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- Good afternoon, everyone.
I'm Mary Comerio, Professor
of the Graduate School
in the College of Environmental Design
and Chair of the Hitchcock
Professorship Committee.
We are pleased, along
with the Graduate Council,
to present Lucy Jones, this year's speaker
in the Charles M. and Martha
Hitchcock Lecture Series.
As a condition of this request,
we are obligated and happy
to tell you how the endowment
came to UC Berkeley.
It is a story that
exemplifies the many ways
this campus is linked to
the history of California
and to the Bay area.
Dr. Charles Hitchcock, a
physician for the Army,
came to San Francisco during the Gold Rush
where he opened a thriving
private practice in 1885.
Charles established a
Professorship here at Berkeley,
as an expression of his long
held interest in education.
His daughter, Lillie Hitchcock Coit,
still treasured in San Francisco
for her colorful personality
as well as her generosity,
greatly expanded her
father's original gift
to establish a Professorship
at UC, making it possible
for us to present this series of lectures.
The Hitchcock Fund has become
one of the most cherished endowments
of the University of California,
recognizing the highest distinction
of scholarly thought and achievement.
Thank you, Lillie and Charles.
And now, a few words about Lucy Jones.
Dr. Lucy Jones has
served as a seismologist
with the U.S. Geological Survey
and visiting Research Associate
at the Seismological Laboratory
at Cal Tech since 1983.
She created SAFRR, Science
Application for Risk Reduction,
Project to innovate and
protect the safety, security,
and economic well-being of the nation.
Major products of SAFRR, I guess
we should say that acronym,
include the ShakeOut Earthquake Scenario
and the Great Shakeout,
a public emergency preparedness event
that began with five million people
in Southern California in 2008
and has expanded to more than
24 million people annually
around the world in 2013.
The ARkStorm Scenario is
a model of a great storm
in California and there's
a SAFRR Tsunami Scenario.
So these things have brought
huge public awareness
to disaster preparedness.
In 2014, she served in
a special assignment
as the Mayor's Science
Advisor for Seismic Safety
for the city of Los Angeles,
applying the results
of the ShakeOut Scenario
to increase the resilience
of the city.
The Task Force recommendation
included retrofitting many
of the city's older concrete buildings,
planning water backup systems
for the Fire Department,
and building a solar-powered
wireless network
to backup cellular and digital service.
On October 9th, 2015, just last week,
Jones celebrated a triumphant moment
as the legislation was passed
requiring the mandatory
earthquake retrofit
of 15,000 buildings in Los Angeles.
I have to personally tell
you this is a really big deal
and this was not easy.
And Lucy deserves a huge
amount of the credit
for the kind of coalition
she put together.
She received a Bachelor of
Arts degree in Chinese Language
and Literature, Magna Cum Laude,
from Brown University in 1976.
At Brown, she also studied physics
and began to gravitate towards geophysics.
In 1981, she had her PhD
in Geophysics from MIT.
She is a fellow of the
American Geophysical Union,
member of the Resilient America Roundtable
of the National Academy of
Sciences and previously served
on the California Seismic
Safety Commission.
She has received numerous awards
including the Meritorious Service Award
from the Department of the Interior,
an Ambassador Award from the
American Geophysical Union
for outstanding contributions
in policy and public service.
In early October, Jones was
awarded the Samuel J. Heyman
Service to America Medal
in services often known
as the Oscars of government service,
they're called the
Sammy's for those of you
who don't know that award,
recognizing Federal workers
who have made notable
impact in the United States
and around the world.
And I should add that
she has just been given
a Distinguished Alumni
Award from Brown University.
Would you thank you me and the host
Department of Seismology in welcoming
Dr. Lucy Jones to Berkeley.
(applause)
- Thank you, Mary.
And I'm glad to be here.
And it's been a extraordinary
time in the last month,
especially being able to
see this significant step
in seismic safety for
the city of Los Angeles,
and I do hope that it's gonna end up being
a significant event for the whole state.
I'm really think that we're gonna be able
to use this opportunity to
advance across the state
and maybe eventually across the country.
We're seeing a shift in how
people think about disasters.
And that's the really fundamental issue
is this something that you can't predict
and who knows what's gonna happen
or is it something that's inevitable,
it's just a matter of
when and there are things
that we can do about it.
And I've spent a lot of my
work over the last decade
is trying to help that
shift in opinion happen.
And it's a combination of a lot of things.
Part of it is about how we
as scientists communicate.
We like to focus on what we don't know,
'cause that's what's interesting,
that's where we do our work.
When we communicate to
the public that way,
we often end up communicating
that we don't know
instead of focusing on the
things that we do know.
And what I'm gonna talk
about today is the process
of creating disaster scenarios
as a way of helping our
communities better understand
what science has to tell
them and how they can be used
to be making better choices about this.
And I'm gonna focus primarily
on our first scenario
which was to create an earthquake
on the southern San Andreas Fault,
really focused on Southern California,
and look at how we put
together the information
and then, to a certain
amount, about how it was used.
A lot of it is applicable
for other disasters
and for other regions.
And, in fact, the SAFRR
Project is just now coming
towards the end of creating a scenario,
a comprehensive scenario,
for the Hayward Fault.
We all know that we have
earthquake risks here.
We've had the science
of what's the hazard,
what's the shaking, but
integrating it over a range
of disciplines to better
understand what it means for us
as individuals and as
communities gives us the support
for moving forward some
of these policy decisions
that we wanna have.
So, let's start with why we
would be wanting to do it.
I'll just remind you.
Now we, this is the way a seismologist
or a geologist sees California.
All of those red lines are some
of the faults that we have.
And those faults are what make
California California, right.
Because of the San Andreas,
we have the San Francisco Bay,
because of the frontal fault,
we create the Sierra Nevada Mountains,
the San Gabriel Mountains are there
because of the Sierra Madre Fault.
The faults are what make
California a place we wanna live.
Without it, we'd be a desert.
It's our mountains that
are trapping our moisture.
And especially for those of
us in Southern California,
the faults trap the oil
which is how the whole city
got started in the first place.
So they're all part of
what our reality is.
If we wanna live here,
we have to learn to live
with the earthquakes.
So, we need to learn
to live with that risk.
And what is the nature of the risk?
In general, most people are afraid
of dying in an earthquake.
The reality is if you look
at your chance of dying,
if you were a regular skier,
you have about a one in ten
thousand chance of dying
because of skiing,
unless you wore helmets,
and then you bring the rate
down to a certain extent.
