 
# Musings on the Islamic State

Volume – I

Ashwath Komath

Smashwords Edition

Copyright 2015 Ashwath Komath

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# Table of Contents

Foreword

Maliki's Sins

The Degradation of the Iraqi Army

How Important Are Boots On The Ground?

Will America Put Boots On The Ground?

Should America Send Weapons to an Incompetent Army?

Replaying The Clash of Civilizations

Rationale Behind The Madness

Is the Daesh a terrorist group?

Attacking the Supra-terrorist

'We don't want your money'

The Limits of Oil

Buying from the Devil - The Turkish and Syrian Double Deal

Back to the Home Front

Vanguards of the ISIS

The Lone Wolves of the ISIS

If the Islamic State had an Air Force

Command And Conquer: ISIS

How far can ISIS expand?

Are ISIS Advances a Global Failure?

Neither Islamic Nor Stately

Pin-up

You're No Longer British

The Caliphate Vs. The Base

A Second Chance

The Libyan Route

Can the Islamic State penetrate the Cedar Nation?

The Kurdish Question

The Crimes We Are Blind To

Is International Law futile against the ISIS?

Is the splitting up of Iraq the only viable solution left?

Bibliography

Note from the Author

#  **Foreword**

The idea for writing about the ISIS has been in my mind since a while. The iconic moment where we saw Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi come up in a Mosul mosque and declare the establishment of a Caliphate to me, was a defining moment in history.

Up till this point, Al Qaeda and its affiliates dominated global jihad. Its methods were more long, drawn out and aimed at bringing about an Islamic Caliphate, albeit slowly. It was going to be a slow structural process by which they wanted to take it forward.

The entry of ISIS challenged the whole idea of taking it slow. It delved right into the idea of the caliphate. Despite outright opposition from scholars of the Islamic world, the caliphate did come up and it showed that the long wait wasn't necessary. Whether or not this would survive into the future, is something we still need to see.

This book is a collection of essays which focuses on certain nuances of the Islamic State and analyzes them. A vast variety of literature exists at this point about the history, origins, strengths and other details of the ISIS and this book aims to add some of the details that have been either left behind or not really concentrated upon.

The ISIS is no longer an organization or an insurgency, it is a phenomenon. It has defied the traditional notions of terrorism and terrorist organizations and studying it is important to understand the changes in the idea of violence.

Musings on the Islamic State is a work chronicling the various events that happened between the entry of ISIS into Iraq from Syria and continues till date. It is constantly evolving and clearly, a lot more literature will come out talking about the ISIS.

In order to minimize confusion over the names of the organization, the term used in this book is the ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). There exist several versions of the name including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh, which is an acronym of the Arabic name of the ISIS (Dawwlat Al Islamiyya Fi Iraq wa Al Sham). Even though the ISIS has declared itself to be the Islamic State now, it is not the intention of this book to legitimize the claim that the ISIS is a legitimate state. This is not because I assume any authority over legitimacy of states, but because there is a general consensus amongst the academic community that ISIS does not bear any state-like characteristics while agreeing that the ISIS has been desperately trying to prove that they are indeed a state.

Most of the sources that have been used for this book are from Internet resources and they have been mentioned in the bibliography at the end of this book.

It is my sincere hope that the readers would find the content of this book interesting and educating about the nuances of the ISIS. Understanding the nuances of the ISIS becomes important especially when the ISIS has concentrated on making the narrative as straight-forward and simplistic as possible and in the process has deprived us of the true picture on the ground.

We don't know how long the ISIS is going to survive as a state or as a terrorist group. We do know that it is going to be around for quite a while because defeating the ISIS requires a large structural overhaul and the resolution of the Syrian Civil War. Given the dynamics of the Middle East, it is safe to assume that such a resolution and the demise of the ISIS will take a long time.

As the dynamics change and the idea of ISIS expands, future volumes will deal with newer issues that would come up. Understanding ISIS as a phenomenon requires deep discussion and hopefully this project will have tried to at least touch the surface through time. 

#  Maliki's sins

Nouri Al Maliki came to power in Iraq with the help of the Bush administration. It is said that Bush had tried to personally coach Maliki in his initial days as president of Iraq in leadership, but clearly America picked the wrong horse. Maliki did not only turn out to be an absolutely inept leader, but also came back and worked against American interests by courting Iran and increasing their influence in Iraqi politics.

Though he was elected as the leader of a sovereign nation, Maliki couldn't get his mind beyond primitive regional and sectarian politics. Of course, it would be rather foolhardy to blame the rise of the ISIS and Sunni discontent with the Iraqi state as only Maliki's fault, because there are a lot of deeper issues in Iraqi society and identity, and it didn't start with Maliki.

But when Maliki inherited the leadership of the state, he decided to do nothing to improve the situation. He could never make the transition to statesman because he lacked leadership and the ability to make broad compromises and secure support beyond his traditional Shia constituency, which fortunately for him constituted the majority of the country.

His anti-Sunni policies included imprisoning Sunni political opponents, denying Sunnis economic opportunities and most importantly ensuring that the Iraqi Army would firmly remain in Shia hands.

Inept as he was in statecraft, Maliki followed in the footsteps of Muammar Gaddafi when he weakened the army and made it unprofessional to stave off a coup d'etat. Iraq is no stranger to coups. Its history has seen power flow to the Baathists from the 1968 coup. His administration replaced able Sunni leaders in the army with Shiites. It didn't matter to him that a well-integrated army which reflected the demographics of Iraq could play a huge role in long-term nation building. The new army didn't fare any better in terms of its protection.

When ISIS took over cities in Iraq, we hear of stories where soldiers numbering 30,000 were driven out by an ISIS force of merely 7,000. This is a glaring example of the state of decay in the Iraqi army and police. It was being more and more corrupt by the day. Rather than acting as an institution of national-building, Maliki used the police and the Army to hound Sunnis and alienate them further.

Maliki turns into a Shia Saddam Hussein and wonders why people don't like him.

There is nothing surprising about hearing of Sunni tribes aligning with the ISIS. After all, how bad could the ISIS be for the Sunni tribes? Baghdad was continuously hounding and punishing them, the government held back goods and services from reaching Sunni areas and were denying them the opportunities entitled to them because of their sect.

Besides, where would they go when the government was denying opportunities to Sunnis, rendering many unemployed and discontented? They would naturally look at the ISIS to join them as volunteers and also to give the "Shia enemy" some payback.

Loretta Napoleoni in her book "The Islamist Phoenix" talks about how ISIS established platforms for the delivery of goods and services for the areas which they controlled. ISIS came and showed that a functioning government could be formed in the place of the non-existent Iraqi state. It filled that void and kept the Shiite controlled army from coming and harassing them and naturally they decided to support the ISIS. The was after all, the larger picture as far as ISIS was concerned. Their quest for legitimacy included the formation of state like structures that could take over territory which they wanted to hold.

