Teleology or finality is a reason or explanation
for something in function of its end, purpose,
or goal. It is derived from two Greek words:
telos (end, goal, purpose) and logos (reason,
explanation). A purpose that is imposed by
a human use, such as that of a fork, is called
extrinsic. Natural teleology, common in classical
philosophy but controversial today, contends
that natural entities also have intrinsic
purposes, irrespective of human use or opinion.
For instance, Aristotle claimed that an acorn's
intrinsic telos is to become a fully grown
oak tree.Though ancient atomists rejected
the notion of natural teleology, teleological
accounts of non-personal or non-human nature
were explored and often endorsed in ancient
and medieval philosophies, but fell into disfavor
during the modern era (1600–1900). In the
late 18th century, Immanuel Kant used the
concept of telos as a regulative principle
in his Critique of Judgment. Teleology was
also fundamental to the speculative philosophy
of Georg Hegel.
Contemporary philosophers and scientists are
still discussing whether teleological axioms
are useful or accurate in proposing modern
philosophies and scientific theories. For
instance, in 2012, Thomas Nagel proposed a
non-Darwinian account of evolution that incorporates
impersonal and natural teleological laws to
explain the existence of life, consciousness,
rationality, and objective value. Regardless,
the accuracy can also be considered independently
from the usefulness: it is a common experience
in pedagogy that a minimum of apparent teleology
can be useful in thinking about and explaining
Darwinian evolution even if there is no true
teleology driving evolution. Thus it is easier
to say that evolution "gave" wolves sharp
canine teeth because those teeth "serve the
purpose of" predation regardless of whether
there is an underlying nonteleologic reality
in which evolution is not an actor with intentions.
In other words, because human cognition and
learning often rely on the narrative structure
of stories (with actors, goals, and proximal
rather than distal causation), some minimal
level of teleology might be recognized as
useful or at least tolerable for practical
purposes even by people who reject its cosmologic
accuracy.
== Etymology ==
The word teleology builds on the Greek τέλος,
telos (root: τελε-, "end, purpose") and
-λογία, logia, "a branch of learning".
The German philosopher Christian von Wolff
coined the term (in the Latin form "teleologia")
in 1728 in his work Philosophia rationalis,
sive logica.
== Historical overview ==
In western philosophy, the term and concept
of teleology originated in the writings of
Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle's Four Causes
give special place to each thing's telos or
"final cause." In this, he followed Plato
in seeing purpose in both human and sub-human
nature.
=== Platonic ===
In the Phaedo, Plato through Socrates argues
that true explanations for any given physical
phenomenon must be teleological. He bemoans
those who fail to distinguish between a thing's
necessary and sufficient causes, which he
identifies respectively as material and final
causes (Phaedo 98–99):
Imagine not being able to distinguish the
real cause, from that without which the cause
would not be able to act, as a cause. It is
what the majority appear to do, like people
groping in the dark; they call it a cause,
thus giving it a name that does not belong
to it. That is why one man surrounds the earth
with a vortex to make the heavens keep it
in place, another makes the air support it
like a wide lid. As for their capacity of
being in the best place they could be at this
very time, this they do not look for, nor
do they believe it to have any divine force,
but they believe that they will some time
discover a stronger and more immortal Atlas
to hold everything together more, and they
do not believe that the truly good and 'binding'
binds and holds them together.
Plato here argues that while the materials
that compose a body are necessary conditions
for its moving or acting in a certain way,
they nevertheless cannot be the sufficient
condition for its moving or acting as it does.
For example, (given in Phaedo 98), if Socrates
is sitting in an Athenian prison, the elasticity
of his tendons is what allows him to be sitting,
and so a physical description of his tendons
can be listed as necessary conditions or auxiliary
causes of his act of sitting (Phaedo 99b;
Timaeus 46c9–d4, 69e6). However, these are
only necessary conditions of Socrates' sitting.
To give a physical description of Socrates'
body is to say that Socrates is sitting, but
it does not give us any idea why it came to
be that he was sitting in the first place.
To say why he was sitting and not not sitting,
we have to explain what it is about his sitting
that is good, for all things brought about
(i.e., all products of actions) are brought
about because the actor saw some good in them.
Thus, to give an explanation of something
is to determine what about it is good. Its
goodness is its actual cause—its purpose,
telos or "reason for which" (Timaeus 27d8–29a).
=== Aristotelian ===
Aristotle argued that Democritus was wrong
to attempt to reduce all things to mere necessity,
because doing so neglects the aim, order,
and "final cause", which brings about these
necessary conditions:
Democritus, however, neglecting the final
cause, reduces to necessity all the operations
of nature. Now, they are necessary, it is
true, but yet they are for a final cause and
for the sake of what is best in each case.
Thus nothing prevents the teeth from being
formed and being shed in this way; but it
is not on account of these causes but on account
of the end....
