Good afternoon,
ladies and gentlemen.
It's a great honor
for me to be here.
I couldn't hesitate
this invitation.
So pardon my English.
I'm not a native speaker.
I don't work in English.
It's a second language
and I use it occasionally.
But while it's hard to
believe in these times,
one needs to fly like 10 hours
to feel almost like at home,
apart from the language and
some architectural details.
I never felt this, like this
before in the United States.
Because we, I mean democrats in
different places of the world,
but especially in your country
and my country, we are say,
brothers in troubles as we've
never been in my lifetime.
What most of you Americans know
about the current situation
in Poland?
You obviously know
that we got crazy.
And in general terms,
it's right, unfortunately.
But forgive me please,
frankly speaking,
it's almost the
same we in Poland
know about you here in the US.
So you know we got crazy
and we know you got crazy.
You have elected
Donald Trump and we
have elected Andrzej Duda.
It's not the same.
But in my opinion, it
represents the same problem.
Both of us also know
very well that people
in some other countries
got crazy too,
like Italians who elected
Berlusconi and they did it
again.
Like in France, people
almost elected Madame Le Pen.
British voters voted for Brexit.
And Germans, those most
predictable and boring
political community in
the post-war Europe,
they were unable to create
a new government for months.
In democratic
narrative, it's usually
described as populist
[INAUDIBLE] situation.
They have won some
Western states.
In other states, they are
growing and complicating
political business as usual.
It seems to be alarming.
It seems to be epidemic.
But WHO is silent, because
it's not a medical case.
It's strictly political case.
And it's not about the
major ideas of the West,
in my opinion.
Particularly, it's not about
the very idea of democracy,
market economy, and freedom.
The vast majority still
believe in the basic set
of liberal ideas
that it used to.
So so-called populists claim
they represent the same values.
They claim to be real democrats,
real patriots, real market
oriented economists, and real
freedom fighters, at least
in Poland.
Populists claim they are real
representation of values,
all [INAUDIBLE],,
all they talk about.
They do it because
liberal values are still
variable for Western societies,
including Americans, Poles,
and so on.
So, what is this crisis about?
In my opinion, it's about
institutions and people.
Perhaps to some
extent, it's also
about advanced tools of social
manipulation like [INAUDIBLE]
technology, of big scale
political profiling,
and [? microtargeting. ?]
But this
is a proof, not an alternative
explanation in my opinion.
To make a long story
short, it seems to me
that institutions
are generally OK.
At least as it has always been.
And people are
generally OK as always.
The problem is, that they
no more fit each other.
That is why people,
and in Poland
we feel it very deeply, that
is why people feel they've
lost control over institutions.
And many of us feel institutions
lost control over reality,
including people of course.
Contemporary people
and institutions
are from different
historical periods.
Democratic institutions we
use are from the 19th century.
People around us are
from the 21st century.
Almost everything around
belongs to the 21st century,
with an exception for
parliaments, political parties,
or elections.
And what could add to this list,
school and the 20th century
media as tools of socialization.
Why is it so crucial now
and it was not 20 years ago?
Because, in this time,
a peaceful revolution
happened as a result
of digitalization
and globalization.
These two factors changed
everything and everybody,
including me and all
of you internally.
The famous "Future
Shock" is here.
Alvin Toffler was
right of course.
And even more than
he could expect.
Technology changed us
and everything around us.
Our families are different.
Our kids are different.
Our relations with
others are different.
Societies are different.
States are different.
Economies, different.
Production, distribution,
media are different as well.
Distribution of knowledge
and skills is different.
Position of experts,
including universities,
is much different.
And yes, global and social
balance or imbalance of power
is different as well.
These changes create huge
opportunities and progress
in many fields.
But for political order,
the most important factor
is, they create instability.
We are happy with each
new Tesla car or iPhone.
But we are alarmed
with instability,
uncertainty, loneliness
in front of privatization
of [INAUDIBLE]
understandable [? racism. ?]
This, everybody knows
and many of us feel.
The popular belief is,
that no hopes and dreams
as [INAUDIBLE] but fears became
the major political drive.
In Poland, it's easy to see.
And of course, it's socially
unacceptable in longer terms.
Nobody likes to live
with constant fear.
And if you look at
the Polish revolution,
this is a revolution of
fears, not of expectations,
not of needs, not of
inequality, just of fears.
It creates unsustainable
political order
because citizens are
looking for anybody who
will promise to reduce fears.
We know it from history
and very little has
come from this knowledge yet.
More and more people request
change to reduce those fears.
And populists offer solutions
or illusions of solutions,
while liberal democratic
elites of the status quo
offer mostly
awareness of necessity
or rather, illusion
of necessity.
The political
competition in Poland
between populistic illusion
of reducing fears, solutions,
and the liberal
democratic illusions
of necessity of these fears.
So says [INAUDIBLE],, who
is [INAUDIBLE] doing?
Leaders of status
quo political parties
say, we will show you how
to deal with your fears,
while so-called
populists say, we
will liberate you
from your fears.
This is like religion,
liberation from fears.
Status quo says, you must
change yourself and your life
to fit into the new world.
And new populists say, the
world must change to fit you.
Status quo requests
us to change.
Populists request
the world to change.
In Poland as well as in
many other countries,
liberal democracy
get into this trap.
Bronislaw Komorowski, who lost
his second presidential term
to the current
president, Andrzej Duda,
famously said, you must change
your job and take a mortgage,
when during
presidential campaign,
a young man asked
him how should he
live earning not enough
to rent an apartment.
And Duda's staff answer was,
we will provide assistance.
That is the essence of
populistic challenge.
But isn't it also an
expression of brotherhood?
Part of the fundament
of democratic ideas?
Of course, populists
are unable to deliver
everything they promise.
Even majority of
peace constituents
announce that is impossible.
But peace delivers
something more important
now after years of
growing, humiliating fears.
They deliver recognition,
attention, concern.
In place of yes, we can,
they put yes, we care.
That's the substantial change.
The constituency of
[? PiS ?] is ready to forgive
Kaczynski his mistakes, at least
to some point, which is today
perhaps.
Because it believes
he is at least
trying to provide relief, while
liberal Democrats don't even
try.
Liberals are saying,
we create progress
and it will make
your life better.
And yes, it's better, at
least in some dimensions,
and at least for
part of the society.
But it doesn't reduce fears.
Because you are still afraid
that you will lose what
you got.
Peace demonstrates there
are good reasons for fears,
and they will reduce it, while
Democrats demonstrate fears
come from weakness
of everybody in front
of inevitability, of the right.
We know these fears and its
possible political outcome
for at least a decade from 2008.
