And it will be posted on
UW Madison Mosse Program.
So feel free to of
course also share that
with it ends
colleagues, et cetera.
It should be available
starting from next week.
So without further ado,
I'd like to kick
off today's panel,
which again is entitled counter
imaginary neoliberalism,
inequality and resistance.
We have three fabulous papers
by Matt get either a hard though,
Quince love Odeon,
and shine webpage.
And then as it discuss it,
we have odor and I'm
going to have to ask you
to pronounce your name because
I don't want to mispronounce it.
Can you just jump in
and tell me Nala.
Fasten that. I get that.
Okay? Yeah. Okay. Let me
say it one more time.
To HeLa Sassoon to
elasto less Assad.
Okay. Better. Good. Thank you.
So that the three of them will be
speaking and T less than
will be commenting.
Very, very excited about today.
So let me tell you a little bit
about these fabulous scholars.
So getting different,
how did though is
an assistant professor
lawrence College?
She received her BA in history
and economics from
the University.
That does add this in
bullet that followed by
her MA and her PhD from
Princeton University.
She has also recently completed
a fellowship or
received, excuse me,
a fellowship from the
National Endowment entities
to finish up her book manuscript,
which is titled The World's
that Latin America created.
Quince love Odeon is
Associate Professor of
History at Wellesley College,
and his most recent book
is entitled Global lists,
the end of empire and the
birth of neoliberalism,
which came out with Harvard
University Press in 2018.
N1, the HA's George
Lewis beer prize.
He edits contemporary
European history and
rights publicly for a number
of places including
the New York Times,
The Guardian, The New Statesman,
The Nation and descent.
He is currently working
on a history of
radical capitalism which will be
published by Metropolitan Books.
Wimpy is an assistant professor
of Modern European History,
California State
University, Bakersfield.
His first book is entitled
remnants of the German empire,
colonial Germans imperialism
and the League of Nations.
It came out with Oxford
University Press in 2019.
And it looks at how
former German officials,
missionaries,
and use the mandate
system to insert
themselves into the
new imperialism
of the inter war period.
His second book, which is
titled chronic disparities,
public health in
historical perspective,
covers the global history
of inequality and public health.
And it came out j,
o with Oxford University
Press in August of 2020,
who are really excited to
read that one as well.
After the pandemic, he
intends to resume work
on his third book on
German and British
interference in League of
Nations narcotics regulations and
treaties in the 19
twenties and thirties.
And he wants to work on
medical prejudice
against Caribbean and
West African migrants
in Britain during
the 1968 flu pandemic.
As well as two separate pieces on
the Istanbul conference or
International Sanitary
Conference of 1866.
And it's role in the emergence of
multinational public
health structures.
So he has lots of exciting
work underway as well.
To he lesser sun are
discuss it for today.
Is an assistant professor
at Emory University.
She is currently completing
a book that tells the story of
how British and American
humanitarian organizations
try to create an alternative
post imperial ethical market
that would connect
economic life in Britain
and the US with ideas
about global hunger,
inequality, and
economic dependencies
in the global south.
But ended up producing
market-based programs that
replicated neoliberal logics
from fair trade to boycotts,
to micro-finance traces
how between 1940 and 990s,
alternative markets connected
domestic economic life
with ideas about poverty,
inequality, and
economic dependencies
in the global south.
So and all-star cast
once again for today.
And we're going to kick
things off with by getting
a hard-nosed paper which is
entitled Vietnam don't
heavy kick out those,
those brazil, between
Dependency Theory
and neoliberalism.
Ticket away might get
ITA. Thank you to you.
I'll Hello.
Can everybody hear me?
Okay. Thank you very
much for having me
and having all of us.
I just want to reiterate
the applause to Juliana on
Matthew for organizing and
running a very
successful conference.
And I want to thank
all of you for
your participation
and engagement.
I, I was very happy to see
some faces for people that I have
either exchange emails
with are like No,
but I haven't seen in awhile,
so I'm happy to do that.
So I was really excited
by these invitation,
not just for the
opportunity to see you all,
but also because the
theme of the conference,
the decline of the welfare state
at the turn of the 20th century,
beginning of the 21st century,
gave me a chance to
transition or to begin to
transition to a new project
that's I finalize
the current one.
So the paper I circulated
is centered on foot and I'm
going to make you gotta go.
So world knowing Brazilian
as sociologists would
turn precedent of Brazil and who
is a very important
character in my book,
The World that Latin
America created,
hopefully coming out early.
Next book is about
highly influential intellectual
and political move that
circulated widely as.
Dependency theory.
And this is something
that I try to kind of
unpack a little bit
more on the book.
So it is a very interesting
figure that I hope I can.
And you're working in the years
that dependent the
stem movement and
a leading figure of the
mid-century development era.
He was one of
the one of the most important
intellectuals of the,
of the left in the
mid-twentieth century and
working on what is development,
what, what are the
limits of the project,
of the, of the project of
development of the mid-century.
And in the paper
like working against
the nationalists in,
in a way that he positioned
himself as, as such.
Ok, but he's also became
President of Brazil through
an alliance with the
political right and
embraced a process of,
or embrace them,
deepened, I guess,
and widened a process
that had just recently
initiated with the transition
to democracy or after Brazil,
21 year military
dictatorship of Neil,
of what we call neoliberal
or market oriented.
We formed. So because he has,
he has this, he has become aware
and he said it was a prominent
of both these arrows.
I have been thinking about
how he can rethink them both.
Rethink the development
era and think that we,
the mid-century development era,
I'm what we've called
the neoliberal era.
So he was, and I tried to talk,
I'm just going to be
very brief about this
because it's kind of in
the book and in the paper.
But he was an
institution builder and
a network maker mobilizing
political and economic elites,
national and international
institutions,
intellectual north and south.
Through advanced.
He's intellectual,
our collective
intellectual projects,
projects, but also heats
political projects.
So the ties that kind of those
who us any intellectual forge
with the political
and economic elites,
as well as I'm moving
intellectual lefts,
helping advancing school.
Did you go or we're
from political advisor,
senator, cabinet member, unbent,
precedent, times
President of Brazil.
In that, in all these,
in an era of opposition
to the military regime
and transition to
democracy or like
the beginnings of
what they called
the New Republic right after,
after the Constitution on
the end of the dictatorship.
So President Cardoso,
as president,
he kind of explicitly
set out to do something
like that's kind of literally
call burying the development era.
And he became a leading member
of these, of this movement.
I could go into more details of
what exactly he dealing
both of these areas,
you know, he is the co-author of
the book dependency
on development.
And, and he created a lot of
research centers in
which the intellectual,
let's sort of gathered
in opposition
to the military,
just to name a few.
And then as President, he kind
of integrated up projects
of like Privatizing previous
state owned enterprises,
liberalization of trade and
other on another project.
So since gotten those struggles,
these two distinct areas,
like the development
one at the neoliberal,
one that we have come to kind
of conceptualizes
radically distinct.
Kind of those trajectories
are useful vehicle
to understand the
continuities between the two.
Something that Amy opener has
so eloquently frame
for us and her book.
But also to explore
to high put it,
put this he sort
chartered to agenda,
which is what the process
of doing, I guess.
First kinda those this trajectory
is perhaps the most notable one,
but he's not unique among
the Latin American
intellectual elect.
So it can help us to,
he's trajectory can
help this trace of
what we can call like a
Latin American path to
neoliberalism that goes beyond
the Chicago Boys or
the Washington
Consensus institutions.
And second, unrelated
to the first,
he's trajectory can help
us trace the origins of
legal liberalism from
what we would call
the political right to
the political left.
Then long trajectory.
As a dependent,
these stem began
precisely as an assault
of the Nationalists led
and also on the
developmental state,
something that we sort of
normally don't think of.
But when we localize,
Cardoso indicates the milieu of
the intellectual and
political milieu that he was
talking in Brazil
in the 19 sixties.
We can see how much it was
sort of an attempt to kind
of challenge the proposition of
a developmental state so
prevalent at the time.
So those are the two sort of
avenues that I'm
just thinking about.
You. I hope that with
your comments and with
these with these
conflicts have helped
me rethink how to move from
these ideas to an actual kind of,
kind of a future book project.
Or maybe this is just the
side of peace or something.
But I'm really grateful
to for any comments
that you might
have on on on on how these
agenda can move forward.
Because it's just that
what I just, just,
just these two ideas
very begun that
not necessarily like developed
from research us.
