Ok,now,let us talk about the question of 
Mencius’ “Philosophic Anthropology”.
To a certain extent,
Mencius developed a “philosophic anthropology”.
What is it to be human?
What is something that distinguishes humans from animals?
Mencius’s position is clear.
It is moral competence that distinguishes humans from animals.
Human beings can be led to act from pure moral motives.
This can be done only when they realize that the capacity
for such behavior lie latent within their own individual selves.
It is an inborn “natural” tendency of the human organism.
Mencius and Gaozi have a debate on human nature.
Gaozi maintains that human nature is that
“which is inborn (and common to all living things)”
The only “inborn” common propensities of living things
are the appetites for food and sex.
All else is presumably shaped by environment.
Only these common propensities of all living things
are “internal” to humans at birth.
All else is internalized by culture “out there”.
Gaozi says that while Ren is internal,
righteousness is external.
In this context,
Gaozi’s Ren is not that much broad-sense as it is in Analects.
It is used to refer to the natural affections,
closely associated with sexual attraction.
“Righteousness” is used here to refer to the capacity to act
correctly in all the complex circumstances of civilized human life.
According to Gaozi,
it cannot derive from any inner instinct or innate, intuitive capacity.
It is based on learned rules of behavior that is
to be internalized from outside.
For instance,
we may have a natural affection for elders
who are our kin because they are kin,
but we have no inborn propensity to respect elders as a class
even though Confucian morality prescribes such respect.
“There is an elderly man and I treat him as an elder (with respect).
It is not that I have the propensity within myself to treat him
as an elder just as my recognition of the fact that he is white
is due to my power to perceive whiteness in him.
It is because
the whiteness (like the rule of treating elders as elders)
comes from without that I recognize him as white.”
The rule “treat elders with respect” derives from no inner impulse.
It is acquired only from without,
maybe through coercion or education.
Mencius’ response is this.
Mencius believes in the “objective” prescriptions of Li.
This he gets from Confucius.
He does not doubt that those prescriptions of Li can be learned.
But the crucial point is that what is learned
is really ours to begin with.
The Li are the expressions of
a capacity for “humanity and righteousness”.
This capacity is intrinsic to the human organism.
What is right is inherent in human nature.
In the learning process of human life experiences,
this capacity would be activated to bring about moral behaviors.
In their debate,
Mencius asks Gaozi if the concept of “nature” is that
which is inborn in all living things,
the common property shared by all living things,
just as all white things are white.
To this, Gaozi does not object.
Mencius continue to ask if
saying that all white things are white is the same as
saying that man is nothing but an animal
since man shares certain properties with animals.
To this Gaozi gives an affirmative reply.
Mencius presses on,
“Is the whiteness of a white feather the same as
the whiteness of white snow and the whiteness of white jade?”
Obviously they are different from each other.
A white feather is different from white snow.
They are different from a white jade.
Properties do not always help in picking out objects.
Although they share the same property of whiteness,
they are different from each other. 
Mencius proceeds to ask,
“Is then the nature of a hound the same as the nature of an ox,
and the nature of an ox the same as the nature of a man?”
Of course not.
Although a hound, an ox,
and a man share the same nature of biological need for food and sex,
they are radically different from each other.
The inborn biological properties are not sufficient for us
to differentiate a hound from an ox,
from a man.
So, any properties whether intrinsic or extrinsic
cannot be used to identify objects.
Men and animals are different
although they share something in common.
Gaozi and his disciples continue to challenge the view
that the prescriptions of right behavior could possibly
have their source in any innate moral propensity.
“If a man from the village is a year older than your elder brother,
whom do you respect?”
asks a disciple of Gaozi.
“My elder brother,”
replies Mencius’ disciple Gong Duzi.
“In filling the cups of wine (on ceremonial village occasions)
whom do you give precedence to?”
“To the man from the village.”
“The one you truly respect is the former,
the one you treat as an elder is the latter.
This shows that it (correct action) is external not internal.”
The respect for one’s elder brother is an extension
of natural familial affection (Ren).
It is internal.
The rule that on certain village occasions the fact of age itself 
takes precedence over kinship ties is based on no internal moral impulse.
It is simply obedience to a learned external rule.
Correct action in a specific situation is external.
This is no problem.
It is correct to respect one’s elder brother on certain occasions.
