SHIREEN: Hi, everyone.
Welcome, and thank you for joining us for
today's webinar.
My name is Shireen, and I'm moderating today's
conversation, crisis and Uprising in Lebanon,
the roots of the explosion.
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Now it's my pleasure to bring in Rima Majed,
Lara Bitar, and Bassel Salloukh.
Rima Majed is Assistant Professor of Sociology
at the American University, Beirut.
Her research is on social movements and sectarianism
in the Middle East, she has written extensively
on the political economy of sectarianism,
protests and uprisings in Lebanon and Iraq,
structural transformations and unemployment
in post-war Lebanon, and the importance of
labor organization.
She's currently working on a book that looks
at sectarian capitalism in Lebanon.
Lara Bitar is a journalist in Beirut and the
founding editor of The Public Source, a Beirut-based
independent media organization that covers
socio-economic and environmental crises afflicting
Lebanon since the onset of neoliberal governance
in the 1990s and provides political commentary
on events unfolding since October 17th, 2019.
Her work focuses on marginalized communities
and connects their struggles to broader frameworks.
She contributes reports on social movements
and civil unrest to grassroots media projects
in the US and Lebanon and writes for regional
and feminist publications.
Bassel Salloukh is Associate Professor of
Political Science at the Lebanese American
University in Beirut.
He is co-author of the politics of sectarianism
in post-war Lebanon and beyond the Arab spring,
authoritarianism and democratization in the
Arab world.
His current research interests include an
intersectional critique of power sharing arrangements
in post-war states, the philosophy of reconciliation
in divided societies, and Middle East international
relations after the popular uprisings.
Thank you for being here.
I wanted to talk about the explosion that
happened on August 4th, one of the largest
non-nuclear explosions in world history.
It killed hundreds of people and wounded and
displaced thousands.
If you want to tell us how the explosion affected
the city of Beirut, what was popularly understood
to be the causes of the blast, and what was
the response on the streets.
If you could each speak a bit about this to
start us off.
LARA: I was going to take the question on
the street, but Rima, if you want to go ahead...
RIMA: First, thank you to Sean and Danny and
everyone at Haymarket for putting on this
event.
This explosion, as you're saying, it's one
of the biggest non-nuclear explosions in the
history of mankind.
Definitely its effects on the city are huge,
on the residents of the city, but also this
country more broadly.
We're talking about more than 200 killed.
We're talking about 7,000 -- around 7,000
injured.
We're talking about still around 20 people
missing.
But also a capital that -- half of the capital
has been very heavily affected, more than
200,000 homes and shops have been damaged,
glass shattered everywhere, not just in the
capital, but everywhere around the country.
Even in the continent.
This was an explosion that happened in Beirut
and was felt in Cyprus.
This is how big it was.
There are 8,000 buildings damaged, and some
of those were heritage buildings.
It was in the two most gentrified neighborhoods,
if you will.
But there were many other lower class neighborhoods
that were very heavily hit by this blast.
And these are areas that really require attention.
Because these are areas that have many residents
that are refugees or migrant workers or low
wage workers.
And the whole discourse around reconstruction,
although I have many problems with framing
it as reconstruction, there is -- we need
to rethink about: What city do we want?
And reconstruction for whom and by whom?
And in many cases, we see that the aid that
has been coming and how it's been distributed
-- there is some xenophobic and racist discourse
around refugees, benefiting from the aid,
et cetera.
So I think that the risk of falling into nationalist
discourse is something that we need to keep
an eye on.
And that we need to clearly push against.
And explaining and understanding what is happening.
Also, of course, the class dimension and the
sense that of course those areas that are
most gentrified and where most of the pubs
and clubs and nice restaurants of the city
are located were very heavily hit.
But also, other areas around that region.
And I was just thinking today that there's
something almost very sad but also ironical
about...
The state has just reinforced today kind of
a lockdown.
And I'm thinking the area called Karantina,
which comes from the word quarantine.
Because of the quarantine that happened at
the beginning of the 20th Century, during
the pandemic back then.
This is an area that's completely shattered.
This is actually the closest neighborhood
to where the explosion happened.
What does it mean today to call for a lockdown?
When Karantina no longer has any houses that
can be lived in?
So there's this context where the damage of
the explosion is huge.
It's huge in its human cost.
But also in its implication on the city.
On a city that was already extremely tired.
Its residents and the city itself, with almost
a year now of financial freefall.
Mass layoffs.
That have left people unemployed and an economy
that already had a very high rate of unemployment.
An economy that relies very much on exporting
the youth, that relies on remittances, because
it's a dollarized economy.
While the world is diving into an economic
recession, it's very difficult for people
to even leave now.
So there's a very complex picture, in terms
of the social implications of a crisis, a
pandemic, a revolution that is still struggling
against a very harsh counterrevolution, that
we can talk a bit more about in a bit.
But with this explosion, everything was magnified
so much.
And while one would think that this would
be a turning point that would put an end to
this ruling class, we quickly realized that
actually disaster capitalism is at its best
now.
We have very quickly seen how international
countries from around the world have very
quickly interfered, all sorts of navies are
on the shores of Lebanon now.
And we have also seen how real estate companies
have quickly jumped on the scenes of those
very shattered neighborhoods, and trying to
already buy the demolished houses, or affected
houses, that they would want to demolish,
in order to build their high-rises.
So it's a very critical turning point.
The effects on the country are critical, because
it doesn't just happen -- it's not just the
explosion, but it's the compounding effect
of an explosion, a financial -- a very, very
deep financial crisis.
We're talking about a country that has a deficit
of around $100 billion.
The estimates are that the costs -- or the
loss after the explosion is around $10 to
$15 billion.
And it has also hit areas where a lot of businesses
are centered.
So many people have lost their jobs.
Because physically, they're no longer there.
So it's a very detrimental situation.
And I think the effects will keep on unfolding
for, I think, years if not decades.
SHIREEN: Bassel, do you want to talk about
the popular conceptions of who was responsible
for the blast?
BASSEL: I'll pick up from Rima.
A number of issues were underscored by this
explosion.
First of all, you get immediately the feeling
that there is no state in this country.
And the state has no institutional capacity.
I mean, for a country that has been through
civil war and then a whole long period of
reconstruction, and post-war and so on, you
would think that the state has some kind of
ability to manage such a crisis.
And immediately, it was obvious for everyone
that there is really no state response.
And so the Lebanese, as is always the case,
went into survival mode.
I don't know if this is something good or
bad.
I tend to think the latter, actually.
In the sense that people should, after a crisis,
should go through a period of healing, and
not be responsible themselves for doing what
the state does.
So in addition to the failure of state institutions,
there is simply no trust.
In anything that the state does.
And I think this is why this explosion in
many ways connects very directly with the
pathologies and the paralysis of the political
system.
People immediately identified it with all
that is bad in this political system.
And no kind of investigation will be considered
trustworthy by most Lebanese.
Because they simply do not have either the
intentions or the capabilities of the state.
And as Rima was saying, you would think that
such an explosion would shock the political
class.
