 
### What Do I Ask of Myself on This Yom HaShoah?

### Jean-Marc LeBouquin

Copyright © April 04, 2018 Jean-Marc LeBouquin – illustrations under same copyright.

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# Table of Contents

What do I Ask Myself, On This Yom Ha'Shoah?

Brief Note to Those Reading or Browsing

Chapter 1 – What Do I Ask Myself, On This Yom Ha'Shoah?

*Part II – Appendices

Chapter 2 – Appendix I – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause

Chapter 3 – Appendix II – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

Chapter 4 – Appendix III – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

Chapter 5 – Appendix IV – IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a.

Chapter 6 – Appendix V – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran

Chapter 7 – Appendix VI – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress

Chapter 8 – Appendix VII– Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

Chapter 9 – Appendix VIII – Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25

Chapter 10 – Appendix IX – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran

Chapter 11 – Appendix X – Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25

* * * * *

**Brief Note to Those Reading or Browsing**

**Quick note to the Reader and the Browsing** : The appendices referred to throughout this writing provide the detailed explanations and documentation of aspects of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) – the "Iran Nuclear Deal" as it is often referred to The information appendices is essential to most of what is being discussed in the writing. I have also supplied these appendices independently as a freely available, downloadable e-book: _U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking_.

I want those appendices freely available to the person who might browse through the book wondering what the writing is going on about in some places. As presented in this writing, the appendices are necessarily in the back of this e-book; the browser can't get access to those from here without buying the book.

I consider that to be a very unfair, very unhappy, intolerable state of affairs.

Therefore, as a solution to this form of Browsing Discrimination – the appendices are available independently, for free, in the e-book _U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking_ ; and I believe they are worth having in themselves as they do explain much of the mechanics of how _Resolution 2231_ ; with its _Annex A: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action_ , works to establish the means to supply Iran with what it needs in order to establish a first-class; highest quality, nuclear weapons capacity development project;

And these explain, as well, some other details of events shaping the progress of this ongoing project. Continuing to the narrative:

* * * * *
* * * * *

Chapter 1 – What Do I Ask Myself, On This Yom HaShoah?

Although it is most probably unlikely that the Reader might read this writing on exactly the day of Yom HaShoah; the issues to be considered do not go away.

Chief Counsel for the Prosecution, Telford Taylor, in Nuernberg Trial III – opening remarks; observed:

Crimes, theoretically and, more often than not, actually, are these acts, which are so contrary to the moral conscience of the community or so dangerous to the maintenance of a reasonable degree of order, justice and peace in the community, that the community, by appropriate processes, demands their elimination and suppression in the interest of the individuals who constitute the community...

"What do I ask myself on this Yom Hashoah" is a standing human question. It was universally conceived of and understood; and thereupon set before us. Among all of the questions of the hope for happiness; that question too is always there before us. And even if that question had been unannounced; we knew inside of ourselves it was always there before us.

This is a question which derives its meaning by our investigation of ourselves.

The remembrances on the secular day of inner thought; that day of "Yom Hashoah;" speaks to the acknowledgment of wrongs against Humanity.

THE LEGACY AND TRADITION of several thousands of years offers the surviving Congregation that day of contemplation and remembrance are set aside and are due ourselves in our partnership with the life of the community.

I am a Jew. I have always been a Jew. Even though I am from Louisiana, it doesn't change anything, I am still a Jew. I am an American Jew; and American as Kosher Pecan Pie – thank you very much; and I'll have a cup of coffee with that if you please as well.

There are days on the Calendar which are set aside for us by tradition. Each of these days furnishes us with particular aspects of life that we may take the opportunity to consider.

On the Day of Yom HaShoah, we have before us to remember and consider various facets of the atrocities carried out by the Hitlerites; by Adolph Hitler and his minions.

The Hitlerites were not to be satisfied with merely the extermination of all the Jews they could get their hands on.

The ethics, the discussions; the very thoughts on life; the very customs and views on life developed among the Jews over several thousand years; the Hilterite philosophy demanded the eradication of all of this.

Following is the first stanza of a German folk song which pre-dated Hitler and his minions. The exact origins of the lyrics are uncertain. The lyrics seem to have been developed over time. It is not thought of as Jewish in origin – but it represents the kind of universally seditious; and impudent thought which infuriated the hysterical absolutist Nazis:

Die Gedanken sind frei, wer kann sie erraten,

sie fliegen vorbei wie nächtliche Schatten.

Kein Mensch kann sie wissen, kein Jäger erschießen

mit Pulver und Blei: Die Gedanken sind frei!

I ask the Reader to forgive my clumsy translation from the German – and I do take a little license in setting it to English:

Thoughts are free; who outside them can guess them?

They fly by before us, translucent night shadows;

Outsiders can't know them, no hunter can blast them

With powder and lead; our thoughts go free instead!

The Jews were thought of by the Hitlerites as even worse then that seditious, inchoate verse.

That seditious verse could mean anything, it was ridiculous. It mocks. This kind of thing is eternally absurd, espousing a disregard for order and control. And the Jews are ever worse than this simplistic peasant verse presented above.

Not only were those Jews, at that time, to be understood as _lebensunwertes Leben_ , "beings unworthy of life" – defectives as it were;

The Jew, by his very nature, was considered inherently subversive, decadent, and uncontrollable; aside from the Jews being confirmed as racially inferior, that group was known as so entirely degenerate, that this intruding and unpardonable scourge on the purity of the Germanic populations of Nazi Germany could not be trusted to be trained to the Correct Thinking necessary in the establishment of Hitler's Reich. They were intolerable, the Jews had to go.

A final solution to this outrage of their continuing unhygienic presence, demoralizing to the Defensive War Efforts of the Fatherland, would be deftly developed, and firmly executed in order to account for this bunch.

IN HANDING DOWN the opinion of the Court, in the Nuernberg Trial III; Presiding Justice James Tenney Brand recounts a long list of gradually mounting Nazi acts and laws providing for the discrimination and deportation of Jews and Poles. In one example, Justice Brand notes the following:

Reich Minister Goebbels, in an address to the judges of the People's Court, on 22 July 1942, stated that "if still more than 40,000 Jews, whom we considered enemies of the State, could go freely about in Berlin, this was solely due to the lack of sufficient means of transportation. Otherwise the Jews would have been in the East long ago." []

What Goebbels was exhibiting there is real en-masse hatred of, and contempt for people he didn't even know; but whom it was fashionable for himself in his society, and in his self-promotional interests, to despise.

WE MIGHT ACKNOWLEDGE within ourselves, on Yom Ha' Shoah, that the eradication intended was not content to merely target life itself, which was decidedly offensive to the regime – the eradication was intended to target all knowledge and understanding arising from that life as well.

Anything associated with those lives must be entirely disposed of and forgotten.

* * * * *

On Yom Hashoah, we remember with solemn and humblest gratitude, our Gentile neighbors; those who risked their own lives – and sometimes had their lives taken from them – as they came to our aid in our time of need.

We recognize them as the Righteous Among the Nations.

There is a garden in Israel – it is known as the Garden of the Righteous Among the Nations. And for each of our revered Gentile neighbors who are known to us, there is a tree planted in that garden;

For indeed, they are known to have taken hold of the Tree of Life – the Tree whose branches reach out to the heavens in thirst for knowledge; and all of its paths, rooted deeply in the earth, are the paths of peace;

And the names of the known recognized are revealed on a series of plaques maintained in the Garden.

We have faith that those not known to us are revealed on the rarest pages in the Book of Life; each inscribed thereon by the hand of the Ancient One.

And each of us are consoled and inspired as we consider them all in our hearts.

* * * * *

On Yom Hashoa we also reflect on the reality of the entities, even those with great temporal power and not under threat; those who might have said something in protest without anything to fear – but chose instead to shrug and turn their backs and say nothing.

Am I one of these wraiths who spirit myself through this life without care or concern for others? Of course I myself have no temporal power to think of.

Why should I ask of myself such a question – whether or not I am a wraith? I am a Jew, with no temporal power to speak of; what need is there for me to ask of myself such a question?

INDEED, who better is there to ask such a question of myself – than myself?

* * * * *

The United State Constitution gives the citizen an intangible temporal power; the power to not have to turn away in fear, and to not have to ignore in shame. The United States Constitution gives the citizen an intangible temporal power to speak up and petition for redress of injustice.

* * * * *

Considering circumstances facing the Community at this time:

The Government Iran regularly pledges the extermination of the Jewish people in Israel.

In response to this, the United States administration of Barack Obama arranged an agreement with Iran whereby the five permanent Member States of the Security Council, along with Germany, would assist Iran in acquiring its desired nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; this while preventing the IAEA from inspecting any aspect of these acquisition (see Appendix I [])

Barack Obama's arrangement with Iran also provided for allowing Iran to work with multipoint detonation systems suitable for use in a thermonuclear implosion style warhead. Iran has been be allowed, by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, through that resolution's _Annex A_ : _Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action_ (JCPOA) to work with these as of _JCPOA Implementation Day_ – which would turn out to be 16 January 2016. Following is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action provision granting the allowance.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, **unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring**.

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, **unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring**.

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

The phrase " _unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring_ " furnishes the open door. That statement declares several things. One of the most obvious is that it grants the Joint Commission the authority to violate treaty at any time, and at its own discretion. Here is what Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT, or Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty) has to say about that:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

In the phrase " _unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring,_ " the Security Council resolution declares that the Security Council, in Resolution 2231, grants the power, to a select Joint Commission, to decide on when the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ applies, and when it doesn't.

Barack Obama, and the others of the E3/EU+3 Iran Cabal, decided to endow this absolutist power to violate international treaty to an unelected body, "The Joint Commission."

The mysterious Gods and Goddesses sitting on this Mount Olympus "Joint Commission," were given the power to violate the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, at whim, in order that they may have at their disposal, the phony permission to violate treaty so that they may feel comfortable and free to assist; by encouraging, and inducing a non-nuclear-weapon State " _to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices_ " under the auspices, and by virtue of "Joint Commission" approval.

Aside from the fact that no one can find anywhere in the Charter of the United Nations anything that grants the Security Council any authority whatsoever to delegate such over-reaching power; the power to violate treaty at whim; to any group; aside from that – one might ask the question:

On what criteria, pray tell, do our Happy Gods and Goddesses of the Joint Commission base their choices in granting the Government of Iran phony permission to engage unchaperoned, and without controls, in the activities described in Section T? Resolution 2231 is mute on that account – it offers no answer or suggestion. Perhaps we should therefore assume that our Happy Gods and Goddesses of the Joint Commission work off of arbitrary, unaccounted for, divine inspiration in formulating and applying their capricious determinations.

* * * * *

Let's pull together some observations and conceptions at this point – so that as we proceed, what follows will fall into place more easily.

The United States Government, our Government, which we are guaranteed by the Constitution as being a government representative of the constituencies; has engaged in a project assisting a non-nuclear-weapon State in acquiring and developing nuclear weapons capacity; manufacturing capacity.

Given the Government of Iran's xenophobic standing pledge that populations in Israel must be abolished; our Government's continuing, ongoing, support for Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed assets must be seen as nothing other than handing off nuclear weapons capacity, in violation of Treaty, and thereby handing off the permission to commit mass murder at choice of opportunity or chance inclination.

In order to do accomplish this adventurous mission of assisting Iran in its ambitions, the United States Government, all participants in the larger plan, must violate the Constitution, the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , and international law:

**Item:** Assisting any State, which has pledged to conduct a war of aggression in violation of treaty and international assurances can most reasonably be construed as falling under the internationally codified defined War Crimes category of _Crimes against Peace_. Aside from this activity as being construed strongly as a War Crime; the overwhelming sensibility in society today is that engagement in this activity is viciously immoral, absurdly psychotic, and entirely against the self-interest of the welfare of the People of the United States.

**Item:** No one in the 115th Congress will even mention discussing the requirement of the United States Constitution, which stipulates that public Money drawn from the Treasury must be accounted for under Law; as follows:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article I - The Legislative Branch

*Section 9 - Limits on Congress

[Clause 6] No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

United States participation in Joint Commission, Procurement Working Group activities is paid for out of the Treasury. Here is how we know this:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

5. Other

5.1. Each JCPOA participant will be responsible for its own costs of participating in the Joint Commission, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.

The 115th Congress refuses to even touch on a discussion of the expenses incurred by United States Agents' participation in Joint Commission, Procurement Working Group activities; activities critical to enabling the expediting, and approving of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated technologies; while preventing any IAEA access to inspection and verification of these acquisitions.

The Congress, perhaps imbued with a primeval sense that the whole affair could be seen by the electorate as viciously immoral, absurdly psychotic, and entirely against the self-interest of the welfare of the People of the United States; the 115th Congress won't even discuss the issue on the Congressional Record, or bring up a vote for an appropriation of funding in support of United States participation in the activities of the Joint Commission, Procurement Working Group.

By default thereby, the 115th Congress, the entire Government of the United States, can most reasonably be construed as embezzling public Money from the United States communal Treasury. This current government, the members of which vaunt themselves as being "representatives" of their various communities, do not deign to suggest that any of them should even mention any of this to the constituencies which elected them to Office. Nevertheless, despite what the Congress decides to ignore, the United Nations Security Council persists in putting out progress reports every six months on ongoing approvals of Iranian procurement packages, approvals which are also dependent on United States Government consent and approval.

**Item:** The creation of the Procurement Working Group mandate, and the activities of the Joint Commission and Procurement Working Group violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

**Item:** Resolution 2231 grants the Joint Commission the over-reaching power to violate treaty at whim by granting the Joint Commission the phony permission to decide when or when not to assist; by encouraging, and inducing a non-nuclear-weapon State " _to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices_ " under the auspices, and by virtue of a spurious "Joint Commission" capricious approval.

The Charter of the United Nations does not anywhere grant the Security Council any authority whatsoever to delegate to any group the power to arbitrarily decide when or when not the restrictions of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , or any other treaty, might or might not apply. The Security Council itself doesn't have the authority to decide any such thing; the Security Council must consult with the Court on such issues.

The Joint Commission however, is given by Resolution 2231 the extraordinary, over-reaching bogus power to decide that it may, at its arbitrary liking, allow for Iranian engagement in Section T defined _activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device_.

These activities, as defined in Section T, involve INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories. The IAEA is prohibited, under Resolution 2231, from investigating anything having to do with Iranian acquisitions, end use of, or end-use location of inventories on the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list. (Appendix I []).

Examining some of the inventory listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a - - which resolution 2231 allows for distribution to Iran:

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

ANNEX CONTENTS

5. Test and Measurement Equipment for the Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices

5.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

5.B.1. Flash X-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators 5 – 1

5.B.2. High-velocity gun systems

5.B.3. High speed cameras and imaging devices

5.B.6. High-speed pulse generators

5.B.7. High explosive containment vessels

6. Components for Nuclear Explosive Devices

6.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

6.A.1. Detonators and multipoint initiation systems

6.A.2. Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulse generators

6.A.3. Switching devices

6.A.4. Pulse discharge capacitors

6.A.5. Neutron generator systems

6.A.6. Striplines

(As mentioned, a larger excerpt from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list is presented in Appendix II [].)

**Summary of Items Mentioned:** Characteristically common to all of the items mentioned above is utter disavowal of rule of law. But that is what's needed in order to put the project to appease the pledged ambitions of the Government of Iran into effect.

The Government of Iran pledges the extermination of populations. It is very simple that in order for that objective to be accomplished, rule of law, peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted – this must be put aside.

There is nothing novel in the basic approach. The need to ignore law in order to put into motion the procedures necessary to extinguish populations is simple enough at the outset.

In opening Statement of Chief Counsel for the Prosecution, Brigadier General Telford Taylor, in Nuernberg Trial III, notes the following:

A special Hitler decree in August 1942 gave the new Reich Minister sweeping powers to bring the administration of justice into conformity with the needs of the regime; it read:

"A strong administration of justice is necessary for the fulfillment of the tasks of the Greater German Reich. Therefore, I commission and empower the Reich Minister of Justice to establish a National Socialist Administration of Justice, and to take all necessary measures in accordance with the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Leader of the Party Chancellery. He can hereby deviate from any existing law." []

Mass deportations of undesirables had already been underway; but it wasn't satisfying enough. No vestige or law predating the Hitler-era would any longer be allowed to interfere on any level with what was planned by the regime.

The standing pledge made by Iran is clear. Our current United States Government participates. The Congress doesn't discuss it, but the U.N. confirms United States Government participation in the project.

* * * * *

As of yet unwilling to admit that rule of law had been dispensed with in Resolution 2231; some Republican Senators were beginning to sense that there was something amiss in the famous section T.

Complaining Senators were unsure of what is meant, in Section T – by the phrase "subject to monitoring" found in the suggestion: " _unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring_."

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, **unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring**.

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, **unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring**.

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

A small group of Senators sent a letter to U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley asking for clarification. I have no idea as to why this group chose that Agency to go to for clarification. The ambassador wouldn't know any more than the Congress – and it is the Congress which has some authority to take action on the matter.

Here is an excerpt of the text of the letter sent – this is the part of the letter that asks for clarification on Section T:

David Purdue – Georgia:

October 26, 2017

Ambassador Nikki Haley

United States Ambassador to the United Nations

United States Mission to the United Nations

799 United Nations Plaza

New York, NY 10017

Dear Ambassador Haley,

We write to you to express concern regarding shortcomings in the inspection and verification regime of the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

When unveiling the JCPOA, President Obama promised that "inspectors will also be able to access any suspicious location. Put simply, the organization responsible for the inspections, the IAEA, will have access where necessary, when necessary." [L01] He stressed that Iran's nuclear program "faces strict limitations and is subject to the most intrusive inspection and verification program ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program." [L02] In practice, it appears that this is not the case.

Most notably, disputes over the meaning of Section T of the JCPOA, as well as a deterioration in the amount and quality of information provided by IAEA inspections, have prevented the inspection and verification regime of the JCPOA from being as thorough and transparent as possible. It is vital to ensure that the IAEA inspection coverage of Iran is comprehensive enough to ensure that estimates on breakout times remain legitimate and to detect early if Iran makes any efforts to leave the JCPOA abruptly or gradually.

