Paul Karl Feyerabend (; German: [ˈfaɪɐˌʔaːbn̩t,
-ˌʔaːbm̩t]; January 13, 1924 – February
11, 1994) was an Austrian-born philosopher
of science best known for his work as a professor
of philosophy at the University of California,
Berkeley, where he worked for three decades
(1958–1989). At various different points
in his life, he lived in England, the United
States, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and finally
Switzerland. His major works include Against
Method (published in 1975), Science in a Free
Society (published in 1978) and Farewell to
Reason (a collection of papers published in
1987). Feyerabend became famous for his purportedly
anarchistic view of science and his rejection
of the existence of universal methodological
rules. He was an influential figure in the
sociology of scientific knowledge. Asteroid
(22356) Feyerabend is named in his honour.
== Biography ==
=== Early Life ===
Feyerabend was born in 1924 in Vienna, where
he attended primary and high school. In this
period he got into the habit of frequent reading,
developed an interest in theatre, and started
singing lessons. After graduating from high
school in April 1942 he was drafted into the
German Arbeitsdienst. After basic training
in Pirmasens, Germany, he was assigned to
a unit in Quelern en Bas, near Brest (France).
Feyerabend described the work he did during
that period as monotonous: "we moved around
in the countryside, dug ditches, and filled
them up again." After a short leave he joined
the army and volunteered for officer school.
In his autobiography he writes that he hoped
the war would be over by the time he had finished
his education as an officer. This turned out
not to be the case. From December 1943 on,
he served as an officer on the northern part
of the Eastern Front, was decorated with an
Iron cross, and attained the rank of lieutenant.
When the German army started its retreat from
the advancing Red Army, Feyerabend was hit
by three bullets while directing traffic.
One bullet hit him in the spine. As a consequence
he needed to walk with a stick for the rest
of his life and frequently experienced severe
pain. He spent the rest of the war recovering
from his wounds.
=== Post–WWII and university ===
When the war was over, Feyerabend first got
a temporary job in Apolda where he wrote plays.
He was influenced by the Marxist playwright
Bertolt Brecht and was invited by Brecht to
be his assistant at the East Berlin State
Opera but turned down the offer. Feyerabend
took various classes at the Weimar Academy,
and returned to Vienna to study history and
sociology. He became dissatisfied, however,
and soon transferred to physics, where he
met Felix Ehrenhaft, a physicist whose experiments
would influence his later views on the nature
of science. Feyerabend changed his course
of studies to philosophy and submitted his
final thesis on observation sentences. In
his autobiography, he described his philosophical
views during this time as "staunchly empiricist".
In 1948 he visited the first Alpbach Forum
in Alpbach. There Feyerabend first met Karl
Popper, who had a "positive" (early Popper),
as well as "negative" (later Popper) effect
on him. In 1949 he was a founding member of
the Kraft Circle. In 1951, Feyerabend was
granted a British Council scholarship to study
under Wittgenstein. However, Wittgenstein
died before Feyerabend moved to England. Feyerabend
then chose Popper as his supervisor instead,
and went to study at the London School of
Economics in 1952. In his autobiography, Feyerabend
explains that during this time, he was influenced
by Popper: "I had fallen for [Popper's ideas]".
After that, Feyerabend returned to Vienna
and was involved in various projects; a translation
of Karl Popper's Open Society and its Enemies,
hunting down manuscripts Popper had left in
Vienna, a report on the development of the
humanities in Austria, and several articles
for an encyclopedia.
=== Academia ===
In 1955, Feyerabend received his first academic
appointment at the University of Bristol,
where he gave lectures about the philosophy
of science. Later in his life he worked as
a professor (or equivalent) at Berkeley, Auckland,
Kassel, Sussex, Yale, London, Berlin and ETH
Zurich. During this time, he developed a critical
view of science, which he later described
as 'anarchistic' or 'dadaistic' to illustrate
his rejection of the dogmatic use of rules,
a position incompatible with the contemporary
rationalistic culture in the philosophy of
science. At the London School of Economics,
Feyerabend met a colleague of K. R. Popper,
Imre Lakatos with whom he planned to write
a dialogue volume in which Lakatos would defend
a rationalist view of science and Feyerabend
would attack it. This planned joint publication
was put to an end by Lakatos's sudden death
in 1974. Against Method became a famous criticism
of current philosophical views of science
and provoked many reactions. In his autobiography,
he reveals that the energy in his writings
came at great cost to himself:
The depression stayed with me for over a year;
it was like an animal, a well-defined, spatially
localizable thing. I would wake up, open my
eyes, listen – Is it here or isn't? No sign
of it. Perhaps it's asleep. Perhaps it will
leave me alone today. Carefully, very carefully,
I get out of bed. All is quiet. I go to the
kitchen, start breakfast. Not a sound. TV
– Good Morning America –, David What's-his-name,
a guy I can't stand. I eat and watch the guests.