And the political sectarian elite into doing
something.
Most of them dealt with it as if it's like
any other catastrophe that this country has
experienced.
Or they try to use it for their own narrow
political purposes.
But that is something also that I think is
very troubling about what has happened in
the period immediately after the explosion.
Big crises like these can be moments of healing.
But they are also moments where you see the
real fissures and the visions and how these
are being manipulated in Lebanese society.
And my greatest fear is that trends that had
already been in motion, demands for sectarian
communities to move inwards, for greater movement,
a kind of divorce among what are often considered
to be homogeneous sectarian communities, is
being set in motion by some people.
As Rima was saying, the kind of xenophobia,
but also the kind of hatred that you heard
immediately after the explosion is worrying.
And my greatest fear is that, for many Lebanese,
the location of the explosion, really the
cosmopolitan heart of Beirut, and we should
not minutes words -- an area that is also
majority Christian -- suggests that something
about the Lebanon that we've known in the
last 100 years may be gone.
And this kind of dynamic that had started
before the explosion -- my greatest worry
is that 
it will accelerate in the future.
SHIREEN: Lara?
Do you want to talk about the streets?
Yeah.
LARA: Yeah, for sure.
So in the immediate aftermath of the explosion,
just the next day, what we saw was an army
of volunteers.
A hundred, if not thousands of people went
down to some of the most damaged neighborhoods,
and yes, it should be admitted, like Rima
said, that they predominantly focused on some
of the gentrified neighborhoods.
The neighborhoods that they were most familiar
with.
These were young students.
High school.
University students.
Who came with hard hats.
Brooms.
Had no idea what they were doing.
But they coordinated their efforts together,
and there were small groups of friends who
just took to the street and started clearing
the debris, started going to the homes of
elderly residents, checking up on them, seeing
if they needed anything, trying to supply
them with medicine, with food.
According to the governor of Beirut, and I'm
not sure if this figure is accurate, but 300,000
people who were rendered homeless by the explosion
-- so a lot of the different initiatives were
very quickly established and created to provide
housing for people who no longer had safe
housing.
And all of this work was being done for the
most part by groups that had been established
during October 17.
During the popular Uprising.
And I think that's primarily why the response
was so quick.
And why these groups were so rapidly dispatched.
And part of some of these groups, and immediately
within a couple of hours, there were plans
--
SHIREEN: Sorry, keep going.
LARA: I'm not sure who that question was addressed
to, but it just disappeared.
All of these networks and groups and initiatives
had already been formed.
First during October 17, and then to respond
to the financial crisis, and all of the other
things that have been happening in Lebanon.
For the past year or so.
A good comparison in the US would be Occupy
Sandy, and the way Occupy Sandy responded
to Hurricane Sandy.
I think it was in the Northeast of the US.
And that was, I think, a result of the organizing
and the networks that were established during
Occupy Wall Street.
And something very simple happened here.
And I think it's a blessing in disguise, and
we were lucky that all of these groups had
already been formed, and were ready to be
deployed.
But very quickly, you had a lot of voices
from the Left who were worried that by having
all of these young people cleaning the streets
and basically acting on behalf of the state
that they're absolving the state from its
responsibilities and its duties, and there
was a very big fear that this anger and this
rage that so many of us were feeling was going
to be absorbed by this relief, this relief
work and this aid work.
Now, thankfully, that did not happen.
What I saw, and I think what we witnessed
across the board was: These students that
were already starting to receive some form
of political education since October 17, that
had been engaging in mass student walkouts,
that had been going on strike, that had been
joining demonstrations, that had been confronted
with a lot of challenges, because of the coronavirus,
because of the financial situation, because
of the banks withholding their parents' money
and not being able to pay tuition -- so it
was a continuation of this politicization,
and to a certain extent radicalization of
our youth that ultimately culminated in this
organizing for a Saturday.
It went under many different names.
A Saturday of Rage.
A Saturday of Vengeance.
And there was a demonstration that was organized
shortly after the blast.
I think it was like five days or so.
And it was expected for the state to unleash
all its violence, as it had done over the
past few months.
And it did so, and at the end of the Saturday
demonstration, there were hundreds of people
-- an incredible amount of tear gas was fired,
the security forces were firing directly at
people's faces, a few demonstrators lost their
eyes, and these demonstrations continued for
a few days afterwards.
It's good to note that the state was completely
absent.
It's true.
But at the same time, the security apparatus
of the state was almost omnipresent.
Different security and intelligence agencies
were on the street.
They were either decorative, they were just
standing around, or they were harassing people
who were volunteering.
We heard many cases of questioning people,
asking them what they were doing there, asking
for identification.
Many women were reporting that they were being
sexually harassed by these security forces.
Later on, they tried through the interior
ministry, there was an attempt to regulate
this work, and they were asking international
and local non-governmental organizations to
coordinate the work and to give them notice
of what they were doing and who they are and
where their funding is coming from.
So yes, the state was absent in the relief
efforts.
But the state was everywhere when it came
to intimidate, to harass, and really the moment
is difficult to describe.
Because the entire city was in mourning.
The entire city, it felt like, as if it was
weeping.
And yet you have security and intelligence
agencies coming and filming people, with their
military vehicles, their weapons, and filming
people who were sweeping the street.
That's the overall image, in the first week
to ten days in the immediate aftermath of
the explosion.
RIMA: Can I just jump in to add two points?
One is that I fully agree with what Bassel
and Lara have described.
But I also think that there is something also
to be highlighted, in the sense that the port
-- something about uneven development in Lebanon.
That the port of Beirut is the port through
which more than 70% of our imports come from.
For an economy that has almost no productive
sectors.
So we are -- it's an economy that mainly relies
on the banking sector and the real estate
sector, and that imports everything from wheat
and bread to...
This is why there's been a fear of shortage
of bread.
Which we've been hearing again this week.
So the explosion of the port has also very
clear and dangerous impacts on livelihoods.
The ability to survive and continue in this
country.
So that is on the one hand.
On the other hand, I fully agree that while
state institutions are weak and absent in
many areas, they're very present when it comes
to repressing protest.
And the repression we've seen on the first
Saturday after the explosion was really unbelievable.
And there's something also about that day
-- because it was a few days after the visit
of the French President, who was portrayed
as the savior.
On that day, thousands of tear gas canisters
were thrown as protesters.
These are French tear gas canisters!
So it also says something about imperial powers.
And how it functions here.
And the first thing the state has done after
the explosion is: First they put Beirut under
-- they announced an emergency law in Beirut.
And then the parliament met, and you would
think that an exceptional meeting for the
parliament would deal with the repercussions
of the explosion.
But they had one item on the agenda.
And it was about announcing a state of emergency
in the whole country.
So basically Lebanon is now under the rule
of the military.
And this says a lot about the month -- things
to come, and how the Uprising will continue
to unfold.
Like Bassel, I'm not very optimistic about
how it's going to unfold.
But these are things that we need to know,
in order to set the ground for further discussion.
BASSEL: Can I add one more idea, before we
leave the port issue?