Uncertainty over the boundaries of Section T, regarding "activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device, still exist between the signatories of the nuclear deal. IAEA Director Yukiya Amano has stated that "more clarification would be helpful" regarding mandate of the IAEA for verifying Section T. [L03] As you have astutely noted, "The JCPOA made no distinction between military and non-military sites. There are also numerous undeclared sites that have not been inspected. That is a problem." [L04]. We believe that without visits to military sites, the IAEA cannot make a credible conclusion that Iran is meeting its section T obligations. We encourage you to continue to stress this point of view to the signatories of the deal, as well as to the IAEA.

List of signatories: David A. Purdue; Ted Cruz; Luther Strange; Marco Rubio; Mike Lee; John Barrasso; Jim Rish; M. Michael Rounds; Jim Inofone; Johnny Isakson; Cory Gardner; Dan Sullivan; Jon Boozman, John Kennedy.

Letter Footnotes:

L1: http: / /time.com/3957036/obama-iran-nuclear-deal-transcript

L2: http: / /thehill.com/policy/international/314450-obam a-marks-one-year-anniversary-of-iran-nuclear-deal-implementation

L3: https :/ /www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iaea-chief-calls-for-clarity-on -disputed-section-of-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKCNICI2AN

L4: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-haley/nuclear-inspectors-should-have-access-to-iran-military-bases-haley-idUSKCNIB5241

That letter can be found and downloaded as a pdf at: https://www.perdue.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/IAEA%20Letter_Updated.pdf – Following is a facsimile of the entire two page letter – which asks for information on other questions as well. This essay doesn't go into the answer to all of those questions – I will address their questions about the other things in the next essay.

The answer to their questions concerning International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Section T activities is found in the JCPOA itself.

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6.1.6. ...When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.

6.7. Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.

6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.

What we're being told in the above is that the IAEA may be invited in to some meetings. Iran has agreed to provide the IAEA access to "... _locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1_ ..."

_INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1_ is the International Atomic Energy Agency list of inventories relating to nuclear energy production.

INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a is the International Atomic Energy Agency list of inventories associated with the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Paragraph 6.8 does not mention allowing the IAEA in to inspect any aspect of those. The IAEA is not informed of the content of the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a associated procurement packages; the IAEA is not allowed to verify what these are being used for, or to verify where these are ending up.

As an added assurance to Iran, the resolution declares, in paragraph 6.8 above; that "... _the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification_." This is a very thorough system of exclusion, which has been developed for the appeasement and comfort of the Government of Iran.

No _Joint Commission_ "expertise" in "verification" is recognized as competent by the multilaterally signed _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_. It couldn't be, because no verification measure carried out by an ad hoc group of Joint Commission experts could be trusted. It would be the proverbial equivalent of hiring the foxes to guard the hen-house. The Joint Commission, along with its sub-bureaucracy the Procurement Working Group, work to expedite the Iranian INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed acquisitions in what must be most reasonably construed as violation of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. The conflict of interest is grossly self-evident. The only Agency recognized as competent to carry out the verification under the Treaty "... _with_ _a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices_ ..." is the IAEA. Again presenting clause 1 of Article III:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive **purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices** ...

A critical objective of the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, is to keep the IAEA away from molesting the Iranian Government from doing whatever it's doing over there with those special acquisitions.

Appendix IX [] presents the Security Council reports documenting the ongoing Project Report progress on the Procurement Working Group sponsored Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories – as much as the Secrecy Agreement allows for;

These above mentioned reports also confirm that there have been no IAEA inspections of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a associated procurements;

The inventories, listed in Section T, with which Iran is allowed to work with – items such as "... _multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device; ... explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device; explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources_ ...;"

These are all INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed assets. Barack Obama, Iran, et al, agreed that the IAEA would be prevented from reviewing this.

In the Senators' letter the author, Senator Purdue quotes a _Reuters_ article of September 26, 2017; by Francoise Murphy: " _IAEA chief calls for clarity on disputed section of Iran nuclear dea_ l;" [which can be found at: https :/ /www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iaea-chief-calls-for-clarity-on -disputed-section-of-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKCNICI2AN].

Senator Purdue, taking note of the article; mentions that it has informed him that "... _IAEA Director Yukiya Amano has stated that 'more clarification would be helpful' regarding mandate of the IAEA for verifying Section T_." Actually, the article more fully quotes Amano as stating:

"More clarification would be helpful ... Russia has a different view. They believe that it is not the mandate of the IAEA. Others have different views and discussions are ongoing."

Amano states that " _Russia has a different view. They believe that it is not the mandate of the IAEA_ [to investigate].'

According to the text of Resolution 2231, with its Annex A: JCPOA; the Russians appear to be correct. But this writing submits that treaty, and international law, supersede the JCPOA. Under the Treaty's superseding authority – it would most strongly appear as though the alleged Russian position is seriously mistaken.

In any event, it is clear that the dispute is there. Fundamentally it is an issue of Judicial Application of Rule of Law as pertaining to the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ; which was conceived of and brought into being primarily by the United States and the then Soviet (now the Russian Federation). The multiple Parties to the dispute are the IAEA; and Russia and Iran arguing against IAEA inspections; with the United States, the U.K., France and Germany faintly protesting that they would like there to be IAEA inspections of any work associated with _Section T_ activities that Iran is engaged in.

The Statute of the IAEA is very clear as to which Agency is competent to make a determination on the issue. And it is certainly not the Joint Commission, or any element of the Security Council which is considered as competent to make a judicial determination in a dispute on any aspect of the agreed upon by multilateral treaty; signed on to by most nations:

STATUTE – of the IAEA []

ARTICLE VII _Settlement of disputes_

A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Statute which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.

It is very clear where this dispute over fundamental rule of treaty and international law goes. But is never occurs to the Senators that the matter has to be resolved in Court. The Senators go racing off to the Ambassador – asking Ambassador to intercede with the IAEA Board of Governors on behalf of their complaints.

But the IAEA Board of Governors is the United States:

Looking back at the composition of the Board of Governors in 2014: []

Argentina; Australia; Canada; China; Spain; France; Germany; India, Japan, Russian Federation; South Africa; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Looking back at the composition of the Board of Governors 2015:

Argentina; Australia; Canada; China; Finland; France; Germany; India, Japan, Russian Federation; South Africa; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The only difference between the years is that Finland replaces Spain in 2015. Essentially the major voting members are unchanged.

Looking back at the composition of the Board of Governors in 2016:

Australia; Brazil; Canada; China; Switzerland; France; Germany; India, Japan, Russian Federation; South Africa; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Brazil changed off from Argentina (2015); Finland (2015) was exchanged by Switzerland.

Looking back at the composition of the Board of Governors in 2017:

Australia; Brazil; Canada; China; Italy; France; Germany; India, Japan, Russian Federation; South Africa; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Italy replaced Switzerland of 2016.

Going back all the way to inception – the United States, and Russia, have been on the IAEA Board of Governors every year since the beginning of the Agency.

How could these elite, savvy, national level Washington politicians not know that after almost sixty years? What's taking these people so long? They are either hopelessly determined as ignoramuses; or the letter is simply more of that political grandstanding done to drum up an appearance that these politicians are actually getting involved in the issues – despite the evident ongoing lack of interest on their parts; or maybe it's something else. Whatever it is, the letter presents itself poses an insult to those Senators' own capacities, knowledge, and perhaps integrity.

Such an appeal should go directly to the President. Nevertheless, the President himself can't resolve the issue. Perhaps it is only slowly beginning to dawn on Donald Trump that he mysteriously finds himself unable to deal with the Russians and the Iranians on the issue; those adversarial Parties feel stridently secure that United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 gives Iran immunity from certain IAEA inspections.

The issue is one of fundamental rule of international law; a concept which seems entirely foreign to United States politicians of this era. The Senators had never voiced any complaint that the whole policy of keeping the IAEA away from inspections is in violation of Treaty; not a whisper along those lines.

Some of these Senators sport high class law degrees from highest class Law Schools in the Nation. But I tell you what – I wouldn't want any of them as my advocate.

Here are premises to be considered:

Resolution 2231 is set up to provide Iran access to nuclear weapons capacity, and;

Iran has pledged the destruction of neighboring populations.

In order for the cited objectives to be accomplished rule of law must be done away with or ignored.

Examining these premises further:

* * * * *

Immediately following the defeat of the Hitlerite regime of NAZI Germany, the Nuernberg Trials were undertaken.

Preparations for these were already underway before hostilities ceased. Rule of Law had been asserted; and the Nazis had already been warned, in the _Moscow Declaration_ – that War Crimes would be followed up on by the Allies. The Allies admonished that the Nazis cease and desist in participating in further outrage. Proceeding with excerpts from the Moscow Declaration of 1943:

THE UNITED KINGDOM, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror.

What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers and that in their desperation; the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-two [thirty-three] United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy.

Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done...

On 8 August 1945 the LONDON AGREEMENT OF 8 AUGUST 1945 was put into play. The following brief excerpt explains something of how the laws surrounding the prosecution of perceived War Criminals:

LONDON AGREEMENT OF 8 AUGUST 1945

AGREEMENT by the Government of the - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, the Provisional Government of the FRENCH REPUBLIC, the Government of the UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERNIRELAND and the Government of the UNION OF SOVIETSOCIALISTREPUBLICS for the Prosecution and Punishment of the MAJOR WARCRIMINALS of the EUROPEAN AXIS

WHEREAS the United Nations have from time to time made declarations of their intention that War Criminals shall be brought to justice;

AND WHEREAS the Moscow Declaration of the 30th October 1943 on German atrocities in Occupied Europe stated that those German Officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free Governments that will be created therein; ...

...NOW THEREFORE the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter called "the Signatories") acting in the interests of all the United Nations and by their representatives duly authorized thereto have concluded this Agreement.

**Article 1**. There shall be established after consultation with the Control Council for Germany an International Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.

**Article 2**. The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement...

**Article 7**. This agreement shall come into force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for the period of one year and shall continue thereafter, subject to the right of any Signatory to give, through the diplomatic channel, one month's notice of intention to terminate it....

The Charter annexed to the above Agreement defines and establishes the laws under which the accused may be tried – it defines and establishes the competency of Court in adjudicating alleged crimes, etc.

The definition of War Crimes has been in place since that time. The category _Crimes against Peace_ is one defined category falling under the broader definition of War Crimes.

The _International Military Tribunal_ was the Council set which about to consult with international legal scholars and judiciaries on the determination of definitions of aspects of War Crimes.

These definitions are codified into international law and remain in place today. In this writing I only address one of the categories of War Crimes – _Crimes against Peace_.

Recalling that Iran has continuously pledged the extermination of neighboring populations; and taking in to account that the current United States Government, by best evidence, forges ahead with its program in support of the Procurement Working Group mandate to assist Iran in its acquisition of the means to develop nuclear weapons capabilities in violation of international treaty;

Bearing the current scenario in mind, _International Military Tribunal Control Council Law No. 10_ provides for the definition of Crimes against Peace:

CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) **Crimes against Peace**. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

The current United States Government, is participating in a common plan; along with Russia, the U.K. Germany, China and France, to violate international treaty in order to expedite Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets; this common plan is arranged so as to prevent the IAEA from investigating any aspect of these nuclear weapons associated transactions.

The Government of Iran has pledged the destruction of neighboring populations. The United States Government, in violation of its own Constitution, violates the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in favor of benefiting Iranian Government pledged ambitions. The United States Constitution declares:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article VI - Debts, Supremacy, Oaths

[Clause 2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; **and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land** ; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an essential Treaty concerned with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In assisting in this expediting of Iranian acquisitions of stipulated nuclear weapons assets, the United States Government violates treaty and hence Article VI of the United States Constitution.

Further, Congress violates the Constitution by not discussing or voting on any appropriation bill justifying surreptitious extraction of public Money in support of United States participation in Procurement Working Group activities – this in violation of Article I; Section 9; clause 6 of the Constitution:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article I - The Legislative Branch

*Section 9 - Limits on Congress

[Clause 6] No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

Watch we don't end up in a third world country where the U.S. Government descends to a policy whereby despite whatever the Constitution stipulates, there will be no accounting for anything. The banana Republican and banana Democratan political parties are working hard to seemingly bring things to that pass in the worse way.

These egregious infringements, which the 115th Congress, the current assembly of representative Government of the United States, is confirmed by United Nations' written testimonial as funding, are carried out in support of the repeated Iranian pledge to destroy neighboring populations.

There is no more effective method for exterminating populations, known at this time, than the use of nuclear weapons. Preferring nuclear weapons capacity upon Iran must be most reasonably construed as assisting in that particular State's declared preparation for its pledged initiation of waging _a war of aggression in violation of international treaty and international assurances_.

Congressional refusal to account for public Moneys expended on behalf of the U.S. Government's supporting of the salaries and expense accounts of the Joint Commission and Procurement Working Group endeavor; an endeavor designed to prefer nuclear weapons capacity upon Iran; is another aspect of the sleaze exhibited by our top quality third world banana republic politicians as they spirit themselves to engage in the shaming embarrassment of the provisions and policies of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

* * * * *

This following is an excerpt from Chief Counsel for the Prosecution, Brigadier General Telford Taylor in opening remarks during Nuernberg Trial Case III [] – he is speaking of the indictment against the alleged War Criminals.

... although this indictment is brought in the name of the Government of the United States, this case in substance is the people of the world against these men who have committed criminal acts against the community we know as the world. ...

Therefore, **unless all the countries of the world fight a continuous struggle to match the moral conscience of the world which has been asserted here, the result will be a ... an apathetic amoral world which drifts aimlessly because it sees no national conduct which matches the standards of moral conduct which are proclaimed here**. The true significance of these proceedings, therefore, far transcends the mere question of the guilt or innocence of the defendants. They are charged with murder, but this is no mere murder trial. These proceedings invoke the moral standards of the civilized world, and thereby impose an obligation on the nations of the world to measure up to the standards applied here...

Although this Tribunal is internationally constituted, it is an American court. **The obligations which derive from these proceedings are, therefore, particularly binding on the United States** ...

...It is the crime of shattering the foundations of peace and denying the very fact of humanity that is charged in this and other proceedings at Nuernberg. It is by trying these charges under law, and in quest of truth, that Nuernberg will find its full measure of justification.

Words of conscience – like those spoken by Counsel – seem somehow utterly lost on these politicians in this day and age. The members of the 115th Congress unlawfully purloin money from the treasury without voting on the appropriations bill required by the Constitution. A vote on an appropriations bill might embarrass Congress members; open public explanation of what the Government is currently up to might be unavoidable.

In the same Nuernberg Trial III – in handing down the opinion of the Court – Presiding Justice James Tenney Brand notes the following observation:

...This is but an application of general concepts of criminal law. The person who persuades another to commit murder, the person who furnishes the lethal weapon for the purpose of its commission, and the person who pulls the trigger are all principals or accessories to the crime.*

*Again: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10: United States of America vs. Josef Altstoetter: Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume 111,

This 115th Congress has shown itself to be quite content to surreptitiously extract public Money from the Treasury in support of furnishing the lethal weapon needed to appease, and hopefully satisfy Iranian ambitions.

* * * * *

I very much appreciate and agree with Chief Counsel Taylor's following insightful observation and forecast:

...unless all the countries of the world fight a continuous struggle to match the moral conscience of the world which has been asserted here, the result will be ... an apathetic amoral world which drifts aimlessly because it sees no national conduct which matches the standards of moral conduct which are proclaimed here. ... These proceedings invoke the moral standards of the civilized world, and thereby impose an obligation on the nations of the world to measure up to the standards applied here...

It is the Congress of the United States which is responsible for accounting and answering for public Money being taken from the Treasury. It is exactly the Congress that doesn't answer to the surreptitious disappearance of public Money being taken from the Treasury without a by-your-leave, and on behalf of U.S. participation in the activities of the Joint Commission, Procurement Working Group.

It is a Congressional responsibility to account for funds the U.S. expends in furnishing the lethal weapon to Iran;

Resolution 2231 stipulates that it is the United States which pays its way on the Joint Commission – and the Joint Commission is the Agency the Security Council resolution stipulates might inspect Iranian protracted experimentation with multi-point detonation systems and the rest.

The United States Government is paying for these efforts without even a Law to support them. This corrupt activity, carried out in favor of furnishing the lethal weapon – cannot be considered as in any way matching the moral conscience of the world which had been asserted in the Nuernberg Trials.

This Congress ignores everything – and explains nothing; but does seem to enjoy the protection of its evasions and pretenses.

* * * * *

The development of a false perception, in the United States, of Resolution 2231 as having any force of law either domestically or internationally is a history marked by continual misdirection and disavowal of rule of law.

President Obama never even transmitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) to Congress for a vote (see Appendix VI []) – and a disinterested and negligent 114th Congress never produced one member who would publicly admit to have bothered to take a few minutes to download a copy of the resolution from the United Nations Security Council website – where is was, and is, freely available to all – including you and I. [].

The Congress only voted on one portion of Resolution 2231; Annex A: JCPOA; and that never even came close to being approved by Congress.

Some self-interested politicians have suggested that Resolution 2231 was installed as an Executive Order made by then President Barack Obama. If it had been codified as an Executive Order – it would have been registered in the National Archives. There is no record of the resolution, or even the JCPOA as ever having been codified as an Executive Order.

The false perception, in the United States, of Resolution 2231 having any force of law domestically – is based on the false assumption that some thing may become a Law without any vote on it having taken place.

This perception is antithetical to the principle of Representative Government. It is as though it is acceptable that a group private individuals; acting as a junket cabal of _banditti_ ; can spread a rumor that any expedient whim or interest of their own is legitimate – and becomes by the force of that groups will – the rule of the land.

This would allow for arbitrary rule by elected oligarchy. The Congress could decide anything it wanted, change its mind whenever it wanted to duck out on something, and change its mind back again whenever whatever political heat had been forgotten.

Neither the Judiciary, nor the electorate would ever know what the laws really were. No Court case could be challenged or tried because anyone could claim that the rules aren't this, they are that.

