
Chinese: 
- [旁白]我们很高兴你们能参与
- （笑声）是的，非常感谢。感谢你们的到来
让我们来看看。我将给你们介绍我的三位合作讲师
然后，我想，John会负责后面的介绍
大概包括讲些关于我的娱乐趣事
缓解下现场压力
好啦，这位是Allen，我在LinkedIn的共同创办人
实际上，他和我同年进入斯坦福大学
那时我们彼此不认识
我们通过valley network相互介绍认识
那时，我开始了首次创业，即Socialnet
我们的首次创业，Socialnet社交网
并且，我们过去常一起做事
比如手工艺以及其他活动
斯坦福的学生们都会记得这些事情
在前面的这位是Chris Yeh
他是我的书籍《The Alliance》的合著者
我们现在还正在合作写
一本关于快速规模化（blitzscaling）主题的书

English: 
- [Voiceover] We're glad you're on it.
- (laughs) Yes, very much.
Thank you for coming.
Let's see, so I'm gonna
introduce my three co-instructors
and then John will, I
guess, take it from there,
including probably saying
something entertaining about me,
although not to put the burden too high.
So Allen, standing here, is
my co-founder at LinkedIn.
He and I were actually at
Stanford the same years.
We did not know each other then.
We got introduced to each other
through the valley network
on my very first startup, Socialnet,
our very first start up, Socialnet.
And used to do things
like craft gaieties and everything else,
which the Stanford students will remember.
Chris Yeh, who is here in
the front, is my coauthor
on the book The Alliance.
We are also working on a book
on this subject of blitzscaling as well,

Chinese: 
书中讲述这次课程的一些情况
这位是John Lilly，也是我们四个当中
唯一的一名教授
曾负责整一个季度的授课
（笑声）好了，不是一个教授，真的不是
讲师，讲师，对
我记得这位老师
他一直在那学校和其他地方教书
也是开发Mozilla的首席执行官
而目前，他是我在Greylock的合作伙伴
然后，我会让John——
- [Chris]现在最重要的是，如果我认识Reid
- Reid也
- [Reid]记得这个视频
- 哦，是的，讨厌
我对mics感觉很糟糕
所以，我们必须好好解决它
那么，是的，感谢你们的到来
Reid和我已经合作很长一段时间
我们之前在斯坦福大学彼此都不认识
我们大约十年后才认识彼此
我们通过斯坦福大学一位朋友介绍认识
你们在这里所建立的各种关系相当重要
而且，这种关系会长期的存在
并且，你与团队在这里所作出的努力
你们所结识的人，都会很大程度影响你的事业
我们在本课堂中将会深入讨论这个问题

English: 
which is part of what
conditions this class.
John Lilly, who is here, is
the only one of the four of us
with being a, having been a professor
for an entire quarter before.
(laughs) Well, not a professor, yes.
Lecturer, lecturer, yes.
I remember the teacher,
and has done that at the
d.school and some other places
and was the CEO who scaled Mozilla
and is now partner with me at Greylock
and I will let John--
- [Chris] So most of all, if I know Reid
- Reid is also--
- [Reid] Remember the video.
- Oh yeah, shit.
I'm pretty bad with mics,
so we'll just have to sort this out.
So, yeah, thanks for coming.
Reid and I collaborated a long, long time.
We also didn't know
each other at Stanford.
We got to know each other
about ten years later,
introduced through a friend
of ours who was at Stanford.
The connection you make
here are pretty critical
and very, very, very long-lasting.
And the work you do with groups here,
the people you meet, will
impact your career greatly
and we'll talk about that
a lot during the class.

English: 
So anyways, so Reid, founder of LinkedIn,
my partner at Greylock,
has been on the boards
of any number of companies,
was one of the early guys at PayPal,
Socialnet, Apple, a
bunch of of other places,
well, not early at Apple but
he's not that old,
(class laughs)
but close, yeah.
Anyway, so, well, we should just talk.
So let's talk about it.
- Wait, we've got legal disclaimers.
- Legal disclaimers, sweet.
- All right team, well, as
the modern world of education
requires me to say a couple of things
before you participate in this class.
First, by participating in
this class you are granting us
permission to use and distribute
the content you create for this class,
though you are still the
owner and rights holder.
So, anyone who's planning
to sign a contract
based on the class, you still
own your content, not ours.
These class sessions are
going to be recorded,
as you can tell by the video cameras.
And these are going to
be publicly distributed.
That means that while
the videos are probably
not going to show any students,
if, in fact, you do not feel comfortable

Chinese: 
所以无论如何，Reid，LinkedIn的创办人
我在Greylock的合作伙伴，
曾与许多公司合作
他也是PayPal
Socialnet、Apple、很多其他领域的老前辈
好吧，在Apple公司不算，不过
他没那么老
（课堂上笑声）
但，也比较老了，是的
无论如何，好吧，我们应该谈谈
让我们一起讨论下
- 等等，我们收到些免责声明
- 免责声明，酷毙了
- 好了，大伙们，由于现代教育
要求我在你们参与本课堂之前
先说说几点问题
第一，你们参与本课堂即表明你们允许我们
使用和分配
你们在课堂上所创建的内容
但你们仍然是这些内容的所有者和权利所有人
所以，如果任何人打算就课堂合同签署一份合同
你们还是自己内容的所有者，而并非我们
课堂会话将会进行录像
你们看到这些录像机就肯定已经明白
并且，这些内容将会公开发布
这意味着录像不可能
同时展示所有同学
确切地说，如果你觉得

Chinese: 
出现在摄像机中不自在的话
如果你可以挪动的话
你可以挪到教室较远的角落
（课堂上笑声）
但以后
请坐到教室的四个角落去
我们不希望任何不希望出现在录像中的同学
出现在录像中
同样，如果我们给你提供机会
提出一些问题，而你觉得面对工作中的摄像机
提出你的问题不太自在的话
讲师们和任何特邀发言人
会在课后短暂地停留
回答你不希望在摄像机前
所提出的各个问题
现在我们都在法律上应该没有什么纠葛了
（课堂上笑声）
- 好的，很好
好吧，我就讲两三点
让你们快速了解一下背景
本课程大概建立在三种不同的传统上
前不久，我作为一名CS学者参加课程
那次培训的课程叫做
《计算机科学家的商业》
一名叫做Dave Liddle的小伙子
就是在Xerox PARC
以及其他一些领域的老前辈
站起来并讨论了十几分钟

English: 
with the slight possibility
that you'll appear on camera,
you should move to one of
the far corners of the room
assuming it was possible to move.
(class laughs)
But in the future,
please do sit in the
four corners of the room.
We do not want anybody who does not wish
to appear on camera to appear on camera.
Similarly, if we're
giving you an opportunity
to ask questions and you
don't feel comfortable
asking your question
with the cameras rolling,
the instructors and any guest speakers
will stay briefly after
class to answer questions
that you did not feel comfortable asking
with the cameras rolling.
And with that we are now legally clear.
(class laughs)
- All right, so, cool.
So, just a couple things.
Just quick background.
The class is sort of built on
three different traditions.
So when I was here as a CS
student a little while ago,
there was a class taught called
Business for Computer Scientists
and a guy named Dave Liddle,
who was one of the
early guys at Xerox PARC
and a number of other places,
got up and talked for a quarter about

English: 
how to do a balance sheet, how to do PNL,
how to do all that stuff and
how to run a basic business.
We're not gonna do any of that,
but it was a huge thing for
my career and think about
a bunch of computer scientists
building businesses.
The second thing that's
worth mentioning is that
entrepreneurship at Stanford
is unbelievably well supported
by guys like Tom Byers and Tina Seelig
and people who have built
entrepreneurship classes
and scaling classes, like Bob Sutton.
So, we'll talk about our
particular brand of scaling,
the one that we see and
touch and build every day,
but there's so much at
Stanford that I think
everybody should be paying attention to
and be grateful that you have.
And then the third thing,
the third sort of tradition is built on
is this is class called CS183c.
Two years ago,
Peter Thiel taught a class
called CS183 about startups,
memorializing a book called Zero to One.
Last year, Sam Altman, from Y Combinator,
taught a class about startup school.
That was sort of the spiritual successor,
which is, how do you actually
get from zero to one?
And then this is, in a lot
of ways, the sequel to that,

Chinese: 
主题关于如何做资产负债表、如何做PNL
如何进行各方面操作以及如何运营基本的业务
我们并不打算去做那些东西
但是，我的事业生涯将面临很多事情
想想大批立业的计算机科学家
值得一说的第二件事是
斯坦福的创业精神得到很多人支持，这点令人难以置信
比如Tom Byers和Tina Seelig
以及开办创业课程
和规模化课程的人士，比如Bob Sutton
所以，我们将讨论我们的规模化品牌
我们每天都看到、接触和创建的品牌
但是，我想，在斯坦福，有太多太多
值得每个人都关注的东西
并且我你们现在所拥有的一切而心存感激
然后，第三点
作为课程基础的第三种传统
叫做CS183c
两年前
Peter Thiel讲授了一节关于创业公司的CS183课程
讲到一本叫做《Zero to One》的书
去年，来自Y 孵化器的Sam Altman
讲授了一节关于创业学校的课程
那是一种精神续作
这就是，你从《zero to one》中到底学到什么东西？
还有，在很多方面，这是一种续作

Chinese: 
这就是，创立是好事，但是，真正激动人心的是
你如何按一定规模建立一个大型且持久的公司
而这就是硅谷真正厉害之处
所以，这就是三种传统
因此，你要知道，你们现在站在了巨人们的肩膀上
你们能在这个时候来到斯坦福真是太幸运了
基于上面所述的，你们从本课程
不该期望的一些方面包括
你不该期望我们教导你如何
阅读资产负债表或PL
或做财务模型或任何方面
你不该期望我们当中的任何人经常
同意彼此的意见
我们将讨论
更多内容
（Reid喃喃自语一些事情）
（John和课堂上的笑声）
正是
对的，你不应该期望我们总是很认真
并且你不应该期望获得既成的脚本
这不是如何将我们推销给一个风投资金
这不是如何取得公司资助
你应该期望的是
如何思考如何将公司
发展壮大，并且在建立真正意义的基础公司
你应该期望我们

English: 
which is, starting up is
cool, but what's really cool
is how do you build a big,
durable business at scale
and that's what Silicon
Valley's really special for.
So, those are the three traditions.
And so, you know, stand on
the shoulders of giants.
You guys are very lucky at a
very lucky time at Stanford.
So with that, what you shouldn't expect
from this class is a few things.
So you shouldn't expect
us to teach you how
to read a balance sheet or PL
or do financial modeling
or any of that stuff.
You shouldn't expect any of us to agree
with each other very often.
We're gonna talk about
a lot of thing--
(Reid mumbles something)
(John and class laugh)
Exactly.
Right, you shouldn't expect
us to be serious all the time.
And you shouldn't expect a playbook.
This is not how to pitch us to a VC,
this is not how to get a company funded.
What you should expect is
how to think about how to grow companies
really big and really make
the fundamental companies.
You should expect us to get into it

Chinese: 
与参加的特邀发言人深入讨论这个问题
而且我们有很多参加的了不起特邀发言人
此外，你应该期望我们回答各个问题
并与你建立友好关系，我们应该期望
你们每个人能相互学习
因为我们也会将内容发布到LinkedIn集团，并回答媒体问题
- [Reid]最后我们会这样做
我们只会稍作解释
然后，我想说的最后一件事，Sam Altman
在一开始时有一个很好的评论
他去年在授课时
有点儿害羞，并且，他认为
他的观点是：如果你真的渴望开办一家公司
那么你就应该竭尽全力建立公司
因此，鼓励人们这样做有点可怕
因为开办一家公司
是一项强度高的、辛苦的工作
确实，真正应该开办公司的人
应该那些不得不开办公司的人
因此，我们会说很多方面
可能有关你们的公司
或者你们的创业或你们的雄心，或与之无关的事情
你们的目标里程可能有所不同，公平的警告，是不？
你们今天可以询问任何问题
你们今天可以询问任何问题
我不喜欢mics
（Chris笑着说）
我们讲课时，你们可以询问任何问题

English: 
with the guest speakers who are coming,
and we have a lot of amazing
guest speakers who are coming.
And you should expect
us to answer questions
and engage with you and we should expect
you each to learn from each
other as we post content
to the LinkedIn group and
to medium questions as well.
- [Reid] Which we will get to at the end.
Which we will explain
in just a little bit.
And then the last thing I
should say, and Sam Altman
had a very good comment
at the very beginning,
he was a little bit
self conscious last year
about teaching a class,
because he thinks that,
his point of view was, you
should only start a company
if you're really dying to start a company.
And so, encouraging people to
do it is a little bit scary
because the job of starting a company
is such an intense, hard job.
Really the only people
who should start a company
are people who can't not start companies.
So, we're gonna say a lot of things
that might me be relevant to your company
or your startups or your
ambitions and they might not.
Your mileage may vary, so
just, fair warning, yeah?
And you can ask questions today.
You can ask questions today.
I don't like mics.
(Chris laughs)
You can ask questions
today when we lecture.

English: 
When our guests come in,
we're gonna do more moderated,
but today and when we lecture
you can be pretty free-flying,
just raise your hand
if you have questions.
There will be a way to submit questions
that we will then edit before the class
when we're having guest lecturers
so we have it highly edited
and useful to the group.
The other things in term
of the mileage may vary
is our target here is not a playbook,
our target is essentially
shining a light ahead
because the general myth
around entrepreneurship
is that you just have
an idea and it works,
and actually, in fact,
there's a tremendous amount
of innovation, hard
work, skilled activity,
and everything else that goes into this.
And so, part of the idea
is it's not a simple recipe.
It's not insert capital,
insert a little bit
of technology, stir, it happens.
So, there's heuristics, not rules.
There's kind of ways to think about this.
And so that's the kind
of thing we're doing
and it's more or less of big concepts.
It's kind of what are the concepts
as you're beginning to think about this.

Chinese: 
如果我们的客座教授到来，我们会适当节制下
但今天，我们讲课时，你们可以活跃自由提问
如果你们有问题，请举手
如果我们邀请客座教授
那么我们会请你们先提交各个问题
我们会在课前进行编辑
所以我们会对问题进行高度编辑，使其对集体有用
有关目标里程的其他事项可能不同
我们在这里的目标并非获得一个既定脚本
基本上，我们的目标是为前程点一盏明灯
因为围绕创业精神的一般误区是
你只拥有一个想法，并且其行得通
但实际上，我们需要投入巨大的
创新、努力工作、技能活动
以及其他等等
因此，一种想法
并不是一个简单的食谱
并不是投入资金、投入一点技术
联合起来，它就能实现
所以，这是一种启发法教育，并不是规则
我们拥有一种思考方式
那也是我们所做的事情
或多或少是一个大概念
这是一种概念定义
因为你正开始去思考这个问题

English: 
Now one of the things that we,
when we started this work,
we're still actually looking
for a better term than this, blitzscaling.
Might as well go to the next slide,
if I recall the next slide.
Yup. (laughs)
Which is, is that, in fact,
one of the things we think we need here
is kind of a specialized term for this.
And there's things that
are good about this term,
which is the speed of scale,
the speed of deployment
on a global basis, the speed
of building an organization,
something that is
crafted as a term of art.
There are parallels
between business strategy
and military strategies, that's okay.
It's less okay because it's
not universally military.
And so, we're still looking for,
like this is part of
what we're working out
because, by the way, just
like any entrepreneurial thing
we're working on the book and doing this
as we're teaching this
class and so we are doing
such things as thinking about this term
and saying, "Does this
term actually really work?"
So, this is the classic
mythos of Silicon Valley,

Chinese: 
现在问题在于
当我们开始这项工作，实际上我们还在寻找
一个更好的术语，快速规模化（blitzscaling）
不如转到下一页幻灯片
我记得下一页幻灯片
好啊（笑声）
事实上
我们认为，在这里，我们需要做的一件事情
就是找出一种专业的术语
而且，这个术语应该拥有众多优势
包括发展规模的速度，全球部署的速度
建立一个组织的速度
诸如一种艺术
商业策略和军事战略
都有些相似之处，这是可以的
但不太好，因为它不是普遍适于战争
因此，我们仍然在寻找
比如，这是我们规划的其中一部分
顺便提一下，因为正如我们在书上
以及我们所做的事情，就和所投入的任何创业努力一样
因为我们任教这节课程，并且我们做着这些事情
同时思考着这个术语
并说：“这个术语真的能表述清楚吗？”
所以，这是硅谷的传统方法模式

Chinese: 
而硅谷则是创业的沃土
实质上，这是你所不拥有的
一种失败文化，一种对失败的恐惧
当你尝试做某事但以失败告终时，你无须受到惩罚
你可以再试一次
你可以很容易地在这里聚集一群创始人
我们有各种风险投资、各类院校，例如斯坦福大学，
并且，总有一定的途径让梦想变为现实。
而这就是那个经典的故事
通常，我发现，和年轻的创业者谈话时
他们仅仅考虑把APP做好，并且投入运行
你会得到一些资金，并且，人们喜欢该APP
然后，你就开始角逐
这是一个经典的故事
并且创造了硅谷神话，但是，这仅仅部分正确
如果你没有之前的故事
你将无法成功
因此，确定如何有效执行
实际上是一个真的非常重要的因素
对于创业之初来说，尤其如此
并且，你们可以在许多创业课堂中了解到这一点
你如何选择一名创始人？
你如何确信创意是否正确？
你如何获取启动资金？
你如何确定怎么应对竞争？
其是否相关联？谷歌
或微软是否也会采取这些措施？

English: 
which is it's a land of startups.
It's a land of,
essentially, you don't have
kind of a culture of
failure, a fear of failure.
That you're not penalized when
you try something and fail.
You can try it again.
That you can assemble a group
of founders here very easily.
There's venture capital,
universities such as Stanford,
and there's a way to make that happen.
And this is the classic story.
Frequently what I find from
talking to young entrepreneurs,
they just think they get
their app right and it works.
You get some capital, people love the app,
and then you're off to the races.
This is the classic story about what
makes Silicon Valley strong
and that's partially true.
If you don't have that previous story,
you're not gonna succeed.
So, figuring out how
to do that effectively
is actually one of the things
that's really important
about the beginning of entrepreneurship
and that's what you see in
many entrepreneurship classes.
How do you select a founder?
How do you know if the
idea's right or not?
How do you get your initial financing?
How do you figure out what
the competition's doing?
Whether it's relevant, whether Google
or Microsoft is doing this,
these sorts of things.

