[SIDE CONVERSATION]
JESSE REYNOLDS: All Right.
[TAPPING]
OK.
So--
JOSEPH MAJKUT: Yeah.
JESSE REYNOLDS: Good afternoon.
JOSEPH MAJKUT: So like--
JESSE REYNOLDS: Welcome to the
third panel of today's forum.
The panel is on the state of
play of politics and policy
of solar geoengineering
research in the US.
I'm Jesse Reynolds
from the University
of Utrecht in the Netherlands.
And I'd like to begin
with a few words
to provide some
background leading up
to the current state of play
of the politics and policy
of solar geoengineering.
Solar geoengineering,
as an idea, is not new.
It has, essentially, always been
a concept within the climate
change discourse as a
potential response measure
to the risks of climate change.
But it's always been at the
fringe of the discourse.
And in fact, was
initially a taboo topic.
But what we can see
is in the last decade
or so there's been
increased attention
to solar geoengineering.
But backing up a
step in time I'm
going to put some
milestones in the ground
and in the chronology,
particularly
of how US policy relates
to solar geoengineering.
In 1992 the National Academies
issued a major report
on climate change with a chapter
on geoengineering that called
for federal research.
The topic remained distant.
Really, in 2006 was a turning
point when Nobel Laureate, Paul
Crutzen published an
academic article, an opinion
piece, where he said, it's
time to seriously consider
solar geoengineering research
in the face of insufficient cuts
in greenhouse gas emissions.
And thereafter, interest has
been gradually picking up.
Here in the US there were
hearings in the House Science
Committee in 2009 or 2010.
And related to that there was
a report from the Government
Accountability Office
on geoengineering,
again, calling for
a research program.
2015 Was another pair of reports
on geoengineering, focused
on geoengineering from
the US National Academies,
again, that, once again,
called for research.
And then, earlier this year, in
the update to the global change
research program
there were some ideas
about how research
might begin to look.
But where does that put the
state of research right now?
So a couple of numbers.
Worldwide, ever, there's
been, maybe, 1,000,
approaching 1,000, scientific
articles and chapters
on geoengineering.
And a lot of this
includes carbon removal.
And these outputs include
both social sciences
and natural sciences,
roughly half and half.
And also worldwide,
to date, there's
been a few tens of millions
of dollars of research funding
for solar
geoengineering research.
And once again, much of that is
mixed up with carbon removal.
And this has come from mostly
from a couple of dozen research
groups in the world.
Most of the output has been
coming from the United Kingdom,
Germany, and the US, where,
as we've heard today,
the sources have been a mix
of public and private funding.
But this is still a topic that
is a small slice of attention
to climate change.
For example, if you measure
output by the number of papers,
you measure output by
the dollars of funding,
it's something
like a few percent
of 1% of the attention given
to climate change as a whole.
A very small fraction.
In terms of politics,
I get into more detail
in my brief written contribution
to the booklet that's provided.
But overall, I see three
primary constituencies
in the political discourse
around solar climate
engineering research.
The advocates for such research,
many of whom are in this room,
they call for research out
of pessimism and concern.
The concern is for the impacts
and risks of climate change.
And the pessimism
is the prospect
of emissions reductions
being sufficient.
So there's a sense that they
are making these calls somewhat
reluctantly.
The second cohort
or constituency
are critics of research who
raise a range of concerns,
many of which we've
heard about today,
such as, the so-called moral
hazard of hindering emissions
cuts, governance
issues, physical risks,
and uncertainties,
matters of justice,
hubris of messing with nature
in this way, slippery slope,
public acceptability.
And the third
constituency is something
that I don't think we've
talked about to date much.
And that's the
traditional opponents
of climate change
action, most of whom
come from the political right.
They've been mostly
silent on the issue
of solar geoengineering
for a variety of reasons.
And so a lingering question
is, as we go into the future,
as the attention given to solar
geoengineering might increase--
it looks like it will
continue to do so--
how they will respond,
these conservatives
who have been silent on solar
geoengineering, I believe,
is a big, big question.
So here we are with
a state of play that
appears to be rapidly changing.
One obvious recent change is a
new presidential administration
that seems to be intent on
charting a different path,
with respect to climate change.
But I'd like to also call
attention to a proposal
that we have entered into
a new geologic epoch,
the anthropocene, in which it
would be the epoch of humans,
in which we recognize ourselves
as a dominant force influencing
Earth's systems.
So having provided
that background I'll
turn the floor over
to the speakers,
whom I will introduce
one at a time
as they provide their comments.
We're going to start with Joseph
Majkut of the Niskanen Center.
He's the director of
climate science there.
He's an expert on climate,
the global carbon cycle,
on risk and uncertainty
in decision making.
Before joining the
Niskanen Center
he worked on climate
change policy in Congress
as a congressional
science fellow supported
by the American Association
for the Advancement of Science,
and the American
Geoscience Institute.
And I'll ask for his
thoughts about how
he sees the political landscape
of solar geoengineering
research in America.
Joseph.
JOSEPH MAJKUT: Thank you, Jesse.
It's a real pleasure
and an honor
to be here, especially on
an issue that I'm learning
a lot more about,
but there is clearly
a lot of thought that's
going to be in most
of the people in this room.
So I've been learning a lot
already today, and thank you.
I wanted to start my
comments by echoing
what Dan said in the last panel,
that the urgency of climate
change, and the, kind of, the
climatology of the last year
really makes clear that
decades hence we're
going to find ourselves
wanting to act, I believe.
And what we've seen
recently boosted by,
El Nino, other things,
are going to be
normal conditions within
the lifetime of my career.
And you know, my wife
and I just had a baby.
And so I'm only one or
two generations distant
from a leadership
class that is going
to potentially want to use
these technologies, right?
And I think it would
be a huge disservice
to those future
leaders to leave them
in ignorance about the potential
for solar radiation management,
or any other thing that
will allow them to reduce
the risks of climate
change for the people
that they are
serving at that time.
Never mind how
they're going to deal
with the risks that are felt
by people in their own futures.
There's also the idea that
somebody else may just
go about doing this.
And so if we think, in the
context of US research program,
for a technical solution or
a technical means of reducing
climate risk they
can be carried out,
sort of, unilaterally
we want to be
prepared to see,
observe, understand,
or potentially interrupt
whatever another nation may
do in the coming decades.
We'll get to that, I
think, a little bit
later in the discussion.
And eventually the US
may want to participate
in some deployment.
An we should know
what we're doing.
In terms of the present
political context
there's almost no
political context
for solar geoengineering
in the United States.
Almost none.
Political actors, by and large,
don't really think about it.
And within the policy
circles here in DC
where I work there's also very
little discussion about how
solar bioengineering research
would be carried out,
who would support it,
what its goals should be.
And the secondary question of,
would we ever deploying this?
Or how does a research
program relate to deployment?
There very little discussion.
In fact, the discussion
always seems to jump there,
as we saw this morning,
rather than sort
of the more minute
questions of, what
are we going to do over
the next five to 10 years?
And how might we channel
another 10 million dollars
into a research program.
I don't have the expertise
in this exact field
to judge how we
should, but I think
its an interesting question.
To speak to the sort of
what we do at Niskanen, when
me introduce ourselves we are
a libertarian policy advocacy
organization that, unlike
some of our colleagues
who defend free
markets and liberty,
also happen to
think climate risk
is a very compelling
issue for public policy.