Slowly the food fills my stomach and gives
me strength. Now a quick excursion to the
bathroom, and out for my morning walk – and
here she is, my faithful depression: "Did
you think you could leave without me?"
Feyerabend moved to the University of California,
Berkeley in California in 1958 and became
a U.S. citizen. Following (visiting) professorships
(or their equivalent) at University College
London, Berlin, and Yale, he taught at the
University of Auckland, New Zealand in 1972
and 1974, always returning to California.
He later enjoyed alternating between posts
at ETH Zurich and Berkeley through the 1980s
but left Berkeley for good in October 1989,
first to Italy, then finally to Zurich. After
his retirement in 1991, Feyerabend continued
to publish frequent papers and worked on his
autobiography. After a short period of suffering
from a brain tumor, he died in 1994 at the
Genolier Clinic, overlooking Lake Geneva,
Switzerland.
== Thought ==
=== Philosophy of science ===
==== Nature of scientific method ====
In his books Against Method and Science in
a Free Society Feyerabend defended the idea
that there are no methodological rules which
are always used by scientists. He objected
to any single prescriptive scientific method
on the grounds that any such method would
limit the activities of scientists, and hence
restrict scientific progress. In his view,
science would benefit most from a "dose" of
theoretical anarchism. He also thought that
theoretical anarchism was desirable because
it was more humanitarian than other systems
of organization, by not imposing rigid rules
on scientists.
For is it not possible that science as we
know it today, or a "search for the truth"
in the style of traditional philosophy, will
create a monster? Is it not possible that
an objective approach that frowns upon personal
connections between the entities examined
will harm people, turn them into miserable,
unfriendly, self-righteous mechanisms without
charm or humour? "Is it not possible," asks
Kierkegaard, "that my activity as an objective
[or critico-rational] observer of nature will
weaken my strength as a human being?" I suspect
the answer to many of these questions is affirmative
and I believe that a reform of the sciences
that makes them more anarchic and more subjective
(in Kierkegaard's sense) is urgently needed.
Against Method. p. 154.
Feyerabend's position was originally seen
as radical in the philosophy of science, because
it implies that philosophy can neither succeed
in providing a general description of science,
nor in devising a method for differentiating
products of science from non-scientific entities
like myths. (Feyerabend's position also implies
that philosophical guidelines should be ignored
by scientists, if they are to aim for progress.)
To support his position that methodological
rules generally do not contribute to scientific
success, Feyerabend provides counterexamples
to the claim that (good) science operates
according to a certain fixed method. He took
some examples of episodes in science that
are generally regarded as indisputable instances
of progress (e.g. the Copernican revolution),
and showed that all common prescriptive rules
of science are violated in such circumstances.
Moreover, he claimed that applying such rules
in these historical situations would actually
have prevented scientific revolution.
One of the criteria for evaluating scientific
theories that Feyerabend attacks is the consistency
criterion. He points out that to insist that
new theories be consistent with old theories
gives an unreasonable advantage to the older
theory. He makes the logical point that being
compatible with a defunct older theory does
not increase the validity or truth of a new
theory over an alternative covering the same
content. That is, if one had to choose between
two theories of equal explanatory power, to
choose the one that is compatible with an
older, falsified theory is to make an aesthetic,
rather than a rational choice. The familiarity
of such a theory might also make it more appealing
to scientists, since they will not have to
disregard as many cherished prejudices. Hence,
that theory can be said to have "an unfair
advantage".
Feyerabend was also critical of falsificationism.