English: 
Those are all actually important
to succeed in this journey.
However, there's a problem with the story.
The problem with the story is that
when you begin to look at the whole world
in terms of the ability to
assemble 10 or 20 people,
do a initial idea, have the idea about how
to distribute it in the app
store, how to distribute it in a
you know, kind of on SEO or
virality, in terms of the web,
how to make all of these things happen.
I have visited at least
20 places personally
where you can assemble 10 to 20 people,
where they have enough knowledge,
venture capital has gone global.
This is all something where you can
do a startup in many areas of the world
and we say, "Well, there's
still a culture here,
"there's still a network."
That's all obviously true.
There's still a differential
edge to Silicon Valley,
but now the world knows, that
actually entrepreneurship
is a very good thing, that
actually having people
take a bold venture effort
to make something happen
is part of how you create
the jobs of the future,
that technology is transforming industries

Chinese: 
如需获得成功，这些其实也是非常重要的因素
但是，这个故事有一个问题
该故事的问题是
当你开始着眼在全世界寻找
关于聚集10个或20个人的能力
去启动一个创意，（你必须）拥有
如何将其通过应用商店进行发布
或者，如何通过网络发布，例如通过SEO或扩散使网络
如何实施所有这些步骤
我最少亲自拜访了20多个地方
你们可以从这些地方召集10到20个人
他们拥有足够的知识
并且各种风投资金也遍布全世界
你可以采取所有可能的措施
在世界许多地方进行创业
并且，我们说，“嗯，这里有一种文化
“还有一个网络。”
当然，所有这些都是正确的
然而，在硅谷，还存在一定的差异
但是，现在，全世界都知道，
创业其实是件好事，并且，事实上
可允许人们采取大胆的风险投资，让梦想成为现实
其是如何创造未来工作的一部分
也是技术转化为工业产品的过程

Chinese: 
并且，这也是众望所归的事情
并且，问题就可归结为
为什么硅谷依然会出现
数量巨大的各种非常新奇的公司？
这个地方为什么现在还如此独特？
创业是其中的一部分，但是，事实上
规模化的能力是其中的关键因素
且还包括规模收益、规模化客户的概念
以及实际规模化组织和我们如何实施
和我们如何以统一一致的方式执行那个脚本
毫无疑问，也包括其如何工作
因为，请记住，这全部都是风险投资
但是也是获得各种不同结果的方式
基本内容包括哪些呢？
各种风险、各种机会、进行创业的决定
都是这个课堂的基本内容
下一个？
- [John]是的
- [Reid]那么，这是你的，对不？
- 当然，是的
对的
那么，这就我们在谈及大公司时所讨论的内容
那么，我们可以快速浏览各个公司
我们所了解的技术公司

English: 
and this is something they want.
And so the question comes down to,
well, why is it that
Silicon Valley still creates
a massive number of very
interesting companies?
Why is it that this
place is still so unique?
And startups are part of it, but actually
the ability to scale is
a key portion of this.
And the notion of scaling
revenue, scaling customers
and actually scaling organizations
and how do we do that
and how do we run that playbook
in a consistent fashion,
not to say that it always works
'cause this is all venture, remember,
but in a way that shows
massively differential results.
What is the underpinnings?
The risks, the opportunities,
the decisions that go
into that, that is essentially
what the class is about.
Are we?
- [John] Yeah.
- [Reid] So, this is you, isn't it?
- Sure, well, yeah.
So, here.
So, this is what we talk
about when we mean big.
So we just did a quick
scan of the companies
that we know about in technology

Chinese: 
这些公司可能为100个亿，或者更大规模
其数量并不多，100亿是个不小的数目
各个公共公司的规模可能更大
值得注意的是，这些公司都在硅谷
除了腾讯和阿里巴巴
每个公司都在硅谷
并且，你将会注意到，它们的数量不断增加
在1998年和1999年，只有4家大公司
你们知道的，谷歌、腾讯、阿里巴巴和Salesforce
但是，现在，这类公司的数量在不断增加
你们可以看到它们创造了更多的价值
并且，并非只有一个标准去判断
某个公司有多大、某个公司的规模多大
但是，值得注意的是，它们都属于硅谷
和几家北京和中国公司
然后，我们可以轻易看到
越来越多的独角兽（公司）不断涌现
这是我所能找到关于独角兽的最佳图片
我原来在找Creative Commons组织的独角兽群图片
无论怎么样，这是我能找到最好的图片了
它就这么吸引了我的注意力
（学生大笑）
无论如何
- [Reid]你现在知道你的圣诞节礼物是什么了
对不？
- 真好，对不？
粉色独角兽，你知道的，我们的朋友Aileen Lee
将独角兽的概念通俗化了
在这个方面，值得注意的是

English: 
that are 10 billion or bigger.
There's not a ton, 10 billion
is a pretty large number.
This is the public
companies that are bigger.
And it's worth noting that
these are all Silicon Valley,
except for Tencent and Alibaba.
Everything else is Silicon Valley.
And if you'll note, they're speeding up.
So there were four in 1998, 1999.
You know, Google, Tencent,
Alibaba, and Salesforce,
but now they're starting to speed up.
You can start to see that
more and more value creation.
And so this is not the only way to judge
how large a company is,
how big a company is,
but it is worth noting all Silicon Valley
and a couple of Beijing
and Chinese companies.
And then lately, obviously,
lots and lots and lots of unicorns.
This is the best unicorn
picture I could find of this.
I was looking for a Creative
Commons unicorn herd picture.
Anyhow, this is the best I could find.
It's kind of growing on me though.
(students laugh)
So, anyhow.
- [Reid] You realize what
your Christmas present is now,
right?
- So good, right?
Pink unicorns and, you
know, our friend Aileen Lee
popularized the term unicorn.
It's worth mentioning at this point

English: 
now there's unicorns,
unicorpses, and dragons,
and all this other stuff.
(class laughs)
And the billion dollar thing
is kind of a goofball metric.
She was trying to say, look,
there are more big companies
getting started now than ever before.
There's something unusual happening
and that's her main point.
And so we try to quantify it.
We were looking through the CrunchBase.
Oh and I guess I should say,
these are all paper unicorns.
These are all paper valuations.
Companies are worth, at some level,
what people would pay for them
and until a market gets made,
they're all, sort of at some
level, pretend valuations.
Having said that, let's just look
by region what's happening.
So, of the top 10 you
can see Uber and Airbnb,
Palantir, Pinterest,
Dropbox, Silicon Valley,
so about half the companies.
The two in China, Xiaomi and Didi Kuaidi,
are in Beijing.
Snapchat and SpaceX are in LA,
but I would argue have
profoundly Silicon Valley roots

Chinese: 
现在很多独角兽、独脚僵尸和龙
以及此类事物
（课堂大笑）
而10亿美元在某种程度上是一种常见标准
她的意思是，现在出现的大规模公司
数量多于往常
这是一些不同于往常的现象
这就是她的主要观点
并且，我们尝试将其量化
我们曾在CrunchBase中搜索
噢，我想我应该说，这些都是书面上的独角兽
因为所有都是书面估价
各个公司在某个层面上的价值
人们觉得它们所具备的价值
并且，在某个市场形成之前
它们在某种程度上都属于不真实的估价
既然这样说，我们就看一看
根据地区，看看存在什么情况
你们所了解的前10强公司，包括Uber和Airbnb
Palantir、Pinterest、Dropbox、Silicon Valley
大概半数的公司
两个来自中国，小米和滴滴快的
位于北京
Snapchat和SpaceX位于洛杉矶
但是，我想说的是，在Elon、Evan和Bobby之间

English: 
between Elon and Evan and Bobby.
And then Flipkart's in Bangalore.
So if you play out and say,
"Look, what about the top 60?"
It looks the same.
So you add 23 more
Silicon Valley companies,
a few more Chinese companies,
you pick up some in New York and Europe
and then elsewhere is, you
know, a couple in Florida
and, well, not many
other places, honestly.
But here's the kicker:
You look at what the population is
that produces each of these things,
7 million people, fewer than
the population of New York
is trading half of the unicorns
to date by CrunchBase metrics.
There's something interesting
happening that's just
qualitatively different
than anywhere else.
And so the question is what?
And like Reid said, it's not starting up,
it's how do you get really big?
- What we're going to be illustrating here
and part of the way that
we're gonna be doing this
and this is the reason why we're having

Chinese: 
都有着很深的硅谷渊源
然后，Flipkart位于印度班加罗尔
然后，如果你将范围扩大点，比如“看看前60强怎么样？”
其结果是一样的
同理，你再添加23个硅谷公司
几个中国公司
你会从纽约和欧洲再找到几个公司
还有其他地方的公司，比如，佛罗里达几个
其实，老实说，不会有很多其他地区
但是，其关键点在于
你看一下这些公司
员工人数有多少
700万人，比纽约的人口还少
但是，管理着半数的独角兽（公司）
这就是最新的CrunchBase数据
其中存在一些有趣的东西
这些东西相比其他因素，存在着质的差异
那么，问题是：什么东西呢？
正如Reid所说，这并非关乎创业
而是关于你如何真正发展壮大
- 我们将在这里解说的内容
以及我们如何实现这个目标的方式
而这就是为什么

Chinese: 
我们邀请了很多嘉宾讲师的原因，
如我所述，其中是否存在一个脚本
其在某种程度上存在一套知识和惯例
一整套关于如何实现这个目标的内容
并且，作为其中一部分
我们将邀请一些实际参与其中的人们
根据他们的亲身实践，来进行针对性讨论
我们都曾经参与其中，这也是我们在这里的原因之一
但是，我们也将从其他公司邀请一些人员
并且讨论：你们如何实现这个目标？
其关键信息是什么？
以及其原因，以一定的方式，尝试说明
我们对硅谷的了解是什么
我们在硅谷所拥有的是什么
以及我们参与这场游戏的方式
这些将会切实帮助我们在座的企业家
在座的各位高管，但是
也希望对全球其他地方的人们有所帮助
其相关的程度
将很大程度取决于该区域的资本、该区域的技术
人才的可用性以及许多其他东西
但是，其目的实际上是
切实为每个人点亮一盏明灯
让我们略过并继续下一个话题
好吧，接下来
让我们继续下个话题

English: 
a number of guest
lectures, is there isn't,
as I mentioned, one playbook.
What there is is a kind of a
set of knowledge and practice,
a set of things in terms
of how to make this work.
And, part of what we're
gonna do is bring in some
of the people who actually run this race,
who do this, and talk with them about it.
All of us have, which is
part of why we're here,
but we're also gonna bring
in folks from other companies
and say, how did you make this work?
What key messages?
And why does, as a way
to try to illustrate,
what is it that we know
here in Silicon Valley,
what is it we have here in Silicon Valley,
and what is the way we play this game
that actually can be helpful
to entrepreneurs here,
to executives here, but also,
hopefully, everywhere in the world.
The degree to which it's relevant will
depend a lot on capital in the
area, technology in the area,
availability of talent and
a bunch of other things,
but the goal is to actually shine a light
that's actually useful to everybody.
Let's go past this one.
All right, so one of the things that,
let's just keep going, 'cause we've talked

Chinese: 
因为我们在规模化方面讨论得太多了（大笑）
好的，你们会发现
我们在这里讨论的主要话题之一
基本上，就是网络的重要性
并且，很显然，当我这样说时
人们都会认为我单纯指LinkedIn
LinkedIn很显然是源自这个理念
但是，其实际上仅仅是
一个基本理念的反映
因此，网络并非
和热门所说的一样，噢，你是指思科
或IP路由器或其他此类事物
我是说，那些因素是这个网络非常重要的部分
并且是网络时代的一部分
但是，那些并非
我原本所述的网络
网络的关键是人
我们就LinkedIn所讨论的内容
其中一点是知识图谱
即关乎公司、人、工作、技能
还有，大学院校，以及这些如何互相联系
这些才是我们所说的网络
如果你在思考，为什么硅谷效率如此之高
其是所有因素之一，就是各种网络

English: 
about scaling enough. (laughs)
Okay, so one of the key things
that you'll find us
talking a lot about here
is, essentially, the
importance of networks.
And obviously when I say that people tend
to think that I'm only meaning LinkedIn.
LinkedIn is obviously
born out of that idea,
but it's actually similarly a projection
from a fundamental idea.
And, so networks also are not,
like some people say, oh, you mean Cisco
or IP routers, or these sorts of things.
I mean, those are a very
important part of this network
and part of being part
of the networked age,
but those also are not the networks
that I'm fundamentally talking about.
The networks are questions of people.
One of the things that we talk
about at LinkedIn is the knowledge graph,
so it's companies, people, jobs, skills,
you know, universities, how
these all relate to each other.
Those are the kinds of networks
that we're talking about.
And one of the things
that when you look at
why it is Silicon Valley
work so well is the networks

Chinese: 
各种不同的网络互相交织
并发挥非常大的作用
并且，创造这些网络的因素就和放大器一样
而网络其实能够放大你所作出的努力
我遇到很多人
他们认为他们在硅谷
他们是天才
并且他们能够在这里创造各种东西
实际上，其中的网络非常重要
你可能是个天才，这实际上也可能是真的
但是，通常，你的关键举措之一
就是把公司开在这里，在这里创办公司
因为你正在布署各种网络
现在，我并不考虑哪些网络
我认为，你们可以在任意地方建立网络
我认为，可能存在某种偶然的成分
但是，我想，这是一系列文化方面的因素
一系列沟通因素，一系列概念因素
最终导致各种网络的建立
并且，例如，这里有一些网络的示例
我是说，某些关乎其天赋，某些关乎其资金
某些关乎其技术诀窍，某些关乎其人员
如果考虑其关键以及其原因
当你开始问，为什么
在这个飞速发展的时代
越来越多具有全球影响和划时代意义的大公司

English: 
of a bunch of different
types all interwoven
work very well here.
And that's the thing that creates
networks being amplifiers,
where the network can
actually amplify what you do.
There's a number of people I meet
who think that they're in Silicon Valley
and they just happen to be geniuses
and that's why they can create stuff here.
Actually, in fact, the
network is very helpful.
You might be a genius, that
may actually in fact be true,
but part of the key move, frequently,
is locating the company
here and building it here
because you're deploying the networks.
Now I don't think those networks,
I think it's possible
to build them anywhere.
I think there's some kind of
organic luck that comes into it
but I think there's a
set of cultural things,
a set of communication things,
a set of ideational things
to get into creating networks.
And, you know, so here's
some of the networks.
I mean, some of it's talent,
some of it's capital,
some of it's know-how,
some of it's people.
And what's key, and this is the reason why
when you begin to say
why is it that we are
in an accelerating age where more globally
impactful and transformational companies

Chinese: 
都刚好诞生在硅谷
其答案是，我处于一个网络时代
你更容易认识更多的人
在全世界范围内，以非常快的方式
现在，他们也可以
理论上来说，在网络时代
你应该看到更多
独角兽、龙、独脚僵尸等新奇事物
你想说点什么？
- [John]是的
- [John]我想说的是，这是建立在
多年发展的基础上，并且你可能听过Fred Wilson
或其他人谈论纽约和新兴网络
他说，“例如，纽约”
正在作为一个技术网络而崛起
“但是，硅谷比我们
可能领先近60年。”
回到那些前辈上来
他们名满校园
无论是惠普（的创始人）
Terman的学生
还是雅虎或谷歌的老前辈
都是一层层铺垫建设起来的
然后你只需召集一大批
各种各样的角色和人才
包括投资者、战略规划人员和产品人员
他们都了解网络

English: 
are happening within Silicon Valley,
the answer is, is that
we're in this networked age.
You're much abler to
get to lots of people,
all around the world, very fast,
now they can too.
Theoretically in a networked age,
you should see a dispersion of essentially
unicorns, dragons, unicorpses, etc.
You're about to say something?
- [John] Yeah
- [John] I would just
say that this is built
on so many years and you
hear Fred Wilson or somebody
talk about New York and
the emerging network
and he's like, "Look, you know, New York
"is emerging as a technology network,
"but, you know, Silicon Valley's got
"probably 60 years on us."
Back to the guys with names all around
on the buildings and all around campus,
whether it's Hewlett and Packard,
who were Terman's students,
to the Yahoo guys to Google,
it's just building layer
after layer after layer
and what's happened is you've
just gotten a huge diversity
of roles and talent, from funders
to strategic people to product people,
who all understand networks and are all