And because of that
we work primarily
with congressional
Republicans who are also
uncomfortable with the denialism
and the policy resistance
on their side of
the aisle to come up
to build a coalition for a
conservative climate action.
And one of the things we've seen
in that community over the two
years that we've existed, and
I've been there for a year,
is that abject denialism
of climate risk
is increasingly untenable.
If you are a Republican
representative
from the district on the
eastern seaboard climate risk
is arriving, and coming quickly.
And it's something
that you need to be
able to satisfy your
constituent demand for response.
Those people face
limited policy options.
Part of that is
political inertia.
There's carbon pricing.
There are favoring support
toward forms of energy
that could be
deemed conservative,
or anti-environmental, like
nuclear power, or other things.
But there's really
been no policy movement
in that direction.
And likewise there is the
sort of Star Trek fantasies
about advanced R and
D Funding programs,
but again, not responsive
to the scale of climate
risk face now or
in the near future.
Geoengineering research
could provide a mechanism
by which somebody who operates
in a political context
where massive mitigation
projects are going
to be a challenge, right now,
could talk about climate,
and develop a
vocabulary for climate
in a way that is actually
responsive to the scales
of climate risk.
I think that's an important
thing to consider.
On the other hand,
solar geoengineering
has this frustrating
thing that people most
concerned about climate
risks, traditionally
the environmental community,
are also the most wary
of where research may lead.
And there has been some cartoon
examples here in the, sort of,
policy community, kind
of, from the last 10
years that show that, right?
There's a Bickel and Lane
paper from 2008 or 2009
that uses a basic cost
benefit analysis to show,
if you're concerned about
climate change you should
do nothing else
but fund research
into solar geoengineering,
because it's the easiest
way to solve this problem,
I understand how that result,
or echoing David's comments
from earlier about, well,
could this be used as an excuse
by political leaders who are
wary of mitigation policy
to do nothing?
Can be frightening.
However, I think the context
in which we find ourselves now
where we have huge warming, but
also the Paris agreement, state
and now delayed federal
policy in the United States,
and increasingly favorable
economics for clean energy
may actually relieve
some of those concerns
more rapidly than we expect.
I think I'll conclude there.
The trump administration
I have absolutely no idea
what to do with.
[LAUGHING]
JESSE REYNOLDS:
Thank you, Joseph.
Next up, Steven Hamburg,
who's chief scientist
at the Environmental
Defense Fund, EDF.
There he oversees and insures
the Scientific Integrity
of EDF's positions and programs.
And he facilitates
collaborations
with researchers from a
diversity of institutions
and countries.
He also helps identify
emerging science that
is relevant to EDF's mission.
He's been actively involved
in biogeochemistry,
and forest ecology research
for more than 35 years
having published more than
100 scientific papers.
And EDF is an
interesting group that's
been involved with the
solar geoengineering
discourse in some degree
for a few years now.
And I'd like Steve to share
with us some of the key lessons
that he's drawn from
that experience.
STEVEN P. HAMBURG:
Thanks, Jesse.
And I think that the
last two panels set up
the conversation in a
great way of talking,
about the sort of social
context in the science context,
as well.
And so it really took the title
The State of Play to heart.
One thing just to
sort of note is, just
to show you the immaturity
of this conversation.
Today we're calling it
solar geoengineering.
I was recently on
an NAS report that
called it albedo modification.
And I'm part of a group that
I'll describe in a minute
that talks do it as solar
radiation management.
So we don't even have
a common vocabulary
of what the thing
we're talking about is.
So one of the things I just
want to start with, similarly,
is to look around in
this room and who's here.
The issue of inclusiveness is
really critical to this issue.
We're talking about
the global climate.
And the people who are
having this conversation
represent a very, very small
fraction of that community.
And I think that is an issue
that this community has
to think a lot about.
It comes back to some of the
social science panel issues,
relative.
But I'll come back
to that in a minute.
But I think it's not something
we should treat lightly.
Similarly the issues
of transparency.
It's got mentioned
a few times, but I
want to bring it to the fore.
If this community,
as we think about,
and I'm including myself in
it, because I've been involved
in thinking about it
for more than six years,
if we're not being transparent
so that we really can say,
look, you can look everywhere,
it's all out there,
once again, this will become
an incredibly polarized and not
constructive conversation.
EDF is unusual in
that we have been,
as an environmental
organization,
involved in this issue
for quite a while.
It started with a science
day that David and Scott
participated in.
I think it was
over six years ago
where we brought our board
together with our senior staff,
and [INAUDIBLE] Frank
was there as a trustee,
and had a conversation for
six hours about this issue.
That led to involvement in the
solar radiation government's
governance initiative, which
is a joint effort of the Royal
Society, The World Academy
of Sciences, and EDF.
And John Shepherd from the Royal
Society, Qasim Jan from TWAS.
And he's from Pakistan.
And myself co-chair that.
And that effort was
at the beginning
to create this inclusive,
transparent conversation
about these issues, about
the governance of research,
and how to make it--
I like to refer to it as
an ever expanding spiral.
How do we get more and
more people involved so
that, in fact, we do have
some kind of social license
to begin to think
about these problems,
because we won't do
it in rooms like this.
That's not to say this
conversation isn't important,
but it's necessary but
certainly not sufficient.
And so what we've done
over the last six years
is we've had more than a dozen
conversations around the globe
at capitals everywhere.
We have a meeting coming
up in May in China,
another one in June in Kenya.
And then we're bringing all the
people who have been involved,
or a good subset of
them, together in Berlin
for the meeting in October.
And that conversation is
really not about presenting.
It involves bringing only two
or three Europeans and North
Americans with a community of
scientists and interest groups
in each of these locations
to say, your voice matters,
and to initiate
that conversation.
In most of the
places we go that's
the first time that
conversation has
taken place in that
country, or in that area.
It's expanding that
spiral, which I would argue
is incredibly important.
And it's done very
deliberately by having
science, global science,
and NGO involved in that.
Now, EDF itself has taken
a position on these issues.
We developed that a
couple of years ago.
It has four parts.
It's fairly straightforward, and
not probably very surprising,
but you can go on our web site
and it's posted right there.
Mitigation first.
You could say first, second,
third, fourth whatever.
But it's not a substitute, as
all of the Royal Society study,
the NHS study, the Asilomar,
I think most meetings
I've talked about.
Deployment for the foreseeable
future is off the table.
That small scale research to
understand both the climate,
it was talked about,
the dual need of,
how do we take
apart our ignorance,
whatever it is, for both
understanding climate,
as well as,
[? SRM ?] is prudent.
And that, as was talked
about, CDR research
is also critically important.
That position puts
us in a place where
we think that, bottom
line, I sum it up,
ignorance is our enemy.
That we have to engage
in these topics.
We have to understand them.
That is, we talked about it.
These are not straightforward.
Those first two panels, I
think, teed up very effectively.
The conversation, I won't claim
that I have answers to those.
We've been part of it.
But it's really,
I think, important
to bring those issues together.
So bottom line is I have four
words that I think matter here,
which is inclusiveness,
transparency, governance,
and research.
And that's sort of the metric by
which we have to look at these.
And I will just
add a final comment
that I added while sitting here.
