Gilles Deleuze (; French: [ʒil dəløz];
18 January 1925 – 4 November 1995) was a
French philosopher who, from the early 1960s
until his death in 1995, wrote on philosophy,
literature, film, and fine art. His most popular
works were the two volumes of Capitalism and
Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus (1972) and A Thousand
Plateaus (1980), both co-written with psychoanalyst
Félix Guattari. His metaphysical treatise
Difference and Repetition (1968) is considered
by many scholars to be his magnum opus. A.
W. Moore, citing Bernard Williams's criteria
for a great thinker, ranks Deleuze among the
"greatest philosophers". His work has influenced
a variety of disciplines across philosophy
and art, including literary theory, post-structuralism
and postmodernism.
== Life ==
=== Early life ===
Deleuze was born into a middle-class family
in Paris and lived there for most of his life.
His initial schooling was undertaken during
World War II, during which time he attended
the Lycée Carnot. He also spent a year in
khâgne at the Lycée Henri IV. During the
Nazi occupation of France, Deleuze's older
brother, Georges, was arrested for his participation
in the French Resistance, and died while in
transit to a concentration camp. In 1944,
Deleuze went to study at the Sorbonne. His
teachers there included several noted specialists
in the history of philosophy, such as Georges
Canguilhem, Jean Hyppolite, Ferdinand Alquié,
and Maurice de Gandillac, and Deleuze's lifelong
interest in the canonical figures of modern
philosophy owed much to these teachers. In
addition, Deleuze found the work of non-academic
writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre attractive.
=== Career ===
Deleuze passed the agrégation in philosophy
in 1948, and taught at various lycées (Amiens,
Orléans, Louis le Grand) until 1957, when
he took up a position at the University of
Paris. In 1953, he published his first monograph,
Empiricism and Subjectivity, on David Hume.
This monograph was based on his DES thesis
(diplôme d'études supérieures, roughly
equivalent to an MA thesis) which was conducted
under the direction of Hyppolite and Canguilhem.
From 1960 to 1964 he held a position at the
Centre National de Recherche Scientifique.
During this time he published the seminal
Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962) and befriended
Michel Foucault. From 1964 to 1969 he was
a professor at the University of Lyon. In
1968 he published his two dissertations, Difference
and Repetition (supervised by Gandillac) and
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (supervised
by Alquié).
In 1969 he was appointed to the University
of Paris VIII at Vincennes/St. Denis, an experimental
school organized to implement educational
reform. This new university drew a number
of talented scholars, including Foucault (who
suggested Deleuze's hiring) and the psychoanalyst
Félix Guattari. Deleuze taught at Vincennes
until his retirement in 1987.
=== Personal life ===
He married Denise Paul "Fanny" Grandjouan
in 1956. When once asked to talk about his
life, he replied: "Academics' lives are seldom
interesting." Deleuze concludes his reply
to this critic thus:
What do you know about me, given that I believe
in secrecy? ... If I stick where I am, if
I don't travel around, like anyone else I
make my inner journeys that I can only measure
by my emotions, and express very obliquely
and circuitously in what I write. ... Arguments
from one's own privileged experience are bad
and reactionary arguments.
Deleuze was an atheist.
=== Death ===
Deleuze, who had suffered from respiratory
ailments from a young age, developed tuberculosis
in 1968 and underwent a thoracoplasty (lung
removal). He suffered increasingly severe
respiratory symptoms for the rest of his life.
In the last years of his life, simple tasks
such as writing required laborious effort.
On November 4, 1995, he committed suicide,
throwing himself from the window of his apartment.Prior
to his death, Deleuze had announced his intention
to write a book entitled La Grandeur de Marx
(The Greatness of Marx), and left behind two
chapters of an unfinished project entitled
Ensembles and Multiplicities (these chapters
have been published as the essays "Immanence:
A Life" and "The Actual and the Virtual").
He is buried in the cemetery of the village
of Saint-Léonard-de-Noblat.
== Philosophy ==
Deleuze's works fall into two groups: on one
hand, monographs interpreting the work of
other philosophers (Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz, David Hume, Immanuel Kant,
Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Michel
Foucault) and artists (Marcel Proust, Franz
Kafka, Francis Bacon); on the other, eclectic
philosophical tomes organized by concept (e.g.,
difference, sense, events, schizophrenia,
cinema, philosophy).