Chinese: 
并且都对网络感兴趣等等
对，我认为Reid说的是对的
你可以在任何地方这样做
只是，会花很长的时间
我们将向你们展示许多公司发展图表
它们一开始看起来都非常平
平的、平的…然后，出现了某些转变
其网络开始形成内部一致性
获得流动性，然后崛起
这种故事反复上演
而硅谷也曾蛰伏了好长一段时间
然后才出现惠普和英特尔
还有Fairchild，随后才真正发展起来
经历上世纪80和90年代，到现在才颇具规模
- 具体而言是90年代中期，但是情况确实如此
- 对，这就是我们一直努力实现的目标
这就是我们所说的快速规模化（blitzscaling）
现在，我们翻到下个幻灯片吧？
有一些东西，你们将会反复听到
作为课程的一部分，我们故意这样安排
我们并非刻意摆出一副专横的样子
让你们仅有一次机会去听到某个句子
要求嘉宾讲课等安排的目标是
让你们能够重复听到一些内容

English: 
investing in network
over and over and over.
So, I think what Reid says is right.
You can do this anywhere, it's just,
it takes a long, long time.
We'll show you lots of graphs of companies
and they almost all look
flat, flat, flat, flat,
flat, flat, flat, and
then something happens
and the network starts to
get internal consistency
and liquidity and take off.
That happens again and again and again
and Silicon Valley was mostly
flat for a really long time
and then it got Hewlett Packard and Intel
and Fairchild and then
it started really ramping
in the 80s and 90s and now
it's in pretty good shape.
- Late 90s specifically, but yes.
- So, that's the subject
of what we are trying to do
and that's what we are
calling blitzscaling.
Now, why don't we go to the next slide?
So these are the things
that you will hear a lot of.
And part of this is, we've
deliberately kept this,
we're not trying to do a
masterful orchestration
where you only hear
each sentence only once.
Part of having guest lectures
in and so forth is there are
things that you will hear
on a repetitive basis

English: 
That's useful information.
You will hear people
disagreeing on some things,
that's useful information
because there isn't just
simply one strategy for making this work.
As a matter of fact, we don't just embody
one strategy here in Silicon Valley,
but there are some common
themes that you will hear.
These are some of the common themes.
So, one, networks, we've
already gone through that
in some depth and you'll hear a lot more
about it in this quarter,
also, in fact, part of the thing
about compounding to scale.
So how is it that you get a revenue model
that feeds back capital
into scaling an organization
both locally and globally
and making that work
or scaling the way that
you can pitch a financing
so you have a lot more capital to fund
the growth of the organization.
And one other thing I think
is probably worth to say
is that there's this
interrelationship between
organization scale, revenue
scale, and customer scale.
Ideally, if you actually talk to most
of the accomplished Silicon
Valley entrepreneurs,
they try to keep their
organizational scale
as trim as possible for customer scale

Chinese: 
而这些都是有用的信息
你会听到人们不赞同某些东西
这些是有用的东西，但是
其并非只有唯一行之有效的策略
实际上，在硅谷
我们并非只有一种策略
但是，你们也会听到一些常见的主题
我们会谈及一些常见的主题
比如，第一个，网络，我们已经谈论过了
深入到一定的深度，并且
在这个课堂中，你们会听到更多
此外，其实还包括关于组合发展规模化的问题
那么，如果你拥有一个盈利模式
能够输送资金，让一个组织能够规模化
在本地和全球范围内规模化，并且使之成为现实
或者以一定方式发展，以便能够获得融资机会
让你有更多的资金
支持组织的发展
我认为，另一个值得一提的事情
就是组织规模、收入规模
以及客户规模之间的关系
从理想的角度，如果你真正和硅谷中
功成名就的企业家进行过探讨
他们尝试让他们的组织规模
尽量与客户规模和收入规模保持一致

Chinese: 
因为这样可保持适应能力
保持发展的能力
然而，随着你真正开始形成收入规模
随着你真正开始养成客户规模
此时，你基本能保证
正常的客户服务，虽然这些都是
我们将会谈及的问题
实际上，你开始需要组织的规模化
- 嗯，我们会解释一下这个
我们已经开始使用行话了
- [Reid]是的，对不起
- [John]那么，有一点要提出的是
你可能不会相信在这个课堂
我们将会提及“分销”这个词的次数
你们会听到很多，我敢保证
因为我们会经常说分销
在我们日常工作、我们与之交谈的每个公司
我们看到的每个场景
我们都会谈及分销、分销、分销
但是，我想说的是
在后续时间里，我们会解释一些术语
如果这些术语不是完全清晰
我们将尝试将它们去术语化
我们都非常、非常情景化
因此，如果你觉得我们过于术语化，请举手
我们就会慢下了，解释一些内容
- [Reid]对的，好的
- 好的
噢，等一下
对，很好
- [Reid]对的
- [John]是的
那么，很显然，我不会阅读

English: 
and revenue scale because
it maintains adaptability,
it maintains ability to grow.
However, as you really begin
to get to revenue scale
as you really begin to
get to customer scale
where you are essentially having
reasonable customer service,
although those are some
of the hacks we will get into,
you actually begin to
need organizational scale.
- We'll explain it, we're already starting
to use jargon.
- [Reid] Yeah, sorry.
- [John] So, one of the things is how
you will not believe the number of times
we're gonna say the word
distribution in this class,
it's gonna be a lot, I promise you.
And it's because we say distribution a lot
in our daily work, in
every company we talk to,
every pitch we see, we talk
distribution, distribution, distribution.
But I would say that we're gonna
explain some of these terms as we go.
If the terms are not totally clear,
we'll try to de-jargonize them.
We're very, very, very contextualized,
so raise you're hand if
you feel we're too jargony
and we'll slow down and explain stuff.
- [Reid] Yeah, all right.
- All right.
Oh, wait.
Yeah, good.
- [Reid] Yeah?
- [John] Yes.
So, I'm not obviously gonna read all

Chinese: 
所有这些问题，但是，这是各种问题的一部分
它们会随着你将一个组织规模化而变化
这是你所考虑的一类事情
好吧，这些是否是你在一开始时
作出该决定所考虑的事情？
然后，随着你从你、以及你的共同创始人
转变到公司中上千人以及更多人时
依然保持不变？
而其答案是，所有这些东西都会变化
你做事的方式
你思考的方式，都会以不同的顺序
根据不同的规模量级而变化
并且，这并非你尝试
对它们进行预先计划
因为如果你没赢得你正在进行的游戏
你将无法进入下一个游戏，但是
如果你看到下一个游戏来临
那么，你会在某种程度上为其做好准备
当你朝着它前进时，你会快速到达目标
你可以利用你所看到的优势
与你的竞争相关、与资金相关
并且，这就是其作用原理
并且，例如——
- [John]对不起
- [Reid]噢，没事
- [John]实在不好意思
- [Reid]真的没事
例如，其中关键因素之一是

English: 
of these questions, but this
is a subset of the questions
that change as you scale an organization.
This is the kind of thing that you think,
okay, are these the kinds of things
you make the decision once
at the very beginning?
And then that persists as you move from
you and your co-founders
to essentially thousands
and more of people in the company,
and the answer is all
of these things change.
The way that you do them,
the way you think about
them, and they change
at these different orders
and magnitude of scale.
And it isn't that you try
to pre-program them
because if you don't win
at the game you're playing, you don't
get to play the next game, but if you see
that the next game is coming
then you can kind of be ready for it.
When you get to it, you get to it quickly.
You can exploit advantages that you see,
relative to your competition,
relative to capital.
And that's part of how this plays.
And so, for example--
- [John] Sorry.
- [Reid] Oh, that's all right.
- [John] Yes.
- [Reid] No, no.
For example, one of the key ones is

Chinese: 
随着你规模化，人员招募如何发生改变？
例如，Aneel Bhusri
Workday的首席执行官和共同创始人
他和他的共同创始人David Duffield
后者是PeopleSoft的创始人
曾对每个加入该公司的人进行面试
直至公司规模达到500人
因为他们认为，保持这种传统文化很重要
并且，直到你全部招募到首批500人时
他们都会以一种传统文化进行面试
但是，即使是在第500人，也会发生变化
因为他们无法这样坚持到10,000人
- 虽然Larry和Sergey最少在前500人
或者更多人招聘时坚持这样做
- 是的，的确如此，也就是说——
- 这有点神话化。你看
这很难确切了解他们坚持了多久
- 是的，但是，实际上，我认为
Larry还在审查很多人的简历
- 我想也是的
- 是的（大笑）
（课堂大笑）
- 在课堂上，我也会经常
使用很多手势
- 的确如此
- 例如，另一个话题是
你应该对竞争持什么看法
通常，当创业人在寻找风险投资时
他们会说，“嗯，是的“
“我担心来自谷歌、来自微软的压力。”

English: 
how does hiring change as you scale?
For example, Aneel Bhusri,
who is the CEO and co-founder of Workday,
he and his co-founder, David Duffield,
who was the founder of PeopleSoft,
interviewed every single
person that joined the company
until there were 500 people because part
of their insight was keeping
culture is really important
and until you get the
first 500 all locked in,
they were gonna interview
on culture basis.
But even at 500, that changes.
Because they can't do that to 10,000.
- Although Larry and Sergey did it
at least to 500, maybe more.
- Yes, exactly, so that's--
- It's a little bit
mythology, see, it's hard
to tell exactly how long they did it.
- Yes, although, I think actually
Larry still reviews a lot of the CVs.
- I think reviews.
- Yes. (laughs)
(class laughs)
- I'm gonna use air quotes a fair amount
during the class, too.
- Exactly.
- For example, another one that gets this
is how you should think about competition.
Frequently, when startup folks pitch VCs,
what they say is, "Okay, well,
"I'm worried about Google,
I'm worried about Microsoft."

Chinese: 
他们从来不会将一个创业公司考虑为你的真正竞争
你的真正竞争对手应该是其他的创业公司，对不？
因为所有组织都会有3-5个事情
作为他们的真正目标，并且，除非你刚好说
“实际上，我想要做的是进行搜索公司创业，”
那么，是的，你应该担心来自谷歌的竞争压力
但是，如果谷歌拥有其200个产品之一
而你刚好在某个层面上
与其中存在竞争关系
那么，这其实并非真的很相关的事情
但是，随着你开始形成组织规模
我们实际上都在部署，拥有一群客户
拥有收入流，然后
我们的竞争则倾向于来自更大的公司
其趋势是，你不仅仅与创业公司
或者可能与你同级的其他公司进行竞争
在某种程度上，你还与行业领导者竞争
因为他们可能存在一定的影响力
并且他们现在可能更多关注你这一块
并且，这是一种关于这方面的感觉
而且，会存在很多这些问题
而我们会在课堂中对其进行讨论
- 很难在没有具体化的情况下讨论规模化
真的非常困难
我们正在尝试考虑公司的量级

English: 
Almost never as a startup is
that your real competition.
Your real competition is
other startups, right?
Because all organizations
have three to five things
that they're really targeting
and unless you happen to say,
"Actually, what I'm doing
is I'm going after search,"
then yes, you should worry
about Google as competition.
But if Google has one of its 200 products
and you happen to be competing
in some angle for one of them,
that's actually not the
really relevant issue.
However, as you begin to
get to organizational scale,
we're actually deploying,
having a bunch of customers,
having revenue stream,
then the competition
tends to become much larger companies.
And it tends to be that
not only are you competing
with startups or other folks
who may be in your class,
but you're also competing
with the industry leaders
in certain ways because
there may have a leverage
and they now may be
focused more on your end.
And that's kind of a
sense of how these are
and there's a ton of these
questions and will will go
through them as we're
going through the class.
- It's hard to talk about scale
without putting a little bit
of specificity around it
and these are super rough.
We're trying to think about
orders of magnitude of company.

English: 
- Yeah, so, basic idea, metaphor
is family, tribe, village, city.
It's on the order of magnitude
of number of employees
and there's actually a sub-theme
here that's kind of 10s
and threes and there's
a sub-theme of threes
that we'll also touch on
lightly in some places.
But essentially it's, you know,
you've kind of got your initial,
like everyone in the room,
everyone in, you know, kind
of an apartment, right?
Or large apartment, house, maybe.
And then it kind of goes up and this,
everything changes as you go through this,
but there's other scales that matter too
and this is all very rough,
about your consumer
traction, your B2B traction,
your revenue traction.
And all of these relate.
And this is not meant to be that any time
you're here, you should be here.
There's differentials about
what your market may be,
what your strategy may
be, what your competition
may look like, such that
you may be here and here.
You know, there may be
various kinds of combinations,
but it's partially what gives you a sense
of where are you on this
massive scale evolution.

Chinese: 
- 是的，比如，基本概念，隐喻
比如“家庭、部落、村庄、城市”（等阶段）
其与雇员人数的量级有关
并且，实际上，其中的子主题可能会有10多个
而其中3个，其中3个子主题
我们会在某些地方稍微进行以下讨论
但是，基本上，你知道的
你一定程度上形成了你最初的…例如所有人可以在房间里
比如，所有人都可以在一个公寓中，对吧？
或者大公寓，可能是住宅
然后，其有点往上走，比如这样
在这个过程中，所有东西都会发生变化
但是，其他规模也很重要
并且，所有这些都非常具有挑战性
关于你的消费者吸引力、你的B2B吸引力
你的收入吸引力
并且，所有这些都互相关联
并且，这并非命中注定
你什么时候到这个阶段，你应该到这个阶段
其是关于各种差异，例如，你的市场
你的策略、你的竞争会是怎么样
这样的话，你可能会在这个阶段，或这个阶段
你知道，可能会存在不同类型的组合
但是，在这个巨大的规模演变中
其是为你提供存在感的部分因素

English: 
- Yeah, I guess the point is that,
what we're trying to say is that,
when it's three or four
founders, it's a super different
enterprise than it is when it's 15 people.
And somewhere between 15 and 100,
things really change a lot too.
It's the same kind of deal
where between zero revenue
and the first million in
revenue, there are really
profoundly different
things about the company.
Some things will be consistent,
many themes will be consistent,
but the activities and the work changes.
And so, like Reid says,
it doesn't always read all the way across.
For example, WhatsApp
obviously breaks the mold.
- [Reid] Yup.
- [John] Like 19 people,
- [Reid] Instagram.
- 19 people and like 600
million users or something.
You know, when we invested in
Kevin and Mikey in Instagram,
he didn't have 13 people and they were
headed towards 100 million users.
So, there are things that break the frame.
What we're really trying to say is usually
employees correlate with users
and revenue, give or take,
there's a lot of things changing.
For this class, we're gonna
talk about organizational scale
because it's the easiest
for us to talk about
around complexities around hiring
around how you gotta market,

Chinese: 
- 是的，我想，问题在于
我们想说明的是
当仅有3、4个创始人时的公司
与规模达到15人的公司大不相同
而人数规模在15到100之间时
也会发生很大的变化
在零收入和第一个100万收入之间
也是同样的情况
公司都会发生很深远的变化
某些东西会保持一致
很多主题都会保持一致
但是，活动和工作会发生变化
并且，如Reid所说
并非所有公司都会遵循这个规则
例如，WhatsApp显然打破了常规
- [Reid]是的
- [John]比如19个人
- [Reid] Instagram
- 19个人和比如6亿用户或诸如此类东西
你知道，当我们在Instagram投资Kevin和Mikey时
他们甚至没有13个人
但是他们的用户差不多达到1个亿
也就说，某些东西打破了常规
我们其实想说明的是
通常，雇员与用户和收入相关，给予或收获
很多东西都会发生变化
在这个课堂，我们将会讨论组织规模
因为这是我们最容易讨论的东西
相比人员招募的复杂性
相比你如何占领市场

English: 
which means how you
sell, and other things.
- Or how you distribute.
- Yup.
- Hold on, don't go to the next slide yet.
So roughly speaking we're gonna
spend two weeks per section.
It'll probably be extra focus
on tribe, village, and city.
This week and next week are
essentially the startup class,
that's kind of the family, like how do you
pull stuff together.
We'll go a little bit to
who we selected to come in
and why we did that towards
the end of today's class.
But the idea is essentially how do
you essentially launch
from that into this?
And as you're thinking
about entrepreneurship,
how do you think about what this growth
and what this journey looks like?
And so we've roughly two weeks per stage.
And it'll depend a little bit on
people's availability and time.
- Yeah, we tried hard to
put together a pretty robust
and amazing speaker list,
people who I think will,
we think we will give you guys
the most interesting insights,
but the rough structure of the
class is Tuesday, Thursday,
Tuesday, Thursday in a four-class section.
We'll do a lecture like this on the scale

Chinese: 
其意味着你如何销售以及其他方面
- 或者，你如何分销
- 是的
- 等一下，先不要进入下一个幻灯片
大概来说，我们每节会花费两周的时间
其可能会额外关注“部落、村庄和城市”（等阶段）
这周和下一周基本都是创业课程
类似于一个家庭，比如
你怎么将各种东西放到一起
在今天的课程结尾，我们会顺带讲下我们选择谁参与进来
以及我们为什么要那样做
但是，其基本内容是
你如何启动，然后从哪个阶段发展到这个阶段
并且，在你考虑创业的时候
你如何考虑这种发展
以及其历程会怎么样呢？
因此，我们每个阶段的课时大约为两周
其将在某种程度取决于
嘉宾的安排和时间
- 是的，我们努力建立一个非常强大
并且出色的发言人清单，我认为
我们认为，这些人将会给你们
提供最令人关注的见解
但是，这个课程的大概结构是周二、周四
周二、周四，每节安排四个课堂
我们将会在规模方面进行一次类似今天的讲课

