figure on the panel, and I use the spotlight to make the case that the overriding U.S. interest in the region should not be trying to help Saudi Arabia gain preeminence over Iran, as is the policy priority under Trump.

Our goal instead should be reducing, not ramping up, tensions between these two regional powers, not on trying to make sure one side eventually prevails. No doubt Saudi Arabia is an ally, but they are a deeply imperfect ally, and we should be more conscious about when our interests align with their interests. My comments are provocative, but they are designed to be.

I want the leaders in Munich to understand that _Democrats have a different view_ of the Middle East than Trump — this will be welcome news to some at the conference.

That done and moving on:

As the sun sets in Munich, I have one more mission. For years, I have met on occasion with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, during both the Obama and Trump Administrations...

...I plan to meet Zarif Saturday night in his hotel suite... [15 February 2020]

He did meet with Zarif as he claimed he planned to.

ON 17 FEBRUARY 2020, Mollie Hemingway of " _the Federalist_ " published an article: _Democrat Senator Held Secret Meeting in Munich with Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif_ , which opens with:

Sen. Chris Murphy of Connecticut and other Democratic senators had a secret meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during the Munich Security Conference last week, according to a source briefed by the French delegation to the conference. Murphy's office did not respond to repeated requests for comment by press time.

Senator Murphy published his account of his trip to Munich on the next day, 18 February 2020. What he claims publicly he did or did not speak to Zarif about is something that can't be credited. Murphy was there with others in the meeting and he didn't mention in his account that very important point (as we shall presently see) of mentioning the presence of others.

On 13 February 2020 Senators Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) introduced a bill, Iran Diplomacy Act of 2020 (S.3314) "... _which calls upon the United States and Iran to return to no less than their commitments under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)_ _, also known as the Iran nuclear deal_ ...;"

The submission is noted in the Congressional Record of the day, and on a press release posted on Senator Markey's website on February 19:

Sec. 3. Statement of Policy, of the proposed bill declares:

It is the policy of the United States as follows:

(1) Achieving a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program, one that the United States had in place prior to President Trump's unilateral abrogation from the JCPOA, would represent a meaningful step to preventing a future armed conflict between the United States and Iran, one which would result in the untold loss of life and treasure.

The United States already has a policy regarding nuclear weapons and the transfer of those to a non-nuclear-weapons-State such as Iran – or any State for that matter.

That policy is the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , (the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) – which Security Council Resolution 2231violates in its multiple provisions; and through which the Security Council resolution establishes a system and bureaucracy, the Procurement Working Group with its mandate; to violate the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty on an ongoing basis.

The policy stated in the proposed Senate bill is that of those influential members currently in control of what used to be the Democratic Party – the two policies are distinct opposites. The declared policy of those in control of the national level Democratic Party has nothing to do with the policy of the United States, which they dismiss so lightly and so out of hand; which they so consistently fail to mention and refuse to acknowledge.

They intend to impose their version of "diplomacy;" which is the to return to the by definition criminal contraband weapons profiteering sales scheme with its procedures established to expedite Iranian development of domestic nuclear weapons capabilities under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group;

In their first bullet point, they simultaneously threaten and promise that a return to their weapons profiteering scheme would "... _represent a meaningful step to preventing a future armed conflict between the United States and Iran, one which would result in the untold loss of life and treasure_." It is either their way or catastrophe. But what they really fear is that the matter should be brought before the International Court of Justice; for if that were come to pass, their arms sales speculation scheme would be lost forever. The real terror for those Senators agitating would be if the United States Government sought to correct the misfortune of Obama's Iran weapons trading swindle by bringing petition for justice, remedy and correction before the Court:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVALIDITY, TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF A TREATY

Article 71. Consequences of the Invalidity of a Treaty which Conflicts with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law

1. In the case of a treaty which is void under article 53 [above] the parties shall:

(a) Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law; and.

(b) Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

The Court might rule that in order for the Parties to " _Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law_ ," among other things the Procurement Working Group books on the secreted Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9 or 10/Part 2 nuclear weapons associated inventories must be publicly and openly accounted for. And if Iran refused to comply – the other nations on the other end of sales-in-question would nevertheless be forced to if so Ordered by the Court.

This would be a devastating political embarrassment to those Senators in support of the legislation and who have (as shall presently be reviewed) staunchly supported the Obama weapons swindle from the beginning. They must by necessity continue in their efforts to by all means protect Procurement Working Group records and the Procurement Working Group mandate providing for the ongoing expediting and approving of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2;

And so they declare in their second bullet point under _Section 3_ :

It is the policy of the United States as follows:

(2) While the United States no longer has standing in the Joint Commission [which is in large part comprised of the Procurement Working Group] or the Dispute Resolution mechanism triggered by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on January 14, 2020, it should support good-faith efforts to achieve one or both of the following:

(A) Returning all sides to not less than full compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA and refraining from imposing or threatening to impose economic penalties on France, Germany, or the United Kingdom.

This is a bid to restore to working order Procurement Working Group activity comprised of expediting and approving contraband weapons sales to Iran; activity which has fallen off precipitously under the weight of U.S. imposed sanctions.

They would have these sanctions dropped and Procurement Working Group reinvigorated even while acknowledging the United States "... _no longer has standing in the Joint Commission_ ...;"

This would mean that the United States; as a non-participant without a representative on the Procurement Working Group decision making board – would not have the slimmest chance of guessing what arsenal Iran has acquired under the Procurement Working Group mandated secrecy agreement; or how far advanced is its current weapons development. Iran gets all the liveliest internationally bought latest weapons technology to backwards engineer and train on – and the U.S. gets left in the dark; forced to sit it out on the sidelines waiting for whatever surprise shows up in the field. That's even a worse appeasement of domestic arms supplier interests and of the Islamic Republic of Iran that even Obama bargained for.

The Senators sponsoring the bill don't care. The most important thing is to restore the Iranian weapons market to domestic corporate arms supplier speculative profiteering possibilities. And this can only happen if Trump's sanctions are dropped.

EMILIE MUNSON of " _Middle Town Press_ " wrote an article published Saturday February 22, 2020, titled " _Merkley, Van Hollen joined Murphy in meeting with Iranian leader_." The article reads:

WASHINGTON — Two other Democratic senators participated in a recent meeting held by U.S. Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif.

The meeting received significant attention after President Donald Trump accused Murphy of violating a law that prohibits U.S. citizens from negotiating with foreign nations...

...U.S. Sens. Jeff Merkley of Oregon and Chris Van Hollen of Maryland joined Murphy and Zarif in the Feb. 15 meeting, Senate aides confirmed.

[https://www.middletownpress.com/middletown/article/Merkley-Van-Hollen-joined-Murphy-in-meeting-with-15075287.php#item-85307-tbla-2]

This meeting took place two days after the Senate Bill S.3314, co-authored or co-sponsored by Chris Van Hollen of Zarif meeting fame, was introduced in the Senate.

The Senators certainly weren't there in Munich meeting with Zarif to arrive at a binding settlement. The Senators have no such authority. So maybe they were just showing up at Zarif's Munich centrally located plush appointments to celebrate an occasion of friendly pass on the good news.

That collection of Senators listed as sponsoring the legislation: On 13 February 2020 Senators Edward J. Markey, Dianne Feinstein, Chris Van Hollen, Tammy Duckworth, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren; were all present and voting on the 10th and 11th of September 2015 when neither the 114th Low House or the Senate voted on Resolution 2231 – but instead voted only on the truncated version Obama satisfied himself transmitting to Congress; which was Resolution 2231 Annex A: JCPOA.

(At the time Van Hollen and Duckworth were in the Lower House. The others were all in the Senate.)

Senator Merkley, who also went along for the 15 February 2020 meeting with Zarif; had been present voting in the Senate for the 2015 September vote as well.

All of these influential persons unquestioningly and willingly accepted the crumbs Obama offered them at the time. All of these influential persons advocated with their votes, for passage of the fragment of the deal tendered. None in their mirthful frivolity could be bothered to go looking on the internet for the rest of the deal they now seek to hide from us by persisting in the sham pretense that the Iran nuclear deal is comprised solely of Annex A: JCPOA.

As documented, the JCPOA fragment was rejected in the Lower House and filibustered in the Senate because everyone there knew that even the JCPOA portion splintered off from the Iran nuclear deal would never pass.

And as is documented, the deal stank so bad even audacious Obama wouldn't dare submit it to a vote.

Everyone in that group of Senators knows that the Iran nuclear deal never made it through either House – _never even made it to_ either House. Furthermore, it's not listed in the National Archive as an Executive Order. It's a nullity, it's not an anything in this country – and internationally it can't pass as any legitimate legally enforceable agreement; nor can it pass as a legitimate Security Council resolution.

And yet the Senators, and all those favoring renewed Government participation in activity which violates the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty; a fundamental treaty made under the Authority of the United States and is thereby recognized under Article VI of the United States Constitution as a part of the supreme Law of the Land,

These Senators do so dourly and solemnly blame and threaten that unless the U.S. supports the Obama method of not so surreptitiously arming the Islamic Republic; the nation which famously pledges annihilation of at least one of its neighbors – then catastrophe will be the result.

The Iran nuclear deal is the means for important domestic Corporate Sponsorship weapons interests to make money off Iran, they hope. The salad days of Procurement Working Group sponsored weapons sales to Iran were in 2017 – before Trump finally figured something out about it and pulled the U.S. out. That unbridled heyday period serves as proof of potential.

And the opening of the Iran conventional weapons market this year on 18 October 2020 is clearly a strong motivator prompting the avaricious politicians, so demonstrably eager to earn their Corporate Sponsorship; to vigorously continue in crooked pursuit of the objective.

The words of our earlier President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which he shared with us in his January 1960 farewell as President; to the people of the United States – are most salient at a juncture such as this:

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, and even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, and every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded...

...It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system -- ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

Overall the Impeachment Attempt of the Decade exhibits itself as a study in the implementation of the most cynical style of political ruse.

The accusers got together a false and entirely ridiculous set of allegations and brought these to the Senate for to conduct a Senate impeachment trial fully aware that the assertions were without merit.

Knowing the frivolous and unjustifiable case would lose, they brought their specious, phony allegations to a Senate where the opposition Party held the majority; so that way – when the President was acquitted – they could claim the system as corrupt and that Republicans are banshees; with the expectation on the part of the perpetrator accusers that those of the public who want to believe what they want aren't going to look at the testimony – so anything goes anyway.

Senator Chris Murphy stressed in his own words that he addressed a Middle-East delegation with a statement such as:

...I use the spotlight to make the case that the overriding U.S. interest in the region should not be trying to help Saudi Arabia gain preeminence over Iran, as is the policy priority under Trump...

Our goal instead should be reducing, not ramping up, tensions between these two regional powers, not on trying to make sure one side eventually prevails. ...Saudi Arabia ...is a deeply imperfect ally, and we should be more conscious about when our interests align with their interests.