=== Metaphysics ===
Deleuze's main philosophical project in the
works he wrote prior to his collaborations
with Guattari can be baldly summarized as
an inversion of the traditional metaphysical
relationship between identity and difference.
Traditionally, difference is seen as derivative
from identity: e.g., to say that "X is different
from Y" assumes some X and Y with at least
relatively stable identities (as in Plato's
forms). To the contrary, Deleuze claims that
all identities are effects of difference.
Identities are neither logically nor metaphysically
prior to difference, Deleuze argues, "given
that there exist differences of nature between
things of the same genus." That is, not only
are no two things ever the same, the categories
we use to identify individuals in the first
place derive from differences. Apparent identities
such as "X" are composed of endless series
of differences, where "X" = "the difference
between x and x'", and "x'" = "the difference
between...", and so forth. Difference, in
other words, goes all the way down. To confront
reality honestly, Deleuze argues, we must
grasp beings exactly as they are, and concepts
of identity (forms, categories, resemblances,
unities of apperception, predicates, etc.)
fail to attain what he calls "difference in
itself." "If philosophy has a positive and
direct relation to things, it is only insofar
as philosophy claims to grasp the thing itself,
according to what it is, in its difference
from everything it is not, in other words,
in its internal difference."Like Kant, Deleuze
considers traditional notions of space and
time as unifying forms imposed by the subject.
He therefore concludes that pure difference
is non-spatio-temporal; it is an idea, what
Deleuze calls "the virtual". (The coinage
refers to Proust's definition of what is constant
in both the past and the present: "real without
being actual, ideal without being abstract.")
While Deleuze's virtual ideas superficially
resemble Plato's forms and Kant's ideas of
pure reason, they are not originals or models,
nor do they transcend possible experience;
instead they are the conditions of actual
experience, the internal difference in itself.
"The concept they [the conditions] form is
identical to its object." A Deleuzean idea
or concept of difference is therefore not
a wraith-like abstraction of an experienced
thing, it is a real system of differential
relations that creates actual spaces, times,
and sensations.Thus, Deleuze at times refers
to his philosophy as a transcendental empiricism
(empirisme transcendantal), alluding to Kant.
In Kant's transcendental idealism, experience
only makes sense when organized by forms of
sensibility (namely, space and time) and intellectual
categories (such as causality). Assuming the
content of these forms and categories to be
qualities of the world as it exists independently
of our perceptual access, according to Kant,
spawns seductive but senseless metaphysical
beliefs (for example, extending the concept
of causality beyond possible experience results
in unverifiable speculation about a first
cause). Deleuze inverts the Kantian arrangement:
experience exceeds our concepts by presenting
novelty, and this raw experience of difference
actualizes an idea, unfettered by our prior
categories, forcing us to invent new ways
of thinking (see Epistemology).
Simultaneously, Deleuze claims that being
is univocal, i.e., that all of its senses
are affirmed in one voice. Deleuze borrows
the doctrine of ontological univocity from
the medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus.
In medieval disputes over the nature of God,
many eminent theologians and philosophers
(such as Thomas Aquinas) held that when one
says that "God is good", God's goodness is
only analogous to human goodness. Scotus argued
to the contrary that when one says that "God
is good", the goodness in question is exactly
the same sort of goodness that is meant when
one says "Jane is good". That is, God only
differs from us in degree, and properties
such as goodness, power, reason, and so forth
are univocally applied, regardless of whether
one is talking about God, a person, or a flea.
Deleuze adapts the doctrine of univocity to
claim that being is, univocally, difference.
"With univocity, however, it is not the differences
which are and must be: it is being which is
Difference, in the sense that it is said of
difference. Moreover, it is not we who are
univocal in a Being which is not; it is we
and our individuality which remains equivocal
in and for a univocal Being." Here Deleuze
at once echoes and inverts Spinoza, who maintained
that everything that exists is a modification
of the one substance, God or Nature. For Deleuze,
there is no one substance, only an always-differentiating
process, an origami cosmos, always folding,
unfolding, refolding. Deleuze summarizes this
ontology in the paradoxical formula "pluralism
= monism".Difference and Repetition (1968)
is Deleuze's most sustained and systematic
attempt to work out the details of such a
metaphysics, but his other works develop similar
ideas. In Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962),
for example, reality is a play of forces;
in Anti-Oedipus (1972), a "body without organs";
in What is Philosophy? (1991), a "plane of
immanence" or "chaosmos".