Because I think there is also -- I mean, the
port is very symbolic of the political economy
of corruption in Lebanon.
As Rima was saying, 80% of what we consume
is imported.
And 70% of what we import is through the port
of Beirut.
Now, what's interesting in the past decade
-- the one place where you see the different
sectarian political parties coexist in a lovely
manner is in the port.
Because that's where -- it's like big chunks
of it is a no man's land.
And that's where they agree on the distribution
of the spoils.
In fact, for a country that -- your consumption,
80% of your consumption is from imports, and
for a place, a site from which you import
70%, in one year, according to one MP, the
port of Beirut did not bring to the state
any revenues.
Assuming we didn't import anything.
So then the question is raised: Where did
the money go?
Where did the customs revenue go?
And so I think if you want to see a good example
of the political economy of corruption, in
the post-war period, it was the port.
And now these people who used to make their
livelihood from this mechanism are actually
worried.
Because they believe that in any future port,
there will be some kind of international monitoring
of the port.
So it symbolizes many things about the kind
of situation we've had in the post-war period.
SHIREEN: I don't know if we want to talk more
about the explosion itself?
We can keep coming back to it.
But I did want to spend a good amount of time
on the backdrop.
Which is -- for the past -- almost a year,
ten months now, there's been the Uprising.
The October Revolution in Lebanon.
That started last October.
Which was -- it's been the largest Uprising
in Lebanon's history.
It's brought out a large percentage of the
country's population into the streets.
And even though the protests have risen and
fallen, they keep returning to the streets,
basically.
So my question is: What has sustained this
movement for so long?
And if you each want to speak for five to
ten minutes about that, again...
RIMA: The movement, the Uprising, is still
at its early stages.
And I think it will continue for a long time.
It's a process.
And it is a process that has started -- one
can argue -- since December 2010 or 2011,
with the Arab Uprisings.
But it also has a root that preceded that
in Lebanon.
So yes, and we've seen how the movement went
through ups and downs, with the revolution
-- very quickly met with a counterrevolution.
The efforts at sectarianization, repression,
also co-optation from some parties.
The difficulties of organizing while the Uprising
had already started.
So it started as a social explosion.
That needed to be challenged politically.
And I think this is where we are -- this is
the dilemma of today.
How do we transform the anger?
It has moved from an initial movement that
was calling for the downfall or the toppling
of the regime.
That was calling for accountability, that
was against corruption.
That was against all of them, with the slogan
(speaking Arabic) to what we have seen in
the past two weeks, which is saying: We don't
want accountability anymore.
We want revenge.
And this is what the explosion has really
brought out.
This anger and this feeling that we don't
believe in any channel anymore.
We don't believe in the ability to go through
a process or a transition.
It became very much a matter of survival and
revenge.
And because it read as a war that has been
waged against us, first economically, but
then it also became about security.
Literally, I mean, we've been blown up in
our homes.
So I think there's the transition here that
is going to affect how the movement will transform.
But also, it's an Uprising that will go through
many stages.
It's an Uprising that is clear in what it
doesn't want.
Not yet very clear in what it wants.
Because it wants many things, and within the
movement, we have many currents.
The more liberal, the more radical, the leftist,
et cetera.
There have been many efforts since October.
A big debate is whether we need to unify the
groups or to actually divide.
To unify amongst those who are closer politically.
Can we unify?
Can we have an alliance with the radical left,
with the liberals, or is it better if they
organize and mobilize you separately?
There's a lot of time and effort that is being
put on organizing internally.
There is a lot of time put on drafting political
papers and discussing these documents.
Which is important.
Right?
But at the same time, there are political
moments and political opportunities that sometimes
need to be grasped.
And this is when you wish there is a vanguard
that would take over and act to overthrow.
But we don't have it.
We're not there.
I think that specifically for this audience,
the left in Lebanon is unfortunately weak.
It's not well organized.
There are many divisions internally.
So it's unlikely -- and if anyone really grasps
this moment, it would just be one step in
this longer historical unfolding of this Uprising.
Because those who are more organized are not
exactly those who will bring about social
justice, necessarily.
But we've seen many efforts, and we've seen
-- there's more than 120 groups that were
born after this initial spark of the revolution.
Many of those groups are very small.
Sometimes they have a big presence online,
but on the ground, they're very small groups.
And the effort is really about -- I think
the challenge is really about -- now there's
a question of representation.
Who represents the street.
Who represents these different groups.
But we're very trapped in this paradigm of
participatory democracy, et cetera.
Which is all great.
There's a big focus on leaderless movements.
I dare say unfortunately a feature of new
social movements.
That is taking away a lot of the efforts and
reflecting internally on how we do what we're
doing, rather than analyzing politically the
material conditions around us.
And trying to grasp those opportunities when
we can.
Of course, it's very important to organize.
And again, there's been efforts at organizing
unions, efforts at organizing migrant workers.
Organizing politically around different ideas.
And it's interesting.
It's shifted from a big social explosion that
is focused in the squares of the different
regions of the country, but then it became
targeted mobilizations against specific institutions.
Whether it's private companies, or state institutions,
and then we've seen how it was the students
who have -- it became about schools and universities.
So we've seen how this has been transforming,
in terms of tactics, and in terms of targets.
One very interesting thing about the Uprising
also is how, in the absence of a labor movement
that has been systematically co-opted since
the mid-'90s in Lebanon, people were somehow
aware and knew that at the core of this, it's
a matter of stopping labor or the engine of
production somehow.
Or accumulation.
And because we were unable to enforce a strike,
it was roadblocks.
And to me, these are equal to strikes.
Because people were actually blocking roads
and burning tires to shut down the country.
And by shutting down the country, it meant
no one goes to work.
No one -- so it is a kind of -- it's a different
way of doing strikes.
These tactics are all very important to understand
how things might unfold.
And we've seen that everyone knew when we
were expecting that with the deepening of
the financial crisis there would be more layoffs
and more unemployment, or underemployment,
and we've already started to see this with
some universities.
The biggest employer in this country after
the state is the university.
That has laid off 850 workers in one day.
But we have also seen the weaknesses of organizing
there.
The inability to strike.
And the politics of what Lauren Berlant calls
"a cruel optimism", people thinking that -- if
I don't mobilize, maybe I can keep my job
or go back to my job.
Or people just feeling thankful that they
still have a job, even if their salary is
now worth -- we've lost more than 80% of our
purchasing power.
But there are all these considerations that
make it difficult for organization.
And on top of that, I think this is at the
labor level -- but at also the political level,
we know that safety or security is the main
issue.
And people are really scared.
This is a country where we're ruled by -- this
is Mafia rule.
Militias are still around.
People know that.
We've seen cases where people have been targeted
by the thugs of those militias.
So it also becomes about -- there is serious
fear about safety.
And Lebanon and Iraq are very close to each
other in their makeup, and also on the geopolitical
scene.
What we're seeing in Iraq just yesterday -- is
something that I would not be surprised at
all if we start seeing more of that in Lebanon.