He argued that no interesting theory is ever
consistent with all the relevant facts. This
would rule out using a naïve falsificationist
rule which says that scientific theories should
be rejected if they do not agree with known
facts. Feyerabend uses several examples, but
"renormalization" in quantum mechanics provides
an example of his intentionally provocative
style: "This procedure consists in crossing
out the results of certain calculations and
replacing them by a description of what is
actually observed. Thus one admits, implicitly,
that the theory is in trouble while formulating
it in a manner suggesting that a new principle
has been discovered" Against Method. p. 61.
Feyerabend is not advocating that scientists
do not make use of renormalization or other
ad hoc methods. Instead, he is arguing that
such methods are essential to the progress
of science for several reasons. One of these
reasons is that progress in science is uneven.
For instance, in the time of Galileo, optical
theory could not account for phenomena that
were observed by means of telescopes. So,
astronomers who used telescopic observation
had to use ad hoc rules until they could justify
their assumptions by means of optical theory.
Feyerabend was critical of any guideline that
aimed to judge the quality of scientific theories
by comparing them to known facts. He thought
that previous theory might influence natural
interpretations of observed phenomena. Scientists
necessarily make implicit assumptions when
comparing scientific theories to facts that
they observe. Such assumptions need to be
changed in order to make the new theory compatible
with observations. The main example of the
influence of natural interpretations that
Feyerabend provided was the tower argument.
The tower argument was one of the main objections
against the theory of a moving earth. Aristotelians
assumed that the fact that a stone which is
dropped from a tower lands directly beneath
it shows that the earth is stationary. They
thought that, if the earth moved while the
stone was falling, the stone would have been
"left behind". Objects would fall diagonally
instead of vertically. Since this does not
happen, Aristotelians thought that it was
evident that the earth did not move. If one
uses ancient theories of impulse and relative
motion, the Copernican theory indeed appears
to be falsified by the fact that objects fall
vertically on earth. This observation required
a new interpretation to make it compatible
with Copernican theory. Galileo was able to
make such a change about the nature of impulse
and relative motion. Before such theories
were articulated, Galileo had to make use
of ad hoc methods and proceed counterinductively.
So, "ad hoc" hypotheses actually have a positive
function: they temporarily make a new theory
compatible with facts until the theory to
be defended can be supported by other theories.
Feyerabend commented on the Galileo affair
as follows:
The church at the time of Galileo was much
more faithful to reason than Galileo himself,
and also took into consideration the ethical
and social consequences of Galileo's doctrine.
Its verdict against Galileo was rational and
just, and revisionism can be legitimized solely
for motives of political opportunism.
Together these remarks sanction the introduction
of theories that are inconsistent with well-established
facts. Furthermore, a pluralistic methodology
that involves making comparisons between any
theories at all forces defendants to improve
the articulation of each theory. In this way,
scientific pluralism improves the critical
power of science. Pope Benedict XVI cited
Feyerabend to this effect.According to Feyerabend,
new theories came to be accepted not because
of their accord with scientific method, but
because their supporters made use of any trick
– rational, rhetorical or ribald – in
order to advance their cause. Without a fixed
ideology, or the introduction of religious
tendencies, the only approach which does not
inhibit progress (using whichever definition
one sees fit) is "anything goes": "'anything
goes' is not a 'principle' I hold... but the
terrified exclamation of a rationalist who
takes a closer look at history." (Feyerabend,
1975).
Feyerabend considered the possibility of incommensurability,
but he was hesitant in his application of
the concept. He wrote that "it is hardly ever
possible to give an explicit definition of
[incommensurability]" Against Method. p. 225.,
because it involves covert classifications
and major conceptual changes. He also was
critical of attempts to capture incommensurability
in a logical framework, since he thought of
incommensurability as a phenomenon outside
the domain of logic. In the second appendix
of Against Method (p. 114), Feyerabend states,
"I never said... that any two rival theories
are incommensurable... What I did say was
that certain rival theories, so-called 'universal'
theories, or 'non-instantial' theories, if
interpreted in a certain way, could not be
compared easily." Incommensurability did not
concern Feyerabend greatly, because he believed
that even when theories are commensurable
(i.e. can be compared), the outcome of the
comparison should not necessarily rule out
either theory. To rephrase: when theories
are incommensurable, they cannot rule each
other out, and when theories are commensurable,
they cannot rule each other out. Assessments
of (in)commensurability, therefore, don't
have much effect in Feyerabend's system, and
can be more or less passed over in silence.