I'm just starting.
But thank you very much.
That would be o. I think
you are getting that.
So next we will hear
from Quince of Odean,
whose paper is entitled
chimp better volcanoes
and other counter
imaginaries, TDN, IO.
Go ahead, quinn. Yes. So much.
I'm assuming everyone can
hear me until I advise.
You guys all did a
really great job
with this tough format.
So I want to address
some of the themes of
the workshop through
the subject of my talk,
but also to kind of expand it out
sort of in the interest
of larger discussion.
And to do so, I
thought it would be
helpful to begin with.
Frame or in fact,
the title of his friends,
social justice remade
the decline of
the European welfare state and
a global context, 1973 to 2009.
And it seems to me
that sort of each
of these terms is
worth revisiting.
First of all, the first,
the header title was so
social justice remade,
was social justice remade?
And if so, into what?
It doesn't seem clear to me
yet that we know what the,
the outcome was that this
remaking of social justice.
Secondly, did the European
welfare state decline?
By which it seems to me
that we're talking about
the Western European
welfare state so far.
If it did decline,
when did that happen?
The traditional
stories I mentioned
briefly in a comment
yesterday for
the Western European
welfare state is
skewed much later
towards the 990s.
And even then, one has to
take on board the kind
of Paul Pierce and David
Edgerton rebuttal,
which is that state
expenditure as
a percentage of GDP is
not actually declining.
And things like medical
expenses that are
still socialized and European
countries continue to rise.
So in what sense precisely do we
see the welfare state decline?
Or is it a question
of the kind of
transformation of the way
certain forms of
social provisioning
or delivered and the
kind of the kind of
conditions under
which people have
to contort themselves and,
and frame their lives in order to
access the resources
of the state.
So decline.
Or the European welfare
state maybe should also
have a question mark next to it.
The third term in the,
in the phrase well
and global contacts
in this question is,
I think also in the
air, what, if anything,
does the global
context have to do
with the transformation of
the European welfare state?
And more specifically, the
discrete demands of the New
International Economic Order,
which was in the kind of
framing of the workshop.
What is the connection
between these two things?
And then lastly,
what, if anything,
does something called
Neoliberalism have to
do with anything of this?
And we've heard that word a
few times in the past days.
And I think it's good to begin
with a little bit of ground
clearing around this.
I mean, it's like some
kind of a chip in my head.
And when the word neoliberalism
he gets mentioned,
I like lurch into action.
And the way that
I think that it's
helpful always to sort of begin
thinking about neoliberalism is
to realize that it's used in
at least three very
distinct ways.
And I think we've already been
using them in all of these ways.
And I think it would
be helpful for
the remaining discussion
and the reflection on
the workshop to sort of keep
these ways of talking
about neoliberalism
more compartmentalized.
So first is the way
of thinking about
neoliberalism as a
kind of a period or
an epoch of global capitalism
that began sometime in
the early 19 seventies,
maybe even 1973 is as used in
the title of this workshop.
Second is. Liberalism
as a kind of
a policy package and an
associated set of mentalities.
So here we have the
familiar litany
of the Washington Consensus,
privatization,
liberalization, deregulation.
And then an associated
set of subjectivities
in which one becomes the
entrepreneur of oneself,
takes responsibility through
initiative in the market,
rather than being, quote,
unquote dependent on the state.
Neoliberalism also become
synonymous with an
idea of the sort of
privatized Keynesianism
of the kind
that Lauren Stokes
was describing,
whereby obligations
normally performed by
the state then become
the responsibility
of the extended or
the nuclear family.
The category of responsible
as ation is relevant here.
This is a set of
quite Victoria and
traits that are incurred
that people are
encouraged to cultivate.
That I think leads Melinda
Cooper, for example,
to helpfully call later
welfare reform a new poor law.
Poverty becomes the fault
of the poor themselves.
Decrease access to services and
means-tested access
to social care.
So that's the second way we use
neoliberalism is a kind of
a policy package mixed with
a set of ways that one
ought to understand
oneself and sort of in plot
oneself and everyday life.
Third, neoliberalism is
used to describe a kind of
intellectual movement of actors
loosely connected to them
all power in society.
And by Friedrich Hayek,
Friedman Vilhelm RCA in 1947.
Instead of continuing
long conversations
over the decades about how
capitalism can be protected
from the disruptive effects of,
of democracy in nationalism
and often populism
as they describe it.
So these three things working
perfectly together, right?
I mean, I think the worst
interpretive move is to sort of
collapse all three together
and think that you
can explain the
world by doing so.
It's just sort of say, you
know, find the villains.
Look where they rolled
out their plan.
And then now we
know we've entered
sort of your reversibly
into a new era of
neoliberalism, right?
I mean, this is sometimes
the way it gets used.
The sort of the ax
falls in, in, in Chile.
And Pinochet then
inaugurates a kind of
a new era of neoliberalism
that we must end somehow.
Whether in 200820162020.
This is the slightly
apocalyptic sort of
Cornell West version
of neoliberalism,
which is obviously a highly
effective mobilizing
tool and can be
very effective at the level
of consciousness raising.
But is how does had sort
of diminishing returns?
The more you try
to turn this into
an operative understanding of
the world, especially
historically.
And so for example,
to say that neoliberalism
began in the 19 seventies,
overlooks the fact that
these major welfare
reforms happened later.
Seventies in Germany was
the high period of the
social liberal coalition.
Indeed, aspects of
the new international
economic order that
that extend from the
initial declaration
in the UN include the
villi brought Commission,
which would have been very
nice to have a paper about,
which is a kind of
attempt to globalize,
in fact, the alive and
well social democracy.
Of West Germany at the
beginning of the 19 eighties.
So the timelines
already don't work.
I mean, one could use
this and many other,
many other examples as well.
And then the question of who is
doing the neoliberal Isaac is
also a very fraught one great.
Especially when you
look at Western Europe,
the main actors are
not at all necessarily
neo liberals and the strict
Montpellier in society sense.
And here I think the work of
Stephanie much who we'll
hear from tomorrow,
who's on the call,
is very important.
The work of Rao we,
Abdulla Al Johanna Bach
vein in the Latin
American context.
And I think that margaritas
work that she just
introduced us to.
It's also excellent
in that sense as well
as the author's talking about how
we sort of end up getting
by the nineties what
Nicholas Olson calls
neoliberalism without liberals.
In other words, the main
actors that deliver
this policy package that we
sometimes call neoliberalism.
Or more likely Social Democrats,
are more likely left-of-center,
at least in their own histories.
Then right of center
conservatives are
self-described, free
market liberal.
So these are all, I think,
puzzles to unpack, right?
I mean, this is not a
message of despair from me,
but more and kind of I,
kind of I, I believe that
we need to be clear about
the difficulties of the tasks
that we're setting for ourselves.
So with that in mind, I did
find it helpful however,
for my paper to focus in on
one actual card
carrying neoliberal,
that, that person I focused on of
my paper is someone
named Herbert gears.
Gears is to give
a brief biographical
sketch who's born in 1921.
So he's more Milton
Friedman's generation
than Friedrich Hayek's.
In fact, he was called
after his death,
which wasn't, it was only
a couple of years ago,
the German Milton Friedman
played the role of
what we would have as a kind of
a Paul Krugman nowadays
in the United States.
Now frequently intervening
in public debates hadn't,
had, had a regular column,
was associated with
a particular kind of
a worldview and had
a place from which he
could deliver these.
He had a sort of a pulpit,
not just in newspapers, but in
the Kiel Institute for
the world economy,
which is quite important
economic research
and think tank and
in Germany and he directed
it from 1969 to 1989.
So he's someone who was,
also wasn't willpower Society
member was the president.
And looking at his writings
I thought was helpful to see
the way that neoliberal
productively
describe their own
vision for the world.
I think it's a bit too
convenient to see
neoliberalism as simply a kind
of a plutocratic
insurgency or a way
to sort of blast us back
into the 19th century.
It is necessary actually
to understand the challenge
of neoliberalism,
understand in its own terms
and the way that
it set out what I,
what what could be
taken as a kind
of laudable alternative
to the status quo.
So Girish is, Girish
is a good example
because he saw it necessary
to directly confront the NIH.
He saw the moral force, the NIO.
He understood that there
was a kind of righteousness
behind the global south
articulation of demands.
But he just thought,
man, he had much,
a lot of company in
the neoliberal world
that NIO was actually not as
forward-looking and
futuristic as it
sometimes blame to be or
that it was made out to be.