Evidently our interests don't align with theirs if we are intent on rejoining the international project to arm Iran with Weapons of Mass Destruction capability; to the detriment and chagrin of our "allies" in the region whose interests don't "align" with ours in this respect; especially in that they are targeted more directly by Iran than we are.

It is not Saudi Arabia which Obama sought to endow with nuclear weapons capacity. It is Obama's weapons development project favoring Iran which the pro-proliferation partisans seek to re-enter with their consistent direct lies and lies of omission – and their malign characterizations and misrepresentations ongoing on which they have built their campaign platform.

The rhetoric of the elite now in control of the trampled and strewn dregs of what used to be the Democratic Party plays so well in some sectors of the media.

But Yikes Christopher _Tonto_ – I don't think we're in Connecticut anymore! And foreign policy prospects with a Democratic Party presidency at this point can be presumed a nightmare of disoriented ineffectuality.

The Democrats have shown themselves to be a Party of out of control political finks and snitches. No foreign leader can trust to have a private conversation with any of them without risking the profound political embarrassment of having their words twisted about by just any secret low echelon unelected vindictive partisan who hasn't even heard the conversation in question but nevertheless the word of the anonymous person of unverifiable credentials is elevated to a status of outlandish credibility and respect far exceeding that of a foreign President who – as covered in _Ignoring Zelenskyy_ is unceremoniously called a liar by committee accusers for having refuted the testimony of the anonymous gossip.

And the foreign leader who talks in private to a United States President might be assured that his or her words are going to get twisted around by another one of those American secreted and protected bogies with the hobgoblin gossips forked lying tongue that deserves more U.S. congressional credit than any foreign leader could ever hope to aspire to;

Or the gossiping misrepresentation spewed by the next undercover, hidden away or absconded with poison tongued purveyor of second hand misinformation, anonymous no status little gossipy trouble-making gremlin nobody; could be turned into the basis for another of these congressional vindictively asserted world of sports televised competitive polemical histrionics: – And who needs it!

And the Democratic contenders keep pretending ongoing that the Sunni Arab Nations don't know what is being contemplated by the Democratic Party candidates soaping themselves up for the 2020 White House; and that they haven't caught on to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 provisions dedicated to developing Iranian nuclear weapons capabilities.

And that the Sunni Arab leaderships don't understand the meaning of Democratic Senator Murphy's loudly espoused hogwash in Munich which proclaimed that: the U.S. is trying to make sure neither side eventually prevails – and so it must be construed that this must be the reason why the Democrats want the Procurement Working Group mandate to prevail so that Iran will, with U.S. assistance and support gain a prevailing edge that not any other State in the region had sought or has;

The Democrats pretend that the Sunni Arab leaderships don't understand the nature of Democratic Senator Murphy's loudly espoused hogwash; and that it actually reflects the Democratic Party leadership's menacing and hypocritical promise to grotesquely rebalance weapons class arsenals' balance in the Middle East.

When the Procurement Working Group prevails so shall Saudi Arabia not be enabled by the United States to " _gain preeminence over Iran_ " is effectively the nature of the Murphy correspondence. And it could have been true except until such time as the Saudi Kingdom gets desperately frustrated and decides throw patience and restraint to the wind and buy its nukes from Pakistan; which defensive measure is not a far off probability.

THE MOTIVE BEHIND the frivolous Impeachment publicity stunt becomes more easily identifiable. The attempt to pass a bill forcing reentry into the deal; or dropping sanctions currently preventing U.S. domestic arms suppliers from profiteering from the upcoming opening of the Iranian market in October followed pretty much directly after the Senate Trial.

The Senate Bill S.3314 does reflect that contraband weapons profiteering interests are a paramount preoccupation of the miserably avaricious Corporate Sponsorship sensitive proliferation movement Office Holders and 2020 White House hopefuls;

And Trump's unspoken impeachable offense of pulling the U.S. out of the deal was the real motivation behind the rancorous debacle.

Perhaps it is hoped by the inventors of it that Senate Bill S.3314; the _Iran Diplomacy Act of 2020_ ; building on the momentum of the inevitable bad press the republicans received in acquitting Trump of frivolous accusations; will again stir up ire and resentment against the Republican Senate majority when it too fails a vote.

The Democrats may then decry the Republicans: "See how they are; those lunatics are going to carry us off to war because everyone knows it's either give the Iranian the illegal deal we had in place – or it's To Arms!"

But it doesn't have to be that way if someone in a position of proper authority points out that the President doesn't need an act of Congress to defend treaty by taking the matter to Court;

He already has the act of Congress manifest in the ratification of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ made under the Authority of the United States – the treaty which is recognized in the Constitution as a piece with the supreme Law of the Land which Congress members are Ordained by the People to adhere to.

So the Senate Bill S.3314; _the_ _Iran Diplomacy Act of 2020_ which sets out to violate the treaty just like Obama and the Ministers designed it to – that Bill is superseded by the Constitution which is the Supreme Law of the Land the People have Ordained to supersede and put to rest the avaricious contrivances of whichever creepy corporate sell out members of Congress come along [see Marbury v. Madison (1803)];

And the Executive doesn't need some act Congress to Defend the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ in Court because implementation of the defense of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, a prominent portion of the supreme Law of the Land, is entirely in the hands of the Executive Branch regardless of how much the pernicious and crooked Congress members' leadership of the association once known as the Democratic Party are spoiling to tear down same in the name of the legend of Barack Obama and their personal political ambitions.

But this President Trump who talks so loud seems intimidated by the opposition and doesn't seem to get it that he might not have any choice and the pro-proliferation wing in current control of the Democratic Party might push it too far with this bogus "Iran Diplomacy" cow paddy; and he might not be able to let it all roll off his back like he's accustomed.

But Trump is timid; and he pulled the U.S. out of the deal; and he never explained his reasons why; and he left a vacuum by abdicating the position in that way; and we witness the opportunism that tries to fill the vacuum left behind by silent Mr. Trump.

So we shouldn't forget that ours is purportedly a representative form of Government; and a President is to represent the will of all the People – and the overwhelming majority don't want Iran to be sold the bomb; and the avaricious corporate stooge political proponents of the Iran nuclear deal know it which is why they've had to lie and hide and so avidly misrepresent the deal these last four and a half years.

So it's time for the People en masse to fill up those Executive Branch mailboxes and call upon the Executive Branch to stop fooling around and take the travesty to Court to have the Procurement Working Group books opened (among the other things) – so that way the Government of Iran won't be so smug and hurried to hazard shooting at and seizing shipping in the Gulf and blasting away at Saudi oil refineries as was undertaken last summer 2019. And opportunist politicians won't be so hurried and eager to go around advocating caving in to Iran's threats and belligerent acts because it's going to be front and center in everyone's mind that there's something worse for Iran than getting into a hot war – which they're clearly not afraid of;

And that worse than war is what it feels like ending up on the bad side of a conversation in Court.

* * * * *

There ends the narrative – Appendices follow.

.

[Chapter 6  
– Appendix 1 – The Procurement Working Group and its mandate to expedite Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories](tmp_1547445aa8df85f930070e5e40a52247_KnuFvg.ch.fixed.fc.tidied.stylehacked.xfixed_split_001.html#ref_a06) –

[]

Fundamental United States policy regarding nuclear weapons is established in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty – (NPT)); a treaty developed jointly by the then Soviet Union and the United States – subsequently approved by the Senate and signed into law as a part supreme Law of the Land per 2nd Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution...

The provisions detailing the activities and mandate of the Procurement Working Group are laid out in JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission; a sub-Annex of Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is itself an Annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) – S/RES/2231 (2015) is presented below. Here then, is the authentic, accepted plan for expediting Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons associated assets as put forward by the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel arrangement expediting – beginning with paragraph 6 of Annex IV:

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6. Procurement Working Group

6.1. With the purpose of establishing a procurement channel, the Joint Commission will, ...decide on proposals by states seeking to engage in:

6.1.1. the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and, if the end-use will be for Iran's nuclear programme set out in this JCPOA or other non-nuclear civilian end-use, all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the relevant State determines that they could contribute to activities inconsistent with the JCPOA; and,

6.1.2. the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above ;

6.1.6. Except as decided otherwise by consensus, the Procurement Working Group will meet every three weeks for reviewing the proposals. When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

6.3. Each E3+3 State and Iran will participate in the Procurement Working Group. The High Representative [of the European Union] will serve as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group.

6.4. ... the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:

6.4.1. Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator [of the Joint Commission] will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA. The Procurement Working Group will have up to 30 working days to consider and decide on the proposal.

6.4.3. Each participant in the Procurement Working Group will have to communicate to the Coordinator, within 20 working days, whether it approves or rejects the proposal. The timeline for consideration may be extended for an additional period of 10 working days at the request of a participant of the Procurement Working Group.

6.4.4. The proposal will be recommended for approval as soon as the Coordinator receives formal approvals from all the Procurement Working Group Participants or if, at the end of the 30 working day period, the Coordinator has received no disapprovals from any of the Procurement Working Group Participants. If at the end of the 30 working day period, the proposal has not been recommended for approval, the proposal may, at the request of at least two Working Group Participants within 5 working days, be referred to the Joint Commission, which would decide on approval of the proposal by consensus within 10 working days. Otherwise the proposal will be recommended for disapproval. The disapproving JCPOA participant(s) should provide relevant information regarding the disapproval to the Joint Commission as appropriate, taking into account the need to protect confidential information.

6.4.5. The Coordinator will communicate the recommendation of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council no later than 35 working days, or in case of referral to the Joint Commission no later than 45 working days from the date the Coordinator transmitted the proposal and all necessary supporting information to the Procurement Working Group.

Oddly, the JCPOA itself doesn't mention anything about the Security Council taking part in this decision making process concerning what gets sent to Iran. Effectively the Security Council's role in this matter could be described as, at best, peripheral – but where is there any mention of that peripheral role?

Resolution 2231, section _JCPOA Implementation_ paragraph 16 (not to be confused as part of the Annex A: JCPOA; this section appears towards the beginning of Resolution 2231) tersely mentions the part that the Security Council plays in this decision making process, stipulating that:

16. [the Security Council] _Decides_ , acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to review recommendations of the Joint Commission regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B, and that such recommendations shall be deemed to be approved unless the Security Council adopts a resolution to reject a Joint Commission recommendation within five working days of receiving it;

The description of the Procurement Working Group thus far has reached a certain level of complexity; naturally a flow chart, at this point, is in order to help clarify the process:

It is worth noting that once the determination to violate treaty has been made by the recruits stationed around the Procurement Working Group worktable; the entire body of the Security Council, under this system, has five working days to mount a defense against the violation of treaty endorsed by those recruits.