In Against Method Feyerabend claimed that
Imre Lakatos's philosophy of research programmes
is actually "anarchism in disguise", because
it does not issue orders to scientists. Feyerabend
playfully dedicated Against Method to "Imre
Lakatos: Friend, and fellow-anarchist". One
interpretation is that Lakatos's philosophy
of mathematics and science was based on creative
transformations of Hegelian historiographic
ideas, many associated with Lakatos's teacher
in Hungary Georg Lukács. Feyerabend's debate
with Lakatos on scientific method recapitulates
the debate of Lukács and (Feyerabend's would-be
mentor) Brecht, over aesthetics several decades
earlier.
While Feyerabend described himself as an "epistemological
anarchist", he explicitly disavowed being
a "political anarchist". Some anarchist-leaning
critics of science have agreed with this distinction,
while others have argued that political anarchism
is tacitly embedded in Feyerabend's philosophy
of science.
==== The decline of the physicist-philosopher
====
Feyerabend was critical of the lack of knowledge
of philosophy shown by the generation of physicists
that emerged after World War II:The withdrawal
of philosophy into a "professional" shell
of its own has had disastrous consequences.
The younger generation of physicists, the
Feynmans, the Schwingers, etc., may be very
bright; they may be more intelligent than
their predecessors, than Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger,
Boltzmann, Mach and so on. But they are uncivilized
savages, they lack in philosophical depth
– and this is the fault of the very same
idea of professionalism which you are now
defending.
On the other hand, Feyerabend was himself
heavily criticized for his misrepresentation
of the practices, methods and goals of some
of the above-mentioned scientists, esp. Mach
and Einstein.
=== Role of science in society ===
Feyerabend described science as being essentially
anarchistic, obsessed with its own mythology,
and as making claims to truth well beyond
its actual capacity. He was especially indignant
about the condescending attitudes of many
scientists towards alternative traditions.
For example, he thought that negative opinions
about astrology and the effectivity of rain
dances were not justified by scientific research,
and dismissed the predominantly negative attitudes
of scientists towards such phenomena as elitist
or racist. In his opinion, science has become
a repressing ideology, even though it arguably
started as a liberating movement. Feyerabend
thought that a pluralistic society should
be protected from being influenced too much
by science, just as it is protected from other
ideologies.
Starting from the argument that a historical
universal scientific method does not exist,
Feyerabend argues that science does not deserve
its privileged status in western society.
Since scientific points of view do not arise
from using a universal method which guarantees
high quality conclusions, he thought that
there is no justification for valuing scientific
claims over claims by other ideologies like
religions. Feyerabend also argued that scientific
accomplishments such as the moon landings
are no compelling reason to give science a
special status. In his opinion, it is not
fair to use scientific assumptions about which
problems are worth solving in order to judge
the merit of other ideologies. Additionally,
success by scientists has traditionally involved
non-scientific elements, such as inspiration
from mythical or religious sources.
Based on these arguments, Feyerabend defended
the idea that science should be separated
from the state in the same way that religion
and state are separated in a modern secular
society (Against Method (3rd ed.). p. 160.).
He envisioned a "free society" in which "all
traditions have equal rights and equal access
to the centres of power" (Science in a Free
Society. p. 9.). For example, parents should
be able to determine the ideological context
of their children's education, instead of
having limited options because of scientific
standards. According to Feyerabend, science
should also be subjected to democratic control:
not only should the subjects that are investigated
by scientists be determined by popular election,
scientific assumptions and conclusions should
also be supervised by committees of lay people.
He thought that citizens should use their
own principles when making decisions about
these matters. He rejected the view that science
is especially "rational" on the grounds that
there is no single common "rational" ingredient
that unites all the sciences but excludes
other modes of thought (Against Method (3rd
ed.). p. 246.).
=== Philosophy of mind ===
Along with a number of mid-20th century philosophers
(most notably, Wilfrid Sellars, Willard Van
Orman Quine, and Richard Rorty), Feyerabend
was influential in the development of eliminative
materialism, a radical position in the philosophy
of mind that holds that our ordinary, common-sense
understanding of the mind (what materialist
monists call "folk psychology") is false.