Assassination.
Targeted assassination.
Killing or attacks against activists, et cetera.
And I think people are aware and know that.
And this is why organizing or being prepared
for this struggle -- this is not a struggle
that is going to be peaceful, unfortunately.
Not because we are happy with blood.
Not because we are not peaceful and we're
violent.
But because it's a very violent system.
That is not going to let us get away without
it being very violent against us.
SHIREEN: Bassel, do you want to talk a little
bit about the movement from an economic lens?
BASSEL: Yeah.
I mean, from an economic perspective, given
how bad the situation is, you would expect
greater numbers of people in the street all
the time.
As Rima was saying.
In our -- 80% of our purchasing power has
evaporated.
And so whether 17 October onwards -- 17 October
was the explosion, the explosion of real economic,
socio-economic anger and deprivations, and
of course, immediately, the sectarian parties,
some of them, gave it a week to defuse -- try
to free ride it, and so on.
But the questions that I keep asking myself,
and I think this is important for your audience,
is: How come decades of socio-economic crisis,
peaking now with the overlapping economic,
financial, banking, environmental, and now
with this disaster -- I mean, as a Latin-American
scholar once put it: Where are all the protesters?
You would expect much more people.
And I think that's where Gramsci comes in.
Particularly for your audience.
You always need to link structure with ideology
This is really the genius of the Lebanese
sectarian system.
Whereby it's very successful in creating this
sectarian ideological hegemony.
Which is built on a particular political economy.
What myself and others, Bowman, called the
political economy of sectarianism.
But what is interesting is that this political
economy is in crisis.
And yet you see the sectarian parties able
to continue.
If they wanted to send people to the street,
they would enable anyone, but that is why
this is important.
We should not speak of demonstrations as if
it is something natural.
That comes as a result of socio-economic problems
and political problems.
But the question that I keep asking myself:
What's happening on the other side?
The technology of the socio-economic system
in Lebanon was so effective, from the 1990s
and onwards, that it was very good at destroying
any alternative avenues for oppositional movement.
The labor movement, whatever we call the left,
and so on -- so you are in this conundrum
now, whereby sectarian parties, despite the
economic crisis, are still very strong.
Coercively.
They're strong ideologically.
And I'm bringing Gramsci, because he's very
important here.
The other side, in their multiplicity and
their diversity, they're being asked to organize
in a situation of crisis.
And they're being asked to do in one year
what it took the sectarian system almost 100
years to achieve.
This is why we have to link political economy
with ideology.
We have to remember that the sectarian system
remains very powerful.
And it can use an array of techniques.
Ideological.
Coercive.
What have you.
And that is the problem that we find ourselves
in now.
That despite this massive economic crisis,
the guys on the other side feel that they
are stronger.
And that they can continue to sustain themselves.
SHIREEN: Yeah, that's very helpful, Bassel.
Thank you.
Lara, I don't know if you want to talk a little
bit more about this question.
How the movement has sort of taken on new
dimensions, as Rima said, from 2011 to now,
basically.
LARA: Yeah, sure.
I'll start where Bassel ended.
The bad guys think that they're stronger after
the explosion.
But something that's been really interesting
to me is that a lot of the grassroots organizing
and the various leftist groups and feminist
groups and student groups managed to kind
of shake off some of the shock that we all
experienced after the explosion.
And do a lot of organizing underground.
To agitate ahead of the Saturday demonstration.
To distribute propaganda.
There were several car convoys that were going
around.
Well, granted, a commonly echoed sentiment
is that now is time for the gallows.
But at the same time, there was also this
sense that we don't only want to execute people
and those who are responsible for the blast.
Ultimately, street justice is not effective.
There was a strong demand from particular
groups for, one, accountability, and two,
justice for the victims.
So three days after the blast, a group of
some of these different leftist groups as
well put out a statement, and I just want
to briefly read some excerpts that I translated.
Not word-for-word.
But just to give your audience that I think
might be interested in some of this resistance
that's now happening on the ground -- and
some of the sentiment with this organizing
that's happening as well.
So it reads, quote: On August 4, 2020, the
authorities admitted to their criminality
when they declared a state of emergency.
Declaring a state of emergency is akin to
declaring war on those who survived, and a
declaration of a growing police state.
On August 4, 2020, the authorities declared
war on us, and we declared the start of a
battle for liberation.
October 17 is no more.
We won't make demands anymore.
We will struggle to liberate our city from
its occupiers.
We will struggle to liberate the money of
small depositors from the banks, liberate
people from the corruption of these occupiers,
and ultimately to liberate ourselves from
the system.
And this is a reference to something that
the Lebanese President had said early on in
the demonstrations.
Addressing protesters, he simply said: If
you don't like it, you can emigrate.
So the statement reads: On August 4, 2020,
the battle for your departure, not ours, has
started.
And then there was an alternative media platform
called Propaganda, who was also agitating
for these protests.
They had this illustration: We will drag you
over the scattered glass of Beirut.
So there is this feeling that now is the time
for vengeance.
But also a lot of the unseen is this underground
organizing that's happening between a lot
of different groups who share a political
vision.
Rima raised the point of whether or not the
radical left or the left more broadly should
be in bed with liberals.
I think learning from what has happened over
the past ten years, I think that would be
a mistake, to kind of compromise and be in
an alliance or network of sorts with liberals.
But to answer directly the question, I think
what has sustained this Uprising is a never-ending
onslaught of calamities.
And obviously the latest of which was the
explosion at the port.
But for a little bit of context of what was
happening before October 17, because October
17 is often described as this explosion, as
this eruption of fury and anger, but this
was in the making for at least a couple of
years.
When the parliamentary elections were last
held in May of 2018, and these parliamentary
elections, after having been postponed for
many, many years, for bullshit reasons, frankly...
And the results of these elections came out
as they were expected, despite a reformed
editorial law that was in theory supposed
to give independent candidates a shot -- but
the same old faces reemerged, and after the
elections, over the coming months, the economic
situation started deteriorating.
And that's when protests started towards the
end of 2018.
And they were in small pockets all around
the country, every other day, there was a
different sector that was demonstrating, whether
it was retired servicemen fighting for their
pensions, public sector employees demanding
wage raises, and we had starting early in
2019 these one-day strikes also by various
sectors.
So October was the culmination of almost two
years of mobilizations on a small-scale.
And of course there's a rich and important
history of organizing that precedes 2010.
But if we want to look just at the last decade,
at the start of the Arab Uprisings, in Lebanon,
there are two moments that we can pause at.
And that the October 17 moment builds on.
The first of course being 2011, which were
demonstrations against the sectarian political
system in Lebanon, and the second one, 2015,
what was initially dubbed the "antigarbage
protests" eventually grew to become antigovernment
protests that tackled all aspects of -- whether
it's government corruption, abuse of power,
and so on and so forth.
So I think it's important to understand that
October 17 is just a continuation of these
two mobilizations, and mobilizations and organizing
that had been happening for decades, despite
the suppression of labor movements, suppression
of protest in general, in Lebanon.
