On the 2nd of February 1943 the Battle of
Stalingrad officially ended with the surrender
of the remnants of the Sixth Army and parts
of the 4 Panzer Army in Stalingrad.
In this video we will look at what various
German generals that were involved in the
Battle wrote in their memoirs or studies about
the encirclement and fate of the soldiers
involved.
Now, since some people treat memoirs quite
often as historical fact or at least not critically
enough, be aware that memoirs are usually
a source that should taken with a lot of salt
for various reasons even if the author had
no bad intentions.
Generally, Memoirs often serve are particular
purpose or better purposes some of them might
be unconscious as well.
They can be entirely self-serving, yet even
in that case they have a particular audience
and that audience lives in certain time.
What do I mean by that?
Well, if a memoir is about furthering once
career, e.g., many former Wehrmacht Generals
wanted two things, first, not be convicted
in the trials after the war and second, ideally
also continue to serve in the Armed Forces.
The focus shifted over-time since the Cold
War changed the priorities of the Western
Allies and as such the treatment of Germany
and its former soldiers.
This is pointed out well by Manfred Kehrig:
"Those of the generals who still published
their memoirs at the end of the 1940s had
been involved in the resistance against Hitler
in this or that form.
The broad production of memoirs, which began
in the early 1950s, was then already dominated
by the Cold War and the discussion about West
German rearmament, and was aimed not only
at justifying and rehabilitating the German
officer, but also at highlighting the continuum
of German military history with regard to
the Bundeswehr.”
Let us start with Wilhelm Keitel, he was the
Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command the “OKW”.
Keitel was executed in 1946 after the Nuremburg
trials.
Yet, during his time in prison he wrote down
his memoirs that were published in 1961.
In these he notes that:
"[...] the looming encirclement of the 6th
Army at the end of November 1942 had only
allowed for one decision: To cease the attack
in the city and to withdraw the entire army
to the west.
That such a decision would have strategic
consequences, namely the withdrawal of Army
Group 'A' from the Caucasus and the abandonment
of the Caucasian oil, he admittedly leaves
unmentioned; it should also be noted that
there are sufficient reports from which it
is clear that he made serious efforts to prevent
that Hitler received a realistic presentation
and reports about the situation of the 6th
Army and as such also had an influence on
the resulting proposals for Hitler’s decisions.”
He also adds that Stalingrad is among his
worst memories in regard to the fate of the
soldiers.
Now, the next in line would be Alfred Jodl,
the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht.
Yet, he did not leave behind any memoirs.
Luckily, his deputy Walter Warlimont did.
In his work he looked at the various structures
and responsibilities.
He looks at the influence on the Operations
Staff on Hitler and the coordination of the
various other services.
He concludes that the Operations Staff had
little influence on Hitler in regard to Stalingrad,
since this was mostly the area of the Army
General Staff.
It is important to point out there, that although
formally the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht
should have been in charge, since the Wehrmacht
High Command (OKW) was a joint command of
the Army, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, in reality
the Army High Command was mostly in charge
of the Eastern Front, whereas the Wehrmacht
High Command in charge of other theaters of
war:
“Because of uncertainty and jealously over
the relative status of the Wehrmacht high
command and those three services, individual
theatres of war were placed under the command
of either the OKW or the OKH [Army High Command].”
As such Warlimonts conclusion is not particularly
surprising:
“For Warlimont, Stalingrad was particularly
suitable for demonstrating the amateurishly
organized leadership relationships with their
antagonism between the various command staffs
and for exposing Hitler's character, who,
when the 6th Army had to cease fighting at
the end of January 1943, outdid himself in
defamation of its leaders.”
Next in line is Franz Halder, who was the
Chief of the German Army General Staff until
the 25.
September 1942, so about 2 months before the
Sixth Army was encircled, but still quite
responsible for the planning of Case Blue.
Now, it is important to point out that Halder
wrote a report for the Operational History
German Section for the US Historical Division
in 1949, which is not necessarily a memoir
per-se.
Yet, considering the conclusions of the report,
it seems as self-serving as most memoirs.
According to Kehrig Halder completely ignores
the strategic situation, namely what consequences
a retreat of the Sixth Army would have had
on Army Group A, which was located in the
Caucasus.