In fact, when they looked at DNA,
yo, they saw it as
very old-fashioned.
They thought it was statist.
It's not, it was dirty,
just they thought it was
actually blind to the realities
of global interdependence.
And based on a kind of
a corporatist crony
capitalism model
that didn't tap into
the entrepreneurial qualities
of the local population.
That actually just
served as a kind of
a transfer mechanism from
elites in one country,
two elites and another.
In fact, they went even further.
They would use this sort of
Peter Bower formation or
formulation to describe
foreign aid is a way
that poor people in
rich countries give money to
rich people in poor countries.
So this is actually
pretty similar to
the way that margarita described.
Cardoso is understanding
of the way that,
that kind of nationalists,
crony capitalism of the,
of the 19 sixties and
seventies was working.
It was more of a kind of
a transfer mechanism
between elites rather than
a way of actually
producing some sort of
bottom-up redistribution
are top-down re,
redistribution and
bottom-up, uplift.
Girish had what I think is
quite nice kind of visual
way to describe what he
saw as his alternative
to state to
state transfers in
the kind of mode
of intergovernmental ism
or internationalism.
Now, yup, oppose. He had this,
I think, pretty great metaphor,
the Schumpeter volcano, which
he built on the basis of
the German location
theory that he
had sort of taken
in, in his training.
The German location theory
was a way of kind of
specializing
neo-classical economics
and marginalize them.
And thinking about the
way that human activity
and human occupation
of space ends up.
The process of agglomeration
take place and people end up
concentrating in different
parts of, of territories.
And as they concentrate,
prices rise, rents rise,
and people who were
there first end up
accumulating sort of path
dependent first-mover advantages.
But then eventually
people start moving
outwards from points
of concentration.
As rents grow too high
in wages are too high.
And then they can profit from,
from the lower costs of
doing business beyond the
centers of, of urban life.
So this is a kind of hundred-year
old way of trying to
understand the way that
economic geography emerges.
And what Girish did, which I
think is quite
interesting, is he,
he inserted his own
idiosyncratic understanding
of ship pitchers idea of
innovation into this.
So nowadays, I mean,
especially ten years ago,
maybe even less so now,
the word innovation
is everywhere.
You know, Harvard
Innovation Lab, every,
every major university has
innovation this and that.
Well, Gish was actually
head is antenna up and he
picked this up already early
and was propagating it.
Already in the late 19 seventies
and early 19 eighties.
And the way he saw it was
that innovation in a
knowledge economy,
which is another term
that he pick that point
early already late 19 seventies,
early 19 eighties, was
producing these sort of sites of
concentration of
wealth and talent.
But it was a,
an advantage that
was easily sort of
co-opted by, by competitors.
And it was an advantage that was
short-lived because as soon
as a new development was created,
it could be imitated away.
It could be emulated away.
So he saw as the kind of
the lava emerging and
these sites of research
insights of, of,
of industrial innovation,
process and product innovation
would then be quickly disperse.
They would sort of flow
down the sides of the,
of the volcanoes, so to speak.
And other, and other
parts of the world
would be able to kind
of be warmed by
them or however you want
to extend the metaphor.
So he saw the need to
produce a situation in
which maximum numbers of
volcanoes could be at work,
which would produce a huge amount
of violence and destruction,
disruption of everyday life.
But one that would
also produce in
gross that kind of
the maximal amount of not
just economic efficiency,
but economic advancement
as he saw it,
and ultimately global prosperity.
So the idea of social
justice as framed in that,
in the title of this workshop
was a kind of a non
sequitur for him.
I mean, he was a good I Archean.
And because he was a good
hierarchy and he thought that
social justice was a
kind of a weasel word.
That was, was implying that,
that, that states
can somehow produce
social justice simply
by waving a wand.
He believed that you
needed to actually
produce the prosperity before
you could have to social justice.
And that the market with
all of its disruptions,
with all of its sort of
unpleasant trees and all of
its necessary inequalities
would still end up
being the best route to
getting the kind of
outcomes that one hope
for when one use this and can't
authority term of social justice.
So he became a kind of forerunner
of this new way of thinking
about the social contract and
a new form of what you would
call govern mentality ultimately.
And in Germany, whereby the
role of the state was not
to evenness across
the territory of the,
of the, of the, of the nation.
But to produce the conditions
under which different regions and
parts within the nation
could compete with each
other over scarce resources.
With the belief that
the one that would
win this competitive struggle
would end up producing
the maximal
productivity that would
end up redound to the
prosperity of all.
I'll give one that,
I'll give one example
of that before I conclude,
because I think it's
very illustrative and
it's close to all
of our own lives.
So that's the world of
higher education in Germany.
And this will give
you an example of how
this sort of gets
operationalized.
So until the early two thousands,
if you ask someone what the best
university in Germany was,
they wouldn't really
have an answer for you.
And for German bureaucrats,
this was a problem
because it meant that,
because all of the German
universities were pretty good.
There were no Harvard's,
there were no Yale's.
There was no one in
the top ten of the,
The Times, The Times
Higher Education rankings.
So they Along the same
lines of thinking as,
as, as gear set,
set out to sort of cultivate
better and larger volcanoes.
And so beginning in
the early teens,
the amount of money which had
previously been given
perfectly evenly
to all the universities was
put into more of a big pot.
And now different
universities had to
compete with proposals to produce
what are called clusters of
excellence in the interest
of creating elite universities.
And that was the
term that they used
in the absence of elite
universities, right?
In the, in the existence of
only very good universities,
they needed to create
a few elite ones
and create thereby inequality.
But through competition,
hopefully working more towards
this goal of an uneven
landscape which,
which however, was more
productive than the aggregate.
So this is produced I could
playing for a long time,
which I won't about the
effects of this on,
on academic life in Germany.
But suffice it to say,
it hasn't decreased the presence
of the state in people's lives,
nor has it sort of economized on
spending and nor has it
produce better outcomes.
But it has sort of reshuffled
state obligations.
And it has forcibly transform to
self conception of players
who are now active in
this game of competition.
So when we say, you know,
the decline of the
European welfare state
and the Remaking
of social justice.
I think it's important to
think about what it's being
remade towards and how
it's being transformed.
And seeing that the state
is not withdrawing,
the state is simply re,
reconfiguring itself to
allow for sort of new forms
of of zero-sum competition
that present themselves
as positive.
Some competitive games.
I think I ended with
that and I look
forward to the conversation.
When thank you, quinn.
So our next and final
paper is shining lamp.
And it entitled developmentally
THE antagonism anti
universal health care
from the mandates is 70 Coven 19.
Chen. Thank you for that really.
And I want to thank
the organizers for the
conference and also thank them
for allowing an interlope
or liked me into
a conference on
the welfare state,
since my specialties come
in a period far
earlier in the 160s,
deny 130s, something
on the 19 seventies,
a little bit outside of my range.
But given that my
specialties are on 19th,
early 20th centuries,
internationalism,
empire, public health.
My goal today, as
has been part of
the running theme of the
conference so far with
statements I individuals
like Dr. off narrow,
Dr. Shields, Dr. Pearson,
and Dr. Moines is to push beyond
the night and Dr. slow
but slogan ology.
Stumbling over my words.
Push beyond the periodization
of the focus on
the 19 seventies and
even push beyond
economics a bit to engage with
the deeper intellectual history
of the politics of language that
helped to curtail and work
dismantle European and
American welfare states.
So in this presentation,
I'm trying to explore how
the preservation
oven retooling of
empire and the post beside league
of nations mandate
system impacted
subsequent developmentalist
policies of
health-related aid on
the international stage.
During the traditionally
considered period of
decolonization in the
fifties to seventies,
which in turn, impact
of maintenance of
European states
purchased the welfare
and universal healthcare struck.
This discourse was
intensified during
the Cold War and beyond
as the West challenged
first the Soviet Union and
the People's Republic of
China for spheres of
influence in Africa,
South America, and civic.
The Narrative of quote,
Western superiority
became so ingrained
that welfare systems and
universal health care structures,
which acknowledged and addressed
societal health inequalities.
This supposedly superior
global north aim
to be viewed as discursive
liabilities and
international displays
remanence over
both formally colonized regions
and competitors for
global hegemony.