But the fact is, we are
unable to address it
with proper policies.
Even if we suppose we know
what policies would answer
to these fears properly,
existing political institutions
are unable to implement
these policies.
[INAUDIBLE] tax
is a good example.
But there are hundreds
of other cases.
Thank you.
Generally, liberal
democracy is still
delivering good
things like freedoms
and some economic growth.
But in just two
decades, it has been
delivering less and less
feeling of security, safety,
and optimism.
These three more and
more missing factors
together with no
means of communication
created a demand for a new
political hope, vision,
and promise.
Populists deliver it.
Democrats do not.
Here we come to
my major message.
Populism is not the problem.
It is only a symptom of
our fundamental problem.
Populists just do their job.
The real problem
we have is with us,
with liberal democrats
and liberal democracy.
If you want to preserve
liberal democracy, free market,
and freedoms,
democrats must change
and we must reshape democracy.
In Poland this is clear.
When the populists
try to change reality,
democrats try to preserve it.
For many people it
looks like populists
try to regain the security
and safety for Poles,
and Democrats try to
regain previous insecure
and for many unsafe, order.
In which [? old ?]
elites were advantaged.
The problem is, among
Polish democrats,
there are many ideas
and debates concerning
punishment for a populace
when they will already
be out of power.
There are some dreams
about restoration
of liberal democratic order.
But there are very
few ideas and debates
about new, sustainable
social and political order,
who will build if you
are in power again.
In very short, populists in
Poland, but not only there,
try to build a different world.
Democrats are all the time
defending the old one.
That is not only because of
what Thomas Kuhn described
as defense of paradigm.
Yes, old elite is defending old
paradigm, in which its members
were educated and recognized.
This is natural that old elites
defend their achievements
and legitimacy.
But defensive
position of democrats
comes also from a
long time experience,
like 20 years or something
like that, which teaches us
that within the contemporary
democratic order,
it's impossible, or extremely
difficult to deliver substance,
deliver substantial change.
If you wanted more Social
Security, impossible.
More equality, impossible,
more safety, hardly possible,
even at the expense
of many freedoms.
Even after 2008, very few
things could be changed.
Elites of status quo defended
it so effectively that even tax
havens are as safe as it were.
While perhaps it seems to
be a bit exotic for you
that Poles care about tax
havens, but they do, yes.
It's a very popular
subject in the country,
and a big social pressure
on the government
to do something with
that, very difficult.
The message I like
to mark with bold
is, autocratic populists grow
because liberal democracy lost
the ability to change itself and
to accommodate to the changing
environment in
which it's existing
and which creates
unacceptable social stress.
Of course saying
unacceptable, I must
mark that it's not objective.
It's subjective.
But politics is
subjective all the time.
I'm not that Marxist to say
to say this is determined.
It's about what people feel.
This inability is
due to the fact
that mechanisms of the
entire human equilibrium
changed substantially
in the last two decades
with an exception for
political structures.
Our old political
institutions are
being crafted by new powers.
You may call it revolution
or cultural revolution,
doesn't matter.
People are more and more alarmed
with the direction many things
change.
But liberal democrat is not
able to offer an answer.
Somebody has to
fill up the vacuum.
And so-called populists do.
I say so-called populists,
because it's not the truth
that only they are wrong.
Populists
underestimate obstacles
when democrats
underestimate possibilities.
Sometimes they are
uninformed or so,
and sometimes we
are misinformed.
In Poland, they were
uninformed about,
for example, complicity
of Polish-Jewish relations
and about importance of
free speech and democracy.
When we were misinformed
by mainstream economists
about the possible economic and
social outcome of famous 500
zlotys government checks
for every second child.
So, partly everybody is wrong.
They underestimate one
problem they created
and we overestimate another
problem they created.
They stay popular
because they gain
enough, due to our mistakes,
to pay for their own mistakes.
I'm not saying things are better
or worse for liberal democracy
now.
They are just
substantially different.
So if democrats want to achieve
more or less the same freedom,
security, just society, we are
supposed to do it another way.
But in countries
like Poland, it's
not possible within
current system
of political institutions.
Why?
Because liberal
democratic institutions
are no more sensitive enough
to popular needs and requests.
They turned from
democratic to meritocratic
and created so-called
regulatory capitalism.
In Poland, it is
extremely regulatory.
The political power
of legal regulators
is untouchable in fact.
With just too much in the
soft power of liberal ideas
and knowledge and
we trust too much
in the hard powers
of rule of law.
So we underestimate
the crucial importance
of demos in democracy.
Generally, there was a vote
and shut up policy for years.
We felt secure behind
these two walls.
And we haven't recognized
that we lose social roots.
We in Poland even developed
pervasive idea of fantastic,
[? daft, ?] and unpopular
reforms and of great government
losing power because they
did what they intended to do,
not what society likes.
It's hard to imagine for me
how democracy may survive
if Democrats believe they
may constantly do things
that a vast and growing part
of society doesn't like.
And how liberal
democracy may exist
if it doesn't supply more or
less what majority demands?
It's not a case for populism.
I don't want to say liberal
democrats should do only
what the majority likes.
But we shouldn't
all the times do
things majority doesn't
like if we are democrats.
[? Apart ?] outputs we expect.
That means that we should
wait with important changes
as long as we gain
popular support for it,
with an exception for some
emergency problems of course.
But [INAUDIBLE] democratically
chosen different ways.
One was we know, you follow.
That was legitimized on the very
beginning of the transformation
but became permanent part
of political culture.
The other was, have fun and
don't disturb, or shut up.
Both of it determined
for example policy
towards public
media, which are part
of European political system.
After 1989, state owned TV
and partly radio station
were commercialized and
dedicated to entertainment, not
to guiding society through
difficult, tough, complicated,
absolutely new
experience of transition.
Similarly, school was
by government considered
as workforce supplier,
not as a place
where democratic society grows.
These two important
institutions dedicated itself
to viewers and employees rather
than participants and citizens.
In 1989, Poles knew nothing
about democratic capitalism,
rule of law, and so on.
Before '89, there were some
programs helping elites
to understand how
the system works.
But very little has been
done after to transfer
this knowledge to society.
On the end of the
day, and I think
now is the end of this
day of Polish democracy,
vast majority still
has not been familiar
with the idea of the rule
of law or free speech.
Even in parliamentary
group of civic platform,
the main party of democratic
opposition, the first decision
was to vote for the famous
anti-defamation laws contested
by the US, Israel, and
many other countries.
This law has been contested
because it established
punishment up to
three years in prison
for any person,
wherever on the Earth
claiming that Polish
nation or state is in part
responsible for the Holocaust.