It is succinctly described by a modern proponent,
Paul Churchland, as follows:
"Eliminative materialism is the thesis that
our commonsense conception of psychological
phenomena constitutes a radically false theory,
a theory so fundamentally defective that both
the principles and the ontology of that theory
will eventually be displaced, rather than
smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience."In
three short papers published in the early
sixties, Feyerabend sought to defend materialism
against the supposition that the mind cannot
be a physical thing. Feyerabend suggested
that our commonsense understanding of the
mind was incommensurable with the (materialistic)
scientific view, but that nevertheless we
ought to prefer the materialistic one on general
methodological grounds.
This view of the mind/body problem is widely
considered one of Feyerabend's most important
legacies. Even though Feyerabend himself seems
to have given it up in the late 1970s, it
was taken up by Richard Rorty and, more recently,
by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland.
In fact, as Keeley observes, "PMC [Paul Churchland]
has spent much of his career carrying the
Feyerabend mantle forward" (p. 13).
=== Other works ===
Some of Feyerabend's work concerns the way
in which people's perception of reality is
influenced by various rules. In his last book,
unfinished when he died, he talks of how our
sense of reality is shaped and limited. Conquest
of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus
the Richness of Being bemoans the propensity
we have of institutionalizing these limitations.
The last philosophy book that Feyerabend finished
is The Tyranny of Science (written 1993, published
May 13, 2011). In it Feyerabend challenges
what he sees in his view as some modern myths
about science, e.g., he believes that the
statement 'science is successful' is a myth.
He argues that some very basic assumptions
about science are simply false and that substantial
parts of scientific ideology were created
on the basis of superficial generalizations
that led to absurd misconceptions about the
nature of human life. He claims that far from
solving the pressing problems of our age,
scientific theorizing glorifies ephemeral
generalities at the cost of confronting the
real particulars that make life meaningful.
=== Popular influence ===
The book On the Warrior's Path quotes Feyerabend,
highlighting the similarities between his
epistemology and Bruce Lee's worldview. In
a 2015 retrospective on Thomas Kuhn's theory
of paradigm shifts in social science, the
philosopher Martin Cohen cites several of
Feyerabend's sceptical positions on conventional
claims at scientific knowledge and agrees
with Feyerabend that Thomas Kuhn himself had
only a very hazy idea of what this notion
of paradigm shifts' might mean, and that Kuhn
essentially retreated from the more radical
implications of his theory, which were that
scientific facts are never really more than
opinions, whose popularity is transitory and
far from conclusive. Cohen says that although
in their lifetimes, Kuhn and Feyerabend made
up two viciously opposed sects, they agreed
that science consists of long periods of settled
agreement (so-called 'normal science') punctuated
by radical, conceptual upheaval (so-called
paradigm shifts).
== Quotations ==
...And it is of course not true that we have
to follow the truth. Human life is guided
by many ideas. Truth is one of them. Freedom
and mental independence are others. If Truth,
as conceived by some ideologists, conflicts
with freedom, then we have a choice. We may
abandon freedom. But we may also abandon Truth.
...when sophistication loses content then
the only way of keeping in touch with reality
is to be crude and superficial. This is what
I intend to be.
== Selected bibliography ==
=== Books ===
Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic
Theory of Knowledge (1975), ISBN 0-391-00381-X,
ISBN 0-86091-222-1, ISBN 0-86091-481-X, ISBN
0-86091-646-4, ISBN 0-86091-934-X, ISBN 0-902308-91-2
(First edition in M. Radner & S. Winokur,
eds., Analyses of Theories and Methods of
Physics and Psychology, Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1970.) The first, 1970
edition, is available for download in pdf
form from the Minnesota Center for Philosophy
of Science (part of the University of Minnesota).
Follow this link path: Minnesota Center for
Philosophy of Science: Home > Minnesota Studies
in Philosophy of Science > Complete Contents
vol I-XIV > Volume IV You need to download
the 3 linked parts, and the immediate following
article on A Picture Theory of Theory Meaning
(sic) in order to get the complete set of
footnotes.