Adapting and modified
Sebastian Conrad's arguments
that German colonialism,
the German colonial
policies and views of
Europeans or superiority were
modified by German officials
and turned inward on the
undeserving or what undeserving
poor during the Taizong,
like, I postulate that it
was not solely as it's
sometimes assumed,
a competition for
resources between
funding overseas aid and
the domestic welfare
structures that contributed
political debates over
the dismantling or
severe financial prepayment of
universal health and
other welfare benefits.
Societies like Britain, Germany,
France, and the United States.
Rather than the diminishing of
the welfare state was tied
to the desire to preserve
notions of superiority over
the global south on all things
health-related by
pointing to the myth of
the quote, self-reliant
population.
Do you put against the foil of
colonized subjects or
formerly colonized subjects?
The result was a seemingly
counterintuitive
political discourse
against welfarism and
universal health aid
programs as hindrances
and antagonism towards
those who use them as
both freeloaders who were
tarnishing the image of
self-sufficient
first-world states
of which they were art.
Instead of a dialogue in which
welfare and health
structures were upheld as
a system to be emulated by
all the lacquer dismantling
of welfare and healthcare
safety net strangely,
NDP worn as a badge of
honor supporting notions of
preeminence and unhealthy,
self-sufficient population.
Especially in term quality
if both free-market healthcare,
even as the reduction
of safety nets,
we can overall health.
In European and
American societies.
These sets of
assumptions have had
dire consequences for decades
and are most certainly visible
during the 19 pandemic.
The origins of this racist
and developmentalist antagonism
towards welfare systems date back
to the preservation of
imperial racial and
class hierarchies and
the League of Nations Charter,
particularly the man.
The drafters of
the league charter
conceived Mandate System as
a safer means of preserving
liberalism's imperial
structures by preventing
the unrestricted land-grant and
imperial competition that had
led to the First World War.
As such, the interwar
period Martin, adaptation,
not a break with
the West's enunciation
of liberalism's
imperialists principles.
As I've argued in
my previous work,
alongside other scholars,
Mandate System served as
a proving drawer for
the transformation of
the civilising mission into
a developmentalist narrative
that can persist long after
formal decolonization.
The League of imperialist,
As you might want to call it,
retooled the mission of
conquering and
civilizing the world.
An international program of
tutelage towards the eventual,
though never scheduled, promised,
nor guaranteed transformation of
colonies into modern
independent nation states.
And a nationalism was not
intended as the destroy empires,
but rather as a life preserver
of the imperial
civilizing mission.
Rather than disbanding
the mandate system.
When the League of Nations
itself was dismantled,
it was given a new
birth and delete
successor the United Nations.
With the establishment of
the trusteeship council.
The last UN trust
territory was not
released and granted
independence the island,
Palau and till 1990 or so,
it's very much relevant for
our ongoing discussions
about the late 20th century.
Well, even with the end of
the trusteeship council,
imperial internationalism
persists and other ways,
the civilizing mission has been
rebranded into the
modernizing mission ambit,
culturally, technologically
and financially binding
the former colonies to
the global community as
defined by the West,
through assimilation, Pia,
humanitarian aid and
financial regulation.
These languages
intentionally of spirit
that the problem space
by the colonial world,
arbitrary aborted designations,
policies and societal
hierarchies.
Hierarchies founded on races,
pseudoscience, genocide,
and war that were the
result of empire itself.
The solutions proposed by NGOs,
western governments
condense at an event.
And in some cases, It's,
even academics have been
nearly identical to
the solution advocated by
imperial thinkers and reformers,
uh, bless these
societies by supplying
them with European
style technology.
You're in style medicine,
European style education, and
European style government.
The town's struct has
frequently been a
racist one which
infantilized as non,
you're in retrain
them as children in
need of further tutelage,
guidance, or assistance.
You see this most painfully
clearly in terms of
Western influence,
aid relief for the IMF and
the World Bank regulations on
states like Uganda and Tanzania.
So how does this
discourse relate to
welfare states in Europe
and the United States?
I need to borrow from the
works of dispassion Conrad and
Frederick Cooper in globalization
and the nation and
Imperial Germany.
Conrad argued that nation
building was inextricably,
inextricably intertwined
with globalization,
colonization, and modernization.
In the turn of the century,
Germany increasing global
interconnectedness
circa 1880 to 1900.
But the high levels of human
mobility and commerce,
great numbers of people,
primarily agricultural
workers, sought
economic opportunity
and moved into,
across and out of the
European Kaiser right?
At the same time, the
fledgling nation was
establishing overseas colonies
and settlements in Africa,
South America, and China as
some of which we're informal.
And in theory and practice,
race became a highly
charged category for
managing the boundaries
and national demarcation.
As German governing officials
and nationalists
sought to modernize,
they sought to
improve the image of
German work in its
economic interactions
on the world stage.
In this sense, contract
argues this led to
comparisons of the poor
within Germany to the UN,
but uncivilized
colonized subjects.
And colonial
knowledge systems and
power structures
were duplicated and
Metropol Not only were
harsh measures and
brutal genocides introduced in
the German colonies to quote,
train Africans to work harder.
Similar punitive actions were
replicated domestically
against those Germans
deemed quote,
lazy as end quote,
and antagonism towards those
perceived as foot dragging down
the German nation input
led to antagonism against
welfare support for such
both lazy chairman's input.
Just as civilizational
discourse produced
antagonism toward systems of
welfare support in
the 19th century,
we can apply and modification of
contrast arguments
that postcolonial
mid-twentieth century
Frederick Cooper's
argued that for trying
to French and British veterans
after the Second World War
included the migration of
colonial troops in metropoles,
similar to the blood
debt demanded by
colonial veterans after
the First World War.
These colonial troops
of the second war,
along with their comrades who had
remained in British
and French colonies,
call for the extension of
benefits in return
for their service.
And in the French case,
insisted that since some of
them were labeled as citizens,
enjoy all the rights of
citizenship, including
welfare access.
Rather, Cooper points
out that this,
combined with the economic hits
damaged infrastructure
from the Second World War,
resulted in an abdication
of responsibility for
former colonies and ushered
in decolonisation from Africa.
But I would argue that it also
necessitated an abdication of
responsibility for other
domestically
disenfranchised groups.
Even as complex
welfare states and
universal health care
systems were being created.
Exclusions from the system.
And its creation based on
hierarchies and developmental
as Frederick can,
the welfare state
ideologically from
its inception let
it vulnerable to
future contraction
as social Darwinism
researches and developmentalists
rhetoric Reem, trenched itself.
Similar to a Conrad points
out in the late 19th century.
Tolerance point rings true
even for the post-colonial era
as developmental rhetoric
of empire was baked into
interpretations of health
merging with older discourses
from the sanitarian movements
and eugenics movements of
the 19th and early 20th
century that emerged in
sort of an unholy intellectual
history alliance.
As far as theologies are
concern as aid to
other countries became
the norm for the Cold
War to compete for
a new form of imperial
spheres of influence.
Aid was criticized as a quote,
waste or drain
uncivilized states.
By some on the left,
it was viewed as
depleting resources that
could be used
domestically for welfare.
By the right, using it
domestically would mean
admitting a lack of
civilizational superiority over
the other states that
could not quote,
stand on their own and they
lack launch the tax on
those needing welfare and aid
as brains on civilization.
Health became a core
target needs debates.
Health and medical science were,
as Jessica Pearson
has very clearly
articulated argued in her work on
the World Health Organization,
French colonialism,
the last vestige of
Europe and West plane two
superiority that had
been used to justify
dying empires and new
international imperialism.
The produce dominance
by other means.
This man's link domestic
welfare so that
metropolitan inequalities
became the fault
of the individual,
not the state
secured an inflated,
arrogant view of quote,
western states capabilities.
The consequences of this
are structures that are
perceived to be quote,
impenetrable and quote,
the best in the world that are
vulnerable to crisis
because those excluded
from or castigate him for
seeking welfare are often
those who are the
most susceptible to
health disparities
and chronic diseases.
The avenue through which
things like Pandemic can
strike a community
nation and economy.
Artists. The antagonism
against universal healthcare
maybe further heightened by
the post imperial xenophobia,
anti-immigrant sentiment.
Several European nations and
the United States
in recent years,
especially in Britain and the US.
This is not just in terms of
access building off
of Cooper's work
on imperialism and far
Myers and poor peace
work on citizenship.
But due to the perceived threat
highly educated migrants in
the medical field posed to
conservative Europe's
developmentalist rhetoric.
The case of Boris Johnson's
COBIT 19 or covering,
highlights this quite plainly.