I don't know for
the other panelists
but these lights are
strobing and are really
giving me a problem.
And the problem with
society and this issue,
applying those four,
if we can't figure out
how to create LED lights,
in a common place that
operate properly,
and I don't know,
others might not be as
sensitive, it's hard for people
to buy the notion that we could
do these kinds of interventions
in a way they'd ever
possibly come out.
Thanks very much.
JESSE REYNOLDS: OK.
Thanks Steven.
I do want to just add one detail
to what he said about meeting
in Berlin in October.
That will be the second
climate engineering
conference in Berlin, October
14th through 17th, I believe.
So if you're interested
in these issues
that promises to be a very
interesting and exciting
meeting.
Next is Jamie Thompson,
immediately to my left.
She's vice president at
Cassidy and Associates
where she works on issues
related to alternative energy
development, environmental
compliance, climate
change, public lands, energy
tax, and technology innovation.
She earlier served in
the Obama administration
as a congressional
affairs liaison
for the Department of Energy.
And prior to that she served
on the staff of the House
Committee on science
and technology,
which held the hearings
in six or seven years ago
that I mentioned earlier.
So Janie, I'll
turn it over to you
and see what you can tell us
about how these issues can
and do interface with
the federal government.
JANIE WISE THOMPSON:
Thanks, Jesse.
It's good to see so many
familiar people here.
Those hearings were actually
eight and nine years ago now.
But many of you
were our witnesses
during those hearings.
And actually, I was just sort
of hearkening back to those days
where I was trying
to unpack this
as a junior staffer
on The Hill, and I
had a lot less experience in
climate change than I do now.
And I like to think
I was a good student.
But I wasn't as conversant
as everybody else in the room
here is today on the topics,
and on geoengineering.
And it was my job to unpack
this very complicated topic,
and explain it to my bosses.
I had to write a memo,
you know, you really
need the memo to be six pages.
And then you need to rewrite
it so it's only one page.
And then you need to write
their talking points.
And they prefer their
speeches to be maybe
six words per sentence or less.
And so this is a
good analogy for what
we have to do with our
lawmakers and our policy makers
in Washington, generally.
And you know, it was an
illustration of the challenge
that we all face
where climate itself,
even though we've
all been working
in this space for
a long time now,
and we're very comfortable with
the acronyms, and the actors,
and what is two degrees
all about, or whatever,
this is not readily
available to most people.
It's not readily available
to most smart people.
But consider how we
use carbon and carbon
dioxide interchangeably.
Nobody even notices
that anymore,
among, probably this audience.
But that is really confounding
to a normal person.
So that's the kind
of things that I've
been trying to spend time on.
And I hope that the
rest of the group
will acknowledge
we try to unpack
these very complicated
questions of what you could need
for some very complicated,
threatening, future scenarios
in the way of governance.
What could you need
in the way of research
to support potential outcomes
you're trying to achieve?
I mean there's a lot of
assumptions baked in.
We're just the gloss
over when we're
communicating with people.
So in general I think that's,
sort of, a mission that I would
like to spread among all of
the smart climate scientists,
in academes in the
room is, we need
to try to think more about
how to break down this subject
into bite sized chunks.
And that is partly
something that you
should do to be respectful
of your lawmakers
when you talk to
them and their staff.
All of these staffers
are very smart.
But they have about
400 other subjects
that they're trying to manage
that may be equally complex.
And they're trying to
juggle their bosses,
you know, constituent
interests, and so on.
So it's incumbent
on us, the folks who
are sort of plugged in,
to potentially develop
a common vocabulary.
That would probably
be helpful if we
started using a single term
of art to talk about this.
And then boil down your
asks and your concerns
into more tangible things.
And I think that's
something that
would be useful in the broader
climate debate, as well.
Putting yourself in
the staffer's shoes,
or the administration's
shoes, quite scary
when somebody shows up and says,
I'm here to sound the alarm.
This is calamitous.
Please fix it.
OK.
Fix it, how?
They've got a lot of
other responsibilities.
And there's a good
chance your meeting
is 25 minutes long, or less.
So we have opportunities,
if we can figure out
how to break down this
enormous problem into smaller
outcome based challenges
where, OK, we don't understand
the research well enough.
What's happening in the clouds?
Well, OK, we can point to a
place in the latest working
group theory report.
It says we don't know
the cloud aerosol effect.
Let's talk about the
cloud aerosol effect.
What does it mean to not
know this well enough?
What are the instruments,
the LIDAR instruments
that's being supported by
NASA that are helping us
unpack this today?
Could you have
better instruments
that would enhance our ability
to understand those things?
Could you asked for a
specific new instrument
to be built by a very
specific location?
So that's a little
bit more finite.
That gives people
something to work with.
So that's kind of
the call to action
to consider how you present
your problem to other people.
It needs to be very finite.
And I think that's, when
you talk to your lawmakers,
and when you talk to just
other folks about your work.
And I'd also encourage
folks to, sort of,
appreciate the environment
that you're in.
I don't know if, maybe, the
whole world, or just the policy
geeks observed the release last
week of the president's skin
budget, which is
sort of the very
incomplete blueprint for what
he'd like to see in budgets.
Now, Congress holds
the purse strings.
That's not gospel.
But that's what the
president would like to see.
And the numbers for
climate research
generally are not good.
So what you do first
is you hold the line.
We think about defending
the resources that we have
now in a very specific way.
Not, be good to climate.
That's not actionable.
Don't shut down
NASA earth sciences,
and the levels need to stay
here for the Goddard Center.
That's actionable.
People can work with that.
So holding the line first.
Communicating clearly about what
tools, resources, capabilities
that the federal
government brings to bear
are already important to
the work you're doing now
is job number one.
And job number two
is articulating
the very finite
obligations that you
would like to see
pursued in the near term.
So giving folks
something to work with
is the name of the game.
JESSE REYNOLDS: All right.
Thanks, Janie.
We'll move on now to
Peter Frumhoff, who
is director of
science and policy,
and chief scientist
of the climate
campaign at the Union
of Concerned Scientists,
where he ensures that
UCS brings robust science
to bear on our
efforts to strengthen
public policies with a
particular focus on climate
change.
A global change
ecologist, Doctor Frumhoff
has published and
lectured widely
on topics including climate
change impacts, climate science
and policy, tropical forest
conservation and management,
and biological diversity.
So with that, I'll turn
the floor over to you
to share your perspectives
and those of your group
on solar geoengineering.
PETER C. FRUMHOFF:
Thank you, Jesse.
It's a pleasure to be here.
Let me frame my
comments at the outset
in the context of the
original intent of this forum.
That is to say, to explore the
conditions under which the US
government should fund solar
geoengineering research.
And I just want to be really
clear that if a proposal were
coming forward to the Trump
administration in Congress,
if it would be taken up
in some serious way--
I don't expect this
to be the case,
but just to note the
plausibility of it,
it's not off the table--
UCS would actively opposed it.
And we would do so
not because we're
opposed to solar geoengineering
field research, quite contrary.
But to the point
that others have
made earlier in the
morning sessions,
because we believe, I believe,
that it's essential to really
think through carefully
about how to build out
a well-designed,
appropriately governed,
appropriately scaled solar
geoengineering field research
in a way that
builds and sustains
legitimacy, social license
that we talked about earlier.