Nor the logistical situation.
Kehrig concludes:
"In his writing, Halder's crucial concern
is to portray Hitler as the dictator solely
responsible for the Stalingrad catastrophe,
to strongly relativize the joint responsibility
of the commanders at the front as well as
the chief of the army's general staff, and
to portray Hitler as his 'commander', who
was simply not interested in the lives of
hundreds of thousands of soldiers.“
For more information about Halder be sure
to check out my interview with Dr. Roman Töppel
about Generals blaming Hitler.
Next one is Zeitzler, who was Halder’s successor
as chief of the German Army’s general staff
and as such had a lot of responsibility and
he was Hitler’s highest-ranking military
advisor.
As such, Zeitzler wrote various studies on
Stalingrad, but none of which had been published
in German.
Although, similar to Halder those are not
necessarily memoirs in the strict sense.
He paints a rather vivid picture about his
role and trying to influence Hitler:
“Zeitzler gives a highly dramatic description
of these continuous arguments - 'always trouble,
always noise' - the correctness of which cannot
be confirmed in detail from the files nor
by his closest subordinates after the war,
since they usually did not attend the situation
lectures.”
It is hard to determine how correct these
statements are, although his chief of operations
staff Heusinger confirmed in his memoirs,
then again, those are memoirs.
Although, what I think is a more convincing
aspect is that Zeitzler limited his own rations
to the amount that was given to the soldiers
in Stalingrad.
The only problem is that the source for this
seems to be Warlimont’s memoirs.
So, as always, hard to know.
Kehrig notes:
"In Zeitzler's notes, knowledge of the human
fate of those encircled in Stalingrad is convincingly
evident; not only did he impose on himself
and the officers on the General Staff of the
Army the same rations for days on end as those
ordered for the troops in Stalingrad, but
he also spoke about his experiences of the
effects of the hunger to Hitler [...].
Next is Maximillian von Weichs, he was the
commander of Army Group B, as such he was
the superior of Paulus the commander of the
Sixth Army.
Additionally and more importantly, Weichs
was responsible for the 6th Army and 4th Panzer
Army attacking Stalingrad, not properly securing
their flanks and missing the upcoming Soviet
counter-attack.
The encirclement of the 6th Army at Stalingrad:
"[...] prompted Weichs, after consultation
with the commander of Luftflotte 4, [...] to
propose to Hitler the abandonment of Stalingrad,
the breakout of the 6th Army and the formation
of a new front.
[...] But Hitler refused and left Weichs only
in charge of the 8th Italian, 2nd Hungarian
and 2nd German Army, while he renamed the
command staff of the 11th Army to 'Supreme
Command of the Army Group Don' and charged
Field Marshal von Manstein with the formation
of a new defensive front southwest of Stalingrad
and the liberation of the 6th Army.”
Since the encirclement of Stalingrad was complete
on the 23rd November 1942, already on the
26th of November Manstein was basically in
charge.
Weichs memoirs were not finished, he started
a manuscript but died, as such only this manuscript
could be used.
“His memoirs served the purpose of clarifying
the responsibilities until the take-over of
command by the Army Group 'Don' under Field
Marshal von Manstein.
It becomes clear that von Weichs not only
demanded from the Army High Command [OKH]
on 23 November 1942 that the 6th Army retreat
to the west, but was also determined to independently
order the 6th Army to retreat to the west
on 24 November 1942, since without clear instructions
from the Army High Command [OKH], the 6th
Army was to retreat to the west on its own.”
The last order did not happen, since an order
finally arrived.
Speaking of Manstein, let’s look at his
statements.
General von Manstein was seen as one of the
most able commanders of Germany in the Second
World War, both inside the Wehrmacht during
the war and after the war by most scholars
as well.
As mentioned before, Hitler put Manstein in
charge and transformed his 11th Army into
Army Group Don, which was put in charge of
the encirclement on the 26th of November.