Maliki's incompetence to keep the state together was so deep, that at the end it was the Shia politicians of Iraq calling for his resignation. The ISIS was at the gates of Baghdad and everyone understood that it was time for him to leave. He could do nothing to prevent the ISIS from gaining more territory and he was still stuck at a sectarian agenda. It was necessary for Iraq to mobilize everybody including the Sunnis and the Kurds, and Maliki had annoyed everybody. There was no surviving the ISIS onslaught without Maliki gone.

Maliki continued the blood feud that has been the largest sorrow of the Islamic world because he was an incompetent and inept leader who wanted revenge more than he wanted to have a well-functioning state. He deceived the Americans into trusting that he would bring consensus, but in hindsight, America didn't act on the knowledge that he was turning into a dictator and undermining their own interests. Their failure to highlight his failings as a leader with the fear of embarrassment because of their initial endorsement also had a role to play in the degradation of the Iraqi state as an institution and ultimately the dominance of the ISIS.

#  The Degradation of the Iraqi Army

The tales from Mosul where 30,000 Iraqi troops were driven off by a mere 7,000 ISIS fighters was perhaps one of the most shocking statistics that has come out from the war against ISIS. What is more surprising is the fact that the Iraqi Army had artillery, armor and many other weapons that the ISIS didn't have. So despite being over four times more than ISIS in terms of numbers and also having had heavy weaponry, the Iraqi army was pushed back and decimated. Several soldiers were caught by the ISIS and then subsequently executed as well. This doesn't show the superiority of the ISIS, but the failure of the Iraqi Army in trying to keep the ISIS at bay.

So how did it come to this pathetic state?

The decay of the Iraqi Army was started a lot earlier than just now. It was a systemic decay and not a sudden one. A lot of it can be attributed to Nouri Al Maliki and his rule. He was always thinking about the various conspiracy theories against him about how the Baath party would come to de-throne him through loyalist infiltration into the Army, setting of a coup d'etat. As a result, he made some institutional changes into the army, which turned it into a corrupt and impotent force.

His view that every Sunni was a closet Baathist was perhaps the most damaging of all. His promotion of many Shia officers over more competent Sunni officers was the start of the death of professionalism in the Iraqi Army. When the leadership is incompetent, it is hard for them to inculcate better practices or show innovation. Besides, it can be reasoned that with their sect becoming a criteria for promotion and benefits, Shia officers probably did become more complacent in trying to create a more professional force. This started the cycle of disillusionment and insubordination.

The irony of this is the fact that Maliki didn't learn a thing from the American mistakes in 2003 with the Coalition Provisional Authority deciding to disband the Iraqi Army through Order 2. This created the bloody insurgency which America fought for many years and lost so many of its troops to. Had America been more wise with this policy, it probably would have avoided a lot of bloodshed. Maliki didn't learn a thing from this. If he had, he would have known the benefits of trying to create a more inclusive and professional military.

He did exactly what Gaddafi did with his army for precisely the same reasons. How does one explain a scenario where an army, trained and equipped by the Americans in their time in Iraq, couldn't respond to this threat in time and lost at the face of it?

Endemic corruption in the Iraqi Army added to the growing degeneration of the Army. Often, commanding officers would allow soldiers to be absent in exchange for a portion of his salary. There were other corrupt practices as well, such as selling fuel in the black market and even pocketing money from food rations to the soldiers. This creates a real shortage of manpower, while on paper it would be fully staffed. At the same time, the discipline dynamic is adversely affected where subordinates lose their respect for their superiors and insubordination would be prevalent. Given that this is something that happens in almost every division of the Iraqi Army, this is a serious challenge.

Apart from the lack of self-respect and dignity to the soldier, the systematic purging of Sunnis for a personal agenda combined with the lack of solidarity drove so many Iraqi soldiers to desert the army and flee the city, leaving its residents to the mercy of the ISIS. They left everything behind, and this shows that where there is no discipline and the fact that the soldiers didn't believe in the agenda of the President, it was only a matter of time before a desertion of such magnitude would take place.

Maliki also retained control over the Special Forces of the Iraqi army. This almost replicated the Republican Guard of the Saddam Hussein era. These forces were routinely used to intimidate political opponents and crush rebellion than be used for more important tasks, like counter-terrorism when ISIS was flourishing in the chaos of Syria.

So in effect, the hasty retreat of 30,000 soldiers in the face of a threat was just a consequence of years of neglect and decay. In its attempt to be coup-proof, the Iraqi army lost its competitive edge, allowing it to be easily intimidated by the likes of the ISIS.

Unfortunately, this is the story of many Arab armies who suffer from advancing and improving themselves in the face of new threats and the interests of their leaders to be coup-proof. The military is the institution tasked to protecting the country but at the same time is distrusted from doing so. This has translated into low levels of professionalism, a large divide between subordinates and superiors, constant distrust between political leaders and the military, endemic corruption and the inability of Arab militaries to be effective fighting forces even when they are given good equipment and are trained by competent nations.

The trajectory taken by the Iraqi military in being a more pruned, coup-proofed and politically supported institution is the same as many other Arab nations and it is hardly surprising that this happened. In retrospect, it probably would have been a lot to ask for the Iraqi army to turn into a model for inclusivity and the political class to be more receptive to the idea of the professionalization of the forces.

While the trajectory may have seemed inevitable, what was not was the deepening sectarian divide and the use of the military as enforcers for the political classes' dirty sectarian agenda. For this, Maliki and his divisive policies were to blame. He exacerbated a problem at the absolute worst time and made it worse, when the best he could have possibly done was to maintain the status quo.

#  How important are boots on the ground?

American assistance against ISIS is not direct. It is aiding the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army in repelling the ISIS advance by providing them with intelligence, funds, weapons and training. It is also conducting air strikes against ISIS targets to somehow stem the advance and aid ground forces. Apart from sending some troops to aid training of the Iraqi Army and act as advisers, the west has no active combat troops involved in the operation.

But how important are boots on the ground?

A lot of people believe that mere air strikes without a ground component, is an exercise in futility. Much of the fighting is supposed to be ground based with the air component only playing a supplementing role in the operation. There are boots on the ground which are actively fighting the ISIS, such as the Iraqi Army, the Syrian Army, the Peshmerga and other smaller groups which are more of militant groups than fully fledged armies.

To understand why the ground component is the most important, we need to understand the nature of the ISIS. It isn't a mere terrorist organization. It is an entity that has transcended that phase and is looking to become a state in its own right. Yet, at the same time, it has characteristics and tactics of a terrorist organization.

The ISIS is easily embedded amongst a civilian population without strict demarcation of military sites. They don't observe the laws of Armed Conflict and are fighting an unconventional war. This requires a strategy which would be more inclined to fight an insurgency or a terrorist organization, but on a much larger scale.

The ISIS is well-trained, well-armed and well-experienced and has adequate strength in terms of numbers. This comes as no surprise of course. How else have they evicted the forces of a sovereign state and occupied swathes of territory? In fact, it was a mere force of 7000, that ejected the 30,000 strong Iraqi Army force stationed in Mosul and occupied that area. Clearly, it isn't a small insurgency we are talking about.