And you know, if I were to
try to design a strategy that
would be intended to
undermine legitimacy
I would do it by seeking funding
from the Trump administration.
In this context, in this
moment, in the context
of an administration that is
so clearly bent on defunding
climate change science,
diminishing funding
for clean energy
research and deployment,
and basically, in
many respects, denying
the risks of
climate change, that
would be the worst
possible outcome.
And I have to say that
I don't know, you know,
to the point about
philanthropical,
independently funded
field research of,
the sort that David
was mentioning earlier,
this is a relatively new
issue for us to wrestle with.
This hasn't been
on my radar screen.
And I actually don't know what
our institutional position
would be on the work
that David's considering,
and colleagues over
the next year or two.
We have to really think
through, carefully,
notwithstanding the
high probability,
if not near certainty,
that the work itself
would not pose significant
risks, as you've described it.
But recognizing that, again,
the issue of legitimacy
is really fundamental here.
And transparency,
inclusivity, kind
of a notion of what the right
kind of consultative process
would be before that
research would take place,
seems really essential to
establish the legitimacy
not just of that work but of
the work that would be implied
to be further beyond it.
And it's really important
to do this right,
lest we find that we end up
creating a system that has--
which I think is
quite plausible--
solar geoengineering
field work be
seen as fracking is,
by so many actors,
inherently negative,
not withstanding
that under some conditions
it might less so.
Or the perceived
health risks of GMOs,
notwithstanding that
those risks are not
established as a fundamental
scientific premise.
But perceptions matter.
And in this moment, a
relatively small number
of scientists and
thought leaders
are wrestling with the trade of
risks associated with climate
risks going well
above two degrees,
and the potential risks,
and the both intended,
and unintended consequences
of solar geoengineering
deployments, potentially,
as well, research,
depending on its scale.
But most others, most
people aren't, including
people within my
organization, and a broad set
of stakeholders, and thought
leaders in the climate science,
and policy, and NGO
community really
are not wrestling with
this in a significant way.
I think that's going to change.
It has to change.
It's worth noting, of course,
that the Paris agreement
focuses on achieving
the two degree target,
or well below two degree target
in the context of reductions
in emissions from sources,
and uptake from sink's.
The notion of radiation
management, albedo modification
doesn't exist formally, in
the context of that agreement.
And of course the IPCC
special report on 1.5,
motivated by the
Paris agreement,
is also, at least in
its draft outline,
silent on whether this
issue will be taken up.
I know there were lot of
lead authors and developers
of the report outlining that
were really loathe to consider
solar geoengineering, the
published research already,
in the context of the
1.5 special report.
And that speaks to the
fact that, I think,
as we all recognize,
there's, for many,
an inherent many who are evolved
in climate policy and climate
advocacy, an inherent
distaste for even
going to the idea of
wrestling with it.
And much credit to
EDF for having really
stepped forward, and began to
wrestle with this as an NGO.
But that's necessary,
but not sufficient.
We need much broader
inclusivity, and participation
in thinking about this.
I do think that in 2018, when
IPC special report is released,
when there'll be a
consultative process
in the international
post-Paris agreement
discussions among governments,
the what is highly likely to be
an IPCC report that points
out just how difficult, if not
nearly impossible, to conceive
of achieving the Paris
targets with the tools at the
disposal of the special report.
That is to say, mitigation, and
carbon monoxide removal, that
is, and should be seen
as an important teachable
moment within the broader
stakeholder community
to wrestle with the trade off
of risks and consequences.
And the notion of research
and appropriate research
governance, in a way that's
very difficult to do today.
I think we really should
be mindful of taking
advantage of that opportunity.
Since we're in the US, and we're
thinking about US leadership,
whether it be philanthropic
approaches, or US government
funding, or both certainly us
researchers who are actively
involved in this,
I just want to--
drawing on my own work in
the tropical forest world--
remind myself as I was thinking
about this of the lessons
that I've taken away from not
entirely a parallel effort,
but nonetheless,
one that I think
has some insights
to offer, which
was around the leadership
of the United States
originally coming out
of the Kyoto process
in trying to incorporate
tropical forests
in their protection
slowly deforestation
in the context of what was
then the clean development
mechanism.
I hear this was an
issue that was intended
to support developing
countries in protecting
biological diversity
in those countries.
It was a US primarily, and
other industrialized country
led effort.
US NGOs, prominently
EDF, and UCS
were active in the
Nature Conservancy,
actively involved
in supporting this.
And the science was evolving,
but nonetheless, robust
and reasonably clear that we
would know how to do this,
and do it relatively well
from a technical perspective.
And really, much to
my surprise, and this
was back in the early 2000s,
the whole notion of this
was met with intense opposition.
Just intense opposition.
Not only from international NGOs
but from developing countries
who came at this with
the frame that this
was an effort by northern
countries, and particularly
the United States, to
essentially get off the hook,
get out of our own commitments
to potentially cheat
offsets and benefits in the
context of tropical forest
offsets with the CDM.
It was basically delegitimatized
and highly unsuccessful.
But it was only after developing
countries, led by Papeau New
Guinea, with funding support
from Norway, a perceived
independent and credible actor,
unlike the United States,
in that context,
that the whole notion
of the role of tropical
forests and climate mitigation
turned around.
There are a lot of
other pieces to this,
but this is just the shorthand.
And ultimately it's now seen
as a legitimate, and indeed,
central part of the
Paris agreement.
So representation
really matters.
There are a lot of
bad ways to do this.
And I'm deeply concerned
that if we don't set up
a research funding initiative
that is inclusive of developing
countries, particularly the
vulnerable developing countries
who we see as the
purported beneficiaries,
or considerable beneficiaries
of this kind of effort,
recognizing that they are among
the least resilient and capable
of responding to
climate impacts--
we're not designing this
in a way that gives them
a seat at the table, making this
salient to developing country
actors.
Not NGO representatives of
them, but in a meaningful way.
That the legitimacy of, not
just deployment, but research,
would be highly questioned.
And the goals that
I think most of us
share of building out an
appropriately designed,
and well-governed, and
sustained, research initiative
will be very much at risk.
I'll stop there.
JESSE REYNOLDS: OK.
Thank you.
Thank you, Peter.
Finally, Janos Pasztor,
who is currently
senior fellow and executive
director of the Carnegie
Climate Geoengineering
Governance Initiative
at the Carnegie
Council for ethics
and international affairs.
And he has over 35
years of work experience
in the areas of energy,
environment, climate change,
and sustainable development.
And before taking up
this current assignment
he was UN Assistant
Secretary General
for climate change in New York,
Under Secretary General Ban Ki
Moon.
And he will tell us a bit
more about his new project.
So Janos, please.
JANOS PASZTOR:
Thank you, Justin.
Good afternoon,
colleagues and friends.
Yes, I will say a few words
about this new initiative.
But I will do that by first
sharing with you a few ideas.
A few key, sort of,
messages that are,
I think, important
for this discussion.
And they are very
important in the way
we set up our initiatives.
And I think the first
point I was going to make
was made the whole morning about
the importance of governance.
There is an issue there.
It's complicated.
It's challenging.
A lot of work still
needs to be done on that.
And we've set up our
initiative precisely
to try to contribute to filling
feeling that governance gap.