Your chance of dying from lightning
is about one in 80 thousand.
That's how many Americans
will die this death.
You know, it's a weird sort of statistic.
What death do you die?
You know, one in two Americans
die from heart disease.
All right?
One in 80 thousand die
by hitting by lightning.
Presumably, you only die
once, so you can use this
as a pretty robust statistic.
For dying in an earthquake,
it's about one in 125 thousand.
And it's a hard number to get.
They are extremely infrequent.
How many people are really gonna
die in the next earthquake?
How far have we got and all this?
But in general, our one is
earthquakes are cause fear
out of proportion to
the risk to our lives.
And we have done a pretty
good job of installing,
you know, working with life
safety in our building code.
So your chance of dying in an
earthquake is not very high.
This really isn't about dying.
It's about living and
what life is gonna be like
after the earthquake and will
the city keep on working?
So we have defined what
we've been aiming for
as urban disaster
resilience, having a city
that still functions after the earthquake,
after the disaster.
And as society has become more complex,
that's become a more
difficult thing to do.
So part of what I'm gonna
be showing today you is
how we go and look at urban
life as a system of systems
and the ways in which disasters
can disrupt those systems
that make life work.
We've done this primarily
through the ShakeOut Scenario
where we chose one particular earthquake
and went and built together a picture
of what it would be like in the event.
And you notice, I've got a
lot of different disciplines.
To actually get an accurate picture
of what this is gonna be like,
you need to invoke a very
wide range of scientific
and social science disciplines.
You know, the seismologists
can tell you what the fault is,
and often, we'll do
that, and we'll give you
a pattern of shaking and say,
"There, we're done,
there's your scenario."
In fact, that doesn't tell a human being
what happens to them.
You go to the engineer and they'll take
what the seismologists do
and then they say, you know,
"Here's what happens to all the buildings
and all the infrastructure,
there, there's the picture."
It still isn't making
connections to people.
It's only when we take it up through
all of the social sciences
where we really think about
what happens to people and to communities
that we start connecting and
giving people the information
that allows them to make
those policy decisions.
Just wanna make a point.
This is how we created
it for an earthquake.
For instance, here's
how we put it together
for a storm scenario.
You've got the same basic concepts.
You have kept earth science, engineering,
and social sciences.
We have different pieces
as we go along here.
On both the storm and the tsunami,
it became a lot more interesting
'cause we had to think about
the role of prediction.
And earthquakes, you know,
we don't predict 'em.
We don't have to think about that.
But in fact, like on a storm,
what the prediction says
determines a lot about how
flood control management
happens, for instance.
One of the things I didn't
understand until I went in
and looked at is like they
actually get to choose
where to flood in many cases.
We have flood control.
If you have a flood exceeding the capacity
of your flood control,
somebody has to decide
whether to breach this
levee or that levee,
where to let the water go.
So it becomes a much more complex system.
And as somebody said,
"Imagine if you could go
and bottle up your earthquake shaking
and sell it the next summer.
You end up with a whole different picture
about how it gets managed."
And of course, in flood management,
every bit of water that goes past the dam
doesn't get to be sold the next summer
and it leads to whole
different sets of dynamics.
All right.
So taking our picture of an earthquake,
we now need to put it into a system.
This is the beginning of a city.
Underneath all of our buildings,
we have a whole network of pipes.
We have water systems.
We have sewer systems.
Tend to be the oldest
things in our community.
They get put in before
the rest of the city.
And on top of this, we go
ahead and we put our roads,
we put the houses that we're living in,
we're putting the buildings
that we're working in,
we're putting in our
manufacturing centers,
our power systems,
our communication systems,
our transportation systems.
And all of those systems are
there to support human society.
So if we want to look at
the impact of a disaster
and inform people how
they can make choices
to move from that, we have to look at
how all of these systems interact.
And I must say, as a
scientist, I'm a bit frustrated
at the simplicity of the
analysis that we've been able
to accomplish so far.
It's an awful lot of hand
waving and approximations
that as a scientist, I'd much
rather be more analytical,
but we tend not to be.
But as I said, at the beginning
of the earthquake scenario,
we need to start with
the earthquake itself.
And so we started from these models.
What I'm showing you is our animation
of what we expect the
earthquake shaking to be,
having set up a lot of parameters
to define the earthquake.
I'll start with one point.
The next earthquake will
be different than this
because we had to make so many assumptions
and it's never gonna be exactly that.
And that was a really hard
thing for the scientists
to get past.
They wanted to say, but, you
know, it's not gonna be this,
or it's not that and why did you say this.
And what we have to do here is say
we've picked a plausible scenario
and be able to understand
that this is the type of thing
that we need to be planning for.
Notice how much I've been talking
'cause I'm having to use up the time.
A big earthquake like this
happens on a long fault.
We estimated it to be about--
We chose a 200 mile long system.
And the rupture propagates up this.
In real time, it is 75 seconds
from the start of the earthquake
until the strong shaking
makes it into the Los Angeles area.
So just by the way a little bit of plug
for what goes on here at Berkeley.
This is why early warning is
a particularly effective thing
when we're talking about
really big earthquakes.
You have a lot of time
within which to work.
But the other thing to
notice here is the scale
over which the strong
shaking happens, okay.
Here, when you have a 200 mile long fault,
it means you have 200 miles
that's actually producing the energy.
And in Southern California, we
have almost 10 million people
that are gonna be receiving
extremely strong shaking,
intensity nine or 10, that
was the level of shaking
that we had only in the worst
shaken parts of the valley
in the Northridge Earthquake.
It's really, you only had it, I think,
up in the Santa Cruz Mountains.
Maybe a little pocket in Santa Cruz
and a pocket in the Marina District
in the Loma Prieta Earthquake.
Here, because the fault is so long,
we're gonna be putting it
through much larger territory
and it's territory on which people live.
So when we look at what this
earthquake can do to us,
we get a really sobering picture.
And I'm, at this point, I'm
basically just jumping over
all of the work that
went into analyzing this.
But we started with
all of these geologists
understanding the shaking
and the landslides
that would be going through it.
And we come up with a conclusion
that we've got about 300,000 buildings
will be moderately damaged,
defined as losing 10% the value
of the building.
And because of that building
damage, we are going to end up
with some substantial
other types of damage.
One in 60 people having no place to live,
53,000 injuries bad enough
to go to the Emergency Room
at a time when we're probably losing
at least one third the
capacity of our hospitals
due to damage to the hospitals,
1800 deaths.