On April 12th, 2020,
the British prime
minister, as we all know,
was released from a whole
London Hospital where he
received treatment for
severe coronavirus symptoms.
A public statement.
Johnson, despite his
long-term criticism
of the NHS as a conservative,
lavish praise on the NHS.
And it's Dr. singling out.
Migrant doctors in particular.
Discerning political
observers noted that
Johnson's loud sharing for
the popular NHS as well as
migrant doctors would
drown out criticisms of
his government's
early missteps in
responding to the 19 pandemic.
The nurses status as
migrants also drew
attention with left-wing
commenters arguing empower
the extremely anti migrant
pro Brexit conservatives
led by Johnson had done little to
recruit needed health care
workers from around the world.
And members of Johnson's
ONE party began
circulating allegations
on social media
that the two nurses were
not registered to work
in the UK and called
for their deportation.
Immediate value to scholars
investigating the decline.
Or if we view it as if Klein
and the welfare state.
To view this as part of the same,
quote, politics of language.
To borrow a phrase
from Quentin Skinner
as the perseverance of
imperial hierarchies.
In an earlier century,
efforts to defend or limit
universal health care are
often combined with
anti-immigration.
The platform of a
single political party.
Anti universal healthcare,
anti migration
conservatives fixate on
health care and
several western states
singling health care out.
Singling healthcare out as
a segment of the
economy where one,
silver migrants tend
to find employment
and to where the
employment of migrants
in fields that require
high levels of
education and are
viewed as market.
Quote, European
civilization stands
at odds with the
developmentalists,
racist hierarchies
of imperial Europe.
The United States that
conservatives are
desperate to retain and
a post imperial Europe.
His praise of the nurses and
doctors that saved his life.
The conservative Johnson
still attacks the NHS in
migration with equal ferocity
in policies and
public statements.
European and North American
welfare states have been and
are predicated on systems and
exclusion both in design
and implementation.
The question is never
truly been over
what services will be provided
by the state or what it cost,
but rather who would be
entitled to those services.
The framed in terms
of cost frequently,
the actual basis for animosity
towards expansion of
universal health
care could indeed be
deep-seated racial and
gender hierarchies that have
their transformational routes in
the developmentalist empires
in the 19th, 20th century.
Tax on national health services,
public health funding and Bs,
as well as higher education
and education more broadly,
often go hand in hand to achieve
a similar aim of maintenance
of the perceived status Bo,
hierarchies and Western
superiority narratives.
We see this pattern play
out again and again.
And modern conservatism
in Britain, France,
Germany, even Italy, and
especially in the United States.
Whether it is Trump
isn't Thatcherism or
the off day and age of COBIT 19.
The desire to
maintain the myth of
Western superiority for centuries
old developmentalist
narrative that we're
rhetorical consistency
demands the dismantling
of the welfare Structures,
Health Services, and
immigration as hard as
it is continuing to have
grave consequences.
Thank you for listening to that.
Apologies if I
spoke very quickly,
I was trying to keep
within the time limit.
Thank you. Shine straight
over to to heat FOR comments.
Hi, everyone. Can hear me.
Okay. Okay, so I'd like to think,
Julianna and that theme for
inviting me to come in on
these very interesting and
thought-provoking foods
and forgetting such
upbringing conference
by the welfare state
in bubble unfolds.
I'm gonna keep my comments
brief and I'm going to
focus on breakpoints
that particularly interesting or
I've been thinking
about any way recently.
And I think also kinda connect
the papers and directly
engaged with bajillion Matthews
framing for this conference.
The first that I find
interesting in all
of these pieces is
that they all reveal
something about the place of
the stay in the histories
of development.
In reply to him,
queens peace, Josh's
idea about she,
Hadrian volcano advances the idea
that five should be
organized and regions
rather than state.
Ie. When you're
liberated about this
a little bit more
in your talk now.
But I'm just going to put
you on the screen, right?
Josh's world, not one
of nation states,
but one of regions defined
by centers of high Liberty.
A core from which
new products and
refine processes
emanated can be coupled.
Regions are nations, parishes,
neoliberal imaginary seem to
either a direct attack
on the nation state.
And it's an attack
that's particularly,
I found particularly interesting
because if you compare
it to what we learned from
your other work about the war,
the role of the state
that it played in
the globalism of the
Austrian school.
It seemed to have a slightly
different kind of position.
It seemed when I was reading it,
I was thinking I mean, when
you were just speaking about it.
I'm slightly differently,
but it sounded right.
It more interesting than
what you wrote about.
So you really curious
to hear more about
that in a mug of ethos east,
it seems to me that
much of quote, those,
those shift from his depend
and each does past isn't
liberal president,
hinges on his earlier critique of
the alliance between the
national bourgeoisie and say,
and I'm not sure if I'm
getting this right,
but I'm wondering how
much of the critique of
the state or a certain state
isn't plays a role in this.
It is a motor and
this transition from,
from one to another.
And Charles keys, the state
of cues slightly differently.
This is not an sustaining switch,
but actually it's the
European or rather
the German Imperial stay
that casts a long shadow
on international aid
after decolonization,
even if it comes in nongovernmental
International swarms.
In fact, I think he goes
as far as to suggest
a continuity from
the mandate system
to the public prices.
Since it seems to me
that I'm not sure if
I'm getting this right,
but I think most of the
archives that you were
talking about where your key and
base rather than in
the global south,
I wanted to invite you.
Shan't talk a bit more.
What, what did it
mean in practice for
the pure healthcare
development ideologies
to shape post-war
multiple states.
So basically Europe rather
than the global south.
To ting, Do you think
perhaps with less with
Sebastian Connor and more what
scholars like dirt and
Balkin and Canada,
Harry, who have
taught us about how
the postcolonial metrical was
shaped by the end
of empire itself.
So there's a long tradition
of history of
policing the bridge.
Some British historian that,
that have been
writing about this.
What did it mean to practice
that imperial ideology
saved the system of welfare
or universal healthcare?
How did achieve the
political economy of
healthcare or on
the welfare state?
And I thought I'll explain,
I'm interested in this
because in my own work,
these questions through
welfare theorists
like kidneys for example,
who was invited by
nearer to advise,
for example, on setting up
health care for a newly
independent on the NAEP.
As well as wrote
extensively about
universal healthcare and
multi-ethnic Britain.
And for tinnitus, for example.
Who wrote during the
nodding Hill riots
and was referring to
them and is writing
the question of rights and
citizenship are crucial to
how he thought about
welfare and healthcare.
So for me, I don't know if
there's something that came
up in many other papers.
We cannot think or
understand the formation of
the welfare state separately from
the history of
development organization.
But there's a specific way
in which it played in it.
And I wanted to
invite you to kind
of expand a bit more about that.
This is curious to see how or
in what way did it appear.
So that's the 1.2nd,
which I think comes off more
clearly in quaint and
MongoDB does piece
is about the
industrialization and
the critique of browse on
dendrites in seventies.
So I guess I wanted to know
what was really the
role of then I0.
I know that was part
of the call for paper,
but what really was the
role of the NIO in?
Motivating new
imaginaries are shifting.
New ways of thinking
about the economy.
And, or whether or not it was
part of the curriculum
grows more generally,
or a turn away from
big development projects focus
on industry that served as
the historical motor
or four dishes from
Curator Catherine
volcano 04 code.
Those those shift
towards neoliberalism.
And for Sean, I thought
I'd like to hear a
bit more about whether
de industrialization,
work critique of modernization
more broadly played
a role for you.
And then, you know, the
story of health care and
aid in the seventies
and eighties.
So that's the second
and the last point.
And this is something
that came up yesterday.
Or I wanted to ask the
panelists to reflect a bit
more and it couldn't just
talk bug to hide it.
How they deploy the idea
of welfare or welfarism.
I guess I, I called it
welfarism when I was
writing this because I
thought maybe there's a way of
separating it from the
welfare state so we can
think about a longer time
period of welfarism or yeah,
greatly from the papers as
well as from other panels.
There's a certain type of binary
between welfarism and
you'd liberalism.
So the 19 seventies and
the 1980 stands as a
watershed moments from
which the neoliberal state
came from replaced
a welfare state.
And to some extent
that's quiet traditional
periodization.
However, at least in
the British case,
I think that this is
scholars like Ben Jackson,
like heat or Stillman
had been pointing
out our attention to
how the Thatcher government and
the state major government
to, more generally,
they're not simply end
welfare altogether,
but rather devise
its own alternatives
to welfare through what
the economists truncate all
redistribute as
market liberalism.