This is the situation the Citizen is placed in under the 114th and 115th Congress. The current Congress treats the "JCPOA" if it were a law – and they fund the activities of the Procurement Working Group as though they had discussed and passed an appropriations bill. An example of the attitude of this Congress is voiced by a Congressman Hastings.

On page H9855 of the Congressional Record of December 13, 2017 [], Mr. Hastings of Florida made this following unfounded assertion:

Mr. HASTINGS. _Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. BUCK), for yielding me the customary 30 minutes of debate. I yield myself such time as I may consume_.

Mr. Speaker, when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action came before Congress, I made my objections very clear. I believed then, as I do now, that the Iran deal too quickly removed the sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first place, allowing Iran to remain a nuclear threshold state.

_However, like it or not,_ _the JCPOA is now law_ _, and it will be wrong to undermine it for purely political reasons_.

The JCPOA is not any kind of law. That Hastings pretends that the " _JCPOA is now law_ " is a fantasy rumor initiated for purely political reasons.

What Alcee Hastings from Florida has to say is publicly known to be complete nonsense. There is no JCPOA recognized by a law that was ever voted on; and President Obama never signed it as an Executive Order. If he had, it would be registered on the National Archives.

This Alcee Hastings is living in a Congress which, following Obama's established tradition of misdirection and deceit in politics, acts on tall tales. Congress carries on allowing the U.S. Government to carry on approving whatever nuclear weapons transactions it pleases, and rubs everyone's nose in it by making up stories about how whatever they do is justified because " _the JCPOA is now law_ ," when anyone can know that it is not. The 115th Congress presents itself as an historic, archetypical example of rule by the arbitrary, untouchable society which really doesn't have to account for anything it doesn't want to.

In order to prevent, as much as possible, this deterioration of a free society into an absolutist secret reign by an unknowable, un-petitionable, arbitrary oligarchy, the Congress is required by the Constitution to keep a record of its proceedings and the votes taken, public Moneys seized from the Treasury, &c. The Congress is required to be accountable for what it does.

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article I - The Legislative Branch

*Section 5 - Membership, Rules, Journals, Adjournment

[3rd clause]

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Because there is a Congressional Record, required by the Constitution; any citizen can knowledgably complain that there is no law allowing for the Congress to fund the Procurement Working Group, and the United States active promotion and participation in expediting and approving Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies and support services listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a.

The way the 115th Congress gets around the issue of reporting, is to not discuss the uncomfortable issues on the Congressional Record; to play dumb as it were; and the 115th Congress has gotten pretty good at pretending they don't know a thing about something when they absolutely know all about that something.

The 115th Congress avoided for the longest time even mentioning the existence of the Procurement Working Group. However, the 115th Congress let it slip out in late October 2017, that they were perfectly well aware of what is being funded from the public Money.

The House of Representatives had come out with a bi-partisan bill, the _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1695_ on 25 October 2017, which almost the entire House of Representatives (except two members) voted unanimously to approve. In that Bill, the 115 Congress mentioned for the first time, that everyone knew very well about the Procurement Working Group. Congress had simply had not previously talked about it on the Congressional Record. Here is where they identified to the electorate that they had known about the Procurement Working Group:

Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1695

SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES.

(e) SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILES.

''(B) ADDITIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGY.—

''(iv **) PROCUREMENT WORKING GROUP DEFINED**.—In clause (iii)(I), the term 'procurement working group' means the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established under Annex IV of the applicable provisions in Annex A of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

The fact that the House of Representatives correctly defined and identified the Procurement Working Group, and correctly identified where the descriptions of its activities are located within the text of the JCPOA; exactly reveals that the Congress is, and was, very much aware of the Procurement Working Group and its mandate. The Congress was always responsible for knowing this; and now the Congress can no longer support the fictional evasion that Congress simply doesn't know.

The denizens of both political parties infesting the 115th Congress may feel immune to being forced to account. Members of Congress obviously feel comfortable making up any story wanted; perhaps feeling quite secure that the electorate can't or won't do anything about it anyway. But the chaos that ensues soon becomes unmanageable.

The sinister result of the ongoing secretive embezzlement, so far, has been that if North Korea can't yet drop a ballistic missile anywhere it wants to on the Continental United States – it is probable that it will be able to sometime in the very near future. That the sweeping sudden leaps in North Korean ballistic capability coincide with the time frame (November 2016 – November 2017) in which the United States Government has been extravagantly supporting Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories has been described in the previous essay.

It is evident, that to provide Iran the advances in weapons capacity the United States Government regularly approves – is to provide Iran's favorite best trading partner, North Korea with same – or similar services. For example:

North Korea doesn't need U.S. help with multipoint detonation systems; because Iran has been allowed to work with these without interference from the IAEA since 16 January 2016. Iran and North Korea can collaborate on knowledge;

And what a coincidence! Suddenly, the thermonuclear explosive capacity of North Korean nuclear warheads suddenly is dramatically increased by the end of 2017.

North Korea doesn't need U.S. help with advanced machining tools; because North Korea can collaborate, and contract out to Iran to produce optimized pieces which North Korea can't quite yet produce on its own. And who's to slow any of this down. Obama agreed that the IAEA would be prevented from snooping around any aspect of Iranian acquisitions procured from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list. So no one really knows where some of these items are ending up, or what they're being used for.

And what a coincidence! By 10 January 2018 Senator Inohofe is throwing fits on the Senate floor about these huge sudden advances in North Korean ballistic missile ranges – and he's also upset about those bigger and bigger detonations being fired up in that country. Other members of both parties in both Houses of Congress are starting to get the jitters too.

It almost seems as though all of this deception and evasion is starting to unnerve some of these inmates of the 115th Congressional ward. They act as though they feel trapped or something – like there's something preventing them from speaking openly about issues.

They'll talk about how nervous they are about sudden leaps in North Korean nuclear weapons capacity; but they won't talk about what they're funding, or why they're funding it. They only play innocent and keep quiet on their purloining of public Money from the Treasury in violation of the Constitution. They act as though they can't figure out that the results of their funding of Procurement Working Group activities has anything to do with their secretive embezzlement of public funds.

Many politicians, proponents of Resolution 2231 still love to assert that the resolution will prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon – this when all the documented evidence shows that the resolution is designed to provide assistance to an Iranian nuclear weapons program – with the United States Government being one of the main ringleaders of the project.

It's probably highly unlikely that this Congress will ever develop any coherent, constructive approach to dealing with the results of the "Iran Nuclear Deal." These people are all too compromised; members of both parties are apparently too burnt out by all this sport of avoiding the issue for two and half years, to comprehend and accept that the matter isn't going away because they pretend it has. This is a matter that can only be effectively dealt with through a petition to the International Court of Justice.

* * * * *

We examine the ultimate goals of Resolution 2231 as declared in that resolutions very provisions – leaving as aside, in this essay, discussion of the sweeping concessions made Iran, associated with conventional weaponry, and ballistic missile development.

As has already been discussed – as of 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day) – Iran was allowed to begin experimentation and development working with the means to detonate an implosion type thermonuclear warhead; this with the concessions granted in famous _Section T_ already discussed.

The promise that the IAEA is to be prevented from overseeing or investigating this activity goes along with the permission.

Likewise, the IAEA is prevented from investigating Iranian acquisitions of assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a. This ongoing procurement activity had also been theoretically allowed as of 16 January 2016 – but due to logistical issues, did not begin to be acted on until November 2016 – during the last few months of the Obama presidency.

On 18 October 2025 (JCPOA Termination Day) Procurement Working Group approval of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets is no longer necessary – and Iran is free to procure as it will:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex B: Statement

2. [first clause] All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;

(b) the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above...

As mentioned, all of the activities listed in this first part of paragraph 2, Annex B, went into effect on January 16, 2016; on which date these activities may be allowed on a case by case basis with prior approval from the Security Council.

Full control of components INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 necessary for the manufacture of detonation systems for fissile nuclear warheads – and the other things – is handed off to Iran on JCPOA Termination Day, October 18, 2025 – as stipulated in the final clause of paragraph 2, Annex B.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex B: Statement

[final clause of paragraph 2]

This paragraph [Paragraph 2 entire] shall apply until the date ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, except if the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion before that date, then the requirement to obtain approval in advance by the Security Council shall be suspended immediately and, beginning on the date of this suspension, the exceptions provided for in this paragraph shall continue to apply and all States may participate in and permit the activities set forth in this paragraph if they notify the Security Council and the Joint Commission at least ten working days in advance of each such activity on a case-by-case basis.

After ten years, no Joint Commission or Security Council approval is necessary – only notification. The prohibitions regarding IAEA inspections remain unaltered.

* * * * *

THE COMBINATION of detonators and multipoint initiation systems; along with highly enriched uranium 235, or weapons grade plutonium alloys cast into suitable forms, is exactly part of what is necessary for the effective manufacture of fairly high yield fissile nuclear explosive devices. After fifteen years, on 18 October 2030, Iran is granted permission to produce or procure the fissile materials necessary to produce fissile nuclear weapons.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.

25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years...

The above restraint continues for fifteen years only; after that, anything is acceptable. There is no provision that, once Iran is allowed to acquire and work with the special fissional materials required to produce fissile nuclear weapons; there is no provision stipulating that Iran is restricted from forming or casting these materials into configurations favorable to creating a high yield fissile chain reaction explosion.

The special fissional materials under discussion here; highly enriched uranium, and plutonium (isotope forms of plutonium are not clarified in Resolution 2231 – it's only a guess as to if weapons grade plutonium is being permitted; there is nothing in Resolution 2231 prohibiting its use); these materials do fall in the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 category of inventories (as opposed to the Rev. 9 category of inventories). Therefore, one may assume that the IAEA does have reasonable knowledge of end-use, location and quantities of these materials allowed to float around in Iran.

Article 57 of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and Iran places safeguards on nationwide quantities of plutonium over a total of 1kgm. Aside from that, there is this:

Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards In Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons []

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Article 13

Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used in non-nuclear activities

Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the Government of Iran shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such material may be terminated.

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES

Article 14

If the Government of Iran intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) The Government of Iran shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:

(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the Government of Iran may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and

(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded material in Iran and of any export of such material; and

(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as, inter alia, temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval [of] or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.

UNDER ARTICLE 13 (above), we see that when safeguarded material is used in the production of [metallurgical] alloys, safeguards are terminated. Article 13 does not indicate any prejudice or controls concerning the precise composition of the alloys to be formed or cast; nor does it make any distinction as to the configuration in which these alloys are to formed – once radioactive metals are cast or formed, they are hardly, any longer, subject to outside scrutiny.

Under Article 14(c), IAEA approval of the activity regarding whatever it is that the alloys are to be used for is not required; and, the IAEA is not allowed any classified knowledge of nuclear related military activity that the alloys may be applied to.

However, as a concession from Iran, under 14(a)(ii), Iran concedes that "... _That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices_ ..."

Iran promises not to weaponize its uranium or plutonium metallurgical alloys while these are under the discrete and watchful custody of the Iranian military – that is the level of reassurance being offered in Resolution.

* * * * *

Every piece of reliable documentation speaks to what this arrangement, between Barack Obama and the Ministers of Iran, is really about.

It is the promise of U.S. support and assistance aiding in the development of nuclear weapons project in Iran; this regardless of the unsupportable claims and arguments of the politician proponents of Barack Obama's "Iran Nuclear Deal."

The ultimate goal of the Resolution 2231 weapons development project is that Iran, after fifteen years, is given full access and permission to develop the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons – along with the ballistic missile capability necessary to properly dispose of these in someone else's front yard. This is all in violation of treaty.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

The United States Government has bargained to assist Iran in the adventure, in violation of Article I; Iran has sought, bargained for, and got assistance for its nuclear weapons development project – in violation of Article II. All governments involved in the affair are in violation of Treaty clearly declared and multilaterally agreed to;

It doesn't matter if the nuclear weapons project doesn't reach full maturity for fifteen years. There is no statute of limitations on the agreed upon prohibitions declared in the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_. The actions of all Governments involved must be considered as in violation of treaty – whether the project reaches full maturity in one year, ten years – or after fifteen years when the political heat might have died down.

The United States Government currently involves itself in this adventure regardless of the ongoing pledges of the Iranian Government to exterminate the populations of a State which a treacherous United States Government does not claim itself as hostile to, and in fact claims to be allied with.

Nevertheless – the United States Government has involved itself in a commitment to participate in assisting a clearly belligerent State in its preparations for a pledged war of aggression in violation of treaty and international assurances. This will be a war conducted under the pledge that populations of Israel will be exterminated.

This United States Government participation in a pledged project to exterminate populations in Israel could be most reasonably construed as falling under the definition of a _Crime against Peace_ ; as codified under International Military Tribunal Control Council Law No. 10. The U.S. politicians involving themselves in the carrying out of this U.S. commitment could justifiably be construed, by the electorate, as manifesting the immorality of a gang of War Criminals.

* * * * *

_Control Council Law No. 10_ already presents a very clear definition of the War Criminal – and the War Criminal in the Context of _Crimes against Peace_.

To put the concept of the morality of a War Criminal in respect to _Crimes Against Peace_ ; to give an example of this morality in more down to earth context; I submit this following ongoing double standard in the current Congress, which nobody in the 115th Congress seems to take notice of – I quote a Mr. Costa;

From the Congressional Record of 11 October 2017; Vol. 163; No. 163: [https://www.congress.gov/crec/2017/10/11/CREC-2017-10-11.pdf]. The speechmaker following is House Member Costa:

IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

Mr. Costa.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak about the significance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding Iran, more commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear agreement...

... we should not withhold certification of the Iran nuclear agreement without credible evidence that Iran is not complying...

Doing so would strip the United States of our credibility in future international agreements not just with Iran, **but with our allies as well**. In addition to Iran, we negotiated the Iran nuclear agreement with the **United Kingdom** , **Germany** , **European Union** , **China** , and **Russia** , and we must keep our word. In other words, to remain credible, the United States cannot change positions on international agreements from one administration to another without serious justification and without the consent in working with our **allies**.

I'm not picking on Mr. Costa as an individual; rather, the view which he presents is typical of both political parties in Congress. The view being that " _our allies_ " are those who signed on to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 arrangement. Incidentally, he left out France as one of "our allies;" France, you remember – Normandy Beach, the Eiffel Tower, croissants, cheese, all that stuff – he must have heard about that place somewhere.

In any event, Costa defines who "our allies" are; "our allies" are the Governments which signed on to Barack Obama's arrangement with the Ministers of Iran.

Of course Costa doesn't talk about the content of the arrangement which the Obama Administration worked out with Iran and "our allies;" that content seems to be a matter of indifference to his sermon.

Costa is speaking on 11 October 2017. In a few days, as mentioned; on 25 October 2017, the entire 115 House of Representatives, after a little over two years, finally admits, nestled in its _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1695,_ that the Congress knows all about U.S. participation in Procurement Working Group activities. Naturally the Congress knows all about it – the Congress is surreptitiously funding the program without a law to support these unconstitutional extractions of public Money from the Treasury.

Costa is speaking on 11 October 2017. On 26 October 2017, the day after the big admission in the House of Representatives, a few Republican Senators would send their letter to Ambassador Nikki Haley, registering their dawning primeval awareness, after a little over two years, that this thing about permitting the famous Section T Iranian exploration in " _activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive_ _device_ " was going un-chaperoned.

So here we have it; the United States is expediting and approving Iranian procurement of the advanced means to develop eventual nuclear weapons manufacturing capability; while at the same time preventing the IAEA from inspecting.

There's your blank check to Iran maybe telling the Ministers of that Government something to the effect of "we'll help you get your weapon, just as long as you do it in fifteen years, so that it's not too embarrassing politically for us."

This is what Barack Obama arranged with Iran possibly so that he could come back home and receive all the favorable accolades for having achieved a groundbreaking "Diplomatic Achievement," (just like Neville Chamberlain did with Adolph Hitler). And if anyone is wondering how Barack Obama thought he could get away with it, just look at the response of these burn-outs in the 115th Congress.

Mr. Costa doesn't want to talk about what he and everyone else in Congress knows about. In his instructional little sermon about the "allies," Costa doesn't even mention his knowledge of what's going on with the United States Government's participation of Procurement Working Group activities, which the Congress is going to admit knowledge of in a very short time from his 11 October 2017 oratory.

Mr. Costa doesn't want to talk about what he and everyone else in Congress knows about; everyone in Congress does know, or is constitutionally responsible for knowing, how it is that the money to fund U.S. participation in Procurement Working Group activities is getting snuck out of the Treasury without a law to support this larceny.

And this thing about the _Section T_ activities which the Barack Obama administration conceded to the Ministers of Iran; such trifles are not material to Mr. Costa's delightful little homily.

The material content of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 arrangement is not of interest to a discussion of who "our allies" are. Mr. Costa's definition of which of "our allies" are, is clear: "our allies" are those Governments which signed on to the Obama Administration's agreement with Iran.

PREVIOUSLY, the United States Government had other allies in the middle east and across the world – those who are not mentioned in Mr. Costa's speech; presumably as they had not signed on to the arrangement. The concerns of those unmentioned allies are not mentioned in Mr. Costa's departure.

In the Middle East, some of those earlier allies included Sunni Moslem Nations such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Kingdom of Jordan, both of which are threatened by a very hostile Shiite Moslem Iran; and are threatened by this hand off of nuclear weapons capacity to Iran in egregious violation of treaty;

And, oh yes!– Let us not forget, another of the U.S. allies which goes unmentioned as this new doctrine of the definition of what "really true allies are" emerges in the 115th Congress; let us not forget another one of these earlier allies of the Government of the United States.

Israel, of course, is the nation particularly despised and targeted by Iran; and Iran has pledged the immolation of Israel.

Members of Congress, of both political parties, just love to go jaywalking down the aisles talking about how much they care about all those people over there in Israel, and how much they support them, and how Israel is our strongest ally in the Middle East, &c.

The concerns that Israelis might have about this United States promiscuous support of the Obama "Iran Nuclear Agreement" hand off might as well go unmentioned. The "our allies" are those that signed on to the agreement; and these "our allies" demand first class, priority precedence.