You see, it's not a very big number
compared to the rest it.
It does unfortunately assume
that all of those 53,000 injuries
are getting the medical
care that they need.
And if that gets really impaired,
we could be raising the number that way.
It's also potentially not the worst thing
that's gonna happen to us
because when we looked at
what happens to our utilities,
we ended up coming to the conclusion
that it was gonna take us six months
to get all of the pipes
in the ground fixed.
Remember, I said those pipes
are one of the oldest things
that go on in a community.
70% of the pipe in Southern California
is something called AC pipe,
which is a nice way of saying
asbestos concrete, but
people don't like the word,
put the word asbestos next to their water,
so they don't usually use that term.
But those are a particularly brittle type
and it was when Southern California
happened to be developed,
it was a very common way
of doing it.
Because of that, such extensive
loss to our water systems
when we got all the
water people in the room,
you know, looking at the damage,
how many breaks did we
think we would have,
and working it out, and there was a moment
at which one of the guys
from the water company said,
"But wait a minute, how much pipe is made
in the U.S. each year?
Aren't we all gonna be
competing with each other
for the same product?"
And that's where we end up
coming to the conclusion
it's gonna take us six
months to get it made,
get all of the pipes
repaired across the region,
even with them working
as hard as they can.
And then the other part that we recognized
is the roll of fire following earthquake.
People in San Francisco
know that pretty well.
And there's actually a professor,
he used to be here a
Berkeley, Charlie Scawthorn,
who's one of the, probably
the expert in the world
on fire following earthquake.
And we engaged him as part of this process
to say what did we think the
role of fires was gonna be.
And he came to the
conclusion by extrapolating
from the rate of fires in Northridge,
the much larger area, so many more people
receiving the strong
shaking, he said 1600 fires
large enough to call the Fire Department,
1200 of which would
grow beyond the capacity
of one fire engine to respond.
We don't have 1600 fire
engines in Southern California.
We are going to be facing the probability
of fires getting out of control.
As he went and tried to model
this, he ended up concluding
that the fire losses
actually double the losses
for the region.
It was so extreme that
the state geologists said
you can't be right, this can't
be, we can't go with this,
it's just too much.
And we ended up convening a
special group of Fire Chiefs.
We got the L.A. Chief from Northridge,
the Oakland Chief from Loma Prieta,
a few other Fire Chiefs around the state,
to sit down with us and
go through this analysis.
And they came to the
conclusion that, in fact,
we, if anything, it was an underestimate.
So we see the potential for
fire following earthquake
as being the overwhelming issue
that we are going to be
dealing after the earthquake
and water problems compound it.
We also ended up with
business disruption costs
that are potentially,
again, double the losses
because of the loss of business.
And that's with a very minimal analysis
just on the impact of loss of
water and loss of electricity.
And as we looked at what's
going on in the modern world,
we struggled to quantify it,
but we recognize that telecommunications
has changed the nature of business.
If we wanna keep our businesses open,
we have to have telecommunications.
We have to have connection
to the internet.
And we have actually been
creating new vulnerabilities
like at the time of Northridge,
our grocery stores had warehouses
in the inland empire.
They, out in the Fontana
area, for those of you
who know Southern California,
there were major warehouses
for the grocery store chains
from which they would deploy food
and go out to their
different stores each day.
When we had the earthquake
and disrupting things,
the food's there.
Because of the internet,
we no longer have that.
They do a just-in-time economy.
They can decide each day
exactly how much needs
to be shipped into Southern California.
It's not cost effective
to have those warehouses.
They're all gone.
All of our food now crosses the
fault to get to us each day.
When the San Andreas moves
and disrupts the import
across those areas, when
those freeways are gone,
we don't have a stockpile of food
on our side of the fault anymore.
So we're recognizing that communications
has changed the nature of
where our vulnerabilities are
and we're trying to
understand it in more detail.
So I can show you the type of things
of how we've tried to
understand the impact
that these things happens.
So let's look at damaged buildings.
We know we're gonna be
having damaged buildings.
What does that mean to the rest of us?
Well, we damage it from a variety of ways.
We have shaking, we have fire,
and actually water damage.
There were two billion dollars
of losses in Northridge,
that was out of 40,
came from water damage.
Because of it, you have significant
short-term consequences.
You lose life, your businesses close,
you don't have a place to live.
How do you get rid of those problems?
Well, you need to take on
quite a few different actions.
You need to get rid of the debris,
you need to be able to
have power to do that,
you need to have transportation
to get the debris out
and bring the new supplies in,
and you need people that
are able to be there
to work on those.
If you don't get your buildings back,
in a long enough term,
what do you end up with?
You end up with significant
business disruption,
you have people that end
up giving up on the region
'cause they don't have an
adequate place to live,
and the other big thing,
and this was very important
in getting Los Angeles to
understand what the issue is,
is that each damaged building affects all
of the buildings around it.
We often see after an earthquake
that a badly damaged building
will cause red tagging
of the adjacent buildings
because it's just too dangerous
to be in there during
the aftershock sequence.
So what we have is, damage to one building
affects everything around it.
And this is a really
important thing to understand
and to really work with
because it means that the,
we have left the cost of
retrofitting buildings
solely to the owners.
But the cost of not
retrofitting lands on all of us.
And this is one of the sort
of societal aspects of it
that we really need to grapple
with if we wanna move on
to a safer society.
Let me also take a moment out of this
because this was a very important thing
of what we looked at.
Many people don't know that
our building code does not try
to give us a building that you
can use after the earthquake.
Absolutely modern building
designed to the current code
is trying to make sure that
you can crawl out alive.
It's saying try and not collapse.
But if it's a complete
financial loss, oh well.
And even getting out alive, we, in fact,
you know there's, it's
not actually perfect.
It's not guaranteeing it.
It's saying let's have a 90%
chance of not collapsing.
Well, if you say you have a
90% chance of not collapsing,
you're actually accepting a 10%
of our current modern buildings
collapsing in the shaking.
That's what it actually means.
Once you aren't looking
at an individual building,
but you're looking at
a group of buildings.
And in addition to collapsing,
there's also impairment
of buildings, right?
A building may not damage anybody,
but it's gonna be red
tagged and you can't use it.
Yellow tag meaning you
only get limited use,
you're not going in during the
immediate aftershock sequence.
If you look at the history in California,
what we see is that on average
for every collapsed building,
we've had 13 red tags.