So Peter filament, for
example, in his recent book,
excellent book by heart,
speeds check it out.
Traces how the
neoliberal state took
Milton Friedman's idea of
the negative income tax and
use it to provide cash transfers
that allow citizens to
choose how to spend
their benefits and
at the same time incentivize
people to not be
dependent on them.
That's not really the
end of welfarism,
renewed liberalism
by a certain type
of modification of that.
And that is even before we get
to the nineties and sort of the,
the third, the third way.
So basically we'd like you to
kind of think through
this or reflect
about what is really kind
of the relationship between
the welfare state and
the new liberal state.
Okay, it's all the view.
Thank you. Thank you.
So maybe we can low in the
order of the pan also start
with margarita. Thank you.
Yeah, that's a great questions
and I think it pairs
up with what I was talking about.
So I think they're the,
sort of the critiques of
Cardoso in his later,
like Moore in his nearly
world present, let's call it.
I've heard the state. I do think
that that's what
I'm trying to trace
that do come to
the critique of the
developmental state itself.
And in particular, what
you pointed out to them.
The relationship
between the state
and the national bourgeoisie.
And I think one of the main,
when we think about dependency,
we sort of forget sometimes
although the literature at the
moment sort of picked it up.
Pick, pick that up.
It was what he called
the internationalists.
They get lucky.
We're saying the national
bourgeoisie is our affection.
They only exist in the mind of
this nationalists
because they are so or
getting so much ingrained with
other bourgeois CSU through
institutions like them
then multinational
corporation for instance.
So that was part
of the critiques.
So I guess going
back to Queens point
is not just a critique
of the state but of
the nation state
as they kind of as
the unit of analysis
of development, right?
Like many of the, of
the developmentally or
development experts,
worth thinking on the nation as,
as, as the unit that
had to be developed.
And so that's kind
of a little bit of
a pushback against that
direction in the case of Brazil,
it's also a critique
against populism.
It was a very strong association
between sort of this drove
state on the populous state
that figures like cut those on
part of that new
intellectual left that
emerges in the 19 sixties
and seventies are
very critical of exerted
that corporatism,
co-optation of the,
of the labor unions.
Kind of very top-down approach
that they were sort of kind
of they were arguing
against and trying
to push for a more
like us as liquids.
I like more of a bottom up,
more of civil society action
in terms of development,
but also in terms of
like political action.
And I think the point of
the NEO is interesting because
I think like, you know,
the dependencies does
seem to be very much kind
of at the crossroads of
these or seem to
match the moment of,
of the, of the discussions of
the national and
international economic order.
But that is something
that I sort of
deal more with in the book.
And he's showing that for them.
By the seventies they
have already been,
they have already worked in the
dependent to some movement
for about ten years.
So by that point
when they get there,
they're already sort
of moving up there,
moving out of that movement.
So, and they do it in
different ways like that.
For undergone their Frank,
which is kind of a
more known figure.
He's a little bit
dismissive of this and
saying like these ideas have
been actually co-opted.
They became these radical,
what he thought were
radical ideas have been
co-opted by, by the National,
he's done but that what he calls
the Bourgeois social
scientist ordered
the bourgeois intellectuals
of the world,
instead of the
radicals like himself,
particles will have a
different take on dot on
the national or international
economic order.
I think that for him,
he's a participant of the
discussions with other like
our world system
theory intellectuals
and especially with
somebody or I mean,
who's trying to do
an alternative.
With the World Social Forum,
create an alternative forum
like more radical one.
But he, in that moment,
like in the mid 19 seventies,
is when he's shifting towards
his political career.
And what he like,
clearly like walk how we call
it like an electoral
political career.
And and, and that's what
he's transforming more interesting
into thinking of like,
well, what do we need to do?
This sort of international
level discussions are not useful.
We need to thing, change
things by strengthening
civil society.
And eventually, this is going
to become a critique of,
of the state on what
he calls like sovereign
globalization,
which you would think
is sort of similar.
The New International
Economic Order
body, it's actually
quite different.
Thinking. Yeah, thanks.
So lots of those questions.
But first on the question
of anti-state ism rate.
I think you then almost
maybe I was more clear in
my presented remarks
than in my written ones,
but it's definitely
not anti status.
It's just, it's against
the idea of the nation as
a kind of space of
redistributive evenness.
So the idea that,
Let's say set federal funds
should go evenly to
all of the states.
So that was an idea
that he thought was not
adapted to economic
competitiveness
and the dynamics of
a world economy.
So you needed to think about,
well, where is the
best work being done?
How can you make other parts of
the country compete
for resources so
that they will emulate
the best practices of this
and that part of the state.
So it's, it's a way
of reconfiguring
the state to help accelerate
and internal markets
between polity,
between jurisdictions and to
make jurisdictions given within
the state act like
entrepreneurs themselves.
So to sort of seek advantage,
to capitalize on their
own endowments and so on.
Also, it's important that in
this sort of connects to
the points that my
read is making.
That there's a very strong
idea of sort of breaking what,
what he called the cartel
of organized labor and
also the cartel of
special interests
working together with the state.
So this is part of where
that kind of moral force of
the appeal to the grass roots and
civil society has some power.
My favorite example of
this is Hernando De Soto,
who is one of
the most important
development thinkers of
the last 25 years, who had a,
held a conference in
Lima at which he had two
Nobel Prize winners speaking,
Hyack and Buchanan.
And the other two
people on the panel
were unlicensed street peddlers.
And this is actually a
very powerful, I think,
rhetorical move to
sort of say, you know,
the energy of the economy is
not in the Ministry of Economics.
That's not even at the love
the multinational corporations,
it's in the streets.
So we need to go and, you
know, formal property formula.
We need to get rid of these
occupational licensing
requirements and so on.
If you look at the
manhattan institute,
their city journal
in the nineties,
it's all about saving
African-Americans in
poor neighborhoods.
Who are strangled to death by
red tape and zoning
and regulations.
So, you know, it's very
important, I think,
to see that sort of
neo-liberal counter-revolution
as it was presented.
Which was as an
attempt to kind of
unleash or liberate sort
of repressed energies
underneath the kind of the
dead hand of the cartels
of organized labor and the state.
And that actually is exactly
where that comes in or
the response to the NIH.
So it's also essential to you
that we did at the
global thought as a kind
of demanding development is
kind of the legend is used and,
and again by neoliberal as
against what they see as
sclerotic social democracy.
So when, let's say farmers
in Europe say we need
to protect European agriculture
with the Common
Agricultural Policy.
Gear says, it's
exactly your demands
that are making people
asked for this radical NIO,
We need to open up
European markets to produce
from Latin America, for example.
And then they'll
come down because
their demands will be
fulfilled through the market
instead of through this
much less efficient state
to state transfer mechanism.
When workers in Northern
Europe say, we want, you know,
standardize working times and
we want workers councils,
representation on all the
boards of corporations.
Then neoliberal say, all
you're doing is
discriminating against
Southern European countries and
Eastern European
countries and making
sure that they don't have
access to our markets, right?
So poor nations and
poorer populations
and constituencies
are always being used
as a kind of weapon
against the ends of
those who have entered
a more prosperous and well
protected and a better
redistributive regulated space.
And that dynamic I think is
really important, right?
And that's also important,
an important way to
sort of see it's
not just a top-down revolution,
but one that's sort of use,
uses the outside
against the inside
and leads to situations
where, you know,
students at my college debt in
their economics courses will
end up writing papers about
how sweatshop discourse is
racist and neo-colonial
because they're only taking
advantage of their endowment,
which is cheap labor.
And if you want fair trade and
ethical consumption than you
are actually strangling the
demands of the global south.
So the way that new
designs are sort of
realized in the core
through the use
of the demands of the
periphery is I think,
a very important dynamic
to keep an eye on here.
It'll just say one
last thing about,
about varieties of
welfarism as, as to heal.
It was sort of
suggesting, I think
that's important and I think
we need to see it that way.
That it, That's why was putting
a question mark on dismantling
the welfare state?
Or the decline of
the welfare state.
Because the welfare reforms
that have been rolled
out in Germany in
the last 20 years.
You know, they don't decrease
the role of the state.
They don't even
necessarily always
decrease the amount of spending.
They just allocate funds in
different ways and they create,
you know, new work requirements.