That whole outlook unpityingly leaves out the concerns of the unmentioned earlier Pacific Rim allies of Japan and South Korea, which are very effectively threatened by Obama's United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, in that whatever Iran gets; North Korea shares in – as the evidence seems to show. Those two unmentionable allies, Japan and North Korea, are both threatened by the whims, wrath and ire of the nuclear North Korean Government.

The double standard which seems to have permeated the sub-conscious of the 115th Congress is a kind of two class system. As observed, accommodation of those of "our allies" which have signed on to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 arrangement take priority. Others, which have not signed on, go unmentioned.

And everyone in Congress knows of the Iranian war pledges; the vows made assuring the destruction of Israel.

And no on in Congress speaks to the funding of U.S. participation in the Procurement Working Group project – a funding which goes on in violation of the Constitution, as this Congressional funding continues on unspoken of without an appropriations bill, or any kind of law to support it.

This illegal surreptitious funding by the 115th Congress, contributes pretty much clearly and directly to Iran's potential for developing nuclear weapons capacity. This illegitimate funding is clearly done with Congressional knowledge of the Iranian Government's well publicized pledged ambition to exterminate neighboring populations.

By handing off nuclear weapons capacity in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and illicitly funding this hand off in violation of the United States Constitution; the United States Government must be most reasonably construed as actively participating and assisting in a foreign State's preparations to carry out its pledged ambition to wage "... _a war of aggression, or a war in of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances...,_ [and this Congress is indulging in] _...participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing_."

The electorate is justified in considering that every member of the Congress does, in the very best moment they are only capable of, present him or herself as of the level of amorality of the War Criminal under the category of _Crimes against Peace_ as defined under the internationally codified and recognized _Control Council Law No_. 10 definition.

IN CONTRAST TO WHAT THE ELECTORATE NATIONWIDE CURRENTLY HAS – had there been any individual in Congress who would be simply reasonable, and show some decency; such a theoretical person might have protested this whole affair and complained something to the effect of:

What?!– We are stealing public Money from the Treasury to support Procurement Working Group activities, and everything that goes on around these, and all the potential consequences that might ensue – and all this without even vote or a discussion of a law to support this funding; and without any required appropriations bill to justify our endangerment of communities nationwide and to humanity as a whole?!

Not on my dime! I'm not going to violate the Constitution, and my Oath to it, just to support this imbecile drama. I'm going back to my constituency, the Community I have pledged on my honor to represent – I'm going back to my constituency, and I'm telling everybody what's going on up here on Mount Olympus; I'm going to ask everyone what they think about it – that's what I'm going to do.

Nothing like that ever happens in this day and age. You don't have little tattle-tales and snitches like that running around in this 115th Congress; the personalities crammed into this elite school are too smug and silent to sink to the level of doing anything like that.

In this period, the Congressional Record testifies that no community anywhere in the United States has any representative who would have the decency to point out that this Congress does not play by the rules.

Not one individual Citizen, in a nation of well over 300 million people, sports a single representative in Congress who will stand up and say something about how the Congress ought to abide by the Constitution in this case, and in every case.

Congressional refusal to play by the rules in this case enables the larcenous 115th Congress to embezzle public Money in favor of the most destructive objectives conceivable.

That there is not one individual in Congress having the common decency to come forward and speak out to the electorate about this ongoing secretive and unconstitutional embezzlement of public funds in support of Iranian xenophobic war aims;

That is what conveys to me that it is the amorality of the War Criminal, the amorality of the supporter and the promoter of _Crimes against Peace_ , which permeates and controls the sensibilities of, and the agreed upon standard of conduct which this 115th Congress recognizes as universally accepted, and which the 115th Congress has adopted and actively pursues and practices.

* * * * *

Repeating the observation of Chief Counsel for the Prosecution, Telford Taylor, in Nuernberg Trial III:

Although this Tribunal is internationally constituted, **it is an American court. The obligations which derive from these proceedings are, therefore, particularly binding on the United States** ...

As previously mentioned, Opening Statements of the Prosecution, in Nuernberg Trial III recounts the following:

A special Hitler decree in August 1942 gave the new Reich Minister sweeping powers to bring the administration of justice into conformity with the needs of the regime; it read:

"A strong administration of justice is necessary for the fulfillment of the tasks of the Greater German Reich. Therefore, I commission and empower the Reich Minister of Justice to establish a National Socialist Administration of Justice, and to take all necessary measures in accordance with the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Leader of the Party Chancellery. **He can hereby deviate from any existing law**." []

Naturally Hitler wanted to get rid of any vestige of judicial independence and law, which might have been still lurking from pre-Hitler times. Hitler wanted free reign to do whatever he wanted. One wonders what took him so long to assert absolute control.

The Iranian Government not only gains U.S. assistance in developing a nuclear weapons; Iran gains another important tool of tremendous value. Iran also gets, from United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, U.S. cooperation in denial and disavowal of International law.

The United States Congress itself, domestically disavows the requirements of the Constitution of the United States as a favor to the Ministers of the Government of Iran, in order to surreptitiously fund the pledged ambitions of the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

Apparently it is now game for the Congress to "hereby deviate from any existing law" in order to help out with the agreed upon, Iranian pledged xenophobic project.

The U.S. Government turns its back on international treaty and disclaims its commitment to lessons learned in World War II. This is enormously helpful to Iranian pledged ambitions.

DEVELOPMENT AND AUTHORSHIP of Resolution 2231 was spearheaded by the U.S. administration of President Barack Obama. The violations of treaty contained therein are not authorized by the Charter of the United Nations. So the authors of Resolution 2231 invented a counterfeit claim to explain it all away. In the 14th opening paragraph of Resolution 2231; the resolution falsely asserts:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2013)

Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions,

The Charter of the United Nations Article 25 doesn't say that at all. Appendix X [] of this writing presents the real text of the Article in English, French, and Spanish; and provides translation, with connotations included, from the French and Spanish. And so that there is absolutely no confusion as to what Article 25 means, that Article is also presented in the context of the preceding Article 24, clause 2, which makes the meaning very clear:

The above fantasy promoted by the Security Council is intended to leave the impression that anything the Security Council decides; must be obeyed. This assertion is specious, it is blatantly false; the Security Council can't go around telling all States that they must accept, as in this case, violation of international treaty – and participation in what could most reasonably be construed as a War Crime, falling under the category of _Crime against Peace_ just because a completely corrupt Security Council decides it.

Article 24, clause 2 of the Charter of the United Nations declares the following:

The Charter of the United Nations;

*CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 24

2. In discharging these [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations...

Any decision by the Security Council is required to conform to the Charter of the United Nations. Article 25 declares the following:

Charter of the United Nations

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

The Members agree to accept the decisions of the Security Council which are in accordance with the Charter; that do conform to the Charter;

But the Members are not "obligated;" they agree – there is a big difference in the two sensibilities. Article 2, clause 7, clarifies this:

Charter of the United Nations

*CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

7. **Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations** to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or **shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter** ; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.

It is understood that the domestic jurisdictions of members override a Security Council decision if Members feel that a Security Council seriously infringes on domestic jurisdiction. If Members feel that a Security Council resolution infringes on that State's right to abide by international treaty, Members don't even have to take the issue to Court – all they have to do is say no; that they refuse to go along with the crime.

If the Security Council has too much of a problem with that – then the burden is on the Security Council to prove the validity of its argument in Court.

In this case – the Security Council would have to show justification for the outrages the Council is trying to push through with its resolution. Regardless of whatever false and un-provable claims U.S. politician proponents of Resolution 2231 might want to promote; these wouldn't stand a chance in Court, where the evidence is all there and accounted for. The U.S. is under no obligation to join in on what be construed as _Crimes against Peace_ , or violation of Treaty.

A Security Council resolution is not international law; and the Security Council is not a recognized, competent judicial body; and an unjustifiable Security Council resolution can be superseded by a ruling from the Court – or even a "no" by any of the many Member States. Regardless of whatever bogus claims tawdry U.S. politicians feel like making if those might help to get them re-elected – a Security Council resolution is basically unenforceable if nations say "no," or unless the Security Council brings the argument to the Court for a ruling.

* * * * *

Although technically, the United States cannot be compelled to take the matter of Resolution 2231 to Court, I believe that it would be of great benefit if the United States would; preferably in alliance with a number of nations all Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; petition the International Court of Justice to have Resolution 2231 invalidated (vacated, nullified) on the grounds of its extreme violations of international treaty, and peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted.

If the International Court of Justice were to invalidate the resolution – then the following would be am outline of the result:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 2. INVALIDITY OF TREATIES

_Article 53_. Treaties Conflicting With a Peremptory Norm of General International Law ("Jus Cogens")

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVALIDITY, TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF A TREATY

_Article 71_. Consequences of the Invalidity of a Treaty which Conflicts with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law

1. In the case of a treaty which is void under article 53 [above] the parties shall:

(a) Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law; and.

(b) Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

The Parties participating in the Resolution 2231 would have to return their "... _mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law_."

The Court could order the parameters of how to "... _Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law_ ..."

Resolution 2231 is its own best testimonial; that in violation of Article II of the NPT, Iran bargained for, and got, direct material assistance in developing a nuclear weapons program; while preventing the IAEA from engaging in inspections required by treaty (in violation of clause 1 of Article III of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ).

The United States, Russia, the U.K. China, France and Germany all acted in violation of Article I of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_. This is a serious international incident very likely to be understood as the instigation and participation in pledged war of aggression in violation of Treaty and international assurances.

The Court could Order that previous sanctions initially brought against Iran's perceived potential nuclear weapons program; which has been aided and abetted by the United States along with the other Governments of the E3/EU+3 syndicate; the Court could order that sanctions introduced by previous United Nations Security Council resolutions be re-instated as if Resolution 2231, which put aside the previous sanctions, had never gone into effect.

Restored sanctions could include this following from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010)

8. [The Security Council] Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) ("the Committee"), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;

Russia and China had earlier agreed, in 2010, that they would not assist Iran in developing any of the above. Once Resolution 2231 was put in place, Iran was allowed to begin again in the building its arsenals. Without an Order by the Court to restore earlier sanctions – Russia and, or China (as well as France, the U.K., and Germany) could continue to support any weapons acceleration in Iran regardless of any ineffectual unilateral sanctions the United States might try to impose.

The Court might Rule that any exchanges of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories; due to prohibition on IAEA verification that these were not being diverted from peaceful use to nuclear weapons development. The IAEA verification is agreed upon and required by treaty. That any verification having been denied, these might have to be returned to the seller – and the seller would have to return the Iranian funds expended in these transactions made in violation of treaty – the transactions being deemed to have been carried out in violation of treaty.

This could mean that all Joint Commission and Procurement Working Group books could be ordered opened – regardless of any "Secrecy Agreement" incorporated into the resolution. An accounting of receipts and expenditures might be ordered.

Any work on multipoint detonation systems and the like; any work relating to _activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device_ could be by Court Order, investigated by the IAEA, to the Court's satisfaction.

A successful petition for remedy by the Court would necessarily terrify the most vocal U.S. politicians who had consistently made unsupportable statements espousing Barack Obama's "Iran Nuclear Deal.

* * * * *

I return to the question: "What should I ask myself on this Yom Hashoah? What should I _remind_ myself of on this Yom HaShoa?

I remind myself that for countless generations, our community has been under ongoing death threat should we ever complain or protest anything.

It is only in the most recent times – and in this United States – that we have been given the right to petition against injustice without having to fear for our lives.

Are we to express our ingratitude to the generations come before us; those who did not enjoy our rights in their lifetimes; and yet nevertheless sustained the principles and the knowledge, and discussions of Torah and Talmud?

I remind myself, on this Yom Hashoah, of the questions of Rabbi Hillel the Elder:

If I will not be for myself; then who will stand with me?

If I am only for myself; then what am I?

If not now; when?

In Israel, the community is under a greater peril – instigated by our own Government which has been, and is, encouraged by our silence.

The community in Israel stands, but not just for itself. Those of the community in Israel know who and what they are – and they stand by us.

Does our silence stand with the community? I maintain that it does not; and I maintain that our silence does not stand along side humanity as a whole – not as did our Gentile neighbors, those righteous among the nations – who stood by our side, and on the side of humanity as a whole, despite having the gun pointed at their heads – not as they did stand by humanity.

I think I am still free to express gratitude and make observation of goodness – that's one of the rare treasures we are allowed in this life.

* * * * *

IN THIS CASE, when this U.S. Government, without a law to support the project, openly violates the Constitution to fund and arm Iran with U.S. Government permission and consent, funding the acceleration Iranian capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons in part on U.S. Taxpayers' expense;

Given the documented history – I don't feel I can express any gratitude for the ploy having been initiated for evident political purposes by the Obama administration, and being maintained, currently being carried on with, by the indecisive, lethargic, and evidently completely inept Trump administration; this politicians' continuing game is vicious defying any excuse.

I am a human being – I am under as much threat from the handing off of nuclear weapons capacity, and the disdain and disavowal of international treaty and Law; I am under as much of an extraordinary threat as anyone else.

Will I stand by the community, by speaking out when I have the right to; when I have nothing to fear by doing so? I will and do.

I must ask myself then – _when_?

Now is the critical time – now cannot be put off to another day. In each day, under present identified circumstance, lawlessness and expedience consolidates its gains – justice loses place, credibility, and the dignity of acceptance and recognition.

...the Congressperson of this day and age, who feels entirely immune and secure, might only consider complaints of the constituency to be merely trivial annoyances – best responded to with some sort of typical automated response.

It doesn't matter what is written to the members of Congress – because the extremity of the situation no longer involves, or falls under the purview of their department.

Nevertheless – it doesn't hurt to let them know that the constituency considers the situation which the United States finds itself in, due in large part to continuing Congressional negligence and violation of Oath of Office – it doesn't hurt to let the respective "Representatives" in the House of Representatives and the Senate know if the constituency finds their conduct, and their silence and evasions completely unacceptable.

* * * * *

The Congress, in this circumstance – in my opinion – although worth writing to, is the wrong department to seriously concentrate on. It is the President who is the one who is given the mandate to negotiate with the several Nations unhappy with, and existentially threatened by, Barack Obama's Resolution 2231. It is the President who is the one who is given the mandate to formulate an international alliance with other Nations with a view towards petitioning the International Court of Justice to invalidate Resolution 2231. He would be the one to write to.

The substantially numerous minority of pro-nuclear weapons proliferation proponents in Congress would have little to say about such an action undertaken by a President. The President doesn't need an Act of Congress to pursue the effort. The President already has an arguably automatic mandate in this area – authorized by the Constitution:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article II - The Executive Branch

*Section 2 - State of the Union, Convening Congress

[clause 2] "...He [the President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed..."

Naturally members of the pro-Obama Resolution 2231 contingent, who have espoused the resolution, would be rankled by a suggestion that this resolution should find petition in the International Court of Justice – and these members might try to obstruct such an action;

But burn-outs in Congress attempting to defend an untenable position, are in poor position to resist Justice.

Resolution 2231 was never presented to a vote – and it was never voted on. The resolution is not recognized as domestic law on any level. And the Congress has been expropriating public Money, from the Treasury, on behalf of supporting the resolution, the non-law, without any discussed or voted on appropriations bill – an appropriations bill required by the Constitution.

The whole of Congress justifiably could be thought of as a series of embezzlers in violation of Oath of Office; purloiners without any morals – purloiners who eschew the principle of Representative Government in favor of extracting public Money from the Treasury for whatever unexplained expediency and political convenience they don't feel like answering for; and this for a Security Council resolution project, which violates treaty and arguably constitutes an internationally defined _Crime against Peace_ ;

It would be hard to imagine that the pro-Obama resolution acolytes, with so much to hide, could get near enough votes in the 115th Congress to even get close to getting a Joint Resolution passed which might obstruct the President from taking a Security Council resolution, so menacing to the United States, and to humanity as a whole to Court.

Chief Counsel for the Prosecution, Telford Taylor, in Nuernberg Trial III observed:

Crimes, theoretically and, more often than not, actually, are these acts, which are so contrary to the moral conscience of the community or so dangerous to the maintenance of a reasonable degree of order, justice and peace in the community, that the community, by appropriate processes, demands their elimination and suppression in the interest of the individuals who constitute the community...[]

The unsupportable fantasy tales the Congressional pro-nuclear weapons proliferation proponents tell, about Resolution 2231 preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, can't stand up to documented facts. The proponents of Barack Obama's Security Council resolution are confronted by the facts, as documented in the text of the resolution itself. The resolution can't hide what it is.

The resolution is designed to commit the U.S. to assisting Iran in developing nuclear weapons capacity over a fifteen year period – this entirely in violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_.

What are these acolytes of the Resolution 2231 scheme in the Congress going to say in protest to the current President initiating a petition to the Court to have the resolution invalidated? Much the same half-baked baseless arguments as always, one might expect. The proponents of the resolution haven't got a defense with facts, or anything to defend with facts.

If this President Trump tried out a quarter of the snappy and the directly honest; instead of the time he wastes on the swagger and boast; he might simply point out what's going on with the Procurement Working Group mandate and what the U.S. is involved with. Maybe that way he could begin to get something constructive done on correcting the issue. That possibility would probably terrify this assembly of embezzlers and maybe put an end to any of discussion of the baseless claims of these pro-nuclear weapons proliferation politicians preferring to see the world go down as long as their political careers could seem secure for the time being.

Going through the Congressional Record one reads of almost all of them, those members of Congress, traipsing up and down, on both sides of the aisle; going on about their huge support for the Holy Land – all the while unanimously surreptitiously embezzling public Money to fund the Resolution 2231 debacle – which supports Iran's pledged ambition to exterminate the populations of Israel (Christians and Jews alike); those Peoples of which these members of Congress all claim to care oh-so-much about.

Concern for protecting Barack Obama's embarrassment isn't nearly as important as supporting human communities, human knowledge and civilization.

Protecting the safety of the United States, the Middle East, Europe, and the Pacific Rim; are far more important than protecting and tolerating the actions and reputations of these politicians.