The second point is
that our initiative,
and we have to say this
very clearly up front,
is we're not promoting any
kind of geoengineering.
We're not necessarily
against its use.
That's not our purpose.
Our purpose is not
to make decisions
whether or not they
should be used.
Our purpose is to understand,
in particular, the governance
requirements and try
to advance the debate.
But we are also very clear that
the number one thing to do,
as many of us have
said here before,
is that we need to bring
emissions down to zero.
And it doesn't matter what
kind of geoengineering option
we talk about.
Whether it's carbon removal,
solar radiation management,
all of those
require, in any case
to bring down our emissions.
And yes, the issue might
arise that we may still
need to do something more
than that, because all of that
will not be enough, and we've
seen some very interesting
graphs.
But if that is the case, then
if the existing mitigation,
and other strategies
that we have are not
able to bring us down
to below the temperature
targets of the Paris agreement
then we will overshoot.
And we will overshoot by
maybe a few degrees, maybe
a few decades.
And that is
something that we may
be able to avoid if we make use
of some of these technologies,
maybe.
But then the question is, can we
ignore those technologies now?
Or can we do some more
serious studies, assessments,
trying to understand
them, and then
make a decision
whether they're viable?
And if they're viable,
under what conditions can
we make use of them?
So it is this
approach that we have
tried to take into the
Carnegie initiative.
Now, this implies
what I just said
is we need to do more research.
We do need to do more research.
And yes, as it was said
before, we need to do,
not just research about
governance, research
about the technologies,
but we also
need to look at the governance
for research itself.
How will that work?
And there was some
discussion of that.
Now, the last point that
is actually very important
is also the question
of, can we just look
at geoengineering in
its vacuum, in its silo?
Or do we have to look
at it in totality with,
not just the other
options that we
have to reduce climate risk,
like adaptation, mitigation,
but, in fact, the broader
sustainable development agenda?
And we believe strongly that
it has to be done that way.
That's the only way
the world community
will be able to make
good decisions about it.
Our initiative may only
address a certain slice
of that problem, but
we're still doing it
in that bigger context.
And that brings us to
the first real objective
of our initiative,
and that is, really,
to enable dialogue so
that eventually the policy
people will also be able
to, not just understand
what this issue is all
about, but that they will
be able to make
policy decisions,
because right now
most of the discussion
is by the scientists.
That's where it's happening.
And that's fine.
We need to base on that.
And I very much appreciate,
Janie, your comments,
you know, that the
policymakers, and it's
the same for the public, for
the civil society organizations.
They don't know what
this is all about.
They don't understand it yet.
And the communication
requirements of that
is quite substantial.
So number one is the dialogue
so that people in government,
but also non-state
actors, will be
in a position to make
policy decisions about that.
And for us that's
very important.
We're not just talking
about governments.
We're talking about governments
and non-state actors, as well.
What we hope after
a few years of work
is that the result of our
work, not the direct outputs,
but the result of our
work will be that,
in fact, you will begin
to see, after a few years,
inter-governmental action
of different kinds,
that it will appear
on the agenda
of intergovernmental
processes, that there
will be some discussion,
maybe beginning
of some work toward
an agreement.
But of course, at the national
level, at the domestic level
also, that there will be
that kind of understanding.
Now, our strategy to get there,
it's a fairly simple strategy,
but it's a very
challenging one, of course.
What we will try to do is
try to engage systematically
over the next few
years with a set
of international organizations,
intergovernmentals,
but also international
NGOs that are working
on these issues, treaty buddies,
private sector organizations,
scientific groups, and so on.
And hope that we
can work together
in partnership with them.
And the engagement
means that we would
try to make sure that each
of these different entities
pick up the issue, if
they haven't yet done so.
If they've already done
it, enhance their work.
And what can they do?
Well, different organizations
can do different things.
But if some of them can do
assessments of the technologies
then we'll get some
authoritative assessments
on the environmental
and social impact.
If some of them, like the World
Meteorological Organization
can address this
issue of monitoring,
that we've talked about earlier,
in a more systematic way.
If some of them can simply
engage different policymakers
in an outreach program to better
explain what the issues are,
and so on, and so forth.
What we hope is that after a few
years of work what will appear
is a whole series of
visible information products
that by themselves
will be useful.
But what's even
more important is
that behind those
information products
there will be a network
of people working
on these issues in
those organizations,
but also in the governments that
link to those organizations who
begin to understand the
issue, and begin to understand
the policy aspects, and
will be able to start
thinking policy, and thinking,
and preparing, for eventually,
policy decisions.
And that is really the
essence of our project.
And we hope that over
the next few years
we will be able to achieve that.
Now, briefly we are hosted
by the Carnegie Council
for Ethics and International
Affairs, based in New York.
Our team, we have a small team
that is virtual in the sense
that we're not linked to any
particular physical location.
I have two colleagues here
in the back, Cynthia and Kai.
They are each located
in different parts
of this country.
I'm in Switzerland.
And others should be
working somewhere else.
So we are setting
this up like that.
We're working in partnership
with a number of entities.
Some of them are here.
Some are even on this panel,
like SRMGI, like the FCA,
and so on and so forth.
So we're trying to
also, first of all,
learn from what's
out there, and also
connect the dots as
much as possible,
because many dots
have to be connected.
And we are also setting
up an advisory group
that will be providing
substantive advice
to our group.
And since January,
we're in operation,
and you'll hear from us again.
Thank you.
JESSE REYNOLDS: Thank you.
Thank you, Janos.
Thanks to all of our speakers
for sharing their thoughts.
What I'd like to do now is
give each of our speakers
the opportunity to respond
in whatever way they
wish to the comments
they've heard,
provide comment or questions.
And let's keep it short, around
a couple of minutes or so,
so that we have plenty
of time to get questions
from the attendees, audience.
So we'll just proceed in the
same order that we began with.
And let's start with Joseph.
JOSEPH MAJKUT: Yeah,
thanks everybody.
That was really interesting.
Peter, I have a
question for you.
You said that if
a research program
were to be funded under the
Trump administration that's
not something that much
UCS would be happy with.
Is that independent
of the characteristics
of the program, how
it may be carried out
by the administration,
or administered
by the administration itself?
And the reason I ask is, if you
had a good faith effort coming
out of Congress
for a transparent,
inclusive, progressive, in
the sense of moving acceptably
from smaller to larger
implementation of research,
but it carried with
the authority of the US
government and
political backing,
why wait four years or a decade?
PETER C. FRUMHOFF:
So fair question.
So we're seeing, although a
lot of it is still yet to come,
this administration in Congress,
leadership in Congress,
pulling back on our commitments
under the Paris agreement,
on seeking to achieve--
whether through the Clean Power
Plan, or another approach--
pulling back on
research funding,
pulling back on Earth system
monitoring through NOAA,
and NASA satellite
infrastructure
that's essential for so
many reasons, including
being able to detect the impacts
intent or non-intent to do
of the field research.
And so the very
premise, that I would
hope most of us share, of this
being a supplement to, if ever
deployed, not a substitute for
commitments to achieve and go
beyond the current Paris
agreement commitments,
would be at odds
with the assumptions
of this administration,
that I think
it would be seen, I think
probably appropriately so,
by a broad range of actors
as part of an effort
to substitute rather
than supplement.
