
DOWN WITH ELECTIONS! a plan for DEMOCRACY WITHOUT ELECTIONS

Campbell Wallace
Introduction

**"DEMOCRACY WITHOUT ELECTIONS"?**

How could anyone except a would-be dictator be so stupid, so irresponsible, or so perverse as to wish to see the end of elections? In the developed and supposedly democratic world, we are accustomed to think that freedom and democracy, if not quite synonymous, go hand in hand; that one is not possible without the other. We assume, usually without giving the matter much thought, that elections are necessary for democracy and that they guarantee freedom.

Even though we cannot precisely define what we mean by the word democracy, we assume that elections are necessary for democracy, and that they are our guarantee of freedom. The Economist Intelligence Unit, for instance, says in the introduction to its Democracy Index for 2016:

"There is no consensus on how to measure democracy. Definitions of democracy are contested, and there is a lively debate on the subject [...] Even if a consensus on precise definitions has proved elusive, most observers would agree that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of a democracy include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed; the existence of free and fair elections; the protection of minority rights; and respect for basic human rights."

And again:

"The condition of holding free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom, is clearly the sine qua non of all definitions." [1]

It is easy enough to see why this assumption is so common. First, citizens of those countries which at present do not have elections, or where elections are a mere sham and the result is a foregone conclusion, are clearly not free. They are subject to dictators, or military juntas; those who are not in power have no rights and are at the mercy of the dictator, his police and his cronies. Clearly this is a bad situation, and no-one would deny that we are better off with elections, whatever their faults may be.

Second, from early in the nineteenth century – not long after ever since the monarchy was replaced in America and France by a government of elected representatives – we have been told by the Press, by philosophers and political theorists, and by the representatives themselves, that an elected government gives us democracy and freedom, that "we the people" are in control. Children are taught in their earliest years of school that "democracy" means "choosing our leaders in elections" and vice versa. Though it is done in all sincerity and with the best of intentions, such is the tenacity of our early beliefs that most of us never question this in later life, and so, in effect, we are indoctrinated. Yet the simple equation "elections equal democracy" is certainly not incontrovertible, and should be open to rigorous, critical examination.

Third, since the nineteenth century we have seen the expansion of the electorate from a franchise limited to propertied white males to an electorate of all citizens who have reached majority. It is obvious that this is a great step towards fairness. Consequently we tend to believe that all the most important steps have now been taken, and that, even if minor reforms could be made, to all intents and purposes we have achieved freedom and equality.

Fourth, we see people in less fortunate countries desperately struggling, often at the risk of prison, torture, or death, to get an elected government like those in Europe or North America, or to migrate to a country with such a government. If these people are willing to risk so much in order to have a political system like ours, then surely our system must be worth defending at all costs.

Yet despite these comforting assumptions, it is apparent that all is not well in our "democratic" world. Politicians seem to serve only the interests of large corporations and the wealthy, not those of the community as a whole, decisions are taken which fly in the face of common sense and well-established facts, and the man or woman in the street is increasingly dissatisfied and cynical. [2] The signs are obvious: political leaders are regarded with contempt, they are seen to be corrupt, incompetent, or to have betrayed the interests of the electors. Voter turnout is low, often not much over 50%, sometimes even less. In the past it has been usual to assume that those who fail to vote are simply apathetic and too lazy to do so; it is accepted now that often they don't vote because they know that their vote will have no effect, or believe that whichever way they vote, the politicians' promises will be broken. Other voters turn to the extreme left or right, quite often not because they want to see an extremist party in power, but as a "protest vote" to show their disgust with the major parties. And whatever one thinks of Donald Trump and of Hillary Clinton, it is hardly a sign of healthy democracy that in 2016 neither candidate had the approval of a majority of Americans. If elections select the best candidate for office, are we really to believe that in a population of 325 million, there is no-one better fitted to be President than a man disapproved of by 61% of the electorate? [3]

We see too that there is a large gap between rhetoric and practice. Western governments, so ready to trumpet their commitment to freedom, nevertheless help to maintain or install dictatorships and military governments in other countries, and oppose any attempt by the citizens of those countries to free themselves. Moreover, blatant abuses of human rights are committed by elected governments, usually with the pretext that this is necessary to defend democracy against subversion or fanatics.

There is a feeling, then, that things don't work out as they should. We tend to blame other people; for most of us the villains are the politicians, and for many, the media and big business. Politicians blame their political opponents, or sometimes the apathy or the ignorance or unreal expectations of the ordinary citizen. And everyone likes to blame "the bureaucrats". Almost no-one, until recently, has considered the notion that it is perhaps not only the people involved who are to blame, but also – indeed especially – the political system itself. It seems to be accepted without question that elections mean democracy, and democracy means freedom.

Of course, unprincipled and venal politicians are common, and so are uninformed and apathetic citizens. However, I shall argue that it is neither the voter (or the non-voter) nor the politicians that are the real problem. As I see it, the root cause is the system itself, the system of free elections that we hold so dear, and which nevertheless is deeply flawed. I also argue that, contrary to accepted wisdom, it is possible to have a more equitable and more efficient system of government.

The first and second chapters of this book deal with the faults (as I see them) of what we call "representative democracy" that is, government chosen by elections, and compare our current systems with accepted standards. In chapter 3 I look briefly at "direct democracy", where issues are decided by popular vote, before moving on to the real subject of the book, sortition. Chapter 4 outlines the nature and advantages of sortition, and chapter 5 sets out a plan or template for a legislature chosen by sortition, at the national level. Chapter 6 shows examples of the functioning of this legislature, while chapter 7 contains a suggestion for the application of sortition at local government level. Chapter 8 compares the proposed sortition-based legislature with the criteria for democracy introduced in chapter 2. The theoretical and practical background behind the choices made in this model is set out in chapters 9 and 10. Chapter 11 consists of replies to objections which have been raised by readers. 
1 – The Failure of Elections: Twenty-Seven Defects

There are many reasons why elections don't work very well, including the following:

**1.1** Elections are all too vulnerable to fraud. Votes are lost or falsely declared invalid, ballot boxes are stolen or stuffed with fake votes, some voters vote many times, electronic voting machines have buggy software, recounts are impossible because there is no permanent record, or "it could not be done in the time available" or are "too expensive", and so on. [4] To be sure, one might protest that these are not so much faults as abuses of the system by the unscrupulous. But without elections these abuses could not occur, so this is no argument at all: it amounts to admitting that elections are vulnerable.

**1.2** In principle, anyone can stand as a candidate, and the voter can choose any candidate whatsoever. But modern election campaigns require huge sums of money, so in practice only those who have the backing of wealthy organisations and individuals can realistically be candidates. [5] Generally speaking then, the ordinary citizen can neither be a candidate – except at the price of joining a party, working long and hard to rise in the hierarchy, and subordinating his or her ideals to the party line – nor vote for the candidate he or she would prefer, since the only candidates "available" – that is to say who have a hope of getting elected – are those who please these powerful groups. Our choice is limited to a small number of candidates chosen by others.

**1.3** Since survival (that is to say re-election) in politics depends on this finance, elected politicians must – at least to some extent – put the interests of their financial supporters before those of the public or risk losing their backing at the next election, which may mean certain loss of the election. [6] The interests of these supporters, of course, have nothing to do with your interests or mine, or those of the rest of the electors. Laws limiting campaign finance are not always effective. Candidates and their donors either find ways to circumvent them legally, or break the law in ways that are not easily detected. Amendments are often made, with the assent of opposition parties, which increase the limits or otherwise neutralise the law.

**1.4** The electoral system makes parties necessary. Even if election campaign expenditure were rigorously limited to zero, it would still be necessary for candidates to form groups. An unknown, independent candidate has no chance of election, because the electorate has no idea of what he or she stands for, and fears the unknown: "Better the devil you know than the devil you don't". Even a celebrity, a sporting hero or actor, for instance, will have to work very hard to make his policies known and his candidature credible. An unknown candidate belonging to a large party, on the other hand, has a better chance of election, because most of that party's supporters will vote for the party regardless of who the candidate is. He will also have the support of the party machine and its leaders.

Now electoral politics is adversarial. Parties struggle to be elected, and to prevent other parties taking power. Party strategists work hard, by means of gimmicks – funny hats in party colours, slogans, ribbons, banners, streamers, etc – to promote a sense of party loyalty in the voters, a sense of belonging to a group. The strategists deliberately polarise the voters, always stressing the division between "us" and "them". Politicians, by their denigration of opponents, (and also by their own questionable behaviour) further this polarisation.

No tactic is too base, too ignoble. Opposing candidates' private lives are searched for anything that will discredit them. Calumny is just part of the game. It doesn't matter if a discreditable report is true or false, mud sticks and the campaign managers know it, and the only thing that counts is the public's reaction on election day. Who cares if there's a bit of a scandal or the threat of a libel suit just after the election, as long as our guy gets elected?

Media reports of elections are couched in competitive metaphors, like those of a sporting match, or even in warlike terms, ("fight to the death" etc) and stress the battle between parties. It is not surprising that the voters often support their party (and abhor the opposition) in a "tribal" fashion, fervently and uncritically, like some supporters of football clubs. Whether or not this helps the candidate, it often leads to serious violence, and never to thoughtful consideration of issues. And surely politics ought to be about issues, not about personalities or party loyalty.

**1.5** Some countries subsidise political campaigns at taxpayers' expense, ostensibly in order to reduce the effect of donations by wealthy groups. Unfortunately this leads to an unfair advantage for some parties, generally the largest, since the money is usually given in proportion to the votes that each party receives, or else is limited to parties that gain more than a certain percentage of the vote. Since the laws governing these subventions are implemented by the politicians of the major parties, and they are the ones who benefit, this is a form of legalised corruption. It also discourages small parties with new – or at least different – policies. The American Political Action Committees, by donating only to the two major parties, have a similar effect. Indeed it is sometimes even argued – absurdly – that the PACs are necessary in order to exclude minor parties, in the name of preserving stability. In reality, it is the privileged position of the major parties which is preserved.

**1.6** The motivation of candidates is open to question. By the very fact of standing for office elected politicians show that they seek power. There is a saying that "no man who seeks power is fit to exercise it". [7] Does your candidate want to change the laws to feather his own nest? Or is he high-minded and honest, and merely gets a buzz from making up rules for you and others to obey? Or is he a complete "power-freak" in the early stages of megalomania? Whatever the case, nobody comes to hold power in a modern state without wanting that power. Elections favour the ambitious, not necessarily the able or the honest, and there must always be the danger that the ambitious, elected few will use the power they have gained to seek more and more power.

It happens often that the politicians' only aim, once elected, is to hang on to power and position by any means available. We can't blame them too much: this is all too human and perfectly understandable if they have been in politics – and out of the real world – for a long time, so that politics is their only way of making a living and supporting a family.

**1.7** Party politics always involves compromise. By joining a party, or voting for its candidate, we are obliged to compromise. We don't all think alike, so the aims of any candidate or party will typically be different from ours. If we have clear personal political aims, in the hope of furthering the principal ones we have to vote for someone who will not attempt to bring about our other goals, which we thus effectively sacrifice, presumably because we regard them as less important.

Once elected, the politician will achieve nothing without cooperating with other elected members, and that entails more compromise. Your candidate may promise to act as you would wish on a particular issue, and may even completely agree with you on that issue, and yet make a contrary vote, following the party line. The "representative" will justify this by saying that in order to get anything useful done, she or he and the party must stay in power, and if a compromise is necessary to stay in power, then so be it, that compromise must be made. Which is all quite true in pragmatic terms, but in the process, one of your key goals may be sacrificed in order to bring about something that is anathema to you. Not only has your politician failed to deliver, he or she has in effect betrayed you. The word "betrayed" is not too strong, even though the politician may have made an honest attempt to act for the best, and so has not acted unethically. You voted for a package based on the candidate's or the party's platform. What you got is nothing like what you anticipated. You feel cheated, and rightly so; if you had known, you might have voted for the other party.

Compromises can happen at more than one level: within a faction, within a party, within a coalition, or to get the support of a minor party determined to sell that support at the highest possible price. At each stage your preferences are likely to be disregarded.

Where, as in the US, politicians are not held to vote strictly according to the party's dictates, the need to compromise in order to achieve anything can lead to a bizarre form of horse trading. "Will you vote for the new aircraft carrier?" "I can't possibly do that. We're supposed to work to reduce government spending." "Suppose you got a subsidy for planting new wheat varieties and a 150% tax rebate on farm machines?" "Throw in a four-lane bridge across the Muddy River and I'll vote to send troops to XXX as well." And so important decisions depend on matters that have nothing to do with the question being considered, and promises made at election time are thrown out the window.

**1.8** Slogans rule! A candidate who says clearly what he or she means to do is immediately at a disadvantage with respect to those who offer meaningless formulas. A well-defined policy can be attacked, misrepresented, quoted out of context, and ridiculed. Slogans like "It's time", "Yes, we can" and so forth have too little meaning in them to be capable of being distorted, though they help to rally the party faithful.

**1.9** The information the public receives from the media is always incomplete and biased, often grotesquely so. The media depend on advertising revenue, and even in the absence of overt pressure, self-censor their news content. To keep their readership or audience, and hence their revenue, they sensationalise their reports: nothing sells like fear. Also, given the pressures on editors, it is not surprising that even the best sometimes uncritically reprint or broadcast propaganda prepared by "spin doctors". The media's tendency to treat elections as sporting events, besides polarising the electorate, focuses on the fortunes of the candidates and the parties, not on their policies. [8] (Even in this shallow treatment they can be grotesquely wrong. [9]) Commercial television, in particular, favours the ten-second "sound bite" rather than any detailed discussion of policies or past performance. [10]

To the older media (press, radio, TV), we must now add social media and the internet itself. In 2016, over 60% of American users of Facebook and Twitter use them as a source of news (18% "often" do so), and this proportion is rising rapidly, as younger adults use them more than older people. [11] Unfortunately, these sites are particularly unreliable as sources. We tend to believe what we want to believe and we are more likely to believe something that seems to come from more than one source. When users limit their network of contacts to like-minded people, re-tweet or link mostly to items of news or opinion that agree with their world view, they create an "echo chamber" where a completely false "news" item may gain credence through being repeated over and over. [12] Deliberate manipulation has become common, and may have decided the result of the 2016 presidential election. [13]

There is also the "search engine manipulation effect": Most of those who use a search engine read only the first few results; 90% of clicks are on the very first result. It is possible for a search engine to favour one candidate in an election through "ranking bias"; (it may even be impossible for it _not_ to do so). Since Google has a near-monopoly, it is not possible for different search engines to cancel each other out. The bias is difficult to detect, and may be either deliberate, or, more likely, an accidental effect of the search algorithm itself. (Does this make it better? Do we want our government chosen by an algorithm?) [14]

**1.10** Even if we had politicians with clear policies which the politicians honestly intended to implement, and which were accurately presented to us by the media, those policies could not take account of future events. Should we then vote for the declared policy, or for the person likely to make the best decisions in unknown circumstances? Either way, you cannot know what a politician will do once in power. This problem is inevitable because we vote for a person or a party, never on an issue except (rarely) in a referendum.

**1.11** It is all too easy for elected politicians to abusively influence school curricula, and a strong motive for doing so is to persuade future voters to favour the ideology of the politicians' party or group. The tinkering with curricula by some US school boards to include creationism is notorious, and Japan's reluctance to acknowledge its militarist past is a consequence of the influence of nationalist politicians. The present Turkish and Hungarian governments are also accused of fiddling with the school syllabus for political and ideological ends. [15] [16]

**1.12** Voting systems and counting methods are never perfect, and often very far from ideal. Even in the absence of corruption or tampering with the ballot, votes don't count equally: a vote in a swinging electorate is more valuable than one in a "safe" seat. For example, in a system with one seat per electorate, a party with 30% of the popular vote will win no seats at all if its voters are evenly distributed in all electorates. On the other hand, it will win a very comfortable majority if its supporters make up 51% of the voters in 59% of electorates.

People with similar political views or interests tend to be grouped in certain areas. This makes possible the gerrymander, where electoral boundaries are drawn to favour one or another party. [17] Unfortunately, even without the gerrymander, electoral boundaries can never be perfectly fair. Many countries have inequality of the vote "built-in", as in the case of the US Senate, and the Australian Senate, where each state has the same number of votes, regardless of population. [18]

Some countries have adopted quite complicated voting systems to try to reduce such unfairness. Eliminating it is not possible, and it is still common for a government to be elected which is not preferred by the majority of votes cast, even when there are no irregularities. [19]

**1.13** In the common case where there are two large, approximately equal parties, a small party may exercise power that is out of all proportion to its size, if it is needed to form a governing coalition. [20] Conversely, if it is not needed, its voice will not be heard.

**1.14** There are fundamental philosophical problems with elections. One of the most important is known as the "Mandate-Independence Controversy" and has been summarised thus:

"Should a representative do what his constituents want, and be bound by mandates from them, or should he be free to act as best seems to him in pursuit of their interests." [21]

If we adopt the first position, and say he is to act as the mere instrument of his constituency, how can the representative get the opinion of each of thousands of constituents on every issue, and how is he to balance a large number of lukewarm "Yeses" against a few strongly-held "Noes"? [22] On the other hand, if we think he should be free to act as he sees fit, in effect we accept the idea that he should act as the "guardian" of his electors, that is to say we approve the extremely dubious notion that the representative knows better than the constituents what is in their best interest.

**1.15** In the usual case where a politician is supposed to "represent" a constituency and not the people as a whole, another theoretical question arises: Should he act always in favour of the narrow interests of the constituency which elected him, or should he attempt to follow the "national" interest, as he sees it? Usually, of course, he will do neither, and will follow the interest or the instructions of his party or its backers.

**1.16** There are also mathematical problems. Two candidates (much less one!) cannot embody all possible political tendencies. Where there are more than two candidates, it has been shown mathematically that it is not possible to design a fair system, either for ranking the candidates, or selecting an outright winner. [23] [24] [25] It is true that this mathematical problem applies whether voters vote for alternative candidates or alternative policy proposals. However, it is sometimes possible to present proposals in the form "A" or "not-A", so that the question of ranking does not arise, or to amend a proposal to make it acceptable to a clear majority, by removing parts that offend some voters. (If only we could do this with candidates!)

**1.17** The costs of making an informed vote, (to the extent that it is possible to do so), in money and inconvenience, will normally exceed the expected benefits to the voter, because the chance of exercising the "pivotal" vote (the vote that decides the election) is minuscule. [26] Why then should the voter take the trouble of studying either the candidates or their professed policies? (This is the problem of "rational ignorance"). It is for this reason, and not from indifference, that many of us don't vote.

**1.18** Perhaps because of the difficulties mentioned in §1.8, §1.9, §1.10, and §1.17, or more likely because we evolved as social animals for whom a sense of belonging to a group is essential, many if not most voters vote from loyalty. Instead of choosing the party because its platform agrees with their political views, they choose the party of their family, friends, or workmates, align their views with those of the party, and then rationalise in order to justify their adopted political preferences to themselves. In this way their party loyalty decidess their political perceptions and opinions, not the reverse. This phenomenon is as common among intellectuals and the highly educated as it is among other people [27]

**1.19** A spectacular event unconnected with previous government policy may stir emotions, change political allegiances, and sometimes influence subsequent policy. An example is the series of shark attacks in New Jersey in 1916. Achen and Bartels' meticulous analysis shows clearly that – although Woodrow Wilson's government was in no way responsible – the attacks cost him about 10% of the vote in the beach communities most affected. [28] A more recent example is the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001 ("9/11"), the psychological effect of which lasted many years. Sensationalism in the media exacerbates this effect.

**1.20** In spite of being called "representatives", in practice our elected politicians are not typical of the people they are supposed to represent; they are not the "portrait in miniature" of the people, since they do not have the same problems, aspirations, standard of living, and so forth. [29] In short, they are an elite, and cannot be expected to vote as would the public they "represent".

Moreover, elected politicians frequently have conflicts of interest. This extends from the business interests of a President, Prime Minister or Minister, to the real-estate agent or developer who is elected to a municipal council. It is particularly worrying where the elected person has both considerable individual power and substantial interests, whether in a privately-owned company or farm, investment property, or in shares or bonds. In the US Congress the conflict of interest is supposedly avoided by creating a "Qualified Blind Trust" managed by an independent trustee, but even the Senate Select Committee on Ethics, which oversees and must approve these trusts, states that only publicly-traded securities (stocks, bonds, mutual funds) are suitable for them. At the time of setting up the trust the member knows what he or she owns, so the conflict of interest does not disappear instantly. The trustee is frequently a financial institution, and at the least, the member obviously has an interest that the institution should not become bankrupt, which at times, may mean favourable treatment for the whole financial sector. Where there is no such "blind trust", the best practice is for members to disqualify themselves from voting or speaking on matters where they have a possible conflict of interest. Unfortunately, many do not. [30]

The "interest" need not be financial or immediate. A member who has grown up in the countryside may have a strong sense of loyalty to farmers; a member who has spent years working in an industry or profession may in all honesty see that industry or profession as deserving of particular support from the government. A member who is thinking of his future may be unduly receptive to the voice of an industry lobby if he envisages holding a position in that industry at the end of his term of office.

**1.21** Elections have a disastrous effect on policy, and on the administration. This often results in policies quite at odds with the facts, with common sense, and with well-established scientific research. Before an election, governments adopt, maintain, or abandon policies purely with the short-term object of influencing the election results, with no regard for their long-term effects or desirability. [31] Sometimes ministries are split up or amalgamated with other ministries, or turned upside-down for no better reason than to make the electorate believe that serious reform is being undertaken, or to hide problems such as deficits in financing. [32] Large projects are announced which, at the next change of government, are abandoned as proof that the incoming government is putting an end to the wasteful policies of the preceding one. These stop-go policies result in huge inefficiencies in the administration. Even worse than this inefficiency is the adoption of populist measures which have an effect opposite to that of their ostensible purpose. The most monstrous form of abuse occurs when a government starts a war to bolster its popularity or to distract attention from its failings.

The adversarial nature of electoral politics means that for reasons of saving face politicians may become "locked into" a policy which they later realise is undesirable; they become victims of their own prior propaganda. Admitting an error may be fatal to their party's or their own chances of re-election.

**1.22** The low turnout that we commonly see (frequently around 60%) means that a candidate or party is often elected with the vote of only about 30% of those eligible to vote. [33] Compulsory voting does not entirely solve this problem, as it is impossible to enforce, and those who would not otherwise vote may make a blank, invalid, or random vote, or where preference voting ("IRV, instant run-off voting") is used, may vote 1,2,3... straight down the page (the "donkey vote").

**1.23** Attempts to buy votes on election day are made – sometimes veiled, such as by arranging taxis to take elderly voters to the polls – sometimes blatant, such as by handing out cans of beer to voters. In some countries the influence of religion is so strong that voters may be intimidated by it and fear fire and brimstone in the after-life or reincarnation as a cockroach if they do not vote for a candidate approved by the clergy. Religious leaders may dictate policies to candidates, and candidates or parties may find it to their advantage to ingratiate themselves with the clergy by making undertakings which remain undisclosed to the public. The influence of the Catholic church on such topics as birth control, abortion, and Sunday trading, for example, is notorious, but the Catholic church is far from being the only religious institution which has used its influence in this way.

Finally, in too many countries intimidation of electors and violence are used to influence results. This is generally done at the behest of the party in power, sometimes by blatant use of the police or military to cow the opposition, sometimes hypocritically or covertly, by allowing threats and violence to go unpunished, or organising illegal acts by "unknown" perpetrators. These tactics are often successful, and bring about the effective dictatorship for long periods of the leader of the party in power. Again, it is no argument to say that these practices are abuses of the electoral system; a system which can be abused in this way is defective. All these practices mean that the true wishes of the voters are not reflected in the vote.

**1.24** We are sometimes told that elections serve to hold politicians accountable for their actions. This argument is breathtaking in its naivety – or its cynicism. In the time between elections, typically between three and six years, hundreds of decisions are made by the legislators. For any citizen, some will be desirable, some undesirable. How then are the electors to hold the politicians accountable? How can you reward a government for what you consider its good actions, and at the same time punish it for its bad ones? What if you approve of your local member and detest his party? or the opposite? [34] In any event, the electors' concern is presumably with the years to come, not the mistakes of the past. How are they to know that the alternative offered by the other party will be better in the future?

In fact, as far as accountability is concerned, we are in the situation of passengers in a bus driven by a drunk, in which all the seats face the rear. After a period of blundering into every conceivable obstacle along one side of the road, the bus halts briefly. Aghast, we implore another driver to take over: we can't know what he will do, but surely nothing could be worse than what we've just been through. The new driver takes the wheel with a smile, swears that all will now be well, and promptly drives us into the ditch on the other side of the road. What do we do next? Do we then ask the first driver to take over?

**1.25** Elections are supposed to guarantee our human rights. Unfortunately they do not. The Ciri project listed data from about 200 countries for the years 1981 to 2011, showing certain human rights (physical integrity, civil liberties, workers' rights, and women's rights) listed according to "country-year" (eg "Canada 2002"). [35] For the 2063 country-years listed as having "free and fair elections", there are:

  * 478 where torture was frequently used by government officials.
  * 175 where many prisoners were held for their political or religious beliefs.
  * 218 where extra-judicial killings by government agents occurred frequently.
  * 232 where workers' rights to associate and bargain collectively were severely restricted.
  * 122 where government agents are believed responsible for political disappearances.
  * 94 where government restrictions on religious practices are severe and widespread.
  * 77 where there are no social rights for women under law and the government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women. (this index was discontinued from 2005, and so applies only to 1506 country-years).
  * 49 where censorship of speech and the press is complete.
  * 42 where freedom of association and assembly is severely restricted or not permitted.

It should be noted that this is in country-years where

"citizens have the right to self-determination under the law, and exercise this right in practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. The electoral process is transparent and fair."

The situation is – of course – worse for women. Amongst these shining beacons of democracy we find, for women's political rights:

  * 3 country-years where women's political rights are not guaranteed in law, and where laws actively discriminate against them.
  * 219 where women have political equality in law, but in practice there are significant limitations, and less than 5% of high positions and seats in legislature are held by women.
  * 1558 where women have political equality in law, but women hold less than 30% though more than 5% of high positions and seats in legislature.

In the remaining 282 (only!) country-years, a score of three – the highest possible – is awarded if women hold the modest level of 30% of high positions and seats in legislature.

For women's economic rights, we find:

  * 30 country-years where there are no economic rights for women under law, and the government tolerates a high level of economic discrimination against women.
  * 828 where, although women have some economic rights in law, the law is not effectively enforced, and a moderate level of economic discrimination is tolerated.
  * 999 where women have some economic rights in law, and the law is effectively enforced, but a low level of discrimination is tolerated.
  * Only 195 country-years where women have nearly all economic rights in law, the law is effectively enforced, and no or almost no discrimination is tolerated.

In contrast, authoritarian Cuba, where free elections have not been held since Castro's revolution, has the highest score of 3 for women's economic and political rights in 2006, 2009, and 2011, and mostly high scores since 1988. The percentage of women in parliament was 49% in 2017, and 45% in 2011.

Elections are no guarantee that even the (imperfect) freedoms we enjoy will endure. Elected governments in the US and Australia have conscripted youths too young to vote to fight in wars which could in no way be justified by an urgent danger to the nation. At present, in several nations of eastern Europe and in Africa, in Russia, Poland, the Philippines, and Turkey, to name only a few, elected governments threaten or trample on basic human rights. Harassment of journalists and opposition politicians, closure of dissenting media, arbitrary detention and other abuses are common, in spite of ostensibly free elections. We should never forget that the constitution of the Weimar republic, designed and implemented by the leading liberal nations of the time, and regarded as a model of good democratic practice, did not prevent Hitler from gaining power by constitutional means.

**1.26** In all present governments, whatever their constitutional form, and whether elected fairly or not, too much power is held by too few people. This opens the way to corruption, but even without it too much depends on the judgement and prejudices of these few, and it is impossible for them to be competent in all domains, though they try to persuade the public that they are, and indeed often believe it themselves. This leads to bad policy choices through ignorance and prejudice, even when there is no ulterior motive or electoral advantage to be gained. Neurological research has shown that power acts on the brain in the same way as cocaine. It hijacks the brain's reward system, increasing testosterone, egocentricity, and narcissism, while reducing empathy and inhibitions, and causing problems of judgement. In effect, power is a drug.[36] So Lord Acton's maxim: "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely" is not without foundation: power corrupts the individual's mind, and the concentration of power amongst a few people opens the way to the corruption of institutions, and can lead to instability when leaders are disgraced, or disappear through accident or assassination.

**1.27** Finally, there is the question of the moral responsibility of electors. At election time politicians of all parties and others urge us to vote. If we do not vote, they say, we are irresponsible. "Every nation has the government it deserves" we are told; if we do not vote we deserve poor government. But if we do vote, we still get poor government; and by voting, we have approved the monstrous charade that we call elections. We have also lent our name to any crimes or unscrupulous actions committed by our government against fellow citizens or citizens of foreign countries. Either way, we are guilty!

To summarise:

  * Elections are wide open to abuse. (§1.1, §1.3, §1.23)
  * In general, the ordinary citizen cannot be a candidate, (§1.2) cannot vote for the person or (generally speaking) the policies he or she wants, (§1.2, §1.7, §1.23).
  * The elector is kept uninformed and cannot know what a candidate will do once elected (§1.3, §1.6, §1.7, §1.8, §1.9, §1.10, §1.13, §1.24, §1.25). 
  * The election is always inequitable, (§1.12, §1.13, §1.16, §1.17, §1.19, §1.22)
  * The person elected will not act in the elector's or the public interest. (§1.3, §1.5, §1.11, §1.9, §1.20).
  * Our basic freedoms are not safe (§1.25)
  * We cannot hold politicians to account in any effective way; (§1.24).
  * Even a politician whose heart is as pure as the driven snow cannot know what he or she ought to do when elected. (§1.14, §1.15)
  * The nature of the political process is divisive, polarises the electorate, and can lead to violence. (§1.4)
  * It may also prevent necessary adjustments of policy. (§1.21)
  * Power is concentrated in too few hands. (§1.26)
  * And at the end of the day, however we vote, and whether we vote or not, it's all our fault! (§1.27)

O wonderful world of elections!

There are no new discoveries here, of course. These defects are well-known to political scientists and, in part at least, to the rest of us, though we tend to forget them. As my barber says, the problem is that we do not vote on issues, we vote for – or, perhaps more often, against – people. We elect someone we don't know, on the basis of ideology and promises that are often not clear and will probably not be respected, to decide issues of which we know little or – because they will arise in the future – nothing at all. In spite of this we still (thoughtlessly!) assume that free elections mean democracy and freedom. We call our system "representative democracy" although, as even the cursory review above shows, modern states are neither representative nor truly democratic. And yet the Greeks of Aristotle's time recognised that elections are essentially oligarchic, not democratic

Although in theory some of these problems may be fixed or partially fixed by tweaking the system, the bulk of them cannot, _they are inseparable from elections._ [38] It is important to realise this.

To avoid being misunderstood, I must emphasise that it is not the concept of democracy that I attack here. What I am attacking is the assumption that our present regimes involving elections are the only way – or indeed even a successful way – to ensure that we get democracy. There is a better alternative, but before considering that alternative, we should look at some criteria of democracy, and consider how well this so-called "representative democracy" fulfils them.

  [39]
2 – Elections and Criteria for Democracy

Two highly regarded political scientists, James Fishkin and Robert Dahl, have each given a list of conditions which they believe are necessary and sufficient for democracy. Taking Fishkin first, he gives three criteria, which he calls "Political Equality", "Non-tyranny" and "Deliberation". [40]
**2.1** Fishkin's Criteria

1 Political Equality

Fishkin defines this as follows:

"By political equality I mean the institutionalisation of a system which grants equal consideration to everyone's preferences and which grants everyone appropriately equal opportunities to formulate preferences on the issues under consideration." [41]

He expands this with the following subdivisions and explanations:

1a Formal Political Equality

This comes about:

"when every voter has an equal probability of being the decisive voter". [42]

In other words, all votes must have equal weight, there must be no gerrymander, or electoral fraud.

As we have seen, with elections fraud often occurs, and voting methods always give unequal weight to votes depending on where the elector lives, or which party or candidate he or she supports (§1.1, §1.12, §1.13, §1.23).

1b Insulation

Voters must be protected from threats, and attempts to bribe them:

"threats or bargains outside the political sphere should not determine results within the political sphere." [43]

Thus there must be no carrots or sticks – not "even in the afterlife", as he says, not frivolously, for the influence of religious promises and threats should not be underestimated (§1.23).

We have noted that voter intimidation occurs (§1.23). "Pork-barrelling" – as in our example of the Muddy River bridge (§1.7) – is common; we may consider that this is "outside the political sphere" because it is external to the question of whether the aircraft carrier is justified. Attempts to buy votes occur §1.23). And in the parliament members are apt – or obliged – to put the preferences of their financial supporters before those of the electors (§1.3). There need not be an explicit threat; politicians know very well which policies suit their backers. And large companies can reward politicians quite legally by giving them plum jobs when they retire.

1c Effective Hearing

Voters must have access to all the information necessary to make a decision, and the capacity to use that information:

"Unless the media permit the full range of views... to get access to the media on issues of intense interest to the proponents of those views, then full realisation of political equality has fallen short." [44]

This assumes

"appropriate background conditions of education preparing everyone for some minimal degree of autonomous citizenship." [45]

How can this effective hearing be possible when media coverage of elections is trivial, biased, and self-censored, when nearly meaningless slogans take the place of policy statements, and when deals are made of which the elector can have no knowledge? (§1.4, §1.7, §1.8, §1.9, §1.17, §1.23)

2 Non-tyranny

"By tyranny I mean the choice of a policy that imposes severe deprivations when an alternative policy could have been chosen that would have imposed no severe deprivations on anyone." [46]

"Non-tyranny" is the hardest condition to ensure in any system, in fact it is probably impossible to guarantee it, just as, although it is possible to design a very safe car, the maker cannot guarantee that it will never kill someone: how the car is driven is entirely beyond the designer's control. All the other conditions mentioned here are criteria of the process of law-making; "non-tyranny", as a criterion of the result, is something of an odd man out.

Unfortunately tyranny is widespread. To take examples only from after the Second World War, there are:

  * The harassment of US citizens by the Commission on Un-American Activities.
  * The conscription of youths under voting age for the war in Vietnam.
  * The eviction of the inhabitants of Diego Garcia, in the Chagos Is, by the British government.
  * Actions by the Israeli government, including the forced expropriation of land for the establishment of Israeli colonies, destruction of property, and reprisal killings in the Occupied Territories of Palestine.
  * The forced removal of children from their parents in Australia (the "Stolen Generation") 
  * The violation of the civil rights of blacks in the South of the US, in South Africa, and Australia.

The reader can probably think of dozens of other examples drawn from the last 60 years, without including the abuses inflicted by "democratic" regimes on their overseas subjects during the colonial period.

We can only conclude that elections are a very imperfect barrier to tyranny.