You know, the model of work fair,
what are so-called
€1 jobs, many jobs.
So it's not that
welfare goes away,
it's that welfare sort
of changes its face.
It becomes a question of
opportunity rather than
a quality access
rather than outcome.
And I think then it's
very important to
frame it the way he
suggests as a kind of
modulation rather than
sort of quantitative
or absolute decline
or disappearance
completed on time.
So I'm going to
actually pick up right
where we left off with
the welfarism question
because I'm actually an agreement
with plan of looking at
it and the HeLa as looking
at it as welfarism,
instead of just
this sharp creation
or sudden decline
of a welfare state.
Since we have
precedence for aspects
of what's called
the welfare state
long before precedence,
brand agonism against
that long before,
and persistence of it
in different forms.
It's really just as points out
a reallocation and
debate about access,
as I pointed out in the
conclusion of my paper,
that it's not about cost
per the state's role.
It's who has access to it.
In some of that's
formed by racism,
some of that's classism,
some of its gendered
hierarchies and forms.
But that's really what's going
on here is a redistribution of
things along ideological lines.
And so I think it's
important not to
look at it is just
this welfare state,
which was this glorious thing
that's graded and then dies,
but rather something that has
flaws and its creation
that are exploited
later and result in
this redistribution,
reallocation overtime.
As far as the other
questions about
the impact of the end of
empire on the metro poem.
There's a couple of
things with this.
Again, my specialty is more
in the twenties and thirties.
So I'm looking at a
different end of empire,
a very sudden one with
the German colonies brick
about from their
perspective brick
the way and the
Treaty of Versailles.
So it's a sudden and
rapid decolonization.
So, but there's a lot of
similarities between
what happens there and
say what Shepherd looks at with
French Algeria or post
imperial Britain,
where you've got these ideological
remnants that persist.
Even as the society itself
is transforming in terms
of health care and medicine.
To look at specific
impacts that those
have on the end of empire
and the Metropole.
What we see is in
some cases it varies
from state to state,
actor to actor,
society to society.
But we see is a persistence of
racism within
medicine and science.
Scientific and medical racism
persist in these structures.
What we, what we
see is a change and
who's exercising them the most.
One perfect example of this
is medical experimentation.
And the role of the state
and medical experimentation.
After decolonization.
So there's lots of great work,
including I had this on my show.
No, there's a great work
by Michelle, her boys.
The experiment must go on,
which talks about this
transition away from
Imperial experimentation
on colonized subjects
and how that transforms in the
post-colonial environment.
Shifting from the state playing
a much more active
role in that, too.
Pharmaceutical companies
playing a more active role
in that and the state than
taking on a more regulatory role
in response to
pharmaceutical companies.
Which leads to changes
and structures to
where the experimentation still
occurs in the formal
call it former colonies,
colonial South, the global south.
Because of less regulation,
less control compared to what
exists in the Metropole,
um, in order to prevent that
experimentation at home.
So it maintains those
distinct barriers
were colonized subjects
were formerly colonized.
Subjects are subject
to experimentation,
but in a different framework.
So there's a lot of continuities,
even as structures change.
As far as access to health care,
a lot of this gets framed
more around
citizenship questions,
particularly in terms of
our former colonial subjects
considered citizens,
are migrants considered citizens?
See a lot of debate
about citizenship.
Your farm iron ore piece worked,
I think a really essential to
consider when it comes
to thinking about
the welfare state.
That citizenship dynamic
and the discourse of
citizenship transforms has
an impact on healthcare.
In particular, since this
is viewed as a privilege.
We also see this with veterans
rights groups as well,
who counts as a veteran of it,
counts as a military
subject of the state,
and who has rights
to the benefits.
So there's militarism there too,
that's inherited from
Empire as well that we
see persist at the end of empire.
As far as the Metropole changing,
I see a lot more continuity
than I do transformation.
It's just adaptation on
a theme in my perspective
more frequently.
Not that I disagree with works by
Balkan or carry or others,
that point too drastic changes.
I see a lot more continuity
and adaptation of empire
instead of that
answered the question,
sorry, I keep running out of
breath because I
get excited talk.
So thanks yen.
So we have a first
question from Christina.
And then I'm going to ask Stefan,
Ted's life to bundle
those questions with
some questions that I
received privately
from Stephanie mind
she had to jump off,
but she has some
questions for all of you.
So go ahead, Kristy.
Great. Thank you.
My question is
mostly for margarita
And to a lesser extent for quinn.
So I'm sorry, shot him.
Although I did want to
recommend the work of
my colleague here at Johns
Hopkins as a sociologist,
you might kind of fall
outside the frame,
but it's a historical sociologist
called Alexander White,
who's working on kind
of long histories
of race in epidemic.
Control from the 19th
to the 20th century.
So you might find fruitful
points of contact.
Their margarita, I'm, you know,
I'm really excited to
read your work and I
we've been talking about this
stuff for such a long time.
So I'm really excited to see
this new work on for
another OD gate,
particularly as you were talking,
it occurred to me
one of the categories that we
haven't actually talked about
during this conference.
But and this is why this
is a question also for
Quinn but maybe for also for
other people present it.
I'm thinking of maybe
Juliano paper yesterday and
maybe Chelsea's work and
some of the other
people who presented,
it strikes me that one of
the most operative
political categories in
Brazil today is the
category of corruption.
And that the critique of
Corruption sounds to me
very similar to the
way that you're
narrating Fernando into biggies,
transition and his
kind of critique of
nationalist state-led
development into a later period.
And so I wonder, maybe if your
work gives us some kind of
pre-history into the
political mobilization
of the category of corruption
that we're seeing today.
And I'm wondering
if that shows up
in anybody else's work.
Like I'm wondering if
the people you're
talking about Quinn
are talking about corruption as
a kind of endemic problem.
And what that might say about
precisely this transition
into neoliberalism.
And I'm actually
wondering about the kind
of the reason that
this came up for me
as I've been trying to
think through and puzzle
through this weird
thing that's going
on in Mexico right now.
Which is that the current
president of Mexico,
who is this sort of
left populist who's
been trying to get into
the presidency for years
and years and years.
He arrives, he has this
leftist political platform,
but one of his main
talking points has been,
and he has implemented
this thing.
He's, he calls Republican
austerity AF stereo. I'm
going to cool Uganda.
And the idea is,
is a state austerity that cuts
out all of the ways in which
the previous
neoliberal governments
were actually deeply
entwined with
national and
international capital
and use the state to kind
of doled out favors
to capitalists.
And so obviously, the corruption
is interesting because
it can kind of go,
it's not just to the
neoliberal accused,
the status of corruption and
Ben has a kind of
afterlife after that.
So I'm wondering, for
the two of you have
corruption comes up as
an operative category.
And if anybody else you know,
things that have been presented,
if that arrives as well.
Thanks. Thanks. I'll take that.
I don't know. Should
I jump in, Juliana?
I do know. Is that pleased?
Okay. Thank you, Kristi,
for that question.
I you know, I I'm going to keep
it in mind as I kind of
go back to kind of the,
the, the readings of the,
of he's writing some of the
17 seventies and eighties,
but I haven't particularly notice
that as a sort of an
operative category,
there's other types of language.
There's more about like
corporatism or
co-optation, or like.
Then than it is, or like the,
the very, how do you collect
fakeness of populism?
You know, the, the
semblance that there is
something kind of
progressive going on,
but actually it isn't
on, on, on populism.
That's, that's the sort
of major critiques that I
find in sort of
the formulation of an
anti status critique.
But, but I will, you know,
that's very good point and I will
keep it in mind this I read and I
will get back to you
if I find something
that seems useful to kind of
but isn't isn't interesting.
I hadn't thought about
it, so thank you.
Yeah. In my case, it's I
would say that the charge
of corruption is less there
than sort of as
margarita is saying,
that the discussion of sort of
clientelism or patron
client networks.
I think the thing is that
neither bull's eye look at
would be less likely to
be charging them with corruption
and more just seeing them
as Economo subjects,
just following incentives, right?
I mean, corruption for them
is just the outcome of
people doing what they're
being liked to do by,
let's say, large-scale
state-to-state transfers.
Those people then
redistribute to their,
to their friends and so on.
In a way they don't see that as
bad as the logical outcome.
So therefore, you need to
change the incentives,
get a different outcome
to get the two,
to get, to get at the
core of corruption.
Then I think that when
you hit the nineties,
of course, corruption
is a huge topic.