This brings us to the next issue of how good are the boots on the ground?

With the fall of Mosul and ISIS coming very close to Baghdad, it was almost assumed that all was lost. After all, if Iraq were to suffer this setback given its much larger force with international backing, then what good is it? This is still a question that is plaguing the fight against the ISIS today.

The good news is that the Iraqi army is no longer alone in fighting the ISIS. The Peshmerga operating from the Kurdish region along with the many other militias operating in the area are making small cumulative gains in order to hand a crushing defeat of the ISIS in the long run. Even so, it is not the most efficient force on the ground and the gains made are rather small.

In a setting where it is more of urban combat (especially when it comes to bigger cities like Tikrit and Mosul), the insertion of troops who are trained for terrain like that is most important. Troops are required not only for direct combat, but to perform other critical tasks as well, such as cutting off supply routes, creating checkpoints and others, which are more important than the actual combat itself. Air strikes can help in these missions to a certain extent, but their roles are still very limited.

The quality of the boots on the ground matter too. The best evidence of this is seen in the counter-attack after the initial ISIS gain. The Iraqi government rallied Special Forces and the more experienced units to stem the advance, and they managed to reverse the gains made by ISIS and drive them off. The experienced Peshmerga and other factions like the YPG managed to stem a very powerful attack on Kobani, which is on the Syrian border.

The question is also about what happens when the ISIS has been driven out of Iraqi borders. Troops are required to secure Iraqi-Syrian border and to provide stability to the cities and villages which have been liberated. The porous border between the two countries, coupled with the fact that Bashar Al Assad has no control in many areas, means that the boots on the ground will not only be needed for immediate repelling of the ISIS, but also to maintain the security till the threat has been completely neutralized, even in Syria. A Clear-and-Hold strategy requires significant manpower.

If there is anything that Iraq can learn from itself, it is that you have to have enough manpower for the post-conflict security situation. This was seen in 2003 when America didn't have enough men to secure urban centres and all manner of lawlessness and looting became prevalent in the early days of the occupation. By the time reinforcements did arrive, it was too late and the Iraqi people could hardly trust the Americans to bring some order to the country.

Post-ISIS Iraq needs to learn from their own precedent and establish order following the expulsion of ISIS. This becomes all the more important also in terms of retribution and reprisals against Sunni tribes who may have sided with the ISIS at the beginning. If Haider Al Abadi wants to consolidate his gains, then he has to make sure that Sunnis are not harmed in retribution and also to keep a check on the Shiite militias which have sprung up over time which are fighting the ISIS and have been responsible for alienating and harassing Sunnis. 

#  Will America put boots on the ground?

When it comes to the ISIS, the ongoing debate in America happens to be if America should put itself on the ground in Iraq to ward off the ISIS. Currently, America is conducting air strikes and is supplying the Iraqi Army with all manner of support including intelligence, weapons and funds. It has also sent American troops as advisers to the Iraqi army for training and tactics.

Right-wing opinion in America supports American boots on the ground in Iraq to fight the ISIS. The subject of boots on the ground in America is quite touchy. Some might even argue that Republicans are shooting themselves in the foot by advocating for boots on the ground in the fight against the ISIS. The wounds of the 2003 invasion is still fresh in the American mind because casualties kept mounting towards the end of the occupation when the insurgency acquired strength. Many commentators also believe that America lost the Iraq war and came back defeated just like the Soviet Union did at the end of the invasion of Afghanistan.

The narrative of boots on the ground in the Middle East used to come with a sort of imagery where you would associate it with all manner of fireworks, freedom and the like. That is no longer the imagery one senses after thinking about boots on the ground. The narrative has now changed to body counts and insurgencies and the like. It is no longer a sweet feeling to send soldiers to battlefields far away to solve problems which stem from local politics, especially when the casualty rates are so high.

Domestically, there is no reason to believe that the American people would want to send their soldiers back to the Iraq where they had come back from a few years ago with great cost, both in financial and human terms. The American public obviously view ISIS as a major threat, but the fact remains that the ISIS has been localized to the Middle East. It is hard for the American to imagine the need to put American lives in danger in order to fight the wars of the Middle East again.

If America were to send soldiers to fight the ISIS, the most urgent time would have been when the ISIS had nearly reached Baghdad. Clearly, the gains have been reversed and ISIS is in a much weaker position as of now. The Iraqi Army, while doing a bad job at the beginning, seems to have recovered and are making good progress in pushing ISIS back. The presence of the Kurdish forces and other groups trying to push the ISIS back also shows that there is a significant force which is willing to fight ISIS without American presence.

America has also been more warm towards this arrangement with the minimal use of forces abroad and the use of allied militaries to counter threats of this nature. This is why America was more than willing to support the other forces without sending any troops to combat the threat directly. It has offered material as well as diplomatic support and conducted air strikes on ISIS targets which would mean minimal American involvement with the Iraqis, Syrians, Kurds, Jordanians and others solving the problem locally.

There is good reason to keep America out as well.

Many groups have unified to fight the ISIS despite their position on America. There are several anti-American groups who are also fighting the ISIS. The entry of America will polarize the groups and create new complications where America will not only be fighting the ISIS, but several other outfits. It would be days of insurgency all over again when America was in Iraq. America wouldn't ever be viewed as a liberator or a friend, even if it had the best of intentions (altruism seems to be a myth in international politics). America's decision to not be involved puts it in a very comfortable status quo.

Besides, the entry of America could jeopardize all the efforts that have already been taken. It would be of immense propaganda value to the ISIS who can recruit new fighters by using American involvement as an attack on Islam. Many groups which have taken an anti-ISIS stand and are instrumental in the fight against them may even decide to switch sides.

Given that its entry would jeopardize things further, and also the fact that there are existing forces fighting and degrading the ISIS capabilities indicates that it is highly unlikely that America would send troops to fight the ISIS. When Iraq managed fine at the height of the ISIS invasion, then it certainly does not need America when ISIS has been diminished. This is an option also favored by the other states in the Middle East which may view this as a long-term capability building approach and a reassurance that they can do without America.

#  Should America Send Weapons to an Incompetent Army?

One of the biggest questions in the fight against ISIS in Iraq is how did a group like the ISIS, with a few thousand fighters, drive away over 30,000 Iraqi soldiers who were backed by heavy weaponry and occupy strategic towns such as Mosul and Tikrit? Deeper analysis would show a variety of factors, including support from local Sunni tribes, inexperience of the Iraqi army and many other smaller factors.

One of the consequences was that a huge cache of weapons that belonged to the Iraqi Army had now fallen into the hands of the ISIS during the Army's retreat from Mosul and other towns. This includes a wide range of weapons ranging from small arms to artillery shells and everything in between. There isn't a full estimate of how many weapons were actually taken from the armory, but it is agreed that the hauls are massive.

