[MUSIC PLAYING]
DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN:
I'm not implying anything.
I think that first-- this
is not a balkanized country,
but geography does divide
even the Pashtun part
of the population.
So you're not changing anything.
It's a reality.
You have ethnic
minorities in the north,
you have a permeating Hazara
problem in different levels,
and isolated areas of
Pashtun population.
Are we going to go in
and change a structure
of ethnic and
sectarian geography
and somehow create a tightly
unified central state?
Of course not.
What happens however,
is in that balance,
is largely going to be
their set of choices.
It worked relatively well
until the Soviet invasion.
It can't work that way
today because the population
is more than three
times what it was
at the time of the
Soviet invasion.
And it is far more urbanized.
But the balance
of political power
is going to depend-- once you
create provincial and district
authorities and as you
put more and more pressure
on the central
government to become
responsible people-- on them.
We're not going to
be in a position
to tell the Afghans
what they should be.
And let me be very careful
about all of these figures.
You can get rough estimates
of what might happen.
These are not plans.
This is not the kind of
case where you can say,
of course we know
what's going to happen.
Here are the schedules.
You can draw those
up any time as long
as you don't believe in them.
DR. CORDESMAN: I
think the problem
you are dealing with is, first,
there isn't "The" Taliban.
There are at least three
major concentrations
of Taliban plus the Haqqani
and [INAUDIBLE] group.
And some rather
disturbing elements
of extremist groups, which
are linked not necessarily
to foreign terrorists in
large numbers, but which
have a steady and increasing
penetration by them.
The eastern Taliban have much
closer relations with Al Qaeda
than the Taliban centered in
the south which is under Omar.
But here, part of the problem
is that while everyone
is sort of titularly
loyal to Omar,
you have to understand the
geography of what happens even
in Helmand province.
Basically, southern
Helmand is a desert.
The Helman River is
the populated area.
The north is a key concentration
of what is happening
in terms of actual Taliban.
The north is not concentrated
around the southern Taliban.
The influx in most of
the foreign volunteers
are coming in through the
east in the upper areas.
Their ties, after eight
years at the cadre level
to not so much Al Qaeda
in the formal sense,
but to a much better articulated
view of Islamic extremism
versus the kind of largely
nationalist and narrow movement
of the original Taliban,
has evolved substantially.
But when you look at this,
what would they do if they won?
I think it is relatively clear
that their relations with Al
Qaeda are good
enough so it could
be seen as a sanctuary area.
The very victory of
that Taliban group
would have a massive impact
in the region on the security
a Pakistan, but it
would also affect
Central Asia where many of the
foreign volunteers are coming.
It's not an accident that
Iran, while it has attempted
to create significant and
economic influence in the west
of Afghanistan, has also
steadily improved its defenses
along the border area.
Because it too faces problems.
And would this impact on
say, the Al Qaeda and Algeria
or other Islamist movements
throughout the world?
Of course it.
Because you have
what would be seen
as a massive strategic victory.
Does that mean the
world comes to an end?
Of course not.
Can you contain it?
Possibly.
But the reality is that
one way or another we'll
still face these kinds of
struggles in varied forms
in good part of the world.
Indonesia may make
progress, but it
isn't going to eradicate this.
The ties are not winning
in southern Thailand.
The problems that you see
building in Yemen and Somalia
are coupled in
ideology and imagery
to what happens in
Afghanistan, but are not
shaped by either Al Qaeda in its
headquarters or by the Taliban.
Ensure demographics,
weak governments,
and other pressures ensure
that one way or another,
we will be facing these kind
of movements for at least
the next decade and
probably well beyond.
Well first, I'm
not sure that you
can tie the outcome
in Afghanistan
to any one of the options
that General McChrystal has
been talking about.
There's a little too much
emphasis on troop levels
and far too little emphasis on
where our [INAUDIBLE] area is
building up aid, creating
stronger Afghan forces,
funneling aid and structures
through local governance.
So one of the problems is until
you see the entire strategy
and evaluate it, pegging
the outcome on troops
might tell you something
about the speed of action.
But it doesn't tell you
about the level of success.
I'm not sure that I would call
regional politics geo-politics,
but what the heck.
I'll accept the term.
You can always make the
rational bargainer or argument
that all of these countries
share common values,
and what they really want and
need is a stable Afghanistan.
The problem is none
of them know it.
Iran is pursuing its goals
without great problems
as yet for NATO ISAF or
the US or anyone else
of creating what they see
as sort of a stabilizing
presence in the West,
backing the Hazara,
and essentially securing
their eastern areas
where they have deep security
problems and ethnic problems
of their own--
particularly in the south.
This is not the
regime that negotiated
with Jim Dobbins and others
after the fall of the Taliban.
It is much harder line.
And frankly, it shows
much less interest
in pursuing any strategy
other than its own,
which is contained
an opportunistic.
Looking for any clear
pattern from Central Asia--
at this point in
time, they might
react if the Taliban really
scored massive gains.
But recreating the
Northern Alliance
does not, at this point,
seems particularly easy.
And the Central Asian states--
while they do have in theory,
an interest in Afghanistan,
tend to be far more interested
in themselves and their own
internal security, stability,
and advantage, trying to balance
off conflicting external powers
to whatever they can get while
ignoring their own Islamists.
India and Pakistan are certainly
competing in Afghanistan.
India's there with a
significant aid presence.
Pakistan still has
ties to the Taliban.
Ambassador Holbrooke
is certainly
seeking to find better
regional solutions.
But are we suddenly
going to use Afghanistan
to solve the Kashmir problem
and through that reduce
Indian and Pakistani tensions?
It is a noble objective.
I would wish it on any
diplomat who cares to try,
but these are
opportunistic powers
who have played this
game for a long time.
And they are going to
continue to play it
unless they see very strong
incentives to play it
differently.
And none of them
at this point do.