And for every red tag, 3.8 yellow tags.
This is data from
Northridge and Loma Prieta.
63 impaired buildings for each collapse.
By comparison, the Napa
Earthquake that just happened
had a similar level, 57
impaired buildings per collapse.
So what does this mean if we
have a really big earthquake?
Well, it's not a 10% collapse
rate because that's only
in the strongest shaking
and not everywhere
gets the strongest shaking, but Dr. Porter
from Colorado took the
distribution of shaking
in the ShakeOut Earthquake and compared it
against the design criteria and estimates
that we're talking about
a 0.8% collapse rate
for modern buildings.
Well, when we now put
that across the scale
of Southern California, if we
scale up with those red tags,
0.8% collapse rate means
10% of our buildings,
new buildings, red tagged
and another almost 40% yellow
tagged and impaired use.
How do we keep our businesses
going in this situation?
And as a really concrete example of this,
this is a picture of the city
of Christchurch, New Zealand.
In 2011, so this--
It's a city of about 400,000
people, modern skyline.
In 2011, they had an earthquake.
It's, in fact, only a magnitude 6.3.
It was, in fact, an aftershock to a seven
that had been out of town,
but the 6.3 was right
under the downtown area.
This picture, amazing picture,
taken during the earthquake itself.
The building code in New
Zealand is like ours.
It's a life safety code.
And it said make sure
you can crawl out alive
and it worked.
This is essentially their
designed earthquake.
People, there were
really only two buildings
that caused a significant loss of life
in the modern buildings.
One of them was, in
fact, an older building.
One of them should not have
been allowed to be built.
They see what the problems were.
Basically, the code worked
as it was supposed to.
Only 185 people died
in those two buildings.
1800 buildings had to be torn down
over the next several years.
They didn't kill people.
They met the code objective.
But they were a total financial loss.
And this is what
Christchurch looks like now.
They lost their downtown
because of the same code
that we've said is enough for us.
Take this picture, imagine
this in Los Angeles, okay.
What will it be like
when this is what happens
to our downtown?
Or to Oakland, or to San Francisco?
This is the way we have
chosen to build our cities.
And we said it's not worth the extra money
to make them be usable.
And, you know, sometimes,
we're thinking it's maybe
only a couple percent
increase in the total cost
of a project to instead of having this,
have a building you can use afterwards.
And this may be saying life safety,
but you know, I went to New
Zealand actually last month.
They asked me to come down and tell them
about the L.A. Project.
And in the discussions
there, somebody said to me,
"You can't treat life safety
as what just what happens
in the earthquake.
My brother died in the
year after the earthquake
because it was so bad, he just gave up.
My cousin killed himself in
the year after the earthquake
because he couldn't handle
the financial losses
that he was facing.
Life safety isn't just what
happens in the earthquake."
So, this is the picture I've
been taking to Los Angeles
and saying, "Is this
the city we want to have
after the earthquake?"
For all the problems of the buildings,
the water is probably a bigger one.
If we take the same sort of analysis,
what is it gonna be like to
be needing to get your water
by buckets for weeks after the earthquake?
Another person in New Zealand said to me
his house had been fine, he really was one
of the lucky ones.
He said, "I didn't know
how much water it takes
just to live.
I'm spending two hours a
day getting enough water
for my family to function."
'Cause when you look at what happens
to your damaged water
supply, it can happen
for a variety of reasons.
You break the pipes with the shaking.
You could offset the water
coming into the region
through fault offset, and
chemical accidents can cause
a lot of contamination.
Chemical accidents is a
sort of odd way of saying it
because one of the big issues
they've seen in Christchurch,
all those broken water pipes
run next to broken sewer pipes.
Yeah, that's enough.
(laughter)
So, what happens?
You've obviously got the
life loss, loss of shelter,
you can't run your businesses,
they do extra damage
to the buildings, and it
really gets in the way
of the medical response.
You need clean water to have a hospital.
To get it going again, you
need a lot of these resources
that are already impaired.
You have to have transportation.
The purification systems, you know,
they have some portable systems.
Like the American
Waterworks Association said,
"We got this covered.
We have portable systems.
We'll bring them in."
We have four of them in the country.
You got the scale of this.
There's no way it's gonna be working.
And of course, you need a
lot of manpower to do it.
If you go for a long time without water,
you end up with really big consequences.
You cannot reopen most
businesses without water.
Beauty salon, a
restaurant, most businesses
can't open without water.
And then there's the personal issues
that you face as well.
How many of you would
be willing to stay here
when you haven't had a shower in a month?
And what are the public
health consequences
of nobody having a shower in a month?
And what you see is you end up,
this is the one way you're
most likely end up losing
your population for a region.
If we go in and look in
Los Angeles, in particular,
we have a couple of specific issues.
This is the Elizabeth Lake Tunnel.
This is the original aqueduct,
the Los Angeles aqueduct,
as in Mulholland and, you
know, the Chinatown movie,
the water coming in from the
Owens Valley to Los Angeles.
This tunnel was built in 1908
and it crosses the San Andreas Fault.
This is where it crosses the fault.
Nine foot wide wooden tunnel
and we expect the fault offset
to be about 15 feet and
this aqueduct is going to be
completely gone after the earthquake.
There are three other
aqueducts bringing in water
to Californ, into Southern California
and the Water Districts have said
we don't have to worry about this.
We have four aqueducts.
So we lose one in an earthquake.
We've got three others.
And we were like, um, you do
know that a 200 mile long fault
breaks all of them.
The most likely earthquake
is going to take them all out
and they haven't been addressing this.
The other issue that we have, though,
is if you, we look back at
the Christchurch earthquake
and what happened with them
with their water system.
We discovered, I mean, there's,
they in general have pipes
like we do that wide spread
breakages during the earthquake.
They also have an experiment
with two and a half kilometers
of a type of polyethylene
pipe and none of it broke
in the earthquake.
There's also a type of
pipe being created in Japan
that does very well in a earthquake.
This is called earthquake
resistant ductile iron pipes
and Professor Tom O'Rourke at Cornell
has been doing a lot of research on this,
has been working with
the city of Los Angeles.
And we are now recognizing that we need
to shift out our pipes and
try and make them be ones
that won't break in an earthquake.
Let me finish this just looking
at the same sort of thing
by looking at communication networks.
Again, we have damage
from cellphone towers.
We've separate the fiber.
Phone lines get overloaded.