3 Deliberation

For this, Fishkin gives a definition which quotes Jürgen Habermas:

"a situation of free and equal discussion, unlimited in its duration, constrained only by the consensus which would be arrived at by the "force of the better argument" ". [47]

As he notes, this is somewhat utopian, since time constraints will always exist in practice, and consensus may never be reached. Nevertheless, its succinctness makes this a good point of departure. He adds that:

"Participants must be willing to consider the arguments offered on their merits." [48]

Here, it seems, Fishkin is talking of debate on issues, rather than on candidates. But the system of elections, with its attendant parties, essentially gives us a choice of candidates, not of issues (§1.4). We can hardly "deliberate" about them, because we do not receive all relevant information (§1.7, §1.8, §1.9), and so we are left to speculate about what their actions might be, and to hope that we will not be let down as badly as we were last time. There is, of course, the stage-managed discussion that occurs on TV panels, and radio talk-back shows, but it is mainly window-dressing and succeeds mostly in influencing people who have no power to decide. As for the possibility of deliberation on issues within the elected body, it is severely limited by party tactics and strategy (§1.7), by party whips, by the "guillotine" and by the filibuster. In practice, important decisions are made behind closed doors, and the discussion in the parliament is largely a matter of scoring points off the opposing party, and not at all about finding good policies. So such deliberation as influences policy generally takes place out of the public's view, while public deliberation has little or no practical effect.
**2.2** Dahl's Criteria

In his 1989 publication _Democracy and its Critics_ Robert Dahl gives similar requirements, five in number:

1 Effective Participation

"Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another." [49]

At election time, ordinary citizens in our electoral "democracies" have almost no chance of placing questions on the agenda, and very limited opportunities for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome (election of one candidate or party) rather than another. This is reserved to a very small group: politicians themselves, political journalists and editorialists, celebrities, and media proprietors. Still, we can indulge in the pleasure of writing a letter to the editor, and not seeing it published, unless it suits that eminent person's notions. And then there is always the opportunity to wear a silly hat and daub our cheeks with a party's colours, or to write on toilet walls... Once the election is over, of course, we can march in the streets in protest; this will probably have no effect at all unless the numbers are sufficient to terrify the politicians, when they are quite likely to abjectly give in, without any possibility of knowing whether the demonstrators represent a majority of the electorate or not.

The participation of ordinary citizens is not _effective._

2 Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage

"At the decisive stage of collective decisions each citizen must be ensured an equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted as equal in weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen. In determining outcomes at the decisive stage, these choices, and only these choices, must be taken into account." [50]

We have seen (§1.1, §1.12) that this requirement is breached when candidates are elected. Since this means that representation in the parliament is biased, clearly it is breached when issues are decided in parliament. If we were in doubt as to this latter point, consideration of the influence of money (§1.3), the need for compromise (§1.7), the fact that policies are decided in view of their short-term electoral impact (§1.21), the influence, either all-important or negligible, of small parties (§1.13), and sometimes the buying of votes (§1.23) ought to convince us. In any case, as far as our preferences on particular issues are concerned, the philosophical and mathematical problems (§1.14, §1.15, §1.16), and the fact that we vote for others who will make decisions in our stead on issues as yet unknown (§1.10) mean that it is meaningless to pose the question of whether our preferences are taken into account fairly. It is simply not possible!

3 Enlightened Understanding

"Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and validating (within the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the citizen's interests." [51]

Citizens almost never vote directly on issues, so the only "matter to be decided" is the election of parties and so-called "representatives". Although candidates and parties often have a "platform", it is anybody's guess which parts of it they will choose to honour, and which undeclared policies they will spring on the unsuspecting public once they are in power. We can only conclude that no enlightened understanding is possible under elected governments.

4 Control of the Agenda

"The _demos_ must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed on the agenda of matters that are to be decided by means of the democratic process." [52]

(" _demos_ ", in Dahl's usage, is the voting public and does not include children, or persons excluded from voting for whatever reason.)

Clearly Dahl is referring here to the issues: proposals for laws and so forth rather than the election of candidates. The agenda is set by the party leaders, usually behind closed doors, and generally influenced – or dictated – by powerful lobbies. Not even the rank and file elected members have much say on the agenda, much less the _demos_ , although issues which arouse strong views in the public may end up on the agenda, if it suits the party in power. To all intents and purposes, though, we have no control of the agenda at all!

5 Inclusion

"The _demos_ must include all adults... except transients and persons proved to be mentally defective." [53]

This is the one requirement which elective "democracy" comes close to meeting in some states, though only very recently. France excluded women – half the population – until 1946, Switzerland until 1971, the southern states of the US put so many difficulties in the way of blacks wishing to vote that they were effectively excluded until at least the 1960s, and Israel still does not permit residents of the Occupied Territories to vote for the Israeli parliament, although it holds effective power over them.

On the whole, must we not say that elective "democracy" scores rather badly?
**2.3** Summary

Paraphrasing, we can summarise these criteria for equity in procedure:

  * All members of the demos must be included in decision-making.
  * All must have an opportunity to inform themselves on issues to be decided.
  * All must have an equal say in deciding which issues go on the agenda to be decided.
  * All must have an equal opportunity to express their opinions on these issues.
  * The wishes of all must have equal weight in making the decision.

These criteria specify the means to our ends, but what are those ends? What do we really want from a democracy? As a rough point of departure, with no pretension to an exact definition of needs, I suggest that we might require:

  * Affordable access to healthy food, clean water and clean air.
  * Protection from foreign enemies, criminals and the dangerously irresponsible.
  * As much liberty as is consistent with the basic needs and the liberty of others.
  * Equality before the law and equality of opportunity, including access to education for all children.
  * Freedom of speech, limited only by the duty of not harming others.
  * Freedom of belief (or non-belief).
  * Freedom from malicious prosecution and unjust punishment, and the right to a fair trial when accused.
  * Freedom of movement, except as limited by private ownership and occupation of property.
  * Public health measures to protect us from infectious diseases and parasites.
  * Some measure of social security and health insurance.
  * Wealth to be distributed sufficiently evenly that even the least favoured can lead a dignified and satisfying life.

If we are honest and just ourselves, we should also insist that:

  * No unjust measures be taken against foreign citizens and nations. (How many elected governments can claim to be innocent in this regard?)

Not everyone will agree in all respects with this list of requirements, some will want to add or alter items, others perhaps to take some away. But the important thing to note here is that _elections are neither necessary nor sufficient to secure any item on this list, nor are they for any other item that we might reasonably add_ to secure any item on this list, nor for any other item that we might reasonably add. And putting a folded piece of paper in a ballot box can hardly be regarded as an end in itself. In chapter 1 I have argued that as a means to choose a government elections are sadly deficient. In later chapters I shall show that there is a feasible and very practical alternative to elections. Before passing to that, however, we shall look briefly at what is known as "direct democracy".
3 – Direct Democracy

One putative alternative to elective "democracy" is _direct democracy_. In this, every citizen votes on every decision. This happens in small clubs and associations of course, where it works quite well. When members vote on which candidates should fill an office (Honorary President, Secretary etc), they generally know the candidates personally, and so are well able to judge their capabilities, and in any case the responsibilities and powers mandated are very limited, both in scope and in time (annual elections are the rule). Moreover, club members very often vote directly on practical issues, and these are almost always on matters well understood by the members. Further, they are free to propose amendments, and so when the matter comes to the vote, they are voting on the question which they want to decide, and not on some ambiguous question which a party in power can interpret to suit itself. They are also free to put matters on the agenda, and to call for a vote of no-confidence in office-bearers.

Direct democracy also occurs occasionally in the form of a referendum, where its use is often much more dubious because:

  * The matter to be decided is generally not proposed by the public, but by the government.
  * The public cannot propose amendments.
  * It is virtually never possible for sufficient informed deliberation to take place. On social media in particular discussion is generally superficial, indeed it seems the more superficial it is, the more effective and persuasive. The same applies to newspaper cartoons and to slogans. Consequently the public often votes in complete ignorance of what is really involved.
  * A referendum is sometimes used by a government to deal with a political "hot potato": the embarrassing question is put to the whole electorate ("What could be more democratic?"), and the government comes out smelling of roses whichever way the decision falls.
  * A lot depends on the way in which the choice is framed: a party in power may put it in such a way as to mask the full implications of the proposed measure, or to deliberately split the opposition by bundling together distasteful clauses with others that are calculated to appeal to them.
  * The government may stage-manage the whole affair, for example a government some years ago made a show of bowing to popular pressure, and actually proposed a measure which it did not wish to see passed. It then allowed a stream of controlled comments and leaks which cast the measure in an unfavourable light until, just before the referendum, it called on government supporters to oppose it. It was a clever stratagem which worked perfectly, and the referendum had nothing in common with democracy except the name.
  * Quite often, a cautious electorate will vote for the status quo, because a few scaremongering editorials or comments on television have sufficed to make it afraid of change.
  * The question to be decided may be technical, and often the full ramifications of the choice are not made clear to the public. The public cannot discuss it beforehand on an equal basis, because debate is largely controlled by the media or the government, and is given a very superficial treatment. 
  * Referendums have a spurious legitimacy: the side which "wins" will claim that the result is sacrosanct and not to be questioned, even when because of low turnout, the "majority" vote is that of less than half of the eligible voters; when the public is poorly informed; when the question is framed ambiguously, or does not take account of the difficulties of implementation. In the case of Brexit, where there are good grounds for believing that the result would be different in a second referendum because of all these problems and because of changes of opinion with the passage of time, we are told that a second referendum would be undemocratic, whereas the first referendum was democracy incarnate!

Thus although Dahl's "voting equality" and "inclusion" criteria may be satisfied, referendums commonly fail to give citizens "effective participation" because of inadequate opportunities to express reasons for endorsing one outcome, and because there is no possibility of amending a proposal. In all but the simplest cases, citizens do not have "enlightened understanding", and "control of the agenda" is always denied to them. Referendums are about as democratic as your asking a bucket of eels whether they would prefer to be fried or grilled: they don't get to choose the matter to be decided, they cannot understand the question, they cannot propose the option of being put back in the water, and in the end, they get cooked in whichever way suits you.

The referendum in France on the proposed European Constitution in 2007 exemplified these problems: the public was presented – on a "take it or leave it" basis – with a long and (at least to non-specialists) incomprehensible document whose implications were not at all clear. An irritated public voted against it, mostly in disgust at President Chirac. (Highly unpopular at the time, he was widely suspected of corruption, but protected by presidential immunity). In doing this the voters pointed out another defect of referendums: the verdict is not necessarily given on the question that is officially posed. Shortly afterwards, the Dutch referendum also rejected the proposed constitution, again at least partly because of opposition to the government in power. The "Brexit" referendum is an example of a technical issue, whose consequences were not clear even to experts, which was decided largely on the basis of misleading – or downright mendacious – campaign slogans, by a public without the knowledge and information necessary to make a reasoned decision. One can say unequivocally that Fishkin's requirements of "effective hearing" and "deliberation", as well as Dahl's "enlightened understanding" and "control of the agenda", at least, were not satisfied in these referendums.

Referendums are fairly rare, and for good reason. The expense is the obvious and usual explanation given. More important to those in power is the fact that if they were generalised the government would effectively lose control of policy, because referendum results are often unpredictable, Brexit being a perfect example. If they did become more common most people – who after all have more immediately important things to do – would lose interest, which would make it even easier for special interests to take control of decisions on issues which concerned them, by means of media campaigns.

Some proponents of direct democracy would extend the referendum principle to every decision made by the community, and some of them even suggest that only measures passed unanimously should be implemented. To the obvious objection that this is impractical in a large modern state of tens or hundreds of millions, the true believers reply that the state should be abolished, to be replaced by small autonomous communities of a few thousand.

While such communities may have been successful in isolated regions (for instance the Inuit, or small agrarian tribes, perhaps even the Zapatistas), it is not obvious how they could co-exist with large states which have so clearly demonstrated their predatory tendencies in the past, nor how they would successfully interact with large multi-national companies, which are no less rapacious. How would they deal with issues involving many communities? How would one split up Tokyo, say, with its thirty-five million people, and all the services of a modern city: electricity, water and sewerage, telecommunications, roads, drains, waste collection, public transport, etc? or operate large infrastructures spanning a whole country: the German rail network, for example? or the French electrical grid with its nuclear power stations and its waste storage problems?

The need in modern societies to make decisions on highly technical matters also poses a problem. It is quite impossible for every person to devote enough time to acquiring sufficient knowledge and expertise to make intelligent, informed decisions on all matters, and still do all the other things one has to do. There are simply not enough hours in the day.

For these reasons most people consider direct democracy to be an attractive but unrealistic dream.
4 – Sortition, or Choice by Lot
**4.1** Representation by Random Selection

We have established that the current electoral form of representation is unsatisfactory, and we have rejected direct democracy as impractical except for small clubs and societies. Some sort of representation is necessary, in spite of Rousseau's dogmatic declaration that:

"the sovereignty of the people] cannot be represented, for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; it consists essentially of the public will and the public will cannot be represented." [[54]

What is needed is to find a form of representation which does not suffer from the defects which we have set out above. In doing this, we must not forget the principle that an adult is the best judge of his or her interests. As Robert Dahl puts it:

"each adult ought to be treated – for purposes of making decisions, as the proper judge of his or her own interests." [55]

This is fundamental to democracy. If we deny it we are in effect advocating "guardianship", that is to say rule by some sort of aristocracy of merit, which is supposed – somehow – to know our interests better than we do.

For that reason, each adult has an equal right to be counted – that is to say each adult's opinion must count equally – in making decisions. Yet it is not practical for everyone's opinion to be incorporated in decision-making. The most satisfactory way out of this impasse is the use of _sortition_. [56]

There are two fundamental aspects to sortition. One is that choice by lot is inherently fair, as the process is not influenced by human decisions or preferences, and the chance of being selected is equal for any member of the population. The other aspect is that a sufficiently large sample chosen at random will in its composition accurately represent (in the sense " _stand for_ ", or portray) the adult population, and that it may therefore reasonably _act for_ it in making decisions. If one takes a fair coin, and tosses it, and records whether it falls "heads" or "tails", after a large number of tosses, the ratio of heads to tails will tend to approach more and more closely to 50:50. Similarly, taking a sample of a population, as the sample size increases, the ratio of men to women in the sample will tend to approach 50:50 (if the number of men equals the number of women in the population). If ten per cent of a population is left-handed, then with a sufficiently large sample, the proportion of left-handers in the sample will be very closeto ten per cent; and similarly for any other trait or distinguishing feature, such as political opinions, cultural values, personal fortune, etc. The larger the sample, the more closely its composition will resemble that of the population. An assembly of five hundred will give a reasonably close approximation; a larger body would probably be too unwieldy in practice.

An analogy is that of a cook preparing a soup. [57] To know what a soup tastes like, the cook stirs it well, and tastes a spoonful. The stirring ensures that the sample (the spoonful) is random, ie accurately represents the whole soup, so the cook knows that the whole soup will have exactly the same taste as the spoonful did, the same spiciness, saltiness, etc. In just the same way, the random sample of citizens will have the same composition as the whole population, with the proviso that because the numbers in any practical body (a few hundred) will be smaller than the millions of millions of molecules in the cook's spoon, the representation will be less perfect, though not enough to matter.

It is important to note that it is the Assembly _as a whole_ that represents the population. It is a mistake to think of individual members as representatives. They cannot be thought of as representing anyone other than themselves, any more than a single particle of tomato or garlic or pepper in the spoon can be taken as representing the whole soup.

Suppose then that we use sortition and choose at random, from the whole adult population, an Assembly or Parliament of several hundred members to govern. What advantages could there be?

  * The most important advantage is that the composition of the Assembly would closely represent that of the public. It would be very close to the "exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large" that John Adams called for, and will act and vote as the entire population would if it had all available relevant information at its disposal, and the time to consider that information. [58]  
So _women and minority groups would automatically be present in the correct proportion._ So would different political tendencies. The more members, the more faithfully the Assembly will represent the general public, though this representation will always be a close approximation but not quite perfect.

  * Since the whole process of choosing by lot can be done openly, in front of anyone who wishes to be present, there can be no election-rigging, and there should be no accusations of fraud, no riots, and no tear gas.

  * Sortition avoids the philosophical paradoxes inherent in elections and elected bodies. Although the Assembly represents the community (much more accurately than any elected one!), individual members stand for no-one but themselves. On any issue they may – indeed _should_ – speak and vote as they see fit. This may mean in their own narrow personal interest, or it may include the interests of those who are dear to them: their family, their district, tribe, or political leaning, or the country as a whole; whichever seems best to them at the time. The aggregate of their votes will represent the interest of the population, _as the population sees it._ So the Assembly as a whole represents the people as a whole, or more accurately, what the people would do and be and decide if they had time to consider all the information available.

  * The members of the Assembly, owing their position to no-one, and knowing that they could not be re-elected, would not have the temptation – or the need – to favour particular interest groups at the expense of the public. Lobbies might still exist, and might try to influence members by publicity or bribes, but could not threaten to withdraw support at elections, since there would be none. If the vote in the Assembly is secret, as it should be, it will be impossible to know if a bribe has had any effect. As the voting intentions of members will generally not be known, to be sure of changing the result of a vote, it would be necessary to attempt to bribe a lot of members, which would be very risky. So corruption would be reduced or eliminated. This is discussed more fully later ( §9.17).

  * Political parties could still exist, and put forward policies, or march in the streets waving banners, but their influence would be moral, not coercive. To threaten members with removal of party endorsement or expulsion from a party would be meaningless. Furthermore, it is likely that their influence would decline, and that there would be less polarisation of the public (since no-one would profit from it).

  * A political "caste" with interests different from those of the public could not arise. There would be no "jobs for the boys" or nepotism.

  * There would be a huge saving in cost and public inconvenience. The random choice could be made at almost no cost by a very modest computer or by a device such as is used for lotteries and football pools. Contrast this with the large sums spent on elections, particularly in the US. [59]

  * Democracy cannot flourish if the mass of people is not educated and well informed. However, an elected government can misuse government media and schools to influence the public to suit its own political ends (§1.11). One great advantage of sortition is that members of the Assembly, since they could not be re-elected, would have nothing to gain politically or personally from trying to influence the media. Consequently there can be no reasonable objection to public news services, and much to gain, since public media, free from the need to please advertisers, or to increase their public by sensationalising events and playing to their audience's prejudices, could present a more balanced coverage than private media do at present. Similarly, members would have nothing to gain financially from influencing school curricula. The nature of the bodies chosen by lot, which represent the views of the whole community, should thwart attempts to influence school boards and curricula in a sectarian way.

  * A chamber chosen by lot could also use the "wisdom of the crowd" (for instance to estimate budget allocations: the median of the members' estimates would serve as the allocation for the following year, as illustrated in Example 2, (§6.2) below). This quick, efficient and fair method is not feasible in an elected chamber whose members vote in accordance with party dictates, ideology, or to score political points.

  * The day-to-day running of the country could continue smoothly at all times, as there would be no stop-start changes in policy (§1.21), and senior public servants would not change with a change of government, as happens now in some countries, for the simple reason that there will be no change of government

There is one qualification which we must make here. We have spoken of drawing an Assembly by lot from the _whole_ population. Unfortunately, it is impossible to include everyone in the population from which the sample is drawn. The largest and most obvious group exclusion is that of children. This is unfair, since children are affected by all decisions taken by a government, and more affected than adults, one could argue, since they will pass more years subject to any laws decided than their elders. Nevertheless, it is clearly impossible to include young children. At what age should a citizen become eligible to be selected? What is the age at which we begin to reflect and to attempt to think logically? Perhaps eighteen or a year or two younger, but the question is best left to the Assembly to decide. [60]

What about criminals and the insane? There is surely no reason to exclude anyone convicted of a crime, however serious, who has completed his or her punishment. However, for practical (not "moral") reasons, those who are in gaol or confined to an institution for the insane will necessarily be excluded from the Assembly. Clearly someone behind bars cannot participate in a normal fashion in discussions in the Assembly, in spite of all our new technologies, and the release of a prisoner simply because he has been chosen by lot would be unmerited: why should not a cell-mate who has not been selected by lot also be released?
**4.2** Graphical Illustration of Representation

How accurate will representation be with sortition? To illustrate this I wrote a short program to mimic choosing assemblies at random, and to show how members of a particular group or class are represented. In this example each assembly has 500 members, and the group forms 50% of the population. Typical output looks like this (I have left out twelve lines):

Some explanations are necessary here. For simplicity, the results in the table above are presented as if all members were drawn at the same time, but there is no such assumption in the program code, and we might regard the results above as a series of snapshots of the Assembly composition taken every time its membership is completely renewed. In this case I have taken the proportion of the class in the total population as one half.

Normal Distribution Curve – adapted from Wikipedia

Random events – like the selection of assembly members proposed – follow a "normal" distribution or "bell" curve as shown above. Statisticians measure the variation from the mean (average) or "scatter" by means of the "standard deviation", sigma (σ). 68.2% of results will fall within one standard deviation of the mean (dark grey); 95.5% within 2 × sigma (dark + mid grey); and 99.7% within 3 × sigma (dark + mid + light grey). In our case the deviation is the difference between the actual number and the expected number of group members, which is here 250. The sigma values are calculated from the results in the table.

The group in this example might consist of either the men or the women in the population (if they are present in exactly equal numbers), those above the median age, or those in favour of Proposal A, if that proposal splits the population exactly in two. In drawing four hundred different assemblies (corresponding to 2 000 years), the worst deviation from the expected 250 members is an under-representation of the group by 34 members. I have marked this case in bold in the table above, and it will be noticed that in the next assembly the group is over-represented. This will not always be the case of course, but things do tend to even out with time, so that if an assembly enacts a measure which is not supported by the majority of the population, and which remains unpopular, it can be overturned by a subsequent assembly. It might be objected that, in the case where a long series of under-representations occurs, the group might have to wait a long time to get a fair deal, but it generally happens in such a series that a number of assemblies come very close to the expected number of group members. (Two such series are italicised in the table). If the group is in fact those in favour of some proposal, the way forward for them is to slightly modify the proposal, so that it becomes acceptable to a clear majority. It will also be noticed that the number of over- and under-representations is approximately equal, and that, generally speaking, one does not have to wait long before the group's representation is closer to the expected value.

What about minorities? Here are some results for a group which makes up 10% of the population. Perhaps they are left-handers, or people without a mobile phone, without a driving licence, or those in favour of Proposal B:

Again, the number of over- and of under-representations is approximately equal, and (usually) there is no long wait for the number of members of the class to approach the expected number. The major difference from the results above lies in the closeness of the representation: 3× sigma = 4.1% of the assembly size, whereas with the first group, 3× sigma = 6.4% of the assembly size. (These figures are calculated from the results shown above for 400 draws, the theoretical figures are 4.02% and 6.71% respectively).

Rather than subject the reader to a battery of tabular results like those above, I have calculated theoretical values of sigma and 3 × sigma for various values of group size as a proportion of the population, and graphed the latter in the figure above, (drawn for an Assembly of 500). As can be seen, the smaller the minority, the closer the representation will be to the ideal (the expected number). This means that minorities, however small, can expect to have a voice in the Assembly. Even a minority which makes up less than one five-hundredth of the population can make its voice heard, though it should not expect to have a member in every assembly.

The next figure shows the effect of increasing the assembly size on the three sigma value (calculated from theory, not from the results in the tables above). Naturally, the larger the assembly, the better the representation. Unfortunately, it is probably not practical to go much above 500 in an assembly which deliberates; even then, the Speaker will have to exercise a little authority to keep conversations under control.

How does this compare with existing assemblies? Consider the case of women. I have used the representation of women as an example because the statistics are readily available, and women form the largest group that is very significantly under-represented in almost all parliaments. The average representation of women in parliaments worldwide is 22.8% (based on 193 countries, both houses combined in the case of bicameral parliaments). For the Nordic countries it is 41.1%, for non-Nordic Europe 24.5%, for the UK 29.6%, for Australia 28.7%, for France 26.2%, and for the US 19.4% (the US is in 97th place, between Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, and below Sudan, South Sudan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia). [61]

We can show in a rough way how faithful the representation is by using tones of grey, with black corresponding to 0% and white to 100%. Let us assume, for simplicity, that exactly half the adult population is female. The four hundred parliaments chosen by lot in our first example would have the tones shown in the small squares in the image above at left. A perfect representation, that is to say 50% (250 members in each parliament) would look like the image on the right. Although most of the small squares in the image on the left are not quite the same tone as the image on the right, they are all very close. For comparison, here are the tones of grey corresponding to some elected parliaments:

On the left is the world average. In the centre is the US, and on the right is Sweden, the best of the countries in the developed world, with 43.6% of members being women, a proportion which is almost the same as that for the worst parliament chosen by lot in the first image.

Although the accurate representation of women and of ethnic groups is very important, that is not the end of the matter. With enough political good will, it is possible to better represent women and minorities in elected parliaments – indeed, some countries have instituted minimum quotas. However, this is only a beginning, and a simplistic and not very satisfactory beginning at that. After all, there is something demeaning in an approach that treats all women, or all members of an ethnic group, as essentially undifferentiated and interchangeable. Quotas do not go anywhere near far enough, as the representation should be exact not only for obvious traits like sex, skin colour or age, it should also cover opinions, attitudes, and aspirations; indeed, it should represent the views of all citizens _even on issues that have not yet arisen_. How else can a parliament make equitable decisions throughout its term? Obviously, this is quite impossible with elections; the only way that it can be achieved is by the use of sortition.

Robert Dahl, in _After the Revolution?_ , after proposing short-term advisory bodies chosen by lot, cautions against the use of decision-making bodies – parliaments – chosen by lot with the following words:

Since, as anyone familiar with the laws of probability knows, the chances are by no means negligible that a sample of five hundred might deviate by a considerable margin from the mean of the whole population, occasionally we might find ourselves with a highly unrepresentative legislature subject to no authority but the next lottery. [62]

In spite of my admiration for Dahl, I consider that this is an extraordinary statement for a man of his stature, and one which suggests that he himself was not familiar with the laws of probability. The expressions "by no means negligible", "by a considerable margin" and "highly unrepresentative", are both vague and very misleading. As we have just seen, almost all elected parliaments are highly unrepresentative. In contrast, the chance of drawing an Assembly which is unrepresentative by more than 6.71% (the 3 sigma limit) is about 1 in 370; so the chance that such an Assembly would make a "wrong" decision (one that is contrary to the considered majority decision of a perfectly informed populace), is half that, or 1 in 740. Can anyone believe that elected parliaments do better than this? Where the draw is within the 3 sigma limit, if there is a close vote the method explained in §6.4 below will deal adequately with it.

Using the program mentioned above I have simulated 2 million assemblies, and found the greatest deviation from the expected number to be 54, or 10.8%, which leaves the under-represented group with 196 members, or 39.2% of the assembly. This worst case is still twice as accurate as the present representation of women in the US Congress, and better than all the developed countries except Belgium, Andorra and the Nordic countries. If members serve for five years, 2 million assemblies correspond to 10 million years, which is longer than humans have existed.

Nor should we underestimate the "authority of the next lottery" when the Assembly has the power to annul or amend any legislation on its own initiative. Indeed, the very fact that an unpopular bill can be repealed may tend to dissuade that one-in-ten-million-years assembly from abusing its power. Moreover, under the heading "Accountability with Elections and Sortition" (§10.6), I argue that an Assembly chosen by lot should most definitely _not_ be subject to any authority other than the "next lottery".
5 – The Structure Proposed for a Government Based on Sortition

If critics of electoral democracy are sincere, it is not sufficient just to denounce elections: those of us who do so ought to try to show that something better is possible. Many of us suggest the use of sortition; but if it is to be introduced, it must be with the informed consent of the majority, and before this can happen, the concept must become familiar to everyone. At present, relatively few people have ever heard of sortition; and even to those who who have, the word on its own means little without an outline of the structure envisaged. Hence there is a need to suggest a political model.

Sortition will require very different institutions from those of an elected government. Choosing members by lot will give the full spectrum of abilities and character from the very stupid to the highly intelligent, from the painfully conscientious to the totally irresponsible. This makes it essential that (a) no individual should hold significant power, and (b) group sizes should be sufficient to allow for some incompetent members. Rotation – a fixed term of service and automatic replacement – is also necessary.

What follows here is only one proposal; many others have been made, often suggesting a chamber chosen by lot in addition to an existing elected one, sometimes with the power to make binding decisions, more often with only moral authority. Although it might be easier to convince the public to accept some such hybrid system, I am sceptical of the ability of the chamber chosen by lot to withstand the inevitable attacks by elected politicians, lobbies, and the media. My intention here is not to set out a rigid blueprint, but rather to show that it is feasible to form a practical government of members chosen by lot. I have tried to avoid excessive details; in practice, the Assembly itself would settle these.
**5.1** The Assembly or Parliament and Proposals for Laws

  * A list of the names of the whole adult population would be kept on a database with public read-only access, so that anyone might check that his or her name had not been omitted. An Assembly of, say, five hundred members of parliament would be chosen at random from this list to serve for five years. [63] Rather than changing them all at once, ten per cent of them would be replaced every six months. This would give continuity of government and allow time for newcomers to become familiar with procedures. In the event of inability or refusal to serve, a replacement would be chosen at random. Each group of new members would spend a six-month training period as observers in the Assembly before taking office, and as temporary replacements for members absent for short periods.

  * The random choice could be made by mechanical means or by a few lines of publicly available open-source computer code which could be easily checked for fairness. On each occasion, a number of extra names would be drawn, to allow for replacements.

  * An Agenda Committee of about ten members would set the agenda for issues to be discussed and voted in the Assembly. The composition and function of this Agenda Committee is discussed below.

  * The important office of Speaker would be filled, for a period of one day in rotation, by the most senior members of the Assembly (see below). The Speaker's job is to see that any member wishing to speak on a proposal gets a reasonable hearing, and that no member can monopolise debate, and prevent other views being expressed by filibustering. He or she would have the power to order a member to finish speaking, to eject the member if necessary; but this decision would only be valid for the day on which that Speaker held office, and would not apply the next day, with a different Speaker.

  * Proposals for law would be considered by the Proposals Committee. This body would be set up by the Assembly as a special standing Policy Committee (see §5.7 below). New proposals would be placed on the Proposals website, which would be something like an on-line forum. On it there would be a list of proposals in rough form. Supporters could add or remove their names as signatories, and – if allowed by the original proposer – comment on the text, while the proposer would be able to edit the proposal and remove comments. If the proposal reached a certain level of support, (as shown by the signatures) the Proposals Committee would check for any obvious incoherence, lack of realism, conflicts with or duplication of existing legislation, and seek any clarification necessary from the proposer.

Next, the proposal would be referred to the professional parliamentary draftsmen (civil servants under the authority of the Proposals Committee), who would again check the effect on existing legislation, and would prepare a first draft. This draft would be returned to the proposer for approval, after which the Proposals Committee would place it on the Agenda Committee's (on-line) list of proposals awaiting the Assembly. Exceptionally, in matters of urgency, or where the proposal was either made "from the floor" by an Assembly member, or originated in a policy committee, and was accompanied by the policy committee's recommendations, the Assembly might debate and vote on the proposal immediately. More often, the Assembly would either refer the proposal to a standing policy committee, or would set up a Single-issue Policy Committee to study it (see below). It might also return the proposal to the Proposals Committee with instructions to have it re-drafted, or indeed defer the matter.

  * Any member of the public would have the right to submit a proposal for law. This includes civil servants and members of the Assembly and committees.

  * The Assembly would have the authority to make all decisions except those concerning members' own pay and conditions, and the appointment of individual judges.

  * Voting in the Assembly would be by secret ballot, to prevent any possibility of members being threatened with reprisals if they do not vote in a particular way. Members would not have the right to reveal how they voted on any issue, until their term of office expired, and it would be an offence to attempt to obtain this information from a member. Speeches would be published by broadcast and on the Assembly website without any information permitting the identification of the member speaking.

  * There would not be a President with executive powers, since one person cannot be representative of the whole nation, whether chosen by lot or elected. It would be possible to have a president with purely symbolic and ceremonial functions, even chosen by popular vote, as long as he or she has no political power. However, a better solution is proposed below ( §5.10).

  * A smaller number of members than five hundred might be chosen, but it would be a false economy to make the number too small. It should be noted, though, that with new members coming every six months, a relatively small number will give reasonable fairness since even if the representation is a bit skewed at any one moment, over a period of time things will even out. Two hundred might be a reasonable lower limit.

  * In order to permit a larger proportion of the public to be involved in government, it would be possible to have two or more chambers, voting and debating the same issues separately and simultaneously, with the aggregate vote being used to decide the issue. Although a little cumbersome, this would probably be more practical than a single large chamber. It would increase the "sample size", and might be useful in very large and populous states, if popular opinion called for it.

  * No-one should be forced to sit as an Assembly member. In order not to systematically weed out competent and intelligent people, members' pay should be generous. Members must leave their occupation for their term of service, and, in addition to the immediate financial loss there is the loss of seniority, experience and knowledge in their field, and reputation. These are considerable sacrifices for many people: employees in large organisations, people in business or the liberal professions, academics, pop stars, professional sportsmen... Even tradesmen or shopkeepers working on their own might find it hard to build up their business again after five years' absence. It would not be unreasonable for members to continue to receive their salary for two or three years after their term finishes.

  * Members will have roughly similar requirements for staff, office space, research assistants, travel, re-location expenses and so forth as elected members, with the great difference that they will not need the large sums that standing for election requires.

  * Attendance at sessions, and voting on all measures should be obligatory, but a null vote, equivalent to an abstention, should be permitted. The insistence on full attendance might seem petty and narrow-minded, but it is important when a randomly selected parliament votes, in order to preserve the accurate representation of the public. Members' pay would be docked for absence, except for illness or pregnancy. Members who become pregnant or whose state of health prevents them serving should be given leave, and allowed to finish their term of office later. Permanent incapacity to attend should lead to retirement, but not to any financial penalty. Members who do not fulfil their duties (as defined by the Salaries Board, see below) would be replaced.

  * It should be noted that there is no assumption here that Assembly members will magically become more honest, intelligent, or conscientious by virtue of being chosen by lot. Nor are they expected to nobly judge each question without reference to their own interests, or to be naive in the sense of being free of prejudices on entering the Assembly. They are expected to be themselves, nothing more, nothing less.

**5.2** The Salaries Board

In most countries, members of parliament or their equivalents fix their own salaries and conditions. With an elected parliament, there is at least some incentive (public hostility and the need to be re-elected) to keep salaries at a reasonable level. That restraint disappears when members are chosen by lot and cannot seek re-election.

For this reason members' salaries should be fixed by an independent Salaries Board. This would be chosen by lot from the whole citizen body, and, as with the Assembly, its members would be replaced regularly: twenty per cent every year would be appropriate. It should have sufficient members – perhaps a hundred – to ensure that it reflects at least roughly the community as a whole, and to ensure that there is a reasonable number of competent people in it. It should meet once a year, for a period no longer than is necessary for its work, thus it should not be necessary for its members to leave their other occupations.

In addition to fixing the salaries of the Assembly members, the Salaries Board would fix the salaries for members of the various policy and other committees proposed below. It would also set expense allowances, retirement benefits, and work conditions for members of all these bodies, as well as the length of their terms of service.