Chinese: 
然后，下一周的课堂将由来自外部的嘉宾
发言人进行讲课，他们会阐述
他们公司里面的具体情况，如何发展，并且
通常，我们会进行一定的会话交谈
因此，在这个课堂后面，我们将邀请
Jeff Weiner，他来自一个大公司
我们将邀请Selina Tobaccowala
其是CS研究生，也是SurveyMonkey的总裁
为我们讲述“村庄”章节
我们会这样安排，但是这是本节的大概安排
如Reid所说，我们会尽力安排
因为这些人都非常难预约到
并且，我们会尽量每节课都会在这里
当然，我们也无法完全保证，因为Reid需要偶尔出差
我也需要偶尔出差，Allen也需要偶尔出差
好啦，准备好了吗？
- 以上就是大概的情况
虽然并不是很详尽，但是
以上就是我们课程的大致内容
也就是说，这是不同的组织结构
以及在你考虑公司的所有各个方面时
会发生什么情况
因此，很显然，人是非常关键的因素

English: 
and then the next week
classes will be guest speakers
from the outside who talk
about what it was like
in their companies, to
grow it, and we'll do a,
often we have moderated conversation,
so we'll have Jeff Weiner in for later
in the class for the very large company.
We'll have Selina Tobaccowala,
who's a CS graduate, who's the president
at SurveyMonkey come in
in the village section.
We'll do that, but that's
roughly the section,
and like Reid says, we'll reorganize it
because some of these people
are fairly painful to schedule.
And most of us will try to
be here for every class.
That won't always be the case
'cause Reid has some travel,
I've got some travel,
Allen's got some travel.
Okay, ready?
- So, this is a way of thinking about,
and it's not exhaustive, but
this is a way of thinking
about what we're walking through.
These say, here's the different
organizational structures
and what happens when
you're thinking about
all of the different parts of a company.
So, people's obviously pretty fundamental

English: 
so it's what we start with.
But then also, are you a single-threaded
or multi-threaded product company?
Always, as a startup,
you're single-threaded.
When do you get to multithreaded?
How do you make that decision?
How do you know it's coming upon you?
How is your go-to-market?
Is your go-to-market one simple thing?
Is your go-to-market a plan that's
you know, an enterprise-based,
a consumer-based,
even there's differentiation
within those plans.
Some enterprise is kind of classic,
you know, heavy field sales.
Some enterprise is essentially telephony.
Some enterprise, like Slack,
is an entirely new model.
And then part of that then gets down
to what's your technology strategy?
So, for example, frequently,
in the beginning of a company,
you actually, in fact, try,
like one of the quotes
that some of my friends, although not,
this one's not John, although I will
probably tease John occasionally,
tell me that I will never live down is,
that if you're not embarrassed
by your product release,
you've released too late.
The whole point of that quote is to say
the importance of speed
and the importance of time

Chinese: 
因此，我们将会从这里开始着手
但是，此外你是一个单线程产品
或多线程产品公司？
通常，作为一个创业公司，你是单线程公司
你什么时候发展到多线程？
你如何做出该决定？
你如何知道什么时候是正确的时机？
你如何进入市场？
你进入市场是否一件简单的事情？
你进入市场是否是一个计划？
例如，一个企业导向、消费者导向性计划？
或者甚至不同于此类的计划？
某些企业在某种程度上很经典
比如，非常注重现场销售
某些企业基本通过电话进行
某些公司，例如Slack，则是一个全新的模式
然后，其中一部分会具体至
你的技术策略是什么？
那么，例如，通常
在一家公司的开始阶段
实际上，你是在尝试
和这里所说的话题一样
我的一些朋友，虽然
这里并不是说John，虽然
我可能偶尔会和John说笑
告诉我，我将永远不会忘记
如果你的产品发布没有让你感到窘迫
你的产品发布已经太迟了
其主要意思是说
速度的重要性以及时间的重要性

Chinese: 
以及你进入市场的时机
其并非意味着
例如，你发布一个硬件产品
并且你的第一个产品发布让你感到窘迫
你可能觉得无地自容，对吧？
那么，对于消费网络软件
这就是速度的重要性
并且，其中一部分实际上会转化为
你的宣传策略
比如，因为我们希望打造超级稳健的技术
并且我们希望从一开始即应用该技术
而这将是我们的OS1策略
那么，在消费者内部可能会认为，
你可能开发速度太慢
并且你无法快速进入市场
并且，例如，在消费网络公司
其趋势是，你如何建立一个产品
然后在发展过程中如何不断重建
这成为了你技术策略的一部分
但是，如果你在这个阶段全程这样做
在所有在座各位中间，你将会惨败
因为你将无法……
那个模式，让你在这个阶段获得成功
将无法在这个阶段获得成功
并且，在这个阶段上，你实际上开始须要
考虑我们如何打造一个平台？
该平台实际上如何形成一个开发堆栈
让每个人的生产效率都得到提高？

English: 
and your general get to market.
It does not mean that,
for example, you're
launching a hardware product
and you're embarrassed by
your first product release,
you're probably also dead, right?
So, for consumer internet software,
it's the importance of speed.
And part of that actually then gets down
to what your text strategy is
because you say, well
we're gonna build super
robust technology and we're
gonna have that technology from
the very beginning and that's
gonna be our OS1 strategy,
then a likelihood in a consumer
inner base is you're likely
to be developing too slowly and you're not
getting the market fast enough.
And so, for example, within
consumer internet companies
it tends to be the how
do you get the thing up
and then how do you
rebuild it as you're going
becomes part of your technology strategy.
However, if you did that
the whole way through here,
then someone around here you're gonna die
because you're not gonna be able to,
that pattern, which made you win here,
isn't gonna win here.
And at that point you
actually start having
to think about how is it
we're building a platform?
How does that platform actually make
a development stack that makes
everyone more productive?

English: 
How do we have tools
that do it the right way?
And all that sort of thing and
that's part of how you begin
to look at what this range looks like.
- Yeah, so I think that's
actually, so that's the deal.
We're trying to put together a metaphor
or a little bit of a chessboard,
trying to think about how
to go from nothing to a
really big, robust company.
And if you think about
most of the startup school
and startup talks, they're
all focused on OS1.
How do you get the people,
product, and go-to-market right?
Maybe technology.
And if you think about just those things,
then you tend to fall down
in other places on the board.
And so we're trying to
help you think about
four different types of
companies and we happen
to be best at consumer internet
and enterprise software.
But four different
categories of a company,
how do you fill out the board?
- Yup, and that's part of how,
when you're thinking about,
when you're listening
to the fireside chats
and the guest speakers and us,
you should be thinking about
what is in the positive column
to watch out for, what
is in the negative column
for how you can die and how it plays in.
And this is only a partial list.
Part of the reason why this
leaves us new functions

Chinese: 
我们如何利用各种工具来正确实施？
以及所有诸如此类东西，并且这是你如何
开始考虑这个范围怎么样等等部分内容
- 是的，因此，我认为，这实际上，是这么个情况
我们正在尝试作一个比喻
或者将其比作一个棋盘，尝试考虑
如何从一无所有发展为正在大型、稳步发展的公司
并且，如果你想想绝大多数创业学校
关于创业的讨论，他们都全部着眼于OS1
你如何以正确的方式部署人员、产品，然后进入市场？
可能还有技术。
并且，如果你仅仅考虑这些内容
那么，你则可能会在其他地方跌倒
因此，我们尝试帮助你考虑
4种不同类型的公司，并且
它们正好是消费网络和企业软件方面的佼佼者
但是，4个不同类型的公司
你如何填写这个表格？
- 是的，这就是一些具体的方法
当你在考虑的时候
当你聆听炉边谈话的时候
以及嘉宾发言人和我们的讲课时
你应该考虑在正面范畴需要注意什么
而在负面范畴，你需要注意什么
例如，你如何可能失败以及如何进入游戏
并且，这仅仅是一个部分清单
为什么其留给我们各种新功能的原因是

Chinese: 
你突然间需要
开始进行公司开发，并且并购各个公司
并且，其成为你策略的一部分
还有随着你到了这个阶段，还有很多其他的东西
有很多新的功能
并且，即使关于人员招募
你可能在这个阶段雇佣你首个HR职员
然后在这个阶段开始实施HR政策，对吧？
不同意？
- GTM是销售和市场营销，不好意思
- [Reid]是的，你是对的
- [John]一个术语警报
是的，好的，好的
但是，其拥有很多其他新的功能
并且，现在，特别是作出变化时
绝大部分时间，这是你能够切实确定
你的变化，并且确定
你能否切实拥有
一个真正的快速规模化（blitzscale）机会
有时候，你可能会在这个阶段花费大量时间
而有时候，你可能会快速发展前行
因此，我们将会围绕这个主题进行重点讲述
但是，你也需要了解在这个阶段会发生什么事情
在我们完成这两周课程之后，我们不会回头
讲述创业相关内容，其通常会导致我们觉得
其已经在斯坦福大学各种课堂中
得到了相对较好的阐述
那么，10人，100人
顺便说一下，其意义是
当你说很多人，这其实可能

English: 
is that part of a thing that
happens is suddenly you have
to start doing corp dev
and buying companies
and that becomes part of your strategy.
There's a bunch of things
that as you go across here,
there's new functions.
And so, even though like
hiring, you might hire
your first HR persons somewhere in here
and start doing an HR process here, right?
Disagree?
- GTM is sales and marketing, sorry.
- [Reid] Yes, you're right.
- [John] A jargon alert.
Yes, okay, all right.
But there's a bunch of
other new functions.
And so, now, particularly
to hit the inflection,
most of the time this
is where you're actually
figuring out your
inflection and figuring out
whether or not you actually have
a real blitzscale opportunity.
And sometimes you may
spend a bunch of time here
and sometimes you may move very quickly.
And so we're gonna focus pretty intensely
on this area, but you also need
to see what's going on here.
Once we clear these two
weeks we won't go back
to the startup stuff
that often 'cause we feel
that's relatively well covered in a number
of different classes at Stanford.
So, 10s, 100s.
And by the way, part of what this means
when you say ones, this
is actually probably

Chinese: 
大概指12到15人，也可能大概达到150人
如果你们谁不知道Dunbar的数量
你应该查一下，D-U-N-B-A-R（大笑）
并且，其基本上会达到100多
通常我们会说200到500、600等等
因为其在一定程度上取决于
你如何运行，并且，你知道
类似全球分销，并且，你是否规模化拓展你的客户服务
你是否规模化拓展你的中心产品
发展组织以及其他很多东西
但是，其大概就是这些内容
因此，这是当你看着前面的道路时
所得到的一些大概观察结果
并且今天课堂内容的目的是
为你提供一个框架，以考虑
我们后续课程的内容和我们后续对话的内容
那么第一个问题是，你何时进行快速规模化（blitzscale）？
实际上，这并不是你说我有了一个创意
然后我去召集一群好友 
然后我就可以马上实现快速规模化（blitzscale）

English: 
to roughly 12 to 15, this
is probably roughly to 150.
If any of you don't know
what Dunbar's number is,
you should look it up,
D-U-N-B-A-R. (laughs)
And this is, essentially
goes into the 100s,
which is, call it 200
to 500, 600 as a way,
'cause it depends a little bit on how
you're operating exactly
and you know, kind of
global distribution and are
you scaling customer service,
are you scaling your central product
development organization
and a bunch of other things,
but that's roughly what this is.
So here are some general observations
when you look at the road ahead
and part of the point of today's class is
to give you some frame for
thinking about what our
next lecture is and our next
conversation's gonna be.
So, first question is,
when do you blitzscale?
It is actually not in fact
that you say I've got an idea
and I go find my couple of buddies
and I go blitzscale right away.

English: 
That is not actually what you do.
Maybe once out of 1,000 or 10,000.
But the question is, what
speed you're operating at
is partially an exercise in
judgment and intelligence
about what does the
competition actually look like,
what is the way you're
gonna win 10-year game,
because very rarely are
these games one-year games.
They're usually 10 plus year games.
Now, you may have to get
ahead of the competition
in the next year and the next
year may be super intensive
in terms of the way you do it,
but what's the way to do that?
And then, the question comes down to is,
'cause if you, example, you decide to hit
the afterburners now
and your business model
isn't ready, your company
actually isn't ready,
that's one of the ways that actually
you miss a curve and you die.
So it doesn't mean don't do it,
'cause sometimes you have
to do it competitively,
but that preparation for
it and the judgment of it
and the execution of blitzscaling
actually really matters.
The next trend that you'll
find is that as you're going

Chinese: 
其实你无法这样做
在达到1000或10000人规模时或者可以
但是，问题是，你以什么速度运行
在一定程度上是一个判断和情报行为
其关于竞争的实际情况到底如何
你将如何赢得一场10年游戏
因为这些游戏很少是为期1年的游戏
其通常都是期限超过10年的游戏
现在，你可能需要在竞争中取得先机
在下一年，下下一年，竞争可能异常剧烈
对于你的实施方式来说
但是，这实施方式是什么呢？
然后，问题就具体到
例如，如果你决定
现在启动加速引擎，而你的商业模式
还没做好准备，你的公司其实没做好准备
这其实就是你错过一个机会的方式
然后，你就失败了
那次，其并非意味着不要去做
因为有时候，你须要能够以具有竞争力的方式去做
但是为其作出的准备以及对其的判断
和快速规模化的实施实际上都非常重要
你将会发现的下一个趋势是，

Chinese: 
随着你经历各个不同的规模量级
总体而言
你从一个多面手发展成为一名专家
这并非指你消除了公司里面的多面手
但是，当你和最初5个人起家时
你必须事事亲为，对吧？
你要去购买办公耗材
还有，我出去买披萨
因为其他的人在写代码
所以我的工作就是去买披萨
实际上，我们都会偶尔做一下这种事情
并且，你当时的情况是
每个人都身兼数职
因此，如果你考虑技术堆栈
比如，我实际上是在做技术这块
你实际上甚至还有更加多面的技术员
比如，如果你的员工中有人说
“其实，我真正最精通的是内核代码，”
那么，如果你正在开发一个应用程序
这对你并没有什么帮助
因此，在早期，你正在寻找
那些更为多面手型的人员
他们更加灵活，因为
围绕这个最常见的术语，你还有很多工作要做
虽然准确的术语和其他所有东西都现在发生了变化
你可以尝试确定你正在做什么
也就是说，你需要全能型人才

English: 
through the orders of magnitude of scale,
you're, generally speaking,
moving from generalist to specialist.
It isn't that you ever get rid
of generalist in a company,
but when you start with
the first five people,
you're doing everything, right?
You're buying office supplies,
you know, I'm heading out for pizza
'cause the other folks are coding.
So my job is to go get the pizza.
Actually, we both did that on occasion.
And so, what you do though is everyone
is responsible for a number of things.
So even if you think
about technology stack,
say, look I'm actually
building the technology,
you actually even have
generalist technologists.
Like if you have someone who says, "Look,
"all I'm really good at is kernel code,"
well, if you're building an application,
that's not gonna help you that much.
So you are looking for,
in the early stages,
people who are much more generalist,
much more flexible because you also
may be moving around in
terms of the classic jargon.
Although accurate jargon now
pivots and everything else,
you may be trying to figure
out what you're doing,
so you need people who will do things

Chinese: 
即使他们并不擅长，但是能快速学习等等
但是，随着你规模化，你会雇佣更多专门人才
技术专门人才、销售专门人才
管理专门人才，诸如此类
然后，会来到第3条路径也就是
随着你规模化，你会转变，从房间里面每个人
都去做所有需要完成的事情
转变为某些人在做事情，而某些人
在进行管理的同时，也在做其他事情
好吧，转变为某些人仅仅进行管理
并且最终发展为高管
而作为高管，其具体情况是
随着你晋升为高管，你的主要职能
转变为组织职能
你如何去组织部署他们？
你如何让他们作为一个团队运行？
你基本上是如何扩大雇员规模？
你如何进行入职培训？
以及诸如此类的其他事情
而不是像：噢，我把愿景讲清楚
然后我站在掌舵的位置，指明方向
这其实是一个很没用的高管
你实际上应该成为致力于组织职能的人
并且，你会把这看做一种模式
另一方面，你并非是在进行一种史无前例的创新

English: 
they're not comfortable
with, learn it quickly, etc.
But as you scale, you will
hire more and more specialists.
Specialists at technology,
specialists at sales,
specialists at management,
all these sorts of things.
And that goes to the third path, which is
as you scale, you will move
from everyone in the room doing,
and doing just about anything
that needs to be done,
to some people who are
doing and some people
who are both managing
and doing, also doing,
to, okay, some people
who are just managing
and eventually to executives.
And part of what executive is,
as you get to an executive,
your primary function
becomes the organization.
How do you compose them?
How do you have them operate as a team?
How do you essentially
have, scaling people up?
How do you have onboarding?
All of the rest of that.
It's not like, oh, I articulate vision
and I stand at the helm
and point in a direction.
That's usually a pretty useless executive.
It's actually people who are
working on the organization.
And so you'll see that as a pattern.
Another one is, is it isn't
that you do innovation first

English: 
and then everything else is
this kind of thoughtless scale.
It almost never works that way.
You actually are in fact
working to preserve your ability
to be innovative as you're
scaling the organization.
Because there's lots of things
that you need to innovate on.
You need to innovate on
how you're managing data,
you need to innovate on
what is your go-to-market
and how are you transforming the way
that you're acquiring customers.
You may be innovating
depending on, you know,
consumer companies tend
to be a lower number
of product lines,
enterprise tend to be more.
Again, all of these things
are heuristics, not rules.
But you may be innovating on
how that's functioning too.
And so you have to both scale
while you maintain innovation.
You also frequently
will encounter a choice
of are you preserving adaptability
or are you doing operational excellence?
And part of what business is
and kind of theory of capitalism,
very good at it is saying,
look, how do you drive
your unit costs down,
how do you make it more
efficient to produce a service,