With they get broken
for a variety of reasons
between the shaking and the fault offset.
For instance, two thirds of
the internet connectivity
for Southern California
to the rest of the world
crosses the San Andreas
Fault in fiber optic cables.
It would be extremely easy
to make those resilient
to fault offset because fiber optic,
you can just coil up extra
wire and you move the fault
and it now just gets a bit longer.
Fiber optic you could do
that, but it hasn't happened
up until now.
So again, it's a place
where there's a lot of ways
in which we can lose our connectivity.
It's very difficult to
have much of life anymore
without communications.
Again, we need the manpower
and the transportation
to be able to bring it together.
And the longterm consequences
are both business disruption,
but also emotional hardship.
We have a society that does not accept
not communicating anymore.
What we saw in Sendai, Japan,
when they had the magnitude nine in 2011,
they lost their
electricity, people stayed.
After 48 hours, they lost the backup power
to their cell networks and
all the cellphone's out
and that's when they started seeing
large numbers of people getting
up and leaving the region.
If they couldn't communicate,
it was cold, it was wet,
and they, you know, no lights,
but they couldn't talk to anybody,
that ended up being the final straw.
And here in Southern, in
California, we don't have 48 hours
of backup power.
Our communities have not been willing
to have backup generators up
at all the cellphone towers.
So we, in general, have about
four hours of backup power,
after which we lose our cellphone towers.
And when we really look, the
other thing that's coming in
is just about every system we have now
depends on internet functioning.
My guess, you know, I'm
sure the internet's working
after the earthquake.
The problem will be whether
or not we can connect to it.
And there's a lot of these systems
that if they can't connect,
they aren't going to be operational.
And it's hard, again, to keep
modern life going at this.
So what's at stake in all of this?
The other part of this
is really understanding
that the core issue is talking about
our economic dependence.
So if you look at a region, you
expect the economic activity
to be growing with time.
If you don't, it's called a recession.
During an earthquake, you lose assets.
Things get broken, you
know, things are destroyed,
but you also lose business.
Without water, without power,
businesses stop functioning.
You stop creating economic wealth.
What we are trying to do
is recover quickly enough
that we get back to where we were.
Within a year or two is
considered really pretty good.
And in fact, we have seen situations,
if there's enough money
coming in after the event,
if people have insurance,
if FEMA is active,
really the situation after Northridge,
we saw the economic recovering
going really quickly.
People hired contractors,
they hired subcontractors.
We were really back up
within about two years
from where we had been.
It doesn't have to happen that way.
You can have a response,
if the response is delayed
and things become too difficult
and you lose population
and people move out, then
you end up with a situation
where you really can't get that
economic engine going again.
Or if you don't have assets coming in.
You know, if we have,
FEMA doesn't write checks
the day of the disaster
anymore like they did in 1994
and instead of having
40% insurance coverage,
we now have about 10% insurance coverage.
Who's gonna be able to
pay to repair their house?
How do we get things moving again?
And when you look at the
difference in the areas
under the curve, you can see
that having that delayed
economic response can be
a much larger economic impact
than the disaster itself.
As an example of this, we
were able to get the data
for New Orleans.
Here's data comparing
the economic, the GDP,
of Nashville and New
Orleans from 2002 to 2012
and you can see that before
the hurricane hit in 2005,
causing 80 billion dollars in losses,
Nashville was actually a bit
smaller than New Orleans.
They're comparable though.
They're similar size
cities in a similar area.
When you look then for
the next seven years,
the total losses by
saying what's, you know,
that New Orleans should have at least
had the GDP of Nashville.
You end up estimating 105
billion dollars in losses
in just those seven years
and we're continuing to lose
at about 15 billion dollars a year.
The longterm, you know, after a decade,
the economy is maybe 20%
below what it would have been
if the hurricane hadn't happened.
So this is what we're
worried about in California,
the level of disruption that we will face.
How do people stay when this is going on?
I also found in Los Angeles,
it was really useful
to consider what happened
in San Francisco.
Here's data from 1906.
1905, San Francisco was
five times the population
of Los Angeles.
And, you know, it was the
economic center of California.
Everything went through San Francisco.
The decade after 1906 is
the largest growth decade
in the history of Los Angeles.
People gave up on San
Francisco and went south.
By a decade later, and there's
of course new population
coming into California,
but they didn't come
to San Francisco.
They came to Southern California.
And within a decade, Los Angeles is bigger
than San Francisco and of course now,
it's about five times the
size of San Francisco.
So, you know, that's just an anecdote,
but this is the type of
thing we're looking at.
And in fact, take the other
end of the population data,
we actually saw the only times,
there's only four years in
the history of Los Angeles
that the population's
gone down, 1971 and 1972,
which were right after the
'71 San Fernando Earthquake
and 1994 and '95, right after Northridge.
The only times we've ever lost population.
So how do you try and make them resilient?
We defined a set of
critical infrastructure
and said that these need
to function well enough
to keep the system going.
We're not trying to make them perfect.
We're trying to get them good enough.
Because from this critical set,
we developed a set of
systems that define our life.
And all of these are part
what makes a society work.
We can cope with a little bit of loss.
For instance, if we lose some buildings,
but we still have the internet,
we have people that can telecommute.
And even though their building may be out,
that doesn't mean that that business
is completely shut down.
Or if we lose water, but we
still have transportation,
we can bring in water to drink,
which will work for a while.
And then so these are the
areas that we're looking at
and then we also, of course,
have sort of these wildcards
of internet and cell towers
where we aren't completely sure
of how the things play out.
So this is how we put together a picture
of what the disaster could do to us.
And by putting it
together in this framework
and saying this isn't just about
will this fault move or not, it's rather,
eventually the fault will
move and this is what's going
to be happening to our society.
We've been able to get
engagement in Southern California
for moving forward.
As Mary said, we create, I
worked with the Mayor's Office.
We created a Resilience By Design Program.
Out of this, we had recommendations
for how to move forward,
a series of proposals for
retrofitting the different types
of bad buildings that we have.
And as of last Friday,
all of the mandatory
retrofit ordinances were passed
and the voluntary ratings
system, it's voluntary,
but the city is in the process
of rating all of its own buildings,
will be disclosing that
information to the public
to try and get the discussion going
about what does it mean to
have a good or a bad building.
We know which buildings are
most likely to fall down.
Wouldn't everybody like
to have that information?
Well, maybe the building owners
don't particularly want
people to be having
all that information,
but it's better, yeah.