Protecting the shaming reputations of the current political clique, manifesting itself in what that self-interested clique of politicians names itself as belonging to – the "Democratic Party" – whatever that is; or that current political clique, manifesting itself in what that self-interested clique of politicians calls the "Republican Party"– whatever that is;

Protecting the interests of their partisan prattle, and the rest of their shaming embarrassment, is not nearly as important as protecting justice, and the rule of law, and the safety of human populations. The Security Council resolution demands to be brought to Court. The electorate has the right to petition the President to bring this aberration of a Security Council resolution to the Court and have it thrown out. The resolution violates too many critical laws; it poses a clear menace to humanity; it couldn't be sustained under challenge.

IT SEEMS SO OBVIOUS to me – the memory of the injustice is well known and never forgotten. What was done is not forgotten.

After the defeat of the Nazi Regime, the laws developed by the _International Military Tribunal_ were applied in the Nuernberg series of Trials.

Control Council Law No. 10 provides who may be thought of as culpable as a War Criminal:

CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a) [pertaining to Crimes against Peace], if he held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) position ... or held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country.

Reiterating the definitions of "Crimes against Peace:

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) **Crimes against Peace**. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, **preparation** , initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or **participation in a common plan** **or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing**.

Although the inmates of the 115th Congress will probably never be brought up on war crimes charges; the electorate has every right to be entirely outraged by this Congress, which surreptitiously extracts public Money to fund U.S. participation in the common plan of the Procurement Working Group, whose mandate it is to expedite and approve Iranian procurement of nuclear weapons associated assets while preventing the IAEA from verifying that these are not being diverted from peaceful use, to the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran.

Iran has pledged the extermination of especially the Jews; and those Israeli Christians, and anyone else in the area at the wrong time; effectively all would naturally share the same fate as the Israeli Jews if a nuclear weapon were set on top of them all.

The U.S. Congress funds the project, and shirks discussing U.S. Government participation in assisting Iran in its ongoing weapons preparations. It can easily be most reasonably construed by the electorate that these inmates of the 115th Congress; engaged in the sport of surreptitiously purloining public Money in violation of the Constitution and in support of the Iranian Ministers' cause; are actively participating in the Iranian contemplated and pledged extermination of populations in Israel. Recalling the words of Presiding Justice James Tenney Brand, in Nuernberg Trial III:

...The person who persuades another to commit murder, the person who furnishes the lethal weapon for the purpose of its commission, and the person who pulls the trigger are all principals or accessories to the crime.

That all of these people in Congress, without exception, universally would go so far as to violate the United States Constitution in order to surreptitiously participate in support of Iranian threatened genocide – it could be justifiably felt by the electorate that the constituencies don't need to be "represented" by a larcenous clique of persons steeped in the operation of an amoral practice characteristic of the War Criminal – as defined under codified international law.

The viciousness of the Hitlerites, the adherents to the Nazi regime, is well known. What was done is not forgotten.

Refusal to speak out against the same injustice ongoing in our own time – and in part perpetrated by our own Government; the refusal to speak out against this ongoing injustice which we attend to in silence, regardless of our opportunity to do otherwise;

That refusal to speak up allows that we will tolerate in silence that the same recognized viciousness which has so haunted humanity throughout the millennia. Our refusal to speak up insures that this same xenophobic violence will be carried out in our own lifetimes in the way Hitler would have wanted to if only he had possessed the means.

This whole policy must be spoken out against; this can't be tolerated in silence. Nobody has forgotten what happened. Nobody has forgotten the laws put into action, and applied by the Courts directly after the defeat of the Nazis.

Those laws never went away – and the Charter of the United Nations is Party to those laws. And when a Security Council resolution transgresses against those laws, as this writing maintains Resolution 2231 so seriously does; then the resolution is automatically not made under the Authority of the Charter of the United Nations; it was null the moment the vote was concluded. A ruling from the Court on this issue will force nations instigating and participating in this Iran Nuclear Project to bring their mutual relations into conformity with peremptory norm of general international law; and put an end this sadistic charade.

Silence is unacceptable in the face of this affront to humanity; this affront to multiple international treaties, to domestic and international rule of law. Silence is especially unacceptable when the option to speak out is now, like never before, so utterly supported by international law.

Never before in history has a set of international laws been in place to protect humanity from the violence of despotism as there have been developed, beginning with the inception of the International Military Tribunal laws established in final years preceding the defeat of the Nazi's. The time has never been better to petition the International Court of Justice to put a stop to this menace. That Court has the authority to do this.

A Security Council resolution is not even an international law – despite what the proponents of nuclear weapons proliferation might say in hopes that their outrageous policies might somehow be made to sound legitimate. Inmates incarcerated in this 115th Congress often say things untrue, and also refuse to admit or acknowledge, a lot more things which are true.

Certainly no record is found of any of those politicians even suggesting recourse to rule of law, to the International Court of Justice, as they busy themselves extracting public Money from the Treasury unannounced.

The constituencies should make an issue of raising this whole issue; and urge the President to take this Security Council resolution, this challenging menace, to the International Court of Justice.

If President Trump can find it within himself to do, he should bring together an alliance of nations, all threatened by the malevolent policies of this Security Council resolution – this United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. The international alliance would be comprised of States all party to the NPT. Many would be of those directly targeted by Iran and North Korea in those belligerent nation's respective spheres of influence and missile range.

An international alliance, putting together a crack international legal team; a team familiar with and experienced in the usages of the International Court of Justice, would have a resounding positive effect worldwide.

The only effective remedy to this destructive Security Council resolution is to have it invalidated by the Court so that nations Party to the travesty are forced to bring their international mutual relations back into conformity with peremptory norm of general international law.

A petition to the Court is a far more preferable to the position; the choice and stance this United States Government presents at the moment – this choice to expedite the Iran nuclear project and let things fall as they may.

A petition to the Court is far more preferable to aiding and abetting the potential fulfillment of Iran's pledge to commit genocide; far more preferable to enabling the Government of North Korea to effectively maintain itself through a perpetual policy of international nuclear blackmail; far more preferable to arming with nuclear weapons a United States Government recognized, and also self-declared State Sponsor of Foreign Terror Organizations; organizations which Iran promotes and argues for, representing these groups as Freedom Fighters.

The policy of the current United States Government to help the Iran nuclear weapons project along is sheer depravity. Members of Congress might deny that is what the U.S. is doing. Both the banana Republicans and the banana Democrats all swear up and down that they're whole objective is to keep Iran from getting the bomb; it's just that their approach is different, that's all.

But the approach of the Republicans and the Democrats is exactly the same. Both political parties violate the United States Constitution in their unanimous endeavor to hide the Government's surreptitious funding of United States participation in the antics of the Procurement Working Group. And all political parties refuse to discuss the bureaucracy

If anyone in Congress really believed that Resolution 2231 had a glimmer of a chance of stopping Iran from getting the bomb; then they should have no fear in coming out and voting on an appropriations bill to fund U.S. participation in the Procurement Working Group.

This refusal to discuss or vote on an appropriations bill is an example of the numb amorality characteristic of the of the War Criminal; those persons who sit out of the way on the sidelines, all the while promoting the aggression with continued funding and moral support.

There is no better time to speak up than now. Silence can only be expected to result in something which will be suffered by ourselves and others throughout our lifetimes, and throughout the lifetimes of those who come after us; and under continuingly vicious worsening settings abjectly subject to the growing lawlessness of the arbitrary whims of despotic dictatorships;

The leaderships of those absolutist regimes being encouraged in their knowledge that with continued threats and violence; eventually backed by their supporting nuclear weapons capacity which is to be used as blackmailing intimidation; the leaders of those Governments may feel free to convince themselves that they need hesitate at nothing, and be confident that they can get away with anything they want.

* * * * *

Books by the Same Author: Jean-Marc LeBouquin

– Throw All the Bums Out Legal;  
Explanation of the National "Vote of No Confidence" Amendment –

– A Singular Charter in Perpetuity –

– Congress Jerks the General; The Citizen Too –

– Hoping or Better Swindler's Seats –

– U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking –

– A Vice President's Adventures in Letter –

– Smiling Vultue Ignites Escalation –

– What Do I Ask Myself on This Yom Hashoa?–

Second Part – Appendices
* * * * *

Chapter 2 – Appendix I – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause

Check [] return; [] return;

What is allowed and what is not allowed as far as concerns IAEA Participation in review of nuclear related assets acquired by Iran is detailed in the JCPOA as follows:

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

6.4. Except as otherwise provided by the Joint Commission or the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:

6.4.1 Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA..:

As a concession to the IAEA, the Agency is informed as to the contents of a proposal when such proposal "... relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA...;" which, as it turns out, means when a proposal has nothing to do with nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories.

6.1.6. ...When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.

A clearer sense of which meetings the IAEA is authorized to attend, as opposed to not authorized, begins to take on more defined shape upon a bit further examination of later provisions of paragraph six with its subs and sub-subs:

6.7. Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.

6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.

The IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1; unlike INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; refers to components and technologies associated specifically with nuclear energy production.

Sub paragraph 6.7 says the IAEA can hang around and check out the lay of the land – the end uses and end use locations of any goods and technology, any inventory, procured from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1.

When it comes to Iranian acquisitions from the prominent, nuclear weapons related inventories listed of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a, the IAEA is dropped from the picture; the Oligarchy authors of the arrangement leave out mention of anything about the IAEA being invited to drop in for inspection time.

It being the case therefore, that IAEA is explicitly not allowed in either to meetings, and is not explicitly granted authority to confirm end-use location of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories – one might ask if the IAEA is allowed to inspect this anyway.

Paragraph 26 of Resolution 2231 – Annex A: JCPOA – section _SANCTIONS_ informs us of the following:

26. ...There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration ... will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. **Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part**.

Any attempt to insist – after the _fait accompli_ – that the IAEA suddenly should be given access to meetings relating to; or given applicable knowledge of end-use or end-use location whereabouts of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons related inventories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; anything like that could justifiably be understood as an attempt to sabotage the E3/EU+3 Iran arrangement effort by imposing a new nuclear related restriction, or restrictive measure.

Note: All participating Parties to the negotiation and concluded arrangement were united in their approval over what had been agreed upon.

It must also be noted that All Parties signatory to the NPT agree that it is the International Atomic Energy Agency that has the duty, the obligation, the responsibility and the mandate to verify that there is no "... _diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices_ ," as follows under the first clause of Article III of the NPT – or to report otherwise:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive **purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices** ...

* * * * *
* * * * *

Chapter 3 Appendix II – The Procurement Working Group and its mandate to expedite Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

[] return;

The provisions detailing the activities and mandate of the Procurement Working Group are laid out in JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission; a sub-Annex of Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is itself an Annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) – S/RES/2231 (2015). Here then, is the authentic, accepted plan put forward by the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel arrangement – beginning with paragraph 6 of Annex IV:

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6. Procurement Working Group

6.1. With the purpose of establishing a procurement channel, the Joint Commission will, ...decide on proposals by states seeking to engage in:

6.1.1. the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and, if the end-use will be for Iran's nuclear programme set out in this JCPOA or other non-nuclear civilian end-use, all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the relevant State determines that they could contribute to activities inconsistent with the JCPOA; and,

6.1.2. the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above ;

6.1.6. Except as decided otherwise by consensus, the Procurement Working Group will meet every three weeks for reviewing the proposals. When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

6.3. Each E3+3 State and Iran will participate in the Procurement Working Group. The High Representative [of the European Union] will serve as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group.

6.4. ... the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:

6.4.1. Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator [of the Joint Commission] will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA. The Procurement Working Group will have up to 30 working days to consider and decide on the proposal.

6.4.3. Each participant in the Procurement Working Group will have to communicate to the Coordinator, within 20 working days, whether it approves or rejects the proposal. The timeline for consideration may be extended for an additional period of 10 working days at the request of a participant of the Procurement Working Group.

6.4.4. The proposal will be recommended for approval as soon as the Coordinator receives formal approvals from all the Procurement Working Group Participants or if, at the end of the 30 working day period, the Coordinator has received no disapprovals from any of the Procurement Working Group Participants. If at the end of the 30 working day period, the proposal has not been recommended for approval, the proposal may, at the request of at least two Working Group Participants within 5 working days, be referred to the Joint Commission, which would decide on approval of the proposal by consensus within 10 working days. Otherwise the proposal will be recommended for disapproval. The disapproving JCPOA participant(s) should provide relevant information regarding the disapproval to the Joint Commission as appropriate, taking into account the need to protect confidential information.

6.4.5. The Coordinator will communicate the recommendation of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council no later than 35 working days, or in case of referral to the Joint Commission no later than 45 working days from the date the Coordinator transmitted the proposal and all necessary supporting information to the Procurement Working Group.

Oddly, the JCPOA itself doesn't mention anything about the Security Council taking part in this decision making process concerning what gets sent to Iran. Effectively the Security Council's role in this matter could be described as, at best, peripheral – but where is there any mention of that peripheral role?

Resolution 2231, section JCPOA Implementation paragraph 16 (not to be confused as part of the Annex A: JCPOA; this section appears towards the beginning of Resolution 2231) tersely mentions the part that the Security Council plays in this decision making process, stipulating that:

16. [the Security Council] Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to review recommendations of the Joint Commission regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B, and that such recommendations shall be deemed to be approved unless the Security Council adopts a resolution to reject a Joint Commission recommendation within five working days of receiving it;

The description of the Procurement Working Group thus far has reached a certain level of complexity; naturally a flow chart, at this point, is in order to help clarify the process:

It is worth noting that once the determination to violate treaty has been made by the recruits stationed around the Procurement Working Group worktable; the entire body of the Security Council, under this system, has five working days to mount a defense against the violation of treaty endorsed by those recruits.

The Security Council has five days to put forward a proposal to reject the violation of treaty endorsed by the recruits of the institutionalized Procurement Working Group. If one of the five permanent members of the Security Council decides to uphold the violation of treaty recommended by the recruited staff of the Procurement Working Group – and veto any resolution against the Procurement Working Group decision; then the choice of the Procurement Working Group recruits to render the judicial decision to violate peremptory norm of general international law; to violate international treaty signed on to by a multitude of nations – that choice of the Procurement Working Group stands in force.

* * * * *

Chapter 4 – Appendix III – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

This is following is an excerpt of the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list – the complete document is found at: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents

Or as an alternate source: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

ANNEX CONTENTS

5. Test and Measurement Equipment for the Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices

5.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

5.B.1. Flash X-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators 5 – 1

5.B.2. High-velocity gun systems

5.B.3. High speed cameras and imaging devices

5.B.5. Specialized instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments

5.B.6. High-speed pulse generators

5.B.7. High explosive containment vessels

5.D. SOFTWARE

5.D.1. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment not controlled in Item 5.B.3. so that it meets or exceeds the characteristics specified in Item 5.B.3.

5.D.2. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment controlled in Item 5.B.3.

5.E. TECHNOLOGY

5.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 5.A. through 5.D.

6. Components for Nuclear Explosive Devices

6.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

6.A.1. Detonators and multipoint initiation systems

6.A.2. Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulse generators

6.A.3. Switching devices

6.A.4. Pulse discharge capacitors

6.A.5. Neutron generator systems

6.A.6. Striplines

6.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

6.C. MATERIALS

6.C.1. High explosive substances or mixtures,

6.E. TECHNOLOGY 6 – 4

6.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development","production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software"

These are examples of some of the inventory found in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; but to understand a little of what is meant by the above we must look at some definitions:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013) ;

DEFINITIONS

"Development" --

is related to all phases before "production" such as:

• design

• design research

• design analysis

• design concepts

• assembly and testing of prototypes

• pilot production schemes

• design data

• process of transforming design data into a product

• configuration design

• integration design

• layouts

"Production" --

means all production phases such as:

• construction

• production engineering

• manufacture

• integration

• assembly (mounting)

• inspection

• testing

• quality assurance

"Technical assistance" --

"Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

"Technical data" --

"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

"Technology" --

means specific information required for the "development", "production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance".

The above is a partial list, giving a sense of the kinds of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies, training and support services the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel.

* * * * *

* * * * *

Chapter 5 – Appendix IV – IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a.

Here is some of what the International Atomic Energy Agency has to say about that list of inventories that the Agency itself had put together:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013);

GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR-RELATED DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, SOFTWARE, AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

OBJECTIVE

1. With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, suppliers have had under consideration procedures in relation to the transfer of certain equipment, materials, software, and related technology that could make a major contribution to a "nuclear explosive activity," an "unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity" or acts of nuclear terrorism. In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common definitions, and an export control list of equipment, materials, software, and related technology. Suppliers intend to implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation and relevant international commitments.

And some of the Basic Principles are:

BASIC PRINCIPLE

2. Suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, materials, software, or related technology identified in the Annex:

– for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or

– in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or

– when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism.

* * * * *

* * * * *

Chapter 6 – Appendix V – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran

Check [] return;

As of JCPOA Implementation Day, 16 January 2016 was allowed, upon approval of the Procurement Working Group – Joint Commission, and acceptance by the Security Council, the acquire INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories.

Procurement activities began only as of October 2016. From November 2016 – towards the end of Barack Obama's term in office – through December 2017, thirteen such procurement proposals for items listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a have been approved. The following are the relevant excerpts from the United Nations Security Council Six-month reports of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) which verify the Security Council approvals of such Iranian acquisitions:

_Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231_ (2015) [18 January 2017].

The English Language version is found on the United Nations website at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/49&Lang=E

_Third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [27 June 2017]

_Fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [15 December 2017]

All of these can be found on the same page: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/briefings-by-the-facilitator.shtml

Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [18 January 2017]

V. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

18. The procurement channel processed five proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) that had been submitted by two Member States to the Security Council for approval. In accordance with paragraph 8 (b) of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), the proposals were immediately forwarded to the Joint Commission for its review.

19. Two proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council on 6 October 2016. The Joint Commission provided recommendations of approval. The two proposals were subsequently approved by the Council on 17 November 2016. One proposal for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 was submitted to the Council on 15 November. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval. The proposal was approved by the Council on 28 December. Two \proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Council on 6 December. These proposals are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

20. On 23 December 2016, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) the second six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2016/1113), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reflecting the activities performed during the said six-month reporting period..

Paragraph 20 informs us that the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) the second six-month Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues. This document (S/2016/1113) gives some further insight into what the Procurement Working Group had been up to in the last six months of 2016. The report advises that it "...provides an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 7 July to 22 December 2016."

Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (Doc. S/2016/1113) – [23 December 2016]

V. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

2. During the reporting period, the Procurement Working Group — comprising the States that are participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with a designated representative of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy serving as Coordinator — held six meetings. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated as observers in one of the meetings. The Procurement Working Group reviewed five proposals from two States. Three of the proposals were recommended for approval. The rest are currently under review.

The above paragraph 2 of the Joint Commission report speaks of six meetings held, with the IAEA being allowed to attend only one of them. Of five proposals submitted by two separate States, two are under review, three were approved.

Paragraph 19 of the Facilitator's report tells us that of the five proposals submitted only one was related to items listed on the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 document which deals primarily with components for nuclear reactors. Paragraph 2 above tells us that, coincidentally, the IAEA had attended only one of the meetings of the Procurement Working Group.

THE THIRD REPORT informs that five more INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a related proposals were also approved – bringing the total of nuclear weapons related proposals up to nine:

Third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [27 June 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

25. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval for the two proposals that had been submitted to the Security Council in December 2016 and were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report. The two proposals were subsequently approved by the Council.

26. During the reporting period, 10 new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council, including 2 for temporary export for the purposes of demonstration and display in an exhibition. Five of those proposals have been approved, one has been withdrawn and four are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

THE FOURTH REPORT informs that four more INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a related proposals were also approved – bringing the total of nuclear weapons related proposals up to thirteen through 2017:

Fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [15 December 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

29. During the reporting period, eight new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Four of these proposals have been approved, two have been rejected and two have been withdrawn.

30. In addition, the Security Council approved two and rejected one of the four proposals that were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report (S/2017/537). The fourth proposal has been withdrawn.

31. Since Implementation Day, a total of 24 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been, submitted to the Security Council by four Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

In all, through end of year 2017 – thirteen proposals having to do with Iranian INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories have been approved. 24 proposals had been submitted altogether.

IAEA Board of Governor reports (listed below) throughout the same period indicate that the IAEA has been allowed to attend only 4 of those meetings. Clearly the IAEA is being kept away from the major portion of what goes on in terms of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear related goods:

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2016/46 – Date: 8 September 2016

E. Other Relevant Information

22. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2016/55 – Date: 9 November 2016

E. Other Relevant Information

22. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/10 – Date: 24 February 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

26. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/24 – Date: 2 June 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

27. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/33 – Date: 31 August 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

28. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/48 – Date: 13 November 2017

27. During this reporting period, the Agency attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

* * * * *

* * * * *

Chapter 7 – Appendix VI – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress

Check [10] return

Barack Obama did not share with the Congress, any part of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 other than Annex A – as is documented in this following timeline of events – this despite that he had signed into Law and agreement that should have guaranteed his doing so.

The following presents a step-by step timeline of how this evasion of responsibility by the Obama administration was carried out:

**ON 22 MAY 2015** , as President, Barack Obama, signed the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ into law. This law stipulates that within not later than five calendar days "...after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit [such agreement] to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership...;"

And that " _an agreement_ ," for the purposes of that Act is defined as:

"... _an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future_."

This appendix is an examination of the simple ruse used by the White House to evade transmitting United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to Congress.

**ON TUESDAY 14 July 2015** , the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed in Vienna. President Barack Obama made a speech from the East Room of the White House corroborating the event stating, among other things:

" _After two years of negotiations, the United States, together with our international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has not: a comprehensive long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon_." [].

**On the same day** ; in another part of the world, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano asserted that the following had been agreed to and mutually signed on to by the IAEA and Iran:

"I have just signed the Road-map between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. The text has been signed on behalf of Iran by the country's Vice-President, and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi. This is a significant step forward towards clarifying outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. ...

'... _Implementation of this Road-map will provide an important opportunity to resolve the outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme_. ... []"

Director General Amano then proceeded to an explanation – which was reprinted in IAEA Board of Governors report GOV/INF/2015/14: In his explanation, Director General Amano stipulates that Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on 14 July 2015, had entered into two side agreements, which can be associated with the new JCPOA. Here are some excerpts of his explanation:

Road-map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program:

Joint Statement

By the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi.

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi agreed on 14 July 2015 the following ...

1. The IAEA and Iran agreed on a separate arrangement that would allow them to address the remaining outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director's General report (GOV/2011/65). Activities undertaken and the outcomes achieved to date by Iran and the IAEA regarding some of the issues will be reflected in the process. ...

5. Iran and the IAEA agreed on another separate arrangement regarding the issue of Parchin.

**ON THURSDAY, 16 July 2015** , Texas Senator Ted Cruz addressed a letter to Barack Obama describing some of his concerns relating to the JCPOA. Senator Cruz wrote:

"Language in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) assumes Congressional consent of this agreement and fails to even mention the statutory review process that you signed into law on February 27, 2015...."

[This writing isn't sure why Senator Cruz mentioned February 27, he may have been thinking of the date of the inception of the original Bill – the bill which would be later known as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.'' This writing adheres to the date listed on Public Law 114–17, which is 22 May 2015]

"Specifically, Annex V of the JCPOA states that the United States and Iran "will endorse this JCPOA," and further elucidates that the UN Security Council will undertake a prompt review of the agreement after the conclusion of negotiations..."

In the above, the Senator is paraphrasing material from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:

i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.

Presented following is a facsimile of the letter Senator Cruz sent the White House on 16 July 2015 – viewing the whole of what was sent might give a better understanding of the impressions the Senator was under during the course of the week's events.

[The letter which follows; and which was quoted from previously; can be found at:

https://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/20150716_LettertoPOTUSonIranDeal.pdf.]

* * * * *

For the purposes of this writing, referencing this 16 July 2015 letter clarifies that the Executive Branch had transmitted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to the Congress by at least 16 July 2015. We note from the above facsimile that on Thursday the 16th, Senator Cruz was under the impression: "...That [Ambassador] Samantha Power has already introduced a draft resolution to the Security Council ..." Actually, Ambassador Ms. Power was up to something quite different on that day.

* * * * *

**On Thursday July 16, 2015** , two days after the July 14th Vienna signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ms. Samantha Power, sent a Letter of Transmittal to the acting President of the United Nations Security Council, Mr. McCully of New Zealand. Ms. Power wrote: "The United States Mission to the United Nations requests that the attached Missile Technology Control Regime list (see annex) be circulated as a document of the Security Council." []

The letter was necessary as part of a sub-gambit. Nobody needed the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex to be re-circulated through the Security Council. Such an action would represent a redundancy. The above list is a well known international document.

It would be like asking the Security Council to re-circulate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is perfectly alright to do so – but it would be sort of a waste of departmental secretaries' time.

The purpose of this seemingly trivial exercise was not necessarily to have the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex circulated. It was to get that Security Council document number appearing on that upper left hand corner of the page of the copied letter of transmittal. This document number was immediately used as a code word, avoiding the need to refer directly to the Annex by name within the text of Resolution 2231 – as we shall soon examine.

When it came time for Congress to debate United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; the use of the code word, which nobody in Congress would think to wonder as to the meaning of or look into, would initially obscure from the body of the Security Council: and, or from the Congress, or from the electorate, positive knowledge that certain classes of weapons were to be made available to Iran through the agreement – as is shown by the provision of Resolution 2231 presented below.

The Code Word was used once in Resolution 2231. It was needed for use in Annex B of the resolution, paragraph 4(a) below. Annex B would never be transmitted to the Congress – nevertheless the code word was used in the following Annex B; paragraph 4(a), which has since become well-known:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B. - Statement

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; and

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

The code word gambit would make it easier for the administration to hide its assistance to, and promotion of the Iranian expansions of its ballistic missile program and arsenals; and to assert that the agreement authored by the Obama administration, had every intention of retaining sanctions limiting Iranian weapons procurements – as opposed to allowing and promoting unheard of Iranian paying procurement of the latest in western weapons design style in advanced achievement.

Appendix XI – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime [50]; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex. presents a substantial excerpt from the list and gives a pretty good idea of what the administration was attempting to cover up with its code word.

ON FRIDAY 17 July 2015: Barack Obama, completely ignoring the Texas Senator's letter as a matter of course; went ahead and had his draft resolution deposited with the Security Council.

Here is a facsimile of the header to the first page of United States of America: draft resolution S/2015/547 is presented immediately below presented as verification of the chronology as stated:

The entire document of the original draft resolution (in pfd format) submitted on the 17 July 2015 was to be found at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/547 [last accessed May, 3 2016.]. However, the United Nations has since modified the document it allows the public to review. The new web address finding United States of America: draft resolution is: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2F2015%2F547&Lang=E

What's missing in this newer version here is any mention of the submittal of the draft resolution by the United States – or the date on which the draft resolution was deposited, by the United States, with the Security Council (17 July 2015). That's perhaps an example of part of your Obama-era, post Obama-Era United Nations Security Council emerging style of paperwork deciding upon the new ideal of what to show the public, and when, in this day and age:

The header of this later version does note that the draft resolution was put out for General Distribution on 20 July 2015, the date of adoption of the resolution by the Security Council. Here then, the Security Council establishes its claim that the entire body of the Security Council, which does include the non-permanent Member States of the Council (none of which were privy to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA negotiation itself); here the Security Council establishes its chronology, which verifies the claim (voiced the morning of the 20th by U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power, and which will be documented anon) that there had been no real review of the draft resolution by the entire body of the Security Council before the 9 AM vote for adoption on Monday morning, 20 July 2015, before anyone was really sure if everyone had even already had their cup of coffee yet.

The original version of the draft resolution can still be found in two places that this writing knows of:

_Human Rights Voices_ has it listed at:

http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/7.17.2015.security.council.resolution.iran.pdf

And _document cloud.org_ retains this at:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2168507/security-council-draft-resolution.pdf

The identical adopted Security Council Resolution 2231 version, as adopted on 20 July 2015 is found at is found (in English) at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015)

To find United Nations Security Council resolutions by year refer to: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions

**ON SUNDAY, 19 July 2015** , Obama Spokesperson John Kirby announced in a press release that the State Department had transmitted to Congress everything relevant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – this was the day before Resolution 2231 was even adopted by the Security Council. The resolution didn't exist yet, transmittal of an authorized version was impossible – and since, as the Security Council claims, the draft proposal would only be circulated of the following day; for the State Department to transmit to Congress an official copy of an un-circulated U.N. document would have been a bureaucratic impossibility. Here is what Kirby released to the news media:

"Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include the Unclassified Verification Assessment Report on the JCPOA and the Intelligence Community's Classified Annex to the Verification Assessment Report, as required under the law. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20 []."

What Kirby does here is to declare that the administration has transmitted these documents as " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ ;" the act which stipulates that:

Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership— ''(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes;

...and continues on by defining what an "Agreement" as far as it concerns the Bill:

''(1) AGREEMENT.—The term 'agreement' means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.

The JCPOA is of interest; but no more so than the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. According to the law, the 60-day countdown period for review couldn't and can't begin just because the Obama administration had only transmitted a part of Resolution 2231. The President had not transmit to Congress the main attraction, the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

Sunday 19 July 2015, was the day before Monday 20 July 2017 – the day when the Security Council voted unanimously to recognize the Draft Resolution deposited by the United States administration of President Barack Obama.

It's too easy to know: Barack Obama's intentionally mendacious Gnome Agent John Kirby claimed to have transmitted everything required by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 to Congress on the day before the awaited United Nations Security Council authorization qualifying the agreement existed. The United Nations' recognized perception the agreement didn't exist yet.

John Kirby declared that: " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include ..., as required under the law. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20._ "

The Obama administration, in asserting that it had sent everything, asserted the irrelevancy of the United Nations Security Council resolution to be declared the following day.

This was the excuse the maliciously mendacious overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress that there were any significant additions to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA that the administration felt might merit any discussion by the Congress of the United States.

This was the excuse the overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress the various weapons transactions agreed to within the entirety of Barack Obama's United States Proposed Draft Resolution, which was accepted as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) on 20 July 2019 – the day after Obama Gnome Agent offered the Obama administration's official statement claiming that it had sent everything relevant which needed be submitted to Congress.

**ON MONDAY, 20 July 2015** , the vote adopting Barack Obama's United States draft proposal S/2015/547 as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 takes place in the 7488th meeting of the Security Council. Now Barack Obama finally had something to send Congress; but there is no movement at that time of any time following, in that regard, emanating from the Obama White House. The 60 day countdown for Congressional review of the "Iran Deal" officially begins – not because Obama had transmitted Resolution 2231 to the Congress; but because Obama had decided explicitly on his own that the race will get started at that time; perhaps, because it should be thought of as the race to see if Congress would ever figure out within the 60-day countdown period that Obama had not acted on any pretence of an intention to effect transmission of Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress...

The day before the resolution existed; on Sunday 19 July 2015; the Obama administration effectively told the Congress that whatever was in that resolution; to be voted on the next day, wasn't of interest to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 law. The Obama administration here had implicitly, or maybe more or less explicitly, asserted that many of the agreed upon weapons transfers to Iran which are reflected in parts of Resolution 2231 other than Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, were not of interest to Congress or the law Obama had signed on to. Whatever the case contemplated and put into effect by the Obama administration; there was never a transmittal of Resolution 2231 to the Congress from the; but further confirmation on that point is required:

**ON WEDNESDAY, 22 July 2015** , White House Spokesperson John Kirby held a press conference in the White House.

The following is a recounting of some further details of the questions posed, and answers given during that July 22 press Conference.

QUESTION: _Yes, please. Just to clarify, you mentioned that the Congress has what we have. And in the same time you mentioned yesterday and today in a TV appearance that you transferred to the Congress all the documents that you have regarding this issue. Can you describe it? I mean, what is it? I mean, it's like it is detailed or it's just – I assume it's not_ \--

MR KIRBY: _It's the entire set of documents that go along with the deal to include the annexes and a verification assessment_.

QUESTION: ... _It's all the technical, the financial part and everything_?

MR KIRBY: ... _It's – everything that we have about this deal has been provided to Congress. And I would point out that much of it is already available to all of you online_.

QUESTION: ... _It's not the 158 pages, right? It's more than that, right_?

MR KIRBY: ... _There is some additional information provided there, yeah, but a lot of it's already been made publicly available. But yes, everything is up there. It got there on Sunday_ [].

And of course, on Sunday, 19 July 2015; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 didn't exist yet.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 was not going to get transmitted to the Congress. Going through the Congressional Record, and State Department records, there is no trace of anything having to do with Obama's "Iran Deal" being transmitted or received after that Sunday, the 19th. The Statements made on the 22nd by John Kirby would be the White House final word on the matter.

That no one in Congress would complain about how the information being relayed by the White House simply didn't match up with the facts is another example of the lack attention, the dinterest; and the primitive nature of discussion surrounding this issue of Security Council Resolution 2231, "JCPOA."

* * * * *

But not quite; the White House later, in December 2015, made a very interesting declaration in writing concerning this "Obama Deal" which was never reviewed by the Congress.

Although everyone in Congress knew about the 20 July 2015 vote in the Security Council, it was blithely ignored until members of the Senate – Republicans Tom Cotton and Mike Pompeo made an earth-shattering discovery/observation on or around 18 September 2015 that nobody in Congress had any signed copies of the JCPOA.

This discovery dawned on these two after both Houses of Congress had voted on something purported to be the "Iran Nuclear Deal" on 10 and 11 September 2017, a little over a week before.

Being the wondering audience they were, Senator Pompeo wrote the State Department, Secretary of State John Kerry, on 18 September 2015, asking questions:

Dear Secretary Kerry:

I have reviewed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Islamic Republic of Iran – or at least the parts of the agreement that were provided to Congress by the administration. As you know, pursuant to H. Res. 411, the House of Representatives considers the documents transmitted on July 19, 2015 incomplete in light of the fact that the secret side deals between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran were not provided to Congress. I look forward to seeing the entire agreement – including the two secret side deals that are part of the JCPOA – so that Congress may continue to evaluate the JCPOA and, depending on the outcome of the vote under the relevant provisions of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, potentially end the current and continuing prohibition of the lifting of sanctions on Iran.

During that review, I found that the copies provided to Congress of the JCPOA are not signed by any of the P5+1 members nor by Iran. Having never seen an international agreement of this magnitude not signed by the parties or an agent of the parties, I assume this is simply an oversight or an administrative error. That is, Congress must not have the final version of the agreement that would necessarily be signed. I request that you provide us with copies of a final, executed copy of the JCPOA. In the event that the JCPOA has not yet been signed by the parties, please inform us (a) when signatures will be placed on the agreement, (b) what parties will be signing, and (c) which person you anticipate will sign on behalf of each of those parties, including on behalf of the United States.

I am confident that you intended for the JCPOA to be signed by each of the P5+1 participants. I can find no international agreement of this "historic" nature that was not signed by the parties. Each of the past five major nuclear agreements to which the U.S. is a party – SALT I, SALT II, START I, START II and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea – were signed by representatives of each nation that was party to the agreement. This is not a mere formality. Those signatures represent the commitment of the signatory and the country on whose behalf he or she is signing.

A signature also serves to make clear precisely who the parties to the agreement are and the authority under which that nation entered into the agreement. In short, just as with any legal instrument, signing matters.

This is particularly important with respect to JCPOA. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has made clear that he does not believe that JCPOA is legally binding on his nation, saying, "If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is sent to (and passed by) parliament, it will create an obligation for the government. It will mean the president, who has not signed it so far, will have to sign it. Why should we place an unnecessary legal restriction on the Iranian people?"

Given the many benefits that will accrue to the ayatollahs, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and other unsavory elements of the Iranian regime, I believe that Iran should, at the very least, bind itself to the few requirements placed on it under the JCPOA by signing the agreement. I also believe that the United States and its P5+1 partners on the JCPOA should execute the agreement on behalf of their countries. I look forward to your response.

We all do. *

*[The text of the letter was found in two places

https://cjhsla.org/2015/11/01/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/

And:

http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/2015/09/19/

I was unable to locate an original facsimile; however, the response to the letter from the State Department verifies that the letter was sent.]