Obviously, the members of the Salaries Board should not fix their own pay. Instead, the Assembly should set Salaries Board members' remuneration as a fixed proportion of something that cannot be easily manipulated for personal advantage. Either the mean salary in the civil service, or the mean salary in public and private sectors combined would be a suitable choice.
**5.3** The Agenda Committee and the Speaker

Both the Speaker and the members of the Agenda Committee require some experience and knowledge of procedure. Rather than simply choosing them by lot, as proposed for all the other bodies proposed here, it would be better if they came from the most competent of the senior cohort of members, ie those in the last six months of their term of office. Alternatively, they might serve after their normal term as members, which would be preferable if the term is short. Assuming that they are fifty in number, they would each vote for the forty amongst themselves whom they consider most able. From the forty who receive the most votes the Agenda Committee (not more than ten) would be chosen by lot; the others would serve in rotation for one day as Speaker of the Assembly. The Speaker would not give his or her views in the discussions while holding that office, and would not vote. In §9.2 below an explanation is given of the reasons for preferring an election for the Agenda Committee, and for the group from which the Speaker is drawn.

The agenda set by the Agenda Committee should be subject to modification by the Assembly. One convenient way to allow for this would be to set aside a fixed time each day to consider and if necessary modify the next day's agenda. This would usually not take long as such changes would probably be rare.
**5.4** The Assembly and the Courts

Assembly members would have no immunity from prosecution, except from actions brought for libel over the content of speeches made in the parliament, and (of course) from an action over the content of his or her vote, which in any case is required to be secret.

The Assembly would fix the manner of selecting judges, and the terms of their appointment, but would not appoint individual judges. Judges would serve for a limited period and would be replaced by rotation. The Assembly would fix the limits of jurisdiction (scope and powers) of the various courts.

The ultimate authority on the interpretation of laws would be the Assembly, not the courts. The courts would not have the authority to strike down a law as "unconstitutional"; indeed there would be no written Constitution. When in doubt either as to the fairness of a law, its validity, or its precise meaning, the courts would appeal to the Assembly for a decision.
**5.5** The Civil Service and Oversight Committees

The executive functions of government would be performed by the Civil Service. The Assembly would decide on the number of Departments (Ministries) and other bodies ("Board", "Authority" "Commission" etc), and their responsibilities. Each Department or body, under its permanent head, would be overseen by an "Oversight Committee" of citizens, again chosen by lot from the whole citizen body. In each case the Assembly would decide on the size of the committee. (These committees would not, of course, be representative; that is not their function. They need to be big enough to ensure that there are sufficient competent members, but not so big as to be cumbersome). The oversight committees would report to the Assembly, and would make recommendations about the Ministry, its staffing, functions, and budget. Like Assembly members, committee members would serve for a limited period, say five years, and be replaced, in turn, every six months. The Assembly would have the authority to dismiss an oversight committee.

The Civil Service would be staffed by permanent employees, and Heads of Departments would not, of course, be political appointees. All vacant positions in the Civil Service would be advertised. A panel of persons with suitable qualifications would be appointed, under the supervision of the oversight committee, for the purpose of evaluating applicants. Unsuccessful candidates would be free to appeal to the oversight committee. Heads of Departments whose performance was considered unsatisfactory by the oversight committee could be replaced by that body subject to the approval of the Assembly.

Apart from the presumably rare occasions when the sacking of a Head of Department was proposed, the involvement of the Assembly in the functioning of the Civil Service would be limited to deciding which bodies were necessary, their scope, and their budget allocation.
**5.6** Public Information

Public information services (Radio, TV, and websites) would be established. (This does not mean that there can be no private media). The radio and TV services, like those in the UK, Europe, Australia and elsewhere, would broadcast news and general interest programs. Websites should list civil service job vacancies, proposed bills, and provide a summary of debates in the Assembly. The management, though autonomous with regard to programs, should be subject to an oversight committee, since it deals with public money.
**5.7** Policy Committees

Many issues of policy are complex and require detailed investigation of a depth which the Assembly will not have time for. To deal with these, the Assembly would set up Policy Committees, chosen by lot from the general public. These committees would call for submissions from the public and from known experts in the field, and would produce a report to be presented in parliament. Standing, or "permanent" Policy Committees would deal with issues which are always important to a government. Energy policy is one example, others might be foreign policy, land management, defence and so on. Members of these committees would serve for a limited term and be replaced by rotation, just like members of the Assembly. These policy committees would sit as frequently as their duties require: some perhaps two or three times per year, others more often. Certain complex topics might best be dealt with by a hierarchy of committees in a "tree" structure, for instance, energy policy might have a general committee, and sub-committees for different aspects of policy, as shown in the diagram:

and so on. Each subcommittee would produce its report and recommendations to the committee above it. Since there is no reason not to form policy committees to cover regions if the Assembly so decides, regional policy committees could replace the local member in elected governments as a channel for citizens' concerns about local issues.

Other committees (Single-Issue Policy Committees or SIPCs) would be formed to study a single issue (typically the issue raised by a proposal for a law). These committees would sit full-time until their issue is settled, and would then be disbanded. [64] If it appeared likely that the sitting would run for more than a year, the Assembly should either increase the number of members, or set up one or more additional SIPCs acting in parallel, or make the SIPC a permanent policy committee.

These committees, both SIPCs and permanent policy committees, would not be required to produce a single recommendation, but would usually produce a majority recommendation and one or more minority recommendations, as they see fit. Although the Assembly would be free to disregard the views of a policy committee, it would be unlikely to do so if the committee produced a unanimous recommendation, or a recommendation supported by a large majority, unless it conflicted with a recommendation of another policy committee.

Creating policy committees, dissolving them, setting the number of members, and deciding the terms of reference would be at the discretion of the Assembly, as would deciding what action should be taken on their reports.

Policy committees present another opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in government. They provide an interface to the public, and the submission of opinions or evidence to them allows every citizen to be involved, not just those selected by lot. The volume of submissions is potentially enormous, and the job of the committee members is to sort this mass into a digestible form, and to present it, with their own views, to the Assembly, thus permitting its members to reach an informed opinion reasonably quickly. Since these committees are not drawn from among the Assembly members, they do not add to members' workload, and there is no limit on their number, except that Assembly members, as taxpayers, will presumably keep an eye to the cost. Payment for service on a policy committee, like salaries of Assembly members, should be fixed by the Salaries Board, and should be generous, to encourage participation.

It is possible that, in time, the greater part of the legislative side of government would come to be dealt with by these committees, and that the role of the Assembly would be largely to review and either to approve policies already hammered out in the committees, or to send proposals back to be reconsidered in committee, with only the occasional debate on the substance of a proposal. As long as the Assembly has the final say, that is, retains the power to accept, reject or amend any proposal, this should not present a danger to democracy.
**5.8** Temporary (Secondary) Assemblies

In the case of a close vote in the Assembly – that is to say a measure approved or rejected by a margin of less than a few per cent – a Temporary Assembly would be formed. This body would be chosen by lot from the whole population in the same manner as the Assembly, but would vote on a single issue only. After examining the report of the policy committee or the SIPC, the Temporary Assembly would vote on the proposal under consideration, without _formal_ debate. [65] If the vote of the Temporary Assembly (by simple majority) is in favour of the measure, it is adopted; if against, it is rejected, whatever the vote was in the permanent Assembly. The Temporary Assembly is then dissolved. The Assembly should fix the size of this body, but it ought to be larger than the Assembly, preferably by a good deal, in order to get the best representation possible. Since it will not debate, and its term is short, the larger size will not be an inconvenience

The functioning of this body is described below in Example 4 ( §6.4).
**5.9** Federations, Regional and Local Government

If one were setting up the government of a new state using sortition there would be no need for a federal system. However, federations are common in practice, and there should be no objection to converting one to sortition.

In general, regional and local governments would follow the pattern proposed for the nation, though of course with limited powers. (An example of a possible structure for a local Council is given in chapter 7). Different countries have different needs: a small island or city state might need only two tiers of government, national and local; three might be suitable for most medium-sized countries, and perhaps more for vast or populous nations. The decision on what is appropriate might be made initially by the Assembly of each country, though local and regional governments should be free to amalgamate or to split into smaller communities. Disputes between regional governments on legal matters should be settled by the courts, if both parties agree to this; if not, and in the case of political disputes, by a joint sitting of the Assemblies, if necessary calling into being a Temporary Assembly. Mediation by the next higher level of government might also be used, although whether lower levels of government should be subject to higher ones is open to doubt.
**5.10** Head of State and Relations with Foreign Governments

There would not be a President with executive powers, since one person cannot be representative of the whole nation, whether chosen by lot or elected. (The French, American and Russian Presidents are, to a greater or lesser degree, elected constitutional monarchs.)

There is probably a need in every nation for a dignified figure who can welcome visiting Heads of State and walk down the red carpet with them, and also pay courtesy visits to foreign nations. This is usually done by a President or a Prime Minister who combines this function with some executive powers. In the absence of an executive Head of State, an alternative must be found. It would be possible to have a president with purely symbolic and ceremonial functions, even chosen by popular vote, as long as he or she has no political power. However, there is a better solution. Foreign relations would no doubt be the subject of a ministry or department, which would appoint ambassadors to those countries deemed sufficiently important to warrant a full Embassy. The easiest solution to the ceremonial and social functions of the Head of State would be to appoint, from the ranks of senior civil servants in the Foreign Ministry, a sort of "ambassador at large" (who might go by some such title as "Chancellor", to mark the difference from an executive President). This Head of State would, of course, be expected to act only on instructions from the Assembly, and would be liable to dismissal for exceeding or not fulfilling his functions.

When a trip to a foreign country is not a mere courtesy visit, and negotiations are involved, it would be appropriate for the Chancellor to be accompanied by senior officials of the departments concerned: Foreign Affairs, Trade, Defence... as circumstances require.
**5.11** More than One Term of Service

The probability of serving more than one term on one body is very low in a population of any size. Even the probability of serving on different bodies is small. Nevertheless, in the interest of allowing as many citizens as possible to participate, it might be considered fair to prohibit this.
**5.12** Summary of the Structure of the Proposed Government

The core features (what we might consider essential to form a constitution) of this proposal are as follows:

  * The use of sortition to choose an Assembly from the whole adult population. 
  * Rotation of members of the Assembly, part retiring and being replaced at fixed intervals. 
  * The daily rotation of the office of Speaker.
  * An independent Salaries Board chosen by lot from the whole adult population. 
  * The right of any member of the public to propose a law.
  * The overriding authority of the Assembly, except in fixing members' salaries and perquisites.
  * A Proposals Committee, with its team of parliamentary draftsmen.
  * No judicial review of Assembly decisions.
  * The relative independence of the judiciary from the Assembly.
  * The Civil Service of permanent employees, subject to the control of the oversight committees, but relatively insulated from the Assembly.
  * Oversight Committees, to ensure fair and efficient operation of the bureaucracy.
  * Permanent Policy Committees to study and make recommendations on policy topics of permanent concern.
  * Single-Issue Policy Committees to fully investigate issues as they arise and to report to the Assembly.
  * Openness: as much information as possible made freely available to the public at all times.
  * Regional and local government on a similar pattern to that of the national government, with appropriate changes.
  * The Agenda Committee, subordinate to the Assembly.
  * A public news service.
  * An appointed Chancellor with ceremonial diplomatic and courtesy functions, under the authority of the Assembly.
  * A Temporary Assembly, to resolve a question where the Assembly is almost equally divided.

It might be appropriate, in some cases only, to have an additional chamber or chambers, acting "in parallel" to the first.

**5.13** Suggested Sizes for the Bodies Proposed

The following is intended merely to give the reader a feel for the proposal. The sizes of these bodies would be decided by the Assembly, and salaries and periods of service would be set by the Salaries Board. The Assembly would also decide which policy committees, Sub-committees, and SIPCs were required. All bodies except the Agenda Committee would be chosen by lot from the whole adult population.

6 – Examples of the Legislation in Action

How might all this work in practice? Let us consider some examples.
**6.1** Example 1: The Passage of a Proposal by a Private Citizen

Bill Brown, who is a little technophobic and eccentric, decides that Watchamacallit Bay is over-fished. He writes a letter to the Assembly:

Dear Sirs and Madams,

Watchamacallit Bay is hopelessly overfished, when I was a kid there was fish everywhere, now its DEAD!!! Theres no fish left! Fishing should be banned in Watchamacallit Bay.

Yours etc, Bill Brown

He receives a reply from the Proposals Committee:

Dear Sir/Madam,

Re: Your Proposal.

The Proposals Committee has received your proposal, and thanks you for it. Your proposal has been added to the list of new proposals as Proposal Number: 2050/456789

Please note that the recommended method of submitting proposals is through an account on the Proposals Committee website at: www.gov_sortitia_props.so. An account has been registered for you as follows:

Account Name: billbrown179

Password: xkq957WGgh54 (You should change the password on your first visit to the site.).

You should use this account to make any changes to this proposal, and for any future proposals. As the account owner you may post explanations or information concerning your proposal, and, if you wish, permit others to post comments or suggestions.

In order to avoid duplication or conflicts you should search the Proposals Committee website for other proposals of a similar nature, or which may be affected by your proposal. It is suggested that you familiarise yourself with existing legislation and regulations which may be affected by your proposal. Details of these may be found on the websites of the Government of Sortitia, and on those of the Regional Governments.

More information may be found in the "Guide for the Submission of Proposals", a copy of which is attached.

Yours faithfully, etc

As things stand, Bill Brown's proposal is not very satisfactory. Before a proposal could be placed before the Assembly, it would need to:

  * Be clearly and unambiguously expressed. 
  * Set out precisely the measures proposed, and their scope in time and space.
  * Not be a duplicate of another proposal, or be subsumed by another proposal.
  * Have the support of a significant number of people.

Bill Brown's proposal does not fulfil these criteria, and it also has a glaring logical blunder: if there really are no fish at all in Watchamacallit Bay, then forbidding fishing there won't make a scrap of difference. In addition, before the proposal could be adopted, there would need to be:

  * Evidence that the intended effects are desirable. 
  * Evidence that the measure proposed will produce those effects and no other undesirable ones.

However, if there is any merit in the notion, it will attract some support. The proposals website will be known to everyone, so anyone in favour can add a signature. [66] Even more useful for Bill, among the supporters there will be those who can suggest improvements to the wording or the content, or put forward arguments and evidence in its favour.

Once the proposal has received a certain number of signatures, the Proposals Committee performs a preliminary check for coherence, conflicts with or duplication of existing laws, regulations, and proposals, before sending it to the legal draftsmen who make a thorough check against existing regulations or proposals at all levels of government, and flag potential problems, before putting it in proper form. Their draft is sent to Bill Brown, so that he can verify that the revised version does conform to what he proposed. It is also published on the web site for all to see.

The Agenda Committee then places the proposal on the agenda for initial consideration. Although in rare cases of urgency the Assembly might decide to debate and vote on it immediately, more usually it will set up a single-issue policy committee (assuming that there is no existing policy committee whose mandate covers the issue) to study and report on the proposal within a given time. The SIPC or permanent policy committee would call for submissions from the general public, from recognised experts, and from government Ministries. Although supporters of the proposal may already have produced arguments in its favour, it is at this stage that solid evidence of its utility and effectiveness, (or the contrary) will appear. After examining the submissions, the policy committee sends its report back to the Agenda Committee with its recommendations and its reasons for making them. The report would typically not be a unanimous opinion, but would contain the views of all members, and the arguments advanced in the submissions received by the committee. The Agenda Committee then tentatively places the proposal on the agenda of the Assembly. Since the Assembly examines the agenda daily, consideration of the proposal may be deferred or advanced, as the Assembly sees fit.

At all stages of this process the text of the proposal, with the various changes made or suggested would be available to the public on the proposals web site, and perhaps by printed media. This ensures that the actions of the Agenda Committee and the Proposals Committee would always be subject to scrutiny by the Assembly and the public.

In this example, it is likely that the proposal could be implemented by a minor change to an existing Act; perhaps by adding something like the words: "Watchamacallit Bay east of a line from Lottery Point to Cape Kleros" to an existing list of prohibited fishing zones. This would not alter the process of review, deliberation and voting.
**6.2** Example 2: The Budget

It has been suggested above that "A chamber chosen by lot could also use the "wisdom of the crowd" (for instance to estimate budget allocations: the median of the members' estimates would serve as the allocation for the following year)". In connection with this, it is worth quoting the Wikipedia article on Francis Galton:

"Galton was a keen observer. In 1906, visiting a livestock fair, he stumbled upon an intriguing contest. An ox was on display, and the villagers were invited to guess the animal's weight after it was slaughtered and dressed. Nearly 800 participated, but not one person hit the exact mark: 1,198 pounds. Galton stated that "the middle-most estimate expresses the _vox populi_ , every other estimate being condemned as too low or too high by a majority of the voters", and calculated this value in modern terminology, the _median_ ] as 1,207 pounds. To his surprise, this was within 0.8% of the weight measured by the judges. Soon afterwards, he acknowledged that the mean of the guesses, at 1,197 pounds, was even more accurate." [[67]

Well before the budget date, the various Departments, Boards, and other administrative bodies would prepare their estimates. A month or so before the budget was due to be discussed, a printed table would be supplied to all members (and made public on the government web site). This table would list, for each body: its requested allocation; the allocation made for it and the money actually spent in the latest year for which figures are available; and a blank space for the member to insert his or her estimate of what the allocation should be for the coming year. Also printed on the same table would be: the past inflation rate; the estimated inflation for the coming year; the total budget sum requested; and Treasury's preferred surplus or deficit. A complementary table would show: the revenue raised in preceding years from each source; the estimated revenue for the coming year if no changes were made to the existing methods of raising income; and of course, a blank space for the member's proposed figure.

Time would be set aside on the Agenda for members to examine the allocation requests, and to question the oversight committees and if necessary the heads of Ministries on their projected needs and past expenditure. After this, each member would submit his or her tables with the blanks filled in, and the median value for each allocation and revenue proposal would be calculated.

The following tables are examples only. (The figures in the columns "Your Estimate" represent what a hypothetical member might propose.) Obviously there would be many more items than are shown here. In practice, both the members and the clerks of the Assembly charged with calculating the median of each estimate would probably use spreadsheets; the paper tables, however, would be submitted as a vote, and would provide a hard copy that could be used for checking.

For each budget item the median value of the members' proposed figures would be taken. (The median value is the "middle-most" value if there is an odd number of estimates, and the mean of the two middle-most values if there is an even number of estimates.) It is important to use the _median_ , and not the mean. If all members were sincerely trying to guess a reasonable figure, the mean might give a slightly "better" estimate, as Galton observed in the case of the ox. However, if the mean value is used, an eccentric or extremist member could disproportionately influence the final value by nominating outrageous figures.

For instance, suppose that in our example 499 members make an honest attempt to choose a reasonable figure for Conservation and Defence, and that the mean of their proposals is 200 million Sortitian dollars for Conservation, and 900 million for Defence, and that most estimates are fairly closely clustered around those two figures. One member, a fanatical pacifist/ecologist might propose the absurd figures of 1 trillion (1 million million) for the Conservation budget, and zero for every other budget item including Defence. The final mean budgets would be:

Defence 898.2 million

Conservation 2 199.6 million

The effect on Defence is slight (0.2%), but the effect on Conservation is huge, (the budget allocation would be 11 times the mean estimate of the other members), which is clearly against the intentions of the majority of members, and consequently against the wishes of the public.

However, if the median figure is used, the effect of unreasonable estimates will be very slight. If, as is likely, the estimates (of the other 499 members) for Conservation nearest to the median are closely grouped, and look something like:

199 200 200 200 (median) 200 201 202 202

(ie several members are very close to, and some actually hit the median) then one absurdly high estimate will have the effect of moving the median one place to the right, in our example from 200 million to... 200 million.

Although in most cases the estimates will tend to be clustered about the median, even if they are not it would take quite a weird distribution of estimates for one "outlier" to have a very great effect, since in any case the median cannot move beyond the next highest estimation. Another plausible, though less likely, distribution – much less clustered about the median – might be:

180 190 195 200 (median) 208 210 212 215

Even in this case our fanatic would succeed only in moving the median value from 200 to 204 (half-way between 200 and 208), a change of 2%. This is hardly likely to do much damage, and we see incidentally that he could have achieved the same effect with the much more reasonable estimate of 208 million. Using the mean would give an unfair weighting to the extreme votes, and the more extreme the estimation, the higher this weighting becomes.

We should note here that in effect _each budget estimate is a vote, and that using the median gives equal weight to each vote._ So this method is equitable; in fact it is the _only_ equitable way of fixing the budget.

In this special case of fixing the budget there would be no discussion, which needs explanation. With other proposals, members are initially presented with the choice of approving or rejecting a measure. Discussion permits the raising of objections to parts of the proposal, and the proposing of amendments. It allows members to question the purpose of the proposed measure, and ask whether that purpose might be better achieved in another way. Discussion allows consideration of a proposal to be deferred, perhaps so that it can be considered as part of a package with another proposal, perhaps because it should only be approved if another measure is also approved. It allows also for the proposal to be returned to the proposer via the policy committee with suggestions for amendments.

In the case of the budget, however, these advantages of discussion do not apply. All government bodies must have funds, and those funds must be raised through taxes, and this must happen within a limited time. There can be no question of refusing to approve the budget, or of putting off one allocation or another, or of making one budget item conditional on another. [68] The questions to be decided are a matter of emphasis or degree: what proportion of the total allocation should go to each body, what proportion of the required revenue should be raised by the different forms of taxation, and the size of the surplus or deficit that the Assembly should aim for.

In these circumstances, discussion is superfluous, and would be a great waste of time: one could argue forever about the relative importance of the items, and never reach agreement. Without discussion, each member's opinion is expressed by the choice which that member makes on the budget form. Moreover, eliminating discussion safeguards the independence of each member's decision, which maximises the efficiency of decision-making by the Assembly as a whole. However, there is a good case for calling the heads of departments before the Assembly to justify their requests, and answer probing questions from members. Since means are always limited, unless members want to greatly change taxation, an increase in the budget for one item must be balanced by decreases elsewhere, so each head of department will be arguing against all the others, which will go some way towards providing balance.

Will the members of the Assembly be competent (ie have the knowledge and skills) to vote a budget? Will they have the information, and the knowledge necessary to interpret that information? We can say immediately that a great deal of information will be available to members. They will know the more important economic figures: revenue and expenditure and surplus or deficit for preceding years, public debt, inflation, unemployment etc, and the views of policy committees on economic topics.

For each budget expenditure item they will have:

  * The estimate from last year. 
  * The estimate for the current year 
  * The amount actually spent last year. 
  * The estimate if they adopt a "steady as she goes" approach (last year's allocation corrected for inflation).
  * The allocation requested by the department or board in question, calculated by its budget experts. 
  * The civil servants' justification of this request, including a break-down of all projected expenses.
  * The views of the oversight committee members.
  * The views of any relevant policy committees. 
  * Their own priorities. (The member used as an example here clearly wants to spend more on conservation and education, and less on defence.)

For revenue, they have for each item:

  * Last year's estimated revenue. 
  * Last year's actual revenue. 
  * The current year's estimate.
  * The "steady as she goes" figure (last year's revenue corrected for inflation.)
  * The views of relevant policy committees.
  * The views of relevant ministries or other bodies (eg the Central Bank)
  * Their own opinion of a fair way to share the costs. (The member used as an example thinks property owners should pay more, and that alcohol should be taxed quite severely. )

As for the knowledge required, the problem that the Assembly faces is to determine, (for the expenditure) what are the priorities of the people, what do they want to spend their money on; and (for the revenue) what do they think is the most equitable way of raising the money. For this, _the Assembly as a whole automatically has the required knowledge_ : the fact that it is selected by lot and is therefore a faithful representation of the whole population makes it competent. What is more, _only an Assembly chosen by lot can have the competence and the moral right to make these choices_. And if five-year terms are used, four-fifths of the Assembly will already have been through the exercise at least once, and seen the results of their choices. In consequence, the estimate that each member reaches will be an informed estimate.

In practice, this level of detail would usually be excessive. Generally it will be sufficient for members to think in such terms as "a bit more for education, a bit less for ports and cargo facilities, railways about the same; now, how does that affect the deficit?" Decisions at that level are quite within the competence of the ordinary citizen. The use of the median prevents any wild estimates having much effect, and there is a "safe" option for those who feel they don't completely understand the ins and outs of a particular item; that is, of course, the "steady as she goes" estimate. The method could of course also be used to decide any other quantity that can be expressed numerically, for instance speed limits or maximum fines for offences.

Voting the budget estimates is probably the most important exercise of the legislature, for it fixes the emphasis placed on all aspects of the administration. At present with our elected governments the process is highly political, and is driven by ideology and interest groups. This is one area where a government chosen by lot could really shine by intelligent apportionment of resources, and by fairness in raising revenue.
**6.3** Example 3: Abusive use of a Proposal by a Minority

Suppose a minority group wishes to impose its moral code on the public. For instance, suppose a group of earnest vegan/animal-rights enthusiasts wishes to abolish all eating of animals, the eating of eggs, all killing of animals for meat, fur, feathers, or whatever; all keeping of animals in captivity, all experiments on animals, and of course all fishing and collection of shellfish. It makes a proposal to this effect, and after the appropriate steps described in Example 1, the bill is presented to the Assembly, which after debate rejects it by a large majority.

The animal rights group then proposes the same measure again, without amendment, and publicly states that, as it can muster enough signatures, it will continue to do this until the bill is passed.

If significant changes had been made to the bill, we might believe that the group was acting in good faith, and that the revised bill should be re-examined, meaning that it should again go before an SIPC, new submissions should be called for, new discussions and recommendations made by the SIPC, and finally, new deliberation and a vote in the Assembly. However, in this example, no significant changes have been made, so this is clearly an attempt to impose a minority view on the majority.

What should be done? It would be possible for either the Proposals Committee to refuse to forward it to the Agenda Committee or for the latter to refuse to put the bill on the agenda, for a given period or until an amended version was proposed. A more democratic solution would be to put it on the agenda for immediate vote in the Assembly, perhaps as the first bill of the next day. Of course it would be rejected again, without delay, as no further discussion would be necessary. If other groups or individuals acted in a similar way, one might imagine dozens – or more – bills being re-proposed frivolously every day. However, this need not be a problem. If all cases were as clearly abusive, the Assembly might vote every morning to reject the whole lot _en bloc_ in a few minutes.

Alternatively, it might pass a measure to the effect that no rejected bill might be re-presented without amendment (not just the form, but the substance) for a given period: three years, for instance. Or it might pass a measure authorising the Proposals Committee to use its judgement to eliminate such proposals.

Whatever the solution chosen, it should be the Assembly that makes the decision. 
**6.4** Example 4: Close Votes in the Assembly

It is unlikely that very close votes will happen often. In practice, when the public and the Assembly are nearly equally divided on an issue, it is probable that an amendment or a "third way" would be found that would find favour with a greater majority.

Why is this probable? Because it will be in the interest of everyone to find such an amendment or alternative. Those in favour of the bill will have a greater chance of seeing it passed by removing unpopular elements. Those who were opposed will of course seek a more palatable alternative, and those who had such strong reservations that they were unable to decide, will surely seek to ameliorate a doubtful measure, by removing those provisions which they object to.

It is certainly desirable that proposals should be approved by a sizeable majority. A quick glance at the tables and the normal distribution curve in §4.2 above, shows that a vote of 251 : 249, or even 260 : 240 in favour of a measure does not necessarily mean that a majority in the community would approve it. To be reasonably sure that the vote in the Assembly truly reflects the view of the majority, the margin should be about three standard deviations – 3 x sigma – above half the votes; or 284 votes (to 216) in the 500-member Assembly. It would be possible to make a firm requirement that this margin always be attained; this would be a so-called "supermajority" requirement. Unfortunately, this would have the effect of maintaining a strong conservative bias, and so would be unfair. To see why this is so, consider the (admittedly artificial) example where a measure is proposed that is supported by all women, and opposed by all men, and where women make up 51% of the population. In an assembly that perfectly represented the ratio of men to women, there would be 255 women and 245 men. Yet as the tables show, an assembly might be drawn that over- or under-represented women by 25, so that there would be 280 or 230 women. In spite of a majority in favour in the community, the measure would not be passed by either assembly, nor by any assembly that more closely matched the proportion of women in the community. Only in the very rare circumstance (1 in 740) of an Assembly with 284 women or more would the majority get its way. This would apply to any measure that had a slight majority in favour in the community, not just to the artificial case used as an example.

How should the Assembly deal with close votes? Suppose that an animal welfare group (perhaps after the previous example) puts forward a proposal to limit cruelty to animals in farms, abattoirs, and laboratories, and that this more moderate bill receives 258 votes. Suppose also that the majority required for a vote to be considered "not close" is 290 votes.

In the first step the proposal – together with the report(s) of the committee(s) and transcripts of the debate – would be referred back, via the SIPC or policy committee, to the original proposer, to allow amendments to be made that might render the measure more popular. If the original proposer amends the proposal, it would pass again to the Assembly, and, if approved by more than 290 votes, would be adopted. If the majority vote on this modified proposal is again less than 290, the proposal would again be referred to the original proposer.

If the original proposer declines to modify the proposal, a Temporary Assembly would be set up, as mentioned in §5.8 above. After examining the proposal, the report of the policy committee or SIPC, and the transcript of the debate in the Assembly, the Temporary Assembly would vote, without formal debate (since the size of the Temporary Assembly will render it impractical, moreover, it has already taken place in the Assembly). [69] If the Temporary Assembly votes in favour the proposal becomes law, whatever the vote of the Assembly. Otherwise, the proposal is rejected. The Temporary Assembly is then dissolved. In the case of a bill rejected by a small majority (or indeed any majority), the originator would of course be able to modify it and then propose the modified version.

In an earlier version of this proposal I suggested a Temporary Assembly of the same size as the permanent Assembly, which was a blunder. If the representation were always perfect, that would be enough to avoid skilful oratory skewing the Assembly vote, causing a bill to be adopted against the "enlightened" choice of the majority of the community (the choice they would make if they had as much time to examine the issue as Assembly members and Policy Committee members). It would not eliminate the problem of statistical variation: when the Assembly vote is close, and the public is nearly evenly divided on an issue, the public's "enlightened" vote (the vote they would make if they had as much time to examine the issue as Assembly members and Policy Committee members) might still be 55% in favour, whereas the Temporary Assembly could well be 55% or more against. The likelihood of this can be reduced somewhat by increasing the size of the Temporary Assembly to, say, 1 000, 2 000, or even more using several Temporary Assemblies. Since there is no formal debate in the Temporary Assembly, increasing the size will not prolong the process of decision. In fact, though, it will always be better if an amendment is found which makes the proposal acceptable to a clear majority. Probably this will be the usual course, but if it does not happen, and a decision is taken which does not reflect the wishes of the majority, before too many years there will be an Assembly more closely representative on this issue which will set matters to rights.
**6.5** Example 5: A Proposal Originating in a Policy Committee

Suppose that, at present, there is a subsidy for the construction of wind-powered generators, and that electricity generated by solar panels receives a guaranteed price. Suppose also that the Permanent Policy Committee on Energy, taking into consideration advice from its subcommittees, submissions from experts, and its own continuous reviewing of the scientific and technical literature, decides that it would be better to abandon the construction subsidy and the fixed price altogether, and instead to subsidise all electricity on a sliding scale, based on the environmental costs of new installation, the environmental cost per unit generated, and the degree to which the supply curve of electricity generated matched the demand curve. In this scheme a particularly polluting or inefficient method of generating electricity would then have a "negative subsidy", that is, it would be taxed.

The policy committee submits its proposal to the Proposals Committee, which (to inform the public) acknowledges receipt on the government website, notifies the Agenda Committee, and refers it to the parliamentary draftsmen, to be put in proper form. After checking for incompatibility and duplication, the draft is returned to the Energy Policy Committee, and published.

Since the Energy Committee is a permanent policy committee, there is no need to form an SIPC. The Energy Committee would call for submissions on the proposal as drafted. In this case, one might expect a number of opposing submissions from makers of wind-powered devices and operators of coal-fired stations, and no doubt some in favour from makers of newer forms of power generation, perhaps also some requesting higher subsidies for an initial period. The Energy Committee and its various sub-committees would debate all this, and might amend its proposal in the light of the new submissions, in which case the bill would again go to the draftsmen, and back to the Energy Committee before going to the Agenda Committee to be submitted to the Assembly for debate and voting.

At all times the draft would be available to the public, as would the submissions and the recommendations of the Energy Committee and subcommittees.
7 – A Proposal for Local Government

Readers who wish to skip this chapter have my blessing, since it introduces no new principles, though it does serve to show that the general form of government proposed here is scalable, that is to say it can be adapted to local or regional government.

In 2016 the Government of the State of Victoria (Australia) dissolved the Council of the City of Greater Geelong, after a Commission of Inquiry found the existing Council to be dysfunctional. The Government announced the setting up of a Citizens' Jury, under the auspices of the New Democracy Foundation, to recommend the best design for a Council. Though the government sought proposals that complied with the existing legal and constitutional framework, it said that the Jury is free to recommend structures which did not comply. On that basis I submitted the following proposal, which is essentially a scaled-down version of the model suggested in Chapter 5 for a national government:

This proposal describes a Council chosen entirely by random selection. As both the Constitution Act and the Local Government Act of Victoria expressly state that Councillors must be elected, the model of local government described here would require that these Acts be amended.

Government at any level ought above all to be equitable. For this, a Council should faithfully represent the community, not just in the obvious characteristics of gender, race, wealth and so on, but also in the number of those in favour of or opposed to a policy or project that has not yet even been proposed. The only way to ensure this is by using random selection from the whole community.

It is also important that decisions should be "wise". For this to occur, research has shown that it is necessary to have the greatest possible diversity of backgrounds and points of view. Random selection ensures this.

Proposed Structure of the Council

A Council of not fewer than 48 members will be chosen by lot from the whole community (residents and rate-payers) aged 18 and above. These members serve for four years, with staggered terms, six being replaced every six months in order to keep continuity. Those eligible are automatically included in the draw, but may opt out. The number of councillors is a compromise, more will give better representation, but ratepayers may be sensitive to the cost. As it is impossible for one or two persons, however well-intentioned, to represent a community, there is no Mayor or Deputy Mayor. Their functions are filled in part by the Liaison Officer (see below), in part by the Chairperson of Council meetings (see next section).

Agenda and Proposals Committee, and Council Chair

The 12 most senior members of the Council will choose eight of their number to sit on the Agenda and Proposals Committee, and to chair Council meetings. The office of Chairperson will be held in rotation, for one meeting only, by the members of the Agenda and Proposals Committee. The Chairperson does not vote and takes no part in debate.

Policy Committees

To ensure that debate and decisions are informed, the Council will set up a number of standing policy committees covering the major functions of local government. The names, number, and scope of these will be set by the Council, but a typical list might include:

• Town Planning and Buildings.  
• Roads and Parking.  
• Health Services.  
• Community Services. (Child care, youth, aged, and disability services.)

and so on. Council itself should decide whether these committees are:

a) chosen by lot from the council itself, so that each member serves on one committee.

b) chosen by lot from the whole community.

c) chosen in part from the Council and in part from the community.