Even for young generation
of Polish liberal democrats,
trying to defend political
freedoms in front
of authoritarian populace,
it is still not obvious
that [INAUDIBLE]
for words is not
very liberal democratic ideal.
How could this happen?
Among many factors, I would
stress more and more painful
deficit of active citizens.
When political representation
is not rooted in local level,
on the local level,
then it degenerates
because it's not under pressure
to explain or represent
[INAUDIBLE]
understand and so on.
Polish politicians
are not well-rooted
because political
soil is [? tiny. ?]
It's not popular to organize,
participate, support,
and run for elected offices.
On a daily basis, society
is silent and remote
from politics, much more
than Western societies.
That means politicians are
not controlled, stimulated,
and properly chosen.
Most of them are not local
leaders, activists, or so on.
Often they become members of
parliament or even cabinet
ministers by coincidence.
So, we have built democracy
without democrats,
without citizens ready
to act for public good,
and without representation
willing to represent anything
more than its selfish
own interests.
Of course, there has always
been a group of good citizens
and politicians, but
they were way too
few to determine
quality of this system.
The Polish boycott custom is,
we are silent for a long time,
and then we
unexpectedly explode.
Professor Eckert mentioned
some explosions before,
not all of us, but a
substantial number.
It's very difficult to predict
when and why it happens.
It doesn't last long.
Majority, soon we
[? throw ?] back home
and a little group is trying
to build something permanent.
This problem we
inherited from our past.
But we also imported
some universal problems
with citizens and
representation from the West.
Robert Putnam named it
Bowling Alone Society.
Now we could name it
Smartphone Society.
With these machines, we
are different creatures.
So we create different society.
And other machines create
different economics.
This universal factor fits
perfectly to Polish tradition
and radicalized it as it could.
Less citizens, less
representation, more activists,
and more political
explosions, this
is the situation I see now.
Explosions are important
to stop bad things
and they manage, but are
not useful to push anything
forward, to create
decision-making process
or even to push things
in proper direction.
I don't want to go into
details of this revolution
because we don't
have enough time.
Just let me in this
context, remind the times
of Industrial Revolution.
The scale of change is
comparable in many dimensions.
So we should expect similar
challenges to social, economic,
and political order.
As everybody knows,
Industrial Revolution
was followed by waves of
unrest, revolutions, and worse.
We probably are
more civilized now.
I hope so.
But if political and social
order of liberal democracy
is unable to accommodate to
the ongoing digital revolution,
we will probably not survive and
bad things may happen as well.
Nationally and internationally,
some of the bad things
already are happening.
The wave of populism is
the beginning, I believe.
I hope we will not go too far.
It happens everywhere.
But some places
are touched more.
One of them is Poland.
Why?
As you know,
generations of Poles
were fighting and praying,
praying for freedom,
not only for
independence of Poland,
but also for personal freedoms,
freedom of expression,
of press, of traveling,
of business, associations,
as well as independent course.
Historical window of
opportunity opened in '89,
and we used it to move
from East to West.
The Western liberal democracy
was on its peak then.
The euphoric decade
was just beginning.
Francis Fukuyama was already
writing his famous essay,
The End of History with
misunderstood conclusion
that liberal democracy
had achieved its destiny
and it may not be better,
it may only be worse.
In 1992, when The End of
History has been published,
Ralf Dahrendorf, famous Ralf
Dahrendorf, came to Poland
and gave a lecture in
Polish Academy of Science.
Written transcript of the
lecture doesn't exist.
But what he said, and he
repeated in an interview
he gave to me, was that we
joined the West too late.
Because the great time of
liberal democracy is over.
Welfare state is over.
Good times are over.
European model is generally
over or decreasing.
Generally, Asiatic
values will prevail
with Asian modern
society, economy,
and Singapore-like or
China-like political order.
So sadly, his prediction
was, we will now
slide back to the order in
many ways similar to this
we've escaped from.
Perhaps he was right.
I hope not.
We were waiting for
freedom too long
to believe that this
is determined we will
lose our freedom soon again.
We, I mean Polish liberal
democratic elites,
believed that after two
centuries, long dreaming
about freedom, we will keep
it and love it and defend it
forever, even though the
West has some problems
with democracy and freedom.
Now we know it was an illusion.
But not until 2015, when
populists gained power
in Poland, it was
popular belief.
The West has some
problems with democracy.
They have some
problems with freedoms.
They are tired.
They are lazy.
But we are real democrats.
We will defend our democracy.
We believe in freedom and Poles,
what we will give to the world?
Our values, democratic
values, freedom values.
And what happened?
Now we know it's
possible that we
will destroy Polish
democracy and freedom
with Polish hands, first time.
We know authoritarian populists
may stay in Poland for a while.
And we know that even if
they will lose one day,
they may come back.
Peace was already in power
for like 10 years ago
if the reasons they
appeared will not disappear.
Because there are some reasons.
They haven't come from Mars.
No, I will answer to the
question from the title.
Can a liberal
democracy be saved?
And my answer is no.
I don't think it can be saved.
At least in a country I know
the best, I mean Poland.
Liberal democracy
may not be saved.
[INAUDIBLE] may not be restored.
I'm very sorry saying this,
but in politics illusions
are worse than tough truth.
Idea of saving
[INAUDIBLE] regime
are that it seems to me
to be a deadly illusion.
But I believe
liberal democracy may
be may be reinvented in
a way in which it will
fit to digital revolution
society in general
and to the say, traditional
low density and low trust
society like in Poland.
I believe this is possible.
What should be, in
my opinion, done,
if we really want to
have liberal democracy,
means freedom, in a country like
Poland, And if we already know,
I think what I said before,
and many other things.
Well, I see three points.
First, we need to stop
dreaming about restoration.
Stop defending what
populists are destroying.
We must be critical our
way not apologetically,
towards the past.
To restore anti-regime
means to restore our reasons
why populists won.
If we restore liberal
democracy as it was,
we'll also restore the
wave of populism that
destroyed liberal democracy.
It comes together.
Perhaps if it works,
it's difficult
because of instinct
of self-defense,
described by Thomas Kuhn,
but we have to overcome it.
Or we lose.
Second, we need to invent
political idea of liberation
from excessive fears,
to provide new optimism
and positive energy for a
liberal democratic movement.
In Poland, liberal
democrat sounds boring now.
Sorry, liberal democracy
sounds boring now.
Liberal democrats as well.
Liberal democrats
need a new dream
to share perhaps with a
new name, new leaders,
new language, new
organization, new ideas,
able to mobilize citizens
for political action.