Chinese: 
然后所有事情都是这种轻率的规模拓展
那样的话，其基本不会起到任何效果
实际上，在你进行组织规模化的时候
你应该保持你的创新能力
因为你需要在很多地方发挥你的创新精神
你需要在如何管理数据方面进行创新
你需要在你如何进入市场方面进行创新
以及你如何改变
你获得客户的方式
你可以根据各种因素进行创新
例如，消费型公司更像一些更低级别的生产线
而各种企业在更大程度上也一样
此外，所有这些东西都是启发性的，没有一定的规则
但是，你还可以在其如何发挥作用方面进行创新
那样，你可以在保持创新的同时进行规模拓展
你还会经常遇到这样的选择
你是保持适应能力呢
还是追求运营管理方面的卓越绩效？
并且，经商在某种程度上
就是一种资本主义，这是个很好的说法
比如，你如何削减你的单位成本
你如何提高某个服务供应效率

Chinese: 
让雇员以更高效的方式提供服务，投入生产
这是一种经典的裁缝行业指标
这些东西依然很有价值
但是，当你以某个速度高速运营
并且进行此类快速规模化时
有时候，你实际上会根据适应能力做出选择
你其实会存在损耗
你实际上会认为，“多雇佣一些人是好事。”
那么，例如
举个例子，比如早期的PayPal案例
你们都知道
这是Peter Thiel和Max Levchin，两名共同创始人
我们当时的增长速度是
每天2%和5%的用户群和交易增长
并且，我会假设这个教室中绝大多数人
都完全知道这种增长速度是怎么样的
- [John]很快
- 因此，我们
（大笑）是的，对的
- [Reid]那么，这基本是说我们进入了这么一个情况
而到第二周
我们会接到20,000封信的客户服务邮件
并且，这种情况每周持续发酵
这种情况从根本上导致

English: 
to provide a service, more
productivity on the employee.
It's kind of a classic
tailor industrial metrics.
Those are still valuable,
but part of when you're operating at speed
and kind of doing this kind of blitzscale,
sometimes you actually make
choices on adaptability,
you actually have wastage.
You actually go, "That's okay
if hired way too many people."
So, for example,
one, kind of early PayPal story,
so this is, you know, Peter Thiel
and Max Levchin, co-founders.
We were growing at between 2% and 5%
of userbase and transactions per day.
And I presume that most
people in this room
have good enough math to
know how that compounds.
- [John] Fast.
- So we,
(laughs) yes, right.
- [Reid] So that basically
meant that we were going
in the hole, and by the second week
we were going 20,000 new
customer service emails
in the hole per week and growing.
That led to essentially having,

Chinese: 
当时我们仅在Palo Alto登记
客户们都很生气，然后他们找到了
我们所在的城市，他们每天24小时
随机拨打办公室的分机号码
你接到的每个电话都是愤怒的顾客打来的
（课堂大笑）
好吧
当时，我们就是处理这类规模化问题
因为当时产品已经完全在我们考虑范围之外了
我们的处理方式是
我们无法实现卓越的运营效果，我们就好像
“噢我的天，我们必须立即解决这个问题。”
因此我们采取措施，毫不夸张地说，我们全体出动
我们决定在奥马哈市建立一个客户服务中心
并且，我们确实是全体出动
各组员工分成各个小组
进行客户服务小组面试
以便于我们能够在两个月时间内
建立一个200人的客服部门，运行起来应对这种状况
我们大批培训出大约其中70%的员工
仅用了3个月的培训时间
因为我们无法实现卓越运营，而是在朝着反方向走
但是，我们集中精力建立这个体系
并且在后续工作中不断进行调整优化
这是你需要频繁作出的选择

English: 
we were only listed in Palo Alto.
Enough angry customers
that they figured out
which city we were in, they
were dialing extension numbers
in the office at random and 24 hours a day
you could pick up the phone
and talk to an angry customer.
(class laughs)
All right.
So when we're dealing with
that kind of scale issue
because the product is
canning away from us,
the way that we dealt this is
we weren't going operational
excellence, we're like,
"Oh my God, we've gotta solve
this problem right away."
So what we did is we literally flew,
we decided to build a customer
service center in Omaha
and we literally flew out
groups of employees to
do group interviewing
of customer service,
so that within two months
we would have a 200-person
customer service department
running to answer that.
We churned out about
70% of those employees
within three months
'cause of churning through
'cause we were doing the opposite
of operational excellence,
but we were focused on getting it up
and adapting as we were going.
And that's a frequent
choice that you will make

Chinese: 
尤其在销售、技术、客户服务等方面
第6个方面是全球性覆盖
其实际上是这么一种情况
作为网络时代的一部分
你全球化的速度远远超过你的想象
例如
当我们推出LinkedIn时
我们有12个公司
来自12个或15个
是某些，不，不，国家
其来自12或15个国家
在下拉列表里面
- [Allen]15个
- [Reid]15个
后来，我们加上了其他国家，因为我们收到客户投诉
“我的国家不在里面。”
这个列表很快就加入了很多国家
并且，此外，如你们所知
虽然我也接受了正常的教育，但是我和你们大家一样
比如，法罗群岛，实际上
我并不知道它是一个国家（大笑）
对的，还记得我们查找法罗群岛？
是的，好吧
那么，你以更快的速度达到全球性覆盖
各种资金要求
基本上，没有大量可用资金
你不能进行快速规模化
并且，其来自两个机制之一

English: 
in sales, technology,
customer service, etc.
The sixth one is global reach,
which is essentially the fact that
as a part of the networked age,
you're global faster than you imagine.
So, one example,
when we launched LinkedIn,
we had 12 companies in the?
12? 15?
It was some, no, no, countries.
It was 12 or 15 countries
in the dropdown list.
- [Allen] 15.
- [Reid] 15.
And we added them as we
got people complaining,
"My country is not in it."
That list got long very fast.
And what's more, even though, you know,
reasonably educated, I came
here along with many of you.
Like Faroe Islands, I didn't actually
really know it was a country. (laughs)
Right, remember looking up Faroe Islands?
Yeah, like okay.
So, you get to global reach much faster.
Capital requirements.
You basically cannot blitzscale
without heavy available capital.
And that comes from one of two mechanisms.

Chinese: 
其或者来自很好的收入模式
你重新投资，或者其来自资本市场
而且其基本是流动资金
现在，这并非意味着你只能快速规模化
你是否——
- [John]资本市场是…
- [Reid]噢，融资
- 风险投资
债务
- [Reid]是的，是的
- [Chris] IPO
- 各种获得资金的方式（大笑）
虽然IPO比这些方式还要多
但是，你需要有资金来执行
现在，你可以进行快速规模化，即使市场状况不佳
因为那是一个相对指标
速度是相对的，并且其仅仅是
你如何在网络时代以更快速度前进的问题
比你的竞争对手更快
- 是的，这是一个非常热门的讨论话题
并且，如果你现在阅读几乎所有风投的博客
好像很多人都对这个环境
持赞同意见，而且，我认为这是合理的
这是一个非常过热的环境
各种东西都非常昂贵，很多公司
都高歌猛进
并且，还有很多风投，包括我们
我们开始担心资金消耗速度
因此，其对话会成为
是的，其焦点在于你花费了多少钱
以及你是否能够赢得市场
并且，你进入到这个有趣的圈子内

English: 
That either comes from
a good revenue model
that you're reinvesting or
it comes from capital markets
that are essentially flowing.
Now that doesn't mean you
can't blitzscale only,
are you--
- [John] Capital markets are...
- [Reid] Oh, financing.
- Venture capital.
Debt.
- [Reid] Yeah, yeah.
- [Chris] IPOs.
- Ways of getting money. (laughs)
Although IPOs are more than that too.
And so you have to have
capital in order to do that.
Now, you can blitzscale
even in down markets
because it's a relative metric.
Speed is relative and
so it's just a question
of how do you move
faster in a networked age
than available competition.
- Yeah, this is a super current debate
and if you look at almost
any blogs of VCs right now,
there's like a lot of
people ringing their hands
about the environment and
I think this is legitimate.
It's a very overheated environment,
things are very expensive,
lots of companies
are raising big rounds.
And so lots of VCs, including us,
we're starting to get
concerned about burn rates.
And so the conversation will be,
well, the tension is
between how much you spend
and whether you can go win the market.
And so, you get into this funny cycle

English: 
of trying to win the
market, but also not trying
to increase burn rate,
which is how much money
you're sending out the door every month.
And so, it's a real tension
and it's a very, very current question.
And Uber, Lyft, all these guys,
everybody who's growing is looking at,
and it's balanced between unit economics,
which is how much money do
you make on each transaction
or lose on each transaction
versus how much money do you
spend to go take the market.
- And if your burn rate
gets out of control,
and then the capital, you
don't have enough revenue
and the capital market's done up,
that's another way, which
in the first internet boom
was a way that you had internet winner.
That's the kind of thing
that blows companies up.
- [John] It's a prize, poof.
- Yes.
So I think that's good enough
'cause we've talked about eight and nine.
- [John] All right.
- [Chris] We should go
a little more quickly.
- Yes.
So this is a high line of
kind of thinking about how,
kind of roughly speaking.
We'll publish these
slides so you don't need
to take notes on them and so forth.
But it's kind of a way of thinking about

Chinese: 
尝试去赢得市场，但是，还要尝试
不要增加资金损耗率，也就是说
你每个月在外面花了多少钱
并且，这是一种真正的焦点
一个非常非常热门的话题
并且，Uber、Lyft，所有这些公司
大家都在看到它们的成长
并且，其必须在单位经济效益方面获得平衡
其现在转为你在每个交易中赚到多少钱
或者在每个交易中亏损多少钱
而不是你花费多少钱来占领市场
- 并且，如果你的资金消耗率超出控制范围
那么，在资金方面，你并没有足够的收入
然后，资本市场已经濒临枯竭了
这是另一种方式，在第一个互联网泡沫时
就是互联网时代赢家所采用的方式
这就是把各个公司捧起来的因素
- [John]这是一个奖励，哇
- 是的
因此，我认为，这已经足够好了
因为我们已经讨论了第8和第9点了。
- [John]好的
- [Chris]我们应该稍微加快一点速度
- 是的
那么，这是关于思考具体方式的提纲
总的而言
我们会发布这些幻灯片
因此，你无需就这些幻灯片做笔记
但是，这是一种方式

English: 
what happens when you're
going between them
and we'll return to these themes
as we're going through them.
Obviously, right now
we're in the family area.
- [Voiceover] Great.
- Okay, so hey everybody.
I wanted to give a, kind of a brief,
I want to give some meat to the story
that just got told about
those operational stages,
or those organizational stages.
Here's one thing you gotta keep in mind
as we go through all this stuff,
there is no one story.
Every single company that's
passed through this stuff
has passed through many different paths,
some of whom we wouldn't
even find it familiar,
we wouldn't recognize it at LinkedIn,
but you might recognize
it at Workday or wherever.
So I'm gonna tell a little
story about how we passed
through these phases for LinkedIn
to try to give you an idea of
what it actually feels like
to be in each place and
some of the decisions
that we actually made, and
hopefully it'll make some
of that stuff, and
we'll actually come back
to that list of one through five
because a lot of the
themes line up really well.
At LinkedIn, we were
one of those companies
that did not blitzscale at the beginning.

Chinese: 
可供你在浏览时思考一下会发生哪些事情
并且，随着我们讲解具体的主题
我们将会再回到这些主题上来
很显然，我们现在处于“家庭”阶段
- [旁白]很好
- 好吧，那么，嗨，大伙们
我本来想做一个简介
我希望赋予这个故事一些血肉
我们刚在这些运营阶段中谈及这个故事
或者在这些组织阶段中
这里有一个事情你需要记住
当我们讲解所有这些内容时
并非只有一个故事
每个经历这些阶段的公司
都已经经历过许多不同的路径
其中一些，我们甚至无法找到类似的对象
我们无法在LinkedIn识别它们
但是，你可能在Workday或其他地方找到它们
那么，我将会讲一个小故事
关于我们在LinkedIn如何经过这些阶段的故事
尝试给你们一个切实的概念
了解每个阶段的实际感受，以及
我们做作出的一些决定，并且希望其能够有所帮助
然后我们将最终回到
第1点到第5点的清单
因为很多主题都已经安排得非常好了
在LinkedIn，我们和某些其他公司一样
并没有在一开始就快速规模化

English: 
So basically, at the very
beginning of the company,
we spent two years in phase one,
which for a company like
Instagram or WhatsApp--
- Did you already explain
what the lines are?
- Oh yeah, well, I'm not
gonna spend too much time on these.
You can see sort of the length of it,
but it took us a little over 12 years
to get where we are right now.
When you go next.
- And also, this is the thing
that you're talking about,
the two years of--
- [Allen] Yup, exactly.
- [John] Employees,
revenues, and all that stuff.
- Yeah, so give me the first picture.
So these guys are the original
well, most of the original
founding crew of LinkedIn.
This was our household back in the day.
This is in 2003 and 2004.
And basically, we started the whole thing
with a single idea.
And I should explain, really quickly.
You're gonna see a whole bunch of pictures
that look like this
'cause we got a tradition,
starting with this photograph
that when we reach major
milestones in terms of user growth,
and you'll understand
when I'm done with this
why user growth was so important to us,
we would take a picture of the people
who are working at the
company, holding up the number
of people who were in the network.

Chinese: 
因此，基本上，在公司初期
我们在阶段1花了两年时间
而对于例如Instagram或WhatsApp等公司——
- 你是否解释了其路线是什么？
- 噢，没有
我并不打算在这上面花费太多时间
你可以看到其长度
但是，我们花了12年多的时间
才发展到我们现在这个阶段
当你进入下一步
- 并且，这是你所提及的
两年时间——
- [Allen]是的，完全正确
- [John]雇员、收入和所有这些东西
- 是的，因此，给我放第一张照片
那么，这些人员都是原来的
对，绝大多数是LinkedIn原来的创始员工
这就是我们当时的大家庭
这是2003和2004年
并且，基本上，我们仅仅基于一个概念
就开始了整个创业
并且，我应该解释，非常快
你将会看到很多照片
类似这样的照片，因为我们有一个传统
就是从这个照片开始
当我们在用户增长上达到了主要节点时，我们就拍照留念
当我说完的时候，你将会明白
用户增长对于我们来说为什么这么重要
我们会给在公司里面上班的人拍照
他们会拿着数字牌
展示网络中的人员数量

English: 
So you're gonna see several
variations on that during this.
Back then, we had a single idea
of what we were actually trying to do.
We discussed it in 2002 and in 2003
we set out with this idea.
If you could build a professional network
with reputable relationships inside of it,
it would be useful for a
thousand different things
that professionals actually
do on a regular basis.
That was the whole theory
behind what we were doing.
So we made it searchable
and the idea is when we
get to a certain number
of people, then people
would start using it
for search on a regular
basis and it would become
a new way of doing business.
That was basically the idea.
Everybody we hired were people
we had worked with before.
These were all friends
or former colleagues.
Sorry about the notes.
The organization itself was
as lightweight as possible.
Literally we were borrowing the rooms
that we took this photograph in.
And basically we had
only the absolute minimum
for building out general administrative,
we had, oh--
- [Reid] Might wanna tell
the story of the whiskey--

Chinese: 
因此，你会在这个过程中看到几个变化
那时候，对于我们所尝试的事情
我们只有一个概念
我们在2002和2003年对其进行了讨论
然后我们就基于这个概念进行创业
如果你能够建立一个专业网络
在其中建立各种信誉良好的关系
其会对各种专业人士经常所做的各种事务
成千上万种事务带来巨大的好处
这就是我们行动背后的整个理论
因此，我们让它具备可搜索特性
并且，我们设想，当我们拥有一定数量的用户时
人们就会开始使用它
经常使用它来进行搜索，并且
其会成为经商的一个新方法
这基本上就是当时的概念
我们所雇佣的每个人都是我们之前曾同事过的
这些都是朋友或之前的同事
很抱歉，我需要使用笔记
这个组织本身是尽可能轻量化
我们甚至借用过房间
我们在借用的房间里面拍下这个照片
并且，基本上，我们仅仅使用绝对最少的资源
来建立日常行政管理
我们，噢——
- [Reid]你可能想说一下关于威士忌的故事——

English: 
- If I have time I'll tell you
the story about the whiskey.
So we had only the absolute
basics for making things happen.
So basically all of our
effort, every single moment
of every day was for solving one problem,
which is, what's gonna
be valuable to the user?
That was literally all we thought about.
And nothing else mattered.
We did everything else at
the minimum level possible.
We released in May of 2003.
We immediately began learning about
what product-market fit
actually meant for us.
People familiar with the concept
of product-market fit in general,
just the idea that basically
you're providing a product
which provides value out
into the market at scale.
That's basically the idea.
We didn't really know, we
had a theory, a hypothesis
about what the market fit
was actually gonna be,
but what we found out was
that it was different.
So we put it out there and it became
immediately obvious that
recruiters were gonna love it.
However, in order to get to that place,
we had to build a critical mass of people
for those recruiters to search.
So we had our first notion
of what product-market fit
actually felt like, what we
didn't have is the userbase