In addition, Council should be able to set up temporary ad hoc committees, to debate and advise on important issues as they arise which are not covered by the standing committees. The members of these committees would be chosen by lot from the public.

Council Staff and Oversight Committee

Subject to the decisions of the Council, Council staff will remain essentially the same as at present, except that a new position of Liaison Officer will be created. The position of Chief Executive Officer will remain. At the discretion of the Council, an Oversight Committee may be formed, either from the members of Council or selected by lot from the public, for the purpose of verifying that purchases, contracts, permits and approvals by Council staff are made in an equitable and transparent manner.

Advisory Nature of Committees

All the committees mentioned above will research, debate, and advise Council on issues in their field of competence, but do not themselves make decisions. Policy committees are not be required to make unanimous recommendations, but are encouraged to submit minority views when opinions differ.

Remuneration Panel

The Remuneration Panel, of 50 members chosen by lot from the community, meets once per year for the sole purpose of fixing pay, allowances, and conditions for members of Council and committees. This it does in the manner described below for the Budget estimates. When finished, the Remuneration Panel is dissolved, and a new panel formed the following year. Those eligible are automatically included in the draw, but may opt out. Panel members are unpaid. The decisions of this panel are binding, and not subject to revision by the Council.

The Liaison Officer

The Liaison Officer acts as the Council's spokesperson and "figurehead" in dealing with the Minister for Local Government, other councils, the media and the public. He is a staff member acting on the Council's instructions, and would be liable to dismissal for not following those instructions.

Public Participation and Proposals

Any member of the public will be able to make a proposal for a project, a by-law, or a policy change. Council may require that proposals meet certain requirements, and show evidence of popular support (such as a certain number of signatures). These proposals should be addressed to the Agenda and Proposals Committee, which, after ensuring that they meet Council's standards, will place them on the Agenda. Council will usually send each proposal to the relevant policy committee for consideration, or, if necessary, set up a temporary policy committee for that proposal only. The policy committee then publishes the proposal, and calls for written submissions from the general public, and for the views of known experts in the field, whether residents of the community or not. After consideration and discussion of the information available, the policy committee makes its recommendation or recommendations to the council, which then votes after any necessary debate. In order to prevent corruption by bribes or threats, voting is by secret ballot.

The Budget

Establishing the budget expenditure and rates is of the first importance, as it sets the emphasis to be placed on each function of the local administration. Council will require each section of the administration to prepare a detailed estimate of its requirements for the following year. Using these and the information available from previous years, each member of Council will make his own assessment of the figure to be set, and the median (the "middle-most" figure) is taken for each item. Rates are fixed in the same way. For this operation debate and a Chairperson are unnecessary, so all members participate. In effect, each estimate is both an opinion and a vote, and using the median gives equal weight to each vote and each opinion. Consequently, insofar as the randomly-selected Council accurately represents the community, this method is equitable, and voting without debate preserves the diversity of opinion necessary for good decisions.

Conclusion

From their own experience, members of the Citizen's Jury will be aware that choice by lot gives a body that is quite capable of making decisions in a responsible and thoughtful way. They will also be aware that members of elected bodies are often unresponsive to the wishes of the citizens that they are supposed to represent. It is hoped that the argument made above for equity in government will persuade them of the need for choice by lot. Other major advantages are that it limits corruption and cronyism. Any increase in the total remuneration of councillors will be offset by savings from not making wasteful decisions.

The small number of councillors suggested – 48 – may surprise, in the light of the evidence presented earlier that larger numbers are desirable for representativity. However, local government, while extremely important for local planning and projects, and for maintaining our standard of living by administering the amenities and services which it provides, does relatively little in the way of making regulations, compared with national or regional governments. There is thus less need for the fine-grained representation that a larger body would provide. Further, the citizens of Geelong would surely look askance at any suggestion that they should pay the salaries of 500 councillors, in the place of the eleven who constituted the Council until its dissolution!

Since Victorian law specifies that a Council must consist of not fewer than five and not more than twelve elected councillors, and that elections must be held every four years, I was not under any illusions that the proposal would be adopted. However, submitting it has not been vain for two reasons: first, it has allowed me to demonstrate that the general design of government proposed here is scalable, and second, it will help to make the concept of sortition more familiar.
8 – Sortition and Criteria for Democracy

Let us now consider how the proposed sortition-based government compares with the criteria for democracy given above.
**8.1** Comparison with the Criteria of Fishkin

1 Political Equality

If the Assembly is chosen fairly, at random, from the entire adult population, then in effect, the whole adult population participates when the members of the Assembly debate and vote. So "formal political equality" is achieved, at least as far as adults are concerned.

The absence of re-election removes the major source of corruption. The secrecy surrounding each member's vote, both before and after it is cast, will make it very difficult to either bribe or threaten a member. There will be no way of knowing how many members, and which, to target in order to change a decision, and no way of knowing whether bribes or threats have any effect. The danger of being denounced would be very high. So we can say that the requirement of "insulation" is met.

The function of the SIPCs is to permit the full range of views to be heard and discussed, to study them, and to present them to the Assembly with the recommendations of the SIPC members. This should provide very "effective hearing".

Theoretically, at least, political equality is achieved. But what is the likelihood of de facto inequality arising from undue influence being wielded by experts who have an axe to grind? Moreover, one cannot entirely exclude the possibility of experts who have an entirely erroneous opinion swaying the vote in the Assembly. Expert evidence has after all misled courts and led to miscarriages of justice. The safeguards against error and bias in the expert opinion are:

  * The right of any member of the public, expert or not, to make a submission to the SIPC, and thus to oppose a submission or opinion already expressed.
  * The right, or rather the duty, of members of the SIPC to call for opposing opinions. 
  * The right of members of the SIPC, and the Assembly, to ask for detailed, rational justification of an opinion, or to disregard any opinion they consider unbalanced or unsupported by the facts and logical argument.

It is thus very unlikely that a blatantly biased or erroneous "expert" opinion would go unchallenged by other experts. If the experts disagree, there should be a lively debate, and the Assembly and the public will be able to judge between the arguments advanced to support the opposing opinions.

Of course, it is possible for the all the experts to agree and for all to be wrong. There is nothing sortition or any other political system can do to fix this; but then this has nothing to do with political equality.

2 Non-tyranny

It is impossible under any system to give a cast-iron guarantee that there will never be tyranny, even within the rather narrow definition of Fishkin:

"By tyranny I mean the choice of a policy that imposes severe deprivations when an alternative policy could have been chosen that would have imposed no severe deprivations on anyone."

A wider definition can be found in several dictionaries:

"The arbitrary, oppressive, or unjust use of power"

In my view, if a minority succeeds in imposing a decision which is not approved by the majority, then that is unjust, and so constitutes tyranny. However, the normal exercise of the majority's right to decide is not tyranny if it is not "oppressive" and does not impose the "severe deprivations" of Fishkin. Since we are not at present discussing tyranny imposed from the outside (for instance, by a foreign power), or despotic or oligarchic regimes, where tyranny is "built-in", we need only consider two types of tyranny here: tyranny by minorities, and tyranny by the majority.

Tyranny by Minorities

Majority rule, together with random selection from the whole adult population, should guarantee that minorities do not tyrannise majorities. However, we should look at the possibilities for failure of the system.

The first possibility is that a lack of formal political equality could permit a minority to get its way unjustly. This possibility has in effect already been considered above in discussing political equality.

We should note a second possibility. We have considered close votes in Example 4 ( §6.4), and suggested a way of dealing with them. However, it would still be possible for a proposal to be approved by a majority of a few votes in the Temporary Assembly, when in fact a small majority of the population oppose it. There is no easy way of avoiding this, but we may say two things: First, that this is unlikely, as it is in the interest of those proposing the bill to make it as popular as they can while retaining their main objectives, because if it is rejected, they will have to go through the whole process again with an amended proposal. From the submissions to the policy committee, its report, and the debate in the Assembly, they will know where the principal difficulties lie, and where to make changes. Second, if nevertheless, a bill is passed against the wishes of a slight majority in the community, sooner or later, with the regular change in membership, an Assembly will come with a majority that opposes the measure, and presumably will revoke or amend it. If this did not happen, it would mean that public opinion had changed, and that experience had shown that the measure was satisfactory to the majority.

A third possible form of tyranny is that a minority might be transformed into a majority by the bribing or coercion of some members of the Assembly. This sort of corruption is a lack of "insulation", as mentioned above. As corruption is discussed at some length in §9.17 below, it will suffice here to note that it is very common in elected governments, and, for reasons which will be given, is rendered very difficult and very improbable by sortition.

This brings us to a fourth possibility, that wealthy interests could influence public opinion, and hence the opinion of the Assembly, by dishonest advertising campaigns and by biased reporting in the media. This disinformation could lead a majority of the Assembly to vote against its own interests, that is to say, against the interests of the majority of the public. The danger of such disinformation cannot be denied, it is much used and very effective at present in elective "democracy". With sortition, it probably cannot be entirely eliminated. However, it will be mitigated by:

  * The process of deliberation in the SIPCs and the Assembly, meaning the ability to express opinions, questions and answers free of the need to follow the party line, to obey the dictates of lobbies, or to score points off the opposition.
  * The freedom of the public, including recognised experts, to make submissions to the SIPCs. 
  * The fact that each SIPC will have the time and resources to examine its single issue thoroughly and to acquaint itself with the facts. The Assembly, too, although its time will be split over a large number of issues, will still have more time to honestly consider issues than elected politicians whose minds are set on re-election, and whose speeches are aimed at countering their political opponents. 
  * The ability of the public information services – financed by the state and thus independent of advertisers, but not beholden to any political party or individual – to present a more balanced coverage of news and opinion than either news services run by large corporations, or state-run services vulnerable to pressure by elected politicians..

Tyranny by the Majority

This seems to concern Americans more than others, At Federation, creditors and capitalists feared the "tyranny of the majority" of indebted smallholders seeking to reduce their debt, and later John Calhoun campaigned vigorously against the "tyranny" of the majority (the northern states which sought to outlaw slavery), against the wishes of the "oppressed" minority of southern slave-owners. In spite of these connotations, we must take seriously the question of tyranny by the majority. It certainly happens with elected governments: for an example we have only to consider the historical treatment of homosexuals.

The measures proposed or instituted in our elective constitutions to prevent majority tyranny, such as "supermajorities", the possibility of appeal to a Court with constitutional powers, or a Senate formed as in the US and Australia, where each state has equal number of votes, mean inevitably that a minority has the right to veto the will of the majority, and thus tend to bring about a tyranny by minorities. The reader who doubts this is referred to Robert Dahl, who has examined the question in detail in _Democracy and Its Critics_. [70]

Majority tyranny could also happen with sortition. As an extreme example, the majority could – at least in theory – decide that all persons whose family name begins with "R", "S", or "T" would be subject to double taxation, or some other oppressive measure. If these people form a minority, in principle they would be unable to prevent it. The safeguards against majority tyranny are:

  * A high level of public education and public information.
  * The general sense of fairness of most people, and their desire to maintain the democratic rights of all citizens.
  * The consideration in each citizen's mind that an injustice done to one minority today could be done to another tomorrow, and that everyone is a member of some minority at some time.

We must conclude that no guarantee can be given against the tyranny of the majority with sortition. Would it be less likely than at present with elected governments? There are some reasons for hope:

  * Minorities would be represented in the Assembly, where they can at least make their views known. They may be completely excluded from an elected parliament. 
  * All citizens, including members of minorities would be free to make proposals on matters important to them. Even when rejected by the Assembly, such proposals would make the majority aware of the minority's concerns, and would no doubt attract some sympathy, perhaps leading in time to a proposal that is accepted by the Assembly.
  * The perverse effect of the subsidising of campaign costs by the state (which reinforces the larger parties) would be absent. (see §1.5 above)
  * The problem of ignorance when the Assembly votes on a measure will be greatly reduced if not eliminated by the SIPCs, which will have the time to study their single issues in depth. If a proposal tends to disadvantage a minority, that minority will be able to object, and the SIPC will be able to take the objections into account. 
  * The need for parties disappears with sortition, so the polarisation of views, the mindless chanting of slogans, the singling-out of scapegoats, and the slurs and denigration that go with elections will be unnecessary. 
  * Non-partisan state-financed news services would give a more balanced and less superficial treatment of news than commercial media.
  * The use of the method shown in Example 2 ( §6.2) to fix numerical values may mitigate some of the worst effects of tyranny by the majority. For instance, if the ruling party in an elected government perceives that a certain offence is usually committed by a minority which it dislikes, it can fix an unduly harsh punishment, just as in former times parliaments composed entirely of property owners set very severe punishments for theft. In a parliament chosen by sortition, the votes of the minority, depending on its strength, may reduce this severity.
  * If inequalities in education are reduced, members of minority groups may gain better opportunities to improve their material circumstances, which might reduce harsh judgements and the contempt of the majority. If education also became more balanced and diverse, the majority, by acquiring some knowledge of the history and culture of a minority, might become less prejudiced and show less hostility towards it.

There is some empirical evidence that a body chosen by lot will respect minority rights. Ned Crosby, speaking from his experience of "Citizen's Juries", says:

"The abuses which can occur through a method dominated by majority rule arise when those voting do not empathize with those who are affected by the policies under consideration. ...] In practice, Citizen's Juries have shown that average citizens are indeed prepared to help out small groups of people with large needs." [[71]

James Fishkin, from his experience with a large number of "Deliberative Polls", has agreed in conversation that citizen bodies do generally respect minority rights. Crosby points out that "basic rights" – he uses the examples of freedom from slavery, and freedom from imprisonment for criticising the government – are "basic" because both slavery and the imprisonment of government critics are very widely regarded as wrong in current society. So a microcosm of society – our randomly-chosen Assembly – will regard such abuses as wrong too.

It is true that the expression "general sense of fairness" may not inspire much confidence in those whose opinions or behaviour are beyond the pale of tolerance for the majority, such as (in modern society): those who wish to practise ritual cannibalism, incest, or bestiality; or (in certain countries) who eat pork or beef; or (in less enlightened societies): atheists, homosexuals, transvestites, heretics, and those guilty of dancing on Sundays. On the other hand, we seldom see anything quite as arbitrarily absurd as the Really Silly Tax (RST) above, which suggests that some "general sense of fairness" does exist.

3 Deliberation

In its passage from bright idea in Bill Brown's head to becoming law, the proposal of Example 1 has been examined by the Proposals Committee, by the professional draftsmen, by the single-issue policy committee and the experts it called, by any Ministries affected, by anyone who made a submission to the SIPC, and by the Assembly. If amendments are proposed, it may pass by these bodies several times. It has been debated (in the sense of arguments for and against it being advanced) before the SIPC and in the Assembly.

We may conclude that Fishkin's requirement of "deliberation" has been fulfilled. 
**8.2** Comparison with the Criteria of Dahl

1 Effective Participation

"citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the agenda..." [72]

In the first place, any citizen may propose a law, and the proposal will be put on the agenda if it receives enough support from others to not seem a waste of the Assembly's time. Secondly, when a proposal is put before an SIPC or a permanent policy committee, any citizen may make a submission of opinion to it, and these submissions are taken into account when the committee prepares its report to the Assembly. Finally, the vote of the Assembly or the Temporary Assembly will accurately express the preferences of the citizens.

This criterion is satisfied.

2 Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage

The decisive stage for all measures is the vote in the Assembly or the Temporary Assembly. Voting here is strictly equal between members, and the members are free to vote without fear or favour. Again we invoke the principle that a sufficiently large body chosen by lot will in its composition accurately represent (in the sense "stand for") the adult population, and that it may therefore reasonably act for it in making decisions. To those who argue that speeches in the Assembly by the more assertive or eloquent may skew the representativity of the Assembly, we may reply that the setting up of a Temporary Assembly as explained above removes this danger in cases where the bias would effectively change the outcome of the vote. Consequently the choices of the citizens, all the choices, and only those choices will be taken into account.

3 Enlightened Understanding

Since all information will be publicly available, it is possible for anyone to inform himself or herself on any proposal at any time after it is made. However, since in practice we do not have enough time to investigate every topic, and we cannot all become experts on everything, under any practical political system we must in effect delegate our right and our duty to inform ourselves, at least on those topics which are of lesser interest to us. This delegation is not "alienation" since we do not give up our right to inform ourselves on any matter. The delegation is surely best made to someone whose views on the matter in question resemble ours, and the best way to achieve this, for the whole population, is by means of a random sample.

The proposed system satisfies the requirement of enlightened understanding within the limits of what is possible.

4 Control of the Agenda

Dahl's expression is:

"The _demos_ must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed on the agenda of matters that are to be decided by means of the democratic process." [73]

Since the Agenda Committee is not truly representative, it might seem at first glance that this requirement is not fulfilled. However, any citizen may initiate a proposal, and the Assembly has authority over the Agenda Committee and the Proposals Committee, and so is quite free to modify the agenda. Any danger to democracy would come not from placing unpopular or undesirable matters on the agenda (they would quickly be voted down), but from a refusal to put a matter on the agenda which ought reasonably to be there. While the Agenda Committee might have reservations about, or be prejudiced against a proposal, every citizen has the right not only to make proposals, but also to campaign for them to be considered. Proposals that have support in the community will have support in the Assembly, so it will be impossible for the Agenda Committee to delay a proposal against the wishes of the Assembly. In any case, the Agenda Committee is replaced every six months.

The conclusion must be that this criterion is met.

5 Inclusion

All adult citizens who are able to participate are included in the draw for all bodies chosen by lot. Those chosen must formally refuse if they do not wish to serve.

This condition is met within the limits of what is possible. 
**8.3** Tabular Comparison of Elective Government with Sortition

9 – The Assembly and Decision-making
**9.1** The Knowledge and Skills of an Assembly Chosen by Lot

We have seen above ( §4.1), that the justification for an Assembly chosen by lot is its representativity: even though there will be a slight difference between sample and population, it is fair for the sample – the Assembly – to represent the population (using the word "represent" this time in the sense of "act for"), because the resemblance will be far closer than it would if the sample were chosen by non-random means, which is to say by any other means. A legislative body chosen by lot will vote as would the population as a whole, all other things being equal.

All other things, however, will not be equal. Assembly membership will after all be a full-time occupation. Members will have much more time to study the issues in question than the rest of us do. They will not have to spend most of their time earning their living in another occupation (or looking for a job!), with the worries which that often brings, and they will have access to the best information available. Debating the issues, and listening to arguments for and against put forward by other members will help them to form an educated opinion. Most importantly, Assembly members will have the benefit of the work done beforehand by the members of the single-issue policy committees, who will work full-time on their issue, and of the permanent policy committees, who are specialised in a narrow field. They will also be able to call for expert opinions. Consequently, the Assembly will vote as the population would if everyone had an enormous amount of time available to study each proposal, and the best knowledge possible of the issues. This theoretical vote is known as the "informed vote" of the community.

One of the criticisms of sortition that is sometimes advanced is that "ordinary" people do not have the necessary knowledge and skills to make decisions. The obvious reply is that in that case they do not have the competence to choose their leaders in elections, so this criticism amounts to a claim that dictatorship or oligarchy is preferable to democracy. Moreover, a great deal of evidence has been amassed in the last forty years showing that bodies of randomly chosen citizens, when tasked with making decisions, typically undertake this in a responsible, painstaking fashion, carefully studying the evidence presented to them, deliberating seriously, and at the end making reasonable, sound choices. [74]

It is true that many professional politicians have some formal training: law school in the USA, the _École Normale d'Administration_ in France, or the schools of Politics, Philosophy, or Economics in the UK.

But what are these skills and this knowledge, and what advantage do they bring? There are two types of knowledge and skills involved: first, those that are needed to get a policy or a proposal made into law, and second, such technical knowledge as is needed to understand the issues involved in a particular proposal.

First, then, what skills are necessary to get laws passed? "Negotiating skills", you might answer. But in an Assembly chosen by lot negotiating will not be required, since members will not be making deals. And really, what skills do successful elected politicians have? It is not overly cynical to reply "A glib tongue, the knack of avoiding awkward questions, a talent for raising money by fair means or foul, the readiness to make behind-the-scenes deals, and a good working knowledge of recent sporting events". In other words, the skills necessary to get elected and to get their way amongst colleagues, not those that are necessary for making responsible decisions, or that are beneficial to the nation after the election. How could it be otherwise? Those are the skills which the electoral system favours.

With sortition the need for these skills essentially disappears. The legal knowledge and skills required for putting a proposal into legal form, for making sure that laws do not contradict each other, will be held (much as at present with elected parliaments) by the parliamentary draftsmen, who will work under the direction of the Proposals Committee, and will be ultimately responsible to the Assembly. Of the remaining knowledge necessary, a working knowledge of parliamentary procedure, is not particularly onerous to acquire, as the successful functioning of innumerable social and sporting clubs proves. The only ones who need a particularly good grounding here are the Speakers, and they will have up to four and a half years of experience in the Assembly in which to gain that knowledge. The same applies to moderating, and in any case, members can be schooled in the rudiments of both these skills during their six-month training period ( §5.1)

As for the technical (engineering, scientific, medical, economic or whatever) knowledge needed for particular issues, knowledge of this sort is often conspicuously lacking in today's elected bodies, with their disproportionate number of lawyers. An assembly chosen by lot will have more members with varied technical knowledge, since they will be present in the same proportion that they are in the community. However, the major sources of technical knowledge will be the SIPCs, the permanent policy committees, and the experts who testify to them. Those who believe that an assembly chosen as a random, representative sample of the community will be incapable presumably believe that society as a whole is incapable, and also seem to forget that before gaining their expertise, the experts were ordinary mortals like the rest of us. It is surely possible, then, for this knowledge to be acquired by other ordinary mortals.

"Ah, but that takes time", reply the critics. "Professor Bloggs has spent forty years in his field." Certainly, and all of Bloggs' knowledge and experience will be available to the policy committees, the SIPCs, and the Assembly unless Bloggs deliberately refuses to share it, which is unlikely, as most academics consider it both a pleasure and a duty to share their knowledge. Even if he does, there will always be other experts. In working with the policy committees, it may at times be frustrating for the experts to have to explain constantly to laymen things which are considered elementary in their field. This has the advantage, however, that they will be induced to re-examine their premises, and justify assumptions which are taken for granted by general consensus. Experts can be wrong, and sometimes a naive question will uncover a flaw in the accepted wisdom.

When a technical matter is debated in parliament, most elected politicians do not have specialised knowledge of it, any more than members of an Assembly chosen by lot. When the politicians honestly want to get the best legislation possible, and are not acting in accordance with some ideology, or in the service of special interests, they set up an inquiry, and call for submissions. That is exactly what will happen in the case of a new issue with a single-issue policy committee, with the difference that the SIPC, whose members are chosen by lot, will be impartial, which is very often not true with commissions appointed by politicians.

For matters which are of a general, persistent or recurring nature, it makes sense to have permanent policy committees, continually keeping abreast of the literature in their field, studying policies adopted or proposed overseas, and seeking opportunities to improve things generally.
**9.1** Aptitude Tests and the Village Idiot

It is frequently suggested that members of an assembly chosen by lot should be subjected to a test of aptitude. Étienne Chouard, an advocate of sortition, says in his proposal:

"those chosen will be subjected to a test of competence" [75]

One wonders whether the advocates of aptitude tests have really thought the matter out. The immediate consequence of a test of "aptitude" is to make an elite. If the test eliminates anyone – and after all that must be its purpose, to eliminate some people – it denies the right of those people to have their opinion taken into account, makes the group remaining unrepresentative of the people as a whole, and violates Fishkin's "Political Equality", as well as Dahl's "Voting Equality" and "Inclusion". So such an assembly would lack legitimacy.

Again, certain questions must be asked. Who decides the criteria to judge by? Do we allow only those who are of good character? Then what does "good character" mean? Those who go regularly to Mass? Those who are good Marxists? Or good Muslims? Good patriots? Or what? Should it be based on the opinions of those who know them? Then which people? The boss, the bank manager, the principal of the last school they attended? The civil servants in charge of taxation?

Do we go by some more objective criterion? Criminal records, for instance? In the US it is estimated that, of those born in 2001, 6.6% of the total population will be incarcerated at some time in their life. For black males, the figure is 32%. [76] Whatever their crimes (remembering that "justice" in the US is less than perfect, and many will be innocent) these people have a right to be heard, a right to have their interests taken into account. And what of those who are never punished for their crimes? Their votes are counted in elections – in principle at least – and their interests would be taken into account with sortition, so why should the unlucky ones who get caught be deprived of their rights when the unpunished are not?

Should it be a medical examination? Blood pressure, blood sugar and cholesterol levels, and all the rest? It would certainly be indecorous to have members indulging in epileptic fits or heart attacks in the Assembly instead of listening and deliberating. But removing epileptics or those at risk of heart attacks or strokes would be unjust and would make the Assembly unrepresentative, and in any case it is very simple to replace by lot a member no longer able to serve.

Is it to be an IQ test, or a test of "civic knowledge"? If it is the former, you bias not only towards the more intelligent, but also towards the wealthy; if the latter, towards those who have had a particular form of education, which may mean excluding immigrants, and may also exclude those who do not share the prejudices of the designers of the test.

The real question, though, is: what is the purpose of eliminating the "less apt"? I suspect that there is an underlying distrust of "ordinary" people, a feeling that "better" people will give (somehow) "better" decisions. One must ask "Better by whose standards?" The answer, unspoken, is probably by the standards of the intellectual elite to which the person proposing the test feels he belongs. In fact however, since in order to be "good" decisions must above all be _equitable_ , that is to say must take every person's interests into account, and since each citizen is the only legitimate judge of his or her own interests, decisions made by an elite, however wise and intelligent it may be, can only be _worse_ than those of a randomly selected, inclusive body such as the Assembly proposed here.

There may be a fear that the lot could fall on the the morally depraved, or the "village idiot". As far as the depraved are concerned, there is no objective standard for depravity, and no reliable way to test for it, so any idea of weeding them out is a fantasy. There is no shortage of them in elected governments!

What about the so-called village idiot? In the first place, those who are severely mentally handicapped would be unable to take part for practical reasons. Secondly, those with mild intellectual disability, which we may take, as a rough approximation, as those with an IQ below 70 make up about 2.2% of the population. [77] They will perhaps not contribute a great deal to debate, but there is no reason to deny them the right to vote in the Assembly. If we take the lowest, perhaps unfair, view of their abilities, we would expect their vote to be random "noise", in the vocabulary of electrical engineers. If that is so, it would at least do no harm, as the "signal" – the choices made with intelligence – from the rest of the Assembly would be so much stronger.

"But what about those whose IQ is between 70 and 100 (the median IQ)? They can't be too bright, can they?" Well, clearly the IQ test tells us that their IQ is lower than that of the rest of the Assembly. But traditional IQ tests with a fixed time period favour speed and snap decisions rather than reflection and judgement, and snap decisions are _not_ what is required in either the committees or the Assembly. There are other types of cognitive test, but again the results need to be treated with caution. For instance, a recent study has shown that cognitive functions are greatly affected by air quality; in fact the scores of test subjects doubled on days when they were in controlled clean air compared to those in typical office air. [78] As we all know, tiredness, drugs, worry, hangovers, excitement, and illness all affect mental performance, so that we really can't place much reliance on tests unless they are performed repeatedly in very closely controlled conditions. In any case, concern about members' intelligence is probably a case of barking up the wrong tree. Recent research has shown that the individual intelligence of the members is not a good predictor of group intelligence (§9.3). As Bouricius and Schecter point out:

"It is not necessary for every member of a body to be intelligent and competent, in order for the group to function effectively. The intelligence of the group is magnified beyond that of any individual due to the cognitive diversity allowed by random selection." [79]

I shall introduce two anecdotes here. Wolfang Köhler, a pioneer ethologist researching primate intelligence, put a chimpanzee into a room in which were some bananas suspended out of reach, some wooden crates, and sticks which could be fitted together to make a long pole. Köhler envisaged several ways to get the bananas with these tools, but the chimp found a quick and effective one that Köhler had not foreseen: using the professor himself as a ladder. [80]

An eminent botanist is said to have had a monkey trained to collect specimens that were hard to reach. One day he came across a flower on a vine of an unknown species. Unfortunately, the flower was in a very perilous position and the monkey baulked at going over the cliff edge to fetch it. Nevertheless, although feeling rather guilty, the botanist continued to urge on the animal. Finally, the monkey walked to the edge of the cliff and simply pulled on a branch of the vine, bringing the flower within easy reach. The botanist joked ruefully afterwards that he was more stupid than a monkey.

In both cases it was the less intelligent member of the group which found a novel, practical, and in some sense, better solution. It is fair to say that it was diversity of outlook that led to this. We shall look at diversity and the effect of eliminating the less intelligent from the lot in §9.3.

Incidentally, those who object to the idea of the mentally less-endowed being present in a legislature usually do not give much thought to the presence of alcoholics. Drunks are not unknown in elected parliaments, so we must expect them in any body chosen by lot. Even if we do eliminate the less intelligent, we will still get members whose brains don't function as well as we might wish, whether they are chosen by elections or by lot. If their behaviour is disruptive, presumably the Speaker will have them ejected, which is exactly what happens in an elected parliament.

"Opt-in" and "Opt-out"

Some proponents of sortition have suggested selection by lot from a pool of volunteers (those who opt-in), as happened in Athens. It has been suggested that this is another form of aptitude test, of selecting an "elite", (albeit rather inexact) by eliminating those who did not consider themselves competent. Hansen writes, referring to Athens:

"the lot was based on voluntary candidature, which helps to eliminate those who had neither the talent nor the taste for administration. However, there must always have been some who had the taste but not the talent..." [81]

Obviously, too, there must have been some who had the talent, but not the taste, and who were left out, and some would suggest that these, the "upright persons who do not care to govern" would make the best government. This may be untrue, but their elimination would make nonsense of any elitist idea of getting "better" decisions by choosing from the self-selected. More importantly, we could expect a much smaller, less diverse, and unrepresentative pool if participants are obliged to opt-in rather than opt-out.

It is necessary, then, to include the whole population, allowing those who are unwilling to participate to opt out, but making the salary such that few will wish to.
**9.3** Group Intelligence, Diversity and the Jury Theorems

In _The Wisdom of Crowds_ James Surowiecki says:

"If you put together a big enough and diverse enough group of people and ask them to make decisions affecting the general interest, that group's decisions will, over time, be intellectually superior to the isolated individual, no matter how smart or well informed he is." [82]

To back this up Surowiecki provides a number of examples where the success of a group was uncanny to the point of improbability; quite simply, it seems too good to be true. However, there is some good mathematical evidence in support of his ideas. Before presenting it I wish to stress that the argument I have made so far in favour of sortition is that it is preferable to elections because it better fulfils the criteria for democracy. It is an argument based on fairness and justice, not on efficiency. Even if bodies chosen by lot could be shown to be less likely to produce good decisions than elected ones, I believe we would be better off suffering from our own bad choices than from unjust decisions imposed on us by others.

Nevertheless, suppose for a moment that we forget about equity, and concentrate on the problem-solving ability or creativity of our allotted bodies. Suppose we forget also the caveat made above about tests and decide arbitrarily – and arrogantly – that the approximately 16% of people whose IQ is below 85 (one standard deviation below the mean) are of no use in making decisions. Just before we banish them from all bodies chosen by lot, however, let us ask: what ill effect would their _inclusion_ have on problem-solving? In an Assembly of 500, we might calculate that we would be left with an _effective_ membership of 420. An SIPC or policy committee of 30 would be reduced by this simplistic arithmetic to 25, (still a reasonably large pool from which different approaches and ideas may come). However, this neglects the fact that _any_ citizen can submit ideas and criticisms to the SIPC, so with or without the less intelligent, the "ideas pool" on which we draw is essentially the whole community; indeed, with the propagation of ideas on the internet, it is probably most of the world. Since all policy committees report to the Assembly, the ideas pool for the Assembly may effectively be the whole world, too. So eliminating the less intelligent will not improve decision-making; in fact because of the small loss of diversity there would be a theoretical and probably imperceptible decrease in performance.

Some interesting results given in a recent paper by Lu Hong and Scott Page will make this clear. [83] As an example of the type of question which they address, Hong and Page give the following: Suppose a firm wants to hire people to solve a hard problem. They give an ability test to 1 000 applicants. Should the firm hire:

(a) The best-scoring applicant?

(b) The twenty next-best applicants?

(c) A random sample of twenty applicants?

It is fairly well-established that (b) is preferable to (a) and we can see this intuitively. "Two heads are better than one" we say, and the more heads that work on a problem the more likely a good solution will be found. But what about option (c)? Surely it would be better to choose (b) and have the most competent people?

Hong and Page made a mathematical model of group problem-solving and conducted a series of computational experiments in which problem-solvers ("agents") try successive possibilities in turn, comparing each new possible solution with the previous one, and rejecting the worse of the two. They examined the effect of selecting the best-performing agents, as opposed to choosing them by random selection. The mathematical assumptions that they made correspond to (in plain English):

  * Different solutions having different values are possible, and there is always one optimum solution.
  * No single agent can always find the optimum solution.
  * The agents are "functionally diverse" (they use different methods or "heuristics" to find solutions), so that when one agent can make no improvement another may find an improvement through a different approach.
  * Agents are not equal in performance, and there is a single best performer.

They write:

"We find that when selecting a problem-solving team from a diverse population of intelligent agents, a team of randomly selected agents outperforms a team comprised of the best-performing agents... Under the set of conditions we identify, as the initial pool of problem solvers becomes large, the functional diversity of the group of individually best-performing agents necessarily becomes very small. Ultimately, the gain in individual abilities in the chosen group of best agents] is more than offset by the functional diversity of a group of randomly selected people. It is in this sense that we might say diversity trumps ability." [[84]

_A team of randomly selected agents outperforms a team comprised of the best-performing agents._ So the most important thing for solving problems in a group is _diversity_ , not ability. This result is quite counter-intuitive, astonishing, in fact. Yet, for the conditions which they assume, it is now rigorously established mathematically. We would gain nothing by eliminating the less intelligent with an aptitude test. Hong and Page point out that although functional diversity is not exactly the same as social diversity (in ethnic, cultural, environmental backgrounds, or in wealth or social status), such social diversity will lead to functional diversity. They also point out that extreme diversity in a group can cause communication problems which may lead to disputes. Given the advantages of diversity, a few squabbles are a small price to pay, and – as we all know – any family is living proof that similar backgrounds do not prevent arguments.