The Security Council has five days to put forward a proposal to reject the violation of treaty endorsed by the recruits of the institutionalized Procurement Working Group. If one of the five permanent members of the Security Council decides to uphold the violation of treaty recommended by the recruited staff of the Procurement Working Group – and veto any resolution against the Procurement Working Group decision; then the choice of the Procurement Working Group recruits to render the judicial decision to violate peremptory norm of general international law; to violate international treaty signed on to by a multitude of nations – that choice of the Procurement Working Group stands in force.

* * * * *
Chapter 7

– Appendix 2 – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran –

[]

As of JCPOA Implementation Day, 16 January 2016 was allowed, upon approval of the Procurement Working Group – Joint Commission, and acceptance by the Security Council, the acquire INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories.

Procurement activities began only as of October 2016. From November 2016 – towards the end of Barack Obama's term in office – through December 2017, fifteen such procurement proposals for items listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a have been approved. The following are the relevant excerpts from the United Nations Security Council Six-month reports of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) which verify the Security Council approvals of such Iranian acquisitions:

_Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [18 January 2017].

The English Language version is found on the United Nations website at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/49&Lang=E

_Third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [27 June 2017]

_Fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [15 December 2017]

All of these can be found on the same page: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/briefings-by-the-facilitator.shtml

Following is the relevant excerpt from the Second sixth month report:

Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [18 January 2017]

V. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

18. The procurement channel processed five proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) that had been submitted by two Member States to the Security Council for approval. In accordance with paragraph 8 (b) of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), the proposals were immediately forwarded to the Joint Commission for its review.

19. Two proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council on 6 October 2016. The Joint Commission provided recommendations of approval. The two proposals were subsequently approved by the Council on 17 November 2016. One proposal for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 was submitted to the Council on 15 November. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval. The proposal was approved by the Council on 28 December. Two proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Council on 6 December. These proposals are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

20. On 23 December 2016, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) the second six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2016/1113), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reflecting the activities performed during the said six-month reporting period..

Paragraph 20 informs us that the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) the second six-month Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues. This document (S/2016/1113) gives some further insight into what the Procurement Working Group had been up to in the last six months of 2016. The report advises that it "... _provides an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 7 July to 22 December 2016_."

Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (Doc. S/2016/1113) – [23 December 2016]

V. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

2. During the reporting period, the Procurement Working Group — comprising the States that are participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with a designated representative of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy serving as Coordinator — held six meetings. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated as observers in one of the meetings. The Procurement Working Group reviewed five proposals from two States. Three of the proposals were recommended for approval. The rest are currently under review.

The above paragraph 2 of the Joint Commission report speaks of six meetings held, with the IAEA being allowed to attend only one of them. Of five proposals submitted by two separate States, two are under review, three were approved.

Paragraph 19 of the Facilitator's report tells us that of the five proposals submitted only one was related to items listed on the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 document which deals primarily with components for nuclear reactors. Paragraph 2 above tells us that, coincidentally, the IAEA had attended only one of the meetings of the Procurement Working Group.

THE THIRD REPORT informs that five more INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a related proposals were also approved – bringing the total of nuclear weapons related proposals up to nine:

Third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [27 June 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

25. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval for the two proposals that had been submitted to the Security Council in December 2016 and were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report. The two proposals were subsequently approved by the Council.

26 During the reporting period, 10 new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council, including 2 for temporary export for the purposes of demonstration and display in an exhibition. Five of those proposals have been approved, one has been withdrawn and four are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

THE FOURTH REPORT informs that four more INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a related proposals were also approved – bringing the total of nuclear weapons related proposals up to thirteen through 2017:

Fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [15 December 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

29. During the reporting period, eight new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Four of these proposals have been approved, two have been rejected and two have been withdrawn.

30. In addition, the Security Council approved two and rejected one of the four proposals that were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report (S/2017/537). The fourth proposal has been withdrawn.

31. Since Implementation Day, a total of 24 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been, submitted to the Security Council by four Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

In all, through end of year 2017 – thirteen proposals having to do with Iranian INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories have been approved. 24 proposals had been submitted altogether.

IAEA Board of Governor reports (listed further below) throughout the same period indicate that the IAEA has been allowed to attend only 4 of those meetings. Clearly the IAEA is being kept away from the major portion of what goes on in terms of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear related goods:

THE FIFTH REPORT informs that the Procurement Working Group has approved eight more procurement proposals; However, the new Facilitator, _Karel J.G. van Oosterom_ , has insinuated for himself a new reporting policy – Mr. van Oosterom had now decided that the Security Council no longer found it suitable, at this juncture, to differentiate between and report a comparison of the number of nuclear energy related approvals of nuclear energy related procurement applications; and the number of weapons related approvals of procurement applications.

It would appear almost as if there is some sense of embarrassment, and perhaps a touch of the guilty conscience beginning to sink in around the Security Council snack bar lounging areas (one might at least hope).

Fifth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [15 December 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

23. During the reporting period, 13 new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Eight of those proposals have been approved, two have been withdrawn and three are currently under review.

24. Since Implementation Day, a total of 37 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 34 proposals that have been processed, 24 have been approved, 3 have been disapproved, and 7 have been withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in less than 51 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including the Procurement Working Group, the procurement channel has continued to function and the Joint Commission has continued to review proposals..

It is worth noting that in this fifth report, as indicated; the new Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), _Karel J.G. van Oosterom_ ; unlike his predecessor _Sebastiano Cardi_ ; does not differentiate between Procurement Working Group approvals of Iranian acquisition from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 (nuclear energy related) list of inventories; and approvals of INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 (nuclear weapons related) acquisitions.

However; the Joint Commission / Procurement Working Group also transmits a very brief six month report which gives a tiny bit more information on the subject of approvals. The Joint Commission Report also does not differentiate between the two lists. But it does reveal how many Procurement Working Group meetings were held, how may proposal were submitted, approved, or are under review;

And it does tell how many meetings the IAEA was allowed to attend. We know from the JCPOA that the International Atomic Energy Agency is not allowed to sit in on meetings pertaining to INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2; now become INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 as these refer to nuclear weapons associated assets which the International Atomic Energy Agency is prohibited any knowledge of under the JCPOA arrangement invented mostly between the Obama administration and the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

(Incidentally, the IAEA Board of Governors Reports also mentions how many meeting the IAEA has been allowed to attend. However, the IAEA doesn't seem to know how many meetings total had been held, and so doesn't know what it might have been missing.)

Following is what the Joint Commission has to say for itself in the reporting period referred to:

Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (Doc. S/2018/601) – [14 June 2018]

3. The Procurement Working Group held seven meetings. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated as observers in one of the meetings. The Procurement Working Group reviewed 13 proposals from three States: 8 were recommended for approval, 2 were withdrawn by the proposing States and 3 are currently under review.

* * * * *

These following are relevant excerpts of IAEA Board of Governor reports from September 2016 through May 2018. These cover the time period around when the Procurement Working Group got started reviewing and approving applications for Iranian procurement of nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed; later become nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed inventories.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is invited only to attend Procurement Working Group meetings which discuss issues relating to nuclear power production. The IAEA is precluded from attending meetings which discuss proposals relating to sales to Iran of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed, or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed nuclear weapons associated assets.

Note that the International Atomic Energy Agency is prevented from attending most Procurement Working Group meetings. This gives some sense that nuclear weapons associated assets form the majority of Iranian material acquisitions through the Procurement Working Group.

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2016/46 – Date: 8 September 2016

E. Other Relevant Information

22. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2016/55 – Date: 9 November 2016

E. Other Relevant Information

22. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/10 – Date: 24 February 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

26. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/24 – Date: 2 June 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

27. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/33 – Date: 31 August 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

28. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/48 – Date: 13 November 2017

27. During this reporting period, the Agency attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2018/7 – Date: 22 February 2018

26. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2018/24 – Date: 24 May 2018

26. During this reporting period, the Agency attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

* * * * *
Chapter 8

– **Appendix 3 –** Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.) –

[]

This following is an excerpt – the complete list is found at: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents

Or as an alternate source: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

ANNEX CONTENTS

5. Test and Measurement Equipment for the Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices

5.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

5.B.1. Flash X-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators 5 – 1

5.B.2. High-velocity gun systems

5.B.3. High speed cameras and imaging devices

5.B.5. Specialized instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments

5.B.6. High-speed pulse generators

5.B.7. High explosive containment vessels

5.D. SOFTWARE

5.D.1. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment not controlled in Item 5.B.3. so that it meets or exceeds the characteristics specified in Item 5.B.3.

5.D.2. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment controlled in Item 5.B.3.

5.E. TECHNOLOGY

5.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 5.A. through 5.D.

6. Components for Nuclear Explosive Devices

6.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

6.A.1. Detonators and multipoint initiation systems

6.A.2. Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulse generators

6.A.3. Switching devices

6.A.4. Pulse discharge capacitors

6.A.5. Neutron generator systems

6.A.6. Striplines

6.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

6.C. MATERIALS

6.C.1. High explosive substances or mixtures,

6.E. TECHNOLOGY 6 – 4

6.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development","production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software"

These are examples of some of the inventory found in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; but to understand a little of what is meant by the above we must look at some definitions:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013) ;

DEFINITIONS

"Development" --

is related to all phases before "production" such as:

• design

• design research

• design analysis

• design concepts

• assembly and testing of prototypes

• pilot production schemes

• design data

• process of transforming design data into a product

• configuration design

• integration design

• layouts

"Production" --

means all production phases such as:

• construction

• production engineering

• manufacture

• integration

• assembly (mounting)

• inspection

• testing

• quality assurance

"Technical assistance" --

"Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

"Technical data" --

"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

"Technology" --

means specific information required for the "development", "production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance".

*[ INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents \- or as an alternate https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]]

The above is a partial list, giving a sense of the kinds of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies, training and support services the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel.

The list of nuclear weapons associated inventories from which the United Nations pledges to expedite procurement of to the benefit of the discretion of use ultimately to be decided upon by the Sovereign Government of Iran – has been identified; and a sense of some of the classes of inventories has been presented.