Chinese: 
- 如果我有时间，我会给你们说关于威士忌的故事
因此，我们仅有一些绝对基础的设施来做各种事情
因此，基本上，我们的全部努力
每天的所有时间都是在解决一个问题
也就是，对于用户来说，哪些东西是有价值的？
这就是我们当时所考虑的所有内容
并且，其他的东西都无关重要
我们将其他所有东西都尽可能控制在最小范围内
我们在2003年5月发布上线
我们马上就开始了解到
产品-市场匹配实际上对于我们来说意味着什么
总体而言，人们对于产品-市场匹配
这个概念很熟悉
其实际上就是说你提供某个产品
该产品以特定比例向市场提供价值
这基本上就是它的概念
但是我们并非真正了解，我们有一个理论，一个假设
关于市场匹配实际应该是怎么样的
但是，我们发现，实际情况远非我们想象的那样
因此，我们把它发布出去，然后
很显然，招聘人员会立即爱上它
然而，为了达到那个阶段
我们需要建立一个临界用户数量
以供那些招聘人员进行搜索
因此，我们就有了我们第一个产品-市场匹配的概念
这实际上就是，我们所没有的，就是用户群

Chinese: 
而这是能够推动产品-市场匹配所必须的
而这就是我们第一个阶段中
所发现的主要内容
这就是关于如何发现这个匹配
在第二阶段，下一张
这就是当时的我们
你可以看到，团队规模变大了
我们必须扩大团队的规模，因为
因为我们已经认识到产品-市场匹配的真正内容
并且，现在我们需要建立最低规模的必要运营团队
以确保我们切实能够达到这种匹配
那么，你可以看到，这其实是3名共同创始人
这是我和Reid，当时
他的头发比较长，还有Jean-Luc
他当时是我们的工程设计主管
基本上
我们发现，我们进入了一个阶段
在这个阶段，我们需要从12名员工，扩展到大约30或40名
才能够支持正常运营
我们还加入了一系列新的功能
我们在创业时无需担心的新项目
其中包括客户服务
然后我们增加了销售，也就是进入市场功能
John在前面不久讲到这个方面
还有，我们增加了最低限度的GNA
日常行政管理职能
以便能够处理诸如支付薪水等问题

English: 
necessary to be able to drive
that product-market fit.
And that was what we discovered
during our very first version.
It was about discovering that fit.
The second version, next.
There we are again.
You can see the team's
a little bit bigger.
We had to build this team
out because basically
we had realized what the
product-market fit actually was
and now we needed to build that
minimal operation necessary
for us to actually be
able to attack that fit.
So you can see these are
actually the three co-founders.
There I am and Reid,
who wore his hair longer
back in the day, and Jean-Luc
who was our original head of engineering.
Basically,
we found ourselves in a place where we had
to go from 12 employees to
roughly 30 or 40 employees
to be able to support things.
We also added a set of new functions,
new things that we didn't have
to worry about as a startup.
Those were customer service,
and we added sales, so the
go-to-market components
that John mentioned a little bit earlier,
and we added minimal GNA,
the general administrative functions,
to be able to do things like cut paychecks

Chinese: 
并且管理员工的福利
这些都是我们运营所必须的最基本部署和资源
下一张
好啦，这又是当时的我们
我们现在是在一个停车场
因为我们已经无法在室内照相了
在这个时候，我们拥有1300万用户
我就在后面这个地方
对于我们来说，我们到了“村庄”这个阶段
到了这个阶段，我们希望尝试
同时做两件事情
因此，我们希望能够利用
当前的匹配，这是一个现成的基础
一个很好的招聘业务，但是，我们还需要
开拓其他的匹配
基本上，我们与招聘人员直接的匹配非常好
当然，这仅代表大约全部专业人员中的半数
但是，我们知道
对于每个专业人员来说，我们获得了一个价值定位
那么，问题就是，你如何切实
走出去，并且发现它？
因此，2007年，我们将组织拆分
然后我们增加了很多额外的管理职能
因为我们需要
将我们的研发机构拆分
因此，我们从1个研发机构
扩展到5个研发机构
5个？5个

English: 
and manage benefits for employees.
So just the minimal stuff
that we actually needed to do.
Next.
Okay, here we are again.
Now we're in the parking lot
'cause we no longer fit in the building.
13 million users at this point.
I'm way in the back there.
In the village, for us,
this became a place where we wanted to try
to do two things simultaneously.
So we wanted to be able to take advantage
of the existing fit, it was a build
a great recruiter business,
but we also needed
to explore additional fits.
Basically, we had a great
fit with recruiters,
which only represents
about half of a percent
of all professionals, but we knew we had
a value proposition
for every professional.
So the question is how
are you actually gonna
go out and find that?
So in 2007 we broke our organization apart
and we added at on of extra overhead
because we needed to divide
our R&D organization up into parts.
So we went from one R&D organization
to five R&D organizations.
Five? Five.

English: 
And for what it's worth, we still have
five R&D organizations at LinkedIn.
- [Reid] That was the tracks,
you're referring to tracks.
- These are tracks, right.
Each one had a different
of things they supported,
either they supported the
growth of an existing business
or they explored new stuff.
It was our way of trying to balance
operational excellence with adaptability.
We wanted to make sure we had four
of those organizations out,
one of those organizations
focused on growth, one focused on revenue,
and the other three focused
on what would be valuable,
what other product-market
fits actually existed
to continue to allow us to grow.
That required new leadership.
When you get a company that
big, we're now at 120 people,
at 120 people, you need a different type
of organizational leadership.
So we brought in a CEO.
Guy's name was Dan Nye.
He came from Intuit.
And he came in with tremendous knowledge
about building enterprise
businesses and sales businesses.
He had worked on QuickBooks and a bunch
of other things for small businesses.
He was extremely knowledgeable
about that stuff.
He came in and put all the effort in
to make a sales organization really work

Chinese: 
并且，无论价值如何
现在LinkedIn依然保有5个研发机构
- [Reid]这是产品线，你所提到的是产品线
- 这些是产品线，对的
每个研发机构都支持不同的东西
它们或者支持现有业务的发展
或者探索新的项目
这就是我们尝试平衡
卓越运营绩效和适应能力的方法
我们希望确保我们拥有
4个这些机构，其中1个专注于发展
1个专注于收入
而其他3个专注于价值方面的内容
是否存在其他产品-市场匹配
以确保我们继续发展
这就需要新的领导层
当你的公司达到这个规模，我们现在有120名员工
在120名员工的规模，你需要不同类型的
组织领导阶层
因此，我们引进了一名首席执行官
他的名字叫Dan Nye
他来自Intuit集团
并且，他带来海量的知识
关于建立企业业务和销售业务
他曾主持QuickBooks以及一系列
适用于小型企业的其他东西
他在这个方面拥有非常丰富的经验和知识
他参与进来并作出所有努力
让一个销售机构真正运作起来

English: 
because it was our ability
to capture that marketplace.
But simultaneously we had to
bring in brand new product
and engineering leadership
to be able to run
those five simultaneous
lines of development.
- That's one of the things
we're gonna talk about,
I think a little bit during the class
'cause most people Silicon
Valley talk about founder or CEO.
I was a founder, I hired
a CEO to replace me.
Reid was a founder, hired to replace him,
then unreplaced himself,
then replaced himself again as CEO.
- Indecisive.
- Yeah, Reid is totally indecisive.
- So I think that knowing
who to put in what jobs,
and especially the CEO, with
respect to the founders,
and we'll talk about
through the quarter I think.
- All right, so next.
All right, the city.
So now, we're in a totally
different parking lot
because now we're talking about
hundreds and hundreds of employees.
In 2009 we basically began blitzscaling.
We hadn't really done it up to this point
because remember, growth
was our main limiter.
If we didn't have a big network,
we weren't gonna be able to drive stuff.
So basically,

Chinese: 
因为这是我们占领市场的能力
但同时我们必须引进全新产品
以及工程领袖
以执行这5条产品线
- 这也是我们准备讨论的问题之一
在课堂上我思考良多
因为大多数硅谷员工都在讨论创始人或首席执行官
我是一名创始人，我雇佣了一名首席执行官接替我
Reid是一名创始人，也雇佣人员接替他
然后他改变主意自己进行管理
最后还是让首席执行官接替他的工作
- 犹豫不决
- 是的，Reid总是犹豫不决
- 因此我想，了解谁可以胜任何种工作
特别是首席执行官，就创始人而言
而且，我想我们后面会讨论十几分钟
- 行，下一个话题
好的，“城市”阶段
所以现在，我们处于完全不同的停车场
因为现在我们要说的是
数以百计的员工
在2009年，我们基本开始了快速规模化
这个时候，我们尚未做到这一步
因为要记住，发展是我们的主要瓶颈
如果我们不拥有强大的网络
我们不可能驱动这些发展
所以基本上

English: 
we had to bring all these people in for us
to be able to basically take advantage
of the growth we had
achieved up to that point
and continue to drive our efforts
in those five product lines.
But at that point, there
were changing expectations
for the way that our customers
were using our products.
So we had a recruiter
product, we had sales product,
we had marketing solutions
products, wide variety of things
and now the bar had to be
raised on all of that stuff.
We had to have people
managing those relationships.
We had to have sales people out
there generating new things.
A lot of our customer growth
was coming from overseas.
So now we're beginning to
see growth outside the US.
So we brought in a new CEO to do this,
this is Jeff Weiner who'll be
with us later in the quarter
to talk about this process,
leading from stage four into stage five.
Jeff came in and the
very first thing he did
was he prepared us to blitzscale.
So one thing we had never done
and this is a great learning for us,
is we'd never written
down our company culture.
We hadn't written down our strategy
because we were too small.
We didn't have to do that.
You'll find, if you haven't
worked in a startup,
that when you're a startup,

Chinese: 
我们必须引进所有这些人才
才能基本上利用
我们已经实现的发展目标
并且在这5条产品线中
继续作出我们的努力
但在那个阶段 对于我们顾客使用我们产品的方式方面
我们的期望又发生了改变
所以我们拥有招聘人员产品，我们拥有销售产品
我们拥有市场营销方案产品，种类繁多
如今，所有这些事情的标准都已经必须提高
我们不得不雇佣人员管理这些关系
我们不得不雇佣销售人员开辟新天地
我们大多数顾客群都来自海外
所以现在我们开始寻求美国以外区域的发展
所以我们引进新的首席执行官担任此任务
这也是Jeff Weiner，他会在后半程与我们
共同讨论这个过程
从阶段4进阶到阶段5
Jeff加入我们，且他做的第一件事
就是他让我们准备好进行快速规模化
所以，我们未曾做过的一件事
并且，对我们来说受益良多的事情
就是我们从未规定我们的公司文化
我们从未规定我们的战略
因为我们的规模太渺小
我们并不需要那样做
你会发现，如果你在创业中未作出努力
那么当你处于创业之初

English: 
everyone knows everything all the time.
But when you're a big company
you have different management
and executive leadership needs.
So Jeff came in, he
wrote all that stuff down
and it's still the way
we run the company today.
We're 8,500 employees now.
Okay, we basically doubled
size year over year over year
from 2009 to 2014.
Okay.
Something else that happened here.
As those of you who've worked
in a startup which lasts a long time know,
when you work on a codebase
for more than six years,
it becomes full of gunk.
Okay.
We had tremendous technical
changes we needed to make
to make sure that we have the
technical platform necessary
to make the thing successful.
So we had to change our
technology strategy at this point.
We had to think about
basically building for scale,
for flexibility, for
developer productivity,
a whole bunch of things
we'd never considered before
because we now had hundreds
of developers working on stuff
and still had to drive to
be able to move quickly.
Finally, we had to change our
financing strategy at this point.
So we had been doing financing,

Chinese: 
人人都通晓每件事
但当你发展成为大公司时，你有不同的管理部门
以及行政领导需求
所以Jeff加入我们，他规定了所有这些东西
而且，这仍然是我们当今运营一家公司的方式
我们目前拥有8,500名员工
好吧，在2009年至2014年期间
我们的员工数量基本上每年翻一番
好吧！
在这个阶段发生了一些东西
如果你们所有人当中曾在创业公司工作
并且持续很长一段时间，你就知道
当你使用某个代码库长达6年之久
它会变得一团糟
好吧
我们面临巨大的技术变革，我们确实需要作出变革
确保我们拥有过硬的技术平台
从而确保突破成功
因此我们此时必须改变我们的技术战略
我们主要需要思考如何发展规模
灵活性、以及开发人员生产力
我们未曾思考过的方方面面
因为我们目前有数以百计的开发人员在处理各种事务
并且我们仍然需要驱动力加速前进
最后，针对这一点
我们此时必须改变我们的融资策略
因此我们已经在进行融资工作

Chinese: 
从根本上，我们于2006年开始赢利
但眼下，我们在思考如何能够将需要的所有资金
筹集到一起
以便能够做些事情，例如并购
所以，这时，我们不仅要努力争取新一轮的种子期融资
而且还要在2011年进行首次IPO
从而保证我们做好准备
向着目标进行必要的并购
下一张
所以这是一小群员工
在我们的旧金山新办公室里
当时我们达到了3亿用户规模
看3亿数字在后面这里
我们达到了3亿用户的节点
这就是我们看到的最大改变
我们的开发机构
现在分散在全球各地
这在公司历史上尚属首次
我们现在在美国境外工作的
员工人数和美国境内工作员工的人数基本相当
我们分布在27个国家
我们在中国拥有大规模业务
我们在全世界范围内
都有员工为LinkedIn工作
我们还拥有8,500名员工
超过20亿美元的收入等等

English: 
basically we became profitable in 2006,
but now we were thinking about
how do you bring together
the capital that you
need in order to be able
to do things like acquisitions.
So not only did we go out for
a seed round at this time,
but we also did the IPO in 2011
in order to make sure that we were ready
to make necessary
acquisitions along the way.
Next.
So this is a small group of people.
This is in our new San Francisco office
when we crossed the 300 million,
see 300 million is back there,
we crossed the 300 million mark.
This was one of the major changes we saw.
Our development organization is now split
across many geographies for the first time
in the company's history.
We now have as many employees working
outside the United States as
we do inside the United States.
We are in 27 different countries,
we have major operations in China,
we have people spread all around the world
making LinkedIn happen.
We also have 8,500 employees,
more than $2 billion of
revenue and so forth,

Chinese: 
那么，各种要求其实已经再次变化
这就是我们所讨论的内容
这就是LinkedIn的故事，并且我们会有更多的细节
因为人们希望了解它，并且你希望随后添加上去
因为这是非常非常高层次的描述
但是，从一个事物到另一个事物
你没法找到一个清晰的路径
但是，了解这些变化，以及这些需求如何随时间变化
是我们希望从这里获得的主要内容
因此，我们可以明确讨论某些此类内容
并且我们将会要求每个来到这里的嘉宾
讨论这些内容以及他们实际所处的阶段
- 并且，其主题并非这个
LinkedIn故事，很显然
其主题是给你提供一个示例
展示这些公司实际上如何发生变化
以及你需要成功完成的各种事项
以成功建立一个受人关注的公司
- 到这里有什么问题吗？
现在有什么问题吗？
好吧，再有20分钟，我们就完成今天的课程了
那么，我们马上回到正题
接下来两周的内容将关于“家庭”阶段
其主要关于建立一个团队，一个小团队
尝试去寻找产品-市场匹配
并且，你所关心的内容基本都在这里

English: 
so again the set of requirements
has actually changed.
So this is the kind of thing
that we're talking about,
this is the LinkedIn story and
we'll have lots more detail
as people desire it and
as you wanna add later on
because this is a very,
very high level description,
but there's no clean path which gets you
from one thing to the next,
but knowing these changes
and how those needs change
over time is the main thing
that we wanna get out of this.
So we can talk specifically
about some of those things
and we're gonna be doing
it with every guest
who comes and talks about the
stage they're actually at.
- And the point is not to make this
the LinkedIn story, obviously.
The point is to give you an illustration
of one example of how these
companies actually change
and what are the things
you need to succeed at
in order to succeed in building
an interesting company.
- Any questions so far?
Any questions now?
All right, so 20 more
minutes and then we're good.
So, just quickly.
The next two weeks are
about the family stage.
It's about having a team, small team
try to find product-market fit.
And so, the things you care
about are mostly these.