=== Epistemology ===
Deleuze's unusual metaphysics entails an equally
atypical epistemology, or what he calls a
transformation of "the image of thought".
According to Deleuze, the traditional image
of thought, found in philosophers such as
Aristotle, René Descartes, and Edmund Husserl,
misconceives of thinking as a mostly unproblematic
business. Truth may be hard to discover—it
may require a life of pure theorizing, or
rigorous computation, or systematic doubt—but
thinking is able, at least in principle, to
correctly grasp facts, forms, ideas, etc.
It may be practically impossible to attain
a God's-eye, neutral point of view, but that
is the ideal to approximate: a disinterested
pursuit that results in a determinate, fixed
truth; an orderly extension of common sense.
Deleuze rejects this view as papering over
the metaphysical flux, instead claiming that
genuine thinking is a violent confrontation
with reality, an involuntary rupture of established
categories. Truth changes what we think; it
alters what we think is possible. By setting
aside the assumption that thinking has a natural
ability to recognize the truth, Deleuze says,
we attain a "thought without image", a thought
always determined by problems rather than
solving them. "All this, however, presupposes
codes or axioms which do not result by chance,
but which do not have an intrinsic rationality
either. It's just like theology: everything
about it is quite rational if you accept sin,
the immaculate conception, and the incarnation.
Reason is always a region carved out of the
irrational—not sheltered from the irrational
at all, but traversed by it and only defined
by a particular kind of relationship among
irrational factors. Underneath all reason
lies delirium, and drift."Deleuze's peculiar
readings of the history of philosophy stem
from this unusual epistemological perspective.
To read a philosopher is no longer to aim
at finding a single, correct interpretation,
but is instead to present a philosopher's
attempt to grapple with the problematic nature
of reality. "Philosophers introduce new concepts,
they explain them, but they don't tell us,
not completely anyway, the problems to which
those concepts are a response. [...] The history
of philosophy, rather than repeating what
a philosopher says, has to say what he must
have taken for granted, what he didn't say
but is nonetheless present in what he did
say."Likewise, rather than seeing philosophy
as a timeless pursuit of truth, reason, or
universals, Deleuze defines philosophy as
the creation of concepts. For Deleuze, concepts
are not identity conditions or propositions,
but metaphysical constructions that define
a range of thinking, such as Plato's ideas,
Descartes's cogito, or Kant's doctrine of
the faculties. A philosophical concept "posits
itself and its object at the same time as
it is created." In Deleuze's view, then, philosophy
more closely resembles practical or artistic
production than it does an adjunct to a definitive
scientific description of a pre-existing world
(as in the tradition of John Locke or Willard
Van Orman Quine).
In his later work (from roughly 1981 onward),
Deleuze sharply distinguishes art, philosophy,
and science as three distinct disciplines,
each analyzing reality in different ways.
While philosophy creates concepts, the arts
create novel qualitative combinations of sensation
and feeling (what Deleuze calls "percepts"
and "affects"), and the sciences create quantitative
theories based on fixed points of reference
such as the speed of light or absolute zero
(which Deleuze calls "functives"). According
to Deleuze, none of these disciplines enjoy
primacy over the others: they are different
ways of organizing the metaphysical flux,
"separate melodic lines in constant interplay
with one another." For example, Deleuze does
not treat cinema as an art representing an
external reality, but as an ontological practice
that creates different ways of organizing
movement and time. Philosophy, science, and
art are equally, and essentially, creative
and practical. Hence, instead of asking traditional
questions of identity such as "is it true?"
or "what is it?", Deleuze proposes that inquiries
should be functional or practical: "what does
it do?" or "how does it work?"
=== Values ===
In ethics and politics, Deleuze again echoes
Spinoza, albeit in a sharply Nietzschean key.