* * * * *
Chapter 9

Appendix 4 – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex

[]

Following is an excerpt of the inventories listed on the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ :

Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex

CATEGORY I -ITEM 1

COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

1.A.1. Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.A.2. Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.B.1. "Production facilities"

1.D.1. "Software"

1.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY I -ITEM 2

COMPLETE SUBSYSTEMS USABLE FOR COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

2.A.1. "Complete subsystems"

2.B.1. "Production facilities"

2.B.2. "Production equipment"

2.D.1. "Software"

2.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 3

PROPULSION COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT

3.A.1. Turbojet and turbofan engines

3.A.2. Ramjet/scramjet/pulse jet/combined cycle engines

3.A.3. Rocket motor cases, 'insulation' components and nozzles

3.A.4. Staging mechanisms, separation mechanisms and interstages

3.A.5. Liquid and slurry propellant (including oxidisers) control systems

3.A.6. Hybrid rocket motors

3.A.7. Radial ball bearings

3.A.8. Liquid propellant tanks

3.A.9. Turboprop engine systems

3.A.10. Combustion chambers

3.B.1. "Production facilities"

3.B.2. "Production equipment"

3.B.3. Flow-forming machines

3.C.1. 'Interior lining' usable for rocket motor cases

3.C.2. 'Insulation' material in bulk form usable for rocket motor cases

3.D.1. "Software"

3.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 4

PROPELLANTS, CHEMICALS AND PROPELLANT PRODUCTION

4.A. None

4.B.1. "Production equipment"

4.B.2. "Production equipment"

4.B.3. a. Batch mixers

4.B.3. b. Continuous mixers

4.B.3. c. Fluid energy mills

4.B.3. d. Metal powder "production equipment"

4.C.1. Composite and composite modified double base propellants

4.C.2. Fuel substances

4.C.2. a. Hydrazine

4.C.2. b. Hydrazine derivatives

4.C.2. c. Spherical aluminium powder

4.C.2. d. Zirconium, beryllium, magnesium and alloys

4.C.2. e. Boron and boron alloys

4.C.2. f. High energy density materials

4.C.3. Perchlorates, chlorates or chromates

4.C.4. a. Oxidiser substances –liquid propellant rocket engines

4.C.4. b. Oxidiser substances –solid propellant rocket motors

4.C.5. Polymeric substances

4.C.6. Other propellant additives and agents

4.C.6. a. Bonding agents

4.C.6. b. Curing reaction catalysts

4.C.6. c. Burning rate modifiers

4.C.6. d. Esters and plasticisers

4.C.6. e. Stabilisers

4.D.1. "Software"

4.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 6

PRODUCTION OF STRUCTURAL COMPOSITES, PYROLYTIC DEPOSITION AND DENSIFICATION, AND STRUCTURAL MATERIALS

6.A.1. Composite structures, laminates and manufactures thereof

6.A.2. Resaturated pyrolised materials

6.B.1. a. Filament winding machines or fibre placement machines

6.B.1. b. Tape-laying machines

6.B.1. c. Multi-directional, multi-dimensional weaving machines or interlacing machines

6.B.1. d. Equipment designed or modified for the production of fibrous or filamentary materials

6.B.1. e. Equipment designed or modified for special fibre surface treatment

6.B.2. Nozzles

6.B.3. Isostatic presses

6.B.4. Chemical vapour deposition furnaces

6.B.5. Equipment and controls for the densification and pyrolysis process

6.C.1. Resin impregnated fibre prepregs and metal coated fibre preforms

6.C.2. Resaturated pyrolised materials

6.C.3. Fine grain graphites

6.C.4. Pyrolytic or fibrous reinforced graphites

6.C.5. Ceramic composite materials for missile radomes

6.C.6. Silicon-carbide materials

6.C.7. Tungsten molybdenum and alloys

6.C.8. Maraging steel

6.C.9. Titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel

6.D.1. "Software"

6.E.1. "Technology"

6.E.2. "Technical data"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 9

INSTRUMENTATION, NAVIGATION AND DIRECTION FINDING

9.A.1. Integrated flight instrument systems

9.A.2. Gyro-astro compasses

9.A.3. Linear accelerometers

9.A.4. All types of gyros

9.A.5. Accelerometers or gyros

9.A.6. Inertial or other equipment

9.A.7. 'Integrated navigation systems'

9.A.8. Three axis magnetic heading sensors

9.B.1. "Production equipment", and other test, calibration and alignment equipment

9.B.2. a. Balancing machines

9.B.2. b. Indicator heads

9.B.2. c. Motion simulators/rate tables

9.B.2. d. Positioning tables

9.B.2. e. Centrifuges

9.D.1. "Software"

9.D.2. Integration "Software"

9.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 10

FLIGHT CONTROL

10.A.1. Hydraulic, mechanical, electro-optical or electromechanical flight control systems

10.A.2. Attitude control equipment

10.A.3. Flight control servo-valves

10.B.1. Test calibration and alignment equipment

10.C. None

10.D.1. "Software"

10.E.1. Design "technology" for integration of air vehicle fuselage, propulsion system and lifting control surfaces

10.E.2. Design "technology" for integration of the flight control, guidance, and propulsion data into a flight management system

10.E.3. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 11

AVIONICS

11.A.1. Radar and laser radar systems including altimeters

11.A.2. Passive sensors

11.A.3. Receiving equipment GNSS e.g. GPS,

GLONASS or Galileo

11.A.4. Electronic assemblies and components

11.A.5. Umbilical and interstage electrical connectors

11.D.1. "Software"

11.E.1. Design "technology"

11.E.2. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 12

LAUNCH SUPPORT

12.A.1. Apparatus and devices

12.A.2. Vehicles

12.A.3. Gravity meters (gravimeters), gravity gradiometers

12.A.4. Telemetry and telecontrol equipment, including ground equipment

12.A.5. Precision tracking systems

12.A.5. a. Tracking Systems

12.A.5. b. Range instrumentation radars

12.A.6. Thermal Batteries

12.D.1. "Software"

12.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 15

TEST FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

15.B.1. Vibration test equipment

15.B.1. a. Vibration test systems

15.B.1. b. Digital controllers [continued]

15.B.1. c. Vibration thrusters (shaker units)

15.B.1. d. Test piece support structures and electronic units

15.B.2. Wind-tunnels

15.B.3. Test benches/stands

15.B.4. Environmental chambers

15.B.5. Accelerators

15.D.1. "Software"

15.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 16

MODELLING-SIMULATION AND DESIGN INTEGRATION

16.A.1. Hybrid (combined analogue/digital) computers

16.D.1. "Software"

16.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 17

STEALTH

17.A.1. Devices for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A. or 20.A.

17.B.1. Systems specially designed for radar cross section measurement

17.C.1. Materials for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A.

CATEGORY II -ITEM 18

NUCLEAR EFFECTS PROTECTION

18.A.1. "Radiation Hardened" "microcircuits"

18.A.2. 'Detectors'

18.A.3. Radomes

18.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 19

OTHER COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

19.A.1. Complete rocket systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.2. Complete UAV systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.3. Complete UAV systems

19.B.1. "Production facilities"

19.D.1. "Software"

19.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 20

OTHER COMPLETE SUBSYSTEMS

20.A.1. a. Individual rocket stages

20.A.1. b. Solid propellant rocket motors, hybrid rocket motors or liquid propellant rocket engines

20.B.1. "Production facilities"

20.B.2. "Production equipment"

There's more to that list – but that should give the reader a pretty good idea that a substantial part of the E3/EU+3 Iran, Resolution 2231 is about promising technological support to a weapons development program; all the while claiming that this whole arrangement is deeply concerned only with promoting the "exclusively" peaceful development of nuclear energy – and could never possibly have anything to do with any impure motives like arms trade profiteering.

THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME – Equipment, Software and Technology Annex is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry, primarily dealing with ballistic missiles and delivery systems; and with other weapons technologies associated with ballistic missiles. This list was developed by the international Missile Technology Control Regime association. The Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was assembled as a list of weapons inventory the M.T.C.R. association considers should be controlled.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (M.T.C.R.) itself is a voluntary association of (currently) 34 member States joining together to establish and promote guidelines coordinating national export licensing efforts aimed at containing and restraining the proliferation of specific weapons war. The M.T.C.R. is not affiliated with the United Nations, but its members may also be United Nations members. All five of the Nuclear Weapons Nations (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China) as well as Germany are all members of this association; the Islamic Republic of Iran is not.

For a more detailed description of the association's purpose and activities the interested reader may refer to the Missile Technology Control Regime website: http://www.mtcr.info/english/The Missile Technology Control Regime; or, possibly better, http://www.mtcr.info/.

The _Missile Technology Control Regime – Equipment, Software And Technology Annex_ does not correspond to the weapons inventory of any particular nation – rather, as mentioned, is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry that the M.T.C.R. association considers should be controlled; and that great care and restraint should be exhibited when considering the import, export, sale or transfer of the listed inventory. The M.T.C.R. has established suggested common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines). These are non-binding legally, but may serve to be taken into account when developing export / import regulations regarding the list of voluntarily controlled items presented in the M.T.C.R. Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

The E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel agreement, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, utilizes the M.T.C.R. Equipment, Software and Technology Annex for a use other than for which it was initially intended. It is used in the arrangement between Iran and the E3/EU+3 as a convenient shopping list which the Islamic Republic of Iran is to be given access to, on a case-by-case, basis as of 16 January 2016, and full access to some eight years after. The use of the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex by the E3/EU+3 Iran Project resembles the Cartel's employment of the International Atomic Energy Agency INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list.

* * * * *
Chapter 10

– Appendix 5 – Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories –

[]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 secrecy arrangements favoring Iranian acquisition of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed assets make it impossible for anyone on the outside to really know what is being acquired and when.

Iranian procurement activities are overseen by an arm of the Joint Commission – the Procurement Working Group. The secrecy surrounding the operations of the Procurement Working Group is described as follows:

United States of America: draft resolution July 17, 2015 (S/2015/547);

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

3. Procedures

3.4. Except as provided in Section 6 of this Annex which will be subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN, the work of the Joint Commission is confidential and may be shared only among JCPOA participants and observers as appropriate, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.

The above explains that the work of the Joint Commission is confidential; and that the work discussed in Section 6 of Annex IV is "subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN." The confidentiality procedure is of a much higher standard than the mere status of something being considered as confidential.

The above Section 6 refers to the functions and procedures of the Procurement Working Group. The Working Group carries out its work under the standard of secrecy of the confidentiality procedure of the UN. The current definition of this U.N. confidentiality standard is found in the U.N. document, document number ST/SGB/2007/6; Secretary-General's bulletin; Information sensitivity, classification and handling; (February 12, 2007): and can be located at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/235/79/PDF/N0723579.pdf?OpenElement

The Bulletin's Section 5 – Handling of classified information gives a sense of the strict security surrounding the Procurement Working Group's activities. Documents are to be kept under lock and key in a secured location; any duplication of documents is tightly controlled – and logged if copied; transmission of documents must be sealed and clearly marked as classified, the addressee and sender is clearly stated, etc.; all transmissions are duly recorded, logged; and there are the various other aspects of strict document controls that are described in the bulletin. And, of course, no one from the office is to divulge any knowledge of what they might have thought they had read or heard somewhere. Here are some examples from Section 5, just to give an idea:

United Nations Secretariat – Document Number ST/SGB/2007/6

12 February 2007

Secretary-General's bulletin

Information sensitivity, classification and handling

*Section 1

Classification principles

1.1 The overall approach to classifying information entrusted to or originating from the United Nations is based on the understanding that the work of the United Nations should be open and transparent, except insofar as the nature of information concerned is deemed confidential in accordance with the guidelines set out in the present bulletin...