In October 2019, what was really fascinating
to me was how much the political discourse
had grown and had matured.
And in particular, in the first ten days or
in the first two weeks of October 17, I was
really taken by how much -- how radicalized
-- at least seemingly -- Lebanese society
had become.
On these roadblocks, that usually drivers
would complain about, we would be on a roadblock,
and drivers would thank us.
And say: (speaking Arabic) thank you so much.
Even though it was disrupting the flow of
traffic.
It was disrupting their work.
But there was a general sense that now is
the time to do something.
Despite the inconveniences on an individual
level.
So it seemed, at least in the first few weeks,
that there was acceptance for direct action.
There was a sustained general strike for about
10 days or so, shortly after October 17.
I think it started on October 21st.
So there was this really newfound radicalization
that I witnessed at the beginning of October
17.
That was interesting, and that builds on what
we had seen in the last decade or so.
SHIREEN: Yeah.
I want to take a little bit of a step back.
Maybe we can step back to explain to an audience
that isn't familiar very much with the Lebanese
political system -- I think it was very helpful,
Bassel, when you talked about Gramsci and
the sectarian system -- but can you all explain
a little bit more about how the sectarian
system works?
Just because I know a lot of the audience
is not that familiar with Lebanon.
I know, Rima, you have used the term sectarian
capitalism.
So maybe explaining a little bit about why
you use that term, and then talking about
how -- just give a broader picture of how
that works.
I think you're muted.
RIMA: Can you hear me now?
Okay.
Great.
Yeah.
So I've been thinking and trying to write
recently about the concept of sectarian capitalism,
and obviously I'm in conversation with the
literature and the theories on racial capitalism.
Not just to borrow and reproduce the same
theory here.
But it's really about: How do we get beyond
the exceptionalism of the Middle East when
we talk about sectarianism?
But also the exceptionalism of the US when
we talk about race?
And how do we think about identitarian politics,
or the politics of identity, and its links
with capitalism?
At the core of this, it's really about thinking
of both sectarianism, racism, but also patriarchy,
communalism in other parts of the world, and
all these types of identity divisions as an
engine of capitalism.
And in my case, thinking about the centrality
of sectarianism for the rise of capitalism
in the late 19th Century, Mount Lebanon, and
there are some excellent historical accounts
that have already shown us how there's this
link between the rise in political sectarianism
or the sectarianization or the politicalization
of sectarian difference and the rise of capitalism
in this part of the world.
But what I'm trying to also look at is not
just how it emerged, but also how it developed
and metamorphosed with time.
And therefore what do we make of sectarian
neoliberalism more specifically?
And how is neoliberalism interacting with
-- or really how is sectarianism at the heart
of neoliberalism?
And this is not to say that neoliberalism
or capitalism would not exist if we don't
have sectarianism.
Right?
There would be other sorts of divisions that
would be exploited.
But it's really to think about how those identity
divisions are used, beyond the idea of just
homogeneous groups that are oppressing and
exploiting each other -- because in this case
-- and I think the case of sectarianism can
also be very enlightening to think about -- racism.
Because this is a case where the hierarchy
is not as clear.
Right?
The divisions are not as clear.
And therefore thinking about race and kind
of its fluidity, and race beyond the categories
themselves...
And how it interacts with class and with accumulation
of capital...
Is very useful in this case.
Because we see that it's not just about intersectarian
exploitation or division.
It's not about the class sect.
It's not about all the Shias are poor and
exploited.
But it's very much about also intrasectarian
exploitation, or cross-sectarian alliances
of class.
So it's about this complex picture, where
beyond saying that all debates were about
-- whether it is sectarian or it's not sectarian.
So it's either a class struggle or a sectarian
conflict.
You know, and now we're starting -- myself
and many others, I think -- to think about
-- well, it's both.
And how do they feed them to each other?
And what are these processes that unfold with
neoliberalism?
And how is sectarianism or sectarianization
shifting to benefit neoliberalism and the
accumulation of capital?
So I'm focused on that aspect because there's
been a lot written about the institutionalization
of sectarianism in the region.
And of course, this is an important history,
the history of colonialism.
And the institutionalization of identity politics.
Power sharing.
And this idea of the deeply divided society
paradigm.
As if there are societies around the world
that are shallowly divided.
As if class division is not deep or gender
divisions are not deep enough.
And then there is the history on the political
economy of Lebanon.
The centrality of the banking sector and the
financial sector.
But there isn't a lot of work that merges
these two literatures together.
So I'm trying in this book project to do that.
And to also think about change and shift and
the salience of sectarian boundaries and sectarian
-- but also the content of those groups, beyond
the groupism of using sects as the basis for
sectarianism.
So this is on the one hand.
On the other hand, an important aspect to
understand sectarianism and why we talk about
sectarianism.
The elites use sectarianism for obvious reasons.
But then why do people follow, right?
And here comes, as Bassel was saying, the
importance of ideology.
But then also the way clientelism works, and
there's a lot written and a lot of very important
work on clientelism, some of Bassel's work,
in the sense of -- non-state welfare, if you
wish.
So there is a clear -- the state has been
-- state institutions have been weakened.
There's no welfare state in Lebanon.
And the only way people can access services
or benefits or help is by going through those
sectarian leaders.
And in many cases, not even the sectarian
leaders.
This is a system that is very, very strong
at the neighborhood level.
So it's those in charge of neighborhoods for
each political party -- that really, if you
want, divide the spoils.
Not to everyone, of course.
And so it's not a non-state welfare that is
equal and that is just.
It's one that reproduces -- or sectarianizes,
in order to be used in not just electoral
politics, but also everyday politics.
And this is where I think there's another
aspect of clientelism that we should also
look at.
And that is -- again, security.
And safety.
Because in many cases, what those parties
are using -- they promise sometimes financial
or material help, but in many cases, it's
also about giving you backing or protecting
you.
Or it could be positive rewards.
It could also be a negative sanction by threatening
you, by actually not giving you electricity,
for example.
And we've heard a lot of stories about people
who have participated in the Uprising, and
who were clearly attacked at the neighborhood
level.
Where they reside.
Because of their participation.
Where they were excluded from some services,
where they were on purpose targeted, because
of that.
And this is why it's a very complex system.
These parties also have their institutions.
They have their hospitals, their schools,
their universities, et cetera.
So I think that, yes, sectarianism is a whole
system.
And it created -- it's structures, but also,
it's culture.
And this is why it reproduces itself.
And it's a system that is strong.
But I also don't think that it's a system
that is impossible to topple.
It's also a system that relies very much on
geopolitics and relationships with countries
abroad or regional, international forces.
And we've seen in this past year that there
has been many holes in the system that one
could have used.
And we have seen that the system is sometimes
cornered.
So we've seen its fragility, sometimes.
But it's very quick as reproducing itself.
And since 2011, it became very clear -- and
even before.
But for example, the municipal elections after
the 2015 movement, we've seen how in Beirut,
all political parties, those who have been
against each other for decades, who have fought
against each other, they all ran on the same
list together.