Now we can only mobilize
people to protest
against some extremely excessive
acts of the government.
Of course, after
occupy movement,
we know how difficult it
is to build something new.
But if populists are as bad
as we consider they are, then
[? the awful ?]
world they create
will mobilize people and, what
perhaps is even more important,
will force current
liberal elites
to open itself to new ideas.
If proper positive idea, our
neoliberal democratic dream,
is there, in right time, when
the populists will collapse,
then it will win.
If it will not be
there, then one
authoritarian Italian
populism may maybe succeeded
with another one authoritarian
populism, perhaps even worse.
There is a competition of
authoritarian populisms
in many countries.
Mentioned Hungary, but
look at Poland as well.
We need to invent
political institutions
able to combine
leadership, representation,
and rational political choices.
Current institutions,
parliaments, parties,
elections, are unable to
deliver all these needs.
Or they deliver
much, not enough.
The wave of populism
shows that we
need more democratic
democracy and more
meritocratic administration.
People request direct influence.
They don't trust politicians.
They are less and less
trust democratic government.
And they are right.
But it's not the end
of liberal democracy
because we know
democratic innovations,
like deliberative panels,
like popular internet polls,
and so on.
[INAUDIBLE] write
books about it.
It's a practice in some Polish
cities with very good effect.
But not on a national level.
That led to a separate
democratic control
and democratic
representation from
meritocratic decision-making
and decision-taking process
to make it not so
heavily influenced
by lobbying corruption,
party dependency,
and different hidden pressures.
We need this
institutional project
as part of our new, big
liberal democratic dream
to make it trustworthy.
I'm very close to the end.
That's not a fairy tale.
Like three years
ago, I had the honor
to coordinate a group of leading
academics and intellectuals
who in interdisciplinary
effort, prepared
this kind of a project.
The group included President of
Polish Economists Association,
[INAUDIBLE] finance
and foreign affairs,
[INAUDIBLE] leading
political scientists,
[INAUDIBLE] leading
social psychologist,
[? Jerzy ?] [? Duszyriski, ?]
is deputy president of Polish
Academy of Science, and so on so
on, many recognized academics.
And, yes we can.
Different liberal democratic
project is possible.
It may work.
It may be economically
effective, socially just,
and politically sustainable.
With contemporary knowledge
of social sciences,
I'm saying it, here in
Harvard, with a conscious where
I am, from economists and law
to pedagogy and psychology,
we know how to do it.
There is the knowledge.
We publish our project with
assistance of National Chamber
of Commerce.
We had a pretty
good public debate,
engaging liberal democratic
political leaders
and intellectuals.
Then PiS won the election
and the liberal democrats
turned to hopeless self defense.
What we need now, I
believe, is a little bit
of determined need
of liberal democrats
to make positive change.
And understanding that we have
to defend everlasting idea, not
outdated institutions.
Idea may be saved.
and I believe, we
know how to do it.
Its institutional shape but
may not be saved in my opinion.
Thank you very much.
[APPLAUSE]
Thank you very much.
And first of all, my deep thanks
to [INAUDIBLE] [? Reichert ?]
and his team here
for inviting me
and for making this
visit possible.
I'm grateful, the more so, since
I'm a commentator on Mr. Jacek
Zakowski, Jacek to me, whom I
have admired for so many years
and who definitely is one of the
most brilliant and interesting
Polish public intellectuals.
I have some troubles in being
an effective commentator
because I agree with
much of what he said.
And of course it's
not a great match
to have two persons
sharing their views,
one of them being a commentator.
So I will I will deliberately
sharpen my disagreement
with Jacek and perhaps
act quite self-consciously
as a devil's advocate.
Who is the devil you ask?
Well, just as Jacek said,
this boring, liberal democrat
who dreams of going back to
the status quo who is perhaps
pathetically anachronistic,
my words, not Jacek's, who
dreams about restoring
the status quo which
can do no better things than
bring with it all [INAUDIBLE]
precisely the sort of populism,
which now contaminates Polish
and not only Polish politics.
I should say that I
haven't seen Jacek's text
before coming here.
So I may be a
little bit chaotic.
But I should say and
sort of advertise to you
that Jacek, at the
beginning, in addition
to a great number of his
extremely important and sort
of landmark articles, in
the beginning of this year,
Jacek published a real
manifesto in political weekly.
And in that manifesto,
Jacek bettered Karl Marx.
Karl Marx, as you know,
published 11 theses
on Feuerbach.
Jacek's article consists of
two sets of 11 theses each,
so it's like twice
as good as Marx's.
And I must say it's
much better actually.
Because everyone when one thinks
about 11 thesis of Feuerbach,
I bet that almost everyone
knows only the 11 theses and all
the others are really
totally insignificant.
While in Jacek's reflections,
they are all equally important.
So what I want to, in this
role of being devil's advocate,
I would like to mention
three issues which
arose both of the paper
to which I just referred,
but especially in Jacek's
oral presentation.
So the first is
about explanation
of what has happened.
The second is about
account, what is going on.
And the third is
about the prospects,
and especially therapy,
what can be done about it.
Now, when it comes to an
explanation, and again
I will be deliberately
polemical just
to sharpen my views to perhaps
stimulate the discussion.
But I think that there are
some thoughts and some themes
in Jacek's ideas which are
very present among a number
of outstanding members of
Polish liberal democratic
intelligentsia,
which is this very
strong attitude of
self-blame leading almost
to self-flagellation.
And I believe that
this self-flagellation
of Polish liberal
democrats in the face
of this disastrous populism,
which reigns in Warsaw
now is probably as
faulty and as dangerous
as the opposite attitude, this
attitude of self-righteousness,
the attitude of licking one's
wounds in public, the attitude
of certain complacence.
We have done nothing wrong
and look how harmed we are.
I think there must be a space
between, on the one hand
self-flagellation,
which I believe
is not only false,
but also dangerous
because it may become a
self-fulfilling prophecy,
so between self-flagellation
and self-righteousness.
And this space in between
may have a form of saying,
we don't have too much
of a liberal democracy
but too little of it.
And much of the current
disaster that today's Poland
is, is an outcome of this
incomplete, inconsistent, not
full liberal democracy, where
both objective and [INAUDIBLE]
are equally important.
And I think Jacek gave a very
good example here about this,
although it's already
an exposed example,
of this opportunistic
and uncertain attitude
of Polish liberal parties
like civil platform
towards this dreadful
Holocaust law.
Where, rather than from
the very beginning saying,
this is fundamentally wrong
because it is fundamentally
inconsistent with freedom of
speech and academic freedom
and we as liberals are in
favor of those very values.