The text of the response follows – and a facsimile of the response is presented after:

Dear Mr. Pompeo.:

Thank you for your September 18 letter regarding the nuclear deal with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the European Union. As you know, the United States has a long-standing practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in political commitments.

The success of the JCPOA will depend not whether it is legally binding or signed, but rather on the extensive verification measures we have put in place, as well as Iran's understanding that we have the capacity to re-impose and ramp up – our sanction if Iran does not meet its commitments.

Everything the JCPOA and its annexes are commitments Iran made, and must keep, to remain in compliance. Iran breaks these commitments, we can snap back both unilateral and UN sanction.

We provided Congress with everything agreed to between the P5+1 and Iran in the JCPOA, in full compliance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INAEA). There are no "secret deals" between the P5+1 and Iran, and no JCPOA document that Congress does not already have. The Administration is fully committed to providing information to Congress to ensure full transparency as we implement the JCPOA.

We hope this information is useful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Julia Frifield; Assistant Secretary; Legislative Affairs.

The facsimile presented next can be found at: _http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/11.24.2015.state.dept.letter.jcpoa.pdf_

* * * * *

The letter claims that the JCPOA was unsigned. The letter doesn't mention that the JCPOA had been incorporated into the larger, Resolution 2231 program and that the resolution's policy of arms transactions is not presented in the resolution's Annex A: JCPOA.

To an extent – this letter gives evidence; again, that Resolution 2231 was never transmitted to the Congress, and never looked at or voted on by the Congress.

* * * * *
* * * * *

Chapter 8 – Appendix VII– Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

[] return;

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 secrecy arrangements favoring Iranian acquisition of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed assets make it impossible for anyone on the outside to really know what is being acquired and when.

Iranian procurement activities are overseen by an arm of the Joint Commission – the Procurement Working Group. The secrecy surrounding the operations of the Procurement Working Group is described as follows:

United States of America: draft resolution July 17, 2015 (S/2015/547);

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

3. Procedures

3.4. Except as provided in Section 6 of this Annex which will be subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN, the work of the Joint Commission is confidential and may be shared only among JCPOA participants and observers as appropriate, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.

The above explains that the work of the Joint Commission is confidential; and that the work discussed in Section 6 of Annex IV is "subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN." The confidentiality procedure is of a much higher standard than the mere status of something being considered as confidential.

Section 6 refers to the functions and procedures of the Procurement Working Group. The Working Group carries out its work under the standard of secrecy of the confidentiality procedure of the UN. The current definition of this U.N. confidentiality standard is found in the U.N. document, document number ST/SGB/2007/6; Secretary-General's bulletin; Information sensitivity, classification and handling; (February 12, 2007): and can be located at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/235/79/PDF/N0723579.pdf?OpenElement

The Bulletin's Section 5 – Handling of classified information gives a sense of the strict security surrounding the Procurement Working Group's activities. Documents are to be kept under lock and key in a secured location; any duplication of documents is tightly controlled – and logged if copied; transmission of documents must be sealed and clearly marked as classified, the addressee and sender is clearly stated, etc.; all transmissions are duly recorded, logged; and there are the various other aspects of strict document controls that are described in the bulletin. And, of course, no one from the office is to divulge any knowledge of what they might have thought they had read or heard somewhere. Here are some examples from Section 5, just to give an idea:

United Nations Secretariat – Document Number ST/SGB/2007/6

12 February 2007

Secretary-General's bulletin

Information sensitivity, classification and handling

*Section 1

Classification principles

1.1 The overall approach to classifying information entrusted to or originating from the United Nations is based on the understanding that the work of the United Nations should be open and transparent, except insofar as the nature of information concerned is deemed confidential in accordance with the guidelines set out in the present bulletin...

*Section 5

Handling of classified information

5.1 Heads of departments or offices shall ensure that the following minimal standards are maintained in the handling of classified information received by or originating from their department or office:

(a) All classified information must be transported in sealed envelopes or containers, and clearly marked as such;

(b) All outgoing and incoming classified information must be recorded in a special registry that lists the staff members who are authorized to handle such information;

(c) Classified materials may be duplicated only with the authorization of either their originator or the head of the receiving or originating department or office, and such copies must be entered in the special registry;

(d) All classified information must be filed and stored under lock and key in a secure location within the department or office concerned, accessible only to the authorized staff members;

And it goes on from there with more detail. If anyone is particularly interested the document is freely presented by the United Nations at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/235/79/PDF/N0723579.pdf?OpenElement.

* * * * *

* * * * *

Chapter 9 – Appendix VIII – Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25

[] return;

The Security Council asserts its claim that Security Council has the authority to declare any of its decisions, at any time, to be an exception to any accepted rule made under the authority of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council presented a fabricated misrepresentation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25; which the resolution idiotically submits in its clause 14 of the introduction to Resolution 2231:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions,

THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH VERSION of the Article ascertains that the Members of the United Nations agree to carry out Security Council decisions that are in accordance with the Charter, that conform to the present Charter.

Charter of the United Nations

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH VERSION ASCERTAINS that the Members of the United Nations agree to carry out Security Council decisions that are in accordance with the Charter, that conform to the present Charter.

This writing translated and compared the writing of Article 25 in various languages. The comparison was intended as an example; but no comparative analysis of the translation is really necessary at all – in aggregate and together, Articles 24, and 25 give the context to Article 25, no matter which translation, as we shall review soon enough.

* * * * *

"In accordance," in English means, of course, that Security Council Resolutions must conform to the Charter of the United Nations. If the Security Council comes up with some obvious scheme to violate international treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, as it has in this case, then nobody has to agree to go along with it - and any tha go along with the scheme could be understood as being just as guilty of violations as the originating perpetrators.

The United Nations Security has no business telling people that it's just fine to violate treaty just because the Council says it is;

And such a Security Council resolution has no authority under the Charter of the United Nations.

If the Security Council decrees that it is now necessary for all States without exception to violate international law and international treaty in order to support various weapons development projects and schemes in an exceptional and uniquely favored State; a State which the Security Council has determined is deserving of every extraordinary deference; then the Security Council must apply, with its reasoning, to the International Court of Justice and attempt to convince the Court of the legitimacy of their construction.

The Security Council can't just order all States without exception to just anything the politicians populating the Security Council want done for whatever reason of chance and eccentricity of personality holds sway over that body at a given time.

The Charter of the United Nations places another restraint against aggressive, lunatic recommendations made and promoted by the Security Council:

Charter of the United Nations

*CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter...

That above stipulates that it is the Member States that are presumed to be in the right – these States do are not required to justify rulings within their jurisdictions to the Security Council. Nobody is required to go jump off a cliff just because the five permanent Member States of the Security Council Oligarchy tries wants everyone to go along with their plans to violate international treaty for the sake of arming a Security Council uniquely favored non-nuclear-weapon State with nuclear weapons capacity.

The Security Council does not have the authority to intimidate or force States choosing to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to follow the example of the Oligarchy syndicate.

Member States don't have to constantly appeal to the Court to justify the integrity of their own jurisdictions;

It is for the Security Council to justify its infringement on the integrity of Member States: "... _Nothing contained in the present Charter shall... require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter_ ...;" the burden of proof of that a Security Council decision is justifiable is the responsibility of the Security Council.

* * * * *

Repeating what is actually written in Article 25, in the English: " _The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter_."

The statement is reciprocal. The Members would agree to a decision if the Security Council decision can be found to be in accordance with the Charter. In accordance with the present Charter means, in English, that a decision must conform to the Charter if it is likely to be considered a valid decision. The Security Council cannot enforce a decision that, under the Charter, the Council was never authorized to ever have made.

The Security Council's only authority is derived from the Charter. Otherwise, discarding that need for restraint, the Security Council is only a collection of powerful nations that would use the United Nations to seek to position themselves into the dominant status previously sought by the tripartite militant powers of NAZI Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Empire of Japan of the World War II era.

Article 25 requires at least two proofs in order to compel States to accept a decision by the Security Council as something that shouldn't be entirely ignored, here is Article 25 again:

"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

The first proof required is that a Security Council's recommendation does conform to the standards set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. If the recommendation is perceived as not even close to being in accord with the Charter (as might be in the case of Resolution 2231); then States have the option to ignore the recommendation. The Security Council has failed the first proof.

The second proof required is that States attempting to follow through on a Security Council's decree can legitimately carry out such without violating international treaty, or the Charter of the United Nations – in other words, can legally carry out the decree.

The only body authorized to decide on proof of whether or not a Security Council's demand can be met without infringing on the Charter of the United Nations, or upon any other international law or treaty, is the International Court of Justice. As of yet, the politicians sitting on the Security Council haven't screwed up the nerve to engage the Court with their presumptions.

Therefore there is not any State that is compelled to, permitted to, required to, or entitled to, violate international treaty on the say-so of the United Nations Security Council as of yet; and no State should be required or permitted to comply with any decree of United Nations Security Council recommendation 2231 that goes against international law until the Court rules on the subject – or perhaps any decree of the resolution at all; this is a resolution that has not been shown to have been given a qualifying, competent vote (competent by any legitimately granted authority vested by the Charter of the United Nations). In other words, as it is not clear that the resolution has ever received a competent vote – then it could most reasonably be construed that Resolution 2231 remains only a draft proposal; waiting for a vote which might never come.

The writing of Article 25 is a reciprocal agreement: " _The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter_."

Both Parties to the agreement have to conduct themselves in a manner conforming to the Charter of the United Nations. In order to be considered valid, the Security Council request must not conflict or violate the Charter; and parties following through on the request must not violate the Charter in their actions attempting to comply with the given Security Council recommendation.

AS FAR AS THE WORD "OBLIGATED;" English speaking Barack Obama, and the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel along with him, chose to insert into their version of the writing of Article 25 – that word, or any derivation of it, exists no where in the true text of the Article – Article 25. It doesn't exist in the authorized English language translation of the Charter of the United Nations; it doesn't exist in the other authorized translations I read.

By inserting the word "obligated" into their peculiar fashioning of the wording of Article 25, the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel cabal tried to make it appear as though all States without exception must be expected, to at any time, unconditionally surrender their rights to any arbitrary pleasure of, or for any arbitrary decision made by the whichever politicians staffing the Security Council at a given time; politicians who might insist that any or every nation on earth must violate international treaty and, or the Charter of the United Nations and, or their own laws in order to appease the whims of the politicians and high-minded diplomats representing the Security Council.

Let us examine, among other things, if the word "obligated," or any of its translations or adaptations, ever appears in either the Spanish or French language translations of Article 25. The Spanish text follows:

CARTA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

*CAPITULO V

EL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD

Funciones y Poderes

Artículo 25

Los Miembros de las Naciones Unidas convienen en aceptar y cumplir las decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad de acuerdo con esta Carta.

Translating the Spanish into English (with connotations noted):

"The Members of the United Nations shall find it fitting to agree to accept and comply with the decisions of the Security Council which are in accordance with this Charter."

Again we find the reciprocal agreement. The decision must conform to and meet the standards of the Charter, and the conduct of carrying out the decision must conform to the Charter. There is no mention of any obligation.

Somehow however, the word "obligated" [obligación, obligar, obligatorio, obligado] or any of its translations or derivatives has nowhere made an appearance. Let's see what happens in French:

CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES

*CHAPITRE V

CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

FONCTIONS ET POUVOIRS

Article 25

Les Membres de l'Organisation conviennent d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.

Translating into English (with connotations noted):

"The Members of the United Nations find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and apply the decisions of the Security Council conforming to this present Charter."

The French version is almost the same as the English and Spanish – but it's very precise in its own context.

The Spanish version had left out exactly saying " _the present Charter_ ," and instead exchanged that for "this Charter;" or, "... de acuerdo con esta Carta."

The French leaves in "the present Charter," allowing for the understanding of the potential mutability of the Charter: <<...à la présente Charte.>> The French there is consistent with the English. This is not really that important; I'm just making a note of it here to give a feeling of how translations may differ slightly.

Whatever the small differences in linguistic usages – the concept is the same: Article 25 defines a reciprocal agreement which the Security Council, in its warped misrepresentation of the Article, seeks to deny.

The French translation chooses the adverb construction <<...les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.>> The French usage << conformément à>> is stronger than merely stating something like – are in accordance with. The French usage seems a bit firmer in the opinion of this writing; it seems to put much more weight on the responsibility of the Security Council. Let us look at this sentence in French and translated into English again, with perhaps a better English translation:

Les Membres de l'Organisation conviennent d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.

"The Members of the Organization find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and to apply the decisions of the Security Council conforming to the present Charter."

This writing is still unhappy with its own English translation in the above. There this writing's English translation fails to indicate the emphasis placed on "conforming to." Perhaps it is better to translate into English using an English language phrase that most resembles << conformément à>> in this context:

"The Members of the Organization find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and to apply the decisions of the Security Council which follow and conform to the present Charter."

The usage << conformément à>> seems closer to something like "follow in conformance to..." in English. When translating the phrase into English as: ...which follow and conform to the present Charter... this writing believes that a translation like that helps to better understand in English the emphasis and precision of the writing in French. Other's might disagree and translate it better, but this writing reads it that way.

In any event – the word "obligated," or any derivation of it, fails to make an appearance in any of the translations.

It is entirely unambiguous from all versions that the Security Council has a clear responsibility and duty to present a recommendation which adheres to the Charter. The Security Council can't just make up anything it likes and then simply order States to do what it says.

No where in the three versions does the word, or any derivative of the word, "obligation" make an appearance. Nowhere in the actual text of the Charter can it be construed that nations are under any obligation to follow illegal orders that might be handed down by the Security Council at any moment.

The above comparative analysis of the translation might be interesting to some – and it was intended only to emphasize the point. As mentioned, there really no need for a comparative analysis of translation at all – a reader can rely entirely on any one of the authentic translations of the Charter, sticking to just one of the languages without having to peek into the others.

The Charter makes its meaning clear through an aggregate of provisions and Articles.

Article 24, 2nd clause, gives the necessary context to Article 25, no matter which translation; between the two Articles there can be no misconstruing the meaning. Let us examine:

The Charter of the United Nations;

*CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 24

2. In discharging these [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations...

Article 24 declares that the Security Council must fulfill its mandate to perform its duties in conformance to, and in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. Article 2 clause 7, along with Article 24 clause 2, clarify some limits (there are more) on the authority of a Security Council decision.

Article 24 declares that a Security Council decision must conform to the Charter; Article 2 declares that if the Security Council that if a member State feels such decision to infringe on Domestic Jurisdiction; then the burden of proving the justice of the Security Council; which must bring its petition before the International Court of Justice.

In the aggregate context of the three articles, the meaning of Articles 25 cannot be reasonably mistaken – no translation is needed. A Security Council decision has no absolute authority. The terms are fixed by agreement, not by arbitrary despotic whim.

The authorship of Resolution 2231 demonstrated – in their rewriting of the Article – their true stance as despotic and absolutist, and contrary to the position of the Charter. The Charter speaks but in terms of agreement and consensus – and chooses justice over the arbitrary unjust, unworkable, and irrational absolutism presented throughout Security Council Resolution 2231.

* * * * *
Chapter 10 – [Appendix IX – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities,  
noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran](tmp_21901efad6846fc2585ed279aabbdcf9_P2SUvI.ch.fixed.fc.tidied.stylehacked.xfixed_split_001.html#ref_nA_10)

[]

As of JCPOA Implementation Day, 16 January 2016 was allowed, upon approval of the Procurement Working Group – Joint Commission, and acceptance by the Security Council, the acquire INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories.

Procurement activities began only as of October 2016. From November 2016 – towards the end of Barack Obama's term in office – through December 2017, fifteen such procurement proposals for items listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a have been approved. The following are the relevant excerpts from the United Nations Security Council Six-month reports of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) which verify the Security Council approvals of such Iranian acquisitions:

_Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [18 January 2017].

The English Language version is found on the United Nations website at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/49&Lang=E

_Third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [27 June 2017]

_Fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [15 December 2017]

All of these can be found on the same page: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/briefings-by-the-facilitator.shtml>

Following is the relevant excerpt from the Second sixth month report:

Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [18 January 2017]

V. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

18. The procurement channel processed five proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) that had been submitted by two Member States to the Security Council for approval. In accordance with paragraph 8 (b) of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), the proposals were immediately forwarded to the Joint Commission for its review.

19. Two proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council on 6 October 2016. The Joint Commission provided recommendations of approval. The two proposals were subsequently approved by the Council on 17 November 2016. One proposal for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 was submitted to the Council on 15 November. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval. The proposal was approved by the Council on 28 December. Two proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Council on 6 December. These proposals are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

20. On 23 December 2016, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) the second six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2016/1113), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reflecting the activities performed during the said six-month reporting period..

Paragraph 20 informs us that the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) the second six-month Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues. This document (S/2016/1113) gives some further insight into what the Procurement Working Group had been up to in the last six months of 2016. The report advises that it "... _provides an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 7 July to 22 December 2016_."

Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (Doc. S/2016/1113) – [23 December 2016]

V. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

2. During the reporting period, the Procurement Working Group — comprising the States that are participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with a designated representative of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy serving as Coordinator — held six meetings. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated as observers in one of the meetings. The Procurement Working Group reviewed five proposals from two States. Three of the proposals were recommended for approval. The rest are currently under review.

The above paragraph 2 of the Joint Commission report speaks of six meetings held, with the IAEA being allowed to attend only one of them. Of five proposals submitted by two separate States, two are under review, three were approved.

Paragraph 19 of the Facilitator's report tells us that of the five proposals submitted only one was related to items listed on the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 document which deals primarily with components for nuclear reactors. Paragraph 2 above tells us that, coincidentally, the IAEA had attended only one of the meetings of the Procurement Working Group.

THE THIRD REPORT informs that five more INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a related proposals were also approved – bringing the total of nuclear weapons related proposals up to nine:

Third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [27 June 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

25. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval for the two proposals that had been submitted to the Security Council in December 2016 and were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report. The two proposals were subsequently approved by the Council.

26 During the reporting period, 10 new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council, including 2 for temporary export for the purposes of demonstration and display in an exhibition. Five of those proposals have been approved, one has been withdrawn and four are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

THE FOURTH REPORT informs that four more INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a related proposals were also approved – bringing the total of nuclear weapons related proposals up to thirteen through 2017:

Fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [15 December 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

29. During the reporting period, eight new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Four of these proposals have been approved, two have been rejected and two have been withdrawn.