Against what was then called "civil society".
So their class awareness is very high.
And maybe one way for us to fight them is
for us to also work on our class awareness.
And that is not just about an us-versus-them
that is loose, but really about labor relations,
class relations, and what it means in this
broader struggle.
That has been unleashed in Lebanon, since
October 2019.
SHIREEN: Yeah.
BASSEL: Can I add something, Shireen?
SHIREEN: Oh, please, yeah.
BASSEL: I think for your audience, it's quite
interesting to know why what's happening in
Lebanon is different from, say, the politics
of multiculturalism or interculturalism in
North America and Europe.
If you look at Lebanon from Europe or North
America, you say: What's the problem with
sectarian identities?
I mean, let everybody celebrate their own
identities.
Power sharing works in some places.
So why doesn't it work in Lebanon?
I think just sort of background for your audience:
I mean, the problem in Lebanon is that the
sectarian system after going through a period
where it was necessary to establish some kind
of agreement on what is really a state that
was created by colonial fiat...
Now, with all the intersectional elements
it has, the violence against women, the violence
against minorities, the violence against regions,
the violence against the poor and so on...
Sectarian identities now are being imposed.
And recreated.
And reproduced, if you like.
Through the kind of complicated machinery
that Rima was talking about.
So it's very important for your audience to
know that there are multiple struggles going
on in Lebanon at the same time.
Now, I think that is part of the problems
that Lara was talking about, and Rima.
One struggle is inside the sectarian political
parties.
Meaning those who want to impose -- and this
is the analogy with Iraq -- in fact, in many
ways, Iraq is a later day Lebanon.
I mean, what's happening in Iraq today, we
went through it in the 1980s in Lebanon.
So on one side, you have those who want to
impose one identity and one identity only.
And that is the sectarian identity.
And they will use violence to impose that
identity.
There's a struggle inside that sectarian system.
Around the balance of power, inside that system.
The other struggle in the country, and this
is the one that we saw emerging beautifully
on the 17th of October, is between all those
who still believe that for ideological reasons,
material reasons, what have you, the sectarian
system represents them, and between all those
who just do not accept that this system has
any more validity.
And they are searching for something new.
And again, I don't want to repeat what was
said earlier.
The problem is that you are trying now to
create a new system, which should look the
exact opposite of the one that has been established.
Again, to come back to Gramsci.
The old is dead.
The new has yet to be born.
This is the age of zombies.
And all the abnormalities that we are living
through in Lebanon is in great measure a consequence
of this struggle.
SHIREEN: Yeah.
Let's see.
I was thinking maybe to put more context into
the gallows and the demand for vengeance.
It's because even though the Uprising has
taken down Hariri, et cetera, you see this
rotating ruling class, that people find responsible,
because for the explosion -- they didn't bother
to mention over 7 years that there was 2700
tons of nitrate in this building.
But it's also -- I mean, the connection to
the sectarian system is clear when people
are saying: We're the popular revolution.
You're the civil war.
You're the sectarian civil war.
And so those are -- the new lines that are
drawn more on class and the separation from
-- the desire to separate from the previous
sectarian system, I guess.
There's so much more to cover.
I guess if you guys could speak more about
the regional and international dimensions
of this crisis...
For example, what should internationalists
and socialists globally know, and how should
they agitate to support the protesters in
Lebanon, who are in worse economic conditions
and continue to go out in the streets?
Bassel, I don't know if you want to start
this one off?
BASSEL: Well, I'll start.
I'll give it a shot.
I think what they should know is that this
is not a simple colonial-anticolonial/imperial-antiimperial
struggle.
What they should know is -- again, as Gramsci,
as Edward Said used to remind us all the time:
You're either with truth and justice, freedom,
democracy everywhere, or you're not.
You cannot pick and choose.
And I think that's very important to understand.
The choices that some of the political actors
make in Lebanon.
The other thing, I think, which is very important
-- in terms of the Lebanese, they ask for
a community, and the Lebanese internationalists,
if you like -- there's a lot of support.
But the other thing, I think, the lesson that
can be taken from Lebanon, as Rima was saying,
is going back to politics.
I hate to use this word.
But in the classical sense of politics.
That is: Organization.
Long-term organization.
A kind of Hannah Arendt Agonistic understanding
of politics.
That is: There are no half truths.
To borrow from Max Weber: Struggle is not
a tax you can stop at any corner.
You have to stay with it all the time.
Lebanon now also, from a kind of international
perspective, we are really in a very different
situation.
People who are trying to make change in this
country.
And this is because of the international and
geopolitical spotlight on the country.
What is the role of the international community?
It's the elephant in the room today.
In the sense that a lot of people who want
change in Lebanon feel that it cannot be done
without the help from the external actors.
The problem is that external actors seem to
be divided between those who want to reproduce
the system, which is to say, reproduce the
sectarian system, and those who want to tweak
it in their own favor.
And so the choices for those struggling in
Lebanon to change the system are not easy.
They are very messy.
They become very complicated.
And they are not binaries.
You know, I'm anticolonial or what have you.
It's a very complicated situation.
And I think for your audience...
Again, one's position on Israel is not enough.
One's position on imperialism is not enough.
What's much more important is to focus on:
Well, what's your position on the right of
minority groups, the right of women, the right
for freedom, democracy, in Lebanon, in Iraq,
and so on?
So it's a very complicated situation.
RIMA: Maybe I'll add a few points here.
I think there's been a lot of support from
the Lebanese diaspora, but also from people
around the world, in terms of donations, in
terms of aid, humanitarian improvement, and
that is great.
But I think what we need now -- you know,
maybe more than charity, although we need
the support -- is solidarity.
And solidarity in the political sense.
And why am I saying that?
Because I think that what happened in Lebanon,
this explosion, and the aftermath of it, and
the fact that all countries from the US to
France to Russia to Turkey to Iran and of
course Israel are all now meddling with the
-- the politics of the aftermath of the explosion
-- is very much about: How are they going
to divide the pie.
Right?
Wanting a hegemony over the region is very
much about the resources.
It's very much about who will control the
port.
Who will control the electricity.
So in that sense, as I said at the beginning,
it's disaster capitalism.
And this is nothing peculiar to Lebanon.
It happened in Lebanon.
It could have happened anywhere else.
We've seen it in other places.
So the struggles here are not detached from
the struggles elsewhere.
These are really global struggles against
capitalism.
But also against what we -- as we've seen
in Syria, authoritarianism as well.
And the system in Lebanon that is called consociational
democracy has nothing to do with democracy.
It is an authoritarian system.
But this is really to say for an internationalist
response to this -- is about politicizing
the response to what happens in Lebanon, and
reading it from this lens of a global crisis.
And the fact that it happened in Lebanon is
-- one can understand the reasons why Lebanon.
But it doesn't prevent it happening anywhere
else.
And we have already seen it.
And I think we'll continue to see how disaster
capitalism will unfold in many parts of the
world.
And saying that we need to politicize our
solidarity -- this is also about pressuring
where you are.
Right?
Pressuring your own governments.