The most important aspect with Manstein is
that he was the exception among the German
generals regarding if a breakout should be
conducted or not:
„[…] Manstein broke up what had been a
unanimous assessment of the perils of Sixth
Army’s situation by Weichs [Commander of
the Army Group], Paulus, and many other German
generals and did not explicitly favor an immediate
breakout from the pocket.“
The semi-official German History of the Second
World War judges Manstein harshly for his
decision:
“It was […] neither the operational situation
of the Sixth Army nor the question of the
time required for its relief, which assessed
Manstein fundamentally differently than Weichs
[Commander of the Army Group B] and the other
generals.
What distinguished him from them was, in the
first place, his greater confidence in the
supply and staying power of the encircled
army.
How true this confidence was, must be left
undecided, well-founded it was certainly not.”
Manstein’s have the title “Lost Victories”
and thus hint strongly at the general direction.
“Lost Victories” contains a complete chapter
on Stalingrad, which is also considered one
of the most important ones.
"He introduces this with a longer reflection
on 'the sacrifice of the German army that
perished there', which can only be compared
to the Spartans' struggle against the Asian
masses of the Persian despot Xerxes.”
Which sounds like it was propaganda written
during the war, not after the war.
He expands on the virtues of the German soldier.
"The invocation of these soldierly virtues
against the background of the National Socialist
objectives, which in 1954 became much more
clearly visible than in 1942/43, prompts Manstein
to state that loyalty, bravery, and performance
of duty, despite all abuse by Hitler, are
a 'Song of Songs of German Soldiers' because
of the bona fides [good faith] demonstrated
by soldiers.”
After this Manstein tries to show two different
aspects, namely, to justify that his decisions
were the best suited for the military situation
at hand considering the limitations from Hitler.
And second, to portray the leadership of the
6th Army to act without authority that was
too optimistic and did not understand his
operational idea.
"Manstein persistently points out again and
again that he had made it clear to Hitler
and the Command of the Sixth Army [AOK 6]
that the withdrawal of the encircled units
was the last, unavoidable necessity from the
beginning.
As far as Hitler is concerned, this is also
true, but towards General Paulus and his staff
Manstein failed to make it that clear.
At any rate, the records show this beyond
any doubt."
Finally, General Friedrich Paulus, the commander
of the Sixth Army, who was encircled in Stalingrad
as well and as such was captured by the Soviets.
Hitler promoted him to General Field Marshall
while encircled and basically indirectly ordering
him to commit suicide, since it was noted
by Hitler that no German Field Marshall was
ever captured so far.
In captivity, Paulus joined the National Committee
for a Free Germany, which was a German anti-Nazi
organization in the Soviet Union.
As such, he was seen as a traitor, furthermore
he was one of the key witnesses of the Nuremburg
trials against the German generals.
Later, a trial against Paulus in the Soviet
Union should have been initiated in 1949,
yet Stalin himself intervened that it did
not happen.
Needless to say, he later settled in East
Germany, which was also a dictatorship and
under Soviet occupation.
As such his memoirs have a very different
context to those of the other generals mentioned
here.
Well, so much for the orientation.
Paulus outlines in his memoirs why he repeatedly
followed Hitler’s orders.
He
"[...] justified his adherence to Hitler's
directive to hold on November 24, 1942, by
stating that unauthorized action would only
have led to the disorganization and collapse
of the entire southern part of the Eastern
Front.”
These were his initial reasons, later on:
"After the failure of the attempt to deploy
the troops in December 1942, however, the
primary goal was to gain time for the reconstruction
of the southern front and the rescue of the
armies in the Caucasus by holding out in the
encirclement.”
As pointed out by Kehrig, Paulus was involved
of the planning of the operations earlier,
as such he was aware of the importance of
covering the flanks of the operations in the
Caucasus.
"The subjectively recognized hopelessness
of a military situation does not justify for
him the right to refuse to obey orders.
Paul acknowledges without reservation his
responsibility as army commander and thus
the destruction of an entire army."
To summarize, the various memoirs include
a wide variety and range of aspects, some
a mere justification, whereas others are basically
blaming others.
Some contain reflections about the German
officer corps, others deal with military situation,
logistics, various responsibilities and the
command structure.
"Nevertheless, the elementary mission of the
military leader breaks through again and again:
responsibility over death and life and the
care for the soldiers entrusted to him, so
it is not surprising that many generals dedicate
their memories to the memory of their fallen
soldiers of all ranks."
I hope you learned something new here.
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