30. In addition, the Security Council approved two and rejected one of the four proposals that were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report (S/2017/537). The fourth proposal has been withdrawn.

31. Since Implementation Day, a total of 24 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been, submitted to the Security Council by four Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

In all, through end of year 2017 – thirteen proposals having to do with Iranian INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories have been approved. 24 proposals had been submitted altogether.

IAEA Board of Governor reports (listed further below) throughout the same period indicate that the IAEA has been allowed to attend only 4 of those meetings. Clearly the IAEA is being kept away from the major portion of what goes on in terms of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear related goods:

THE FIFTH REPORT informs that the Procurement Working Group has approved eight more procurement proposals; However, the new Facilitator, _Karel J.G. van Oosterom_ , has insinuated for himself a new reporting policy – Mr. van Oosterom had now decided that the Security Council no longer found it suitable, at this juncture, to differentiate between and report a comparison of the number of nuclear energy related approvals of nuclear energy related procurement applications; and the number of weapons related approvals of procurement applications.

It would appear almost as if there is some sense of embarrassment, and perhaps a touch of the guilty conscience beginning to sink in around the Security Council snack bar lounging areas (one might at least hope).

Fifth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [15 December 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

23. During the reporting period, 13 new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Eight of those proposals have been approved, two have been withdrawn and three are currently under review.

24. Since Implementation Day, a total of 37 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 34 proposals that have been processed, 24 have been approved, 3 have been disapproved, and 7 have been withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in less than 51 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including the Procurement Working Group, the procurement channel has continued to function and the Joint Commission has continued to review proposals..

It is worth noting that in this fifth report, as indicated; the new Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), _Karel J.G. van Oosterom_ ; unlike his predecessor _Sebastiano Cardi_ ; does not differentiate between Procurement Working Group approvals of Iranian acquisition from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 (nuclear energy related) list of inventories; and approvals of INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 (nuclear weapons related) acquisitions.

However; the Joint Commission / Procurement Working Group also transmits a very brief six month report which gives a tiny bit more information on the subject of approvals. The Joint Commission Report also does not differentiate between the two lists. But it does reveal how many Procurement Working Group meetings were held, how may proposal were submitted, approved, or are under review;

And it does tell how many meetings the IAEA was allowed to attend. We know from the JCPOA that the International Atomic Energy Agency is not allowed to sit in on meetings pertaining to INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2; now become INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 as these refer to nuclear weapons associated assets which the International Atomic Energy Agency is prohibited any knowledge of under the JCPOA arrangement invented mostly between the Obama administration and the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

(Incidentally, the IAEA Board of Governors Reports also mentions how many meeting the IAEA has been allowed to attend. However, the IAEA doesn't seem to know how many meetings total had been held, and so doesn't know what it might have been missing.)

Following is what the Joint Commission has to say for itself in the reporting period referred to:

Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (Doc. S/2018/601) – [14 June 2018]

3. The Procurement Working Group held seven meetings. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated as observers in one of the meetings. The Procurement Working Group reviewed 13 proposals from three States: 8 were recommended for approval, 2 were withdrawn by the proposing States and 3 are currently under review.

* * * * *

These following are relevant excerpts of IAEA Board of Governor reports from September 2016 through May 2018. These cover the time period around when the Procurement Working Group got started reviewing and approving applications for Iranian procurement of nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed; later become nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed inventories;

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2016/46 – Date: 8 September 2016

E. Other Relevant Information

22. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2016/55 – Date: 9 November 2016

E. Other Relevant Information

22. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/10 – Date: 24 February 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

26. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/24 – Date: 2 June 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

27. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/33 – Date: 31 August 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

28. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/48 – Date: 13 November 2017

27. During this reporting period, the Agency attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2018/7 – Date: 22 February 2018

26. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2018/24 – Date: 24 May 2018

26. During this reporting period, the Agency attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

* * * * *

Chapter 11 – Appendix X – Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25

[]

The Security Council asserts its claim that Security Council has the authority to declare any of its decisions, at any time, to be an exception to any accepted rule made under the authority of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council presented a fabricated misrepresentation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25; which the resolution idiotically submits in its clause 14 of the introduction to Resolution 2231:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions,

THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH VERSION of the Article ascertains that the Members of the United Nations agree to carry out Security Council decisions that are in accordance with the Charter, that conform to the present Charter.

Charter of the United Nations

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH VERSION ASCERTAINS that the Members of the United Nations agree to carry out Security Council decisions that are in accordance with the Charter, that conform to the present Charter.

This writing translated and compared the writing of Article 25 in various languages. The comparison was intended as an example; but no comparative analysis of the translation is really necessary at all – in aggregate and together, Articles 24, and 25 give the context to Article 25, no matter which translation, as we shall review soon enough.

* * * * *

"In accordance," in English means, of course, that Security Council Resolutions must conform to the Charter of the United Nations. If the Security Council comes up with some obvious scheme to violate international treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, nobody has to agree to go along with it. Such a Security Council resolution would have no authority under the Charter of the United Nations.

As an example of the meaning of "in accordance" in English I present a parable of a sort:

Should a person perceive a fashion of the day, and that same person would desire to subscribe to that perceived fashion as an admirable and desirable norm; then that person might enthusiastically attempt to mimic it in as convincing and satisfying a manner available;

And should a body, in Office of Trust - be given a law; then that body, comprised of individuals holding Offices of trust, should choose to act in accordance with that law. This is what "in accordance" means, this is how the concept of "in accordance" is translated to English. To act contrary to law is the opposite of acting in "accordance" to the norms of law.

It seems simple enough.

If the Security Council decrees that it is now necessary for all States without exception to violate international law and international treaty in order to support various weapons development projects and schemes in an exceptional and uniquely favored State; a State which the Security Council has determined is deserving of every extraordinary deference; then the Security Council must apply, with its reasoning, to the International Court of Justice and attempt to convince the Court of the legitimacy of their construction.

The Security Council can't just order all States without exception to just anything the politicians populating the Security Council want done for whatever reason of chance and eccentricity of personality holds sway over that body at a given time.

The Charter of the United Nations places another restraint against aggressive, lunatic recommendations made and promoted by the Security Council:

Charter of the United Nations

*CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter...

That above stipulates that it is the Member States that are presumed to be in the right – these States do are not required to justify rulings within their jurisdictions to the Security Council. Nobody is required to go jump off a cliff just because the five permanent Member States of the Security Council Oligarchy tries wants everyone to go along with their plans to violate international treaty for the sake of arming a Security Council uniquely favored non-nuclear-weapon State with nuclear weapons capacity.

The Security Council does not have the authority to intimidate or force States choosing to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to follow the example of the Oligarchy syndicate.

Member States don't have to constantly appeal to the Court to justify the integrity of their own jurisdictions;

It is for the Security Council to justify its infringement on the integrity of Member States: "... _Nothing contained in the present Charter shall... require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter_ ...;" the burden of proof of that a Security Council decision is justifiable is the responsibility of the Security Council.

* * * * *

Repeating what is actually written in Article 25, in the English: " _The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter_."

The statement is reciprocal. The Members would agree to a decision if the Security Council decision can be found to be in accordance with the Charter. In accordance with the present Charter means, in English, that a decision must conform to the Charter if it is likely to be considered a valid decision. The Security Council cannot enforce a decision that, under the Charter, the Council was never authorized to ever have made.

The Security Council's only authority is derived from the Charter. Otherwise, discarding that need for restraint, the Security Council is only a collection of powerful nations that would use the United Nations to seek to position themselves into the dominant status previously sought by the tripartite militant powers of NAZI Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Empire of Japan of the World War II era.

Article 25 requires at least two proofs in order to compel States to accept a decision by the Security Council as something that shouldn't be entirely ignored, here is Article 25 again:

"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

The first proof required is that a Security Council's recommendation does conform to the standards set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. If the recommendation is perceived as not even close to being in accord with the Charter (as might be in the case of Resolution 2231); then States have the option to ignore the recommendation. The Security Council has failed the first proof.

The second proof required is that States attempting to follow through on a Security Council's decree can legitimately carry out such without violating international treaty, or the Charter of the United Nations – in other words, can legally carry out the decree.

The only body authorized to decide on proof of whether or not a Security Council's demand can be met without infringing on the Charter of the United Nations, or upon any other international law or treaty, is the International Court of Justice. As of yet, the politicians sitting on the Security Council haven't screwed up the nerve to engage the Court with their presumptions.

Therefore there is not any State that is compelled to, permitted to, required to, or entitled to, violate international treaty on the say-so of the United Nations Security Council as of yet; and no State should be required or permitted to comply with any decree of United Nations Security Council recommendation 2231 that goes against international law until the Court rules on the subject – or perhaps any decree of the resolution at all; this is a resolution that has not been shown to have been given a qualifying, competent vote (competent by any legitimately granted authority vested by the Charter of the United Nations). In other words, as it is not clear that the resolution has ever received a competent vote – then it could most reasonably be construed that Resolution 2231 remains only a draft proposal; waiting for a vote which might never come.

The writing of Article 25 is a reciprocal agreement: " _The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter_."

Both Parties to the agreement have to conduct themselves in a manner conforming to the Charter of the United Nations. In order to be considered valid, the Security Council request must not conflict or violate the Charter; and parties following through on the request must not violate the Charter in their actions attempting to comply with the given Security Council recommendation.

AS FAR AS THE WORD "OBLIGATED;" English speaking Barack Obama, and the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel along with him, chose to insert into their version of the writing of Article 25 – that word, or any derivation of it, exists no where in the true text of the Article – Article 25. It doesn't exist in the authorized English language translation of the Charter of the United Nations; it doesn't exist in the other authorized translations I read.

By inserting the word "obligated" into their peculiar fashioning of the wording of Article 25, the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel cabal tried to make it appear as though all States without exception must be expected, to at any time, unconditionally surrender their rights to any arbitrary pleasure of, or for any arbitrary decision made by the whichever politicians staffing the Security Council at a given time; politicians who might insist that any or every nation on earth must violate international treaty and, or the Charter of the United Nations and, or their own laws in order to appease the whims of the politicians and high-minded diplomats representing the Security Council.

Let us examine, among other things, if the word "obligated," or any of its translations or adaptations, ever appears in either the Spanish or French language translations of Article 25. The Spanish text follows:

CARTA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

*CAPITULO V

EL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD

Funciones y Poderes

Artículo 25

Los Miembros de las Naciones Unidas convienen en aceptar y cumplir las decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad de acuerdo con esta Carta.

Translating the Spanish into English (with connotations noted):

"The Members of the United Nations shall find it fitting to agree to accept and comply with the decisions of the Security Council which are in accordance with this Charter."

Again we find the reciprocal agreement. The decision must conform to and meet the standards of the Charter, and the conduct of carrying out the decision must conform to the Charter. There is no mention of any obligation.

Somehow however, the word "obligated" [obligación, obligar, obligatorio, obligado] or any of its translations or derivatives has nowhere made an appearance. Let's see what happens in French:

CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES

*CHAPITRE V

CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

FONCTIONS ET POUVOIRS

Article 25

Les Membres de l'Organisation conviennent d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.

Translating into English (with connotations noted):

"The Members of the United Nations find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and apply the decisions of the Security Council conforming to this present Charter."

The French version is almost the same as the English and Spanish – but it's very precise in its own context.

The Spanish version had left out exactly saying " _the present Charter_ ," and instead exchanged that for "this Charter;" or, "... de acuerdo con esta Carta."

The French leaves in "the present Charter," allowing for the understanding of the potential mutability of the Charter: <<...à la présente Charte.>> The French there is consistent with the English. This is not really that important; I'm just making a note of it here to give a feeling of how translations may differ slightly.

Whatever the small differences in linguistic usages – the concept is the same: Article 25 defines a reciprocal agreement which the Security Council, in its warped misrepresentation of the Article, seeks to deny.

The French translation chooses the adverb construction <<...les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.>> The French usage << conformément à>> is stronger than merely stating something like – are in accordance with. The French usage seems a bit firmer in the opinion of this writing; it seems to put much more weight on the responsibility of the Security Council. Let us look at this sentence in French and translated into English again, with perhaps a better English translation:

Les Membres de l'Organisation conviennent d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.

"The Members of the Organization find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and to apply the decisions of the Security Council conforming to the present Charter."

This writing is still unhappy with its own English translation in the above. There this writing's English translation fails to indicate the emphasis placed on "conforming to." Perhaps it is better to translate into English using an English language phrase that most resembles << conformément à>> in this context:

"The Members of the Organization find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and to apply the decisions of the Security Council which follow and conform to the present Charter."

The usage << conformément à>> seems closer to something like "follow in conformance to..." in English. When translating the phrase into English as: ...which follow and conform to the present Charter... this writing believes that a translation like that helps to better understand in English the emphasis and precision of the writing in French. Other's might disagree and translate it better, but this writing reads it that way.

In any event – the word "obligated," or any derivation of it, fails to make an appearance in any of the translations.

It is entirely unambiguous from all versions that the Security Council has a clear responsibility and duty to present a recommendation which adheres to the Charter. The Security Council can't just make up anything it likes and then simply order States to do what it says.

No where in the three versions does the word, or any derivative of the word, "obligation" make an appearance. Nowhere in the actual text of the Charter can it be construed that nations are under any obligation to follow illegal orders that might be handed down by the Security Council at any moment.

The above comparative analysis of the translation might be interesting to some – and it was intended only to emphasize the point. As mentioned, there really no need for a comparative analysis of translation at all – a reader can rely entirely on any one of the authentic translations of the Charter, sticking to just one of the languages without having to peek into the others.

The Charter makes its meaning clear through an aggregate of provisions and Articles.

Article 24, 2nd clause, gives the necessary context to Article 25, no matter which translation; between the two Articles there can be no misconstruing the meaning. Let us examine:

The Charter of the United Nations;

*CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 24

2. In discharging these [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations...

Article 24 declares that the Security Council must fulfill its mandate to perform its duties in conformance to, and in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. Article 2 clause 7, along with Article 24 clause 2, clarify some limits (there are more) on the authority of a Security Council decision.

Article 24 declares that a Security Council decision must conform to the Charter; Article 2 declares that if the Security Council that if a member State feels such decision to infringe on Domestic Jurisdiction; then the burden of proving the justice of the Security Council; which must bring its petition before the International Court of Justice.

In the aggregate context of the three articles, the meaning of Articles 25 cannot be reasonably mistaken – no translation is needed. A Security Council decision has no absolute authority. The terms are fixed by agreement, not by arbitrary despotic whim.

The authorship of Resolution 2231 demonstrated – in their rewriting of the Article – their true stance as despotic and absolutist, and contrary to the position of the Charter. The Charter speaks but in terms of agreement and consensus – and chooses justice over the arbitrary unjust, unworkable, and irrational absolutism presented throughout Security Council Resolution 2231.

* * * * *

End of Appendices
Endnotes

Endnote [] Check

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10: United States of America vs. Josef Altstoetter: Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume 111,

(Page 1071)

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-III.pdf

Endnote [] Check

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10: United States of America vs. Josef Altstoetter: Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume 111,

(Page 51)

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-III.pdf

Endnote [] Check

The Statute of the IAEA can be found at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/statute.pdf

Endnote [] Check

The Board of Governors is elected each year for a year's term. Elections are held generally in September. This following is how to find out which States are on the IAEA Board of Governors for each year:

All one has to do is look on the IAEA website under https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC61/Documents/

This puts the search on the "IAEA General Conference" Page. Just underneath the masthead, the picture of the flags of various nations waving in the wind [at the moment – the picture might change]; there is, on the left side, a scroll down menu. Scrolling through that menu will open up the archives of the General Conference for each particular year the IAEA has been in business.

The current year [2017] is the first year that should have come up under the web address https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC61/Documents/

In viewing the contents of each year the searcher will find one document titled: "Election of members to the Board of Governors."

Hitting on that will offer a list of which official U.N. language the reader would like to read the election results in (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish). Clicking on the respective language gives the information on the Board of Governors.

That is the way the website was laid out in early 2018.

[Return to Text]

Endnote []

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10: United States of America vs. Josef Altstoetter: Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume 111,

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-III.pdf

Endnote []

The Security Council Resolution 2231, as adopted on 20 July 2015 is found (in English) at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015)

To find United Nations Security Council resolutions by year refer to: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions

Endnote [] check

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD; PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 114th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION; Vol. 163, No. 203.; page H9855: This record can be retrieved as a PDF file at web address: https://www.congress.gov/crec/2015/09/10/CREC-2015-09-10.pdf

Endnote [] Check

The text of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and Iran is identified as IAEA Information Circular document number listing: INFCIRC/214. It is dated 13 December 1974 and its status of accessibility is listed as GENERAL Distr. – which means: for general distribution. Its original language is English. Web address access is: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1974/infcirc214.pdf [Last accessed June 24, 2016].

Endnote [] Check

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10: United States of America vs. Josef Altstoetter: Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume 111,

(Page 51)

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-III.pdf

[Return to Text]

Endnote [] Check

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10: United States of America vs. Josef Altstoetter: Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume 111,

(Page 106)

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-III.pdf

Endnote []

BARACK OBAMA THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY; Statement by the President on Iran; July 14, 2015 (For Immediate Release); This file has been archived, find it on google at: whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/14/statement-president-iran

Endnote []

BARACK OBAMA THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY; Statement by the President on Iran; July 14, 2015 (For Immediate Release); This file has been archived, find it on google at: whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/14/statement-president-iran

Endnote []

U.S. AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER: Letter dated 16 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. (United Nations document number S/2015/546): Available on the internet at: https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/6d9eec6cdd36149b85257ddc006cd868/e7551f39803265f285257e92005b6a0c/$FILE/S%202015%20546.pdf [last accessed: August 22, 2016.]

Endnote []

DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Press Statement, John Kirby, Washington DC (July 19, 2015). This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# - Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245051.htm.

Endnote []

DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Press Statement, John Kirby, Washington DC (July 19, 2015). This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# - Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245051.htm.