It is also correct to respect the man
from the village on other occasions.
They are both external actions.
Mencius’ emphasis is that external actions
are rooted in internal moral sense.
When you say you respect your elder brother,
you are supposed to have a sense of respect
for your brother in your heart.
If you respect the man from the village,
you also need to have a moral sense of doing it.
Maybe this time,
your moral sense is based on moral account.
Whatever you do, you cannot do things blindly.
You are a moral agent.
Your moral act issues from your moral understanding.
Mencius claims that moral understanding is an innate capacity.
This innate capacity distinguishes humans from animals.
Mencius describes the innate moral capacity in terms of
a four-fold potentiality from the beginning.
In the actual growing individual,
this four-fold potentiality manifests itself as
the so-called four beginnings (si-duan).
They are the four spontaneous dispositions of feeling
which are present in the child from the beginning.
They remain latently present in the corrupted adult.
If properly nourished and if unblocked by impediments,
such feelings will grow plantlike into the full maturity
of the four cardinal moral sentiments.
The four cardinal moral sentiments constitute
the fully actualized human nature.
They are spontaneous and intuitive,
unreflective and uncalculating,
when they are not impeded.
They are dispositional acts.
The four sentiments are specified as the sentiment of
compassion (the inability to bear the suffering of others),
the sentiment of shame,
the sense of courtesy and deference,
and the sense of what is right and wrong in given life situations.
If all these dispositions are allowed to
achieve their full development,
they will be realized into the four cardinal virtues.
Compassion matures into humanity (Ren);
the sense shame matures into the virtue of
righteousness (Yi) in all life situations.
The sense of courtesy and deference matures into the spirit of Li;
and the ability to make intuitive moral judgments
leads to true moral knowledge (Zhi).
The four cardinal virtues are ultimately one,
though one can think of them separately
as intimately related aspects of the good.
The first virtue of humanity is clearly illustrated in
the famous example of the infant on the brink of falling into a well.
Any human being,
no matter how corrupted or dulled by
the habits of an unworthy life,
will feel a spontaneous,
uncalculating impulse to snatch the child away from the well.
“Not because he wants to get into the good graces of the parents;
not because he wishes to win the praises
of his fellow villagers or friends,
nor because he dislike the cry of the child.”
The virtue of humanity is expressed through
the dispositional act of saving the child from falling into the well.
Similarly, other virtues can also be expressed
through dispositional acts.
Dispositional acts are used as indicators to show human nature.
This is consistent with Daoist view as
is discussed in Laozi and Zhuangzi.
As a matter of fact,
in the real world,
not all human acts are dispositional acts.
Daoist solution is that all the non-dispositional acts
are to be removed from the human world.
They want to change status quo in a radical way.
If this is impossible,
they would be withdrawn from the actual world.
Facing this situation,
Mencius tries to make clear how dispositions are hampered
and what to do to instate the world of dispositions.
When dispositions are reinstated,
human nature would be illumined.
Mencius believes that what deflects or blocks the nature
from its natural trajectory is an evil sociopolitical environment.
The parable of “Ox Mountain” seems to illustrate this point.
The trees on Ox Mountain are constantly being cut down by axes
and new shoots are constantly being devoured by sheep and oxen.
Yet the shoots continue to sprout and
the mountain continues to be bald and desolate.
For ordinary people,
the shoots of virtue are constantly being cut down
by the economic sufferings and
constant warfare brought about by harsh and ruthless rulers.
The shoots of goodness in the rulers are also blocked
although they enjoy all the creature comforts.
Maybe the parable of Ox Mountain is meant to refer to the rulers.
“Do not be puzzled by the king’s lack of wisdom.
Even a plant that grows most readily will not survive if it is
placed in the sun for one day and exposed to the cold for ten.”
We can guess that the cold winds to which the king
is exposed are his sycophant courtiers and evil advisors.
Maybe Mencius himself represents the one day of warm sun.
The ancient sage-kings found that
“if they are well fed and have warm clothing and
are comfortably lodged and are not taught,
then they are close to beasts.”
From this we see that the impediments to the growth of
the plant of goodness are not simply external to the organism.
There somehow resides within
the human organism itself a disordering principle.
This principle in application
would block the tendency to the good.
What then is the nature of this principle?
and how is it overcome?
