Part Five of Beyond Good and Evil begins with
section 186, in which Nietzsche describes
his project and contrasts it with the projects
of past moral philosophers.
Nietzsche will, he says, produce a descriptive
typology of morals.
Past philosophers have attempted something
quite different: they have tried to find a
rational foundation for morals.
This quest for a rational foundation took
the existence of morality and moral obligation
for granted.
Thus the moral philosophers of the past ignored
the descriptive task as trivial and unimportant.
On the contrary, writes Nietzsche, constructing
a typology of morals requires the greatest subtlety.
Note that here Nietzsche contrasts his subtle
psychological observation with the clumsy
moralizing that has passed for philosophy
up to now.
The problem with past moral philosophy, writes
Nietzsche, is that it has not yet confronted
the real problems of morality.
Because they ignored the descriptive task
in favor of inquiry into rational foundations,
these philosophers’ knowledge of morals
was only approximate and arbitrary.
They did not study the moralities of different
peoples and past ages.
The real problems of morality can only be
seen by a comparison of many different moralities.
Past scholars’ claimed rational foundations
of morals are nothing more than disguised
faith in the dominant moral code of their
place and time.
(Think especially of Kant in this regard.)
Thus these philosophers assume that there
is, and can be, no real problem with morality
as such.
Nietzsche’s task, by contrast, is the analysis,
examination, and vivisection (or live dissection)
of this faith in moral obligation.
He concludes this section with an example.
Schopenhauer, the famous pessimist, talks
like a child or a pious old woman when he
says that “Hurt no one” is a universal moral precept.
Nietzsche replies: “whoever has once felt
deeply how insipidly false and sentimental
this principle is in a world whose essence
is will to power” should recall that Schopenhauer,
for all his claimed pessimism, played the
flute, every day after dinner.
Nietzsche here suggests that although Schopenhauer
repudiates belief in God, he is not willing
to abandon belief in a universal “do no
harm” morality.
Is he really a pessimist then?, asks Nietzsche.
Note that in attacking Schopenhauer as sentimentalist,
Nietzsche appeals to his reader’s “deep
feeling” that the no-harm principle is ridiculous
and false, since the world is run by will
to power.
He does not appeal to a rational principle,
so much as to a shared intuition of how things are.
He appeals to a prior acceptance of the reality
of will to power in order to dismiss Schopenhauer.
Where does this acceptance come from?
Why should we, as Nietzsche’s readers, share it? 
What is its foundation?
These are questions we should keep in mind
as we continue to read the work.
That’s my summary of and commentary on section
186 of Beyond Good and Evil.
Thanks for watching today; goodbye.