*Section 5

Handling of classified information

5.1 Heads of departments or offices shall ensure that the following minimal standards are maintained in the handling of classified information received by or originating from their department or office:

(a) All classified information must be transported in sealed envelopes or containers, and clearly marked as such;

(b) All outgoing and incoming classified information must be recorded in a special registry that lists the staff members who are authorized to handle such information;

(c) Classified materials may be duplicated only with the authorization of either their originator or the head of the receiving or originating department or office, and such copies must be entered in the special registry;

(d) All classified information must be filed and stored under lock and key in a secure location within the department or office concerned, accessible only to the authorized staff members;

And it goes on from there with more detail. If anyone is particularly interested the document is freely presented by the United Nations at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/235/79/PDF/N0723579.pdf?OpenElement.

* * * * *
Chapter 11

– Appendix 6 – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause –

[]

What is allowed and what is not allowed as far as concerns IAEA Participation in review of nuclear related assets acquired by Iran is detailed in the JCPOA as follows:

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

6.4. Except as otherwise provided by the Joint Commission or the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:

6.4.1 Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA..:

As a concession to the IAEA, the Agency is informed as to the contents of a proposal when such proposal "... relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA...;" which, as it turns out, means when a proposal has nothing to do with nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories.

6.1.6. ...When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.

A clearer sense of which meetings the IAEA is authorized to attend, as opposed to not authorized, begins to take on more defined shape upon a bit further examination of later provisions of paragraph six with its subs and sub-subs:

6.7. Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.

6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.

The IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1; unlike INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; refers to components and technologies associated specifically with nuclear energy production.

Sub paragraph 6.7 says the IAEA can hang around and check out the lay of the land – the end uses and end use locations of any goods and technology, any inventory, procured from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1.

When it comes to Iranian acquisitions from the prominent, nuclear weapons related inventories listed of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a, the IAEA is dropped from the picture; the Oligarchy authors of the arrangement leave out mention of anything about the IAEA being invited to drop in for inspection time.

It being the case therefore, that IAEA is explicitly not allowed in either to meetings, and is not explicitly granted authority to confirm end-use location of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories – one might ask if the IAEA is allowed to inspect this anyway.

Paragraph 26 of Resolution 2231 – Annex A: JCPOA – section SANCTIONS informs us of the following:

26. ...There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration ... will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. **Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part**.

Any attempt to insist – after the fait accompli – that the IAEA suddenly should be given access to meetings relating to; or given applicable knowledge of end-use or end-use location whereabouts of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons related inventories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; anything like that could justifiably be understood as an attempt to sabotage the E3/EU+3 Iran arrangement effort by imposing a new nuclear related restriction, or restrictive measure.

Note: All participating Parties to the negotiation and concluded arrangement were united in their approval over what had been agreed upon.

It must also be noted that All Parties signatory to the NPT agree that it is the International Atomic Energy Agency that has the duty, the obligation, the responsibility and the mandate to verify that there is no "... diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," as follows under the first clause of Article III of the NPT – or to report otherwise:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...

* * * * *
– Chapter 12 –  
Appendix 7 – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"

[];

AS HAS BEEN presented in the various appendices, the International Atomic Energy Agency is to be kept from the knowledge of any contents of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies, or support services – and subsequently, any knowledge of end-use location, whereabouts, or end-use of such acquisitions.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 also asserts this in its _JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures_ :

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

A. General

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.

Nothing in Annex V mentioned in the paragraph _A – General; 1_ , mentioned above; indicates that the timeline for putting in to effect the very important Section T following below "... _has otherwise been specified_ ...;" therefore the following activities described under JCPOA Annex I; Section T have been permitted since JCPOA Implementation Day; 16 January 2016.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

The JCPOA has already indicated, in _JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission_ ; paragraph _6. Procurement Working Group_ ; sub-paragraph _6.8_ , that Iran has not given the IAEA permission to: ... _verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2_ ...;"

The materials referred to above, in 825.2 through 82.4 e.g.: "...multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device...explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras)...;" neutron generating systems in application as: "... explosively driven neutron sources..." etc.; these are all INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories (see Appendix II [footnote]).

Again – the IAEA is not entitled to look into these per the JCPOA. The above paragraph 8, with subparagraphs, stipulates that these things will be monitored. The answer to the question of "by whom" is not within the scope of that paragraph. Paragraph 6.7 of Resolution 2231; Annex A: JCPOA; (sub-Annex of JCPOA) JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission; paragraph 6.8 gives us an idea:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6. Procurement Working Group

6.8 **Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2** (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, **the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification**.

The Security Council JCPOA Joint Commission asserts that it will provide expertise required for end-use verification. That's open ended it would seem. End-use verification can suggest that the monitoring and verification of the end-use of any Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories in the capacity detailed in paragraphs 82.2 through 82.4 listed above is to be conducted by the ad hoc committee set up by the Joint Commission – as much as the ad hoc committee set up by the Joint Commission feel like doing. It's pretty vague. Nevertheless:

This set-up bears witness of the intent by the Security Council to supersede treaty with vague promises. The Security Council asserts it will supersede treaty by preventing the IAEA from fulfilling its mandate to verify that INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories are not being diverted.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive **purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices** ...

Every signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT) has agreed that it will be the International Atomic Energy Agency which verifies there is no diversion of resources to a nuclear weapons development project. It is not for an ad-hoc committee of lackey functionaries, playing the role of foxes guarding the hen house, to say that everything is going just fine.

Any committee the Procurement Working Group sets up for "verification" is simply not recognized by treaty.

That having been mentioned, the Security Council proceeds to supplant the IAEA with its own ad hoc unrecognizable verifiers – those who are not recognized by the NPT treaty signed on to by a multitude of Nations.

* * * * *
Chapter 13

– Appendix 8 – Sham Dispute Resolution Mechanism –

[]

What happens if it were to be proven that Iran was responsible for the arms smuggling into a zone under a U.N. arms embargo; arms smuggling which had occurred before October 18, 2020? Not necessarily anything.

U.S. President Barack Obama claimed that sanctions can be reinstated if merely one of the five permanent members of the Security Council considers it necessary; Obama has claimed this on many occasions (Obama makes a lot of claims he can't back up). Here is how he put in his August 5, 2015 American University speech:

_"If Iran violates the agreement over the next decade, all of the sanctions can snap back into place. We won't need the support of other members of the U.N. Security Council; America can trigger snap back on our own."_ *

_*_ [BARACK OBAMA; Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal; American University, Washington D.C.; August 5, 2015; This file has been archived, find it on google at: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.]

His claim is hardly factual – no matter how legitimate a complaint against Iran might appear to some. Here is how the dispute resolution process works (Resolution 2231 handles complaints on non-performance or breech of the agreement under a defined dispute resolution mechanism process):

The Dispute Resolution Mechanism procedure is presented in two places in Resolution 2231; neither contradicting the other, with both describing the same thing, although perhaps in slightly differing ways, and mentioning a few different aspects. First we examine this version from the opening of Resolution 2231. This begins at paragraph 10; [section] Application of Provisions of Previous Resolutions (approximately page 3 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Application of Provisions of Previous Resolutions

10. Encourages China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union (EU), and Iran (the "JCPOA participants") to resolve any issues arising with respect to implementation of JCPOA commitments through the procedures specified in the JCPOA, and expresses its intention to address possible complaints by JCPOA participants about significant non-performance by another JCPOA participant;

11. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, within 30 days of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an issue that the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a) of this resolution, decides further that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member of the Security Council has submitted such a draft resolution for a vote, then the President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and put it to a vote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and expresses its intention to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue by the Advisory Board established in the JCPOA;

12. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph 11 to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), then effective midnight Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of this resolution, and the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

The process for reinstating the previous resolutions is a bit longer then the above – this process is elaborated in another part of Resolution 2231:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, 14 July 2015

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level - either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.

37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

At first glance the above provisions seem to support Barack Obama's claim that sanctions can be easily reinstated. Again, here is how he put in his August 5, 2015 American University speech:

"If Iran violates the agreement over the next decade, all of the sanctions can snap back into place. We won't need the support of other members of the U.N. Security Council; America can trigger snap back on our own. "

Regardless of Obama's claims; closer examination of those provisions demonstrates that Obama's statement of August 5, 2015 is effectively false. The United States can't reliably "trigger snap back" on its own.

The aspect of what Obama implied concerning a potential veto of a Security Council resolution by one of the five permanent members of the Security Council certainly is the case; but that is not the end of the story. The above provisions inform us that a veto, effectively, is only a call for a simple majority vote on the subject.

Suppose, for example, the hypothesis of the Conflict Armament Research group; that the arms confiscated on the high seas did irrefutably come from Iran in violation of paragraph 6(b) [presented on page 313]. This may be grounds for the United States president succeeding Obama – a president perhaps not so amenable to the proliferation of conventional or nuclear weapons; this might be a basis for such a president to lodge a complaint contending that Iran was refusing to honor its commitments to Resolution 2231.

Suppose then, that this complaint, after going through the process described in the above preceding provisions, finally reached the Security Council; and that the Security Council produced " _a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting_ ...;" and then the United States vetoed that resolution...;

There is an identical contingency written into paragraph 12, and paragraph 37 that allows the Security Council to block a veto by one or more of the five permanent members of the Council. The proviso is stated so simply that a person could easily miss it, it says this: "... _unless the Security Council decides otherwise_."

Let's examine that in context to discover what "... _unless the Security Council decides otherwise_ ..." means.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Application of Provisions of Previous Resolutions

11. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, within 30 days of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an issue that the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a) of this resolution, decides further that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member of the Security Council has submitted such a draft resolution for a vote, then the President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and put it to a vote within 30 days ...

12. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph 11 to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), then effective midnight Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of this resolution, ... unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

We proceed to paragraph 37:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, ...the UN Security Council, ...shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise.

There we see the proviso in context. The result is that a veto can be overridden by whatever means are decided. Even when presented in the context of the text of the above paragraph 37, the exact meaning of the contingency, the proviso "... _unless the Security Council decides otherwise_ ..." is not clearly defined. It could be reasonably interpreted to mean that a simple majority vote in the Security Council would be needed to override any veto – or it could mean veto could be overridden by some other means.

The proviso is an undefined escape clause; "...unless the Security Council decides otherwise...," could mean that a veto could be overridden by a simple majority vote, or an invention such as: the Veto must be supported by two thirds of the Security Council. Given the notoriously corrupt nature of the transaction, it might not be so far-fetched to imagine that some absurdity of an excuse could be invented.

In any event, it is very likely that a simple majority vote to override the veto could be easily attained. Members of the Security Council might be very squeamish about jeopardizing United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 on account of a little weapons smuggling – even if the recipient has been proven to be responsible for supporting war crimes or terrorism.