And in that context,
the legitimacy
of it, whatever UCS
thinks as an organization
would put the legitimacy of
the research at great risk.
I think that the number of civil
society organizations who would
oppose it would be very strong.
And we'd end up with a highly
contentious debate over it
in a way that it would
be unhelpful to the goals
that we all share about a
fundamentally sustained,
and an appropriately
scaled research initiative.
JESSE REYNOLDS: Steven.
STEVEN P. HAMBURG:
Well, I really
don't have a question
for my panelists.
But I do want to highlight
something that Peter raised
that I didn't talk about.
But I think the funding
sources issue is one
that we really need to grapple
with using the sort of frame
that I said.
And I didn't have time.
It's something we think
about an ETF broadly, a lot,
since we do a lot of work
with the corporate sector.
We do work on a lot of
issues that may not be always
within the mainstream
of our own,
sort of, sister organizations.
So I think that I
see three, sort of,
broad strokes, three
different areas.
They're corporate funding,
philanthropic, and public.
And I think we need to
think about those three
in the context of this.
And I agree with Peter,
certainly in the context.
I mean, we would certainly
never be able to endorse funding
if it were in the context
of cutting in the way
that it's been proposed for
all these basic research,
and then say, we're
going to fund this.
Well, of course,
that would be totally
antithetical to our
position, which says,
we have to mitigate first.
But I think we need to think
a bit about the funding issue.
We need to think about
what the implications are.
I think that has
to happen jointly
with the government's
conversation,
even on small scale
research, even on modeling.
So even not going on
the field, just sort of,
what does it mean?
And again, I don't have
a preconceived notion,
other than our own position is,
certainly, corporate funding--
again, we work with a lot
of people collaboratively
that bring corporate money.
But we don't take it.
So there's no question
about motive for us.
So I don't know quite how
this interplays, but as far
as I know, we've not had, as a
community, that conversation.
And that's a conversation
we need to have soon,
and we need to have
it in a broad way.
JESSE REYNOLDS: Thanks.
Janie.
JANIE WISE THOMPSON:
So, Steven, when
we were talking about
transparency concerns,
actually several
people mentioned
transparency concerns.
One thing I didn't get around
to but I meant to point out--
I get distracted
while I'm talking--
is that-- I pointed
out, you sort of
want to pursue specific
research requirements.
But we also might want
to consider really
specific governance requirements
in more of a finite way,
and even map the
most mature proposals
that we know about, against the
federal policies that we have
today, and how these unfold.
And I've wondered, and I
wonder if you've considered,
how NEPA, National Environmental
Policy Act, and the EIS
process, provide
for transparency?
Because I keep trying to imagine
a field study of some scale
that could potentially
exert some influence
on a local climate condition
that wouldn't trigger NEPA.
It's a hair trigger.
You get NEPA pretty easy.
And then you have
to write a long EIS,
and you have to tell
everybody, and everybody's
paying attention.
And that process, I think,
gives you a great opportunity
to appreciate,
what are the risks
that we're talking about here?
And to make sure that the world
knows that the civil society
organizations are tuned in.
People can sue you when they
think your EIS is inadequate.
So I just wonder if that's
something that you'd considered
before.
I'm sure you wouldn't
consider it complete,
but maybe that's a tool.
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: Well,
it's a real element.
And there have
been conversations.
The National Academy
Report dealt with that,
to some degree, and
with conversations.
Certainly existing
rules and laws are--
absolutely, we've
got to apply them.
But this question is, they're
necessary but not sufficient.
And I think that's where
we need the roadmap of,
when are they necessary?
We've had this conversation
about what's de minimis?
In many forums.
And where's the threshold?
And when does it get invoked?
And even if it
isn't invoked, what
are the requirements
for transparency,
because the nature of the topic,
even if it wouldn't involve
NEPA, or some other mechanism?
So again, I think,
absolutely, those are issues.
But again, we need to
put the time and effort
into trying to create those.
There have been various efforts
to begin to think about it.
Jane Long chaired one
many of us in the room
have participated in.
And we need to take
it to the next step,
and actually creating a,
kind of, proposed roadmap,
or at least
alternatives, and then
vet them in a very open
and transparent way
with a wide range of people.
JESSE REYNOLDS: Yeah?
PETER C. FRUMHOFF: I have
a question for Janos.
I just want to ask you to say
a little bit about research
governance, and in
particular, how it relates
to the kind of
small scale research
that we're seeing on the table.
And in particular, I wanted
just to call attention
to another domain, which is
the history of human subjects
research, in the context
of medical, biomedical,
and psychological research,
where, as I understand,
that history over
the past 40, 50
years, the development
of research governance
was prompted by small
scale, essentially,
research in the 50s and 60s that
was seen by a variety of actors
as problematic.
And that didn't de-legitimize
human subjects research.
It prompted, in a kind
of bootstrapped way,
to use David's frame, the
motivation for the development
of a governance regime that
was iterative and developed
over time, and included an
important dimension of informed
consent, that I think
is important dimension
of this work that needs
to be fleshed out.
So I'm wondering
whether you think
that that's a useful analogy?
And whether it's OK, from--
not to take a position--
but how you think
small scale research, in the
absence of governance might
both, inform and motivate,
research governance of the sort
you're trying to put forward?
JANOS PASZTOR: Well, thank you.
Well, first of all,
I think, one can,
and one should learn
from different histories
in areas which have nothing
to do with geoengineering.
But the governance of those
processes, there are maybe
things we can learn from that.
And if that works, and if it's
helpful, let's look into it.
And let's look at it.
And maybe we'll
learn a few things.
But in terms of the--
Jane, I also liked
your comment about,
let's look at specific
governance issues.
So one thing is to say
we need governance.
The other one is to say, what
are the governance issues that
are important?
And you can imagine, based
on my earlier question,
that I look at the small scale
experiment type of situation
quite differently than
the very large scale.
And I'm not sure where the
boundary is in between the two.
So let's leave that for now.
We can work on it.
But certainly, when it
comes to this small scale
one can come up with some
reasonably concrete ideas
of what is probably necessary.
One thing, it's probably
necessary to have
a clear, transparent
engagement with the public,
which includes civil
society organizations so
at least there is
an understanding
of what is being planned,
how it's going to happen,
and then the mechanisms
we can work on it.
But the basic idea
of transparent
engagement with the public.
The second one, it's also
reasonably clear to me,
is that if there is
such an experiment,
yes there will be
some things that
have to be done based
on the existing laws.
But the existing laws may not
cover some of these things,
because it's different.
And so one has to
be a little bit open
to going beyond the box.
And therefore, in this
kind of situation,
bringing together a good
group of people, experts,
in some kind of independent body
to look at what you're doing
and give you advice.
So that's another thing.
These are concrete
things that one can do.
And there was discussion
about the funding.
Funding is very important to
be clear about the funding,
because all of this
together, maybe not just
these things, but these
together, and other things,
will provide, or
not, the legitimacy
that is so important.
And I totally agree
with you, the legitimacy
can throw you off in the
wrong direction for years.
And you will have to
fight very, very hard
to get back to some
legitimacy if you've
taken the wrong steps.
If you take the right
steps, then maybe
it's going to go a lot easier.
JESSE REYNOLDS: You
want add anything any?
Comments or observations
from your co-panelists?