The weapons were purchased by the US for the Iraqi Army. It included a lot of American weaponry, but it also came from suppliers in Russia and China. This isn't very surprising because such weapons are usually a little cheaper to procure and are very good for the kind of conditions in the Middle East with its harsh terrain.

The weapons not only supported an already well-armed ISIS, but the ISIS started selling them on black markets all over the place to civilians and others. Many of these weapons also found its way to the ISIS war in Syria against the Assad government and other factions trying to fight its way out in the Syrian Civil War. Given that the armaments was intended for a force of 200,000 soldiers, it is clear that the ISIS has secured enough ammunition for a very long and drawn out war.

If such a huge force had to abandon all these weapons, it is clear that they retreated really quickly and we can't really claim that they fought very hard. The reason why this is so surprising, is because they were American-trained, American-armed and was a conventional army and not a mere militia outfit. This is particularly worrying when we consider that the fight against the ISIS is being spearheaded by this very force.

In its defence, the Iraqi army is doing a good job as of this date in pushing the ISIS back and ejecting them from Iraqi territory. But that too, came with considerable assistance from Americans and Iranians. American drone strikes, intelligence gathering and the accelerated supply of essential weapons were instrumental in the Iraqi Army's push towards occupied towns like Tikrit.

Should America continue to support the Iraqi Army given that its incompetence has gotten it in hot water in the first place? The answer to this is a little complicated and has many dimensions to it.

For now, it is important that the Iraqi Army be given all the assistance that it can be given. This assistance needs to be extended till ISIS has been completely ejected out of Iraqi territory. In fact, a better deadline would be the re-taking of Mosul, which is one of the most strategic cities in Iraq under ISIS control. If the Iraqi Army retakes Mosul, then there needs to be a renegotiation on the terms of support to the Iraqi Army and the government in Baghdad.

This brings us to an old argument that if America hadn't left without ensuring that the Iraqis were able to manage their security, then perhaps this wouldn't have escalated the way it did. This is not a very sound argument because in its essence, it is shifting the burden of the blame on to America than on to Iraq. Capacity-building takes a really long time, and it can't be done just by throwing money on it and sending more people to help with the training. Capacity building needs to be supplemented with deep reforms of the Army and its working and the re-definition of the Political-Military relationship with the civilian government being in tune with the needs of the military.

In fact, the development of this relationship is crucial for long-term nation building and survival. It requires political will and a far-sighted political class. When the political class in Iraq is constantly worried about the next coup or is paranoid about the status of his ethnic group, this is hampered. This is what has happened to Iraq.

Even when the Americans were there to train the Iraqis to handle their security, they were constantly hamstrung by the Maliki government and undermined all the efforts that General Petraeus took to counter the rise of Sunni extremism. So it is clear, that the problem is more structural than we have thought. So it is escapism to attribute that the current incompetence of the Iraqi Army and the shambles of Iraqi security is America's fault. This is and will remain, an Iraqi problem.

Haider Al Abadi, the current Prime Minister of Iraq, however, seems to be showing more promise when it comes to governance of Iraq and handling the crisis. But Iraq in the future, needs some tough love. It is obvious that a security arrangement will require future supplies of weapons and training, and this is where America and other partners should press for conditions with the aid. The US must put conditions to aid the integration of all ethnic groups in the armed forces and also call out on the use of militias and the armed forces for political purposes.

This is not some demand based on altruism or idealism, because this is in the best interest of the US and other partner countries itself. This ensures that all that training and weapons don't really go to waste and we don't see the repeat of the ISIS incident in Iraq. A stronger partnership with the United States is important for the US because they would want to keep Iranian influence out of Iraqi politics. In the long-term, its benefits will be seen in a better security situation and the reconciliation in Iraqi statehood. It is clear that the chaos in the Middle East is not going to end and in this case, the best thing that can be done is to create a better security situation that can deal with crises as they arise without sacrificing core objectives.

It also seems like America is willing to act on such a suggestion too. The American Ambassador to Iraq warned to stop strikes in Anbar province unless Shiite militia withdrew. It worked and the strikes resumed. This is the kind of coercion that is necessary to keep sight of the larger picture.

A state like Iraq can always claim to need help because of the lack of capacity, but there will always be situations where structural improvements need to be made by the Iraqis itself if they want any meaningful capacity building to happen. While the request for capacity building is not a sham in itself, it is often a very convenient veil to hide behind when it is structural weaknesses that is actually bringing you down.

#  Replaying The Clash of Civilizations

There has been several accusations against the west for allegedly funding the ISIS and in effect, creating a monster it can't control. A lot of this actually comes from many people who are opposing the intervention of the US in Iraq to fight the ISIS.

While this may not be true, what we are seeing is America paying the price for a lot of its misadventures in the recent decades and its dabbling in regime change. For its supposed sins in supplying the Mujahideen to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan as well as various other places where they supplied arms to rebel factions to get rid of governments they viewed as detrimental to their interests, America is now paying the price when it comes to legitimacy.

Of course, America was experiencing a legitimacy deficit over the years when it was seen as indiscriminately occupying countries and supporting regime change in different countries across the globe. The legitimacy deficit widened when you have even its allies having second thoughts about its ability to protect them when it came to serious conflict. Evidence of this can be seen in Japan and Taiwan where military expenditure is increasing and a scenario often rehearsed is a situation where America wouldn't come to its aid in the face of conflict.

This legitimacy deficit is most acute in the Middle East where most people view the USA as being a force that is always trying to secure its interests at the cost of other people. The bad PR as a result of American Middle East policy is playing out here as well.

There is little evidence to suggest that the West had supplied ISIS, even at the start of the Syrian Civil War where ISIS rose to prominence. If we trace the history of the ISIS, we see it emerging from the "Al Qaeda in Iraq" which was led by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. It was one of the biggest terrorist groups in the time of the American occupation. America's occupation of Iraq in 2003 didn't attribute the presence of Al Qaeda as its main causes, but a few years into the occupation, this became a reality.

Even when Zarqawi was killed in 2004, the movement never really died out. It didn't gain as much prominence moving forward, but that could be attributed to the fact that Al Qaeda in Iraq was competing with so many other groups in Iraq at that time. In this light, it is reasonable to assume that the West knew something about these groups, even if it was not much.

It is however, agreed that wealthy patrons in Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia bankrolled the ISIS when it had started to fight the Assad regime. That wasn't the only group that was funded by the Gulf, as we know. There was the Jabhat Al Nusra, the Free Syrian Army (a Western favourite) and many others. It also is a fact that the ISIS is mostly a self-funded organization, which has been really adept at managing its finances and finding independent sources of income.

Presumably, ISIS has understood the limitations of patronage by larger parties such as Saudi Arabia or anybody else. When we look at cases such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the limits under which it has to operate given the control of the purse from Iran, ISIS understood early on the need for independent sources of financing. The fact that external financing forces you to operate under certain conditions of your patron, limits the group when it comes to crucial decisions, especially if the patrons see this as an opportunity to play a larger proxy war with other states.