TO SUMMARIZE THIS POINT: If Iran were found to be egregiously violating Resolution 2231; if this resulted in going so far that the United States, or another of the five permanent members of the Security Council, actually managed to force the Security Council to produce "a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting [against Iran]...;" and if the United States, or another of the five permanent members of the Security Council, then vetoed that resolution; then the Security Council might nevertheless "decide otherwise" and take a simple majority vote to override the veto – or "decide otherwise" through some other undefined method.

Resolution 2231, consistent with its style of using vague language and undefined terms, never tells how the Security Council might nevertheless to "decide otherwise" to override a veto on "a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting..."

There is also the issue that it is never defined how many times a vote might be taken to override a veto (as a vote is never specified in this context of "decides otherwise;" or how long after a potential veto a vote to override the veto could still take place and be valid). This whole set up is designed to perpetuate the provisions of Resolution 2231, and if possible, over any objection.

* * * * *
Chapter 14

– Appendix 9 – Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25 –

[]

The Security Council asserts its claim that Security Council has the authority to declare any of its decisions, at any time, to be an exception to any accepted rule made under the authority of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council presented a fabricated misrepresentation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25; which the resolution idiotically submits in its clause 14 of the introduction to Resolution 2231:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions,

THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH VERSION of the Article ascertains that the Members of the United Nations agree to carry out Security Council decisions that are in accordance with the Charter, that conform to the present Charter.

Charter of the United Nations

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH VERSION ASCERTAINS that the Members of the United Nations agree to carry out Security Council decisions that are in accordance with the Charter, that conform to the present Charter.

This writing translated and compared the writing of Article 25 in various languages. The comparison was intended as an example; but no comparative analysis of the translation is really necessary at all – in aggregate and together, Articles 24, and 25 give the context to Article 25, no matter which translation, as we shall review soon enough.

* * * * *

"In accordance," in English means, of course, that Security Council Resolutions must conform to the Charter of the United Nations. If the Security Council comes up with some obvious scheme to violate international treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, nobody has to agree to go along with it. Such a Security Council resolution would have no authority under the Charter of the United Nations.

As an example of the meaning of "in accordance" in English I present a parable of a sort:

Should a person perceive a fashion of the day, and that same person would desire to subscribe to that perceived fashion as an admirable and desirable norm; then that person might enthusiastically attempt to mimic it in as convincing and satisfying a manner available;

And should a body, in Office of Trust - be given a law; then that body, comprised of individuals holding Offices of trust, should choose to act in accordance with that law. This is what "in accordance" means, this is how the concept of "in accordance" is translated to English. To act contrary to law is the opposite of acting in "accordance" to the norms of law.

It seems simple enough.

If the Security Council decrees that it is now necessary for all States without exception to violate international law and international treaty in order to support various weapons development projects and schemes in an exceptional and uniquely favored State; a State which the Security Council has determined is deserving of every extraordinary deference; then the Security Council must apply, with its reasoning, to the International Court of Justice and attempt to convince the Court of the legitimacy of their construction.

The Security Council can't just order all States without exception to just anything the politicians populating the Security Council want done for whatever reason of chance and eccentricity of personality holds sway over that body at a given time.

The Charter of the United Nations places another restraint against aggressive, lunatic recommendations made and promoted by the Security Council:

Charter of the United Nations

*CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter...

That above stipulates that it is the Member States that are presumed to be in the right – these States do are not required to justify rulings within their jurisdictions to the Security Council. Nobody is required to go jump off a cliff just because the five permanent Member States of the Security Council Oligarchy tries wants everyone to go along with their plans to violate international treaty for the sake of arming a Security Council uniquely favored non-nuclear-weapon State with nuclear weapons capacity.

The Security Council does not have the authority to intimidate or force States choosing to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to follow the example of the Oligarchy syndicate.

Member States don't have to constantly appeal to the Court to justify the integrity of their own jurisdictions;

It is for the Security Council to justify its infringement on the integrity of Member States: "... _Nothing contained in the present Charter shall... require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter_ ...;" the burden of proof of that a Security Council decision is justifiable is the responsibility of the Security Council.

* * * * *

Repeating what is actually written in Article 25, in the English: " _The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter_."

The statement is reciprocal. The Members would agree to a decision if the Security Council decision can be found to be in accordance with the Charter. In accordance with the present Charter means, in English, that a decision must conform to the Charter if it is likely to be considered a valid decision. The Security Council cannot enforce a decision that, under the Charter, the Council was never authorized to ever have made.

The Security Council's only authority is derived from the Charter. Otherwise, discarding that need for restraint, the Security Council is only a collection of powerful nations that would use the United Nations to seek to position themselves into the dominant status previously sought by the tripartite militant powers of NAZI Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Empire of Japan of the World War II era.

Article 25 requires at least two proofs in order to compel States to accept a decision by the Security Council as something that shouldn't be entirely ignored, here is Article 25 again:

"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

The first proof required is that a Security Council's recommendation does conform to the standards set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. If the recommendation is perceived as not even close to being in accord with the Charter (as might be in the case of Resolution 2231); then States have the option to ignore the recommendation. The Security Council has failed the first proof.

The second proof required is that States attempting to follow through on a Security Council's decree can legitimately carry out such without violating international treaty, or the Charter of the United Nations – in other words, can legally carry out the decree.

The only body authorized to decide on proof of whether or not a Security Council's demand can be met without infringing on the Charter of the United Nations, or upon any other international law or treaty, is the International Court of Justice. As of yet, the politicians sitting on the Security Council haven't screwed up the nerve to engage the Court with their presumptions.

Therefore there is not any State that is compelled to, permitted to, required to, or entitled to, violate international treaty on the say-so of the United Nations Security Council as of yet; and no State should be required or permitted to comply with any decree of United Nations Security Council recommendation 2231 that goes against international law until the Court rules on the subject – or perhaps any decree of the resolution at all; this is a resolution that has not been shown to have been given a qualifying, competent vote (competent by any legitimately granted authority vested by the Charter of the United Nations). In other words, as it is not clear that the resolution has ever received a competent vote – then it could most reasonably be construed that Resolution 2231 remains only a draft proposal; waiting for a vote which might never come.

The writing of Article 25 is a reciprocal agreement: " _The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter_."

Both Parties to the agreement have to conduct themselves in a manner conforming to the Charter of the United Nations. In order to be considered valid, the Security Council request must not conflict or violate the Charter; and parties following through on the request must not violate the Charter in their actions attempting to comply with the given Security Council recommendation.

AS FAR AS THE WORD "OBLIGATED;" English speaking Barack Obama, and the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel along with him, chose to insert into their version of the writing of Article 25 – that word, or any derivation of it, exists no where in the true text of the Article – Article 25. It doesn't exist in the authorized English language translation of the Charter of the United Nations; it doesn't exist in the other authorized translations I read.

By inserting the word "obligated" into their peculiar fashioning of the wording of Article 25, the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel cabal tried to make it appear as though all States without exception must be expected, to at any time, unconditionally surrender their rights to any arbitrary pleasure of, or for any arbitrary decision made by the whichever politicians staffing the Security Council at a given time; politicians who might insist that any or every nation on earth must violate international treaty and, or the Charter of the United Nations and, or their own laws in order to appease the whims of the politicians and high-minded diplomats representing the Security Council.

Let us examine, among other things, if the word "obligated," or any of its translations or adaptations, ever appears in either the Spanish or French language translations of Article 25. The Spanish text follows:

CARTA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

*CAPITULO V

EL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD

Funciones y Poderes

Artículo 25

Los Miembros de las Naciones Unidas convienen en aceptar y cumplir las decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad de acuerdo con esta Carta.

Translating the Spanish into English (with connotations noted):

"The Members of the United Nations shall find it fitting to agree to accept and comply with the decisions of the Security Council which are in accordance with this Charter."

Again we find the reciprocal agreement. The decision must conform to and meet the standards of the Charter, and the conduct of carrying out the decision must conform to the Charter. There is no mention of any obligation.

Somehow however, the word "obligated" [obligación, obligar, obligatorio, obligado] or any of its translations or derivatives has nowhere made an appearance. Let's see what happens in French:

CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES

*CHAPITRE V

CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

FONCTIONS ET POUVOIRS

Article 25

Les Membres de l'Organisation conviennent d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.

Translating into English (with connotations noted):

"The Members of the United Nations find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and apply the decisions of the Security Council conforming to this present Charter."

The French version is almost the same as the English and Spanish – but it's very precise in its own context.

The Spanish version had left out exactly saying " _the present Charter_ ," and instead exchanged that for "this Charter;" or, "... de acuerdo con esta Carta."

The French leaves in "the present Charter," allowing for the understanding of the potential mutability of the Charter: <<...à la présente Charte.>> The French there is consistent with the English. This is not really that important; I'm just making a note of it here to give a feeling of how translations may differ slightly.

Whatever the small differences in linguistic usages – the concept is the same: Article 25 defines a reciprocal agreement which the Security Council, in its warped misrepresentation of the Article, seeks to deny.

The French translation chooses the adverb construction <<...les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.>> The French usage << conformément à>> is stronger than merely stating something like – are in accordance with. The French usage seems a bit firmer in the opinion of this writing; it seems to put much more weight on the responsibility of the Security Council. Let us look at this sentence in French and translated into English again, with perhaps a better English translation:

Les Membres de l'Organisation conviennent d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.

"The Members of the Organization find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and to apply the decisions of the Security Council conforming to the present Charter."

This writing is still unhappy with its own English translation in the above. There this writing's English translation fails to indicate the emphasis placed on "conforming to." Perhaps it is better to translate into English using an English language phrase that most resembles << conformément à>> in this context:

"The Members of the Organization find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and to apply the decisions of the Security Council which follow and conform to the present Charter."

The usage << conformément à>> seems closer to something like "follow in conformance to..." in English. When translating the phrase into English as: ...which follow and conform to the present Charter... this writing believes that a translation like that helps to better understand in English the emphasis and precision of the writing in French. Other's might disagree and translate it better, but this writing reads it that way.

In any event – the word "obligated," or any derivation of it, fails to make an appearance in any of the translations.

It is entirely unambiguous from all versions that the Security Council has a clear responsibility and duty to present a recommendation which adheres to the Charter. The Security Council can't just make up anything it likes and then simply order States to do what it says.

No where in the three versions does the word, or any derivative of the word, "obligation" make an appearance. Nowhere in the actual text of the Charter can it be construed that nations are under any obligation to follow illegal orders that might be handed down by the Security Council at any moment.

The above comparative analysis of the translation might be interesting to some – and it was intended only to emphasize the point. As mentioned, there really no need for a comparative analysis of translation at all – a reader can rely entirely on any one of the authentic translations of the Charter, sticking to just one of the languages without having to peek into the others.