In the Physics Aristotle rejected Plato's
assumption that the universe was created by
an intelligent designer using eternal forms
as his model. For Aristotle, natural ends
are produced by "natures" (principles of change
internal to living things), and natures, Aristotle
argued, do not deliberate:
"It is absurd to suppose that ends are not
present [in nature] because we do not see
an agent deliberating."
These Platonic and Aristotelian arguments
ran counter to those presented earlier by
Democritus and later by Lucretius, both of
whom were supporters of what is now often
called accidentalism:
Nothing in the body is made in order that
we may use it. What happens to exist is the
cause of its use.
== Disfavor ==
Since the Novum Organum of Francis Bacon,
teleological explanations in physical science
tend to be deliberately avoided in favor of
focus on material and efficient explanations.
Final and formal causation came to be viewed
as false or too subjective. Nonetheless, some
disciplines, in particular within evolutionary
biology, continue to use language that appears
teleological when they describe natural tendencies
towards certain end conditions; although some
argue that these arguments ought to be, and
practicably can be, rephrased in non-teleological
forms, others hold that teleological language
cannot always be easily expunged from descriptions
in the life sciences, at least within the
bounds of practical pedagogy. This is discussed
further below.
== Economics ==
A teleology of human aims played a crucial
role in the work of Ludwig von Mises especially
in the development of his science of praxeology.
More specifically he believed that human action,
i.e. purposeful behavior, is teleological
based on the presupposition that an individual's
action is governed or caused by the existence
of their chosen ends. Or in other words an
individual selects what they believe to be
the most appropriate means to achieve a sought
after goal or end. Mises however also stressed
that teleology with respect to human action
was by no means independent of causality as
he states "no action can be devised and ventured
upon without definite ideas about the relation
of cause and effect, teleology presupposes
causality"
== Modern and postmodern philosophy ==
Historically, teleology may be identified
with the philosophical tradition of Aristotelianism.
The rationale of teleology was explored by
Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgement
and, again, made central to speculative philosophy
by Hegel and in the various neo-Hegelian schools
– proposing a history of our species some
consider to be at variance with Darwin, as
well as with the dialectical materialism of
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and with what
is now called analytic philosophy – the
point of departure is not so much formal logic
and scientific fact but 'identity'. (In Hegel's
terminology: 'objective spirit'.)
Individual human consciousness, in the process
of reaching for autonomy and freedom, has
no choice but to deal with an obvious reality:
the collective identities (such as the multiplicity
of world views, ethnic, cultural and national
identities) that divide the human race and
set (and always have set) different groups
in violent conflict with each other. Hegel
conceived of the 'totality' of mutually antagonistic
world-views and life-forms in history as being
'goal-driven', that is, oriented towards an
end-point in history. The 'objective contradiction'
of 'subject' and 'object' would eventually
'sublate' into a form of life that leaves
violent conflict behind. This goal-oriented,
'teleological' notion of the 'historical process
as a whole' is present in a variety of 20th-century
authors, although its prominence declined
drastically after the Second World War.
In contrast, teleological based "grand narratives"
are eschewed by the postmodern attitude and
teleology may be viewed as reductive, exclusionary
and harmful to those whose stories are diminished
or overlooked.Against this postmodern position,
Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that a narrative
understanding of oneself, of one's capacity
as an independent reasoner, one's dependence
on others and on the social practices and
traditions in which one participates, all
tend towards an ultimate good of liberation.
Social practices may themselves be understood
as teleologically oriented to internal goods,
for example practices of philosophical and
scientific inquiry are teleologically ordered
to the elaboration of a true understanding
of their objects. MacIntyre's book After Virtue
famously dismissed the naturalistic teleology
of Aristotle's 'metaphysical biology', but
he has cautiously moved from that book's account
of a sociological teleology toward an exploration
of what remains valid in a more traditional
teleological naturalism.
== Ethics ==
Teleology informs the study of ethics.
=== Business ethics ===
Business people commonly think in terms of
purposeful action as in, for example, management
by objectives. Teleological analysis of business
ethics leads to consideration of the full
range of stakeholders in any business decision,
including the management, the staff, the customers,
the shareholders, the country, humanity and
the environment.
=== Medical ethics ===
Teleology provides a moral basis for the professional
ethics of medicine, as physicians are generally
concerned with outcomes and must therefore
know the telos of a given treatment paradigm.
=== Consequentialism ===
The broad spectrum of consequentialist ethics,
of which utilitarianism is a well-known example,
focuses on the end result or consequences,
with such principles as utilitarian philosopher
John Stuart Mill's "the greatest good for
the greatest number", or the Principle of
Utility. Hence, this principle is teleological,
but in a broader sense than is elsewhere understood
in philosophy. In the classical notion, teleology
is grounded in the inherent natures of things
themselves, whereas in consequentialism, teleology
is imposed on nature from outside by the human
will. Consequentialist theories justify inherently
what most people would call evil acts by their
desirable outcomes, if the good of the outcome
outweighs the bad of the act. So, for example,
a consequentialist theory would say it was
acceptable to kill one person in order to
save two or more other people. These theories
may be summarized by the maxim "the ends can
justify the means."