I'm a scientist.
I think knowledge is always better.
We've discovered that, in
fact, the population really,
in general, does want to
know and the city is trying
to promote this approach by
going with this rating system
and disclosing all the information.
There's also a wide variety of proposals
that have been put in to
fortify the water system.
Here are these--
This is actually the San Andreas Fault
and the California Aqueduct.
It's sort of astonishing.
It actually runs down
the fault for a ways.
So proposals to how to strengthen
the aqueduct crossings,
improve the pipe system, and the last one,
which is potentially
the most important one
and maybe isn't obvious, where I say
a Resilience By Design Program.
From here on out, there's now
a Resilience By Design Program
at the Department of Water and Power
and every project they
undertake is being evaluated
for the impact on our seismic resilience.
Moving forward, and
then telecommunications.
In some ways, we discover the
problems weren't really as bad
as they might have been.
But there are some very big things.
One of them is our cellphone towers.
50% are on buildings and
generally our older buildings
more likely to come down.
So, but we do have free standing towers
and we are requiring
now that those be built
to a life safety standard, not just a,
I mean a functionality standard,
and not just a life safety standard.
Right now, cellphone
towers are life safety.
Make sure you can crawl out alive.
Who do they think's living
in cellphone towers?
I mean, it's sort of a bizarre concept.
And so we're saying no, they actually,
we're gonna be aiming towards
usability of the towers.
And from this, we're hoping
to really move forward.
The city of Los Angeles
has adopted all of these.
I actually, and I would have
been happy if half of it
had made it through.
The fact that all of them
seem to be going forward,
to me, is incredibly astonishing.
And I think it's gonna make a difference.
We're also seeing, the Mayor's
really been reaching out
to the other cities.
I have them coming to me as well.
We are looking at, there's
a dozen other cities
that have asked about
getting more information
to move towards some of
the ordinances themselves.
I thought I would end this
by just teasing you a bit.
I couldn't give you the full thing yet,
but we're starting to do
the same thing for up here.
We're creating The Haywired Scenario
because of the impact of the Hayward Fault
on the digital economy.
And it's going to be released
in April of this year.
So again, the same sort of pictures.
You know that you've got the fault,
but what does that mean
in terms of the shaking
that you're actually
going to be receiving.
And the scary thing,
this scale is actually,
I believe it's in, it's
accelerations in the,
you know, it's twice the force
of gravity showing up here
in the Berkeley area.
And in the process, we're trying to create
a lot of the same sort of
information that I just showed you
for Los Angeles.
We're also trying to
expand in a couple of ways.
One of the ways is to try and focus more
on some of the issues
raised by aftershocks.
So just what we saw in Christchurch,
the ongoing sequence of earthquakes
caused a whole other set of problems.
So we're creating a synthetic
aftershock sequence.
That's all, again, it's a plausible,
sure it isn't gonna be different,
but part of the plausible aftershock
is plenty of aftershocks on other faults.
That's a thing that we tend to forget
is that most aftershocks are
off the ends of the faults,
sometimes they're on different faults.
So we created a
statistically viable sequence
that matches all of the
characteristics that we see
and it's a part of the planning
that could be able to be used,
will be focused on that area.
We're also getting modeling
from Charlie Scawthorn
about fire following earthquake.
And I thought it looked bad in L.A.
Whoo!
This is really a big issue.
And San Francisco, of course,
has an alternative fire fighting system.
Looking at developing more of
the capacity in the East Bay
is a really big piece of this.
And just one other sort
of piece of information
to give you this sort of idea
of the things we're doing.
25,000 people trapped in 5,000 elevators.
So again, get that earthquake
early warning in there
and get those elevators stopped
before the earthquake
shaking comes through.
There's 25,000 people that
are not gonna be spending
a couple of days trapped
in a little metal box
wondering what's going on.
So, thank you.
(applause)
- [Audience Member] Hello.
- Hi.
- [Audience Member] Hi, thank you so much.
This is fantastic.
- Thank you.
- [Audience Member] I'm a
volunteer with city of Berkeley
for Emergency Preparedness.
I do a lot of this stuff.
I recently visited Christchurch
and I was just really intensely
moved by seeing the downtown
as I imagine you were four
years after the earthquake.
Still abandoned buildings.
You can still see the search
and rescue marks on buildings.
What I learned speaking
with the City Planner
in Christchurch was I learned about
the residential red zones
where they actually purchased
and demolished 8,000
homes in what he called
a strategic retreat
that they will not allow
any structures to be
built on that land again.
And I'm curious if that's
something that anyone in,
you know, California talks
about or thinks about?
- Okay, the red zones in Christchurch are,
they have a compounded problem.
They had extensive liquefaction
that came with the earthquake
so it was one of the reasons
that there's that much
damage in spite of the size.
But it also literally
sank the area, all right.
So much material came out
through the liquefaction
that they then had to cart
away, the elevation went down
and the regulations in New
Zealand do not allow building
within the 50 year floodplain.
And by sinking, they actually
moved whole neighborhoods
down into the 50 year floodplain.
And they ended up making the
decision to buy people out,
keep them out of there, and
move onto the other regions.
It's unlikely that we're gonna end up
in a similar situation.
Number one, liquefaction at that scale
requires a very high water table and the--
It requires rain.
The good part of a drought
is it really reduces
the risk of liquefaction.
(laughter)
And so we don't really have a
comparable situation to that.
And it becomes a very difficult question,
what is an appropriate level
at which to keep people out?
And the decision has
been made in California,
the logic makes sense to me to say,
you can't say stay away from the faults
or otherwise we move out, right?
There are over 100 faults in
the L.A. metropolitan area.
Everybody's within five
miles of an active fault.
So, you gotta accept
that you're near that.
What you can do is say
don't build right across
the active trace of the fault
and have your building ripped apart.
And that's what we call
the Alquist-Priolo Act.
The problem is is that really
is only about being exactly
on the trace.
And so the way the law works
is you say if you're near,
you've gotta go in and dig and
figure out where the fault is
and make sure you don't stay on it.
The problem with the
implementation of that is
you can hire a geologist
to tell you where it is.
You don't like his
result, you throw it away
and tell him to go away
because you signed,
he signed a nondisclosure
agreement with you
when you did it.
And you can then submit it.
Find another geologist to
give you a different answer.
Not that that happens all
the time, but the situ--
We allow it.