Hong and Page's approach is theoretical and mathematical, but their results, and Surowiecki's statement above, have received considerable support from an empirical study of the performance of groups. Anita Williams Woolley and her colleagues showed that groups have a measurable collective intelligence (which she calls "c"), analogous to the general intelligence "g" of an individual.i ("g" is the quantity which IQ tests are intended to measure). A group with a high "c" will tend to perform better on all decision-making tasks than a group with low "c", just as individuals with high "g" tend to perform better on all types of test than those with low "g". One might expect, then, that the individual intelligence "g" of a group's members would be a good indicator of the group's collective intelligence "c". In fact, Woolley found that neither the mean nor the maximum intelligence of the members is a good predictor of "c", the best predictor being "social sensitivity". In the context of deliberation, this would mean the patience to listen to and to reflect on the views of other people. Without this the exchange of different ideas – diversity – would be reduced.[85]

More mathematical support for the wisdom of crowds comes from the jury theorems. The original Jury Theorem, published by Condorcet in 1785, has been extended in the 20th century by several mathematicians, so that now we speak of jury theorems in the plural. These theorems have particularly interested political theorists seeking a robust justification of representative (electoral) democracy on "epistemic" grounds, that is to say based on its superior ability (compared with dictatorship or oligarchy) to make good decisions. They are in fact far more effective as a justification of sortition, because of the much greater diversity of an assembly or a committee chosen by lot, compared with an elected body.

A generalised form of jury theorem states :

"When a group votes, if the mean competence of the members is greater than 0.5, the probability of the group verdict being correct approaches 1 as the number of members increases. Conversely, if the mean competence is less than 0.5, the probability of the group verdict being correct approaches zero." [86]

In the derivation of this theorem:

  * "Competence" is defined as the propensity to be "right" or to make the best choice. Note that in general, for the term "competence" to have any meaning, one choice must be objectively better than the other(s). "Competence" here should not be confused with intelligence.
  * The calculation is made for a large number of _assumed_ competences.
  * The choice is binary (two options, as opposed to multiple choices), one of which is "correct" or better than the other.
  * The decision is by simple majority.
  * Decisions by the members of the group are independent: no copying your neighbour's answers, no blindly following the party line, though of course voters may agree, and still be independent.
  * Voters do not necessarily have the same competence.

In each case, the approach is quite rapid even if the competence is near 0.5, and gets faster the more it differs from 0.5.

Some commentators, pointing to the existence of parties and ideologies, have considered that independent voting is impossible, and that this nullifies the epistemic justification of (electoral) democracy. In this context James Hawthorne has investigated the lack of independence in voting and found that it reduces the effective size of the assembly. [87] In the extreme case where everyone follows some "guru", the effective group size is one, and its competence is just that of the guru. In less extreme cases the effect is not disastrous, though independence is always desirable. Obviously, independence will be much greater in a body chosen by lot than in an elected one.

Hawthorne's tabulated results show the dramatic rise in group competence as voter competence increases. For instance, (with only a small amount of dependence), if the mean competence is 0.52, about 450 voters will get the "right" answer with 80% probability; if the mean competence is 0.53, the probability rises to 90%; for a mean competence of 0.6, the probability rises to over 99.9%.

So far we have considered voter competence over 0.5. When voter competence is below 0.5, the probability of the group verdict being correct approaches zero. To put this in perspective, 0.5 represents the competence of voters who take a random guess. It is the result we would expect if we put a question to a tankful of tadpoles, and took the answer to be "yes" for those which swam right and "no" for those that swam left. So 0.5 is not a very high competence level. However, it is quite possible for competence to be below this. As an example, what would be the verdict if we had assembled a group of leading earth scientists in 1922 and asked them if the continents moved? That question can be answered with certainty because when Alfred Wegener presented his theory in America the academic audience was almost unanimous in ridiculing the idea, which wasn't accepted until half-way through the 20th century. So the mean competence of the experts, in this case, was below that of our tadpoles. To be fair to the American scientists, the evidence in support of the theory was, of course, much less convincing than the evidence available to us now.

As an aside, some reasons for this poor decision may be easily guessed:

  * Common background: All scientists present had received a similar education, with similar prejudices.
  * Pressure to conform: Academic status – reputation, influence with colleagues, and job prospects – may be damaged by espousing an "outlandish" idea.
  * Personal factors: Wegener's imperfect command of the English language, and perhaps anti-German prejudice in the aftermath of the Great War.

In the Assembly, secret voting means there can be no pressure to conform. We also have ensured diversity by the method of selection. What remains is to increase the competence (likelihood of making the best decision) of the members by giving them the best information available. This is the role of the policy committees.

Christian List and Robert E Goodin have extended the theorem of Condorcet to "plurality" voting in cases of more than two options. [88] Their version may be expressed:

Suppose that there are _k_ options and each voter has an independent probability of voting for the "correct" option which exceeds that of voting for any other option. Then the "correct" option is more likely than any other to receive the most votes.

(In the multi-option case, the expression "competence" is replaced by "probability of voting for the correct option". It is not necessary for the voters' probability of voting for the "correct" option to exceed 50%, it needs only to exceed 1/k for k options.)

List and Goodin tabulate some illustrative results, which show that the likelihood of the "correct" option being chosen by the largest group of voters (the "plurality") increases very steeply as the probability of a voter choosing that option rises, even with small groups. For example, with 51 voters and three options, if each voter has a 50% probability of voting for option "A", there is a 99% chance that "A" will receive the most votes.

This is not a justification for "plurality" rather than majority voting in the Assembly,that is to say accepting the option that receives the most votes even when this is a minority of the total votes cast. Rather, it would be useful to the Assembly, when evaluating a number of differing recommendations from a policy committee, to know that the recommendation that received the most support was very likely the best.

**9.4** Deliberation

It is easy to picture deliberation in the Assembly as a debate similar to what we see in elected parliaments, improved no doubt by the absence of the party "line", party discipline, and partisan point-scoring against opponents, but nevertheless with formal speeches and rhetoric. However, that is probably not the best way for members to arrive at an intelligent choice between different policies. Formal speeches are usually either a defence of or an attack on some thesis, rather than being an investigation or exploration of possibilities. A long speech may leave listeners confused, since it is not possible to ask for an explanation in the middle of a speech, and by the end there may be so many other points needing clarification, that the first questions may be forgotten. Formal speeches may cause biased decisions because of differences in rhetorical ability (§9.5). Some speakers are so persuasive that they carry all before them, whereas other people are just too timid or too inarticulate to effectively present their point of view.

One approach to decision-making that has been tried with great success recently is the use of small groups, holding informal discussions facilitated by a "moderator". Individuals who are too diffident to express themselves before a large body may find a small group less overpowering, and open up. A small group permits one-to-one conversations, or conversations between several participants. An informal, relaxed atmosphere makes for more equality in participation, and a less declamatory style of discussion permits questions, explanations, and changes of opinion when necessary. The moderator's task is to ensure that all members express their views, that discussions are courteous and respectful, and that the more assertive members do not dominate the discussions.

A difficulty that has been raised, notably by Cass Sunstein, is the possibility of an "echo chamber" effect resulting in polarisation within the group. In the "Colorado experiment" performed by Sunstein and colleagues, ten groups of five to seven people deliberated on three controversial issues.

"People were asked to state their opinions anonymously both before and after fifteen minutes of group discussion [...] In almost every group, members ended up with more extreme positions after they spoke with one another.[...]

"Aside from increasing extremism, the experiment had an independent effect: It made both liberal and conservatives more homogeneous – and thus squelched diversity. [89]

And, we may add, by squelching diversity, limited the possibility of finding alternative solutions by compromise or innovative suggestions.

However, while Sunstein and his colleagues have performed a valuable service in showing that polarisation and reduced diversity _may_ result from deliberation in small groups, they are far from proving that it must _always_ happen. Indeed, their experimental model seems to have been chosen with a view to maximising the likelihood of polarisation. The participants were selected from two cities: Boulder, known to be predominantly liberal, and Colorado Springs, known to be predominantly conservative, and the groups were chosen to have either conservative or liberal members, but not both:

"Participants were also screened to have generally liberal (Boulder) or conservative (Colorado Springs) political views. There were a total of five conservative groups and five liberal groups, with five to seven members each." [90]

Participants were told:

"As an individual, your job is to express your personal opinion on each discussion topic, and _to attempt to reach a group consensus_ through discussion." [91] (my italics)

Note that the emphasis was on reaching consensus, not on bringing out all the information and opinions that members had. Under these conditions, in groups deliberately chosen to be like-minded, it is difficult to see how the members could _not_ align themselves with each other, reinforce each others' views and so "squelch diversity".

However, polarisation – the movement away from the mean position – does not necessarily occur in small groups. James Fishkin, whose criteria for democracy we have used above, is also the originator of "Deliberative Polls". He found that in fifteen of these, with 1848 "group/issue" combinations (the number of issue indices times the number of groups in that Deliberative Poll), about half the groups moved away from the mean position, and half moved towards it. [92] There was, however, a slight net movement towards consensus.

Of course, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with a change of opinion, either toward or away from the mean position, as long as the move is not caused by social pressures to conform, by deference to a leader, or by the need to come to consensus at any cost. If the change is prompted by an increase in knowledge, or by a more thoughtful consideration of information already available, it is surely desirable. Small groups excel at promoting this.

How should deliberation be conducted in the Assembly? Research on small-group deliberation is continuing, so a hard and fast answer would be inappropriate, and in any event it is a question which should be answered by the Assembly itself. My tentative suggestion is as follows: Each time they enter the Assembly, members take a ticket which assigns a seat number at random. (This is a measure against corruption, and will be discussed in §10.9). The small groups would be made up as follows: Group 1: seats 1 – 12; Group 2: seats 13 – 25, and so on, giving forty groups of either twelve or thirteen members. The moderators would be those members of the senior cohort who were in the Agenda Committee, or in the group of Speakers. Now, whatever the proposal under consideration, some groups will be made up predominantly of like-minded members who are unlikely to challenge each other's viewpoints, or prompt fresh thinking and (perhaps) some reformulation of opinions. For this reason, the small groups should be reconstituted several times, which is very easily done with the random seat numbers: Assembly members simply take a fresh ticket, and so join a different group, with a different spectrum of views. Plenary sessions, with the whole Assembly together as a body, would also be held. Details such as the length of the small-group sessions, the number of times the groups are reconstituted, and the number of times members reassemble in plenary sessions are matters for the Assembly to decide.

In the research mentioned in §9.3 above, Anita Woolley and her colleagues found that the best predictor of group intelligence was "social sensitivity" (as measured by a so-called "RME" test), the next best was equality in speaking times, and the third was the percentage of women in the group. This suggests that eliminating men and the socially insensitive (I suspect that there is a huge overlap between these two categories!) might improve the quality of decisions made by the Assembly. Equity forbids this, of course. However, it is fair, feasible and highly desirable to make an effort to keep speaking times as equal as possible, particularly in the small-group sessions, and to prevent domineering members silencing others. This is, indeed, the greater part of the task of the moderators and the Speakers. It is also possible that the experience of being moderated might make some members a little less insensitive, and maybe even save a few marriages!

It is likely that policy committees too would benefit if they had a moderator. In the case of the permanent policy committees, the more recently selected might tend to show too much deference to the greater knowledge and experience of the senior members. In the case of the SIPCs, all members will be equally inexperienced. Some of their work – extracting and summarising the arguments used from the submissions – will be fairly straightforward and mechanical, and can be done without reference to other members. However, in formulating recommendations, without an impartial moderator, there may be a tendency for the opinions of the more assertive to dominate. Moderators should be rotated regularly.

Supplying moderators for all these bodies need not be a problem. The Assembly will generate forty experienced moderators every six months. It would also be reasonable to recognise moderating as a profession, with formal requirements and courses and assessments organised by higher education institutions.

In its deliberations, the Assembly will study and reflect on material of which the general public may be unaware, and which it won't have time to thoroughly study, and perhaps understand. This will lead to decisions which run against the sort of "top of the head" public opinion which opinion polls reflect, and contrary to many opinions stridently voiced on radio, TV and the internet. There is a danger that this may make the Assembly seem unrepresentative, and there will be people who find it in their interest to denounce it as such. If small-group deliberation is used extensively, this danger is increased, since although formal speeches in plenary sessions can be made public, it will be impractical to broadcast all the informal discussions. The policy committee reports, with their summary of the arguments presented, their recommendations, and their reasons for those recommendations, will be published as a matter of course, and should help to allay public concerns. Nevertheless, to avoid looking like a black-box mechanism, the Assembly would do well to outline the reasons for rejecting certain arguments and accepting others, much as judges do when handing down a decision. Although no-one will know exactly how members voted and why, the moderators will have a good idea of which arguments carried most weight in the informal discussions of the small groups, and could produce a summary, which would be presented first to the Assembly for approval, and then published.
**9.5** Bias due to Difference in Rhetorical Skill or Assertiveness

It is claimed by a number of people that discussion and debate in the Assembly will permit the more assertive or eloquent members to dominate their colleagues in a demagogic fashion. In this way, we are told, the representativity of the Assembly will be lost.

There is a grain of truth in this. An assembly of several hundred taken at random from the population will be representative, but if (for instance) the only members to speak on a proposal are those who come from the wealthy and educated strata of society, then the opinions of the Assembly as a whole could be biased towards the interests of the wealthy and educated. I feel that the danger has been overstated, since in an Assembly of several hundred it is certain that if the opinions expressed on a proposal by one or more eloquent members seem biased and too favourable to particular interests, there will be a fair number of members opposed, some of whom will be assertive and vocal enough to restore some balance to the debate. The use of small groups, with members assigned successively to several different groups, as suggested in §9.4, will help since it will ensure that members are exposed to a range of views, expressed in a calm and egalitarian environment. Another way of reducing bias is to permit members who are not sufficiently confident to address the Assembly to have speeches read by someone else. This should definitely be permitted for those with a speech impediment or other handicap, and why not for anyone? Moreover, the use of professional speech readers is a useful measure against corruption (§10.9). In any case the Assembly will be far more representative than our present elected parliaments are.

To avoid this danger of bias, some authors suggest that all proposals should be voted on _without debate_ , after the arguments for and against are presented to the Assembly, either by "acknowledged experts" or by "advocates for" and "advocates against" the proposal. All proposals are presumed to be binary, that is, members vote either "yes" or "no". Obviously, under this system the Assembly will NOT have control over the agenda. Some sortition advocates call for a new body to be chosen by lot for each proposal, and to be dismissed after the decision is taken.

There are a number of disadvantages to the exclusive use of these "mute moots". In the first place it is not certain that this approach would ensure that the Assembly is perfectly representative at the moment of voting. Is it feasible to impose silence on the members? Interjections, catcalls, laughter and groans may all strongly influence hearers, but how do you prevent them? How do you isolate several hundred members when they are out of the Assembly? The hearings of even relatively simple proposals might take several days, and it will not be possible to stop members from discussing proposals or haranguing other members in the cafeteria or over dinner. It is also impossible to isolate members of an Assembly – whether elected or chosen by lot – from discussion and comment by outsiders. Media campaigns, TV discussion forums, editorials in journals, the neighbour over the back fence, pub pundits, husband or wife... all can influence members. Social media – Twitter, Facebook, YouTube videos and the like – also may have enormous influence. and the "information" they present is often misleading. To pretend that by preventing discussion in the Assembly one can isolate members from being influenced is quite unrealistic.

The manner of presenting opposing arguments also poses problems. If "acknowledged experts" are used to present the pros and cons of each question, we must ask who chooses the experts. If they are chosen by the peer group, that is to say, other experts, then there is a strong probability that only the conventional, dominant view will be heard and not minority or radical opinions. If the experts are chosen in some other manner, there is still no clear way to ensure that the choosers will be impartial, and it is obvious that whoever does the choosing will have a great deal more power to influence the Assembly than a simple member, however eloquent.

The "opposing advocacies" method might seem fairer, but the question will arise of who should represent each side. Either a choice must be made, or the "advocates" must be allowed to select themselves. If the former method is used, who makes the choice? The possibility of bias is huge: the gallery of experts could be stacked, or an incompetent or sarcastic speaker could be chosen deliberately to sabotage one side of the argument. If the latter method – self-selection – is used, that means anyone can address the Assembly. The danger of bias in the choice of experts is eliminated, but a worse danger looms, that a long series of speakers could make such long addresses ("filibusters" in American terminology) that a vote could never be taken. (This difficulty does not apply to the SIPCs, since they would initially call for only written submissions, but would be free to invite those interested to address them, or to answer questions. They would also be free to tell those appearing before them to finish their address.)

We cannot do without the specialised knowledge of experts, but with the best will in the world, experts are rarely neutral. For instance, no-one knows nuclear energy better than trained nuclear engineers and nuclear research scientists. But these people have a large stake in any decision regarding nuclear energy; if the world abandoned it, they would all be out of a job. More importantly, they would not have chosen the field in the first place if they had not been enthusiastic about it or at least favourable to it. The same applies to all fields. For this reason an assembly should be able to question the advice presented to it, and demand proof of any assertions made and the underlying assumptions.

Discussion in the Assembly has a number of advantages. It will permit the members to alter the agenda proposed to them by the Agenda Committee, and thus to schedule their work themselves. If they feel it appropriate to defer consideration of a bill they will be free to do so. It may be that a proposal would be better considered as part of a package with another proposal, or perhaps it depends on another measure and could only be approved if that measure is also approved. If the Assembly is condemned to silence some other method must be found of setting the agenda in a way that truly gives control to the _demos_ , and at the same time remains flexible. Some form of discussion is also required for members to be able to propose the setting up of policy committees, and for them to be able to question these and oversight committees.

Discussion of a proposal allows for much more flexibility than the rigid "yes/no" which is the only response that a "mute moot" can give. It allows members to raise objections to parts of a proposal, to question the underlying reasoning or the end desired, and to ask if there is not a better way of achieving this end. Members will be able to question the recommendations of the SIPCs, or to refer the proposal back to the proposer with suggestions for amendments.

Unlike the other sources of opinion, (who often have an axe to grind, or else are too lazy or too busy to look deeply into matters), Assembly members will at least have all the facts available to them, and the time to consider them. Those who express opinions which fly in the face of the facts can expect to be called to order by their peers.

How can we retain the advantages of discussion in the Assembly, and yet be reasonably sure that every decision taken is representative? First, we note that it is only if the vote is fairly close that we need to worry that it may not represent the verdict of the community. If only five percent of the members are effective speakers, and even in a small assembly of two or three hundred, that still leaves a group of ten or fifteen. It is most improbable that these speakers will all be of the same opinion, unless the Assembly itself is strongly on one side of the issue, and then their eloquence will change nothing. Otherwise, although the effect of their speeches may not be as closely representative as membership of the Assembly will be, any bias will be fairly small. Moreover, it will be difficult for members, however persuasive, to pull the wool over their colleagues' eyes with deliberate falsehoods, since the reports of the policy committee (together with the arguments of those who gave evidence to them) will be before the Assembly, and will provide ample ammunition for those resisting baloney. Consequently it is unlikely that the vote distribution will be much different from what it would have been in the absence of speeches. Now, if a proposal is approved or rejected by a large majority, it is unlikely that the speakers have changed the outcome: we may have a percentage vote of 75:25 instead of one of 80:20, or vice-versa, but the end result is the same.

So it is only with fairly close votes that the problem arises, and we already have a means of dealing with close votes: the setting up of a Temporary Assembly, as detailed in Example 4 (§6.4). There is nothing to be gained from speeches which address the whole Temporary Assembly, nor from proposing deferral or amendment, of a proposal, since discussion has already occurred in the Assembly, and presumably all options of amendments have been explored, so it is now a question of a simple "yes/no" verdict. On the other hand, small-group deliberations, with members assigned successively to several different groups, (§9.4) would probably help the members understand the implications of the proposal, and keep them awake and interested. Eliminating addresses to the whole house at this point allows the use of a Temporary Assembly much larger than the permanent Assembly, maximises the independence of the members' decisions, and gives the best possible chance that the Temporary Assembly will be truly representative of the population. If the Temporary Assembly votes in favour the proposal is adopted (§6.4). The decision of the Temporary Assembly is given preference because in principle, being larger, it should be more representative than the Assembly, if there is a difference between them.

All that remains is to decide how small the majority in the Assembly may be before a Temporary Assembly should be set up. If the margin is too low, there is the possibility that occasionally a decision will be made that does not represent the will of the majority of the community. If it is too high, then legislation will be delayed and will cost more than necessary. Although one can only make a guess initially, with time it will be possible to refine this: if the decisions of both Assemblies regularly differ by only a few votes, then the margin can be small; if there are large divergences, then the margin should be increased until it is greater than the largest disparity. Perhaps one might start with the "three sigma" number, which would give a minimum of 284 votes (to 216) for an Assembly of five hundred. Then, if ever the (percentage) difference between the Assembly vote and that of the Temporary Assembly is greater than this, the margin should be changed to 20% more than the greatest disparity over twenty years, or 10% more than the greatest over fifty years. It should not be less than the "three sigma" value, however, since this margin is necessary to allow for the statistical variations inherent in sortition.
**9.6** Groupthink

The term _groupthink_ , coined by William Whyte and employed by Irving Janis, is used in the context of decision making in management and government to describe a situation in which members of a group align their opinions to agree with those of the rest of the group. In layman's terms, they behave like sheep. [93]

Groupthink is of course not the only cause of bad decisions by groups, as Janis himself points out. A common cause is a dominant leader who surrounds himself with yes-men – Neville Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement is an example – or whose subordinates fear to cross him, as was the case with Adolf Hitler and his generals. However, these are cases where a single person has the final authority to make the decision, and so do not concern us here.

A different cause of bad decisions may occur when a group splits into two factions which become polarised, refuse to see any merit in the arguments of the other side, and work only to defeat each other, rather than to seek a good solution to a problem. The use of small groups for deliberation, with rotation of members (§9.4), should prevent this.

Janis described three antecedent conditions which favour groupthink.

  1. **High group " _cohesiveness_ "**

    * " _Deindividuation_ ": group cohesiveness becomes more important [in the members' eyes] than individual freedom of expression (ie it is more important to act as a team member than to say what one thinks, if this is different from other members' opinions).

  2. **Structural faults:**

    * Insulation of the group from outside ideas and influences.
    * Lack of impartial leadership (group leaders with strong views may prevent members from expressing opposing views).
    * Lack of norms requiring methodological procedures (there are no rules setting out measures to permit all opinions to get a fair hearing).
    * Homogeneity of members' social backgrounds and ideology.

  3. **Situational context:**

    * Highly stressful external threats.
    * Recent failures.
    * Excessive difficulties on the decision-making task (there may be no good solution to a given problem, or opposing and incompatible strategies may appear equally valid).
    * Moral dilemmas.

Although the predictive value of Janis's conclusions has been contested and although some of his conditions do not apply to juries, it is worthwhile to compare our larger groups chosen by lot with juries, in the light of his "antecedents to groupthink". [94]

**Group cohesiveness** :   
Juries may perhaps see themselves as a group distinct from others in the court: distinct for instance from lawyers, on one hand, and the accused (or plaintiff and defendant) on the other. They are neither injured nor injuring, neither learned and partial, like the advocates, nor learned and supposedly impartial, like the judge, they are not interrogated and not interrogating, not at their normal work, like court officials and reporters. They sit in their own special place, the jury box. It is not impossible that they see themselves as a cohesive group or team and that, under stress, group cohesion becomes more important to them than individual freedom of expression. Whether this is so or not for juries, it is impossible that a large group chosen at random from a diverse society will be cohesive; their backgrounds are sure to be too different to permit it. (More recent research suggests that group cohesiveness is not a strong predictor of groupthink)

**Insulation of the group** :   
Juries are instructed not to take into account anything they may have heard about the case outside the court. They may be forbidden to return home until the case is decided. There are excellent reasons for this, of course, but it reinforces the internal group dynamics. Policy committee and Assembly members will be exposed to any and all views expressed in the community.

**Lack of impartial leadership** :   
Jury foremen may be highly partial. Neither the Assembly nor the policy committees will have a leader (a moderator is not so much a leader as an umpire, and should be trained in impartiality), so the question of partiality does not arise. The fact that the person of the Speaker changes daily will prevent the possibility of his or her becoming a leader, and will prevent systematic bias.

**Lack of norms requiring methodological procedures** :   
In contrast with the formality of the court, what happens in the jury room is generally left to the discretion of the jurors, particularly to the foreman. In the case of the Assembly, the office of Speaker exists so that formal parliamentary rules for debate are followed. Although small-group discussions will be informal, within them there is one over-riding methodological rule: all members must be able to express their views. Dissolving and re-forming the groups is another strong rule that makes it very unlikely that any member will escape being exposed to different opinions.

**Homogeneity of members' social backgrounds and ideology** : This may well occur in the case of a jury, particularly when legal counsel can object, but also because the list of people eligible for jury duty may be unrepresentative. It will rarely occur in a large randomly chosen body, unless all members of society have the same background and ideology, which is improbable in any real human society, except on certain questions (eg we are all opposed to murder. For these questions, conformity is not a problem).

**Stress** :   
For jurors, there is the stress due to the unfamiliar, even threatening, court environment. Of course this will not apply to members of the Assembly or the policy committees, who will have time to grow familiar with their surroundings and will not be subject to the instructions of a judge. Juries are called to decide questions where (usually) only two answers are possible: "guilty" or "not guilty". Since these are the only two verdicts possible, one answer must be "right", and the other "wrong". If a juror is inclined to an opinion opposed to that of the majority, there may be a tendency to think "If they all believe that, they are probably right and I must be wrong, there must be something that I'm not seeing."

The gravitas of court proceedings is calculated to instil in juries a sense of the high importance of their decisions, and jurors are made aware that trials are expensive affairs, and that if agreement is not reached, there will be a retrial. This leads to a feeling in a dissenting juror that he or she must fall into line. Most jurors do not enjoy having to make a decision, and most are paid a great deal less than they normally earn. Jurors know that their colleagues would probably prefer to be at work or at the beach. So failure to agree punishes the whole "team jury", as well as "wasting" public money.

All this constitutes strong pressure on the jury to conform, as Dawkins notes. None of this applies to Assembly or policy committee members.

Time pressure may exist for an Assembly, depending on the circumstances, but it will not be possible for self-appointed "mindguards" to use it to control other members' thinking. [95] In any case, time pressure will not be more present than it is for an elected parliament, and it will not apply more to members who have a minority opinion than to those who share the opinion of the majority. In the Assembly, members will probably not know until the vote is counted whether they are in the majority or a minority.

**External Threats and Recent Failures** :   
Presumably these do not apply to juries. They may well apply to a parliament, whether elected or chosen by lot. For instance, a prior bad decision which has led to a crisis, or the presence of a hostile army on the border might well lead to serious errors of judgement.

**Difficult Decisions and Moral Dilemmas** :   
These may apply both to juries and governments. Where time permits, the use of SIPCs, and the input from outside sources should lighten the load for the Assembly, and make sure that all alternatives get considered.

**Groupthink Outside the Courtroom – Hierarchies and Aspirations** :   
In many cases of groupthink, members of the group belong to a hierarchy. Sometimes it is a very formal one, as in a military environment where group members have a defined rank prominently shown on their uniform; sometimes it is less formal, where it is a matter of seniority or prestige. In these situations it is likely that lower-ranking or junior members will show excessive deference to the views expressed by higher ranking or senior members. Voicing an opinion that conflicts with the views of a superior may be fatal for the inferior member's prospects of promotion; in a technical or industrial context, openly disagreeing with a more distinguished colleague can result in ridicule, loss of respect by others, and diminished chances of advancement.

In a policy committee or in the Assembly itself there may chance to be a member who is particularly knowledgeable in a matter under discussion, but this will be rare. With no hierarchy, no pressure to arrive at a unanimous decision, and no possibility of rising or falling in grade, other members will have little reason for undue deference.

It remains that it is extremely important that members should make independent decisions when voting, the quality of the laws made by the Assembly depends on it. In spite of the arguments I have advanced above that the Assembly and the policy committees will not behave like juries, I would be in favour of the words " **THINK FOR YOURSELF** " or similar being written in letters of gold on the Assembly wall, over the Speaker's chair. Perhaps the members might swear a new version of the Heliastic Oath [96] including the words "I swear to use my own judgement, and not to blindly follow the ideas of others."

We have said that voting in the Assembly should be secret in order to prevent corruption. This secrecy should also prevent members looking over their neighbours' shoulders and copying their vote. 
**9.7** Election of the Speakers and the Agenda Committee

After reading a vigorous denunciation of elections the reader may be surprised at the suggestion that election be used to choose the Agenda Committee and the Speakers. However, the numbered criticisms given in Chapter 1 apply to elections in such large bodies as we find in nations and states, and not to small bodies where it is possible for all members of the population to know each other sufficiently well. We may take the upper limit for adequate knowledge to be around 150 persons, though obviously a smaller number would tend to better acquaintance. [97]

Why should we prefer an election for the Agenda Committee and the group from which the Speakers are drawn? If sortition were used, there is always a small chance of getting one or two truly incompetent or ill-intentioned persons. In the large body of the Assembly they could do little harm, as they would be in a very small minority. However, in a small body of, say, ten members, one or two members who were incompetent, hostile to, or not respected by their peers could be quite disruptive. In the position of Speaker, the disruption would be worse, although limited by the fact that each Speaker holds the office for one day only.

In this case where the fifty (say) most senior members of the Assembly elect the forty (say) most competent from amongst themselves, the disadvantages of elections disappear: we have a situation like that of a small club. Referring to the numbered list of failings in the first part of this essay, we can note that here there is no possibility of fraud (§1.1, §1.23), and members are free to choose whomever they please amongst their colleagues (§1.2). No election campaign is required (§1.4, §1.5), there is no need for finance (§1.2, §1.3), no need to be elected to keep one's employment (§1.3), no parties (§1.4, §1.13), no policies, so no need for compromise (§1.7). After four and a half years of working together the members will know each other well (§1.6, §1.9, §1.17), and consequently can make a reasoned choice. Votes will of course count equally (§1.12). The representation problems disappear (§1.14, §1.15, §1.20), since there is no representation. The mathematical problems (§1.16) lose their importance because it is merely a matter of selecting a sufficient number of competent people, not of ordering preferences and because the power that these people hold is very limited.

The reader who cares to examine the list of defects of elections given above will see that the remaining defects (§1.6, §1.8, §1.11, §1.19, §1.20, §1.21, §1.22, §1.24, §1.25, §1.26) simply do not apply.

Although it is a complete misnomer, I have adopted the word "Speaker" as used in elected parliaments rather than "President" or "Chairman" to avoid suggesting that the holder of this post has a higher status or rank than that of other members of the Assembly.
10 – Theoretical and Practical Considerations
**10.1** Athens

Proponents of sortition usually refer to the fact that it was used in Athens, and sometimes use the Athenian constitution as a yardstick for evaluating other proposals. There is no attempt here to reproduce or imitate the Athenian democracy, which had several features which would now be considered objectionable, among which are:

  * The exclusion of the majority of persons living under the control of the government from any say in that government. One can argue about the relative numbers of adult male citizens, adult female citizens, metics ( _metoikoi_ , foreigners living and working in Athens), children of citizens, and slaves, but clearly the adult male citizens were a small minority of those affected by the laws which they alone could vote on. If the Athenian constitution can be considered democratic amongst adult male citizens, amongst all those who were subject to its laws it was oligarchic.
  * The lack of separation of justice and legislature. Assembly members voted on lawsuits brought against individuals, and on proposals for laws.
  * Ostracism. It was not necessary to commit a crime to be ostracised and exiled, merely to be feared. 
  * _Dokimasia_. This was an examination, not to determine whether a citizen was competent, but whether he was formally eligible for office, and if so, whether his political views were offensive (usually meaning that he had oligarchic sympathies). 
  * The _graphe paranomon_ and _graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai_. These were prosecutions of a citizen who proposed a law or decree which, even though adopted, was later considered unconstitutional or contrary to the existing laws. The penalty might be a huge fine and loss of citizen rights. The prosecution was frequently political in motivation, and often sought to attack indirectly a person behind the citizen who had proposed the law or decree (who was often a "straw man", paid to incur the risk in place of the other). 
  * _Eisangelia_ , which was the denunciation and trial of officials (frequently generals), ostensibly for corruption, but often for political motives. [98]

  * Assembly members voted their own remuneration.

The Athenian Assembly was not really representative even of the male population. Sortition was used to choose the members of the _Boule_ (council), and of juries, but any male citizen could attend the Assembly. It seems likely that the Assembly members on any given day came primarily from the landless urban poor for two reasons: (a) Land owners from the country obviously had to travel further to attend, and in many cases were too busy working on their farms. (b) Payment for attendance meant that the urban poor could often earn more by attending and voting than in other ways.

Athens had been quite imperialistic even before the establishment of democracy, and continued so under it. She attacked other city states, and when successful either levied a heavy tribute, or else expelled or killed their inhabitants, and replaced them with Athenians, who received holdings distributed by lot (clerouchies). The hope of personal gain provided a powerful motive for Assembly members to vote for offensive wars. It was, indeed, a recipe for tyranny (in the modern sense) over Athens' neighbours.[99]

Sortition was also used for various purposes in the Italian republics of the Middle Ages (in Venice until the eighteenth century). Again, there is no attempt here to imitate these republics.

**10.2** Sortition and Juries

Those in favour of sortition in government, myself included, often mention juries. To counter the objection, expressed or implied, that "Ordinary people cannot be trusted to make important decisions" we reply "If ordinary people can be trusted to serve on a jury deciding cases of life and death, or life imprisonment, why should they be incompetent to make laws?" This argument is certainly valid, but it has the unfortunate effect of conflating juries and assemblies, and suggesting that all bodies chosen by lot will necessarily suffer from the same disadvantages as juries. This effect is aggravated by the use of the term "Citizen Juries" to designate deliberative bodies chosen at random for various purposes.

"Trial by jury must be one of the most conspicuously bad good ideas anyone ever had..."

So begins an essay by Richard Dawkins. [100] Why are juries preferred to a single judge? he asks. Not because they are wiser or more knowledgeable or more logical in their thinking. They are preferred because they are more numerous. Twelve heads are better than one because they represent twelve assessments of the evidence.

"But for this argument to be valid, the twelve assessments really have to be independent. And of course they are not... In practice, as is well documented... juries are massively swayed by one or two vocal individuals. There is also strong pressure to conform to a unanimous verdict, which further undermines the principle of independent data."

A well-known example occurs in the Sidney Lumet film _Twelve Angry Men_. [101] A notionally innocent person is acquitted, in spite of the apparently damning evidence against him. One perceptive and stubborn juror persuades the others that there is not, in fact, proof beyond reasonable doubt, so right overcomes wrong, there is a happy Hollywood ending, and American justice triumphs after all. (Personally, I wouldn't mind betting that for every perceptive juror who sticks to his guns and defends the right there are a dozen – or many more – who acquiesce with the judgement of the majority).

_Twelve Angry Men_ is fiction, of course. But in real life the University of Michigan Law School "National Registry of Exonerations" has registered 1927 exonerations of persons wrongfully convicted since 1989 in America alone, and that number is increasing. [102] The total number of wrongful convictions is surely much higher, though often the fault lies not with the jury but with false confessions or irregularities in the trial, perjury for instance.

There are also wrongful acquittals. In Australia in 1991 a former head of a notoriously corrupt state government was tried for perjury and corruption. He escaped conviction, to universal stupefaction. (There had been a commission of enquiry into corruption in his government, and sworn evidence of his involvement in bribery). Some time after the trial, one or two of the jurors talked to the media. It seems the jury were all convinced of his guilt, except for the jury foreman, a young man who was a fanatical member of the former politician's party and of a group formed to support him in his legal troubles. (The prosecution dropped the ball here; he could have been excluded). After a period of deliberation (reportedly mostly harangues by the jury foreman), one other member of the jury threw in the towel, and the trial was aborted because of the hung jury.