Organizing where you are.
And linking those struggles together.
For us also, all these states and state leaders
work together.
They meet and they concoct -- they're sitting
now in secret meetings, cooking what they
will feed us next in this region.
Maybe we should do the same.
We should connect more with each other.
We should build more, our solidarity networks.
We should work more to understand together
how global capitalism is unfolding in different
places.
And what it means for all of us.
And you know, sometimes pressuring in one
place in the world can have a lot of effect
in another place of the world.
So with the elections coming up in the US,
it's very much about who is also going to
become President in the US.
Right?
It's very much also about where your tax money
is going.
And I think in that sense, it's our duty everywhere
to struggle.
Because it's a system that is linked globally,
and it's difficult to imagine socialism in
one country, detached from the rest of the
world.
It's a global struggle.
And by broadening our networks, working more
together, strengthening our organization,
that we really support protesters in Lebanon
and protesters around the world, from Belarus
to Chile.
SHIREEN: I wanted to turn to you, Lara.
I know you've been involved in a lot of really
exciting work on the ground in the Uprising.
Specifically with media justice work.
So if you could talk about the role of left
wing media in the Uprising.
I know you've been involved in several Megaphone
-- and the publication you co-founded -- The
Public Source.
Sorry.
Megaphone is another online publication from
Lebanon.
Could you speak about that work?
LARA: Yeah, absolutely.
I just want to very briefly touch on the question
that you asked earlier.
About how folks abroad can be in solidarity
with the ongoing struggle in Lebanon.
I have this great fear, and I see these so-called
antiimperialists already roaming around our
corpses.
And seeing this as an opportunity to either
further their agendas or to get a book deal.
And so on.
So my one word on that is: Don't repeat what's
ongoing right now in Syria and Lebanon.
And I think there's a very high likelihood
that it's gonna happen.
Because I already see it happening.
Heed the call of local organizers.
Build networks with people who are on the
ground and share your politics.
Be in constant communication.
Let others who are here and who understand
the situation and who are struggling and who
are doing so at a great expense to their lives,
to their eyes, their bodies, their livelihoods,
let them lead.
And just basically follow their lead.
So media...
Generally, journalism is in crisis.
Not just in Lebanon, but around the world.
That precedes October 17, and has been ongoing
for many, many years.
Ownership of media organizations in Lebanon
are concentrated in a handful of wealthy families.
I think there's about 12 families who control
the media landscape in Lebanon.
So it's very hard to be able to reach wider
audiences if you're an independent media platform
or an activist platform.
But over the past few years, there's been
several media initiatives that have been very
successful and that have managed to share
information, verify what's happening on the
ground, Akhbar al-Saha, for example, that
wasn't founded in 2019, but in 2015, during
the antigarbage protest, and has been ongoing
and has grown exponentially over the past
few months -- I think they have about 100,000
followers on Facebook.
And they're now viewed as a trustworthy news
organization.
And as far as I know, it's run by a bunch
of volunteers.
So that's one noticeable example of media
activists who are on the ground.
And who are reporting on what's happening
firsthand.
And not relying on TV channels or the mainstream
press for information.
And oftentimes, they're much faster at relaying
what's happening.
And much faster at verifying or debunking
allegedly what's happening than mainstream
platforms.
Megaphone is also another media initiative.
And I think it's been in existence for the
past three years, I think.
Or maybe four years.
And what they've been doing is actually quite
remarkable.
There are also a bunch of volunteers.
I think there's about 30 of them or so.
And they respond to the news.
So they provide very quick updates with commentary.
Sometimes quite forceful commentary.
Very political.
That informs what's happening, but also serves
as a tool to mobilize and to organize people
who might be at home and be reluctant to join.
So I'll briefly talk about The Public Source,
which was launched at the beginning of this
year.
So we've been out for about six months or
so.
The initial idea behind The Public Source
was to focus solely on in-depth and long form
journalism.
We really wanted to address the social, economic,
environmental crises that Lebanon has been
facing for the past three decades.
So when the idea for the publication was initially
conceived, a few months before the October
Uprising, we knew that there was going to
be planned austerity measures, the looming
financial crisis, all of these things were
expected to cause a lot of disturbances, a
lot of chaos.
We kind of anticipated that there was going
to be some form of resistance.
Of course, we never anticipated that it was
going to be in the form of a popular Uprising.
But we wanted to be able to create a media
organization, one, that is independent and
that is focused on investigative journalism.
Of course, while there are several investigative
units, most prominently the one affiliated
to Aljadeed, that has been doing really good
work, we wanted to establish an organization
that is truly independent from the political
agendas of the different parties that control
the media in Lebanon.
We wanted to at least attempt to name the
individuals who are responsible for the catastrophic
state of affairs right now.
And more importantly, try to pinpoint who
is benefiting from all of these crises, ongoing
for many years.
So on our platform, we are attempting to support
a culture of whistleblowing.
We have -- the only whistleblowing platform
that's tied to a media organization in Lebanon.
One of a handful around the Arab world.
It means "leak".
We have a couple of different tools on there,
where potential whistleblowers can contact
us safely, securely, and anonymously.
And we launched the platform with dispatches
from the October revolution.
So we're providing commentary, analysis, reflections
from the street, from people who have a stake
in the struggle.
So we don't have a huge output, and we're
not putting stuff out on a daily basis.
But there's a lot of reflection and thought
behind the pieces that we commission.
We're very selective about who we work with.
We're interested in primarily commissioning
articles by people who have been in different
struggles for a long time.
And we're very conscientious of whose voices
we elevate.
And maybe by extension, whose voices we don't.
And I'm sorry if I took too much time.
But the last thing I want to say about The
Public Source, because we're trying to build
this media organization not just to be an
independent platform for a certain kind of
journalism, but our organizational structure
is very important to us.
So we run a non-hierarchical structure, equal
decision making among all the members of the
collective.
We're very transparent about where we get
our funding from.
How our funding is allocated to different
members of the Collective.
And we're gonna launch in a couple of days
an internship program, which as far as I know
is the only paid media internship program
in the country.
And also we're very conscientious that labor
should be compensated.
And we compensate members of the Collective,
obviously.
But also everyone we work with.
And in particular, our interns.
Who will be doing meaningful work.
Who we hope we are able to train them to become
investigative journalists and stick around
in this profession.
SHIREEN: Yeah, and you mentioned -- oh, I'm
sorry.
You mentioned to me how The Public Source
and the other media outlets are really helping
to agitate people into the streets.
In this moment.
In new ways.
That haven't been --
LARA: Yeah, in new ways.
I see Megaphone and The Public Source to a
certain extent complementary.
The Megaphone is doing quick dispatches of
what's happening, reporting from the ground.
They have a ton of stuff that's coming out
on a daily basis.
We have long form, in-depth kind of analysis.
And trying to kind of position where we are
and try to understand this very crucial moment
that we now found ourselves in.
SHIREEN: Yeah.
So we only have a few minutes left.
I feel like there's so much more to get in
depth on.