So ISIS decided, like any good investor, to diversify its sources of income. They went about selling oil from captured areas, extortion, looting, kidnapping and many other activities to remain afloat.

The idea that the West in the initial stages funded the ISIS has no evidence as yet. Sufficient explanation doesn't exist to suggest that the West didn't know about how such groups may turn out. It may have underestimated groups like the ISIS, but it was clear as to what was going on.

Even the media narrative at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War was about the void that would be created in the fighting between rebels and the Syrian Armed Forces. There were clear indications that the void created could be filled by foreign fighters and extremists from all over the world. When intelligence derived from open sources itself showed that the void created could be filled by those who hated the West the most, it is unlikely that support would be given to them, even secretly. It is only a matter of speculation as to what they know from other intelligence sources as to the finer details of the group.

America has learnt from its mistakes in managing the funding for various groups that are trying to overthrow the regime. It understands the limits of regulation and certainly knows that they can't control the ideology or the direction which the groups think. This wouldn't mean that they won't try it, but they are going to be more circumspect in the details of the operation and ensure the return of weapons and would release funds only if it was sure about how the group, its members, its ideology and the chances of it going rogue.

Needless to say, ISIS doesn't fit that criteria.

#  Rationale Behind The Madness

In terrorism, it is often an assertion that those who engage in terrorist activity are insane or irrational, because the violence they perpetuate cannot be thought of by normal, rational human beings. The ISIS in this case would seem to be the absolute worst of the lot then, perhaps the import of the world's worst mental institution.

The assertion that terrorism is a product of madness, however, is a myth. The same would apply to ISIS. In fact, the assertion that ISIS is irrational, is a far cry.

Terrorists are perfectly rational individuals. The use of violence as a means to achieve political objectives may seem horrifying, but the fact remains that the violence used is cold and calculated. The images of death and destruction would evoke emotion to the viewer, but the use of violence is merely a tool in the hands of terrorists than the objective itself.

How to conduct this violence? What are the objectives achieved through this act of violence? How it would impact the group? What are the gains made in this operation?

These are questions that the group asks before any attack. These show that there is a certain order and a certain sense of goal-oriented behaviour. It is not randomized violence. These calculations require a lot of rationality and at every level right from the top where the big decisions regarding the group's long-term objectives, to the foot-soldier at the bottom who carries out the attack and improvises with the circumstances. This is not the work of irrational people.

Similarly, the ISIS is actually a rational organization. The general public may tend to think of ISIS as merely be-headings and other horrible crimes they do to people. This is without a doubt horrifying and ghastly, but ISIS is much more than beheading dissidents and killing people who are not affiliated to them.

How else does one explain an organization which was vying for influence with so many other groups in the same region and comes out on top, while making inroads into another country and setting up control there? Not to mention that ISIS has turned itself into a self-funded organization with negligible support from outside patrons and is employing huge resources into brand management and social media penetration. This requires rationality, reason and strategy. To do all these tasks, the whole organization requires rational minds.

Looking at merely the violence and the fights and not the broader idea of the ISIS is missing the woods for the trees.

The ISIS is an organization that is trying to act and become a legitimate state. The heads of the organization is involved in a lot of planning right down to the details. They are managing finances, procuring arms and ammunition and even ensuring delivery of services, just like a proper state.

Even in their supposed irrationality, there remains rational objectives. The reason they make themselves out to be horrific, barbarous and savage people, is because they are competing for influence with many other groups on the ground. They have this need to show that they are the meanest, most brutal and most feared organization to attract attention to it, and with it, more recruits and more support from others. This brand management goes to show that they are the most effective organization which delivers the best results in the quest for a state which is 100% compliant with Islam and the Quran.

Of course, it is a ridiculous claim that they can create a state like that, but this is clever brand management and a means to an end. They are capitalizing on the emotions of discontented individuals to fuel their objectives.

Even the be-headings and mass killings of people have their own objectives. This is the ISIS version of justice which satisfies the mob and at the same time deters any dissidents. Let us take for example, the killing of alleged homosexuals by throwing them off tall structures. The ISIS has pandered to a very common Middle Eastern revulsion for homosexuality and is gaining supporters who believe in the same, which is a lot of people.

The rule of law is something these areas have never witnessed. In that sense, concepts of due process and "innocent till proven guilty" are merely Western constructs (which is seen as all the more reason to disown such notions of law). By manipulating the sayings of the Holy Quran and terming people as apostates and infidels, they have tried to look legitimate in the eyes of the Sunnis in the area, trying to get their support. What didn't help was the Iraqi government's purge of Sunnis and a denial of justice to them, sowing the seeds of discontent.

The ISIS played political games and made full use of all the discontent and problems in the Middle East. Every move was cold and calculated. These are not works of irrational people.

#  Is the Daesh a terrorist group?

One of the biggest sorrows in the field of terrorism studies is the fact that there is no fixed definition of terrorism. Most agencies, states and organization that tries to define terrorism have their own variations, though they all sound alike. Yet, all of them can be opposed on technical grounds.

In such a situation, the status of the "Islamic State" is even more problematic.

They seem to be less of a terrorist organization, and more of a militancy. Yet, they are spread across borders with full intent to expand. They are supposedly fighting for freedom and have a fixed territory of whose "independence" they are fighting to keep. They fit the definition of terrorism in their intent to kill civilians and the use of violence to achieve political motives.

With so many grey areas, it is hard to characterize them as a particular type of organization.

Everyone recognizes it to be a terrorist organization, but what I have found problematic is that, it isn't merely enough to call it a terrorist organization. It goes way beyond killing civilians and using violence as a means to secure political objectives. It is an organization that does way more than that. While securing political objectives, it has gone to assume functions of a state.

The Islamic State deserves a bigger designation of a supra-terrorist organization. The inference is necessary because it stands out from other terrorist groups which are almost minimalist and straight-forward in its approach and organization. In a situation where a terrorist group has managed to achieve its political objectives using violence and securing itself territory through armed conflict, it should qualify as being more than a mere terrorist organization.

The Islamic State has assumed a lot of governance functions in the areas it controls. Its constant search for legitimacy shows that it wants to be taken seriously as a state and not a mere organization.

They have been trying to get busy in creating the conditions which they perceive to be ways of true Islam. They are very keen on assuming legislative functions where they would create Islamic courts and laws which are literal interpretations of the Quran. Whether or not they really understand the Quran and the other commentary with it, is a different matter altogether.

Daesh doesn't fall under the category of a mere terrorist organization, a militancy, an insurgency or even for that matter, a state or a government. It is a very dangerous cocktail of all of these elements. What confuses us more is the fact that we have almost never seen this happen till date. The closest we have seen to this happening would be the Taliban regime and yet, they don't exactly fit into the same circumstances as the Islamic State has.

