Some people argue that Hitler shouldn’t
have gone East in 1941, and should have waited
until 1942, when the Wehrmacht may have been
better prepared to fight the Soviet Union.
I have argued against this view before, having
talked about the oil crisis in several videos.
Still, some remain firm in their conviction
that Hitler should have waited in 1941. Well,
today I’m going to add more weight to the
idea that Hitler had no choice but to attack
in 1941 by talking once more about the food
crisis in the Third Reich. I’ve mentioned
this before in a few videos - the Fate of
Soviet Prisoners of War video, and the Stalingrad
videos, to name but a few - but in today’s
video we’re going to hear what one of the
highest ranking members of the Hitler regime
thought about the situation.
Now I know that Goebbels was the propaganda
minister, and I know that we should be sceptical
of his views, but the words he writes in his
diary in regards to the food crisis in the
Reich are supported by other sources; including
what is an awesome book by Collingham - The
Taste of War. And since this is his personal
diary, and doesn’t exactly present a favourable
view of the food situation, I’m inclined
to believe these passages are a true reflection
of what was happening in the Third Reich in
1942 and 1943.
To add some context to this, when the German
Army marched East in 1941, the plan was for
the men to ‘live off the land’ rather
than burden the Reich with having to feed
their own troops. In fact, far from feeding
their own troops, they wanted those troops
to ship food pillaged from the Soviet territories
back to the Reich, which they did. And this
was necessary, since (for various reasons)
the Reich was suffering a shortage of food.
Grain reserves (which were the staple food
for the Reich) fell from 5.5 million tons
in 1939, to 2 million tons in 1941, and were
down to 670,000 tons by the middle of 1942.
Clearly, if they didn’t extract more food
from the occupied territories, rations would
have to be reduced, and the Germans would
go hungry. We know how devastating an impact
a food shortage had on Germany in the First
World War, so a similar scenario could have
played out the second time round.
The questions I want you to have in the back
of your mind as I read these passages are
these: what would have happened if the three
or so million men of the German Army hadn’t
gone East in 1941, but had stayed at home?
What would have happened if they hadn’t
‘lived off the land’ and pillaged and
plundered the food, shipping it to the Reich?
In addition, what would have happened if there
had been 3 or so more million mouths for the
Reich to feed in 1942 if the Germans hadn’t
sent those mouths Eastwards? And how would
this have then impacted the situation in 1943?
With those questions in mind, here are passages
from Goebbels’s diary, presented in chronological
order.
From the 14th of October 1939 -
“Great debate about supplies of fat. In
hotels, too much meat continues to be given
out without ration cards. I take steps against
it…”
4th of December 1939 -
“Study a memorandum from Darré on the food-supply
situation and its future development. There
are all possible sorts of problems to be overcome
in this area. And in the near future they
can only get worse. Darré’s responsibilities
are unenviable. The transportation question
is particularly difficult. We can expect all
sorts on this front…”
15th of December 1940 -
“Darré has made a speech dealing with our
food situation. We are well-placed in this
respect, it seems.”
1st of May 1941 -
“Backe gives me a report on the food situation.
Meat is going to have to be cut by 100 grams
per week from the 2nd of June. The Wehrmacht
is too well off and is using up too much of
the available ration. Per head, three times
that allowed to the civilian population. We
can hope to get by so far as bread is concerned,
as long as there are no problems with the
harvest. Fat is still in reasonable supply.
If we have to go through a third year at war,
then we shall consume the last reserves of
bread. But nevertheless we are better off
than England in many respects. But our situation
is by no means rosy. I now face the question
of how I am to put this over to the public.
I shall wait for the most favourable moment
possible and then make the announcement. Backe’s
control of his department is masterly. If
anything is possible, then he will do it.”
6th of May 1941 -
“Backe describes the food situation. Along
the same lines as his report to me a few days
ago. A few extra details, which give reasons
for optimism. All we need is a good harvest
this year. And then, of course, we intend
to be firmly established in the East.”
28th of June 1941 -
“The food supply situation in Berlin is
very bad. No potatoes, very few vegetables.
But Backe tells me that it will improve in
a week. It is due to the weather and the transport
situation. But the people have to eat. I am
keeping an eye on things. The position in
the occupied territories is much worse. In
some areas there is real starvation.”