Will assemblies and policy committees chosen by lot be subject to the same failings as juries? Surely not, for several reasons: first, because there will be no pressure on members for unanimity in decisions. In an assembly of several hundred, unanimity is almost impossible anyway. In the case of the policy committees, what is required is the presentation of _all_ evidence and views on the subject under consideration. Since the aim is to find differences of opinion, there should be no feeling in anyone's mind that by disagreeing a member is being disloyal, or "letting the side down" in some way. (Disloyal to whom? There will be no "sides" or teams with any right to demand loyalty in a randomly-chosen Assembly, or in a policy committee.)

Second, although it is true that some individuals will be more assertive or more eloquent than others, whereas in a small group such as a jury of twelve it is likely that one or two assertive, dominant or determined members will lead the others (as in _Twelve Angry Men_ ), in an assembly of a few hundred one is sure to get a larger number of tenors, who will not all think the same way. Argument between them will enlighten and perhaps amuse the whole assembly. (Indeed, this discussion in the assembly helps to parry one criticism of sortition, that half the members will have less than average ability. Those members who are a bit slow on the uptake can nevertheless be informed by the debate.) Small-group discussions can also provide an antidote to the unbalanced dominance of assertiveness and rhetoric, since the vocal few cannot be in all groups at once.

Third, generally speaking, in a criminal case, and when not asked to fix damages in a civil case, juries decide on questions that are binary, eg "yes" or "no", "A" or "not-A". The accused is either guilty or not guilty, there is no in-between option [103], although he may be found not guilty of one charge but guilty of another, lesser charge. In contrast, an assembly will decide on policy questions and rarely or never on questions of fact, and the issues will often not be binary. For instance, a proposal for a new high-speed railway, for instance, may have several possible routes, it may be built as one project or in stages, it may or may not be articulated with other lines or modes of transport. Again, aid to young couples seeking to buy a home might take several forms: a direct grant, government construction of cheap housing, cheap loans, subsidies to builders of suitable homes, tax rebates... Assembly members will be free to suggest such options, or to send the proposal back to the proposer and the policy committee for amendment. Neither the Assembly nor the policy committee is expected to reach a unanimous verdict, and it should be obvious to all concerned that the job of the policy committee is to investigate all possibilities, and to point out possible problems, objections, or better ideas. That is the reason for their existence; for them, unanimity is definitely not a virtue. 
**10.3** Opinion Polls and Sortition

Critics have sometimes conflated sortition and opinion polls or surveys, and said that sortition is not to be trusted, since surveys often do not accurately measure what they are supposed to. For instance, surveys of voting intentions often give a result which is not borne out by the results of the election. To answer this we should consider the difference between sortition, in which the members of a body are chosen as a random sample taken from the whole population, and the sort of sampling used in opinion polls.

**Sampling Error**  
Both are subject to " _sampling error_ " or variability between sample and population. As noted above, in sortition the representation, although close, will not be perfect unless sample and population are identical, that is, until all the members of a population are included in the sample. This error is certain to be less with sortition than it is in a survey, since it is very difficult in surveys to get a true random sample. To overcome this difficulty so-called "stratified sampling" is sometimes used. In this, those conducting the survey divide the population into "strata" (for instance "black", "white", "male", "female", "under 30" and so forth), and attempt to make sure that each stratum is present in the sample in the same proportion that one finds in the population. This will reduce the error, but not eliminate it, since it is impossible to be sure that those who are included in the sample from each stratum are representative of that stratum.

In addition, " _non-sampling errors_ " occur in surveys, but not in sortition. Such errors have been classified as follows:

**Specification Error**  
For instance, in a survey the question doesn't match what the researchers are trying to find.   
Question: "Will you vote for a candidate opposed to legal abortion?"   
Response: "No".  
If the researcher assumes that the respondent is in favour of legal abortion, that might not be the case: the respondent might consider that all the candidates opposed to it were unacceptable for other reasons, may intend to be overseas on the day of the vote, may simply not wish to vote, or may be ineligible to vote... Specification error can also occur with referendums if the voters do not fully understand the implications of the question they are being asked to vote on. As an aside, this is sometimes the intention of those who formulate the question.

**Frame Error or Coverage Bias**  
Some people are not counted, or counted more than once, or ineligible people are counted. Telephone surveys suffer from this because they don't include those without a telephone, or those who do not answer when called. Internet surveys only include those who have access to internet, who happen to see the survey, and who can be bothered to answer. Street corner surveys only include those who are in that location at that time, and so on.

**Non-response Error and Response Bias**  
Some people don't answer the survey, or don't completely answer. To this should be added the deliberately false responses given for any number of reasons: by those who are fed up with answering too many questions, or are grumpy about being woken up, or who just don't like surveys, or who fear that a survey will be used in some way to their disadvantage... There are also "top of the head" answers which differ from what the respondent would answer after even a few moments' reflection.

**Measurement Error**  
The classic case in surveying opinions occurs when the question influences the response. Compare: "Would you vote for Bill Buggins?" with "Would you vote for a man who has been divorced twice, has been a bankrupt, and has a criminal record?" Of course, this is an extreme and grotesque example, but it is possible for researchers to influence the response in a more subtle fashion, and indeed quite unintentionally. It also appears likely that voters are often affected by the published results of an opinion poll, and change their vote accordingly.

**Processing Error**  
This includes errors arising in processing the data, for example in arithmetic, in encoding, or in assigning weights in stratified sampling.

Again, since polls of voting intentions are always taken some time before an election, the results may differ from the votes cast in the election because voters change their minds between the survey and the election, for reasons other than the influence of the published results of the poll. Finally, when the survey and the election results are different, there is always the possibility that irregularities in the election have caused the difference.

It should be clear that the method of choosing an assembly proposed here – a true random sample from the whole population – does not suffer from these non-sampling errors, nor from changes of mind by the public, nor (above all!) from electoral fraud. Therefore it is quite incorrect to suggest that sortition will suffer from the defects of survey polls.
**10.4** Parties, Polarisation, and Sortition

I have said above (see §1.4) that political parties cause or reinforce polarisation in society, and in §9.4 I have considered the potential for reinforcement of polarisation in small groups, and suggested a means for avoiding it.. Is there any reason to think that in society there would be less polarisation, less animosity, with sortition? I believe there is.

Most of us, most of the time, just want to get on with living our lives and letting others do the same. This is the easiest way to get through life: we have enough to do with digging potatoes, changing nappies, performing surgery, mending the fishing nets or whatever else our livelihood depends on. We might have the occasional acrimonious discussion or brawl, but by and large, it's live and let live.

For social animals this is the most cost-effective way to be successful in evolutionary terms. Those individuals who pick a lot of needless fights, whether chimpanzees or humans, make a lot of enemies, put themselves at risk, lose a lot of teeth, and so are likely to leave fewer descendants than more tolerant, restrained ones. Evolution has tamed us, and continues to do so. At what times? Well, until some unpleasant individual or group finds it advantageous to cause trouble, and conditions are right for the trouble to spread. Usually, to get ordinary people involved, there's some underlying resentment or sense of injustice. Action on one side brings reaction on the other; people become polarised, violence breeds violence, until there is a state of hostilities which does not end until it cannot continue: for instance one side is annihilated, both sides are incapable of continuing, or some greater threat appears which makes the two sides drop their quarrel to face a common foe.

Now, what is the relevance of this to sortition and elections? Parties are inherent to the electoral system and there is virtually no elected government without parties. [104] It is almost impossible to get elected without belonging to one. Those few independents who do get elected are almost always ex-members of a party who have achieved enough notoriety to be popular in their own electorate, if not in their party. Now parties, whatever virtues they may possess, stress their differences with other parties, and condemn the policies and statements of other parties for no better reason than that they come from the other side. They pretend that their own policies are light and logic incarnate, although they are usually a hodge-podge of compromises. Throw in the usual personal attacks, the smearing and stereotyping of the opposition, the manipulation of statistics, control of the media if it's possible, and you have a powerful machine to make people hate the opponents.

Parties, in the sense of opinion groups, might continue to exist under sortition. Obviously Conservatives won't stop being Conservatives overnight, Liberals being Liberals, Sunnis being Sunnis, Shiites being Shiites, Marxists being Marxists, and Greens being Greens. However, in an assembly chosen by lot, the members (initially all strangers) start off not knowing who has what beliefs or prejudices. When such an assembly addresses problems like road rules, or the provision of life-belts at public swimming pools, or the standards to adopt for Class B electrical appliances, is there any reason to suppose that Conservatives will always vote as Conservatives, or Marxists as Marxists? If it meant that they could hang on to power by so doing, they certainly might, and this is what we find in elected governments. With sortition, where the members will be out of the parliament in a fixed time however they vote, and where they can neither be rewarded nor punished by a party, since (because of the secret ballot) there is no way of knowing how members vote, why should they follow party lines?

I suggest that most issues, and many of the most important, are of the hum-drum non-ideological sort that I have tried to exemplify. Where strong differences of opinion arise on these issues, they will mostly not be on the old ideological cleavages. Why should a left-wing power point be different from right-wing one? There may be sound reasons for it having round pins, flat pins, large pins, or small pins, but not Marxist or liberal pins. Even on contentious issues, such as a large dam, in an allotted assembly an environmentalist might be fervently opposed, while a Trotskyist, a neo-conservative and a moderate socialist might find themselves completely agreeing in favour of it, and vote similarly, although they are opposed in ideology. Equally, another environmentalist could well be in favour of it. Not so in an elected assembly, where the party line will almost always prevail.

This blurring of lines and allegiances must weaken the party system in the long run. One could object that not all issues will be as bread-and-butter as those I have mentioned. True, but it will be possible, in an allotted assembly, for parties – which we have in effect transformed into opinion groups – to make concessions on the clauses of a proposal without losing face. The platform or program of any large party cannot be reduced to a single issue. Some issues are "core", some are of less importance in the eyes of the party stalwarts. The core issues are not the same for all groups, nor for all members of a group, so it will often be easy for members of one group to make a concession that is not important to them, but which is highly important to another group; and this will be all the easier since the group will have no means other than persuasion to make people stick to its line and often no way of knowing if they don't. This should be a mechanism for defusing conflicts.

Who gains from promoting animosity? Where there are elections and hence parties, some parties and their members may gain from proposing policies that are deeply divisive. This has led some American commentators and candidates to cynically denounce others with milder views as being "soft on communism", "soft on terrorism", "soft on drugs", etc, which led to a rush to the right. In the same way, the charge of "fascism" has been loosely bandied about, offensively and sometimes quite unjustly, but often very effectively in electoral terms, and may have obliged the right to drop – or to hide – some of its policies. In an allotted assembly, where members cannot seek re-election, it is not easy to see how such tactics could function. Of course, furious ideologues might rant and rave outside the chamber, and affect the opinions of the public, to some extent, but parliament would be free to reflect and vote without fear and without favour, which would make the ranting much less effective than the ideological blackmail which we see now.

If you add this effect of "removing the advantage from promoting extremism" to the "defusing" effect and the "blurring" effect mentioned above, you will see why I believe we would see sortition reduce ideological divisions in society. 
**10.5** Policy Revision

I have touched on the fact that elected politicians may become "locked into" a bad policy. (see §1.21 above) It is not simply a question of damage to the ego, or the embarrassment of publicly changing their stance after several TV or newspaper interviews. There may be the inertia of a whole political and publicity machine brought into being to push a policy which was once thought to be important for gaining office, and which later turns out to be doubtful or disastrous. (Examples include climate change denial, the "war on drugs", and the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.)

Changing policy means that the whole team of bullocks: tame journalists and editorialists, other politicians of the same party, public relations staff, and grass-roots party members have to change direction as well. A large part of the public may need to be convinced, not only of the need for the change, but also of the politicians' sincerity in advocating first one policy, then another. Some sources of party finance may dry up overnight and other sources may have to be found. To make the change, some heads may have to roll, and they will not roll without causing political damage. All this is risky politically, and time-consuming.

An Assembly chosen by lot will not suffer from these disadvantages, of course. Members will be quite free to change their minds, and in any case, with a secret ballot, there is no need for anyone else even to be aware of a change of mind. This will permit errors of judgement to be quickly corrected, and policies which are no longer desirable because of changed circumstances to be altered, which would facilitate a "loose-leaf" approach to legislature. In this, the entire corpus of law could be thought of as being similar to a loose-leaf folder. Laws would be drafted in such form and language that amendments could be made in a way that parallels the removal and replacement of one or two pages from a folder, without invalidating the rest of the law.
**10.6** Accountability with Elections and Sortition

_Accountability_ – in the sense of the ability to sanction the party in power – is generally held to be vital with an elected parliament, indeed it is considered a sufficient justification on its own for the use of elections. The problem is that it just doesn't happen. As Terry Bouricius and David Schecter, discussing elected government in the US, say:

"Holding elected legislators accountable is crucial because elected legislators generally have different interests than the people they represent. Having one opportunity every 2-6 years to "throw the bums out," when legislators may vote on hundreds of bills each year, is an accountability mechanism that cannot possibly work." [105]

Because accountability is considered to be so important for elected parliaments, it is sometimes thought to be always necessary, and that either some means must be found to hold members chosen by lot accountable for their actions, or else that it is a grave and irremediable failing of sortition that it does not provide accountability. In Étienne Chouard's proposal:

"those chosen by lot... are supervised during their mandate and may be removed at any time"

and

"they are judged at the end of their term, and possibly punished or rewarded" [106]

We must ask who would have the moral right to supervise them, or to judge them afterwards? On what basis? What would be the criteria? Who would have any legitimate claim to find fault with their voting? Rewarded or punished how? Chouard does not answer these questions.

Clearly, since the vote of the Assembly will be that of the population, if the population had the time to intensively study and debate every issue, that vote must be legitimate. So any person or body finding fault with it will have special interests that are not those of the ensemble of the people. Such a person or body would have no moral right to overrule the Assembly.

Every member of an Assembly chosen by lot should be entirely free to vote as he or she wishes, without regard to the opinions of others. For this, a secret ballot in the parliament is necessary. As noted above ( §5.1) it should be illegal for a member to reveal how he or she voted, at least while still a member. This might perhaps be hard to enforce, but it has the advantage that the member would have a valid reason for refusing to answer questions by a domineering spouse – or by the pushy reporter with the microphone in the street.

One can only guess how "accountability" might be implemented, though we can be sure that it would find favour with those seeking to destroy democracy. Perhaps a tribunal (elected? nominated? if nominated, then by whom?) of "experts in politics" might be set up to judge members. The subjects of its hearings would of course be known in advance, and media campaigns would be launched to influence tribunal members, who would have every reason to fear for their reputations and safety if they did not follow the wisdom of the talking heads on TV, the shock jocks of pop radio, and the editorials and articles of the tabloids.

Members of the Assembly likewise would soon learn that they had no independence, that an honest vote in accordance with their own wishes, in addition to any sanction inflicted by the tribunal, could sentence them to a campaign of harassment and vituperation by these same worthies, and especially by the social media. Furthermore, since the voting in the Assembly could not then be by secret ballot, members would be liable to violence and intimidation by extremists.

Obviously, then, "accountability", in the sense of the liability of members to sanctions, is neither necessary nor desirable with sortition. It is in fact completely incompatible with it.
**10.7** The Mandate

One of the justifications claimed for elections is that they are the only mechanism by which the citizens give a mandate to those who govern them: "We can't just leave choosing our representatives to chance. When we vote, we give the winning candidate a mandate."

But who actually gives this mandate? Surely not those who vote against the winners. And not those who don't vote, for whatever reason. So it must be those who vote for the winning candidates? Suppose you vote in an electorate where your candidate wins by a handsome margin. If you hadn't voted at all, he would still have won. If you had voted for another candidate, once again, he would still have won. In short, your vote made no difference at all. How then can you say that you had even a part in giving that candidate a mandate?

Only if the other voters are so divided between candidates that your vote is the deciding one, can you be said to have made a difference, and then, of course, you are in a sense a "dictator", as the political scientists put it when speaking of this problem. In saying this, I've assumed a winner-takes-all, first past the post system. Is the situation different in a proportional or a preferential system? Not really. Most of the time, your vote makes no difference at all. And the statement that "we can't leave choosing our representatives to chance" – as though chance plays no part in elections – is just laughable.

**Overheard in a pub in Godelpus:** (yes, the names have been changed to protect the guilty.)

Two men sat down at the next table.

"I didn't catch what you were saying about a mandate" said one.

His friend took a deep swig of beer. "It brings back painful memories... I don't know if you remember when Harry Bolt got elected?"

"That was that very close election, wasn't it?"

"Very close. In fact he won by two votes on about the twentieth recount. Two votes in the electorate where I lived. Two votes, but that didn't stop him trumpeting that he had a mandate." He took another swig, and continued, imitating Bolt's ponderous, braying delivery: "In our democratic system, the majority vote carries the day. The people have spoken, and their choice has fallen on us. We have a mandate..."

"Well?"

"I still feel guilty about it, forty years later. You know that less than six months after being elected he brought in conscription and sent the troops off to fight in Asia alongside the Americans. _That_ was never amongst his campaign promises, incidentally. Five hundred of our men died, and more than three thousand were injured." He stared into his glass.

"But why do you feel guilty about it?"

"The day of the election, I lent my car to my brother Bob. He went off with three of his mates to shoot rabbits; one of them had inherited a property that was over-run with them, and the Council was threatening to take him to court, so they went off to blast the bunnies. The deal was that they would come back in time to pick me up and we'd all go into town together to vote. We were all dead against Harry Bolt, and we knew the election would be close. The polls closed at 8pm, so I was pretty furious when they still hadn't shown up at 7:30, and even more so when they finally appeared at 9:30, on foot.

"To cut a long story short, the fan belt had broken. Bob drove back most of the way without it – you don't really need a fan for cooling when you're going at a reasonable speed. But he got worried about the last long climb, and thought he'd stop at the bottom of the hill to give the engine time to cool down a bit. He forgot that with no fan belt the battery wasn't being charged, and he couldn't start the car again. They hitch-hiked home, and none of us got to vote. Five votes against Bolt that didn't get cast.

"So Harry Bolt's mandate was given to him by a broken fan belt on a twelve-year old Ford. Five hundred men killed, and over three thousand injured, by my fan belt."

"Well, that was bad luck, but come on, the war was hardly your fault."

"Luck !... I knew the damn thing was getting a bit ragged, I just hadn't got around to changing it. I didn't have much money at the time."

"But you can't just blame yourself. What about Bolt and all of his crew, and the people who voted for him? And even your brother was partly responsible, for stopping when he did."

"My brother... If that car hadn't voted for Harry Bolt my brother might still be alive. He was one of the five hundred".

**10.8** The Good of the Nation, Selfishness, Conflict of Interest

It is sometimes asked "How can you be sure that members chosen by lot will vote in a way to promote the good of the nation as a whole, and not just in accordance with their own selfish interest?"

We can make the obvious and facile reply: "What makes you think elected politicians vote in a way to promote the good of the nation?", but we need to consider the question of the good of the nation. What is it, and who is competent to judge where it lies? Can it be anything other than the aggregate of what is good for the individual citizens that compose it? And if so, what? If you argue that there is a separate "good of the nation" different from that determined by the aggregate of the individual wishes of the citizens (as determined after informed, thoughtful consideration), you are either arguing that someone knows better than the citizens what is in their own interest; or, what is much the same thing, that there is some external value: military glory, perhaps, or national honour, virtue according to the notions of the ancestors, or religious values, that should be set above the wishes of the living citizens. In short, you are advocating a form of _guardianship_ , you are seeking to put someone (yourself or someone else) in charge of the citizens, and so opposing democracy.

The original question also reveals a certain lack of understanding of the principle of taking a random sample. It is important that members _should_ vote in their own interest as they perceive it, or _as they see fit_. If they do not, the sample (ie the Assembly) will no longer represent the population. This does not necessarily mean that they should think only of their own narrow financial interest, however. For instance, a grandmother of eighty may be far more concerned with her grandchildren's interests than with her own. She may vote for a proposal for making tertiary education free, even though she has no intention of seeking a place in a university, because what benefits her offspring is more important to her than the increase in her own taxation that will be required. And this tendency of some members of the Assembly to further the interests of others will mirror a tendency in the population outside the Assembly. This should not really be called altruism, since Granny votes as Granny pleases, and in a highly reasonable way too, if she knows she will not live much longer, and has enough money for her own needs. Likewise, some assembly members may at times put such abstract ideals as those mentioned above before their immediate financial interest when voting. If that is what is most important to them at the time, then they are quite right to do so.

Consensus is not essential, but an arrangement as widely acceptable as possible should always be sought. Suppose, for example, there is a proposal for a new railway between A and B. I live in A and work in B, so I'm all in favour of something that will save me 45 minutes of heavy traffic twice a day. You live half-way between, fifty metres from the proposed route, so you will have the noise, and will have to use other transport to go to either town. Obviously our initial opinions will be different, for good reason, but perhaps concessions can be made which will cause one or the other of us to reconsider. You might agree to the railway if acoustic barriers are erected, if modern technology is used to reduce the noise at the source, and if you realise that the roads near your home will carry a lot less traffic. Even if in the end you are not in favour, you will still be better off than if the railway went ahead without measures to reduce the nuisance. On the other hand, I might be content without the railway if the roads were upgraded and an efficient bus service instituted instead.

**Conflict of Interest**

We noted above (§1.20) that elected members may have conflicts of interest. Will this not be true of members chosen by lot? Of course, each member will have some sort of special or personal interest, whether pecuniary or not. The assets of each member will not be the same as the median assets of the community, and their outlook and the issues that interest them will also be different. However, since their decisions are always _group_ decisions, and they are an adequately large random sample of the community, _as a group_ , they will represent all interests in the community.

Suppose that Mike Megarich is a major shareholder in Frackall, a company set up to exploit the technology of fracking (hydraulic fracturing of schist to extract oil and gas). Frackall wishes to drill its boreholes and inject its fluid directly underneath the City of London, and has been instrumental in getting a proposal before the Assembly which would permit fracking anywhere in the country. By chance, Mr Megarich happens to be chosen by lot to serve in the Assembly. [107]

"Conflict of Interest!" is the knee-jerk reaction. Well, of course Megarich thinks it's in his interest to frack beneath London. He stands to make many millions, if not billions. The risk to the historic buildings, to the infrastructure and to the environment may not matter greatly to him: even if the cost of repairing the damage is huge, he will still make money. He will vote in favour, and so possibly will a few other members who stand to gain from providing services to Frackall, or who will benefit from the cheaper energy. Probably, though, most of the assembly will say to themselves "Over my dead body!", and vote against it.

Ethically, should Megarich vote or campaign against it? Certainly not: if he did so the group decision would not be representative. If Megarich is in a situation of conflict of interest then so is every other member, and at all times. If the proposal had been to demolish part of the City of London in order to make a park, some members would benefit from the amenity, others not. Should those who would benefit vote against it because of the supposed conflict of interest? Again, certainly not, and for the same reason: it is important that the decision be representative.

What if Megarich is chosen not for the Assembly, but for the SIPC set up to examine the issue? On the face of things his voice might count for more in a group of fifteen to thirty – most of whom may not have anything to counter his ambition, acumen, and drive – than it would in the Assembly. But the situation will surely be well-known to the other members of the SIPC as well as to the Assembly. Is it likely that he will be able to bamboozle the hundreds of Assembly members, many of whom will be not merely suspicious, but utterly prejudiced against him? At the least we might expect the SIPC to get a thorough grilling by the Assembly members, at most it might be dissolved and a new one formed. This latter course might be a little unfair to the SIPC members, but at least we can be fairly sure that Megarich will not ride roughshod over the interests of the rest of the community.

Projects like Frackall's usually have some advantages. Megarich may be concerned only with the financial advantage to himself, but presumably cheaper energy would benefit many people, even if the benefits are greatly outweighed by the damage done. There might be some environmental advantage too, the oil or gas would be very close to a major market, so less energy would be wasted in transport.

The vote in favour of the project by Megarich and others merely reflects the fact that some people in the community would benefit more if the project goes ahead than if it is stopped.
**10.9** Corruption

Corruption in today's elected governments is extremely damaging, difficult to eradicate, and very common. I believe that sortition will greatly reduce corruption, if not completely eliminate it. To justify this claim I shall look at corruption in the three branches of government: the administration, the judiciary and the legislature.

The Administration

With an elective government, civil servants are under the control of elected politicians. This opens the way to corruption by politicians using their power to improperly enrich themselves or their family or friends; or to unfairly favour political supporters under the temptation of bribes, or under the threat of violence or blackmail.

This favouring of supporters is done in many ways, for example by:

  * Allocating contracts improperly.
  * Providing well-paid government jobs – or fictitious jobs – to friends or supporters.
  * Selling government property at bargain prices.
  * Reducing government services to make the public more dependent on private companies.
  * Granting permission to use government services on unduly favourable terms.
  * Granting permits or monopolies for certain activities (mines, exploitation of state forests, irrigation rights, fish farms...) in a corrupt fashion.
  * Permitting environmental degradation by authorising discharge of waste and spoil on land, in rivers, or in coastal waters.

It is also possible for civil servants to unduly influence policy by suggesting that initiatives proposed by the Minister might have unfortunate consequences for him or her at the next election. Sir Humphrey Appleby's subtle mastery of this technique was a staple of the BBC comedy series " _Yes, Minister_ ".

Under a government formed by sortition on the model suggested here, Departments or Ministries and their staffs are not subject to a politician, but instead are answerable to the oversight committee. Although this committee is subject to the Assembly as a whole, no individual Assembly member has any authority over it, or over the Department and its staff. The need for a politician to be re-elected disappears, and with it goes campaign funding provided with the intention of getting something in exchange. Unlike elected politicians, members chosen by lot will not need to repay political support. So both the means of corruption, and the temptation or need to be corrupt disappear. Similarly, the opportunity for civil servants to manipulate ministers vanishes. Likewise the need to hide the failings of the administration disappears, and with it the need to manipulate statistics, to trumpet good results, and to avoid scandal by not releasing the bad ones, or by releasing them when the public is distracted by holidays or major sporting events.

It might be suggested that an oversight committee could abuse its powers in the same way as elected politicians. However, this loses sight of the fact that it will not have the same motivation to repay a political debt, that all its members would have to act in concert, and that it will not be easy to get agreement for a risky proceeding between people of different backgrounds, amongst whom there will always be some who are recently chosen, and so unknown to the others. Unlike a political party which may attempt to save one of its own in order to avoid scandal, neither their fellow-members nor the Assembly would have any reason to tolerate even a suspicion about the probity of an oversight committee member. Whistleblowers in the civil service and elsewhere would not have to fear corrupt or unfair treatment from members either of the Assembly or of the oversight committee, none of whom have any individual power to punish them and who are subject to automatic retirement in a short time.

The Judiciary

The more respectable elective governments have measures intended to avoid corrupt acts by the judiciary. In addition to these a government formed as described above would add the rotation of all judges, including senior ones.

The fact that judges would not have any power to declare laws unconstitutional removes the possibility of a "back-door" recourse against a decision of the Assembly, such as undoing a law by bribing or otherwise influencing a judge or two.

The Legislature

Let us first consider corruption initiated by a member to serve his or her own ends, and corruption within a government or party. In an elected parliament, corrupt members may:

**1** Abuse their power over the administration, as discussed above.

**2** Use their position within a party or faction to persuade or pressure their colleagues to act corruptly in their stead: ("Joe Lemaffieu is a friend, I'd like to see him get that mine permit")

**3** Use their position to gain further power: ("I'll back your bid for the leadership against Harry, if you'll make me Minister for Transport"). This is not normally considered corrupt, but it amounts to advancing oneself in disregard of and probably at the expense of the public interest. In those countries where dual or multiple mandates are permitted, party support for an additional lucrative position can be given or sought as a reward for services rendered.

**4** Vote against their own election promises, or against the clear wishes of the majority, in order to further their own interests. An example is given in §1.7 above.

In the model of government proposed here, a member chosen by lot will have no power over the administration, so items (1) and (2) are simply not possible. Since there is no party structure, no leadership, and no plum jobs, item (3) disappears also. What about item (4)? Members chosen by lot do not make electoral promises, and as we have seen, in order to maintain the representativity of the Assembly, members are _expected_ to vote in their own interest as they see it. So this form of corruption also disappears.

Now let us look at corruption at the behest of another person or organisation. It is sometimes suggested that that it will suffice to corrupt one or only a very few members of an Assembly to change its decisions, and that members chosen by lot will be particularly easy to bribe. Sometimes the words "because of their inexperience" are added, though why inexperience or the fact of being chosen by lot should automatically make members less honest is never explained.

The first factor which renders corruption attempts difficult is the anonymity of Assembly members. At the time of each half-yearly drawing of lots for the Assembly, the names of those drawn will be public knowledge. However, there are many bodies whose members are chosen in the same way, and it will be convenient for them all to be drawn at the same time. If there are (for instance) 200 departments and similar bodies, each with an oversight committee of ten, and a similar number of policy committees and subcommittees, with an average membership of ten, then the half-yearly draw would need to fill 450 places (one tenth of 4 500); and it will be necessary to draw perhaps ten percent more to allow for deaths, illness and so forth, which means a total draw of about five hundred persons every six months. There is no compelling reason for the fifty who are drawn for the Assembly to be identified as such, so even a next-door neighbour who knows that a person has been drawn need not know whether it is for the Assembly, or – much more likely – one of the committees.

There is a second safeguard against corruption which can be used. I have suggested above (§9.4) that members should be assigned seats at random every time they enter the Assembly. If they are routinely referred to by their seat number (as "member 269" or whatever), and if, in addition, formal speeches are read by professional speech readers (§9.5), it will be impossible to identify them by voice.

To examine further the danger of corruption, let us imagine that an unscrupulous person – call him A Crooke – wishes to make the Assembly pass a bill, and is prepared to bribe or threaten members in order to get his way.

Obviously, if the bill is a popular bill, so that it will be passed by a majority in the absence of corruption, it is pointless for Crooke to do anything. Similarly, if it is clear that the bill will be rejected by a large majority, bribing or threatening members is unlikely to succeed; it may reduce the majority, but it won't prevent the bill being rejected.

So it is only in the case where the result is uncertain that dishonest methods will be useful to Crooke. Suppose that an opinion poll leads him to believe that the vote in the Assembly will be very close. Of course, he cannot know what the exact result will be, so he assumes that without his intervention there will be 250 votes for and 250 against. If a majority of 284 to 216 is required to avoid setting up a Temporary Assembly, and Crooke wants the bill to be approved in the (permanent) Assembly, he must persuade 34 more members to vote for it. Since half of the members will vote for the project for their own reasons, it will be necessary to approach at least double that number, or 68 members. Members chosen by lot will be no more and no less honest than anyone else, of course, but since we don't know how honest anyone is, let us suppose that only one member in ten is honest – or afraid of the risk – and will expose any attempt to bribe him or her. The probability of _not_ being exposed is then (0.9)68, or 1 in 1 293: not very encouraging for Crooke! If half of the members behave honestly, the risk of not being exposed is(0.5)68, or 1 in 295 billion. If Crooke's estimate is slightly incorrect (suppose that without corruption 248 members are favourable so that even with 34 extra votes the total is less than 284), the bill will go to a Temporary Assembly, and Crooke will have taken the risk for nothing. To avoid that, he will have to bribe more members – say another ten – so that he has to make his proposal to 88 members, and the risk becomes even more absurd.

If Crooke waits until the proposal goes before a Temporary Assembly, although he will have a better idea of how many Temporary Assembly members he needs to corrupt, he will have very little time in which to do so, and certainly no idea of which members might be tempted by a bribe. Because of the variation in composition of the Temporary Assembly, to be sure of getting his way he will have to corrupt a number of members equal to "3 sigma" and approach twice that number: 94 for a Temporary Assembly of 1 000 members, or 134 for 2 000 members. The risk becomes astronomical.

Of course, these figures are given for the sake of example. Whatever the exact figures are, however, it would always be necessary to approach a large number of members, at very high risk, unless the number in favour in the Assembly is only just insufficient for the bill to pass without calling a Temporary Assembly. But Crooke cannot know this before the vote, and if that is the case, the bill will almost certainly be approved by a Temporary Assembly without corruption, so for no advantage whatsoever he will expose himself to a risk which is still not insignificant.

Furthermore, the secret vote in the Assembly will prevent Crooke from knowing if his bribe has had any effect. If an unscrupulous member has his own reasons to vote against the measure, there is nothing to make him vote as Crooke wishes, even if he does take his money. If the member is already in favour of the bill, Crooke's bribe will change nothing, unless the member decides to vote against the bill to ease his conscience. ("Sure I took the swine's money. It cost him a packet, and I voted against. Serves him right.") Threats, such as: "If you don't vote for the bill, something unpleasant might happen to your children" won't help Crooke either, as he still won't know whether the member votes as he wishes, and he will antagonise the member, who will be far more likely to denounce him than cooperate, and will easily be able to inform the Speaker by note without Crooke knowing. A postponement of the vote – which should happen automatically if there is a suspicion of corruption – will give time for the police to act.

It has been suggested that, rather than attempting to buy or gain votes by coercion, Crooke might try to bribe or threaten a member or members to speak in favour of the bill. In this case, we are told, he only needs to find one (corruptible) member who is a persuasive speaker, and a sufficient number of members will be convinced, will vote in favour, and the bill will pass. In this scenario Crooke approaches only one member, or very few, so the risk of discovery is much less. After the bribe or threat, the member makes the speech. Speeches in the Assembly will be anonymous, but Crooke could insist on a particular phrase being used which he can recognise. A large number of members are convinced by the splendid rhetoric of the corrupt member, the bill passes, and evil triumphs.

Or does it?

In the first place, if the method of small group deliberation is used, it is most unlikely that even the most stirring orator will have a disproportionate influence, since members will be exposed to a range of opinions in a setting which permits calm deliberation and quiet reflection. Secondly, although at the time of the drawing of lots, the names of those drawn will be published, Crooke won't know which of them are in the Assembly. Nor will he know the members' opinions, their rhetorical skills, nor their honesty. Really effective speakers are rather rare: we might guess at most about one in twenty. If so, and Crooke does not know which members are effective speakers — as he should not, given the anonymity of speeches — then to be reasonably sure of getting one effective speaker who would otherwise have spoken against the bill, Crooke will have to approach about forty members, and so the risk is again extremely high. Even if he only approaches ten members, and if only one member in ten is honest, his chance of not being exposed is only one in three; if half the members act honestly, his chance of not being exposed is about one in a thousand. But since each member cannot know how many other members Crooke has approached, and given that it would only take one of them to spill the beans, all but the rashest of members would consider the danger too great, with the result that fewer than one in two will accept, and the risk will be even higher. Again, any member approached can inform the Speaker without Crooke knowing. The Speaker should then inform all members by note, leading to a motion for the postponement of the vote and a police investigation.