JANOS PASZTOR: Well, some of
them have come up in this,
but I think there was the
issue of the legitimacy.
I think that's
really, really key.
And then this idea
of, most people,
whether it's policy
makers, or the public,
and their accessibility
to what this is.
What is this technology?
What are the implications?
I think we have a lot of work
to do there, collectively.
And I think part of that
consultation process
that might happen, for
example, around an experiment,
is part of that process.
It's part of the
educational process.
This is something.
And it's happening
for a certain reason.
And I think you can use
that in a very serious way
for educational purposes.
And there was just
one more thing
about the terminology issue.
We are all speaking
English here.
And there are a few
other languages there.
But even in English
we have a problem
of geoengineering,
climate engineering,
and all that stuff.
And many of us have
felt that maybe some
of these terminologies are
not very helpful, anyway.
But maybe that's part
of what can evolve
through these different
conversations,
to come up with better
words, and better
expression for someone
who uses the technology.
JANIE WISE THOMPSON: I
might offer up the notion
that, perhaps, we talk
about solar geoengineering
geoengineering.
And the carbon-- it's
very confusing to say,
there's two categories,
and they're got nothing
to do with each other.
And one of them is kind
of like adaptations.
The other one is kind
of like mitigation.
And then each of them incurs--
they need research and
they need governance, sure,
but they couldn't be
possibly any more different.
And the longer we talk
about it, the more
you realize it's different
researchers doing the work.
You would have
different nuts to crack.
So for your
consideration, I think
we jettison carbon removal and
put that in its own bucket.
And now we have four options.
JESSE REYNOLDS:
On that note, I'd
like to open the floor for
short, relevant questions
from the audience.
We have 16 minutes, if
we're going to say on time.
So I'm going to
take three at first,
and see what the responses
are, and if we have more time.
So one, Mike.
And then the woman in back with
black dark, sweater, I believe.
And we'll see if
we have more time.
MIKE: I thought I was num--
is that on?
JESSE REYNOLDS: Yeah.
MIKE: So I guess I
wanted to, sort of,
pick up again from
the last one, and just
say, given the course we're
on, heading past irreversible
thresholds, it just seems to me
that this discussion that we're
going to do this in series
rather than in parallel
really bothers
me, because I just
don't think we really have
the time to wait for all that.
I mean, it's really great
to do social sciences,
I guess I will just
speak for my time
when we were in the US Global
Change Research Program
about how long it has
taken to get social science
research really done
in an organized way,
and in a mission focused way.
It's hard to do.
It takes a long time.
And I guess, I think
if you wait to get
it done we're going
to be way past a time
when you can do
something reasonable.
JESSE REYNOLDS: OK.
So.
David?
AUDIENCE: Thanks, I have more
a comment than a question
responding to Peter Frumhoff.
And I would say from
the point of view of us,
running experiments,
we are absolutely
clear that under the condition
where this administration cuts
research deeply on
climate science,
and cuts action on
mitigation, then we
think that our response,
and the correct response
of the community that wants
to build a sustainable
effort on solar geoengineering
is not to take the money,
and to offer active resistance.
So from my point of view, to
build a sustainable effort
you have to tie this
to mitigation policy.
And so I think what Peter
said is completely sensible,
and in no way do I disagree.
In fact, I really
strongly agree.
And so from my point of
view, what we need to do
is focus more on
international funding,
and focus on working
internationally,
and focus on raising funds
in a way that's transparent,
and from organizations with a
long track record of funding
environmental work.
And that's what
we've been doing.
And finally, Peter mentioned
that it was crucial
that if these things
are to benefit people
in the developing world that we
work closely with that world.
And we, again, strongly
agree, and in different ways
are trying to do that.
And even to join.
JESSE REYNOLDS: Great.
OK.
So there was a woman
back there with her hand
high up in the air.
And I'll add in
two more, because
of the presence of
comments, and not question.
So Oliver and the woman directly
in front of me with her hand
in the air.
That doesn't narrow it down.
In either order, whichever
is more convenient.
SARAH GONZALEZ-ROTHI:
So I'll be brief.
I'm Sarah Gonzalez Rothe,
with the democratic staff
of the Senate Committee
on Commerce Science
and Transportation.
And so I have two questions.
Both are brief.
If, as we've heard,
the United States maybe
isn't in a position
right now, politically,
to lead on research
governance, then who is?
And then, secondarily,
Scott talked earlier,
on the first panel,
about incidental masking
with sulfur dioxide.
And so in recognizing
that, and in recognizing
our current pollution framework
for Clean Air Act, or Clean
Water Act discharges, how
would a deployment governance
system work, as it relates
to the incidental masking
and discharge of sulfur dioxide?
KELLY WANSER: Hi,
I'm Kelly Wanser.
I'm with the Marine
Club Writing Project.
I'm going to toss out a
little bit of a contrarian
point of view on
federal research
funding in the current climate.
So in a very tactical
way, from my understanding
of being engaged
with field research
proposals in
geoengineering, and others
can argue the percentage, but
a good majority of the work
is very synergistic,
if not identical,
with a detailed
understanding of the climate.
And there are three components.
There are the platforms
for observing climate.
There are the models for
interpreting climate.
And there are other people.
And right now we have
proposals on the table
to decommission those things
inside the government.
And if there is a framework
for a Republican climate
policy that allows
the maintenance
of that infrastructure
in the United States
for understanding
climate, which is--
and when we talk about
geoengineering research,
I think it's just
important to consider
that much of what
we're talking about
is very fine grained
understanding of climate
and feedbacks.
And so I just wanted
to put that out there,
in the context of this
particular emphasis.
JESSE REYNOLDS: OK.
And Oliver.
OLIVER MOORE: Hi, Oliver
Moore, and I just wanted
to lower the tone.
Under the rubric
of state of play
I just wondered if
any of the panel
had any feeling about what
the prevalence of Chemtrail
conspiracies means for
geoengineering policy,
in this event.
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: Great.
[LAUGHING]
JESSE REYNOLDS: OK.
I'm going to go in the
same order, as before.
Or actually, why don't
I go in reverse order,
and just see, starting
over there with Janos.
Any responses to the
questions that were
scattered among the comments?
JANOS PASZTOR: Sure.
So I've been receiving
more and more followers
from the Chemtrails category.
So this is great.
We talked earlier, a
lot, about attribution.
Oliver, you were the one
who actually brought this up
in an interesting way.
And we're not going
to get away with it
that easy about that issue.
And the perception of what is
happening is just so important.
And whether it has anything
to do with reality,
or a little bit to
do with reality,
or a lot to do with
reality, something
we will need to deal with.
But, anyway.
But I wanted to come back to
the first question about series
or parallel.
And I would strongly believe
that in this kind of situation
going parallel is the
way to go, particularly
when it comes to
research and governance,
because neither side do
we know exactly yet what
we're looking for.
And we're learning
from each other so.
I think it makes a lot
of sense to go ahead,
do some experiments that
spur others to think
about governance
issues, and then we
do some governance, that spurs
some of the research people
to do things differently.
And if we are all
transparent about this,
then we can learn from it.
And that is the way
to move forward.
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: Can I
just comment on that one.
JESSE REYNOLDS: Yes, please.
Go ahead.
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: So I heard
Mike say something different.