English: 
Is your product any good?
Does anybody care that
your product's good?
What do you do everyday?
- [Reid] Other than you.
- [John] What's that?
- [Reid] Other than you.
- [John] Yeah, and your mom and your dad.
They love your product, of course.
Who do you hire and how
the hell do you get them
to work for you, when they can go work for
Facebook or Dropbox or hot startups X
or go to Y Combinator
and be their own founder.
How do you get anybody,
not just customers to care,
how do you get any employees to care?
And then how do you make
sure you can pay people?
Anything you wanna add here?
- [Reid] Nope.
- This is it.
This is about all you can
care about at this stage.
Things that are not very
relevant, they're kind of key,
like who's in charge and
how do you have analytics,
how do you tell how
you're doing, strategy,
but in truth, you're not
gonna do any of this stuff
because it's not nearly as
important as these other things.
Product, product, product.
People, people, people.
Making sure you can pay.
That's it.
There's nothing else at this stage.
- One of the key things
when you're looking
at these different scales is not only
which problems do you solve,

Chinese: 
你的产品有何优势？
是否有人关注你产品的优势？
你每天都做什么
- [Reid]除了你之外
- [John]什么？
- [Reid]除了你之外
- [John]是的，还有你的妈妈和爸爸
他们喜欢你的产品，毫无疑问
你会雇佣谁以及你如何让他们
为你工作，而其实他们可以
去Facebook或Dropbox或某个热门创业公司工作
或者去Y孵化器并且自己做创始人
除了客户之外，你如何让所有人去关注
你如何让每个员工去关注
然后，你如何确保你可以给员工发工资？
你希望在这方面说点什么？
- [Reid]没有
- 就是这些内容
这就是你在这个阶段所能够关心的所有内容
某些内容可能并不相关，但是比较关键
比如，谁说了算，以及你如何获得分析数据
你如何了解你做得怎么样，策略等
但是，实际上，你不会去做任何这些东西
因为它们并没有这里所列的其他东西那么重要
产品、产品、产品
人员、人员、人员
确保你能够发出薪水
就是这些内容
在这个阶段，没有其他东西了
- 其中的一个关键问题
当你看着这些不同的规模时
其并非你解决了哪些问题

English: 
but which problems do you not solve.
Part of the entrepreneurial journey,
and that happens even when
you're at scales of thousands,
is there are fires burning
when you're going home.
That's fine.
You have to know which
fires it's okay to go home,
it's like, yeah, we can deal
with that one next week,
right, that's fine,
and which ones you can't.
In the family, OS1,
these are some of the things
that are absolutely critical
and if you're not obsessed
about them every single day,
you are most likely gonna fail.
- Yeah, I mean, I would Reid
is probably better at this
than anybody that I know,
which I call triaging,
which is knowing what to take
care of and what to ignore.
And when Reid ignores something
he totally ignores it.
So there are things if you,
I mean, he has these characteristics
some of my other partners do, which is
if you send them mail and they give a damn
about the mail, they'll
respond in about 18 seconds.
If they don't and they
don't respond in 18 seconds,
forget it, you're never
gonna get a response back
because it's below the triage line.
So I think that the key for this stage is
know what's important and if stuff,

Chinese: 
而是你没有解决哪些问题
在创业的路上
并且，即使是你拥有上千人的规模时依然会发生的问题
是你回家的时候却后院起火了
这没问题
但是你需要知道哪种火灾下，你可以回家
就好比，对，我们可以下周再来处理这个问题
对，这没问题
然后，哪些火灾情况下，你不能回家
在“家庭”阶段，OS1
这些都是一些绝对关键的问题
并且，如果你不每天考虑这些问题
你就很可能会失败
- 是的，我是说，我认为Reid可能在这方面
比我所认识的所有人都擅长这一块，我把它成为分类
也就是说，知道哪些问题需要处理，而哪些可以忽略
并且，当Reid忽略某些问题时，他会完全忽略它
那么，有些东西，如果你
我是指，他拥有这些天赋
我的其他合伙人也一样，也就是说
如果你给他们发送电邮，而他们在乎的话
他们会在大约18秒内作出回应
如果他们不在乎，他们不会在18秒内回应
算了吧，而你将永远不会收到回复
因为其处于分类底线之下
因此，我认为，在这个阶段
关键是了解哪些是重要问题，并且，如果

Chinese: 
我在这方面比Reid差多了
我是说，噢我的天，这是我的待办事项表
“我真的希望去完成这些事情
它们虽然并非很重要，但是，我还没有查阅
而我会去查看邮箱
因此，这有点斯坦福式
但是，Reid很擅长忽视问题
忽略问题是非常关键
如果这些问题不会造成坏的影响
- 是的
而忽略一些重要的问题
显然会导致致命的后果
- [John]是的，会很惨
- [John]会造成另一个致命问题
- 让我们回到另一个幻灯片
有很多东西，其全部…
并且，有许多东西可纳入这4个类型，其他所有东西
建立一个公司需要经历很多问题
你不能预先解决问题
例如，在“家庭”阶段，你的数据
很少会成为你成功的关键
随着你进入到“村庄”阶段，或者到“部落”阶段
则数据很可能会成为一个关键
也就是说，这是变化着的
在这个阶段，谁在乎？
我只有一个基本的控制面板，有多少人注册
人们如何下载应用，等等
你知道，就好比，好的，好的
或者了解你的确切链接
随着你开始进入这个阶段
它会从第10位进入到第2位

English: 
I tend to be worse at it than Reid.
I tend to say, oh my
God, here's my todo list,
"I'd really like to
finish these other things
that are maybe not totally
priority, but they're unchecked
and I'd really like to check that box.
So it's a little bit
Stanfordy in that way.
But Reid is pretty good
at letting fires burn
and letting fires burn is pretty key
if they're the right fires.
- Yeah.
Letting the wrong fires burn obviously is
another fatality.
- [John] Pretty bad, yes.
- [John] Another fatality, yeah.
- Go back to the other one.
There's a lot of things that all,
and there's a ton that fits
into four, everything else.
There's a lot of things that
go into building a company.
You do not presolve problems.
So, for example, it's very
rare in the family stage
that your data is gonna
be key to your success.
It's very likely that as
you get to the village,
maybe even the tribe, the
data's gonna be essential.
So, it shifts.
Here, who cares?
And I have a basic dashboard,
how many people signed up,
how many people downloaded
the app, whatever.
You know, like fine, fine.
Or understanding your exact link.
As you're beginning to get into it
that will move from tenth to second.

English: 
Or something, it depends on the
exact company and what you're doing.
Likewise you're gonna iterate through,
like strategy's always important,
but the fact is, if you're only thinking
and talking about your strategy,
that's actually not gonna play out.
You need to actually have a disposition
to getting in the fight, to doing things.
That's part of the, "If
you're not embarrassed
"by your first product release,
you've released too late."
There are very few product
geniuses, who just think it
and then launch it and it works.
Very, very few.
So if you presume you're one of them,
it's a high bit of strategy.
Maybe it'll work, probably won't.
- Part of what happens
is trying to get anybody
to use it is a pretty Herculean effort,
trying to get the thing
to compile, then ship,
and then released in the app store,
and getting anyone to use it,
you have to do hand-to-hand
combat in a lot of ways.
Once you do that, if it
starts to work at all,
the system, the app, the
people, and all the users
become too big for you
to hold in your head
and that's why data starts to become more
and more important over time.
- And one great thing that's changed a lot
in the last few years, you all are

Chinese: 
或者诸如此类，其取决于
具体的公司以及你所从事的行业
同样，你需要循环迭代
例如，策略通常都是重要的
但是，实际上，如果你仅仅思考
或考虑你的策略
其实际上不会发挥作用
你需要切实部署
以加入战斗，去做事情
这就例如，“如果你不觉得窘迫
“因为你的产品发布，你发布太迟。”
很少有哪个产品天才，他只要想到某个产品
然后将其发布，就会马上取得成功
非常非常少
如果你假设你是其中之一
这是一个策略的高位
其可能会成功，也可能会失败
- 所会发生的情况是，尝试让每个人
都去用这个产品是一个非常困难的事情
尝试编写好一个应用，然后包装好
然后在应用商店中发布
并且让任何人使用这个应用
你需要通过很多方式参加很多白刃战
在你这样做之后，如果其开始生效
该系统、应用、人员以及所有用户
都会变得太大，你无法在你自己头脑中处理
并且，这就是数据开始
随时间变得越来越重要的原因
- 并且，其中一个重大问题是
在过去几年发生了很多变化

English: 
in a much better environment
to be able to handle this.
And the reason that's true is that so many
of the things which
are, in fact, not vital
are now things you can get off the shelf.
For instance, the whole
idea of provisioning a colo
is something that we had to do.
We literally, in our first office,
we were sitting on the
box, instead of chairs
we had boxes of hardware that we were
gonna take to our colo, okay.
That no longer happens.
Now, that problem, which is not
an important problem at all,
it's a necessary thing,
but it's not important,
is something you can do just by signing up
for Amazon Web Services.
So you've got it much better.
The good thing is, all
the things you don't want
to focus on, many of you don't have to.
The thing is that the things you do have
to focus on are still really hard.
- Yeah, the bad news is everybody
else gets to do that too.
- Yes, exactly
- So you're competing with
everybody who has the same thing.
- So this is my favorite essay about OS1
by a guy, Paul Graham,
who started Y Combinator.
His essay is Do Things That Don't Scale.
And so this will be homework
for Thursday's class.
There'll be three things to read,
two things by Sam Altman,
one by Paul Graham.

Chinese: 
你处于一个更好的环境，能够处理这个问题
并且其真实的原因是
有很多东西，其实，并非至关重要的东西
你现在都能够获得现成的产品或服务
例如，整个关于提供一个COLO的想法
是我们必须要做的事情
在我们第一个办公室，毫不夸张地说
我们就坐在箱子上，而不是椅子上
我们有一箱箱的硬件
我们要将其搬到我们的colo去，对的
现在肯定不会出现这种情况
现在，这个问题，根本就不是什么重要问题
这是一个必要的事情，但不是重要事项
你可以直接注册
亚马逊网站服务，就可以做到
因此，你们的条件已经好了很多了
好的一面是，所有这些你不希望
特别关注的问题，有很多你都无须去做
另一方面，那些你必须
特别专注的事情，依然非常困难
- 是的，坏消息是，每个人都可以那样做了
- 对的，非常准确
- 因此，你和每个人进行竞争，而他们都拥有同样的条件
- 这是一篇关于OS1的论文，我最喜欢的一篇
其作者是Paul Graham，Y孵化器的创始人
他的论文是《做一些非规模化的事情》
因此，这就是周四课堂的家庭作业
这里有3个内容需要阅读
两个是Sam Altman的作品，一个是Paul Graham的作品

English: 
But this is the essay
that I think everybody
should pay real attention to.
And what he tells is stories about
when you're just starting out,
like you might have to
go grab somebody's phone
and install the app for them
and then show them how to use it.
That obviously won't scale to
even 100 users or 1,000 users,
but getting the first user is critical,
getting the second user is critical.
And so he tells us a story
about Airbnb doing things
that didn't scale when they started
and I don't know if you know it.
Do you know any of those stories?
- I know a lot of the stories.
- Do you wanna tell any of the Airbnb?
- So, for example, one thing is
they went door to door in New York
to sign up people's, they
identify 'em off Craigslist's,
they got in touch with them
and they went and said,
"You should go post in Airbnb."
So the founders showed up
and said, "Hey, this is why
"you should be listening
on my marketplace."
They then also began to realize
that the trust and quality
of the transactions really
had a lot to do with

Chinese: 
但是，我认为，这篇论文
每个人都应该认真阅读
并且，他所讲述的故事内容是
当你刚开始创业的时候
好比你可能须要去抢某人的手机
并且帮他们安装应用
然后教他们如何使用
这很显然还没有规模化到100或1000名用户
但是，获得第一个用户至关重要
获得第二个用户也至关重要
并且，他向我们讲述一个故事，关于Airbnb如何
在他们开始的时候去做一些非规模化的事情
我不知道你们是否了解
你们谁知道这些故事吗？
- 我非常了解这些故事
- 你是否想将一些关于Airbnb的故事？
- 好吧，例如，有个故事是
他们在纽约市挨家挨户上门
注册人们的用户名，他们从Craigslist表上获得信息
他们和人们取得联系，然后上门并劝说
“你应该到Airbnb上发布。”
然后，创始人来到人们家里说，“嗨，这是
“你为什么应该关注我卖场的原因”
然后他们也开始意识到
信任和交易的质量真的在很大程度上

Chinese: 
与我是否看到我喜欢的地方相关
因此，他们会请摄影师
去到这些地方拍照
这些都是创始人在开始阶段
在做的所有事情
当你在创业时，你并非在写代码
你不是在购买市场营销服务
你不是面试或雇佣员工
这就是所有的各种事情
并且其时间强度很大
现在，当然，当你处于“家庭”阶段时
你可能会悠闲地每周工作100小时
每周120小时，或者更多
这没什么问题，但是
这是一个选择，关于你如何安排时间
并且，这都是为了达到最初的临界数量
而必须去做的所有事情
以拥有一个价值定位，那样人们会说
“噢，对的
“这实际上就是我想要使用的东西”
- 这至关重要，原因有很多
其能给你一个认知，了解实际客户是怎么样的
并且去感受他们关心什么东西
其为所有员工建立模型
为你的客户建立模型
其可以在各方面提供帮助
做一些非规模化的东西
可能你会后面再去做，可能你不会去做
Craig Newark在Craigslist的时候
他一直都在做客户服务
- [Reid]我想，他的头衔依然是

English: 
do I see a place that I like?
So they would pay photographers
to go take pictures of those places.
Those are all kinds of
things that the founders
were doing at the very beginning.
And when you're doing that,
you're not writing code,
you're not buying marketing,
you're not interviewing and hiring people.
That's all a bunch of stuff
that is massively time intensive.
Now, of course, when
you're in the family stage,
you will tend to be working
probably casually 100 hours,
120 hours a week, maybe even more.
So, that's fine, but
it's a choice of how
you're putting the time
and those were all
things that was necessary
to get to the initial critical mass
to have a value proposition
that people say,
"Oh yeah.
"This is actually something I would use."
- It's critical for so many reasons.
It gives you a sense of what
actual customers look like
and feel like and what they care about.
It does modeling for all the employees,
it does modeling for your customers,
it helps everything.
Doing things that don't scale,
maybe you will do it
later, maybe you won't.
Craig Newark did customer service
the whole time he was at Craigslist.
- [Reid] I think his title's still

English: 
Chief Customer Service Rep.
- Yeah, so some people
like doing that forever,
but it's critical at the beginning,
so we'll have you read that.
This is Mozilla and this is my story.
I got there sort of right
when the orange started,
so obviously highly
correlated with winning.
(class laughs)
- [Reid] Taking personal responsibility.
- Totally causal.
No, so, all I wanted to say is look,
this story, you're gonna
see it again and again,
which is, people kind off to the left,
kind of wandering around,
trying to make a thing
that they think is important.
And then you start to get
a little bit of traction,
some people care.
And then you start to figure a thing out.
In this case, they figured out how
to build a quick, fast web
browser right at the right time
when IE, Internet Explorer,
none of you probably use it anymore,
really started to not be very good.
And so they were building
asset, building asset,
building asset and then
the context happened
that they could blitzscale.
And I was employed 12 or 15,
right at the beginning there,

Chinese: 
主要客服代表
- 是的，有的人希望永远担任那种角色
但是，在开始阶段，这非常关键
因此，我们让你阅读这个文章
这是Mozilla，而这是我的故事
我到哪里的时候，正好就是黄色部分开始的时候
因此，很显然，与成功高度相关
（课堂大笑）
- [Reid]承担个人责任
- 绝对存在因果关系
好的，我想说的是，看
这个故事，你们会反复看到好多次
其中，在左侧
大家都在四处徘徊，尝试去做
他们认为重要的事情
然后，你开始获得一点吸引力
有些用户关注了
然后你开始弄明白一些事情
在这个案例中，他们弄明白
如果在正确的时候打造好一款快速网络浏览器
当时，IE网页浏览器
你们可能谁都不再用IE了
开始表现得越来越差
因此，他们积累资本，积累资本
积累资本，然后环境成熟
他们就可以进行快速规模化发展
我是第12个或者第15个员工，就在那里开始位置

English: 
but it was right at the
beginning of us blitzscaling
and we got to be about 400 million users
over the next three or four years.
Anyways, we're gonna see chart after chart
that looks like this, which
is slow, slow, slow, fast.
- Can I actually go
back for just a second?
'Cause this is the thing
to actually really pay attention to.
'Cause this is the thing
to actually really pay attention to.
This isn't just the compounding graph,
this is organization, uncertainty,
the fog of what's going on in the market,
all the rest that goes into this.
And that's part of what
you meant by decisioning,
on when are you trying
to hit the accelerator.
- Yeah, yep.
Yeah, if they had tried
to hit the accelerator
any other time, it just
wouldn't have worked.
They would've spent money and
they wouldn't have happened.
Hitting the accelerator
then was a profoundly
uncomfortable thing an
one of the things is
when you're starting to blitzscale,
it's uncomfortable all the time.
You're not doing anything
well except just trying
to keep the wheels or
the wings on the plan,
I guess is the metaphor I'd use.
But all these charts look the same.
Here's Airbnb.
Airbnb had a long period over
here on the left of the graph.
Before 2010 it was just flat.
And again, they were building assets,
they were creating momentum,
creating a community,

Chinese: 
但是，那是在我们开始快速规模化发展的时候
并且在接下来3-4年
我们发展到大约4亿用户
不管怎么样，我们会一个接着一个地看到各种图表
类似这样的图表，一开始很慢很慢，然后突然加速
- 我能不能往回解释一下？
因为这个问题
其实真的需要注意
因为这其实是一个
切实需要注意的问题
这并非复合图表
这里是组织部分，不确定性
市场现状的迷雾
所有其他部分归到这里来
然后，这就是你所指的
决定什么时候尝试用力踩油门的部分
- 是的，是的
是的，如果他们在任何其他时间尝试踩了油门
那是不会起作用的
他们可能花了资金，但是那样不会产生什么效果
那么，踩下油门则是一个非常难受的事情
并且，问题之一是
当你开始快速规模化发展时
所有时间都是艰难的
你无法把任何事情做得很好，你所能做的
就是尝试控制好方向或者保持平衡
我想，我这里用了一个比喻
但是，所有的图表看起来都是一样的
这个是Airbnb的图表
Airbnb在图表的左侧花费了很长的时间
在2010年之前的部分都是平的
然后，同样，他们正在积累资本
他们正在积累动力，创建一个社区

English: 
so that by 2011 when conditions
started to get right,
it started to work really well.
So, here's the first couple of weeks.
So 9/22's today.
Welcome.
Thursday we'll have Sam Altman come in
and do a reprise of his
class from last year.
One of the assignments
we'll have you to do
next day or so, is in the LinkedIn group,
which we'll tell you how to do,
put down questions you'd like
us to ask Sam during class.
So it'll be an hour and a half of Sam.
Sam, he was here at Stanford,
he dropped out of Stanford,
founded Loopt, now he runs Y
Combinator, probably the most
important startup
organization in the world.
This is no joke.
He sees thousands and
thousands of new ventures,
he helps, actively, hundreds.
There's nobody quite in
the same position as Sam.
And so what we're gonna ask him to do
is of all the things he sees,
especially this organizational stage one,
what does he see around commonalities?