Even if a member is too greedy or too terrified to inform the Speaker and the other members, and makes the speech, quivering and trembling, there will be other members who speak against it, and no doubt some who speak for it in all honesty, quite unaware of the corruption attempt. (Remember that it's only if the members are roughly equally divided that it's worth attempting to corrupt a member.) The Assembly votes, the bill is either passed or rejected, but Crooke will never know if anyone was in fact persuaded by the speech. He won't even know if the member he suborned voted for it. This is a very meagre and doubtful gain for a very real risk.

In any case, there are much safer and probably more effective ways for Crooke to attempt to get his bill passed, and some of them are legal. He could spend his money on an advertising campaign, or on an army of social media bots. He could pay a radio or TV "personality", or a newspaper editor to push his argument. He could approach known experts on the subject in question, and convince them to publicly speak in favour of the bill from a position of authority.

This brings us to another possibility. Suppose Crooke is not a person, but a large organisation, (a tobacco company for instance). There are probably a number of experts either on the staff, or who have been funded by the company, or who can be persuaded by the lure of a research grant, or even blackmailed: ("We know you massaged your results in your paper on XYZ; it wouldn't look too good if we pointed out that the photos have been retouched"). The experts would not have to stand up and boldly say "Smoke more, it's good for you", they could use well-honed techniques to cast doubt on research embarrassing to the company, and to overplay results that could be taken to be in its favour. Crooke Inc might then set them to testify to a policy committee, and convince the members of the policy committee to favour Crooke's interests in their report to the Assembly.

This is a very real danger: this sort of thing is common at present. The scandals concerning leaded petrol, asbestos, and of course tobacco are obvious examples. Large multinational companies spend massively on research, and scientists are dependent on funding to pursue their careers. It is well-known that bias exists in published papers, and much of that bias exists because research results that run counter to the interests of the corporation funding the research are not published.

Our salvation here is that other experts in the field, those who are not bound to the large corporations, will be called on by the policy committees and the SIPCs to testify, and their testimony is likely to be far more convincing than that of the tame experts with known conflicts of interest tip-toeing around awkward topics. If the government has enough good sense to allocate sufficient funds to science, researchers will be less at the mercy of large corporations than at present. 
**10.10** Tyranny, Defence, Spies, and Treaties

So far, in talking of tyranny, we have considered only tyranny originating within the political system. Tyranny can of course be imposed from the outside by a foreign power, as the Nazis did in occupied Europe, the Soviet Union did in its satellite states, and as the US has done in Chile and elsewhere in South and Central America, and the colonial powers did throughout the world. There are also ways in which tyranny can be imposed from outside the political system, but within the country, by organised crime groups or bands of ideologically-motivated thugs, for instance. Usually, however, this is associated with corrupt politicians.

It is totally unrealistic to believe that a state using sortition to choose its government could be sure of not being attacked or involved in war, though it might be very unlikely to start one. Therefore it will be just as necessary for such a state to have armed forces as it is for regimes with elected representatives. It is also absurd to suppose that crime will magically cease. Therefore it will also be necessary to have a police force. Similarly, immigration and customs services will also be required.

All of these services will require some form of intelligence service to support them. In all cases, some secrecy will be essential, and for all services some surveillance of the civilian population will be necessary. And so, BINGO! It seems that in our virgin utopia we are stuck with the whole unpleasant bag of offensive weapons, military personnel eager for a chance to use them, secrecy, and spies who are so expert at and so fond of finding enemies that they find them everywhere, including under the bed.

Security Agencies

One of the greatest difficulties for a democratic state must lie in preventing the well-intentioned members of the security agencies from establishing a secret parallel agenda within the state, while allowing enough scope and secrecy for them to do their job of protecting us from genuine threats.

Does the co-operation between agencies of various nations mean that their agents feel more loyalty to their foreign colleagues than to the people and the government of the state they nominally serve? Recent revelations by Edward Snowden and others lead us to wonder who really has the power in the US and other "democratic" regimes. Certainly with the enormous capacity for gathering information that is now available to the various agencies there are huge possibilities for blackmailing individual politicians and also for influencing elections by selectively releasing information just before them. [108] It also appears that the enormous sums of money being spent on them in the US escape rigorous control. Perhaps the politicians find that it is just too dangerous to attempt to rein in the security services, as seems to have been the case in the days of J Edgar Hoover. In view of the failure to prevent the "September 11" attacks, and the apparent failure to anticipate the rise of the Islamic State, the US taxpayer – and others – may have very good grounds for wondering whether the money is well spent.

Might things be better with sortition instead of elections? The obvious dangers from the secret service and defence personnel, and the safeguards against them under sortition, are:

**1. Use of secret services and surveillance information by those in power to remove or discredit rivals or silence opposition**.

There is no reason for this to occur with sortition, since there is no-one in power and no-one in opposition.

**2. Blackmail of members by secret services.**

The possibility of the most dangerous form of blackmail is removed because members of the Assembly are not Ministers with control over a large part of the administration. (Blackmailing a high-ranking civil servant might be possible, as it is with elected governments, but should be more difficult because of the supervision exercised by the oversight committees.) The absence of re-election removes the possibility of promising to sabotage or to aid a member's election campaign.

In principle, it might be possible to influence the vote of a member in the Assembly, but this will almost certainly have no effect, since any proposal that has a majority of only one will automatically go to a Temporary Assembly. If the majority is such that one vote pushes it over the 3 × sigma limit (§6.4), then it is most unlikely that that one vote makes any difference to the final result, as there would almost certainly be a majority in the Temporary Assembly.

Any citizen who has an embarrassing secret is vulnerable to blackmail for money, but a member of the Assembly would be no more vulnerable to this than anyone else, and this is not relevant to the process of legislation.

**3. Assassination of members and putsch attempts**.

We may assume that the defence forces, all security agencies and police forces would each have an oversight committee, and that there would be various policy committees covering their fields of action. It may be impossible to eliminate the possibility of assassinations or coup attempts entirely, but:

  * Secret service and defence personnel would be free to make their private concerns known to the Assembly and to relevant policy committees. There would be no political motive for the Assembly to disregard advice that required action, as there may be with elected ministers. This might remove any frustration they feel that account is not being taken of information they provide.
  * Those who engage in an illegal action could not expect to be protected, since the random process of selection of members of the Assembly, the oversight committees and policy committees, and the fact that they are regularly replaced, would make it difficult to secure the complicity of a member, and in any case, individual members would have no power to protect an offender.
  * Close supervision by the oversight committee, as well as cooperation in achieving legitimate objectives, might permit the attitudes of personnel to be known. 
  * The absence of an executive Head of State will remove a vulnerable concentration of power. It will be harder to cut off five hundred heads than one.
  * There would be little popular support for a putsch.

**4. Unauthorised initiatives**

Secret services and Defence personnel who believe they know better than the government initiating actions designed to force the government's hand or to embarrass it.

It may happen that Secret services and Defence personnel believe they know better than the government and initiate actions designed to force the government's hand or to embarrass it. The first three considerations given under item 3 above (freedom to inform the Assembly, lack of immunity and close supervision) also apply here, and should reduce the risk.

**5. Empire building**

The oversight committee should be able to keep empire building in check by closely following expenditure and requests for budget allocations. The assembly itself, when making the budget, will limit expenditure. No-one will be in a position to set up a secret "slush fund" of any magnitude which escapes the control of the oversight committee and the Assembly.

It would not be surprising if security professionals were at first very wary of telling all their little secrets to a government whose members are regularly replaced. From their point of view such a government must look like a security disaster. However, with an elected government there is the problem (from the spies' point of view) that what they tell the Prime Minister and the Cabinet or the Senators today is known by the ex-PM, ex-Ministers and ex-Senators tomorrow, and sometimes by their spouses and partners, some of whom may be disgruntled, and who would pose at least as great a security risk as members of bodies selected by lot.

It would be a simple matter to swear to secrecy the members of the oversight committees and the policy committees, and the Assembly, if necessary. Such an oath would have no more and no less force than at present with elected governments.

To put fears for security in perspective, it is reported that in the US some 5 million people have security clearance. [109] Even if this figure is exaggerated tenfold, adding a few Assembly and policy committee members and a smaller number of oversight committee members seems a small extra risk.

Treaties

Treaties may seem a strange thing to consider in the context of tyranny, but they can have implications which are not foreseen at the time they are made, and which can be disastrous for future governments and their citizens. The network of treaties in Europe before the Great War are a case in point. Treaties are a form of tyranny in which a government ties the hands of future governments. The treaty establishing Hong Kong as a British territory, the treaty leasing Guantanamo Bay to the US, and the treaties establishing the Panama Canal zone and British and French control over the Suez Canal are all treaties bitterly resented by later governments. The fact that these treaties were imposed on governments that were not democratic in any sense is of course irrelevant.

The way in which treaties are agreed at present is often dubious. When the draft European Constitution was rejected by referendum in France and the Netherlands, the basic provisions were instituted by amending the Treaty of Maastricht, and by the new Treaty of Lisbon. This is a clear case where the manifest wishes of the people were circumvented by politicians in an "arbitrary exercise of power", to use the words of the Oxford Dictionary article on "Tyranny". The lack of transparency and of public participation in the negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is also seen as tyranny by many. Even a US senator complained:

"The majority of Congress is being kept in the dark as to the substance of the TPP negotiations, while representatives of U.S. corporations – like Halliburton, Chevron, PHRMA, Comcast, and the Motion Picture Association of America – are being consulted and made privy to details of the agreement." [110]

If Ron Wyden, (Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee's Subcommittee on International Trade, Customs, and Global Competitiveness) does not or did not know what is going on, what hope have the rest of us? If even Congress is being kept in the dark, then what sort of "democracy" is this? [111]

Treaties are a problem for the theory of democracy. Ordinary laws can be made and unmade, but it can be very difficult to tear up a treaty, because of the reaction of the other party or parties. As we have said, treaties also bind future generations, who are not able to take part in the decision. Yet treaties are sometimes necessary. We already have many international agreements, for instance on safety at sea and in the air, on nuclear proliferation, and on the banning of chemical and biological weapons. As global cooperation becomes ever more necessary on issues such as the environment, telecommunications, and safety, more treaties will be necessary. When future treaties are proposed, it will be important to make the right decision the first time, in other words to be certain that the decision taken does truly reflect the will of the community.

Often it will not be possible for the proposer to modify the content of a treaty, especially if it is already in existence between other nations, so this method of avoiding close decisions may not be available. One could argue that there should be a "supermajority" (a minimum percentage in excess of 50%, say 55% or 60%), in favour before the treaty could be adopted, especially if the status quo is considered to be the "safe default position". However this is not justifiable in terms of equity, and in general one cannot be sure that the status quo is in fact the safe option. One way to deal with treaties would be to require that a Temporary Assembly be used in all cases, and that where the vote is closer than "three sigma" from equal votes on each side (with 500 members, that would mean between 216 and 284 in favour), that a number of Temporary Assemblies be used, so that a total of five or six thousand citizens are called. This would make it more likely that the decision finally taken was in accordance with the community's wishes, and not a statistical fluke.

In any government formed on the model proposed here there would no doubt be Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Each would have its oversight committee, and there would be several permanent policy committees in this area, and probably a number of SIPCs at any given time. Negotiations would be open and transparent, and in discussing proposed treaties members of permanent policy committees and SIPCs would have the advantage over civil servants that they would not risk their job or prospects of promotion for challenging the prevailing orthodoxy, or for expressing a point of view that was not popular with the hierarchy.

One might also hope that such a government would have the wisdom not to make treaties which completely tie the hands of future governments and prevent them from withdrawing from an agreement gracefully and without penalty.
**10.11** Checks and Balances

The omission in this model of one traditional kind of checks and balances – the sharing of power between various bodies – is quite deliberate, and stems from the heretical belief that this is more akin to a shovelful of gravel in the cogs of government, than to the precise regulation of a chronometer which the phrase is intended to suggest. In the case of the US, for instance, the two Houses of Congress, the President, the legislatures and Governors of states, and the courts can all put a spoke in each other's wheel, but does this mean that the sovereign will of the citizens always prevails? History suggests it does not.

It is not true, however, to say that there are no checks and balances in the model I set out here. The extensive use of SIPCs and permanent policy committees means that there will always be a well-informed body able to present the advantages and disadvantages of every bill proposed, thus permitting rational deliberation, and reducing the likelihood of the Assembly getting carried away by a rash burst of popular enthusiasm, and ignoring the facts. The ability of every citizen to propose a bill will also function as a check on past legislation, since a law which later is seen by most people to be a mistake can be reversed relatively easily. The oversight committees exist to keep the administration honest, and finally, the Salaries Board exists to prevent Assembly members from writing their own pay-cheques.

It is also quite deliberately that I reject the idea of a Constitution, in the sense of a legally binding document which is intended to constrain future governments, and so prevent abuses. My first reason is that a paper constitution is worthless unless it has the active support – not just lip service – of the great majority of people, including those in power. Quite often, some provisions of a constitution become outdated, and are simply ignored by the government, sometimes with the tacit agreement of most citizens. [112] Secondly, a constitution must be interpreted, and this task normally falls to the highest court in the nation. It goes without saying that the judges on this court are necessarily unrepresentative of the community at large; they may also be strongly prejudiced, and some constitutional interpretations have been widely regarded as perverted

As Robert Dahl pointed out, when discussing the the US Supreme Court, which is considered by many to be a bulwark of fundamental rights:

"Judging from the whole history of judicial review in the United States, judicial guardians do not in fact offer much protection for fundamental rights [...] [there] are a substantial number of cases in which the Court used the protections of the Bill of Rights, or the constitutional amendments enacted after the Civil War to protect the rights of the newly freed blacks, not to uphold the rights of those who were too weak politically to protect themselves through electoral politics, but quite the reverse. The victors were chiefly slaveholders at the expense of slaves, whites at the expense of non-whites, and property holders at the expense of wage earners and other groups. [...] these cases all involved rights and interests of genuinely fundamental importance...

"The US Supreme Court has not regularly stood as a bulwark against violations of fundamental rights and interests by congressional legislation ...]The Supreme Court inevitably becomes part of any national political coalition that steadily wins majorities in national elections [...] What the American experience indicates, then, is that in a democratic country, employing quasi guardians [the judges of the Supreme Court] to protect fundamental rights from invasion by the national legislature [...] does not provide a promising alternative to democratic processes, except perhaps in the short run." [[113]

Courts, when deciding a case, must decide in accordance with the law, and to do this it must be clear exactly what the law is. All human activity is subject to error, so there will be times when the law is obscure or ambiguous, and times when it appears to the Court or to the parties to the case that the law is contrary to basic rights. Therefore presiding judges should be able to appeal to the Assembly, as the final authority, to interpret statutes.

A persuasive argument has been made, by Alon Harel and Tsvi Kahana, for the "right to be heard" of individuals who believe that their rights have been infringed by the legislature or the civil service.[114] In the American context, this means judicial review of legislation, based on a court's interpretation of the Constitution, often in the light of preceding judicial decisions. The problems with this are:

  * As noted above, the grave lack of democratic legitimacy in that judges are not at all representative of the people.
  * Priority is given to the opinions of the dead over those of the living citizens.
  * A judge must attempt to decide what was in the mind of the Founding Fathers or earlier judges when they produced an inspiring but obscure phrase.

The key questions in selecting a form of government are: first, to decide who is sovereign – that is to say who should hold the supreme power by right – and second, how best that power should be exercised. The assumptions made here are that the sovereign is the demos, the body of all adults subject to jurisdiction of the government, and – since direct democracy is manifestly impractical, and hence representation is necessary – that a random sample of the demos is the best representative. If these assumptions are accepted, then it is hard to see any justification for handing power to institutions that are either not very representative (elected bodies), or not representative at all (courts).

There is one additional measure which would be worthwhile, but which I will not attempt, preferring to leave it to the Assembly: the composing of a Bill of Rights. [115] This should have moral authority as a statement of principles, which it will have if it is seen as being genuinely in the interests of all. It should not have legal force, since this would make it a de facto constitution, with all the perils of interpretation already mentioned. The composition of the text is a task well-suited to a policy committee, and in my view it should not be above review. At the present time many countries are instituting reforms to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sexual preferences, and it seems just that the rights of those with unorthodox orientations should be guaranteed. Yet it is unimaginable that a Bill of Rights written fifty – or perhaps even twenty – years ago would have included them. Similarly, a Bill written today or in fifty years time could be quite out of date a hundred years hence.
**10.12** Change and Adaptation

Bouricius and Schecter point to the need for a political system to be able to adapt to meet change. [116] In their proposal for a government based on sortition, they suggest a constitutional review every ten years. This is probably not necessary with the form of government proposed here. One advantage of the overriding power of the Assembly is that it has the authority to make changes in structure and proceedings that could become extensive over time. The exception is the power to fix its own salaries; I feel sure that most people would support this limitation.

One possible change is for the importance of the standing policy committees and the SIPCs to increase relative to that of the Assembly, so that most or all important decisions were taken by those bodies, with the Assembly tending to take on the role of a "watchdog", only meddling with decisions when its members were convinced that something had gone wrong in the process of getting submissions and examining the evidence.

I can see no harm in this, if it worked in practice. It would be a step towards proposals, such as those of Bouricius and Schecter ("Multi-Body Sortition"), John Burnheim ("Demarchy") and A Guerrero ("Single-Issue Lottery-selected Legislatures"), where there is no central authority at all. [117] [118] [119] If it proved to be feasible to do without a central government, and not to be invaded by hostile states or reduced to slavery by the rich and powerful, so much the better, no doubt, but my guess is that it will not be possible to go so far.

The simplicity of the model proposed here means that it is flexible enough to be applicable to all states from the very small to the very large, and also to regional and local government. Obviously a small island state would have fewer policy issues and fewer SIPCs than a large state, and the Assembly might also be smaller. The sizes of the various bodies, the length of the terms of office and frequency of retirement of members might all be varied in the light of experience without abandoning the principle of sortition. 
**10.13** Getting There

How difficult would it be to make a peaceful change from an existing government to one on the lines I have set out above? The answer will depend on the extent of popular support for the change, and the institutions already existing. In the developed world there is little chance of seeing such a change at the national level in the immediate future, the reaction of the media being one reason. In many countries the media are in the hands of a small number of owners who are hostile to any reform which might reduce their power. Editors often prefer to amuse their readers by ridiculing a new idea, rather than to present it as worthy of consideration, and journalists, like all of us, find it hard to open their minds to an idea which seems bizarre. However, it might be possible, in some countries, for a scaled-down version, similar to that proposed for the City of Geelong (Chapter 7), to be introduced at the level of local government. It would not happen overnight throughout a whole country; rather, one can imagine that in a small town suffering from a severe economic crisis with high unemployment, loss of population and more or less abandoned by the local politicians, that a group might be elected which decided to set up a town council chosen by lot and then either resign or else, if this proved illegal, retain nominal power, and enact all the decisions of the assembly chosen by lot. In a sufficiently small and insignificant town there might initially be little attention and no opposition from entrenched interests and the media. From some such modest start, the idea might spread.

Probably the best candidate for a "pure sortition" government would be a developing country with a good standard of education, currently suffering under an aging dictator or oligarchy, and where revolution is already brewing. I suppose I must stress here that I am not calling for revolution – not that it would make much difference if I did, since no-one is going to start a revolution to please me – but revolutions do happen from time to time, when an oppressed populace can see no alternative. Often the power vacuum resulting from the overthrow of the old regime is filled by opportunists who prove as tyrannical as those they replace. Sometimes the aims of the revolutionaries are far from clear in their own minds, and chaos results from quarrels between them. Often the call for elections proves disastrous because those who are best organised to win elections are those who are least interested in establishing democracy. If the street demonstrations of the Arab Spring had called for government based on sortition, instead of calling for elections, there might be some stable, though very young, true democracies in the region, and the perception amongst their citizens that at last they had a fair share in government.

Another possible way is by a process like the 2005 British Columbia electoral reform referendum (on whether to adopt a single transferable vote system instead of the "first past the post" system). In this a Citizens' Assembly was appointed to study, deliberate, and make a recommendation, which was then voted upon in a referendum.[120]

It is also possible that a sortition-based government might be established as a compromise peace plan in a country weary of a long civil war. If it were proposed by some mediating body, it might be very appealing to the citizens, if not to the heads of the factions.

At the national level, most countries, even severely dysfunctional ones, have some sort of civil service at least notionally providing infrastructure and services, and some sort of legal system, with a body of laws, and officials to enforce them. These could be taken over by the new government and modified as need be. Alternatively, the legal code of another country might be adopted and modified to suit. The only other requirement of sortition is a register of citizens, and this is not difficult to set up.

Given sufficient popular support, governments with a single Westminster-style parliament would be relatively easy to convert, it is principally a matter of replacing elected members of parliament with members chosen by lot. A full assembly could be chosen at first; of these members 10% (chosen by lot, of course!) would retire every six months and be replaced as described above. Until there were members with sufficient experience to form the Agenda Committee and the Speakers' group, a group of 50 or more might be chosen by lot, who would elect from amongst themselves the members to fill these posts. A policy committee might be used to study procedural questions until there were experienced members available. Federations would introduce another level of complexity. It would be desirable to convert both state and federal bodies at the same time, but this might be difficult in practice.

Much more difficult would be the conversion of countries with a presidential system, where the President has significant power. For these countries it is not simply a matter of minor tweaks to the constitution, but a complete rewrite. In the US, in particular, where the Founders made the Constitution particularly difficult to modify, and where it is held in quasi-religious awe, this would be very hard.

What is most needed for the adoption of this system is the widespread acceptance of its principles. It cannot and must not be adopted until a majority of citizens are in favour. I feel that this is a matter of time and education. Already a number of proposals using sortition to form a government have been made in the second half of the 20th century and in this century, and the idea is slowly gaining ground. There are great obstacles, of course; some very powerful people stand to lose their unfair advantages under sortition. We can expect it to be ridiculed by politicians, by big business, by the media, in short by all those who have a position of power under elected governments. But far more people stand to gain with sortition, and even many of those who see themselves losing in the short term may one day find that they are in fact better off with a fairer, more representative form of government. 
11 – Objections and Replies

• "This is a crackpot idea which has never been tried, and couldn't work. Elections are tried and tested."

Thank you. Elections are indeed tried and tested, and have consistently shown themselves to be less than satisfactory. Sortition was used in Athens and served its purpose for two hundred years, in Venice for much longer. It often happens that today's "crackpot idea" becomes tomorrow's orthodoxy: Wegener's theory of continental drift mentioned above is a case in point. More and more serious political scientists are coming to favour some form of government involving sortition.

• "Could you not get members in your Assembly who are not fit to govern, or even to be at liberty in a civilised society?"

Yes, of course, just as happens now, though probably less often. They would be in a tiny minority, just as they are in the world outside. The amount of harm they could do in a body of several hundred reasonable citizens would be very limited. And please note that individual members do not "govern"; only the Assembly as a whole can make laws.

• "But half of the Assembly members will have less than average IQ!"

Yes, of course. And half of them will have more than average IQ. Setting aside the question of the validity of IQ tests for predicting anything other than the ability to do IQ tests, when the facts are placed before them very few people are incapable of making a reasonable decision if they are given sufficient time. On the other hand, even very intelligent people make stupid decisions if they do not have good information, do not reflect before deciding, or let themselves be ruled by their prejudices. Group intelligence, as pointed out above (§9.3) does not depend so much on the members' individual capabilities as on diversity. Finally, we would be better served by members of modest intelligence acting in our interest because that interest is their own, than by intelligent rascals who do not have our interest in mind.

• "How can you be sure that members of the Assembly will bother to show up? And if they do, what's to stop them sleeping through every session for the whole five years?"

Members who do not fulfil their duties for whatever reason will be replaced. (It is for the Salaries Board to define just what "fulfilling a member's duties" requires.) As for those who doze off occasionally, it is part of the Speaker's job to ensure that members behave themselves. This could well include a call for a small quantity of iced water to be thrown over such offenders, from a silver bucket of course. Any resulting hilarity would help to keep other members awake.

• "What if you get a majority of extremist left- or right-wingers, racists, or religious fundamentalists?"

In a sufficiently large random sample, all tendencies will be represented, in the same proportions as in the public at large. It is virtually impossible to get a majority of people whose views are greatly different from those of the population as a whole; the odds are vanishingly small. On the other hand, if the population as a whole is, for instance, racist, then the Assembly also will be racist. Sortition can only permit the views of the majority to prevail, it cannot itself change those views. That should be done by reasoned argument (which might indeed occur in the Assembly).

• "To resolve complex and technical issues, you propose policy committees drawn from the general public, but naive members of the public would be incapable of understanding technical issues. Vested interests could influence them by using tame or corrupt experts to pull the wool over their eyes."

Elected governments commonly set up commissions of enquiry into technical matters, headed by a judge or former MP with no technical expertise. In our case, it is true that SIPC members would need to acquaint themselves with their issue, but that issue would be a very limited field of study. In the process of sorting and summarising the arguments raised by the public, they will automatically gain a familiarity with the subject which will serve them when they come to make recommendations. Standing policy committees, on the other hand, by virtue of their permanence, would have members who have had time to acquire considerable expertise in their field. Members of both would be independent, not having a vested interest, which is rarely the case with experts, as even experts with no financial interest tend to have an emotional involvement. For tame experts to influence members, they would have to produce arguments which would withstand public scrutiny. On contentious issues, (by definition) there will be other experts who will produce opposing arguments. If anyone can write to the committees, and be called to address them, then all those who wish to be heard will be heard, and the policy committee will decide which arguments are valid, much as happens in court cases.

• "Your system with its policy committees, oversight committees, and all the rest will be complicated and expensive, and decision-making will be slow."

The system proposed here is far simpler than the US system, or the British, or the French... in fact there is probably not a simpler system anywhere, except perhaps absolute monarchy. As for decisions, it would be a false economy to adopt a bad decision when a little more expense and time might produce a good one. Complex issues require detailed, non-partisan investigation. One cannot always have a simple solution to a complicated problem.

Elected governments can be extremely slow in making decisions and implementing them. I know of two airport proposals that have gone on for 50 years, and the first sod has yet to be turned. [121] No doubt there are others. And nothing could be more wasteful and futile than the current common practice of elected politicians of cynically calling into being a commission of inquiry, with no intention of following its recommendations, merely to take the heat off the government on a sensitive issue.

In the case of climate change and greenhouse gases, we have known for twenty-five years that a very serious problem was probable, yet little has been done even now. It is hard to imagine policy committees deliberately dragging their feet as elected governments have on this issue. In any event, the Assembly would be free to dissolve an ineffective or superfluous policy committee.

• "Will there be sufficient momentum to make any real changes when drastic reforms need to be undertaken? There might be a tendency to leave it all up to someone else so action is too slow or there is inaction, which could have terrible results. Who would have the will to undertake hard reforms?"

If reforms are needed, the desire for those reforms will be widespread in the community. This is axiomatic: the introduction of any "reform" that is not wanted by the majority of the community would be tyrannical, and so is most certainly not needed. If a majority of the community want a particular reform, a majority of the Assembly will want it too. Amongst that majority at least half will be more energetic and vocal than the average, they will initiate action and agitate, and the reform will be unstoppable.

How well do elected governments perform when reforms are needed? I have already mentioned climate change; here are two more examples:

In France women did not get the vote until the end of World War II. From 1919 onwards, bills in favour of female suffrage were passed several times in the _Assemblée_ (the lower house), including one in 1936 when the vote was unanimous, but in spite of popular support the Senate either voted against the bills or refused to consider them. (The Senate was controlled by the supposedly reformist Radical Party, which feared it would lose its majority if women – thought to be politically conservative – were allowed to vote. Could there be a better example of how elections can lead to natural justice, good policy, and a party's own principles being cast aside for political advantage?) The right of women to vote was finally given by an order signed by de Gaulle, at the urging of his wife, in April 1944, when there was no legitimate government.

Legislation passed by the US Congress outlawing child labour in 1916 was delayed by the Supreme Court until 1941, although it was clear that the great majority of the population was in favour of the proposed law. [122]

Could inaction possibly be worse with sortition?

• "Your system won't work because the Assembly members will be manipulated by the bureaucrats. They will be naive and unfamiliar with the bureaucracy and won't understand how bureaucrats work."

This objection seems prompted more by a prejudice against the public sector (or perhaps by over-exposure to " _Yes Minister_ "!) than by serious consideration of the proposal. To answer it, however: In most countries between 25% and 40% – generally around one third – of the working population is employed by the government. In addition there are very many people in the private sector whose work brings them into contact with the public sector every day. To suggest that these people are unfamiliar with bureaucracy seems absurd, and they will be present in the Assembly in the same proportion as in the community. As for the rest of us, we all have some acquaintance with bureaucracy, and many of us share your distrust.

More importantly, unlike elected Ministers, the Assembly members will have no direct contact with senior bureaucrats in their work, and a single Assembly member (who might have some fortuitous contact, at the golf club, for instance) has very little power. Any influencing of the Assembly as a whole would have to take place over very public, open channels: by recommendations to the policy committees, for instance. Of course, oversight committee members will be in contact with senior bureaucrats, but they have no power to decide on issues. Like Assembly members, they are rotated regularly and can not be re-elected or re-appointed, so it will be difficult to manipulate them: there will be no carrot and no stick available to the bureaucrats. After several years of observing the same small group of civil servants under their control, the senior members of the oversight committee will be well able to warn their junior colleagues of any tendency to play little tricks. In fact, manipulation of policy by civil servants is far more likely with an elected government than with the model proposed here.

• "Your system doesn't allow for statesmanship, or for those inspirational leaders who, though rare, do come along from time to time. This will be a government of the lowest common denominator."

Why do you want a leader? Why do you want to be led, and where? As soon as you have a leader, that is to say someone with more power than others, you have taken a step towards despotism. Moreover, there will be those who are jealous and who will seek to take his or her place. In other words, you can expect factions and strife.

Europe in 1914 was full of very able and experienced statesmen, none of whom wanted war, or at least such a war as occurred. (Not even the Kaiser wanted that). The actions of these statesmen, and the web of treaties drawn up by them and earlier statesmen, created the conditions which permitted a minor incident to cause a catastrophe.

My reading of a number of dictionary definitions suggests that "statesman" is only a flattering term for a successful or prominent politician, sometimes used with special reference to foreign affairs. A successful politician, in this context, we can take to mean one who succeeds in getting his way more often than his rivals. By these definitions, in early 1939 Adolf Hitler was one of the most successful statesmen ever. Moreover, many of his compatriots found his speeches very moving and inspirational. Is that the sort of "inspirational leader" we want?

What we need is not a government of a few brilliant or Machiavellian individuals who lead us by the nose, but one that makes decisions that are firstly, fair to everyone, and secondly, as wise as possible. An Assembly which accurately represents the population will ensure fairness, while access to all relevant information, calm deliberation, and the "wisdom of crowds" will enable it to decide intelligently.

• "What safeguards are in place in case the assembly chooses to change the way it is selected, that is, make itself elitist and thus invalidate its very premise?"

Any move to change the selection would necessarily make it narrower, that is, eliminate some class of persons in the community. That class of persons would be represented in the Assembly, and would presumably object, and would find supporters amongst other members. The terms and conditions of service of members of the Assembly are a matter for the Salaries Board, not the Assembly, so such an initiative by some members of the Assembly would be seen by the public (and hence by the Assembly itself) as being illegitimate.

At the end of the day, the only real guarantee is public opinion, just as it is only public opinion that can stop a clique of generals seizing power under our present elected governments.

• "You don't mention the rate of participation in government, although high participation is supposed to be one of the great advantages of sortition, and must surely be very important in a democracy.

If participation in the Assembly were the most important criterion of government, the best government would be one with 100% participation, and no-one left to do the work of other professions, on which our livelihood depends. Conversely, if productivity were the most important, the best government would have 0% participation.

Some critics have attacked sortition on the grounds that the chance of being chosen for the Assembly is very low, in this case about 1 in 10 000 for a state of 50 million adults. The objection is absurd, as the proportion is generally even lower with an elected government, since members are often re-elected, which means few new members enter parliament at each election. (For a country of 50 million adults, with a parliament of 500, in the course of her adult years a citizen might see 2 000 new members elected, giving a proportion of 1 in 25 000). Moreover, in the case of the model proposed, the criticism neglects participation by sitting on a policy committee, either permanent or an SIPC, in a Temporary Assembly, or on an Oversight Committee. (A very rough estimate including these is about 1 in 200, for the same population). However, the two greatest opportunities to participate, both numerically and by their value to the citizen, are the ability to propose a bill, and to make one's views known to a policy committee. _Every_ citizen can participate in these two ways.

Taking another view, one might argue that if citizens spend a great deal of time on the business of government it is a sign of inefficiency in the latter. How much time do we want to spend? Do we want to vote on the variety and colour of every flower in the municipal flower-beds? I certainly don't, any more than I wish to open and close the valves in my car's engine by hand: a camshaft does the job much better than I could. History (if we except Gibbon's "crimes and follies of mankind") is largely a matter of discovering ways of reducing human labour, first by using animal labour, then by mechanising and then by automating. From this point of view, a monarchy or an oligarchy appears as a crude and dangerous device for getting the work of legislation done, comparable to a capricious or drunken helmsman; an elected government is an improved but still imperfect device, still quite capable of running us on to reefs. In contrast, with the model described above, our "labour-saving device" is our own alter ego, thinking and acting as we would. After an initial period spent refining the laws, such a government might reach a point where, barring changes in external factors beyond its control, very little new law-making was needed. After all, there would not be the sort of party- or faction-driven policy changes we see now, and most people would presumably be happy with the laws that a representative sample of them had established. In that halcyon age those who do want a say in the municipal flower-beds will have their opinion taken into account; the rest of us could sleep, go to the beach, or work to enrich ourselves.

• "I don't understand why there is no need for any deliberation over budgetary allocations and priorities."

There is nothing to stop the Assembly deliberating the budget if it wishes, but my feeling is that deliberation could go on for ever and still not satisfy everyone. (Suppose there are 200 administrative bodies, each with about ten main budget items, and 500 opinions on all of these). Nevertheless, as mentioned in §6.2 there is good reason for calling the heads of departments before the Assembly and to permit members to question them.

Use of the median means that a member's estimate is essentially a vote. If it is above the median of the other members' estimates, it is really just saying "more!", if below, it says "less!". Either way, it can only nudge the allocation a little higher or a little lower. In the absence of major disasters or new items of large capital expenditure (in either case there would be deliberation at the time it became obvious that action was needed), and barring extreme inflation, allocations should be fairly similar from one year to the next, so for most items, the median of every other member's estimates is likely to be close to the value of last year's allocation, indexed for inflation (this value is labelled "Projected Allocation" in Budget Sheet 1). If you want to increase spending on a certain item, it usually makes no difference whether your estimate is 10% or 1000% above the median of the other members' estimates. Either the allocation will be nudged upwards by the same small amount, or (if a number of members choose the projected allocation as their estimate, and the median coincides with it) it may not move at all. Only if a majority of members want to raise this item above the projected allocation will it move, and then there may be a difference between your choosing an increase of 10% or 1000%, but the most you can raise the median is the difference between it and the next higher estimate. This means that there's no point in members expending ingenuity, eloquence and time in arguing with each other for a particular figure; the key words are "more" and "less", and the pleading can be left to the Department heads.