Consequentialism stands in contrast to the
more classical notions of deontological ethics,
such as Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative,
and Aristotle's virtue ethics (although formulations
of virtue ethics are also often consequentialist
in derivation). In deontological ethics, the
goodness or badness of individual acts is
primary and a desirable larger goal is insufficient
to justify bad acts committed on the way to
that goal, even if the bad acts are relatively
minor and the goal is major (like telling
a small lie to prevent a war and save millions
of lives). In requiring all constituent acts
to be good, deontological ethics is much more
rigid than consequentialism, which varies
by circumstances.
Practical ethics are usually a mix of the
two. For example, Mill also relies on deontic
maxims to guide practical behavior, but they
must be justifiable by the principle of utility.
== Science ==
In modern science, explanations that rely
on teleology are often, but not always, avoided,
either because they are unnecessary or because
whether they are true or false is thought
to be beyond the ability of human perception
and understanding to judge. But using teleology
as an explanatory style, in particular within
evolutionary biology, is still controversial.
=== Biology ===
Apparent teleology is a recurring issue in
evolutionary biology, much to the consternation
of some writers.Statements which imply that
nature has goals, for example where a species
is said to do something "in order to" achieve
survival, appear teleological, and therefore
invalid. Usually, it is possible to rewrite
such sentences to avoid the apparent teleology.
Some biology courses have incorporated exercises
requiring students to rephrase such sentences
so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless,
biologists still frequently write in a way
which can be read as implying teleology even
if that is not the intention. These issues
have recently been discussed by John Reiss.
He argues that evolutionary biology can be
purged of such teleology by rejecting the
analogy of natural selection as a watchmaker;
other arguments against this analogy have
also been promoted by writers such as Richard
Dawkins.Some authors, like James Lennox, have
argued that Darwin was a teleologist, while
others like Michael Ghiselin described this
claim as a myth promoted by misinterpretations
of his discussions and emphasized the distinction
between using teleological metaphors and being
teleological.Biologist philosopher Francisco
Ayala has argued that all statements about
processes can be trivially translated into
teleological statements, and vice versa, but
that teleological statements are more explanatory
and cannot be disposed of. Karen Neander has
argued that the modern concept of biological
'function' is dependent upon selection. So,
for example, it is not possible to say that
anything that simply winks into existence
without going through a process of selection
has functions. We decide whether an appendage
has a function by analysing the process of
selection that led to it. Therefore, any talk
of functions must be posterior to natural
selection and function cannot be defined in
the manner advocated by Reiss and Dawkins.
Ernst Mayr states that "adaptedness... is
an a posteriori result rather than an a priori
goal-seeking." Various commentators view the
teleological phrases used in modern evolutionary
biology as a type of shorthand. For example,
S. H. P. Madrell writes that "the proper but
cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary
adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter
overtly teleological statements" for the sake
of saving space, but that this "should not
be taken to imply that evolution proceeds
by anything other than from mutations arising
by chance, with those that impart an advantage
being retained by natural selection." J. B.
S. Haldane said, "Teleology is like a mistress
to a biologist: he cannot live without her
but he's unwilling to be seen with her in
public."Selected-effects accounts, like the
one Neander suggests, face objections due
to their reliance on etiological accounts,
which some fields lack the resources to accommodate.
Many such sciences, which study the same traits
and behaviors regarded by evolutionary biology,
still correctly attribute teleological functions
without appeal to selection history. Gualtiero
Piccinini and Corey J. Maley are a proponent
of one such account which focuses instead
on goal-contribution. With the objective goals
of organisms being survival and inclusive
fitness, Piccinini and Maley define teleological
functions to be “a stable contribution by
a trait (or component, activity, property)
of organisms belonging to a biological population
to an objective goal of those organisms.”
=== Cybernetics ===
Julian Bigelow, Arturo Rosenblueth, and Norbert
Wiener have conceived of feedback mechanisms
as lending a teleology to machinery. Wiener,
a mathematician, coined the term 'cybernetics'
to denote the study of "teleological mechanisms."
Cybernetics is the study of the communication
and control of regulatory feedback both in
living beings and machines, and in combinations
of the two. In the cybernetic classification
presented in "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology",
teleology is feedback controlled purpose.The
classification system underlying cybernetics
was criticized by Frank Honywill George, who
cited the need for an external observability
to the purposeful behavior in order to establish
and validate the goal-seeking behavior. In
this view, the purpose of observing and observed
systems is respectively distinguished by the
system's subjective autonomy and objective
control.
== See also