So Mike can correct
which one it is.
So I 100% agree.
Our position statement at
EDF says that explicitly.
What I heard, though, is
the parallelism of Mike
was deployment, or beginning
to actually go into the field.
JANOS PASZTOR: OK.
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: That I will
push back very hard against,
and let me explain why.
Even if you didn't say
it, I'll push back.
[LAUGHING]
[AUDIO OUT]
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: Well,
a large scale field.
MIKE: How large?
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: Yeah.
How large?
I mean, large scale
enough that it's not--
JANOS PASZTOR: [INAUDIBLE].
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: Right.
I mean, something that will have
more than a de minimis impact,
was your parallel.
No?
Yes?
MIKE: I want [AUDIO OUT].
STEVEN P. HAMBURG:
Parallel with what?
Governance?
Well, I think we're all
in agreement with that.
So I don't think
there's any question.
Or at least, certainly,
we are, and the community
that I know of.
At least, initially, you can't
figure out the governance well
unless you're
doing some research
so you can bounce it off.
Doesn't mean you start
the research then
think about the governance.
You do them in
truly and parallel.
OK.
[AUDIO OUT]
JESSE REYNOLDS: All right.
Let Peter talk then.
OK.
Peter.
PETER C. FRUMHOFF: So I'm a
little confused about what
the conversation's about, but--
[LAUGHING]
Fundamentally you're-- it's OK.
I don't think we need a
fully fledged governance
system, whatever fully
fledged looks like, in order
to initiate small scale
research of the sort we're
talking about here today.
I think it's appropriate to
think about them as co-evolving
as Ted Parsons has talked
about in other contexts.
But scale matters, and
perception, and legitimacy
matters a lot.
And so I think I'm worried about
the emergence of things that
will be perceived as risky
or large scale by others,
and how we perceive it
probably doesn't really matter.
It's how others perceive
it that matters.
And we just need to
be mindful of doing
this in a way that doesn't step
into the minefields of pushing
back on the goals
that we all share.
Exactly where the
boundaries are,
and what appropriate
scale looks like,
and what the level of governance
is needed for research
of different scales, is
well beyond my ability
to characterize today.
But I do think that as we
do small scale research
some clear understanding of
where the governance process is
heading, what it's
intended to look like,
and the fact that it's
being done in a way that
has legitimacy, with the
right set of stakeholders,
and inclusiveness,
and transparency,
is going to be
essential so we don't
trip over those many minefields
that will be in front of those.
I'm not sure if that really gets
to your question or not, Mike.
So yes, in parallel.
I'm sorry, in parallel
rather than series,
but with some care to ensure
that we don't undermine
our fundamental goals.
JESSE REYNOLDS:
Let's see if I can
get Janie, and Joseph,
in here, and then I'll
circle back around to Janos.
JANIE WISE THOMPSON:
So I really liked--
Sarah and Kelly's comments both
kind of fit in together, which
was sort of unpacking
the science questions,
and geoengineering
helps you unpack
a lot of other great
things about the climate,
including understanding the
sulfur masking, which I mean,
if it's sulfates
in the troposphere
we're talking about things
that harm human health.
So for me, that
makes me think about,
this is something
that comes home
to people's constituency's.
If you don't have one
person in your district
that understands climate
science you definitely
have people that
understand asthma.
So it's a good question
to, sort of, think about,
how would you address sulfur
masking from the governance
perspective?
But also sort of
marrying these two
concepts to draw out the need
for research and to build that
support.
And also Sarah's
question about, who
ought lead on research
governance, if not the US,
if we're not in a
position to do that?
The very question makes me
think, well, it must be the US.
I mean, despite
all our misgivings,
and maybe, lack of faith in the
United States government today
I do believe we've got the tools
to do a good job with this,
and to take a good faith effort.
And you know, it's
telling me, yeah we
should you know get cracking.
JOSEPH MAJKUT: Yeah.
Actually, I agree.
And I think likewise.
I mean, I'm worried
by the idea that we're
waiting for the right
political context,
or the right preconditions
from political actors
before moving ahead,
or supporting research.
The enemy is ignorance, right?
What we're trying to do is
give people in the future tools
to better understand,
and perhaps, better
respond to the risks
from climate change.
If the vessel or the
funder that will marshal
the war against ignorance
doesn't like mitigation policy
all that much, I
don't necessarily
agree that that's going to be
a problem for the governance
issues, because we're
so far from deployment.
We're decades from tenth
of [INAUDIBLE], which
is an experiment, right?
That's not even a
deployment statement.
I really question the
hesitancy because--
I tried to get at
this in my comments--
if it's not those
who are concerned
about climate risk
pushing for this research
it'll never come about.
And if the conditions for the
preconditions are too strong
then it'll never be an option.
JANOS PASZTOR: So two issues.
I mean, following
this line, that's
not why I asked for the mic.
But I do tend to agree
that, on the one hand,
refusing money from a government
that is against mitigation,
that's one thing.
But there is other
things in this world,
including in this country,
than the federal government.
There are states,
there are cities,
there are lots of
different entities
that can do useful
things in this area.
And I hope they will do that.
So let's work on that.
But coming back to the--
I lost my [INAUDIBLE]
on the other point
that I wanted to raise.
So I will skip that.
OK.
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: So let me.
I was just going to jump in.
One thing is there was
sort of a presumption,
and maybe not by
everybody, but governance
doesn't mean government.
JOSEPH MAJKUT: Yes.
STEVEN P. HAMBURG: And I think
we have to be really careful.
There are lots of
governance institutions.
And in this space.
I think the initial ones are
not going to be government
but they may evolve
into government.
And so I think we need to spend
some time figuring that out.
Or it may be
government governance
outside and within government.
If you do NEPA, obviously,
that's government.
But if it's pre-NEPA you
may still have governance.
JESSE REYNOLDS: I think
Janos remembered his--
JANOS PASZTOR: I
remembered the other point.
So that relates to the
question I asked David.
And it's not that I'm
pushing for an answer.
And I'm just flagging
it, because I think
we will need to work on this.
Between the small
scale, that I think
is fairly clear what
we're talking about,
small scale, and the very
large scale deployment,
there must be stages.
And we need to be able
to define that so that we
can be clear about when
one becomes the other,
as part of this
evolution of our work.
JESSE REYNOLDS: And I will
give the last word to Peter.
PETER C. FRUMHOFF:
So I guess I just
wanted to say that whatever
I think, and perhaps most
of us in the room think,
about the advisability
of beyond small scale research
in the direction of larger
scale work, and ultimately
the feasibility of deployment,
it's not my decision.
And I don't think
it's our decision.
And I think we have to
be careful to distinguish
our interest in understanding
the risks and tradeoffs,
and communicating them, and
promoting an outcome that
really is an outcome
to be decided
in a consultative process
that's inclusive and transparent
by a much broader
range of stakeholders
than are in the room today.
So it's easy to, kind
of, get those entwined.
I know, and I do
it all the time.
And I just want to
make sure that we're--
even though I might want to see
work move forward aggressively,
that might not be an [? end ?]
where society wants to take us.
JESSE REYNOLDS: OK.
I get the sense we
could go on all day.
But we'll wrap it up here.
So thank you for your
comments, and your questions,
and your attention.
And please join me in
thanking the panel.
[APPLAUSE]