ISIS definitely fits the traditional description of a terrorist organization, namely the use of violence to achieve political ends. The whole definition of terrorism is by itself controversial evidenced from the fact that there is no international consensus on defining terrorism. Forget the fact that most countries can't agree on one definition of a 'terrorist organization', even governmental agencies within the same country often have their differences. For example, in America, the FBI, Department of Defense and Department of State all have different definitions in spite of the fact that most of them sound the same.

The whole controversy and debate over the semantics of the definition of terrorism is a matter to be discussed another time, but the basic elements remain the same. There is violence, it is for political objectives and it mostly involves civilians. Does ISIS fit these criteria? Check, check and check.

The violence part is obvious. The extent of violence employed is unimaginable and horrifying. Do they use it for political objectives? Their aim of overthrowing the state and establishing in its place a caliphate would definitely be a political objective. And finally does it involve civilians? They have killed thousands of civilians for various reasons including sectarian, ethnic and other reasons.

Some commentators would like to believe that ISIS is not a terrorist organization but a rebellion. The evidence they provide is the fact that they enjoy legitimacy in many of the areas that they have captured. This is true to an extent. Many of the Sunni tribes had supported the ISIS takeover of many areas. They were willing to tolerate the 'inconveniences' of the Islamic State than tolerate the thugs of the Maliki government in Iraq. The Iraqi government was indeed harassing the Sunnis of Iraq and there is legitimacy given to ISIS rule when we look at it that way. The other argument is that their main opponents are the armies of Iraq, Syria and the Peshmerga.

ISIS, however, would remain a terrorist organization in the eyes of conventional standards of terrorism. For one, it fits the definition, or at least the elements on which the definition is based on. The minute the ISIS killed civilians, they became terrorists. There was no grey area on the fact that these were innocent, defenseless civilians. Let us take the case of the Yazidis who died in thousands on Mount Sinjar before the Kurds came to protect them. They were killed en masse.

Secondly, just because a certain part of the population accords legitimacy and accepts their rule, it doesn't absolve them from the crimes that they have committed against other civilians. The very concept of legitimacy here also is a bit sketchy given that we don't really know whether ISIS enjoys full legitimacy in the areas they control.

So conclusion, is Daesh terrorist? Definitely so and by any standard.

#  Attacking the Supra-terrorist

As of now, there exists no designation called supra-terrorist. One of the reasons is because we haven't really seen this happen and there is no precedent which we can compare it to. The Taliban doesn't seem to be exactly the same thing because when we examine the objectives of both organizations, we see that the ISIS has a much larger aim than being a localized body.

Firstly, there would be an overwhelming majority or consensus which agrees that it is a terrorist organization. This could be expressed in a United Nations Security Council Resolution. Situations where all the states agree, especially the P5 when it designates an organization to be a terrorist organization is rare and therefore the distinction becomes more prominent and more heavy.

Secondly, the organization should have designated territory which they currently control. This is important because this is what separates a terrorism from militancy and rebellion. But the Islamic State is no mere rebellion or militancy. It has no nationalistic yearnings or objectives and it is not fighting for freedom from any one state. Also, sanctuary states as well as states which provide patronage to such groups wouldn't fall into this category. This land should exclusively be under the control of the organization (near sovereignty).

This also makes a distinction between Al Qaeda and the ISIS. Here, Al Qaeda is an umbrella organization for so many terrorist groups, yet it isn't a supra-terrorist organization. It remains a umbrella organization. Had the Al Qaeda also been controlling land and territory, this would have qualified them. At no point did Al-Qaeda control specific territory and administered it. Even when it came to Afghanistan and Sudan, they enjoyed patronage from state authorities.

Now the suggestion of the designation as a supra-terrorist organization is not for mere symbolic purposes or to acknowledge the power of groups like the ISIS. It could be used to facilitate action against it. If there is an agreement as to what constituted territory held by said organization, then there should be a universal jurisdiction for member states to conduct military operations to restore the peace.

The designation of a group to be supra-terrorist organization through a resolution after lengthy debate should come with an annexure describing what constituted the areas held under the organization. This would give rather broad legitimacy to bring down such an organization without being stuck at technicalities.

By technicalities, what is being referred to is the fact that there needs to be a certain number of measures that has to be taken before force can be authorized in international law. There is a need to apply coercive measures, such as sanctions, arms embargoes, asset freezes and travel bans first. If they fail, only then can a question of force be debated.

The designation of a supra-terrorist organization should come with a blanket approval to use force against the organization without waiting for the imposition of sanctions and other measures. In truth, such measures would already kick in by individual member states or the UN itself at the beginning of the terrorist organization's life. Besides, the fact that it isn't really a state shouldn't make it really hard to enforce action because it doesn't enjoy protections under the UN charter.

The designation is necessary because the international community hasn't really evolved a standard protocol on how to tackle this kind of problem or the problem of terrorism. Of course, international law relating to terrorism is far from simple and is an extremely complicated debate. But this designation would help solve the extremities of the problem, should it arise again.

#  'We don't want your money'

A very talked-about subject in the academic circles is the funding of the ISIS. It has become a very crucial topic given the sense of urgency that prevails about the organization and the need to get rid of it.

The initial assumption was that ISIS was taking foreign money especially from Gulf monarchies like Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Such an assumption has its basis in the fact that the Gulf monarchies were actively involved in funding a lot of projects from the Syrian Civil War. Gulf funds went to groups like Jabhat Al-Nusra, Free Syrian Army and many others. Given that ISIS rose out of the fighting in the Syrian Civil War, a correlation was made, but whether or not it was the cause of the rise of the ISIS is debatable.

While we may not know for sure whether ISIS was taking Gulf money in past, we know for certain that it isn't taking any money from the Gulf right now. This is not a shortcoming of the ISIS, but a feature by the design of the organization itself. ISIS strategy has always been about maintaining control over all aspects of its operation. Foreign funding compromises a lot of decisions.

To rely on a particular source of funding sometimes becomes very important, especially for groups which are just starting out their operations and are slowly increasing their influence and power. But how these funds translate into gains depends on the objectives and the demands for the patron. Patrons always have visions and objectives of their own. The choice of the organization also is based on which one matches with his visions the closest.

In such situations, terrorist organizations act exactly as corporations, where a prevalent maxim is "Keep the investor happy".

In the day and age where there are multiple organizations representing each sect, ethnicity and any other distinguishing factor, there is always competition for the limited funding that is received. The need to please the patron also increases, which may result in the compromise of the objectives of the organization. It isn't always a big difference of opinion, but sometimes it does restrict the independence.

ISIS has learned well on how bad that can sometimes be. It has identified that foreign funding is a weakness. After all, the patron is not a firm believer of the cause. The patron sits on the sidelines and contributes a surplus without immersing himself in the fight completely. He remains the weakest link and can be subjected to pressure. Besides, patrons are in for their own selfish, political purposes and would be most willing to compromise on the principles of the cause if need be. Such inefficiencies would kill the organization early.

ISIS has learnt from the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon. This Shiite group is mostly supported by Iran and Syria and we have seen that affect the way that the organization functions as well. The Hezbollah was born during the Lebanese Civil War and has mushroomed into a large organization that has now deeply embedded itself in Lebanese politics. It is now very much a mainstream party in Lebanese society, though it is recognized as a terrorist organization by several states.