I know one thing that's -- there's a lot of
confusion about in the West, I think, is the
role of Hezbollah.
I know it's either seen as a uniquely right
wing terrorist organization or, on the other
hand, it's seen, as you guys were alluding
to, an antiimperialist, antistate, by some
people -- usually in the Western Left -- so
maybe if we could talk a little bit about
what is Hezbollah's role in Lebanon itself,
and how protesters navigate their role in
the movement?
I don't know if Rima wants to tackle that.
Or anybody else.
RIMA: Yeah.
I'm happy to do that.
Well, as you rightly point out, Hezbollah
is not an antiimperialist party.
Hezbollah is a party that was born out of
the Iranian Islamic Revolution.
It's very much linked to the Iranian state.
And is today the strongest party in the country.
Because it has -- militarily, it's the strongest,
but also, politically, it entered the political
life through institutions after 2005.
And its alliance with the party of the president
of the republic, the FPM, made this camp,
politically, the strongest in the country.
They also control most of the main institutions
and also the borders.
So Lebanon has just two borders.
One with Occupied Palestine, Israel, and the
other is with the Syrian state.
Hezbollah also occupies the airport.
Allegedly the port that exploded.
Or at least it divides its control over the
port with other parties.
But it's a party that has a lot of influence
internally.
It's a party unlike what they like to say
-- that they've never used their arm internally.
They have used their arms internally, repeatedly,
actually, since their very start, during the
civil war.
They used their arms internally.
But they've continued to do that in 2008.
They did that in May, 2008.
And just yesterday, we've seen clashes, intra-Shia
clashes, if you want.
In some villages.
So in that sense, Hezbollah is a party that
is playing -- that is taking a side in those
bigger imperial struggles in the region.
It is clearly a political arm of Iran and
Lebanon.
And in that sense, yes, it has played an important
role as a resistance movement in liberating
the South of Lebanon, but it's also important
to know that the resistance in the South had
started way before Hezbollah was even created.
And what Hezbollah has actually done is it's
monopolized resistance against Israel.
And sectarianized it.
So in that sense, it is definitely not a progressive
force.
It's one that has also been very oppressive
internally, with any opponents.
And they're no longer guerilla warfare.
It's a party represented in all state institutions.
It's part of the Mafia rule.
It controls areas -- it controls borders.
It smuggles goods.
It has its own economy.
It has its own army.
It's really a very strong party, and it is
also one that is playing the game with everyone
else.
They sit on the negotiation table.
They sat with the French President, they are
bargaining.
And they're using the stick of the Resistance
to negotiate on that table.
It's also -- in the past 7 years, we've seen
some other horrible sides of this party with
it.
Branching out to fight in Syria, but also
other countries in the region.
And this is very unfortunate.
So it's really a counterrevolutionary force.
Hezbollah went to Syria to actually crush
the revolution.
You know, they can call it all they want,
as a Resistance against the Islamist Sunni
-- they have tried to sectarianize it.
But the fact remains that they have sided
with the criminal regime of Assad, and in
that sense, it's impossible to think of them
as an anti-imperialist force.
Or a progressive force.
They are actually a party that is supporting
and upholding authoritarian regimes and capitalism.
Hezbollah is a major -- they said it very
clearly.
They were inviting the IMF!
So anyone on the anti-imperialist Left who
has the illusion that this is a socialist
party -- Hezbollah is your typical neoliberal
capitalist force.
So yeah.
From where I stand, this is what Hezbollah
is.
And it's actually one of the most dangerous
-- it's not the only dangerous party in the
country.
But it's one of the most dangerous parties.
And the fact that in the past week, they've
been -- they've used this before, repeatedly,
but we've heard this very clearly, this past
week, in the speech of Nasrallah, talking
about the civil war and threatening with the
civil war -- is not -- this is not just by
coincidence that they're bringing this up
now.
In Syria, it started the same way.
Right?
The civil war -- I mean, there's no society
in the world that slips into civil war.
A war is a decision.
It's a decision that is taken by those who
can go to war.
And then the others will get armed.
If they do.
So it worries me, when we start to hear about
this.
Because it probably means that this is on
the table now.
More seriously.
And what I'm trying to say is that if we go
to war, Hezbollah will be responsible.
Not alone, but it will be one of the responsible
forces that will take us to war.
SHIREEN: We just about have to wrap up.
But if Bassel or Lara want to add in -- either
on this question or anything -- any other
thoughts, last thoughts.
BASSEL: I guess, for your own audience, I
think it's important that we think about the
struggle against sectarianism as something
similar to the struggle against neoliberalism.
The need to create a new kind of identity,
beyond narrow sectarian affiliations, and
also the need to think about how we go to
a new form of social democracy and social
justice.
And what Lara was talking about was so important.
I mean, again, it goes back to this whole
issue of the ideological hegemony of sectarianism.
What the work is doing is to offer a new kind
of truth.
Because a lot of the media in Lebanon is part
of this -- the machine, about manufacturing
consent.
So the struggle against sectarianism and the
struggle against neoliberalism are the same.
In fact, the sectarian parties, as Rima was
saying, meet, converge, on neoliberalism.
SHIREEN: Absolutely.
LARA: I'm just gonna very briefly address
the Hezbollah question.
I doubt that to anyone's mind Hezbollah is
a progressive force for good.
Or anti-imperialist.
And for all of the reasons that Rima already
outlined.
My concern is this focus on Hezbollah that
could potentially lead us to war.
October 17 started with a very basic premise
of all of them means all of them.
But now what we've been seeing, especially
after the explosion at the port, is all of
these manufactured reports claiming evidence
that Hezbollah was behind the explosion.
That Hezbollah was storing this ammonium nitrate
there.
That they were gonna use it to manufacture
weapons.
So far, all of these have been baseless.
And there's been no evidence that's been presented.
So yes, locally, internally, in our conversations,
and in Leftist circles, we can admit that
Hezbollah has played a really detrimental
role in many different aspects.
But we have to be very, very careful, especially
when speaking to an international audience,
and when doing work outside of Lebanon and
outside of our narrow circles, not to pinpoint
all of the blame on solely Hezbollah and the
parties' allies.
But to just focus on the very basic premise
that all of these political parties have been
in cahoots with each other for 40 years.
And if they're not directly involved in a
particular crime, then at least they've been
complicit through their silence.
And I think that's just important for us to
remember, because ultimately, a war on Hezbollah
is not gonna necessarily be a war on Hezbollah.
It's gonna be a war on the Lebanese people.
Whether it's through economic warfare or direct
military strikes.
Ultimately, the people of this country will
pay the price of this war.
SHIREEN: Yeah.
That was very important, I think.
Thank you.
People on the chat, before we wrap up, people
on the chat were asking for more information.
I'll just say: Follow The Public Source.
Follow Megaphone.
Akhbar al-Saha.
We've posted on the Facebook page articles
by the three speakers.
We can try to post some more resources as
well.
But we have to wrap up now.
But thank you so much for being in this conversation
today.
BASSEL: Thank you so much.
LARA: Thanks.