The Charter makes its meaning clear through an aggregate of provisions and Articles.

Article 24, 2nd clause, gives the necessary context to Article 25, no matter which translation; between the two Articles there can be no misconstruing the meaning. Let us examine:

The Charter of the United Nations;

*CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 24

2. In discharging these [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations...

Article 24 declares that the Security Council must fulfill its mandate to perform its duties in conformance to, and in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. Article 2 clause 7, along with Article 24 clause 2, clarify some limits (there are more) on the authority of a Security Council decision.

Article 24 declares that a Security Council decision must conform to the Charter; Article 2 declares that if the Security Council that if a member State feels such decision to infringe on Domestic Jurisdiction; then the burden of proving the justice of the Security Council; which must bring its petition before the International Court of Justice.

In the aggregate context of the three articles, the meaning of Articles 25 cannot be reasonably mistaken – no translation is needed. A Security Council decision has no absolute authority. The terms are fixed by agreement, not by arbitrary despotic whim.

The authorship of Resolution 2231 demonstrated – in their rewriting of the Article – their true stance as despotic and absolutist, and contrary to the position of the Charter. The Charter speaks but in terms of agreement and consensus – and chooses justice over the arbitrary unjust, unworkable, and irrational absolutism presented throughout Security Council Resolution 2231.

* * * * *
– Chapter 15 –  
Appendix 10 – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress

[]

Barack Obama did not share with the Congress, any part of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 other than Annex A – as is documented in this following timeline of ev7ents – this despite that he had signed into Law and agreement that should have guaranteed his doing so.

The following presents a step-by step timeline of how this evasion of responsibility by the Obama administration was carried out:

**ON 22 MAY 2015** , as President, Barack Obama, signed the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ into law. This law stipulates that within not later than five calendar days "... _after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit_ [such agreement] _to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership_ ...;"

And that " _an agreement_ ," for the purposes of that Act is defined as:

"... _an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future_."

This appendix is an examination of the simple ruse used by the White House to evade transmitting United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to Congress.

**ON TUESDAY 14 July 2015** , the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed in Vienna. President Barack Obama made a speech from the East Room of the White House corroborating the event stating, among other things:

"After two years of negotiations, the United States, together with our international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has not: a comprehensive long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon." *

*[BARACK OBAMA; Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal; American University, Washington D.C.; August 5, 2015; This file has been archived, find it on google at: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.]

**On the same day** ; in another part of the world, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano asserted that the following had been agreed to and mutually signed on to by the IAEA and Iran:

"I have just signed the Road-map between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. The text has been signed on behalf of Iran by the country's Vice-President, and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi. This is a significant step forward towards clarifying outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. ...

'... Implementation of this Road-map will provide an important opportunity to resolve the outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme. ..." *

*[INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: IAEA Director General's Statement and Road-map for the Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program; (Tuesday 14 July 2015 8:30 CEST); Web address: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-road-map-for-the-clarification-of-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-programme]

Director General Amano then proceeded to an explanation – which was reprinted in IAEA Board of Governors report GOV/INF/2015/14: In his explanation, Director General Amano stipulates that Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on 14 July 2015, had entered into two side agreements, which can be associated with the new JCPOA. Here are some excerpts of his explanation:

Road-map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program:

Joint Statement

By the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi.

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi agreed on 14 July 2015 the following ...

1. The IAEA and Iran agreed on a separate arrangement that would allow them to address the remaining outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director's General report (GOV/2011/65). Activities undertaken and the outcomes achieved to date by Iran and the IAEA regarding some of the issues will be reflected in the process. ...

5. Iran and the IAEA agreed on another separate arrangement regarding the issue of Parchin.*

*[INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: GOV/INF/2015/14: (Date: 14 July 2015) https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2015-14.pdf - The contents of the document have been published in many places by the IAEA, in its press releases and secondary sources reporting on it – on or around July 14, 2015.]

This declaration by the IAEA Director General is brought up here as it is used indirectly by at least one specific Democratic Party member of the House of Representatives to distract attention away from the fact that the Congress had never been transmitted the official United Nations recognized version of the agreement.

**ON THURSDAY, 16 July 2015** , Texas Senator Ted Cruz addressed a letter to Barack Obama describing some of his concerns relating to the JCPOA. Senator Cruz wrote:

"Language in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) assumes Congressional consent of this agreement and fails to even mention the statutory review process that you signed into law on February 27, 2015...."

[This writing isn't sure why Senator Cruz mentioned February 27, he may have been thinking of the date of the inception of the original Bill – the bill which would be later known as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.'' This writing adheres to the date listed on Public Law 114–17, which is 22 May 2015]

_"Specifically, Annex V of the JCPOA states that the United States and Iran "will endorse this JCPOA," and further elucidates that the UN Security Council will undertake a prompt review of the agreement after the conclusion of negotiations..."_

In the above, the Senator is paraphrasing material from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:

i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.

Presented following is a facsimile of the letter Senator Cruz sent the White House on 16 July 2015 – viewing the whole of what was sent might give a better understanding of the impressions the Senator was under during the course of the week's events.

[The letter which follows can be found at:

https://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/20150716_LettertoPOTUSonIranDeal.pdf.]

For the purposes of this writing, referencing this 16 July 2015 letter clarifies that the Executive Branch had transmitted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to the Congress by at least 16 July 2015. We note from the above facsimile that on Thursday the 16th, Senator Cruz was under the impression: "... _That_ [Ambassador] _Samantha Power has already introduced a draft resolution to the Security Council_ ..." Actually, Ambassador Ms. Power was up to something quite different on that day.

* * * * *

On Thursday July 16, 2015, two days after the July 14th Vienna signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ms. Samantha Power, sent a Letter of Transmittal to the acting President of the United Nations Security Council, Mr. McCully of New Zealand. Ms. Power wrote: " _The United States Mission to the United Nations requests that the attached Missile Technology Control Regime list (see annex) be circulated as a document of the Security Council_." *

*[U.S. AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER: Letter dated 16 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. (United Nations document number S/2015/546): Available on the internet at: https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/6d9eec6cdd36149b85257ddc006cd868/e7551f39803265f285257e92005b6a0c/$FILE/S%202015%20546.pdf [last accessed: August 22, 2016.]]

The letter was necessary as part of a sub-gambit. Nobody needed the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ to be recirculated through the Security Council. Such an action would represent a redundancy. The above list is a well known international document.

It would be like asking the Security Council to re-circulate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is perfectly alright to do so – but it would be sort of a waste of departmental secretaries' time.

The purpose of this seemingly trivial exercise was not necessarily to have the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ circulated. It was to get that Security Council document number appearing on that upper left hand corner of the page of the copied letter of transmittal. This document number was immediately used as a code word, avoiding the need to refer directly to the Annex by name within the text of Resolution 2231 – as we shall soon examine.

When it came time for Congress to debate United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; the use of the code word, which nobody in Congress would think to wonder as to the meaning of or look into, would initially obscure from the body of the Security Council: and, or from the Congress, or from the electorate, positive knowledge that certain classes of weapons were to be made available to Iran through the agreement – as is shown by the provision of Resolution 2231 presented below.

The Code Word was used once in Resolution 2231. It was needed for use in Annex B of the resolution, paragraph 4(a) below. Annex B would never be transmitted to the Congress – nevertheless the code word was used in the following Annex B; paragraph 4(a), which has since become well-known:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B. - Statement

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in _S/2015/546_ and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology **that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems** ; and

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

The code word gambit would make it easier for the administration to hide its assistance to, and promotion of the Iranian expansions of its ballistic missile program and arsenals; and to assert that the agreement authored by the Obama administration, had every intention of retaining sanctions limiting Iranian weapons procurements – as opposed to allowing and promoting unheard of Iranian paying procurement of the latest in western weapons design style in advanced achievement.

The Appendix (Chapter 9) – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex presents a substantial excerpt from the list and gives a pretty good idea of what the administration was attempting to cover up with its code word.

**ON FRIDAY 17 July 2015** : Barack Obama, completely ignoring the Texas Senator's letter as a matter of course; went ahead and had his draft resolution deposited with the Security Council.

Here is a facsimile of the header to the first page of _United States of America: draft resolution S/2015/547_ is presented immediately below presented as verification of the chronology as stated:

The entire document of the original draft resolution (in pfd format) submitted on the 17 July 2015 was to be found at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/547 [last accessed May, 3 2016.]. However, the United Nations has since modified the document it allows the public to review. The new web address finding United States of America: draft resolution is: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2F2015%2F547&Lang=E

What's missing in this newer version here is any mention of the submittal of the draft resolution by the United States – or the date on which the draft resolution was deposited, by the United States, with the Security Council (17 July 2015). That's perhaps an example of part of your Obama-era, post Obama-Era United Nations Security Council emerging style of paperwork deciding upon the new ideal of what to show the public, and when, in this day and age:

The header of this later version does note that the draft resolution was put out for General Distribution on 20 July 2015, the date of adoption of the resolution by the Security Council. Here then, the Security Council establishes its claim that the entire body of the Security Council, which does include the non-permanent Member States of the Council (none of which were privy to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA negotiation itself); here the Security Council establishes its chronology, which verifies the claim (voiced the morning of the 20th by U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power, and which will be documented anon) that there had been no real review of the draft resolution by the entire body of the Security Council before the 9 AM vote for adoption on Monday morning, 20 July 2015, before anyone was really sure if everyone had even already had their cup of coffee yet.

The original version of the draft resolution can still be found in two places that this writing knows of:

_Human Rights Voices_ has it listed at:

http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/7.17.2015.security.council.resolution.iran.pdf

And _document cloud.org_ retains this at:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2168507/security-council-draft-resolution.pdf

The identical adopted Security Council Resolution 2231 version, as adopted on 20 July 2015 is found at is found (in English) at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015)

To find United Nations Security Council resolutions by year refer to: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions

**ON SUNDAY, 19 July 2015** , Obama Spokesperson John Kirby announced in a press release that the State Department had transmitted to Congress everything relevant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – this was the day before Resolution 2231 was even adopted by the Security Council. The resolution didn't exist yet, transmittal of an authorized version was impossible – and since, as the Security Council claims, the draft proposal would only be circulated of the following day; for the State Department to transmit to Congress an official copy of an un-circulated U.N. document would have been a bureaucratic impossibility. Here is what Kirby released to the news media:

"Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include the Unclassified Verification Assessment Report on the JCPOA and the Intelligence Community's Classified Annex to the Verification Assessment Report, as required under the law. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20 ."*

*[DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Press Statement, John Kirby, Washington DC (July 19, 2015). This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# - Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245051.htm]

What Kirby does here is to declare that the administration has transmitted these documents as " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ ;" the act which stipulates that:

Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership— ''(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes;

...and continues on by defining what an "Agreement" as far as it concerns the Bill:

''(1) AGREEMENT.—The term 'agreement' means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.