3rd of July 1941 -
“Something close to starvation is widespread
in France and Belgium. For this reason, feelings
there are very mixed. What would the Bolshevik
infection have been able to achieve if the
Soviet Union had really attacked? It does
not bear thinking about. Thank God, we have
every prospect of a better harvest this time.
So long as the weather does not play a dirty
trick on us at the last moment.”
From the 24th of January 1942 -
“The Reich Food Ministry is insistent that
the price of potatoes be raised. I am against
that. While it is true that the farmers must
get better prices as an incentive for increasing
the crop acreage, on the other hand one cannot
overlook the fact that a raise in the price
of potatoes chiefly affects the masses, for
in the budget of the common man the price
of potatoes plays quite a different role from
that in the budget of the wealthier classes.
I therefore favor a policy of premiums financed
by the state.”
10th of February 1942 -
“Beginning April 6th, food rations must
be reduced. Emphasis is laid upon the fact,
however, that the workers performing hardest
labor and the children are not to be affected
too much. That is important, especially so
far as the children are concerned.”
“There can be no doubt that the rations
in force after April 6th will no longer be
sufficient to guarantee health and the maintenance
of reserves of human labor power. We must
therefore expect a number of developments
which we have hitherto been in a position
to avoid. We are now gradually entering upon conditions
that in some ways resemble those of World
War I during its third year. It is quite obvious
that a war which extends over so long a period
of time, and encompasses such tremendous spaces
of earth, cannot but make a dent in the food
economy of a people. It is satisfying and
comforting, however, to know that similar
conditions obtain in England also, so that
our difficulties are not because of the blockade
but rather because of the long duration of
the war.”
19th of February 1942 -
“The food difficulties in all occupied areas
are enormous. For some time to come we shall
not be able to overcome them. The wonder to
me is that the people in the occupied areas
are remaining so quiet.”
6th of March 1942 -
“The food situation in the occupied eastern
areas is exceptionally precarious. Thousands
and tens of thousands of people are dying
of hunger without anybody even raising a finger.
We shall undoubtedly face exceptional difficulties
and problems there for a number of years to
come. Very much water will still have to flow
down the Rhine before this area has been integrated
into the European economy and its rich products
made available to our section of the globe.”
7th of April 1942 -
“From Lisbon we had news via Sweden that
the internal situation in the Soviet Union
is desperate. Hunger is rampant to a degree
that the human imagination cannot conceive.
If Stalin doesn’t soon achieve military
successes on a huge scale, the Soviet system
is doomed to collapse. While I don’t judge
the situation to be so dramatic as it is here
represented, there is no doubt some truth
to this analysis.”
14th of April 1942 -
“Gluttony in foreign missions is creating
a lot of bad blood. Thus a reception was recently
held in the Croatian Legation during which
a thousand of our people prominent in state,
Party, and Wehrmacht filled their bellies.
This is such an unworthy and shameless behaviour
that something has to be done against it.
I demanded of the Foreign Office that it reduce
the rations for the diplomats, and especially
cut the allocation of gasoline down drastically,
since a situation has developed whereby certain
diplomats get themselves “gasoline sweethearts”
with whom they go on excursions on Sundays
out into God’s free nature. That naturally
causes severe criticism by the public. The
diplomats should adjust themselves to the
general usages of the country. They have no
right to live the lives of drones at our expense,
especially not when they are diplomats representing
powers that are on terms of friendship with
us and are fighting the war on our side.”
29th of April 1942 -
“A report from the Reich Health Office goes
into elaborate detail to prove that the food
rations authorized at present are not sufficient
for maintaining a normal state of health.
We know that! I notice it in my own case.
But there is no other choice. If we lost the
war the rations at our disposal would suffice
even less to keep up the health of the German
people.”
2nd of May 1942 -
“As regards food [in the East], we are not
to expect too much in the immediate future.
German troops have devoured everything there.
There are no cattle left and there is a dearth
of horses and other draft animals, so that
the plows must again be drawn by human beings.
It is not hard to imagine what the results
will be. As one can see here, it isn’t sufficient
to possess land, one must also be in a position
to work it.”
“I received a report about the present position
of [German] agriculture which is anything
but encouraging. There is a dearth of seeds,
of man power, of gasoline, of horses, of cattle,
of good weather - in short of just about everything
essential to guarantee sufficient food. It
may be necessary next autumn to take in our
belts a few more notches.”