They only started
getting upset only
when there have been disastrous
international implications
of the fact.
So that sort of like
exposed suggest in what ways
Polish so-called third republic,
the years between 2007 and 2015
15 were the case of unfinished
liberal democratic experiment.
And other themes in addition
to the questions of freedom
of speech and academic
freedom is of course
a totally incomplete
Polish secularism.
Polish is a secular state
in the Constitution,
but almost theological state
when it comes to the practice.
And much of the blame should be
put on those liberal democrats,
but not in the
way that populists
help us see the truth.
But rather, that we, if I may
use the first plural here,
were unfaithful to
our true ideals.
And now that I've
mentioned populists,
part of this idea
of self-flagellation
is something that I would
call, quote unquote,
a signaling theory or signaling
conception of populism.
There's a popular view in
contemporary literature
and popular.
And this literature, as
you all know, is enormous.
And the books of
the sort, you know,
How Democracies Die and People
Versus Democracy and many
other, many of which
originate from this university
and this faculty,
ponder over the issues
of what we liberal
democrats, what
sense we can make of populism.
And one particular idea is
that even if populists produce
wrong solutions,
nevertheless, their successes
or their near successes
are important signals.
They know something
that we didn't know.
And I would say, how
about if it's incorrect?
How about if they are dead wrong
about everything that they say?
Why should we, why
should we believe
that the very fact
that they have nearly
won as in the Netherlands or
France, or they have actually
won, as in the United
States Poland and Hungary,
how about that.
It doesn't mean anything
about whether they
are correct or incorrect?
Not only are they
incorrect, they
are also very evil on
a number of issues,
such as the question of refugees
and asylum seekers, et cetera.
So I would like us at
least to consider this view
that we shouldn't give too
much credit to populists
in the way in which many of
those self-flagellating liberal
democratic intellectuals do.
Now, how to explain then
their assent to power?
There is a well-known
taxonomy or distinction
in political science between
structural and agentic,
That's an ugly word,
agency based theories.
One of which emphasizes certain
structural objective reasons
for political
development, others
the strength of leadership
so to speak and agency.
One is more a
demand-based theory,
another more supply-based.
And we know that
probably in order
to give a good account
of political developments
in any state, we must have both.
But the different
proportions matter.
Now, before Poland and
Hungary went the way they did,
nothing actually
could have predicted
that these countries
arguably, the leaders
of post-communist
transformations
would go this way.
There was an important
article years
ago by your colleague,
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way
in Journal of Democracy,
which sort of summarized
a little bit their book on
competitive authoritarianism.
Let me just quote one
very short passage where
they try to identify
in a very laconic and I
think clear way, the main
conditions for weakness
of democracy, where
democracies are
fragile and likely to
occur, likely to fall,
not resilient enough, et cetera.
So they say, according to a
substantial body of research,
stable democratizations
are unlikely in, very
poor countries with weak states,
dynastic monarchies with oil
and Western support,
and single party
regimes with strong states
and high growth rates.
Our own research,
Levitsky and Way continue,
such that democratization
is less likely in countries
with very low
linkage to the West
and in regimes born of
violent revolutions.
And they give examples
of all these instances
of these categories
in this taxonomy.
Now, Poland and Hungary doesn't
fit any of these categories.
If anything, it is as far
from any of these categories
as we might imagine,
which of course
may be one hypothesis
we may be about sort
of perplexity and myopia
of political science.
But another is that there
are very strong limits
to these structural theories.
That in some countries, in
some times, in some moments,
extremely strong,
determined, committed
anti-democratic leaders
may seduce the society
with their shining packages of
several inchoate ideas, which
sort of roughly,
but only roughly,
resonate with certain anxieties
and concerns that people have
and win the elections.
So that's what, in my
view, Kaczynski did.
He provided a shiny
package in which
there was a very strong
anti-elite view, he,
member of the elite
himself, against migrants
in a country which basically
has no migrants at all,
and with a degree of cultural
paranoia about modernism,
et cetera.
And somehow he managed
to win the election.
But if that is the
lesson which we
may draw for what happened in
Poland and perhaps in Hungary,
but here we are talking
about Poland only,
then I think that also suggests
some reasons for optimism.
Because if really the
causes, the explanation
of this populous backsliding
in countries like Poland
are mainly about the agency
rather than structure,
about the force of
leaders rather than
objective determinants,
then equally similarly,
the agency of counter-leaders,
of challengers,
may prevail over the incumbents.
Of course, assuming, and
that's a very, very big
if, that the incumbents will not
so distort the electoral system
that there will be no
longer a level playing field
and that the challengers
will basically
have no chance of winning.
And so that leads me
to the last point.
So what chances are?
What can we do about?
Now, in the last section
of his prison of his paper,
Jacek drew this
very exhilarating,
and I would say, attractive
idea of new social movements.
The problem is that still
it is very difficult
to imagine effective democracy
with only social movements
which clearly do not translate
into traditional political
parties.
[? Shatsnider ?] said, there is
no democracy without parties.
Adam Shavorsky, who,
by the way Jacek
interviewed a few weeks ago
in a fascinating, intriguing
interview in Politica,
says, democracy
means a system in
which political parties
lose elections.
So we need to have
elections, but also we
need to have political parties.
And all these
movements that Jacek
is very much excited about and
I'm also sort of excited about,
maybe less than Jacek, but I
can see great attractiveness
in them, in Poland they
failed to translate
into a political action
of political parties.
There is no, if you like,
what is the word, segue,
there is no follow up.
You know, so yes there are all
sorts of very important, very
impressive movements.
But they are single issue
movements, one off movements,
episodic movements,
and they disappear
as quickly as they emerge.
Somehow there is no
bridge between them
and political parties.
And without that, probably
any sustained action
to depose populists
is unthinkable.
But there is just
one other point.
And just as I said that the
populists, we shouldn't put too
much give too much credit to
populists, that also means
that populists in
power, I very deeply
believes or at least hope
so, carry in themselves
germs of self-destruction.
they are, by their definition,
inefficient and ineffective.
They, the leaders, value
people who are loyal to them
rather than those
who are competent.
So there is this incompetence
written into their DNA.
That I hope means that they
will not last too long.
So think about it.
We are discussing this
issue in a country
in which a leading newspaper,
and I have in mind today's
editorial in New York
Times says that a porn
star has more credibility
and class than the president.
I rest my case.
[APPLAUSE]
Thank you very much.
Director Jakowski,
would you like
to respond to some of
the points Wojciech made?
I don't want to
take much time now.
So I would perhaps only say,
I'm not against parties.
But I think parties,
it's sad to say,
are unable to make good
choices when they're in power.