Chinese: 
因此，到2011年，条件开始成熟
其效益开始变得非常好
这里是最初几周的安排
今天是9月22日
欢迎
周四，我们会邀请到Sam Altman
重复他去年的讲课
我们给你们安排的任务之一
明天或前后时间，是在LinkedIn集团
我们会告诉你们怎么做
在课堂中，请写下你们希望我们向Sam提出的问题
Sam会有一个半小时的时间
Sam曾经在斯坦福上学，他从斯坦福退学
创立了Loopt，现在，他运营着Y孵化器
可能是全球最重要的创业机构
这并非说笑
他见过数以千计的新风投项目
他还积极为数以百计的项目提供帮助
没有人能够和Sam在这方面相提并论
因此，我们将要求他做的事情是
为我们带来他的所有经历
特别是在这个组织阶段1（OS1）
他看到什么共性呢？

English: 
- [Reid] Yeah, patterns or
work patterns that fail.
- Yup.
So Sam, we're grateful
that he's gonna come out.
So, that's the content for today.
We have two more slides.
Here's how the class is gonna
work, I'll come back to it.
And then here's what
to read for next week.
Does anybody have any
questions before we talk
about mechanics and class logistics?
- [Voiceover] (mumbles) that
binds to consumer internet.
Do you think B2B is gonna
be equally relevant here?
- Yeah, we'll talk about enterprise,
we call it enterprise software or B2B.
Today, you got a lot of consumer internet.
Reid and I both, Reid, Allen, we all,
well, LinkedIn is I think
a good canonical company
of one that lives in both worlds
of consumer and enterprise.
We do a lot of that.
I think it'll depend on the guests,
especially when they come.
- You should mention Reactivity, too.
- Yeah, I had an,
well, it's kind of a long
story, but I had an enterprise
software company we sold to Cisco, too.
Plus Dropbox
- [Reid] Plus guests.
- [John] and Quip and some others.
- [Reid] The goal is to be appropriate,
although we will, we know consumer better

Chinese: 
- [Reid]是的，成功的模式或失败的模式
- 对
那么，对于Sam，他能够到来，我们将非常感激
这就是今天的课堂内容
我们还有两张幻灯片
这是关于课堂如何进行的内容，我后面会回到这方面
而这里是下周的阅读任务
在我们讨论各种机制和课堂流程之前
有人有什么问题吗？
- [学生]（数字）与消费者网络相关
你认为B2B在这方面是否同样相关？
- 是的，我们将讲到企业
我们会将其称为企业软件或B2B
今天，你们有很多消费者网络
Reid和我、Reid、Allen，我们全部
好吧，我认为，LinkedIn是一个很好的标准公司
一个深入全球消费者和企业心中的公司
我们会讲述很多这些内容
我认为，这会取决于嘉宾
特别是他们来的时候
- 你也应该提到活动性
- 对的，我有一个
嗯，说来话长，但是，我之前也有一个企业
软件公司，我们把它卖给了思科
还有Dropbox
- [Reid]还有嘉宾
- [John]和Quip以及其他公司
- [Reid]其目的是恰如其分
当然我们会，我们更了解消费者

Chinese: 
并且，其趋向于变得更大，因此
在消费者方面的时间可能不成比例
但是，我们也会讲述B2B方面的内容
是的，实际上，我们还有
一名生物技术嘉宾，他后面会来
我们可以说出来，对不？
- [Reid]对
- 对的，Elizabeth Holmes
Theranos的创始人和首席执行官会来我们这里
对于这个，我们感到很兴奋
她一般不会公开讲课
所以，这次会是一次非常有趣的课堂
并且，这是一个非常特别的领域
- 那么，问题是，这些快速规模化策略
在你走出软件行业之外，是否依然同样适用？
这基本上可从3个部分去回答这个问题
第一部分是，这仅仅与速度差异相关
那么，关键是，比你的竞争对手
发展得更快，这依然至关重要，单纯的闪电战
不好意思，我不喜欢那个词
我真不应该用这个词
快速规模化（大笑）
我会对这块进行编辑
（课堂大笑）
- [John]这是一个玩笑
你始终都可以编辑帖子
- [Reid]是的，确实
- [John]除非是你无法编辑的时候
- [Reid]是的，确实
快速规模化的关键实际上

English: 
and it tends to get bigger,
so there'll probably
disproportionate time on consumer,
but we will cover B2B as well.
Yeah, and in fact, we also have one
biotech guest as well
who's coming later in the,
we can mention, yeah?
- [Reid] Yeah.
- Yeah, so Elizabeth Holmes,
who is the founder and CEO
of Theranos is gonna come,
which we're pretty excited about.
She doesn't talk a lot in public,
so that should be an interesting one too.
And it's quite different domain.
- So question is, are these
blitzscaling strategies
equally applicable when you
get out of the software realm?
There's essentially three
parts to the answer to that.
The first part is, it's all
about speed differential.
So the question is, is moving
faster than your competition
is still important, the
pure blitzkrieg that a,
sorry, I hate that term.
I shouldn't use that term.
Blitzscale! (laughs)
That will get edited.
(class laughs)
- [John] That'll be a running joke,
you can always edit in post.
- [Reid] Yes, exactly.
- [John] Except when you can't.
- [Reid] Yeah, exactly.
The pure blitzscale part of
this is a differential speed

Chinese: 
在于市场现状
竞争状况和你如何发挥之间的速度差异
那么，其依然基于硬件
第二部分是，很多硬件
或将其称为“原子”
各种企业和行业逐渐受到更多影响
因此，比如，软件和医药
比如，软件和遗传学
比如，硬件交付中的软件
而其中的软件是差异化的关键部分
并且，还有更多其他方面
软件影响着其他行业
并且，其激发了那个行业中的
整个竞争发条
例如，人们对特斯拉那么感兴趣，很大程度上
并非因为它是一辆电动车，而因为它配备了大量软件
这才是其备受关注的原因
并且，这从一开始就让它脱颖而出
然后，第三部分是
总有一些与众不同的东西
例如，在硬件或类似的东西方面
或者医药或其他东西
你必须确保更低的错误率
但是，其中还是有某些东西
好吧，比如，我们如何能够
以较低的错误率比竞争对手发展得更快一点？

English: 
between what's going on in the markets,
what the competition looks
like, and how you play.
And so, it still plays on hardware.
Second thing is, many hardware,
or call 'em atoms,
businesses and industries are
being more affected by bits.
So there's software and medicine,
there's software and genetics.
There's software in hardware delivery,
where the software is the
key part of the differential.
And so there's more ways that software
affects these other industries,
so that also just picks up the entire
competitive clock in that industry.
So, for example, what makes
Tesla interesting is not so much
that it's an electric
car, it's a software car.
That's the thing that makes it interesting
and that starts what's
really picking it up.
And then the third part of it is,
there are some things
that will be different.
So, for example, in
hardware or things like it
or medicine or other things,
you have to have a much,
much lower error rate.
But that's still something you say,
well, okay, how do we move a little faster
than the competition
with a low error rate?

English: 
As opposed to we can just
accept a high error rate
as a way of doing it
'cause one of the things
you'll see frequently in software
is you'll accept a higher error rate.
For example, you'll
accept customer service
that essentially responds through email,
like, take the PayPal case.
Three weeks later!
As opposed, and they
don't do that anymore,
but that was during the growth period.
As a way of hacking which problems
you need to solve in order to scale.
Now, in kind of classic,
whether it's biology or
hardware or everything else,
you actually have to
have a much lower, lower,
much lower error rate.
But that still can play into it.
- You'll get judged on what
are called comps, comparables.
And so people will, to the
extent that you don't have
competition that's
direct, people will try to
baseline how your progress
is going against others.
But I think the critical questions are
are you selling your product
and are you hiring well enough?
And not a lot more--
- The other key thing of
this is you actually do not
overly focus on your competition anyway.
The real thing that smart
founders, smart executives,
smart investors are doing is saying,

Chinese: 
相反，我们可以接受较低的错误率
出现这种情况的原因是，因为
你在软件中经常会看到的一件事情是
你可以接受较高的错误率
例如，你可以接受基本上通过电邮
进行回应的客户服务
例如，PayPal就是一个例子
3周之后！
相反，他们现在不会这样了
但是，在发展期，确实是这种情况
作为一种方法，你需要了解你须要
解决哪些问题，你才能扩大规模
现在，看起来比较经典
无论是生物技术还是硬件或其他行业
实际上，你都必须实现更低
更低的错误率
但是，这个规律依然会起作用
- 人们会通过案例数据比较来对你进行判断
并且，人们会
即使你没有直接形成竞争，人们都会尝试
将你的发展基线与其他的进行对比
但是，我想，关键的问题是
你的产品是否卖的足够好？并且，你是否雇佣了足够好的员工？
而不是很多其他——
- 其他一个关键因素是，你实际上
不要太过于关注你的竞争对手
聪明的创始人、聪明的高管
聪明的投资者所做的真正事情是说

Chinese: 
你是否会拥有市场机会？
你是否发展得足够快去抓住机会？
你是否建立了一个坚固持久的基础？
关于竞争的关键问题是
如果在你前面获得了市场机会
那么，你很显然无法获得该机会
因此，当你接触到并非直接面对的竞争时
你实际上开始思考的问题是
好吧，你如何建立某种东西
其会随着时间慢慢积累
而不是说你以非常快的速度达到那个阶段
并且发展得那么强大，当然
其中一个指标是，如果你发展真的很慢
实际上，你是否会积累，随后发展壮大起来
就显得有点值得怀疑了
当然不是完全不可能
因此，这些就是全部的内容
但这也是其为什么不是纯粹科学理论的原因
在每种特定情况下，都会有很多判断
并且，你无法给出一个路线图的原因
是因为，作为一个创始人，一名高管
你的工作内容是
你去执行各种判断
我们在硅谷这里的所拥有的一个优势
基本上就是一个学习的网络
因此，你应该经常去做的一件事
就是和你周围所有经验丰富的人进行交流
并不仅仅是有过此类经验的人
还包括其他经验丰富的人
因为如果这可以让你更容易做出决定

English: 
will you own the market opportunity?
Are you moving fast enough to do that?
Are you building out the
foundation such that it's durable?
The key question on
competition is if someone else
owns that market opportunity before you,
then you're clearly not gonna own it.
So when you get to the
competition is not close to you,
what you're actually
beginning to think about is,
okay, how are you building something
that will compound over time,
not do you get there really fast.
And is that strong, now, of course,
one metric is that if
you're moving really slowly,
the fact that you're gonna
compound, get big later
becomes a little bit in doubt,
not necessarily fully in doubt.
So, those are all the
things and this is part
of the reason why it's not pure science.
There's a lot of judgment
that goes in each specific
and part of the reason you
can't just give out a roadmap
is because part of what you're doing
as a founder, as an executive,
is you're exercising judgment.
One of the things we have
here in Silicon Valley
is essentially a network of learning,
so one of the things you should always do
is talk to all the
smart people around you,
not just people who have done it before,
but also other smart
people because if that
makes your decision crisper,

English: 
then you make that decision much better.
Like how fast should be moving,
how much capital should be,
should we make the hire early,
should we make the hire late.
Those kinds of questions are
the things that you're hitting
as you're going into scale.
- And an example for that
from the LinkedIn story.
We didn't pay attention to the competition
particularly at all early in the period
and the reason was, is that
we were concentrating on
was the thing which was gonna allow us
to completely win the
market down the line.
So if we were able to build
up the largest collection
of professionals together in one place,
it actually kind of didn't matter.
If we got that first, even if we didn't
have the business set up yet,
the people who are already
concentrating on monetizing,
it was gonna be fine.
So basically we were
concentrating on that stuff
and it allowed us to not
take our eye off that ball
and continue to be successful.
What people are looking for,
is are you building something
which will have the asset necessary
for you to dominate the
market down the line.
- Most of our early competitors
at LinkedIn are companies
that don't exist anymore
and they were all focused
on selling the corporations.
- Yup.

Chinese: 
然后，你可以做出更好的决定
例如，发展速度应该多快
资本应该有多少
我们是否应该提前雇佣人员
我们是否应该延后雇佣人员
在你进入规模化阶段时
这类问题就是你需要考虑的问题
- 并且，关于这个问题，LinkedIn的故事中有一个例子
在发展的早期
我们根本就没有怎么关注竞争
其原因是，我们当时所关注的事情是
那些让我们能够
彻底完全赢得市场的事情
因此，如果我们能够在一个地方
聚集最大数量的专业人员
竞争其实就不怎么重要了
如果我们首先做到这点
即使我们还没有业务开展起来
而人们已经开始关注盈利了，这不会有什么问题
因此，基本上，我们当时就着眼于这些东西
并且，这样可允许我们不会分心
然后继续发展，最后获得成功
人们所寻找的是，你是否在建立某些基础
这些基础将为你提供必要的资本
帮助你彻底占领市场
- LinkedIn早期的对手中，绝大多数公司已经消失了
并且，他们当时都在专注于
推销他们的公司
- 是的

Chinese: 
- 好的，那么
我们将快速讨论一下课堂机制
我们将会利用LinkedIn集团
我们将利用Medium的各种资料
并且，我们将会分配一些作业和阅读任务
因此，其具体方式是
我们将给每个人发送一份到LinkedIn集团的邀请
这是我将发布问题的地方
以及思考内容，进行各种讨论
还有，我们将会要求你们每个人
比如，向Sam Altman提出问题
或者回答一些问题
这些问题会与当周的课堂内容或此类内容相关
此外，我们希望大家
这是可选的，但是，我们强烈推荐
将你们在课堂上的一些作品发布到Medium
我们希望这样做，有几个原因
其一，我认为，如果提高可见性
互动性和公开之后，一切都会变得更好
在Peter Thiel的课堂上Blake Master的一些作品
那是两年之前的，我认为，就可以充分说明这一点
因为，如果你有好的作品，你能够写出好的文章
很多好的东西都会慢慢积累起来
因此，这个理念是，对于作品
如果你选择发布在Medium上，我们将会看到你的作业

English: 
- Okay, so, we're gonna, just quickly
about mechanics of the class.
We're gonna use LinkedIn groups,
we're gonna use Medium collections,
and we're gonna have some
assignments and reading.
So the way it's gonna work is we're gonna
send everybody an invitation
to the LinkedIn group.
That's where I'll post questions
and thought things, have discussions.
And we'll ask you each to post
you know, questions for Sam Altman
or answer some questions about
the content of the week
or something like that.
Additionally, we'd like people,
it's optional, but very, very recommended,
to put some of the work
you do in class on Medium.
And the reason we'd like to do that,
number one is I think
everything gets better
with visibility and
interaction and being public.
Some of Blake Master's
work on Peter Thiel's class
two years ago I think is
very, very indicative of this
as if you do good work,
you write good things,
lots of good things accrue.
And so the idea is that for work
if you're opt-in on Medium,
we'll look at your assignments,

Chinese: 
我是说，我会将它们全部发布到合集中 
大家都可以去查阅这些作品
然后，我们还会奖励一些最好的作品
并且通过LinkedIn和Twitter和Facebook
推广该作品等等
因此，我认为，这会让你吸引更多注意力
如果你完成一个好的作品的话，并且
我认为，这是一个很好的良性循环
那么，这大概就是我们运作的方式
并且，在LinkedIn集团里
我们将有更明确的指示
那么，在下一周
我们希望你们阅读3个资料
这些都在LinkedIn集团里面
Paul Graham所写的一篇论文，我之前曾提到
《做一些非规模化的事情》
《创业建议简录》，作者是Sam Altman
其中包括他的所有建议
摘录到一个很好的博客帖子中
然后是《Why Silicon Valley Works》
这就是我们今天的内容
并且，还有
- [Allen]一分钟时间
- [John]还有40秒
好吧，我想，就这样
- 感谢大家第一天来参加，我们很快就会见面
- 谢谢
（课堂鼓掌）

English: 
I mean, we'll post them
all to collections,
they'll all be visible to the public,
but then we'll also curate
some of the best work
and to amplify that work through
LinkedIn and Twitter and
Facebook and what have you,
so I think it'll get you more attention
when you've done good work and that's,
I think, a good, virtuous cycle.
So that's the rough way we're gonna work
and we'll have more explicit instructions
in the LinkedIn group itself.
So these are the three things
we'd like you to read for next week.
This'll be in the LinkedIn group.
One essay by Paul Graham I mentioned,
Do Things That Don't Scale.
Startup Advice, Briefly, by Sam Altman,
which is all of his advice, condensed
into one fantastic blog post.
And then Why Silicon Valley Works.
That's all we have today
and it is
- [Allen] One minute to go!
- [John] 40 seconds to go.
All right, so I think that's it.
- So thanks for the first
day, we'll see you soon.
- Thank you.
(class claps)