Science in a Free Society (1978), ISBN 0-8052-7043-4
Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method:
Philosophical papers, Volume 1 (1981), ISBN
0-521-22897-2, ISBN 0-521-31642-1
Problems of Empiricism: Philosophical Papers,
Volume 2 (1981), ISBN 0-521-23964-8, ISBN
0-521-31641-3
Farewell to Reason (1987), ISBN 0-86091-184-5,
ISBN 0-86091-896-3
Three Dialogues on Knowledge (1991), ISBN
0-631-17917-8, ISBN 0-631-17918-6
Killing Time: The Autobiography of Paul Feyerabend
(1995), ISBN 0-226-24531-4, ISBN 0-226-24532-2
Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction
versus the Richness of Being (1999), ISBN
0-226-24533-0, ISBN 0-226-24534-9
Knowledge, Science and Relativism: Philosophical
Papers, Volume 3 (1999), ISBN 0-521-64129-2
For and Against Method: Including Lakatos's
Lectures on Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend
Correspondence with Imre Lakatos (1999), ISBN
0-226-46774-0, ISBN 0-226-46775-9
Naturphilosophie (2009) Posthumously published,
recently discovered manuscript from the 1970s
- found in the Philosophisches Archiv der
Universität Konstanz (Germany). Helmut Heit
and Eric Oberheim (Eds.): 1. Edition. ISBN
3-518-58514-2.
The Tyranny of Science (2011), ISBN 0-7456-5189-5,
ISBN 0-7456-5190-9
=== Articles ===
"Linguistic Arguments and Scientific Method".
TELOS 03 (Spring 1969). New York: Telos Press,
Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method:
Philosophical papers, Volume 1 (1981), ISBN
0-521-22897-2, ISBN 0-521-31642-1
"How To Defend Society Against Science". Radical
Philosophy, no. 11, Summer 03 1975. [1], Introductory
Readings in the Philosophy of Science edited
by E. D. Klemke (1998), ISBN 1-573-92240-4
== See also ==
== References ==
== Further reading ==
Daniele Bolelli, "On the Warrior's Path: Philosophy,
Fighting, and Martial Arts Mythology", Frog
Books (2003), ISBN 1-58394-066-9
Klaus Hentschel, "On Feyerabend's version
of 'Mach's theory of research and its relation
to Einstein", Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science 16 (1985): 387-394.
Gonzalo Munévar, Beyond Reason: Essays on
the Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend, Boston
Studies in the Philosophy of Science (1991),
ISBN 0-7923-1272-4
Eric Oberheim, Feyerabend's Philosophy (2006),
ISBN 3-11-018907-0
John Preston, Gonzalo Munévar and David Lamb
(ed.), The Worst Enemy of Science? Essays
in memory of Paul Feyerabend (2000), ISBN
0-19-512874-5
John Preston, Feyerabend: Philosophy, Science
and Society (1997), ISBN 0-7456-1675-5, ISBN
0-7456-1676-3
Thomas Kupka: Feyerabend und Kant — Kann
das gut gehen? Paul K. Feyerabends ›Naturphilosophie‹
und Kants Polemik gegen den Dogmatismus. In:
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
42 (2011), pp. 399–409 (DOI 10.1007/s10838-011-9170-0)
== External links ==
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Paul Feyerabend".
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Works of Paul K. Feyerabend Chronological
and annotated bibliographies, with hyperlinks
to digital libraries and Web sources (compiled
by Dr. Matteo Collodel)
"Anything goes": Feyerabend and Method Paul
Newall, The Galilean Library (2005)
Feyerabend and Beyond, an interview by Paul
Newall with Feyerabend's student Gonzalo Munévar,
The Galilean Library (2005)
Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge
Analytical Index and the concluding chapter
from Against Method (1975)
De la paradoja en el "todo vale" de Paul Feyerabend
a la falacia de la falsa libertad Horacio
Bernardo en Galileo Número 28. Octubre 2003
(Spanish)
La Epistemología de Feyerabend. Esquema de
una teoría anarquista del conocimiento Prof.
Dr. Adolfo Vásquez Rocca en ALEPH ZERO 43,
Enero-Marzo 2007 (Spanish)
Science and Society: An Exchange Feyerabend
in The New York Review of Books, Volume 26,
Number 15 · October 11, 1979
Voodoo and the monster of science a review
by David E. Cooper of Conquest of Abundance,
Times Higher Education Supplement (17 March
2000)
History of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of
Science See Book VI on Feyerabend.
Now we're done! (It's time for Feyerabend)
– OA paper (2018) on the topicality of Feyerabend
with subsequent detailed discussion