In a classical liberal model of society, morality
begins from individuals, who bear abstract
natural rights or duties set by themselves
or a God. Following his rejection of any metaphysics
based on identity, Deleuze criticizes the
notion of an individual as an arresting or
halting of differentiation (as the etymology
of the word "individual" suggests). Guided
by the naturalistic ethics of Spinoza and
Nietzsche, Deleuze instead seeks to understand
individuals and their moralities as products
of the organization of pre-individual desires
and powers.In the two volumes of Capitalism
and Schizophrenia (Anti-Oedipus (1972) and
A Thousand Plateaus (1980)), Deleuze and Guattari
describe history as a congealing and regimentation
of "desiring-production" (a concept combining
features of Freudian drives and Marxist labor)
into the modern individual (typically neurotic
and repressed), the nation-state (a society
of continuous control), and capitalism (an
anarchy domesticated into infantilizing commodification).
Deleuze, following Karl Marx, welcomes capitalism's
destruction of traditional social hierarchies
as liberating, but inveighs against its homogenization
of all values to the aims of the market.
The first part of Capitalism and Schizophrenia
undertakes a universal history and posits
the existence of a separate socius (the social
body that takes credit for production) for
each mode of production: the earth for the
tribe, the body of the despot for the empire,
and capital for capitalism."In his 1990 essay
"Postscript on the Societies of Control" ("Post-scriptum
sur les sociétés de contrôle"), Deleuze
builds on Foucault's notion of the society
of discipline to argue that society is undergoing
a shift in structure and control. Where societies
of discipline were characterized by discrete
physical enclosures (such as schools, factories,
prisons, office buildings, etc.), institutions
and technologies introduced since World War
II have dissolved the boundaries between these
enclosures. As a result, social coercion and
discipline have moved into the lives of individuals
considered as "masses, samples, data, markets,
or 'banks'." The mechanisms of modern societies
of control are described as continuous, following
and tracking individuals throughout their
existence via transaction records, mobile
location tracking, and other personally identifiable
information.But how does Deleuze square his
pessimistic diagnoses with his ethical naturalism?
Deleuze claims that standards of value are
internal or immanent: to live well is to fully
express one's power, to go to the limits of
one's potential, rather than to judge what
exists by non-empirical, transcendent standards.
Modern society still suppresses difference
and alienates persons from what they can do.
To affirm reality, which is a flux of change
and difference, we must overturn established
identities and so become all that we can become—though
we cannot know what that is in advance. The
pinnacle of Deleuzean practice, then, is creativity.
"Herein, perhaps, lies the secret: to bring
into existence and not to judge. If it is
so disgusting to judge, it is not because
everything is of equal value, but on the contrary
because what has value can be made or distinguished
only by defying judgment. What expert judgment,
in art, could ever bear on the work to come?"
=== Deleuze's interpretations ===
Deleuze's studies of individual philosophers
and artists are purposely heterodox. In Nietzsche
and Philosophy, for example, Deleuze claims
that Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality
(1887) is an attempt to rewrite Kant's Critique
of Pure Reason (1781), even though Nietzsche
nowhere mentions the First Critique in the
Genealogy, and the Genealogy's moral topics
are far removed from the epistemological focus
of Kant's book. Likewise, Deleuze claims that
univocity is the organizing principle of Spinoza's
philosophy, despite the total absence of the
term from any of Spinoza's works. Deleuze
once famously described his method of interpreting
philosophers as "buggery (enculage)", as sneaking
behind an author and producing an offspring
which is recognizably his, yet also monstrous
and different.The various monographs thus
are not attempts to present what Nietzsche
or Spinoza strictly intended, but re-stagings
of their ideas in different and unexpected
ways. Deleuze's peculiar readings aim to enact
the creativity he believes is the acme of
philosophical practice. A parallel in painting
Deleuze points to is Francis Bacon's Study
after Velázquez—it is quite beside the
point to say that Bacon "gets Velasquez wrong".
Similar considerations apply, in Deleuze's
view, to his own uses of mathematical and
scientific terms, pace critics such as Alan
Sokal: "I'm not saying that Resnais and Prigogine,
or Godard and Thom, are doing the same thing.
I'm pointing out, rather, that there are remarkable
similarities between scientific creators of
functions and cinematic creators of images.
And the same goes for philosophical concepts,
since there are distinct concepts of these
spaces."
== Reception ==
In the 1960s, Deleuze's portrayal of Nietzsche
as a metaphysician of difference rather than
a reactionary mystic contributed greatly to
the plausibility and popularity of "left-wing
Nietzscheanism" as an intellectual stance.