When Hezbollah engaged in kidnappings of Americans and other westerners in the late 80s and early 90s, negotiations were conducted with Iran and also possibly Syria for the release of the hostages. This would mean that Iran and Syria took some very significant cuts from the ransom and were at the mercy of the patrons. They would be forced to do what the Iranians and Syrians told them to do. If they defied the orders coming from Tehran or Damascus, they could just threaten the withholding of funds or weapons which would constrain Hezbollah significantly. They would probably lose influence to other Shiite militias and die a slow death. The room for manoeuvrability here is significantly low.

The process of accounting and transparency with the patron is also an addition of bureaucracy and is another potential weakness in the system. In the case of a fallout, it is this paperwork that can be leaked to either intelligence agencies or to rival groups which can lead to their destruction. Patrons may also want to keep the group under a low-profile so as to protect his identity as well as to avoid the interest of intelligence authorities who may try to search for patrons and funding.

ISIS has found that patrons are a huge liability due to this very reason. ISIS thrives on a good show and violent visuals. Protecting the interest of the shareholders means that there is no way that ISIS can actually gain market share. It was good business not to have them on board where they could influence outcomes and create more middlemen.

So when ISIS started kidnapping and extortion, there were no patrons that could act as middlemen for their release. They were free to negotiate themselves, without a phone call from the patron demanding the release of the hostage, and could pocket all the ransom money without splitting it with the patron. This gave them unbelievable flexibility in their operations. This ransom money may have well compensated for the lack of patronage.

ISIS kept investors out and retained all the profits and the decision-making powers. In doing so, it has maintained its independence and has enabled it to grow by leaps and bounds.

#  The Limits of Oil

The financial prowess of ISIS lies in its diversified economic and non-economic activities. Mimicking many of the states in the Middle East, the biggest cash cow with the ISIS also is the sale of oil. It is estimated that they make $1 million a day from the sale of oil, which is a substantial sum. Production as estimated by experts comes to around 25-40 thousand barrels of oil a day. The ISIS sells it relatively cheap to aid smuggling and circumvention of sanctions.

While this may seem to be a big amount, when actually it is minuscule when you compare it to global oil trade which goes into billions of dollars every day. ISIS sells its oil to the Assad regime and Turkey through smuggling and the black market. There are a lot of factors which prevent ISIS from actually obtaining the maximum benefits out of the oil wells that they do own in the territories that they have captured. These range from structural issues to economic issues and everything in between.

For one, the ISIS inherited weak infrastructure. Oil wells in Iraq and Syria have not known to be very advanced, especially those of Syria which has received limited investments in order to upgrade. Their capacity to extract oil was less to begin with. The ISIS started gaining territory within two years of the Syrian Civil War, which was enough time to see most of the infrastructure just decay and fall into a state of utter disrepair and disuse. This means that the supply side of ISIS oil was always limited.

Secondly, ISIS doesn't have skilled manpower to help with oil extraction or to improve the processes by which oil is extracted. The lack of qualified personnel operating the equipment means that the efficiency of oil extraction would be low. Getting skilled engineers to actually upgrade and innovate oil extracting technology is just too far a prospect to even give a thought to. This problem can get worse in many ways. One, the already existing people with the rudimentary knowledge of running oil rigs may get reassigned to fighting, or they may defect, or they may just be killed in time. This means that the little efficiency that they had in the extraction of oil would reduce further as the conflict drags on.

Thirdly, the crude oil in the Northern Iraq oil fields are not of good quality. They would hardly fetch you the best of prices and most importantly, it costs more to refine lower quality crude. The current territory of the ISIS doesn't really have a lot of refineries, and the infrastructure linking crude oil fields to refineries is also in the state of disrepair, so there is very little value addition when it comes to the oil. They can't possibly fetch higher prices even if they wanted to because there is so little that you can do with low-quality crude and no facility to upgrade.

This isn't something that you can invest and improve either. There is nothing that can support the expansion of the industry. There are no qualified engineers who can improve upon the technology, the Islamic state is under sanctions that cannot support the exports of oil to anybody and while the Islamic State may be the richest terrorist group that exists, the money isn't enough to run a full fledged state.

The thing about the $1 million a day statistic is that it seems like a lot of money because it is a terrorist organization. But compared to the goals that the Islamic State has, the income levels are nothing for it. There is definitely no money to run a full-fledged state. They have been trying to embark on various infrastructural projects to appease the local population but they are all looking like prospective failures in the long run.

Soon, they may even run out of money for day-to-day expenses, let alone financing big projects to satisfy the population.

The only way that they have managed so far is by diversifying into other activities like extortion, kidnapping, and taking over the essential businesses within the territories they have occupied. They are also keeping a close check on the finances of the people that live under the caliphate. This economic micromanagement is keeping them afloat for now.

In the near future, when the oil revenues dip because of inefficiencies, disrepair, loss of oil wells or even a greater implementation of sanctions, the ISIS will find itself very desperate for funds. It could try and beef up other sources of income, but how much will the ISIS squeeze out of an already impoverished and bankrupt citizenry?

Eventually, this would mark their descent and hopefully, a quick demise as well. The lack of money may either force the ISIS to discourage the recruitment or encourage recruitment and ask for fees from the new recruits. This may not bode well with new recruits. Either way, this would lead to a decline in the number of people wanting to join them. There may be more defections and this won't be because the fighters are greedy for money and are fighting for payment, but because ISIS can no longer muster up its logistical and financial prowess to conduct operations and expand the caliphate.

And from here starts a string of potential failures which will possibly bring about the end of the ISIS as we know it.

#  Buying from the Devil - The Turkish and Syrian Double Deal

When we say that states look out for nothing but national interests, the role of Turkey and the Assad regime are very good examples of pure pragmatism in foreign and internal policy. The ISIS makes $1 million by selling oil from the oil-fields under their control producing anywhere between 25,000 to 40,000 barrels of oil in a day. One often wonders who would buy the ISIS oil given that there are sanctions in place to both import and export fuel to the group.

Turkey and the Assad regime are loyal customers of ISIS oil. While this sounds really confusing to many given that Turkey is a NATO member and a close ally of the US which is fighting the ISIS, and the Assad regime which the ISIS used as a springboard to enter Syria. Given that the main purpose with which it came to Syria in the first place was to dislodge Assad, it is shocking as to why the ISIS would sell them oil and why the Assad regime would purchase it.

But there are certain facts that need to be put into context.

To begin with, the sale of oil to Turkey and the Assad regime are done illegally through black markets and smugglers. Given the risks involved and that they have no legitimate buyers because they are not a legitimate state, the ISIS is willing to sell the oil at cheaper rates, sometimes as less as $40 a barrel. The price point becomes a very important aspect.