The JCPOA is of interest; but no more so than the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. According to the law, the 60-day countdown period for review couldn't and can't begin just because the Obama administration had only transmitted a part of Resolution 2231. The President had not transmitted to Congress the main attraction, the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

Sunday 19 July 2015, was the day before Monday 20 July 2017 – the day when the Security Council voted unanimously to recognize the Draft Resolution deposited by the United States administration of President Barack Obama.

It's too easy to know: Barack Obama's intentionally mendacious Puppet Gnome Agent John Kirby claimed to have transmitted everything required by the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ to Congress on the day before the awaited United Nations Security Council authorization qualifying the agreement existed. The United Nations' recognized perception the agreement didn't exist yet.

John Kirby declared that: " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include ...,_ _as required under the law_ _. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20_."

The Obama administration, in asserting that it had sent everything, asserted the irrelevancy of the United Nations Security Council resolution to be declared the following day.

This was the excuse the maliciously mendacious overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress that there were any significant additions to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA that the administration felt might merit any discussion by the Congress of the United States.

This was the excuse the maliciously mendacious overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress the various weapons transactions agreed to within the entirety of Barack Obama's United States Proposed Draft Resolution, which was accepted as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) on 20 July 2019 – the day after Obama Gnome Agent offered the Obama administration's official statement claiming that it had sent everything relevant which needed be submitted to Congress.

**ON MONDAY, 20 July 2015** , the vote adopting Barack Obama's _United States draft proposal S/2015/547_ as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 takes place in the 7488th meeting of the Security Council. Now Barack Obama finally had something to send Congress; but there is no movement at that time of any time following, in that regard, emanating from the Obama White House. The 60 day countdown for Congressional review of the "Iran Deal" officially begins – not because Obama had transmitted Resolution 2231 to the Congress; but because Obama had decided explicitly on his own that the race will get started at that time; perhaps, because it should be thought of as the race to see if Congress would ever figure out within the 60-day countdown period that Obama had not acted on any pretence of an intention to effect transmission of Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress...

The day before the resolution existed; on Sunday 19 July 2015; the Obama administration effectively told the Congress that whatever was in that resolution; to be voted on the next day, wasn't of interest to the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015,_ law. The Obama administration here had implicitly, or maybe more or less explicitly, asserted that many of the agreed upon weapons transfers to Iran which are reflected in parts of Resolution 2231 other than Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, were not of interest to Congress or the law Obama had signed on to. Whatever the case contemplated and put into effect by the Obama administration; there was never a transmittal of Resolution 2231 to the Congress from the; but further confirmation on that point is required:

**ON WEDNESDAY, 22 July 2015** , White House Spokesperson John Kirby held a press conference in the White House.

The following is a recounting of some further details of the questions posed, and answers given during that July 22 press Conference.

QUESTION: _Yes, please. Just to clarify, you mentioned that the Congress has what we have. And in the same time you mentioned yesterday and today in a TV appearance that you transferred to the Congress all the documents that you have regarding this issue. Can you describe it? I mean, what is it? I mean, it's like it is detailed or it's just – I assume it's not --_

MR KIRBY: _It's the entire set of documents that go along with the deal to include the annexes and a verification assessment._

QUESTION: _...It's all the technical, the financial part and everything?_

MR KIRBY: _...It's – everything that we have about this deal has been provided to Congress. And I would point out that much of it is already available to all of you online._

QUESTION: _...It's not the 158 pages, right? It's more than that, right?_

MR KIRBY: ...There is some additional information provided there, yeah, but a lot of it's already been made publicly available. But yes, everything is up there. It got there on Sunday.*

*[U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT: Daily Press Briefing - Washington DC (July 22, 2015); John Kirby, spokesperson. This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# - Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/07/245186.htm]

It was all a nonsensical lie, of course. On Sunday, 19 July 2015; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 didn't exist yet. Kirby simply made up an inane story to cover for the Obama administration's refusal to transmit the resolution to Congress. And naturally., the imbecile members of the 114th Congress , incapable of exhibiting any common sense whatsoever, unanimously swallowed the story whole; And naturally, no member of the 114th Congress would take an interest in going up to the Security Council website and pulling down a free copy of the resolution to read it and consider what it might contain. This was, and remains even today, the going standard of disinterest in this whole issue of Barack Obama's "Iran Nuclear Deal."

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 was not going to get transmitted to the Congress. Going through the Congressional Record, and State Department records, there is no trace of anything having to do with Obama's "Iran Deal" being transmitted or received after that Sunday, the 19th. The Statements made on the 22nd by John Kirby would be the White House final word on the matter.

That no one in Congress would complain about how the information being relayed by the White House simply didn't match up with the facts is another example of the lack attention, the dinterest; and the primitive nature of discussion surrounding this issue of Security Council Resolution 2231, "JCPOA."

* * * * *

But not quite; the White House later, in December 2015, made a very interesting declaration in writing concerning this "Obama Deal" which was never reviewed by the Congress.

Although everyone in Congress knew about the 20 July 2015 vote in the Security Council, it was blithely ignored until members of the Senate – Republicans Tom Cotton and Mike Pompeo made an earth-shattering discovery/observation on or around 18 September 2015 that nobody in Congress had any signed copies of the JCPOA.

This discovery dawned on these two after both Houses of Congress had voted on something purported to be the "Iran Nuclear Deal" on 10 and 11 September 2017, a little over a week before.

Being the wondering audience they were, Senator Pompeo wrote the State Department, Secretary of State John Kerry, on 18 September 2015, asking questions:

Dear Secretary Kerry:

I have reviewed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Islamic Republic of Iran – or at least the parts of the agreement that were provided to Congress by the administration. As you know, pursuant to H. Res. 411, the House of Representatives considers the documents transmitted on July 19, 2015 incomplete in light of the fact that the secret side deals between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran were not provided to Congress. I look forward to seeing the entire agreement – including the two secret side deals that are part of the JCPOA – so that Congress may continue to evaluate the JCPOA and, depending on the outcome of the vote under the relevant provisions of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, potentially end the current and continuing prohibition of the lifting of sanctions on Iran.

During that review, I found that the copies provided to Congress of the JCPOA are not signed by any of the P5+1 members nor by Iran. Having never seen an international agreement of this magnitude not signed by the parties or an agent of the parties, I assume this is simply an oversight or an administrative error. That is, Congress must not have the final version of the agreement that would necessarily be signed. I request that you provide us with copies of a final, executed copy of the JCPOA. In the event that the JCPOA has not yet been signed by the parties, please inform us (a) when signatures will be placed on the agreement, (b) what parties will be signing, and (c) which person you anticipate will sign on behalf of each of those parties, including on behalf of the United States.

I am confident that you intended for the JCPOA to be signed by each of the P5+1 participants. I can find no international agreement of this "historic" nature that was not signed by the parties. Each of the past five major nuclear agreements to which the U.S. is a party – SALT I, SALT II, START I, START II and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea – were signed by representatives of each nation that was party to the agreement. This is not a mere formality. Those signatures represent the commitment of the signatory and the country on whose behalf he or she is signing.

A signature also serves to make clear precisely who the parties to the agreement are and the authority under which that nation entered into the agreement. In short, just as with any legal instrument, signing matters.

This is particularly important with respect to JCPOA. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has made clear that he does not believe that JCPOA is legally binding on his nation, saying, "If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is sent to (and passed by) parliament, it will create an obligation for the government. It will mean the president, who has not signed it so far, will have to sign it. Why should we place an unnecessary legal restriction on the Iranian people?"

Given the many benefits that will accrue to the ayatollahs, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and other unsavory elements of the Iranian regime, I believe that Iran should, at the very least, bind itself to the few requirements placed on it under the JCPOA by signing the agreement. I also believe that the United States and its P5+1 partners on the JCPOA should execute the agreement on behalf of their countries. I look forward to your response.

We all do. *

*[The text of the letter was found in two places

https://cjhsla.org/2015/11/01/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/

And:

http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/2015/09/19/

I was unable to locate an original facsimile; however, the response to the letter from the State Department verifies that the letter was sent.]

The text of the response follows – and a facsimile of the response is presented after:

Dear Mr. Pompeo.:

Thank you for your September 18 letter regarding the nuclear deal with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the European Union. As you know, the United States has a long-standing practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in political commitments.

The success of the JCPOA will depend not whether it is legally binding or signed, but rather on the extensive verification measures we have put in place, as well as Iran's understanding that we have the capacity to re-impose and ramp up – our sanction if Iran does not meet its commitments.

Everything the JCPOA and its annexes are commitments Iran made, and must keep, to remain in compliance. Iran breaks these commitments, we can snap back both unilateral and UN sanction.

We provided Congress with everything agreed to between the P5+1 and Iran in the JCPOA, in full compliance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INAEA). There are no "secret deals" between the P5+1 and Iran, and no JCPOA document that Congress does not already have. The Administration is fully committed to providing information to Congress to ensure full transparency as we implement the JCPOA.

We hope this information is useful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Julia Frifield; Assistant Secretary; Legislative Affairs.

The facsimile presented next can be found at: _http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/11.24.2015.state.dept.letter.jcpoa.pdf_

The letter claims that the JCPOA was unsigned. The letter doesn't mention that the JCPOA had been incorporated into the larger, Resolution 2231 program and that the resolution's policy of arms transactions is not presented in the resolution's Annex A: JCPOA.

To an extent – this letter gives evidence; again, that Resolution 2231 was never transmitted to the Congress, and never looked at or voted on by the Congress.

* * * * *

– **Chapter 16 –  
** – Appendix 8 – IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.##/Part 2 –

What is allowed and what is not allowed as far as concerns IAEA Participation in review of nuclear related assets acquired by Iran is detailed in the JCPOA as follows:

Below is the Statement of purpose the International Atomic Energy Agency has declared concerning this INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list of inventories the Agency itself had put together:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013);

GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR-RELATED DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, SOFTWARE, AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY*

OBJECTIVE

1. With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, suppliers have had under consideration procedures in relation to the transfer of certain equipment, materials, software, and related technology that could make a major contribution to a "nuclear explosive activity," an "unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity" or acts of nuclear terrorism. In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common definitions, and an export control list of equipment, materials, software, and related technology. Suppliers intend to implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation and relevant international commitments.

And some of the Basic Principles are:

BASIC PRINCIPLE

2. Suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, materials, software, or related technology identified in the Annex:

– for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or

– in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or

– when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism.

*[ INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents \- or as an alternate https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]]

The Security Council asserts its claim that Security Council has the authority to declare any of its decisions, at any time, to be an exception to any accepted rule made under the authority of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council presented a fabricated misrepresentation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25; which the resolution idiotically submits in its clause 14 of the introduction to Resolution 2231:

* * * * *