And then the, this is something
actually that hazily bodily
just pointed out in a,
in a a zoom conversation
she had with as he's
Ronald last night.
Which is that we need to talk
about the kind of
Washington Consensus
historically as also bundled with
huge discourse on rule
of law and transparency.
So the actual, the Neil a roll
out through the
International Institute,
financial institutions in the
eighties and nineties was
as much about law as it
was about economics.
I actually think
that that's true.
I've written a bit
about that myself.
And I think that the way that
corruption comes in then it is
as the kind of the shadow side or
the dark side of the
normatively positive thing,
which is something
called rule of law,
which the works of people
like Katrina store
have shown is
interpreted basically to
mean the US certainty
for investors or
kind of the stability of
covenant investment climate
for mobile capital.
But I think that that's
one than the sort of
dark figure of corruption enters
the discourse most clearly
rather than, are there.
Great, thanks. John,
would you like to say
anything or you show a
moment to the next question?
I just wanted to
tell Dr. Thornton,
thank you fast for the
recommendation of Alexander white.
So I will definitely look into
that. Sounds fascinating.
Great. Thank you. So Stefan,
let me know that he is happy
with the answer that Quint
already gave to the question
any type in the chat box.
So then we will have Andrew
seat and ask a question,
which I will then bundle with
Stephanie much. Go ahead, Andrew.
I'm, I'm onreceive.
I'm a PhD candidate at
New York University.
And I work on the history of
the National Palace and
sexual democracy in
post-war person.
So I have a question for show,
shown as a relaxed paper.
I was really interested to know
how you would place
the narrative that
you've told in relation to war
in recent years has
been a kind of resurgence
of interest in,
in universal health care.
Kind of achieving
universal health care.
As advocate,
particularly like that,
WHO is returned to trying to
achieve universal health
care quite explicitly,
kind of saying that they're
going to try and support him.
Whereas in 1978 with the
Alma Ata Declaration,
obviously they can achieve that.
There were also some
16 recent successes
in achieving the ILO,
quite important in this areas.
Helping countries like Thailand
achieve universal health care,
I think in 2002.
And there is some
kind of scholars,
historians of global health,
quite optimistic like
Martin Gorski about
the chances of achieving
universal health care.
And they kind of made me think of
Quentin's point about whether
health care is a kind of
section to the decline of,
of the welfare state.
Is the scenario where kind of
solid arrested universalist
politics is possible.
As I wondered, how
would you put your,
your narrative that you told
about the kind of legacies,
that pile of justice
and inequalities that do
exist for the university.
How do you put that
in relation to
this resurgence of interest in it
by stocks for organizations,
bikes, or group.
Well, thank you, Andrew.
The narrative I'm sorry.
Shine. When is it okay if we
bundle the questions
from Stephanie,
match just in the
interest of time and
then I forgot that. No worries.
It actually works
out well because
the other questions are one
for metadata, N1 for quinn.
So each of you then we'll
have a few minutes to
answer and then we'll
wrap up for today.
Ok. So Stephanie mage apologizes
she had to run off to
another conference,
but she will be watching
your responses later.
I'll make the video
available to her.
So here is her question
slash comment format.
Getty died. She says First,
I just want to say that
I love this project.
Picasso is a
fascinating figure and
an analysis of his trajectory
would be a great contribution.
I wonder if my Getty to
has thought about cut,
does those trajectory
alongside the trajectory of
the Brazilian Party landscape in
general and the Social
Democratic Party in particular.
With an eye to accounting
to what was happening in
parties in terms of party
organization and practices,
dominant factions, et cetera,
and how that shaped
his descendants.
And then 70 my jostle has
a question for Quinn,
which is one of the interesting
things about Girish has
his role in international
institutions
in the late 19 seventies.
And thinking here
of his membership
in the group that produce
the OECD's 1977 report.
Towards full employment
and price stability,
which among other things,
help to internationalize
the rational expectations
turn in economics.
How does this fit into
an analysis of Girish has
intellectual trajectory?
It seems likely that it should
be significant given that
the OECD report was published in
the same year that he
condemned the NIH E0.
Okay. So let's go maybe in
reverse panel order this time.
So have Sean, Quinn
and then metadata.
You'll wrap us up. My apologies.
If each of you could try to limit
your answers to about a
minute, a minute and a half.
That would be terrific so
that we can end on time.
I'm so sorry. Go ahead, John.
Thank you for the great
question, Andrea.
I'm going to try to
be quick with this.
The narrative I told was one,
to explain the origins of
the antagonism towards
universal health care.
I actually share Quinn and Gorski
is optimism about the
likelihood of it occurring,
at least in the not
too distant future
of universal health care actually
starting become more successful,
especially as we
see this narrative
among conservatives and liberals,
if we want to use that
term more broadly,
has resulted in this
drastic failure,
especially encoded 19.
So Empires trajectory
with the antagonism,
that imperial legacy,
he antagonism
towards universal healthcare for
these developmentalist reasons.
I think the legs are
starting to be cut
out from under it.
So I think it's
beginning to reach,
beginning to reach
the end of its arcs.
So that's where I would fit
in with this narrative.
So I was outlining the
intellectual origins
of that conservative framework,
as opposed to saying that
universal health care
will never happen.
I actually think it will
be an exception that will
start to went out more
and more over time.
Just as quite as pointed out,
it has been somewhat of
an exception over time.
As it starts to expand.
I think there will be
some resistance at
each stage with some Hold on
from this older ideology.
But I think like Gorski,
There is a hope if
the world health organization
survives this
pandemic and loss of
funding and various
avenues that we could see
more pushes towards global
universal health care.
Or even in the United States,
at least I think some form
of national health service
in the near future,
given the extreme failures with
the current system
playing, Take it away.
Yeah, that's a great point
from from Stephanie.
I actually have to admit
I didn't know about
his participation in
that OECD commission.
He's definitely like
a mover and shaker.
I know that Charlie mayor,
Sadie madam at the Brookings
Institution some years ago,
he was kind of all over
the place and very active
also with proposals about
the European monetary union.
So he was part of a cohort
of neoliberal
economists who really
wanted to have parallel
competing currencies
rather than a single
unified currency.
But I'll just take that
as a chance to promote
the great work that others have
done on the OECD specifically.
Th melters book on the
hegemony of growth,
which actually really takes
on board this question of
how global north
industrialized countries
responded to the demands of
the New International
Economic Order.
Sort of co-opting some of
them and repressing others.
And trying to fold
it into a kind of a
still North managed
growth framework.
And I would guess without knowing
concretely that the commission
that Stephanie is referring to.
But as part of that
attempt to kind of to
fold radical redistributive and
even perhaps demands for
colonial reparations
into a kind of participatory
free trade regulatory framework.
Oh, sorry.
Thank you for the
question too, I think.
But about the party structure
and I need to do a
lot more of that,
especially for the
early nineties,
like the 1981-82 period on
which this is the end of the,
of the military rule
in the beginning of,
of the democracy,
there's a multiplication
of, of parties.
In Brazil. We like to
sort of the opposition
to them editorial belong
to these Umbrella Party.
Hi, everybody that western
opposition to the dictatorship.
And gradually throughout
the eighties,
they divide themselves into
different, into
different parties.
And Cardozo has one,
establishes one that is the
Social Democratic party.
And I think it is
crucial what Stephanie,
I think I mentioned was there's
a moment in the electoral
or they run to
the presidency that he
decides to kind of break,
or he's party decides
to break with
alliances with the left such as
the Workers Party and begins
alliances with the
electoral political right,
the party so on the right.
So I think that is definitely
important and he is he's a,
as I said, he's an
institution builder.
So for us to kind
of look at the, uh,
he's role in creating these
new kind of political,
any intellectually front
structures will be very useful.
So I will definitely keep
my mind on that. Thank you.
Grade but a huge thank you to
our three panelists and
the commentator for
another fabulous day.
And I'm looking
forward to seeing you
all tomorrow for the
concluding roundtable.
Alas. Excuse me.
I'll then Yang had to cancel
his participation last minute.
But PLL, Sam, mine and
70 image as well as
myself and all of you,
I hope, will be there as well.
As we pull together
various threads that we've
discussed over the course
of the past few days.
And also discuss the
possibility of putting together
a special issue for
a journal along the themes
that have been raised
by the conference.
So thank you all for
your fabulous participation and
I look forward to
seeing you tomorrow.
Have a good day. I Hi.