Something changed in
this in this dimension.
So I think parties are
probably necessary.
I cannot imagine a democracy
without parties totally
for legitimisation.
But as far as process of
decision taking was concerned,
we must to export it out of
parliament, out of parliament.
Because nothing good
comes out of it.
And that's difficult.
But we have these tools,
these democratic innovations.
It worked very well in Poland,
in the different cities
like Lublin, like [INAUDIBLE],,
like [INAUDIBLE],, like Gdansk,
they experimented that.
It seems that society is
ready to accept this kind
of decision-making process.
And I admire what
[INAUDIBLE] [? Markowski ?]
prepared for our report.
And I think it can
be one of promises,
that this low, untrusted
group of politicians,
will no more make
decisions in our name
than they will just provide
general structure for decision
taking by society.
If we have this
kind of narrative,
then I hope people will
see a new promise, which
is necessary to activate
them, not constantly,
because I don't think that this
30 or 40 or 20 years all people
are ready to go to party
meetings and spend all day.
No, it's rather impossible.
But if we will offer a
democratic frame in which
people can engage as
they like, as they are,
I mean, not permanently, but
to engage when they want,
when they want to be a
member if somebody wants
to be a member of
the liberative party,
taking decision about how
many trees should be there
in Warsaw.
Or should we join the European
Union or Asiatic Union, yes?
Perhaps.
Some people are interested.
They would apply.
We can create a decision-making
group, a decision panel.
And I think it will be
more clever and more
acceptable for the society than
any decision that Parliament
is able or the government,
whichever government.
That's why, one.
So I think we need
this new vision
of activity, activisation.
and the other problem,
from my point of view
is these movements.
Are movements an answer?
I would say, it
happens they are.
And every movement
which appeared in Poland
in the last two years
left something good.
It's, well, if we have
30,000 people movement
on Krakow [INAUDIBLE],,
defending constitution in front
of presidential palace, then
people go home, go back home.
And 20 people stay.
This is [NON-ENGLISH SPEECH],,
and they create a network.
And there is 250,000
people in the network
that this is only
Facebook, nothing more.
But when they call people like
in last Friday, Friday, Friday.
And then 55,000 comes.
So, it's not the truth that the
movement disappeared totally.
Because after every
demonstration,
something stays with us.
And I tried to, because I'm very
fond of it, I tried to count.
We have like 20
new organizations
with 50, 60 new leaders.
Each of these leaders is more
suitable for a public position
than the vast majority
of members of parliament.
These are really new people.
I mean we have new
political elites already.
It's only two years.
And if PiS will stay
in power for 10 years--
we'll have-- no, they will not.
I'm joking.
I promise.
But, you see, this
is the process.
I think you must be
open to new processes.
That's it.
OK.
Let me open the floor.
When you ask the question,
please mention your name.
Peter Hall.
I mentioned your name.
[INAUDIBLE] Peter Hall.
I teach in the
government department.
I had two related
questions I thought.
Thank you very much, by the way,
for a very stimulating, very
elegant and very
thought provoking talk.
So first, I wonder if you
could elaborate a little more
on the sources of the fear.
I agree with you that populism
reflects a politics of fear.
I think that's a
powerful observation.
I'm a little more skeptical
about whether the pace
of social change is the
source of those fears.
Because the world has
changed rapidly in past years
and even without smartphones.
It's not clear to me that
it's the pace of social change
per se that generates the fear.
So I wonder if you
could say a little more
about in the Polish
case in particular,
the sources of fear.
And then the second
question, which
is related to that
is, when you talk,
although this is my
term rather than yours,
you talk in some ways about the
exhaustion of liberal democrats
or liberal democracy in
Poland, their incapacity,
the incapacity of
the institutions,
the liberal democratic
institutions
to respond to these challenges.
I wonder whether what's
at stake and what's
at the heart of that are
liberal democratic institutions
or the kind of
neoliberal policies
that have gone hand-in-hand
with those institutions,
especially in East Central
Europe, although certainly not
exclusively there.
In other words, does
the solution really
have to lie in changing
liberal democratic institutions
or can it lie in changing
the neoliberal policies
that those institutions
have promoted?
And my impression, I'm not an
expert on East Central Europe,
but my impression is that
those two things have
tended to go together there.
But of course they don't
necessarily historically.
I think Franklin
Roosevelt, for instance,
managed to change
policies in this country
dramatically in the
face of another crisis
without changing
the institutions.
Thank you.
Thank you, Brother Hall.
It's not so easy to answer
your questions because I
prepare interview with you.
And if I answer,
it might shape--
sources of view.
I would say the change,
instability, nothing special.
I mean of course there is
a problem of unemployment,
for example.
And we had a long period
of high unemployment
and very many people were afraid
that they would lose jobs.
It's not the case anymore.
And I think if PiS will
lose, one of main reasons
will be that the level
of fear is much lower
and they support lowering
the number, level of fear
and they will die of that,
of their achievements.
That's one.
But also rhetorics.
You know the Civic Platform
adopted very limited reforms,
economic reforms,
and so on and so on.
So people were not alarmed
with what they did.
But people were alarmed with
what they were talking about.
They were all the time talking
about commercialisation
of medical assistance.
And that was constant.
So what society felt
was that somebody
is going to take it back.
We'll have to pay.
And there were many big
projects, ideas how to do it.
How much should we pay?
Five zlotys or 500
zlotys, everybody.
And it created these emotions.
And finally, there was, I
mean the constant policy
was deregulation.
Regulation we know is not
very good for economy.
But it was an obsession.
Deregulation of employment
law for example.
I mean, we are the
leader of European Union,
with self-employment
so-called self-employment
but these are cleaners and
waiters, I mean, not artists.
And it creates fears, yes.
Because you never
know whether you will
pay your checks or not.
So this is, I think
it's neoliberalism
but not in what they
did but people expected.
And institutions and policies,
I think that comes together.
If institutions are
so much, I mean,
let's take Polish Parliament.
If it's so heavily influenced
by different groups,
I don't mean corruption,
but popular talk
is, why leader of
post-communists
in Poland, Leszek Miller,
supported a flat tax
idea at a low level.
It's anti socialist,
yes, progressive tax
is good for socialists.
Why?
Because a group
of business people
offered him money for election.
And if you look at politics
in countries like Poland,
not only Poland I know,
politicians all the times
pay debts when
they are in power.
PiS pays debts to the church.
Liberals pay to business.
Is there a place for
clever policy politics?
Less and less.
So political decisions
are as political system
is letting let to politicians.
They are constantly under
this kind of local pressures.
I mean you have this problem
in the USA, which is famous
all over the world of course.