4th of May 1942 -
“The weather is still terrible, and truly
poisonous for our harvest. Rain won’t come,
and sun won’t come either. The temperature
has sunk again. If that continues, we shall
have to count on a complete crop failure.”
6th of May 1942 -
“The food situation is becoming constantly
more critical on account of the continuing
bad weather. We are going to have to put up
with an exceedingly dangerous shortage of
fats. It will probably be necessary soon to
reduce the fat rations again considerably.
In my opinion that will lead to a tremendous
lowering of morale. It won’t help matters
either that we may possibly be able to increase
the meat rations slightly. Our present reserves
of meat are owing to the fact that we have
had to slaughter a lot of cattle because of
the lack of fodder.”
Quick note - the Germans used grain as fodder
during WW2, so a failure for farmers to grow
grain would result in a shortage of cattle,
as well as other animals - like pigs.
7th of May 1942 -
“The Führer did not accept my proposal
to reduce appreciably the rations for the
diplomats. He believes the good rations [for
the diplomats] are partly the reason for their
reporting so favourably on Germany. I can’t
quite believe this and am going to try once
more to present my viewpoint to the Führer.”
By this point, German civilians who didn’t
work were on just 1,358 calories per day,
which simply wasn’t enough to sustain life.
And the workers were also suffering. German
officials had taken note that miners in the
Ruhr had lost up to 6 kilograms in weight
- some of that was muscle, which they were
concerned would decrease their capacity to
work.
For the next entry, Goebbels talks about Richard
Darré (Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture)
and his replacement, Herbert Backe (who had
previously been the main developer of the
Backe-Plan, or the Hunger Plan - which had
called for the starving of the Soviet people
and the extraction of food to feed the Reich).
So, on the 19th of May 1942, Goebbels writes -
“Darré is completely discredited with the
Führer. He deserved it. In these serious
times he occupied himself with writing “think-pieces”
and books instead of getting order into the
food situation, even though his means are
limited. The Führer deals only with Backe.
Darré is a great flop and nowise equal to
the tasks of war.”
21st of May 1942 -
“The food situation is causing us great
worry. According to a report by the Food Ministry
the question of seed is especially depressing.
During the next autumn, we shall lack the
necessary grain so that we shall again be
compelled to revise the bread rations considerably
downward. That is a reduction that hits the
broad masses of the people hardest. It would
help matters if we at least had an abundance
of potatoes, but if this swinish weather continues,
as at present, there isn’t a ghost of a
chance of this either.”
“As regards bread, we won’t be able to
avoid mixing barley into it to a large extent.
That will further reduce both the quality
and the nutritive value of the bread. In short,
we are faced with a problem which human intelligence
and talent for organization are powerless
to solve. Every day we look to heaven with
fear and trembling to see whether the right
mixture of rain and sunshine will come. We
are surely a poor people, and if we continue
to exist at all as a nation this is owing
solely to our industry and intelligence.”
“The Führer has at last decided to boot
out Darré. Backe is to be his successor.
I begged the Führer urgently, however, not
to make a public front-page announcement,
because that would carry with it the danger
that all mistakes made in our food policies
and all curtailments of rations would be blamed
on Darré and thereby on the National Socialist
regime, for Darré, after all, is a National
Socialist minister. The Führer agreed to
this and was willing merely to have an item
published about Darré’s illness which,
for the present, prevents him from attending
to his duties of his office; meanwhile he
is to be replaced by Backe.”
“Backe does his job in an exemplary manner.
You can depend upon him. He is not a pale
theoretician like Darré, but a real, first-class
man of practice. I never thought much of Darré.
His theories are pure fiction. He doesn’t
understand much of practical farm life. His
slogan, too, of blood and soil has been so
ridden to death by himself and his henchmen
that you can hardly even tempt a dog away
from behind the stove with it.”
Quick note - the slogan of ‘Blood and Soil’
- ‘Blut und Boden’ - was a play on Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck’s ‘Blood and Iron’
- ‘Blut und Eisen’ - speech in 1862.