And if it were up to me, I
would keep our current situation
in California saying only
across the active trace
that we actually ban construction,
but I'd say that anytime a
registered geologist is hired
to do a report, it cannot be
under a nondisclosure agreement
and the results of the report,
as terms of his registration,
get given to the State
Geologist and maintained
in a database.
We, it's hap--
We have a major issue with landslides
where again, the same thing
happens and we've ended up
with major damage in landslide regions
and it turns out there had been a report
saying this is landslides prone
that had been thrown away.
So that would be the one
modification I'd like to make.
Yeah.
(clapping)
(laughs)
- [Audience Member] Thank you, Dr. Jones.
We moved here from 50 miles
north of New York City
and had the pleasure of living
through Superstorm Sandy.
And we were on well and
septic and so for a week,
we had not only no electricity,
but no heat, no water,
no, and no cell towers.
- Right.
- Nothing.
There were two or three
problems which I'd like
to ask you to address in further detail.
One is that, this was wind forces.
They're different forces,
- Right.
- [Audience Member]
but I think it might be
the same problem.
About 25% of the power poles just cracked.
So the streets were full of live wires
until NYSEG and the utilities got around
to turning off the electricity,
which is a hazard to everybody.
That also meant people weren't driving.
There was so much damage
everywhere it took time
for the crews to get to the
different neighborhoods.
So transportation, maybe.
Second, what bothered us coming
here is the issue of fire.
And we had a power outage and
people were lighting candles
and I've swapped out all my candles
for those windup flashlights
because if they don't--
We're really dependent on the utilities
to have things so that they turn off.
I'm more scared of gas
even then electricity.
If we have gas streaming out,
somebody lights a candle,
poof, the whole neighborhood goes.
So could you please speak
to plans utilities have
to turn things off, you know, immediately.
And secondly, you kind
of had to go quickly
for time reasons over fire control.
- Right.
- But we live in
such a congested area here
in Berkeley, in many places.
Can you speak to Berkeley's
Fire Department, thank you.
- So fires and utilities, yes you got it.
That's where we've got problems.
One thing I'll just say and
I didn't say this earlier,
you know, you look at
where we have problems
in Southern California, it's
water, fire, and healthcare.
It's like where do we have
trouble on a normal basis?
Fire, water, and healthcare.
And so, you know, the
failures in a disaster
happen in the parts of the
system that are already weak.
In terms of utilities, one of the reasons
for doing these scenarios
is to engage the utilities
in a discussion.
By asking them to come
in, and we didn't say,
here's what the problem
is you're gonna have.
We said, here's the shaking.
Tell us what the problem is.
So we got them to think
it through and understand
what the vulnerabilities were.
And we scared them and they
went back to their companies
and we're starting a process.
I'm not gonna say it isn't a big problem.
It is very much a big problem.
But I believe that this
scenario process has
advanced the discussion
and one of the things
that's come out of it,
took a while to happen,
and the Mayor's process
has implemented it,
or gives us a bit of a prod
in Southern California.
We actually now have a
consortium of utilities
that are looking together
at where the shared vulnerabilities are.
I wish, I mean it's,
it tends to be focused
on how to respond and I
tend to go wait a minute,
why don't you prevent the
loss in the first place.
Like put valves when you have a gas pipe
crossing an active
fault so you turn it off
when you set up the early warning system.
I think that whole process takes time.
Right now, I'm not, we're
not in a great place,
but I do see the discussion happening
and that part is extremely encouraging.
Fire following earthquake, you're right.
It becomes the scariest part.
When we modeled it for
the Southern San Andreas,
we doubled the losses with the fires
and we defined it as not
having Santa Ana winds.
I don't get to do that for
the real earthquake, right?
If we actually have Santa Ana winds,
I don't think we keep the fires in control
and that becomes the
real doomsday scenario.
So you're right about that.
What we are hoping,
especially with Haywired,
is to get, well, I'm getting
it going in Los Angeles
through this process.
We've been working with
the Fire Department.
One of the Mayor's recommendations
and it's now moving forward
is that the Fire Department
and the Water Department have to agree
on what they need to do.
And, one, what, you know, city
departments tend not to talk
to each other so making this
requirement has been a bit
of an adjustment, but
they're moving forward
and I think that requiring that
was probably the most
important thing we did.
Here in the Bay area, you've
again, got this issue.
You've got all these
different communities.
You've got different systems in place.
In Haywired, we are very much focusing
on the fire following earthquake
for all of these reasons.
And, I mean, and Professor
Scowthorn's been working on this
for quite a while.
I think that we're getting
traction on the problem.
Again, not to say it's solved in any way,
but I hope it's moving forward.
Yeah.
- [Audience Member] I'm
very excited about the fact
that L.A. is actually starting
to do something about this.
It hasn't been my
favorite city, of course.
I'm in Northern California.
But I'm a Bay area person.
I'd like to know if there's
a way that, you know,
an individual can impact it.
I work with scientists and I'm very aware
that their primary
effort is not political.
And, in fact, they would rather
not deal with these things,
as most of us would not.
I know the Facilities
Manager's Association
is very concerned about prevention
both for fire and for water and gas.
So the public/private partnership
seems really important.
I'm kinda overwhelmed with
the thought of how do I
as an individual begin
to make some inroads here
because I don't even know at what level.
Is it regional, do I
go to my city council?
You know, I'm just overwhelmed.
I, any suggestions are fine.
- Okay, yeah, and I'm
actually thinking, you know,
so tomorrow, I'm talking about
science communication
challenges and why it's so hard
for scientists to do
this 'cause we just talk
in different ways.
And I, one of the points
that would be there
is we're never supposed
to give the problem
without the solution and
I sort of did that today.
So, I'm sorry about that.
You're right.
So what can you do as an individual?
There's a range of things that can go on.
Part of it is getting your
local government to take action.
I will say, I mean, I'm not
as familiar with what goes on
in the Bay area.
I went to the Mayor of Los Angeles saying,
"Look at everything San Francisco's doing.
Why can't we be there?"
So in many senses, there's
a lot of what's going on
in the Bay area that's very encouraging.
And we tried to be learning from it.
All of the regulations we
put in about the SAFRR story,
we just adopted from what
San Francisco had done.
So we've now done the
concrete one and worked out
that ordinance and I
think they're looking at
how to learn from what we did.
So, there is, you know, political support
for doing this is important.
The other aspect though is there are,
there's a lot that you
can do as an individual.
And there's a group called the
Earthquake Country Alliance
that actually started the ShakeOut.