His books Difference and Repetition (1968)
and The Logic of Sense (1969) led Michel Foucault
to declare that "one day, perhaps, this century
will be called Deleuzian." (Deleuze, for his
part, said Foucault's comment was "a joke
meant to make people who like us laugh, and
make everyone else livid.") In the 1970s,
the Anti-Oedipus, written in a style by turns
vulgar and esoteric, offering a sweeping analysis
of the family, language, capitalism, and history
via eclectic borrowings from Freud, Marx,
Nietzsche, and dozens of other writers, was
received as a theoretical embodiment of the
anarchic spirit of May 1968. In 1994 and 1995,
L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, an eight-hour
series of interviews between Deleuze and Claire
Parnet, aired on France's Arte Channel.In
the 1980s and 1990s, almost all of Deleuze's
books were translated into English. Deleuze's
work is frequently cited in English-speaking
academia (in 2007, e.g., he was the 11th most
frequently cited author in English-speaking
publications in the humanities, between Freud
and Kant). Like his contemporaries Foucault,
Jacques Derrida, and Jean-François Lyotard,
Deleuze's influence has been most strongly
felt in North American humanities departments,
particularly in literary theory, where Anti-Oedipus
and A Thousand Plateaus are oft regarded as
major statements of post-structuralism and
postmodernism, though neither Deleuze nor
Guattari described their work in those terms.
Likewise in the English-speaking academy,
Deleuze's work is typically classified as
continental philosophy.Deleuze has attracted
critics as well. The following list is not
exhaustive, and gives only the briefest of
summaries.
Among French philosophers, Vincent Descombes
argues that Deleuze's account of a difference
that is not derived from identity (in Nietzsche
and Philosophy) is incoherent, and that his
analysis of history in Anti-Oedipus is 'utter
idealism', criticizing reality for falling
short of a non-existent ideal of schizophrenic
becoming. According to Pascal Engel, Deleuze's
metaphilosophical approach makes it impossible
to reasonably disagree with a philosophical
system, and so destroys meaning, truth, and
philosophy itself. Engel summarizes Deleuze's
metaphilosophy thus: "When faced with a beautiful
philosophical concept you should just sit
back and admire it. You should not question
it." Alain Badiou claims that Deleuze's metaphysics
only apparently embraces plurality and diversity,
remaining at bottom monist. Badiou further
argues that, in practical matters, Deleuze's
monism entails an ascetic, aristocratic fatalism
akin to ancient Stoicism.Other European philosophers
have criticized Deleuze's theory of subjectivity.
For example, Manfred Frank claims that Deleuze's
theory of individuation as a process of bottomless
differentiation fails to explain the unity
of consciousness. Slavoj Žižek claims that
Deleuze's ontology oscillates between materialism
and idealism, and that the Deleuze of Anti-Oedipus
("arguably Deleuze's worst book"), the "political"
Deleuze under the "'bad' influence" of Guattari,
ends up, despite protestations to the contrary,
as "the ideologist of late capitalism". Žižek
also calls Deleuze to task for allegedly reducing
the subject to "just another" substance and
thereby failing to grasp the nothingness that,
according to Lacan and Žižek, defines subjectivity.
What remains worthwhile in Deleuze's oeuvre,
Žižek finds, are precisely those concepts
closest to Žižek's own ideas.English-speaking
philosophers have also criticized aspects
of Deleuze's work. Stanley Rosen objects to
Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal
return. Todd May argues that Deleuze's claim
that difference is ontologically primary ultimately
contradicts his embrace of immanence, i.e.,
his monism. However, May believes that Deleuze
can discard the primacy-of-difference thesis,
and accept a Wittgensteinian holism without
significantly altering his practical philosophy.
Peter Hallward argues that Deleuze's insistence
that being is necessarily creative and always-differentiating
entails that his philosophy can offer no insight
into, and is supremely indifferent to, the
material, actual conditions of existence.
Thus Hallward claims that Deleuze's thought
is literally other-worldly, aiming only at
a passive contemplation of the dissolution
of all identity into the theophanic self-creation
of nature.In Fashionable Nonsense (1997),
physicists Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont accuse
Deleuze of abusing mathematical and scientific
terms, particularly by sliding between accepted
technical meanings and his own idiosyncratic
use of those terms in his works. Sokal and
Bricmont state that they don't object to metaphorical
reasoning, including with mathematical concepts,
but mathematical and scientific terms are
useful only insofar as they are precise. They
give examples of mathematical concepts being
"abused" by taking them out of their intended
meaning, rendering the idea into normal language
reduces it to truism or nonsense. In their
opinion, Deleuze used mathematical concepts
about which the typical reader might be not
knowledgeable, and thus served to display
erudition rather than enlightening the reader.