22nd of May 1942 -
“I have received a report about the present
food situation in Berlin. It gives cause for
the greatest worry. Again there is a shortage
of potatoes. What we have accumulated in the
way of reserves must now be given out as seed
potatoes. The early harvest will keep us waiting
a good many weeks more, and we can hardly
expect anything from Italy. We must therefore
attempt to bridge over a whole series of weeks.
There are no possibilities of getting extra
bread or flour; in short, here again is a
precarious situation that without a doubt
may become the normal condition for the coming
months of autumn and winter.”
“The letters arriving from various parts
of the country indicate that the masses of
the people are getting increasingly angry
about the food situation. For this reason
I think that the dismissal of Darré at this
moment was more than dangerous psychologically.”
Unfortunately, the entries of Goebbels’
diaries between the period of late May to
mid-December 1942 are missing, presumably
destroyed at the end of the war. So, we miss
out on his views at what can only be described
as an important point in the war, in terms
of the fighting itself and the food crisis
in the Reich. We pick up on the food crisis
once more on the 13th of December 1942 -
“The supply train from the Ukraine that
Koch placed at my disposal has arrived in
Berlin. It brought great quantities of high-grade
food, especially butter. I have given orders
that this food be distributed only to the
wounded, the families with many children,
and old people.”
“Distribution is to take place on a somewhat
smaller scale than originally planned, so
that every beneficiary may receive a really
decent portion. “One must not thin out an
operation of this kind too much, because that
does not impress the public. This food from
the Ukraine does not have only intrinsic value;
it is also to serve a propaganda purpose.”
Entering 1943, Backe was able to get grain
reserves back up to 1.2 million tons from
the 670,000 tons the year before. So the immediate
crisis for the Reich had passed. Still, there
was talk of more ration cuts, and it was clear
that entire areas of the East had been stripped
bare of anything edible. On the 9th of March
1942, Goebbels writes -
“I studied the material on the reduction
of the meat ration by fifty grams [1¾ oz.]
as proposed by our Food Ministry. I regard
this as absolutely necessary to avoid having
to slaughter the last cattle in the Ukraine.
That would have a very bad psychological effect
since even the Bolsheviks left at least one
cow to a farmer. I shall speak earnestly about
this to the Führer since we cannot found
our food policies on illusions. The occupied
areas must of course do their part in feeding
the Reich, but you can’t expect a cow to
give milk and let herself be eaten up at the
same time.”
20th of March 1943 -
“In this connection it is interesting to
note that the Wehrmacht demands food rations
for thirteen million drafted soldiers, whereas
actually only about nine million are inducted.
I brought this matter up with the Führer,
because this may open up a possibility of
avoiding a cut in meat rations. The Führer
is having these figures checked over. One
can see from this incident how irresponsibly
certain circles operate with figures. Statistics
do not only prove, they also lie. Anybody
who depends on statistics is sunk.”
9th of May 1943 -
“Backe has reported to the Führer. The
Führer simply won’t approve a 100-gram
reduction in the meat ration. Yet it is so
necessary. If we don’t put it through we
are headed for a catastrophe.”
Yes, the Germans were getting increasingly
hungry, as Collingham makes clear -
“By 1943-44 an ordinary German civilian
was eating 40 per cent less fat, 60 per cent
less meat and 20 per cent less bread than
in 1939.”
Speaking with Werner Naumann on the 22nd of
May 1943, Goebbels writes -
“[Naumann does not] think much of Backe.
He believes that Backe’s policies will gradually
lead to the complete ruin of our stock of
cattle. He deduces this from his own experiences
with his farm in western Germany… I believe
he is more pessimistic than the situation
warrants. Nevertheless I believe he is right
in his contention that Backe is too much of
a theoretician and therefore is getting to
be more and more impractical. The whole Food
Ministry - but this is more the fault of Darré
than of Backe - is quite a dogmatic institution,
totally unsuited to wartime.”
In my opinion, these passages are very telling
of the situation that presented itself in
the Reich. It would not be wrong to conclude
that if the German Army hadn’t marched East
in 1941, and hadn’t ‘lived off the land’
and extracted food from the occupied territories
and shipped it back to the Reich, the Germans
would have gone even more hungry than they
already were. What impact this would have
had on the German war effort can only be imagined,
but at the very least, the food crisis meant
that it probably would have been a bad idea
for Hitler to have delayed the war in the
East until 1942. Thanks for watching, bye
for now.