• "Most governments are bicameral. The Upper House or Senate acts as a "chamber of review" and serves to guard against unwise decisions made in haste, or under the influence of a dramatic event. This is surely better than your single-chamber parliament, which might be swayed by brief but strong emotions."

The usual historical reason for having a second chamber has been to protect minority rights, particularly "states' rights", against the "tyranny of the majority". The problem here is that this has usually been done by giving more weight to the minority's votes, and this comes at the expense of the majority's legitimate rights, as mentioned above (§8.2). Furthermore, the thorough examination of all proposals by policy committees, and the public participation suggested above will take time and should be sufficient to preclude rash and hasty decisions.

Nevertheless, there is a very simple way of incorporating a second House into the model proposed. This is by calling a Temporary Assembly for every proposal, and not just for those proposals on which the Assembly is nearly equally divided. As long as the temporary assemblies are drawn by lot from the whole adult population, and not from some sub-set, this would be perfectly equitable. Because the Temporary Assembly should be more representative (since it is larger), its vote would take precedence over that of the permanent Assembly – unlike the usual practice with Senates. The only disadvantages would be the extra expense, and the extra time necessary to pass legislation.

• "You don't give any space to grass-roots campaigns and demonstrations, but these are a very important part of democracy."

Grass-roots campaigns will still have a very important part to play (a) in proposing measures, (b) in indicating the degree of support for them, and (c) in providing information and views to the policy committees, and they may be far more effective in this way than they are at present.

Large street demonstrations of the indignant, chanting, pot-banging sort are generally a sign that democracy is not working well. Most people will not go to the trouble of demonstrating unless they are convinced of serious injustice in an existing or proposed law, or in its implementation. In principle, since the Assembly will have the same composition as the community, decisions made will mirror the "informed" wishes of the community, making demonstrations unnecessary. Where this is not so, the disagreement will have its root in the relative ignorance of those who have not been able to fully inform themselves of the Assembly's reasons for taking a decision. The decision made in full knowledge of the facts ought to prevail, so it is right that the Assembly should be more attentive to the reasoned arguments set out in the policy committee reports than to the chanting of slogans in the street. Your objection has the great merit that it points to the necessity of the Assembly giving the reasons for each decision, and the reasons why some arguments were rejected.

• "Other people who have proposed using sortition suggest using it in combination with elections, for example one chamber elected, and one chosen by lot. Why don't you adopt this more moderate approach?"

It should be clear from my catalogue of the failings of elections at the beginning of this essay that I am not in favour of any use of elections in forming a government. The only advantage I can see in keeping an elected chamber is that it might help when introducing sortition, by making the change seem less radical to a wary public.

In principle, any use of sortition from the whole population to reduce the power of unrepresentative elected bodies – and non-elected judges, as in the US – should be an improvement, but a great deal of care would be required in defining the role and powers of each chamber if the government is not to be unstable or ineffectual. While the chamber chosen by lot would have moral authority, without some real power – to veto legislation, for instance – the politicians would simply disregard it when it suited them. If it did have real power, most elected politicians would have a strong prejudice against the chamber chosen by lot, and would gain by suppressing it. The mass media make money from political scandals, politicians' gaffes, and the "horse race" reporting of elections; and the media moguls and the lobbies would hate to lose their power to influence politicians. So lobbies, media and politicians – perhaps the bureaucrats too – could all be expected to do everything they could to discredit sortition and get rid of any chamber chosen by lot. Probably then, for stability, either the house chosen by lot must be little more than an ornament, with no real power, or else the powers of the elected chamber must be very severely limited by a constitution, especially with regard to changing that constitution. In the first case the change from a pure elected government is only nominal, in the second the chamber chosen by lot drags a ball and chain, (or two, since the constitution would no doubt need interpretation by judges). If the two chambers have equal power, then stalemates are virtually assured.

• "Sortition is a nice idea, but no-one has heard of it, so no-one will be in favour of it, and it won't happen."

Well, of course, it won't happen tomorrow. The only real problem with sortition is the fact that it is not widely known and accepted, which is why I have written this book. It will take time, but when at last it is accepted, it will be possible to set up a government based on sortition. You can help by spreading the word.

11 – Conclusion

I have already rejected the idea of a written Constitution, so it should not be necessary to point out that this book is not an attempt to write one. It would be absurdly arrogant for me to attempt to write a constitution for unknown states in a possibly remote future, and by so doing to attempt to bind future generations in unknown circumstances to my beliefs and values. My intention here is no more than to provide an outline of what a desirable state might look like, with an indication of the underlying principles.

In his introduction to Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois, Édouard Laboulaye says: "Inside the skin of any maker of political systems there is a despot". [123] I hope I am not guilty of this charge. The system proposed is not inflexible, changes can be made by the Assembly, and power is not concentrated in a few hands. This book is not an ideological agenda, whether socialist, conservative, liberal, or whatever. Advocacy of a system based on sortition is not advocacy of any ideology except the insistence on fairness for all. In fact, I maintain that this proposal can be considered anti-ideological, in that it puts forward a method of judging every issue not on the basis of some pre-conceived dogma, but according to the interests of all citizens, weighed equally, as established by an open, honest, and equitable system of enquiry by means of the policy committees.

The reader may well say that this essay is completely utopian. In the literal sense this is of course true: the form of government proposed here (as opposed to the use of sortition to choose citizen bodies) has been tried nowhere, hence: utopia. However, the word "utopian" is often used pejoratively,and it has acquired a sense of "unrealistic" or "useless"; quite wrongly so, in my opinion, for a utopia may be anything but useless. Eduardo Galeano wrote:

"Utopia is on the horizon. I take two paces towards it; it moves two paces farther away. I advance another ten paces, the horizon moves ten paces further from me. However far I go, I shall never reach it. So what use is this utopia? It is useful for this: to advance." [124]

I have four reasons to hope that the utopia of this book will not be useless. I hope, first, that it will help to introduce the idea of using sortition to form a government to those for whom this idea is a novelty, and to persuade them that is not utter madness. Second, a utopia may give us a direction to head for, "a star to steer by" in Masefield's words. Third, utopian models are also useful in the debate between those in favour of the change. "Sortition" on its own doesn't mean much if you don't at least sketch out the institutions and the structure you propose, what functions those chosen by lot are to have, and so forth. Lastly, when modern governments finally come which use sortition in a significant way, the utopias of today will serve as yardsticks for assessing them.

The faults of elections are clear; readers with whom I have talked seem generally to agree with most of my criticisms in chapter 1. There is less agreement in favour of the radical change which I propose. For instance, after agreeing with my criticisms, one political scientist continued: "but elections have served us well". Presumably to such people, to abandon elections seems too much of a leap in the dark, too much like abandoning a safe position. But do elections really put us in a safe position? It is a position that certainly wasn't very safe for young men in the US at the time of the Vietnam war.

The present US President (Trump) has caused a lot of alarm by his unorthodox, undiplomatic style, his contempt for facts, and his authoritarian tendencies. But does it make sense to wring our hands over Trump without casting a critical eye at the system – elections – which put him in place? Elections also put in place the various US and other governments which, on very dubious grounds, embarked on wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq at a huge cost in deaths, injuries and blighted lives, to say nothing of the financial cost. And, as we have remarked, elections in Germany did not stop the rise to power of the Nazis. Can we be sure that the next US administration will not be worse than that of Trump? Under the pressure of terrorism, the developed nations generally have moved to increase police powers and to reduce civil liberties. Can we be sure that other democracies will not follow the downward slide into authoritarianism that we see in eastern Europe and Turkey?

Very dangerous abuses are a constant threat under elections. Apart from their inability to avoid war, our elected governments have shown themselves unable or unwilling to effectively address a number of perennial problems and what are effectively ticking time bombs. Action, where it has been taken, has been either counter-productive or "too little, too late". The most obvious problems include: global warming; massive environmental damage and species loss; severe inequalities of income, education, and opportunity; drug abuse; the rise of bacterial resistance to antibiotics... the reader can surely add to this list. The problems are well-known, and it is also well-known that methods based on strong scientific evidence are available to eliminate or at least greatly reduce them, yet our politicians look the other way.

Surely the time has come to take our own blinkers off, to acknowledge that our system is flawed beyond repair, and to give serious consideration to finding a better solution to making decisions and sharing power equitably. This essay is my contribution; I believe that the model of government based entirely on sortition, which I have described, is such a solution. Others may be able to make improvements, but I believe I have described a system which will work well in practice, though perhaps after a period of learning, and fumbling, by the Assembly and others. At the very least, this is a system which can evolve through progressive modifications by the Assembly until it does work well.

* * * * *

Acknowledgements

I have been greatly aided by the encouragement, insights, suggestions and corrections which I received while preparing and revising this book. Among those to whom I am indebted are: Arash Abizadeh, Juan Gabriel Gomez Albarillo, Pat Benn, Bernard Blaise, Terry Bouricius, Lyn Carson, Ned Crosby, Dimitri Courant, Andrea Felicetti, James Fishkin, Francis Fornairon, Roslyn Fuller, John Gastil, Yoram Gat, Christian Girard, Brett Hennig, Jane Mansbridge, Yves Sintomer, Kathy Stewart, "K.S." (who prefers not to be named), Erik Olin Wright, and the participants on the forum Equality by Lot and the conference Legislature by Lot held in Madison, Wisconsin in September 2017.  
Of course, all errors and faults are my own.  
2017 – 11 – 19

* * * * *

Notes

 _Democracy Index 2016, Revenge of the "deplorables"_ , Appendix, pp 51, 52. The Economist Intelligence Unit, available: <http://pages.eiu.com/rs/783-XMC-194/images/Democracy_Index_2016.pdf>

 For instance: "[In the US] the popular mood has soured and faith in political institutions and elites has collapsed. [...] Popular confidence in political institutions and parties continues to decline in many developed countries. [...] Discontent with democracy in Europe was expressed in 2015 in the form of growing support for populist parties, which pose an increasing challenge to the established political order, as was illustrated by election results in Greece, Portugal and Spain. In eastern Europe, where democracy was restored only relatively recently, in 1990-91, there is a mood of deep popular disappointment with democracy, and the former communist bloc has recorded the most dramatic regression of any region during the decade since we launched the Democracy Index, as measured by its average score compared with 2006. _Democracy Index 2015, Democracy in an age of anxiety_ , p 4. The Economist Intelligence Unit, available: <https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015>. The Edelman Trust Barometer found the "largest-ever drop in trust across the institutions of government, business, media and NGOs. [...] trust levels in government (41 percent) dropped in 14 markets and is the least trusted institution in half of the 28 countries surveyed." <https://www.edelman.com/news/2017-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-global-implosion/> "Surveys led by the University of Canberra showed only 42 per cent of Australians were happy with the way democracy worked. [...] trust in politicians and the political process was at its lowest ebb in more than two decades." <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-24>

 "Trump's 61% unfavorable score is worst in presidential polling history. Clinton's 52% unfavorable score is second-worst." http://www.gallup.com/poll/197231/trump-clinton-finish-historically-poor-images.aspx .

 President Bush was elected in such circumstances in 2000.

 The philosopher Ronald Dworkin said in 2000 "Our politics are a disgrace, and money is the root of the problem". Since then, the problem has only grown worse: "... In 2008, candidates for office, political parties, and independent groups spent a total of $5.3 billion on federal elections. The amount spent on the Presidential race alone was $2.4 billion". <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campaign_finance_in_the_United_States>.   
According to the Washington Post, by the 19/10/2016, Hillary Clinton had raised $1 300 million, Donald Trump $795 million and other candidates $1 022 million, making a total of $3.1 billion. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/campaign-finance/>. It is true that the sums spent are lower in other countries.

 Clear evidence of the skewing of policy changes to the advantage of interest groups and the wealthy – the main sources of campaign finance – may be found in "Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens" (p 12, Figure 1), Gilens, Martin, and Page, Benjamin I, _Perspectives on Politics_ , Vol 12, Issue 3, September 2014

 Compare the maxim of Alain (Émile-Auguste Chartier): "For the most obvious characteristic of a just man is that he does not at all wish to rule others, and rules only himself" ("Car enfin le trait le plus visible dans l'homme juste est de ne point vouloir du tout gouverner les autres, et de se gouverner seulement lui-même.")

 _The Tyndall Report_ , a website that monitors news coverage by the three largest US TV networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) noted (25/10/2016) that: "With just two weeks to go [to the Presidential elections], issues coverage this year has been virtually non-existent. Of the 32 minutes total, terrorism (17 mins) and foreign policy (7 mins) towards the Middle East (Israel-ISIS-Syria-Iraq) have attracted some attention. Gay rights, immigration and policing have been mentioned in passing. No trade, no healthcare, no climate change, no drugs, no poverty, no guns, no infrastructure, no deficits." <http://tyndallreport.com/comment/20/5778/>.

 Many political pundits incorrectly predicted a win for Mitt Romney in the 2012 US Presidential election based, it would seem, at best on "gut feeling", at worst on wishful thinking compounded with the desire to make a self-fulfilling prophecy. The honourable exceptions were Nate Silver, who correctly predicted results in 49 out of 50 states, and staff of University political science faculties. <http://techcrunch.com/2012/11/07/pundit-forecasts-all-wrong-silver-perfectly-right-is-punditry-dead>. The 2016 Presidential election confounded all the predictions, perhaps at least partly because of the practices mentioned in (§1.9) and in Notes 12 and 13 below.

 See Fishkin, James S, _Democracy and Deliberation_ , 1991, Yale University, p 63.

 According to a study by the Pew Research Center http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016

 "Social [network] algorithms allow fake news stories from untrustworthy sources to spread like wildfire over networks of family and friends. [...] we prefer to strengthen our ties to the people and organizations we already know and like. When offered a choice of news stories, we prefer to read about the issues we already care about, from pundits and news outlets we've enjoyed in the past." – Philip Howard, <http://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/policy/is-social-media-killing-democracy/> Alexandra Samuel points out that much of the content may not even be read by the person who shares a link or re-tweets it. _Harvard Business Review_. <https://hbr.org/2015/06/how-bots-took-over-twitter>

 "Andrés Sepúlveda rigged elections throughout Latin America for almost a decade. ...] Sepúlveda managed thousands of such fake [Twitter] profiles and used the accounts to shape discussion around topics such as Peña Nieto's plan to end drug violence, priming the social media pump with views that real users would mimic. For less nuanced work, he had a larger army of 30,000 Twitter bots, automatic posters that could create trends." – Robertson, Riley, Willis, _Bloomberg Businessweek_ , April 4, 2016, available: [ http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-how-to-hack-an-election/. In the 2016 US Presidential election, "The use of automated accounts [defined as ones making more than 50 posts per day; the top 20 accounts averaged over 1300 tweets a day] was deliberate and strategic throughout the election, most clearly with pro-Trump campaigners. [...] When comparing the highly automated accounts tweeting for Trump versus those messaging for Clinton, it appears that the pro-Trump tweets out-numbered pro-Clinton tweets 5:1 during this period." – Kollanyi, Howard, Woolley, "Bots and Automation over Twitter during the U.S. Election", _Comprop Data Memo 2016.4_ 17 Nov 2016, available: <http://politicalbots.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Data-Memo-First-Presidential-Debate.pdf>

 "In a national experiment we conducted in the United States, we were able to shift a whopping 80 percent of moderate Republicans in any direction we chose just by varying search rankings. [...] for all practical purposes, there is just one search engine. More than 75 percent of online search in the United States is conducted on Google, and in most other countries that proportion is 90 percent. That means that if Google's CEO, a rogue employee or even just the search algorithm itself favors one candidate, there is no way to counteract that influence [...] even when people do notice they are seeing biased search rankings, their voting preferences still shift in the desired directions – even more than the preferences of people who are oblivious to the bias [...] 36 percent of people who were unaware of the rankings bias shifted toward the candidate we chose for them, but 45 percent of those who were aware of the bias also shifted." – Robert Epstein, _Politico Magazine_ , 19 August 2016, available: <https://aeon.co/essays/how-the-internet-flips-elections-and-alters-our-thoughts>

 Dinç, Erkan, "some authors argued that the previous Turkish History Curriculum possessed a nationalistic and ethnocentric approach (Behar, 1996; Copeaux, 1998; Millas, 1998). The Turkish curriculum was criticized as aiming to inculcate particular socio-political or ideological perspectives (Dinç, 2001) and to introduce a nationalistic version of history through its content and the aims and objectives it presents (Aydin, 2001; Dinç, 2006; Özbaran, 1997; Tekeli, 1998)..." <https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-2546614681/a-comparative-investigation-of-the-previous-and-new>.

 "To curriculum critics, politicians are using the education system to play to these [nationalist] sentiments." – Peter Murphy, <http://www.tol.org/client/article/23245-hungarys-new-curriculum-writing-wrongs.html>. "A few days ago I noticed a new attempt by the Christian Democratic People's party (KDNP) to shove religious education down the throats of a basically secular Hungarian society... Zsolt Semjén, the chairman of KDNP, makes no secret of the fact that his party is the political arm of the Catholic Church." – Eva S Balogh, <https://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2013/04/02/introducing-religion-as-part-of-the-curriculum-in-hungarian-public-schools>.

 For instance: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steele_Hall> "... However, by the 1960s, even though Adelaide accounted for two-thirds of the state's population, a vote in Adelaide was effectively worth only half a country vote..."

 In 2015 California had a population of 39 144 818, Wyoming had 586 107. Both states have two senators. US Census Bureau <http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/06> and /56. See also Dahl, Robert A, _A Preface to Democratic Theory_ , University of Chicago Press, 1956, p 116.

 Proponents of proportional representation claim that PR methods give fairer results than "first past the post" single-seat voting. However, they do not give results consistent with each other. For example consider two of the most common methods, Sainte-Laguë and D'Hondt. In a seven-seat electorate with three parties, A with 53 000 votes;B with 24 000 votes and C with 23 000 votes. Under the Sainte-Laguë method, party A would get three seats, B two seats, and C two seats. ( <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sainte-Lagu%C3%AB_method> ). Under the D'Hondt method ( <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%27Hondt_method>), party A would get four seats, B two seats, and C one seat. Similarly the Hare and Droop quota methods (used with single transferable or non-transferable voting) may give different results. (  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hare_quota) These methods are not directly comparable with D'Hondt and Sainte-Laguë.

 For instance the Democratic Labor Party in Australia held the balance of power between the late 1950s and 1972, with less than 12% of the popular vote, and was able to keep Labor out of office, and impose its policies on the ruling Liberal Party (notably on the issue of State Aid to Church schools). See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Labor_Party_%28historical%29>.

 Pitkin, Hannah F, _The Concept of Representation_ , 1967, University of California Press, p 145.

 See Dahl, op cit, p 48 sqq.

 The Condorcet Paradox: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox>.

 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow's_impossibility_theorem>.

 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard-Satterthwaite_theorem>.

 The Downs Paradox: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_voting>.

 Achen, Christopher H, and Bartels, Larry M, _Democracy for Realists_ , 2016, Princeton, p 310. Quoting Philip Converse, the authors state that in the US, where voters are about evenly split between Democrat, Republican, and "independent" (unaligned) voters, the last-named are the least informed and it is they, as swinging voters, who usually decide the result. I do not know whether this applies elsewhere.

 Ibid, chapter 5.

 John Adams, "Letter to John Penn" in _Works_ IV, 205. Available at <http://oll.libertyfund.org>.

 The President and his advisors are not obliged to use blind trusts.

 According to Barbara Tuchman, President Kennedy confided to Senator Mansfield in March 1963 that he was considering withdrawing completely from Vietnam "But I can't do it until 1965 – until after I'm re-elected." Tuchman comments: "to continue for that time to invest American resources and inevitably lives [...] rather than risk his own second term, was a decision in his own interests, not the country's. Only an exceedingly rare ruler reverses that order." _The March of Folly_ , 1984, Alfred Knopf, p 303.

 In the 1990s the French state railway company SNCF was notorious for huge deficits. The problem was "solved" – politically, at least – by splitting it into two parts, one part kept the rolling stock and the name SNCF, and the other part (RFF) the debt and the infrastructure. The SNCF's debt essentially disappeared overnight, and as the government controlled the charges made by RFF for the use of the railway network, the SNCF could be made profitable. RFF continued to make huge losses until it was abolished in 2014, but it was much less in the public eye than the very prominent SNCF.

 According to Wikipedia, in the 2012 US Presidential election, the turnout was 58.2%, and Obama won 51.08% of the popular vote, which means 29.7% of eligible Americans voted for him. (  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_us_presidential_election#cite_ref-VEP12_1-0 citing McDonald, Michael (March 25, 2013). "2012 General Election Turnout Rates", George Mason University. Retrieved April 12, 2013. (This link is broken now.) The US Census figure for turnout was 61.8% ( <http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf>), which means 31.6% of the electorate elected Obama.

 Achen and Bartels effectively and mercilessly demolish this notion of retrospective accountability. See _Democracy for Realists_ , chapters 5 and 6.

 Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay. 2014. "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset." Version 2014.04.14. <http://www.humanrightsdata.com>. The data comes from US State Department "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" for the relevant year, and from the Annual Report of Amnesty International. Human rights violations against foreign nationals, refugees, and undocumented immigrants, or those committed outside a country's borders are not included. Unfortunately the last available year is 2011.

 _Politics_ Book IV, Ch 9 (1294b): "Choosing officials by lot is considered democratic in nature, while choice by vote is considered aristocratic in nature.", or as W Ellis translates: "it seems correspondent to the nature of a democracy, that the magistrates should be chosen by lot, but an aristocracy by vote," (tr Ellis, W., available: <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/6762>. "Democracy" was a pejorative for Aristotle, who preferred a mixed constitution incorporating oligarchic elements.

Ian Robertson, "The ultimate high", _New Scientist_ , 7 July 2012, p 28.

 One might attempt to fix §1.2 and §1.3 by prohibiting all campaign expenditure, prohibiting all political references in the media for (say) six weeks before the election, and requiring candidates to make available a printed statement of their policy in text form without illustrations. The reader can decide whether these changes would be useful. And of course §1.1, §1.11, and §1.23 would magically disappear if all politicians became honest, and pigs took to flying.

 Artist unknown, I must confess that this is a reconstruction from memory. The text is accurate, however, and the sentiment is still topical, and can be found on Tee-shirts today.

 Fishkin, _Democracy and Deliberation_ , Ch 4.

 Ibid, pp 30, 31.

 Ibid, p 31.

 Ibid, p 33.

 Ibid, p 33.

 Ibid, p 33.

 Ibid, p 34.

 Ibid, p 36.

 Ibid, p 37.

 Dahl, Robert A, _Democracy and its Critics_ , 1989, Yale University, p 109.

 Ibid, p 109.

 Ibid, p 112.

 Ibid, p 113.

 Ibid, p 129.

 "La souveraineté ne peut ètre représentée, par la même raison qu'elle ne peut ètre aliénée; elle consiste essentiellement dans la volonté générale et la volonté générale ne se représente point." _The Social Contract_ , Book 2 Ch 1 and Book 3 Ch 15.

 Dahl, 1989, p 100.

 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sortition>

 Callenbach, E, and Philips, M, _A Citizen Legislature_ , 1985, Banyan Tree Books, p 15.

 John Adams, "Letter to John Penn" in _Works_ IV, 205 available at <http://oll.libertyfund.org>.

 See Note 1 above.

 For a discussion of voting age see Laurence Steinberg's article "Thinking outside the box" in _New Scientist_ , 11 October, 2014, p 30.

 In September 2016. Figures are taken from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. "Women in Parliament and Government" ( <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm>, <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm> ). See also <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01250/SN01250.pdf>, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_the_United_States_House_of_Representatives> and <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_the_United_States_Senate>.

 Dahl, op cit, Yale University, (1970 and 1990), p. 125

 The period of five years is not engraved in marble, nor is the number 500. Both figures are probably a reasonable maximum.

 The SIPCs are inspired by Alexander Guerrero. In "Against Elections," available: <http://www.alexguerrero.org/storage/PAPA_Against_Elections_Final_Web.pdf> he suggests "Single-issue Lottery-selected Legislatures" or SILLs. In Guerrero's proposal these independent bodies would make the law; there is no central authority such as the Assembly proposed here. A proposal similar in this respect to Guerrero's was made by John Burnheim for "Citizen Juries" in _Is Democracy Possible?_ available: <http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/democracy>.

 In an earlier version of this work, this sentence read "without debate". My concern was that an unusually persuasive orator might sway the Temporary Assembly to make a decision at odds with the "informed opinion" of the community. However, members will gain a much better understanding of the issue if the TA is split into small groups for informal discussion, each with a trained moderator and members selected at random (see §6.4 and §9.3). This should be repeated several times with the group membership shuffled, to ensure that all members are exposed to different points of view. The procedure will also help to keep matters interesting. Otherwise, it is possible that many members will be extremely bored and unlikely to give the issue the attention it requires.

 The proposals website will be useful both to the public and to the Proposals Committee. It will be a one-stop shop for ideas for change. It might be organised so that users can see proposals listed in order of date proposed, date of last change, popularity and alphabetically. If the proposer permits, users might add suggestions, while the proposer may modify the proposal and remove irrelevant comments and abuse. From the number of signatures, the Proposals Committee will see which proposals are likely to be approved by the Assembly. (How many signatures are "enough" will be found by trial and error.) Measures against fraud and the use of "bots" will no doubt be necessary. Signatories might be required to identify which of a number of images shows a certain object, to enter a text which appears in deliberately difficult script, or to enter a password by manually clicking on a grill of characters. Proposers might be required to submit a hand-written copy of the proposal. Fraud in making or supporting a proposal will not get it adopted, but could clog the system.

 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Galton> The concept has been popularised by James Surowiecki in _The Wisdom of Crowds_ , 2005, Anchor Books, New York.

 It happens sometimes that one part of an elected government rejects or delays approval of the budget in order to blackmail or force the hand of the other part, or in order to force it to call a fresh election. When the Senate (controlled by the opposition) used this questionable ploy in Australia in 1975, it was amusing to hear the party which had gained power in an election declare that holding an election would be undemocratic.

 Small-group deliberation might be used, if the (permanent) Assembly so decides. (See §9.4).

 Dahl, Robert A, _Democracy and its Critics_ , 1989, Yale University, pp 135-162.

 Crosby, Ned, "How Should We Live Together?", available: <http://nedcrosby.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/How-Should-We-Live-Together-COMPLETE.pdf>

 Dahl, Robert A, _Democracy and its Critics_ , 1989, Yale University, p 109.

 Ibid, p 113.

 Since the first Citizen's Juries and _Plannungzelle_ in 1971, in various forms and under various names (Deliberative Polls, Citizen's Juries, Citizen's Assemblies...), mini-publics of "ordinary" citizens have been convoked in a great number of countries to study and deliberate on political issues. These bodies have usually been limited to an advisory role, and decisions taken can be disregarded by politicians. See (among many sources): Fishkin, James S, _When the People Speak_ , 2009, Oxford; <http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/system/files/Crosby2011.pdf>; <http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/citizens-jury-process>; <http://cdd.stanford.edu/deliberative-polling-timeline/> (contains links to details of 48 deliberative polls in 23 countries)

 "les tirés au sort sont soumis à un examen d'aptitude" Op cit.

 See US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report "Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population", 1974-2001 http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pd; <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf>

 The value of 70 which is now given, by definition, to a score two standard deviations below the median, used to be considered the limit of intellectual disability. IQ tests (there are several) have their problems: one is that the same person may score very differently – as much as twenty points – in different tests. ( <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IQ_tests>, citing Kaufman, Alan S. _IQ Testing 101_ , 2009, Springer Publishing). Some of those who fare badly in IQ tests do so because of problems quite unrelated to intelligence; motor problems, for example, or unfamiliarity with the language, or simply a background different from the background of the researcher who designed the test. These failings are additional arguments against an aptitude test based on IQ.

 Joseph Allen et al, "Associations of Cognitive Function Scores with Carbon Dioxide, Ventilation, and Volatile Organic Compound Exposures in Office Workers." _Environmental Health Perspectives_ , 2015. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1510037>.

 Bouricius, Terry and Schecter, David. (2014). "An Idealized Design for Government. Part 2: Executive Branch Accountability". _Systems Thinking World Journal: Reflection in Action_. [Online Journal]. 2. [Referred 2014-11-5]. Available: <http://stwj.systemswiki.org> ISSN 2242-8577. Aristotle expressed a similar idea ( _Politics_ Book III Chapter xi).

 Wolfgang Köhler _The Mentality of Apes_ , 1925, Kegan Paul, London.

 Hansen, Mogens Herman, _The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes_ , 1991, Blackwell, p 239.

 Surowiecki, James, _The Wisdom of Crowds_ , 2005, Anchor Books, New York, (Introduction, p. xvii).

 Lu Hong and Scott Page "Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers." _PNAS_ , vol 101 no 46 November 16 2004 available: <http://vserver1.cscs.lsa.umich.edu/~spage/pnas.pdf>

 Ibid.

 Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi and Malone "Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in the Performance of Human Groups", Science magazine, 30-10-2010, <http://science.sciencemag.org/content/330/6004/686>

 Theorem X in the paper of Grofman, Owen, and Feld, "Thirteen theorems in search of the truth" <http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bgrofman/69%20Grofman-Owen-Feld-13%20theorems%20in%20search%20of%20truth.pdf>

 <http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/H/James.A.Hawthorne-1/Hawthorne-Jury-Theorems.pdf>

 <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LIST/PDF-files/listgoodin.pdf>

 Cass R Sunstein, _Infotopia: how many minds produce knowledge_ , Oxford University Press, 2006, pp 45,46

 David Schkade, Cass R Sunstein, Reid Hastie, "What Happened on Deliberation Day?", June 2006, U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 298 available: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=911646>

 Ibid.

 Fishkin, James S, _When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation_ , Oxford University Press, 2009, p 131

 Janis, I. L., _Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes_ , 2nd ed. 1982, Houghton Mifflin.

 For a discussion of Janis' work, see for instance Esser, James K., "Alive and Well after 25 Years: A Review of Groupthink Research", _Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes_ , Vol. 73, Nos. 2/3, February/March, pp. 116-141, 1998, available: <http://liquidbriefing.com/twiki/pub/Dev/RefEsser1998/alive_and_well_after_25_years.pdf>.

 "Mindguards" is Janis' expression.

 This oath was sworn by Athenians chosen to serve on the "Heliaia", or dikasterion, the People's Court.

 "Dunbar's Number". Robin Dunbar, after studying the size of groups in primates, concludes "that the number of neocortical neurons limits the organism's information-processing capacity and that this then limits the number of relationships that an individual can monitor simultaneously. When a group's size exceeds this limit, it becomes unstable and begins to fragment. This then places an upper limit on the size of groups which any given species can maintain as cohesive social units through time". For humans Dunbar calculated this number to be about 150. See Dunbar, R, "Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates", _Journal of Human Evolution_ , Volume 22, Issue 6, June 1992, Pages 469-493 available at <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004724849290081J> or the Wikipedia article: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunbar%27s_number#Research_background>.

 For the Athenian Constitution and an explanation of these terms see Hansen, M H, _The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes_ , 1991, Blackwell, Oxford.

 Thucydides puts the word "tyranny" into Pericles' mouth in the funeral oration: "For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny [over other states]; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe." _The Peloponnesian War_ , Book II, Ch 7, tr Richard Crawley.

 Dawkins, R "Trial by Jury", _The Observer_ , 16 November, 1997; (included in _A Devil's Chaplain_ , Phoenix, 2004).

 Directed by Sidney Lumet, and based on the play by Reginald Ross.

 As at November 2016. See <http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx>

 Scotland is an exception, where the verdict may be "guilty" "not guilty" or "not proven".

 In a number of states parties are banned by law. There is also a number of very small states where their place seems to be taken by clans. Generally, though, parties are the rule.

 Bouricius, Terry and Schecter, David. (2013). "An Idealized Design for the Legislative Branch of Government." _Systems Thinking World Journal_ : Reflection in Action [Online Journal]. 2(1). [Referred 2013-01-22]. Available: <http://stwj.systemswiki.org>. ISSN 2242-8577

 "les tirés au sort... sont surveillés en cours de mandat et révocables à tout moment" "ils sont évalués en fin de mandat, et éventuellement sanctionnés ou récompensés." Chouard, E, "Centralité du Tirage au Sort", available: <http://etienne.chouard.free.fr/Europe/centralite_du_tirage_au_sort_en_democratie.pdf>

 I hope it is permissible to dream that one day the UK will have a truly democratic government!

 Soon after this was written, the head of the FBI (a Republican) announced, eleven days before the 2016 US Presidential elections, that he was re-opening enquiries into (Democratic candidate) Hillary Clinton's email leaks. The timing was completely coincidental, of course. Clinton lost.

 Reuters: <http://rt.com/usa/security-clearance-opm-usis-351> retrieved 08-01-2015.

 US Senator Ron Wyden. Congressional Record – Senate, May 23, 2012, available: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-05-23/pdf/CREC-2012-05-23-pt1-PgS3517.pdf>

 Recent developments (the Trump administration's disavowal of the treaty, and Justin Trudeau's unexplained last-minute non-appearance to sign it) have heightened the comic-opera aspect of the TPP, and underlined the lack of transparency. Nobody, it seems, really knows what is going on, not even the political leaders negotiating!

 Until recently, this was the case with section 44 of the Australian constitution, which prohibits persons holding citizenship of another country from standing for parliament, even if they are also Australian citizens.

 Dahl, (1989), p 190.

 Harel and Kahana, "The Real Case for Judicial Review: A Plea for Non-Instrumentalist Justification in Constitutional Theory" Georgetown Law Center for Transnational Legal Studies Colloquium Research Paper No 1, March 2009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1372742>

 I am indebted to Jane Mansbridge for this suggestion.

 Bouricius, Terry and Schecter, David. 2013.

 Ibid. See also "Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition: Athenian Lessons for the Modern Day" _Journal of Public Deliberation_ , vol 9, issue 1, 2013.

 Burnheim, John, _Is Democracy Possible?_ available: <http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/democracy>

 Guerrero, Alexander, "Against Elections," available: <http://www.alexguerrero.org/storage/PAPA_Against_Elections_Final_Web.pdf>

 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_British_Columbia_electoral_reform_referendum>

 The Second Sydney Airport and the Aéroport du Grand Ouest come immediately to my mind, but there must be hundreds of other similar cases of long delays caused by the political sensitivity of projects. (President Macron cancelled the latter in 2018)

 Dahl, (1989), p359, note 8. Dahl comments "it would be hard to imagine a more palpable abuse of the Court's power to delay". Those who see the US Supreme Court as a bastion against tyranny or who consider that judicial review of legislature is necessary or desirable would do well to read Dahl's observations in pp 187-191 of the same work.

123 "En politique, tout faiseur de systèmes est doublé d'un despote." _L'Esprit des lois_ , Garnier Frères, 1875

124 "Ella está en el horizonte – dice Fernando Birri – Me acerco dos pasos, ella se aleja dos pasos. Camino diez pasos y el horizonte se corre diez pasos más allá. Por mucho que yo camine, nunca la alcanzaré. ¿Para qué sirve la utopía? Para eso sirve: para caminar." _Las Palabras Andantes_ , available: <http://www.bsolot.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Galeano_Eduardo-Las_palabras_andantes.pdf>

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