But we have this problem as
well and Polish democracy
is not so deeply rooted in
institutions, in culture,
in tradition as here.
So every problem which
makes some difficulties here
kills democracies young
democracies like Poland.
That's my explanation.
Jane Mansbridge.
I teach at the Kennedy School.
I'd like to follow up
on Peter's question
and be perhaps more specific.
We haven't talked about the
decline, almost universally,
in manufacturing jobs and
also in small agriculture.
So that across Europe
and the United States,
we see a set of people
who had more secure jobs
than they do now.
And some of them have
no jobs as you say.
So naturally, I agree with
you, the Cleopatra's nose
theory of history, that there
are these long term trends.
But what happens
in those long term
trends is often an
accident of history.
Nevertheless, we do see
these populist parties
coming up all over the place.
And they often appeal
to working class people,
and often partly become
because of the insecurity.
But the insecurity
isn't caused, I
don't believe just
by smartphones.
I think it's also caused
by the loss of shipbuilding
jobs and other union jobs.
And I'm wondering, I
completely agree with you
about the new institutions.
That's wonderful.
Let's think very
creatively about
new democratic institutions.
But as we think about
these new institutions,
perhaps we should also be
thinking about this underlying
problem, which I
hadn't noted you
know I haven't heard discussed.
So I wonder if you could talk
about that as a possible cause
of this fear.
Well, sure it is, I believe.
The problem is, I
mean, some subjective
processes yes, globalization,
smartphones, they are here.
And there are some
subjective parts as well.
And what I think that
this transition concerning
agriculture, productive work
and so on, this is painful.
And if you want to
preserve democracy,
you must care, demonstrate.
You must demonstrate
that you care.
Sometimes it's more
important than what you do.
But if you lose people,
if you stay them behind,
I mean in Poland,
Poland is very selfish.
Polish culture is very selfish.
[SPEAKING POLISH]
There's a famous
American saying,
nobody is left behind, yes?
The disconcerts
American army in action.
And all this Polish
military song says,
[POLISH SAYING]
That's the difference.
[SPEAKING POLISH]
What a beautiful thing the
battle is, especially when,
No.
When a soldier fall
down from his horse.
Of the horse, not
only his colleagues
do not regret his fate, in
addition, they stamp on him
or jump on him.
Yes.
It's not a great
literary translation.
Yes.
So you'll see the difference.
In society, when the saying
is nobody left behind,
it's much easier
to build democracy.
Because there are
some relations,
obligations to others.
When you just, when
you make your horse
to stand on your colleague
when he fell down in action,
it's a different culture.
And it's extremely difficult
to create a democratic society
on this cultural ground.
And we experienced it in
the beginning of transition
when we just left
people in rural areas
that were state owned.
Farms were just collapsed.
There were 800,000
people left behind.
Absolutely nobody wanted
to talk about them.
So that that's the problem.
Everybody's expecting that
they will leave behind.
That's why when
[INAUDIBLE] comes and says,
I will not, and says, I
will not leave you behind,
that's the crucial point.
Would you like to say
something on this?
Hi.
Thank you.
Thank you very much to both
our speaker and our discussant.
My name's [INAUDIBLE].
I'm a visiting scholar here at
Center for European Studies.
I'm studying
political opposition.
And in the footsteps
of our discussant,
I don't find it
surprising that you
know, you would be
self-critical when
talking about the
opposition, liberal,
because that's what
liberal Democrats do.
They are self-critical.
And that's a good thing.
They know how to disagree,
unlike their opponents who
do not disagree, who
are unified, right?
Who are not self-critical.
But these aren't
necessarily strengths.
You know they may be
strengths in the short run.
But I don't think they are
strengths in the long run.
But the more
important thing here
is again, what you know was
raised by our discussant
is, this element of agency.
You know, you could
be self-critical
but that doesn't
have to translate
into a loss of agency.
You know, the two
are different things.
So, because when
you lose that it's
almost like resigning from being
in the position of opposition.
Kind of saying like, I don't
want to play this game anymore
more because this is
like a really weird game.
I mean, look at this.
You know like, it doesn't
even deserve my attention.
I'm disgusted by it.
I can't even look at it
kind of thing, right?
So I mean, self-critical
is good but loss of agency
is the problem.
And you actually only
die when you lose
agency is you know as they say.
Also, as human beings
you know you only
die when you lose that.
So you we look at the
Polish opposition,
you know, say, Civic
Platform, can we
say, you know they
initiate politics or are
they just responders to what
the incumbent government does?
Because I mean that's what
institutions are there for,
right?
Opposition can
initiate politics.
Opposition can actually
work really hard.
So I wonder if you know you see
that resignation in opposition
parties or do you see any
little signs of life in there?
No, they are brave.
But the problem is,
I mean, yes, they
are defensive and
responsive and I mean,
the major message is,
it was not that bad
and the current government
is extremely bad
and whatever they do is wrong.
And of course, I suppose most
of non-democratic regimes
lose power only as a
result of internal crisis
within the regime.
I mean it is very
difficult to destroy it.
But you can put
it under pressure.
And this pressure
makes it more possible
that there will be
problems inside.
And this opposition tries to do.
And I think it's
pretty successful.
I mean they expose weaknesses,
mistakes, and so on.
But the problem is, if the
government will collapse,
if Kaczynski will
lose power, then what?
Then what?
Will we have like
[INAUDIBLE] said once,
with the danger of [? civic ?]
platform, he said once,
we'll prepare one [? bill ?]
which will reestablish
situation to 2015.
How?
Is it what the society likes?
Is what people are waiting for?
Why don't we reestablish
the First Republic?
It was pretty good.
Or the second one.
So the problem is, it's never
a way back that we know.
And we don't know where to go.
And for me, Thomas Kuhn
is absolutely fantastic
explanation.
Yes, we don't have
a new paradigm
to put in the place
of the old one.
And that's what it was about.
As long because we
don't have new paradigm,
we cannot offer it.
Majority will stick
to the old one.
And this will to come
back, it's like, it's
a psychoanalytical problem.
Yea, coming back to
mother, pre-born.
Yes, that's what we'd like.
And I don't think
this is the solution.
[INAUDIBLE]?
Yep.
Go ahead, Mark.
Mark Elliot.
I teach the history of China
in the History Department
in East Asian languages here.
And I was thinking,
this is not my question,
but I was thinking about
the Asiatic Union I
think that you're referring to.
And I just want to say
for the record, that
having spent a lot of time
living in and studying in Asia,
I don't see a place for
Poland in the Asiatic Union.
I could be wrong about that.
How does he know that?
How does he know that?