So when we first did the scenario,
we recognized that there
was all these things
that really could make a
difference among individuals.
We said, let's do, let's get
that information to people.
We did the first ShakeOut Drill.
It was supposed to be a one-time-only.
But you get five million
people to do something
and people take notice
and the state wanted
to take it statewide.
The group of people that worked with me
to create the first ShakeOut
was the Earthquake Country Alliance.
That ended up becoming
a bigger organization.
There is a Northern
California Chapter of it.
I think it's just called
the Earthquake Country Alliance here.
- [Audience Member] The Bay area.
- The Bay Area Earthquake
Country Alliance.
Okay.
And Peggy, right behind us, might be able
to give you more information.
So you can become involved
as an individual on that.
And then the other piece
that I feel like I'm sort of
it's the next challenge for me.
Community resilience.
How do you get community
organizations to care about this
and move forward?
And that's a, it's a difficult problem,
but I think it's where a
lot of the strength will be.
Communities recover because
people wanna stay here.
So we need to make this, you know,
you need to make your home a place
that is worth staying through
the problems (laughs).
And I think that that's where
one of the really big pieces
are gonna happen.
There was research in New Orleans.
The communities, the neighborhoods
that have recovered the
best, the single most
best defining issue was
that they did a Mardi
Gras float each year.
- [Audience Member] Yes,
I'd been reading about that,
that community spirit and, in fact,
almost in spite of the
government assistance
in some cases.
- In New Orleans, definitely.
You know, that was a pretty
dysfunctional political system.
But they, you know, so
having a reason to come back.
There's also an organization
around doing the floats.
Those crews would know how
to, you know, get resources,
and arrange for volunteers,
and arrange for food,
and whatever, so they were more effective
at managing their neighborhood.
But they also had a community spirit
that made them wanna be here.
- [Audience Member]
You've given me a couple
of really good suggestions already.
And I really, I'm so delighted to see that
you set up a scenario which is,
even though you said it's negative,
it's very positive, in
fact, because it sets it out
and it looks to okay, these are the area
rather than oh, it's
gonna be overwhelming,
let's hit the road.
- Right, it's steps you can
do just to make a change.
And we're just trying to be good enough.
- [Audience Member] Thank you.
- Thanks, yeah.
- [Audience Member] I really
thank you for your talk
and I found it really
stimulating and interesting.
But I was involved with the
development of the scenario
in the '70's.
Scenario of a 7.0 earthquake
on the Hayward Fault.
You're probably familiar
with that state scenario.
And some of the issues that
came up, like for instance,
and I live in Berkeley, the Chevron,
we're in the Chevron Auditorium
so I'll mention that first.
The Chevron gas line and oil lines
that go right on San
Pablo, down to San Jose,
from the Chevron oil
refineries are huge pipes
that were built in the
'40's and '50's or earlier.
They're, it was viewed in the scenario
that they would probably
break and there would be
huge, huge fires and we tried to vote
in the city of Berkeley for getting
some kind of suction system
to get water from the Bay
to be able to use in the
fire stations, but that,
we did not pass that, even
after the fire in Oakland Hills.
I think we're in really
bad shape, if not worse,
than 45 years ago in
the Bay area right now.
And the firemen and the
police do not live in Berkeley
or San Francisco.
They live in Brentwood and Antioch
and places where they can
afford to live and okay.
Anyway, I just wanted to ask you again,
I appreciated the person before me,
but I really do feel that
it's very difficult to,
as a person who's in
a different profession
and not a seismologist,
to be able to work,
even if you want to,
and some organizations
try to get these things changed.
- Well, I think that we do
need to look at what we can do
as a community.
And, you know, I'm trying to understand
why we got it through this time.
You know, what's been different?
And I do think that part of that has been
that we have the science
to make a clear statement.
You know, and I'm hoping
that the Haywired Scenario
will give you guys a tool.
You know, it's not like
it's really new science.
It's just giving it
into a coherent picture
so you can make that
connection to what it is
and why these actions are worthwhile.
- [Audience Member] I just wanna mention,
I hope you're gonna include Silicon Valley
and the things like Bubonic
Plague in the little jars
and stuff like that.
- Oh yeah, we've been doing
quite a bit of work with them.
- [Audience Member] And the
plants, the power plants.
- Yeah.
- [Audience Member] Hi,
you mentioned insurance.
When you, as a homeowner in Berkeley, you,
I have very smart friends
that say it's smart
to get earthquake insurance.
And I have other equally smart friends
that say it's the
stupidest thing you can do.
I wonder what your position is?
- Okay, earthquake insurance
is a very difficult thing.
It is very clear at a societal level
that we desperately
need a much higher rate
of earthquake insurance.
When you look at what's
happened in Christchurch,
they are recovering only because they had
95% insurance coverage.
It brought in the money
that allowed them to do it.
They almost lost their
reinsurance because of this.
They were finally able to bring it along.
If they have another big
earthquake like this,
they're losing it.
They're trying to figure out how to move
to a higher standard.
This is the problem with
the life safety code.
As a society, we need more insurance now
and we need to move to building buildings
that don't come down.
As an individual, it is a
much more difficult choice,
partly because what we, the
products that are offered,
you're required, you can only insure
for the total replacement
value of your home.
You aren't, you know, and if
you really retrofit your home,
the chances of losing the complete value
is extremely small on a
really well-built house.
So do you do this?
One way to support you
in making the decision,
there's a new tool that's just out,
a place called temblor dot net.
It's an actually an ex-USGS scientist
who has taken the USGS data and turned it
into a really accessible tool.
You put in your address.
It tells you what--
And you put in the value of your house
and it gives you the probability
in whatever timeframe you wanna look at,
usually the length of
your mortgage, 30 years,
your probability of shaking, of damage.
What's your chance that
you're gonna have major damage
exceeding a half a million dollars
and comparing it to other things
that you're used to insuring for,
like, you know, fire of your house,
totaling your car, being
sued, major injury.
And in Berkeley, in general,
unless you have really
retrofitted your house,
your probability of
major damage is up there
with your chance of major injury
and greater than your
chance of being sued,
totaling your car, or
burning down your house.
So, it's a useful piece of information
to just do that financial comparison.
Temblor dot net.
- [Audience Member] So the bottom line was
would you get it yourself?
If you had a (laughs).
- I haven't talked my
husband into it (laughs).
- Please join me in giving
another round of applause
to Dr. Lucy Jones.
(applause)
(upbeat music)
