In TOR, to improve performance, instead of routing each packet using a new onion routing path,
TOR sets up a circuit between two endpoints to allow further communications
to only require symmetric encryption operations.
And so the question is--what could go wrong?
And the options are--if the onion routers at the beginning and end of the circuit collude,
they are able to identify the communicating endpoints by looking at the circuit identifiers.
If the onion routers at the beginning and end of the circuit collude, they may be able to identify
the communicating endpoints by manipulating the timing of packets in a flow.
If an onion router in the middle of the circuit is malicious, it would be able to identify
and disrupt Alice's traffic by identifying the symmetric keys used.
And the last option--an adversary who can cause arbitrary congestion on the network
and who knows someone is sending a steady flow of packets to endpoint B,
may be able to identify all the onion routers in the circuit.
Check all that apply.