Well, that's a good question.
So what I wanted
to ask you about
has to do with I
think something that's
a problem that's well known here
and best known to my colleagues
in the Government Department
and the Kennedy School, which
is that the principal
strength of liberal society
is that it's open.
And it's openness is at
the same time its greatest
vulnerability.
And people have been
exploiting that in various ways
off and on for a very long time.
We've seen in the latest
US general election,
new ways in which
that vulnerability can
be used to severely weaken
the institution upon which
we presume our democracy
and democratic processes
are legitimated,
namely elections.
And I wondered, in a
re-imagined liberal order
of the sort that
you're advocating for,
which I certainly
would endorse that idea
rather than trying to reinvent
the past, which the Chinese are
constantly trying to do,
how you see institutions?
What kinds of
institutions can be
put in place to keep
the electoral process,
again, we've fetishized
that, but as we all
know elections are easy to game.
And we've seen demonstrated
very clearly just
how easy they are to game.
If social media is not, and
the changes that that's brought
is not unprecedented as
Professor Hall was saying,
is that aspect though of what
social media enables in fact,
not something that
requires a different level
or a different type of response?
Thank you.
Well, perhaps too
difficult question for me.
We can only, I mean, it is much
easier in a country like the US
with long history of
democracy, with institutions,
and the Democratic culture.
I know you are skeptical
about and so on and so on,
it's not enough, but
still is 200 years.
And so, for this
kind of democracy,
it's much easier to be open.
Because even if you elect Trump,
then you have [? codes, ?] you
have an establishment,
you have huge media,
and huge money for
democracy itself.
And federalism, which is--
And federalism, yes.
But I mean the
culture capital, it's
not the case for a
country like Poland.
I just mentioned
one paranoid factor.
You know Russians interfere
in American elections.
You know Russians interfere
in the French elections.
You know Russians interfere
in German elections.
You know Russians interfered
in Brexit referendum.
We don't know they interfered
in Polish election.
Are they not interested?
Listen, this is phenomenon.
I mean, we have one
of biggest counter
intelligence service in Europe.
We know nothing about
Russians in Poland.
So, openness, and my
guess is, they were
important in these elections.
And we can speculate
about that and so on.
But we do know
nothing about this.
This is the difference.
But we have some information.
They are some journalists
who try to learn.
But not strong enough.
Not as strong as New
York Times for example.
And so I would say, openness,
because different prizes
in different countries.
But if you survive first 150
years or so, then it's easy.
Hey, our hope was we knew
that from the very beginning
that the beginning is very
difficult. But we expected,
I don't want to be very
selfish, but we expected
that we will gain more support
from all democracies, more
support, I mean, like
in this situation
in counterintelligence
for example.
We expected a kind of umbrella.
And it was, I think it actually.
was very long.
But something happened.
And probably everybody
started to believe in Poland
and abroad, that we grown up.
And the feeling of growing up
is extremely important also
in rise of Polish populists.
Because the society came to the
conclusion that quarter century
past, we do well.
Why they still teach us?
We will teach them now.
We show them how
to make democracy.
We show you to make democracy.
We are very effective of course.
We are leaders.
And one more thing, it
didn't happen in 2015.
If you look at institutional
changes in last 10 years
step by step,
democratic institutions
were limited, within
the parliament the same.
New regulations every
two years limiting
rights of single
representatives and exceeding
rights of [INAUDIBLE],,
speaker of the same.
The same, new relations between
President city president
and city boards.
All the time there
was presidentialism
and this kind of
presidentialism very well
feeds to authoritarian
tradition of '20s and '30s
in Poland or the
Second Republic.
And the code, I mean
this is also if you ask,
German, Hungary, and Poland.
Poland is the only
European country
where main places in
cities, also in Warsaw,
the main square in
Warsaw, is named
with the name of
[INAUDIBLE],, who
was a Polish dictator for
50 years or so and more
and died as dictator
after coup d'etat.
Is there any other
country in Europe
where monuments of ex-dictator
are still constructed?
Is there any?
Is there any country
in Europe where
a dictator, the
name of a dictator
is given to squares,
streets, schools, and so on?
No such a place.
That means that this
authoritarian fascination is
still present in the culture.
And if you look at that
Hungary, this tradition
is perhaps not as exposed.
But it also hasn't
been overcome.
Because under communism,
everything that was before
was good of course.
So the cult of Pilsudski,
the cult of [INAUDIBLE],,
[INAUDIBLE]
I mean, that's why it's so easy
to reestablish authoritarian
in my opinion, authoritarian
government in Poland.
Because those liberal, those
cultural, liberal Democrats
like Kaczynski, like
[INAUDIBLE],, like [INAUDIBLE],,
and so on, they were
always, every year,
paying tribute to Pilsudski.
Is there any other place
like this in Europe?
But if I may say so,
I believe, while I
would agree about the
assessment of Pilsudski who
was a dictator who carried
out a successful coup d'etat,
as far as the diagnosis of
Polish collective memory
is concerned, he's not
remembered and cherished
and applauded because
he did a coup d'etat,
but because he's
considered to be
the father of
Polish independence
and he's really cherished
in that capacity.
So one may of course, puzzle,
might say there is a puzzle,
how can you draw the
line in one person
between two types of memories?
But I think it's the memory
related to 1980 and then 1920
war, not to 1926.
But look, Pilsudski,
yes, [? Patel, ?] not.
It says something
about the culture.
Why?
Because the dictatorship is not
as bad to make not important.
[? Heathrow ?] in 1920.
I think that that's
the problem, that, it
was awful dictatorship, awful.
Yes, we have crazy dictator
shooting to his officers
when he got crazy.
And but Poles like it.
Poles like it.
In Polish TV like few days ago,
a host of a show entertainment
says, I remember the
fantastic officer
of Pilsudski, who ride
on the back of a horse
to the most popular
restaurant in Warsaw
to let the horse drink
water from the fountain
within the restaurant.
Imagine now, General Powell,
on his horse entering the best
restaurant in Washington.
Imaginable?
Or [? Grash. ?] You know
[? Grash? ?] Some of you know
who is [? Grash. ?] I mean,
and Pole like and it's very
positive in the culture, the
memory of these crazy officers
in the Polish [INAUDIBLE]
'20s and '30s.
I want to notice that we moved
from institutions to culture
in the end.
I'm afraid that we
are out of time.
My apologies to
[? Bojan ?] and others
who wanted to ask the question.
So thank you so much for
attending Zaleski Lecture
and you are all invited
upstairs to the reception
to continue the discussion.
And join me to thank Jacek
Zakowski and Wojciech Sadurski.