Sokal and Bricmont state that they only deal
with the "abuse" of mathematical and scientific
concepts and explicitly suspend judgment about
Deleuze's wider contributions.
== Bibliography ==
Single-authoredEmpirisme et subjectivité
(1953). Trans. Empiricism and Subjectivity
(1991).
Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962). Trans.
Nietzsche and Philosophy (1983).
La philosophie critique de Kant (1963). Trans.
Kant's Critical Philosophy (1983).
Proust et les signes (1964, 2nd exp. ed. 1976).
Trans. Proust and Signs (1973, 2nd exp. ed.
2000).
Nietzsche (1965). Trans. in Pure Immanence
(2001).
Le Bergsonisme (1966). Trans. Bergsonism (1988).
Présentation de Sacher-Masoch (1967). Trans.
Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty (1989).
Différence et répétition (1968). Trans.
Difference and Repetition (1994).
Spinoza et le problème de l'expression (1968).
Trans. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza
(1990).
Logique du sens (1969). Trans. The Logic of
Sense (1990).
Spinoza - Philosophie pratique (1970, 2nd
ed. 1981). Trans. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy
(1988).
Dialogues (1977, 2nd exp. ed. 1996, with Claire
Parnet). Trans. Dialogues II (1987, 2nd exp.
ed. 2002).
'One Less Manifesto' (1978) in Superpositions
(with Carmelo Bene).
Francis Bacon - Logique de la sensation (1981).
Trans. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation
(2003).
Cinéma I: L'image-mouvement (1983). Trans.
Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1986).
Cinéma II: L'image-temps (1985). Trans. Cinema
2: The Time-Image (1989).
Foucault (1986). Trans. Foucault (1988).
Le pli - Leibniz et le baroque (1988). Trans.
The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993).
Périclès et Verdi: La philosophie de Francois
Châtelet (1988). Trans. in Dialogues II,
revised ed. (2007).
Pourparlers (1990). Trans. Negotiations (1995).
Critique et clinique (1993). Trans. Essays
Critical and Clinical (1997).
Pure Immanence (2001).
L'île déserte et autres textes (2002). Trans.
Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974 (2003).
Deux régimes de fous et autres textes (2004).
Trans. Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews
1975-1995 (2006).In collaboration with Félix
GuattariCapitalisme et Schizophrénie 1. L'Anti-Œdipe
(1972). Trans. Anti-Oedipus (1977).
Kafka: Pour une Littérature Mineure (1975).
Trans. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1986).
Rhizome (1976). Trans., in revised form, in
A Thousand Plateaus (1987)
Nomadology: The War Machine (1986). Trans.
in A Thousand Plateaus (1987)
Capitalisme et Schizophrénie 2. Mille Plateaux
(1980). Trans. A Thousand Plateaus (1987).
Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? (1991). Trans.
What Is Philosophy? (1994).
"Part I: Deleuze and Guattari on Anti-Oedipus"
of Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972-77
(2009) Edited by Sylvere Lotringer. (pp. 35–118)In
collaboration with Michel Foucault"Intellectuals
and Power: A Discussion Between Gilles Deleuze
and Michel Foucault". TELOS 16 (Summer 1973).
New York: Telos Press (reprinted in L'île
déserte et autres textes / Desert Islands
and Other Texts; see above)
== Documentaries ==
L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, with Claire
Parnet, produced by Pierre-André Boutang.
Éditions Montparnasse.
== See also ==
== Notes and references ==
== External links ==
Webdeleuze - Courses & audio (in French),
(in English), (in Italian), (in Spanish),
(in Portuguese), etc.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Gilles
Deleuze", by Daniel Smith & John Protevi.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Gilles
Deleuze", by Jon Roffe.
Near complete bibliography, including various
translations
Alain Badiou, "The Event in Deleuze." (English
translation).
Lectures and notes on work by Deleuze and
Guattari.
Rhizomes. Online journal inspired by Deleuzian
thought.
Web resources from Wayne State University.
Capitalism: A Very Special Delirium (1995).