The ISIS doesn't feel like this is a big loss because they have neither spent money on establishing infrastructure to pump the oil out because they are just using the already existing infrastructure built by the Syrian government or the Iraqi government. They don't see the need to operate for profits because they have invested very little capital and don't intend to invest or further the oil production anyway. So them selling the oil at any price would be gains for them.

So why are there customers for the oil sold by ISIS?

In Turkey, oil and petroleum is relatively expensive owing to the fact that it has few reserves of its own and up till the Syrian Civil War access to Middle Eastern oil fields were easier. The oil is not tested for origin and therefore Turkey has plausible deniability when it comes to the source of the oil that they have purchased. In their defense however, all known trade of ISIS oil happens through black markets and smugglers, and there is little government involvement in this.

Turkey routinely claims that they have confiscated oil from time to time on the border, but clearly it doesn't seem enough. Practical difficulties to this too, exist. For one, the borders between Syria, Iraq and Turkey are long and it is laborious to maintain border security. Besides, given the kind of trucking traffic between Iraq and Turkey, it would be hard to ascertain what the source of oil is. Compliance with anti-ISIS measures would mean significantly longer delays at the checkpoints and even the stop of trade at times, which would fare out worse for Iraq.

We can also assume that Turkey is not going to be very pro-active in trying to keep ISIS oil out because of the cost and because they never have to deal with the ISIS directly when it comes to oil transactions.

The Assad regime is another case altogether. It is really intriguing that the ISIS and Assad would deal with each other because they are sworn enemies. The very existence of ISIS has been to destroy the regime. It is one of the many opponents of the ISIS. But ironically enough, Assad would be a more loyal customer for ISIS oil. These also have reasons which involves interests of both.

The Assad regime is facing sanctions on the import of oil. Critical shortages of oil is a huge problem for the regime especially because they are in the midst of a civil war. Not only does he need the oil to support his military operations, which by itself consume a lot of oil and petroleum products, but he also needs it to sustain the civilian population in the areas which he controls. The only reason Assad hasn't been toppled is because he has managed to keep a significant portion of the population happy and loyal to him. Most of them would be from the same Alawite sect, but nevertheless, is a significant constituency to keep happy.

Arab politicians have for years known the value of handouts and to keep the most loyal parts of your population (leader's own clan, ethnicity or sect) happy by providing them with adequate resources and jobs, even if it is at the cost of national integration and feelings of anger from the others. This has been one of the driving factors behind a deep identity crisis in the Middle East and the Assads have contributed to this in their own way.

Given these concerns, Assad again sees no problem in purchasing the oil from the ISIS. After all, ISIS is one (albeit the most powerful one) of many groups trying to topple the Assad regime. The regime needs the resources to sustain the fighting in whatever way it can against all the groups trying to bring it down. So to run the tanks, vehicles, and facilities such as airbases and factories, it would look to anybody willing to sell.

The ISIS would be willing to sell to their enemies because they have no other buyers. The international community is unanimous in its denouncement of the ISIS and it would at least on paper swear that it would not contribute in any way to the financial well-being of the ISIS. Smuggling is easier to neighbouring states and countries, and that would leave many of the other states out of the loop anyway.

#  Back to the Home Front

While ISIS was born and raised in Iraq, its real importance is when it started to fight in the Syrian Civil War and that is where a lot of interesting connections and consequences can be seen.

What started out as a rebellion in the Arab Spring against a brutal dictatorship, turned into an ugly and bitter civil war. But it acquired a lot of dimensions that were expected in some ways and unexpected in others. One of the consequences was the fact that the conflict turned sectarian. Assad's Alawi tribe were considered broadly to be Shia and it became a question of this being a suppression of Sunnis.

What didn't help was the fact that the regime was despotic and was seen as anti-Sunni in its very nature. This was not a sudden occurrence where Bashar Al Assad suddenly turned anti-Sunni. Bashar Al Assad's father, Hafez Al Assad, who ruled Syria before his son took over, was equal in his suppression of any movements that were perceived to be a threat to its regime. In 1982, Assad Senior laid siege on the town of Hama and killed thousands because Islamists were rebelling against the regime. At that time, the lack of social media and other communication technologies helped to create an information blackout and stop the coordination of people rebelling against the regime. The 1982 massacre was as brutal as it could get with Syria indiscriminately shelling the town and sending in troops to kill anybody that stood in their way. Estimates vary between 10,000 and 40,000 killed in conflict.

With Hama being a mainly Sunni town, it was deduced that the Assad regime was systematically killing the Sunnis of Syria and turning them into a minority.

Instances like these coupled with the social realities such as higher economic participation and jobs acquired were going to the Alawi community brought a sectarian angle to everything. Syria soon began to court Iran, and that was confirmation for the world that Syria was taking a sectarian turn.

So when the civil war started in Syria, what was focused on was the pouring in of hundreds of people all over the globe to fight against the regime. It was understood that most of them were Sunnis fighting the "Sectarian" Assad regime. What was not discussed as much was the fact that there were a large number of fighters representing the Shia side as well, trying to keep the regime safe. The reports that remotely talked about this was the possibility of Iranians fighters on the ground fighting for the Assad regime.

What was missing was the fact that hundreds had come from neighbouring Iraq to support the Assad regime as well. Shias in Iraq were feeling at peace with the fact that Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime had come to an end years ago with the Shias finally at the reins with Nouri Al Maliki at its head. Shias now occupied the Army, Police and other government jobs and were now coming to terms with their power. Shia volunteers felt at ease about going to Syria to help their Shia brethren. It is reported that many of them were part of the Mahdi Army and were under the command of the Hezbollah at the time of the civil war.

The coming in of the ISIS however, forced many of these volunteers to go back to Iraq to fight the new threat at the home front which was rabidly anti-Shia and had to be stopped.

The ISIS occupation of places in Iraq created two major impediments for the Assad regime. One, the focus of the world shifted to Iraq almost completely. The narrative could no longer be influenced because the attention wasn't on him any more. Second, it took away a large chunk of fighters that comprised his forces that were fighting the rebels and their many factions.

Now the reason this is important is because it isn't just about the fight against ISIS that concerns these fighters. They will be instrumental in the long term dynamics of Iraq and the Middle East.

They were part of the Mahdi Army, the same force that pinned down the Americans in Iraq and Sadr City and taught them a costly lesson in estimation of the enemy. They went to Syria for experience and they have come back battle-hardened. They were under the command of the Hezbollah and it is these events that leads to a greater integration between Hezbollah, Iran and other groups. The Iranian influence in Iraq is one of great concern to many and this would enable a whole demographic that would be able to change things given the right circumstances.

They will have a larger role in the politics of the Middle East. It is likely that the sectarian divisions will grow deeper as the unifying force behind all these groups is their common sect. Sectarian politics in the Middle East has accentuated differences and has created and deepened conflicts like never before. As this piece is being written, Saudi Arabia has been in an air campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen which has approval from the Yemeni President, who is Abdu Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and a wide range of states whose population can mostly identify itself as Sunni Muslim in faith. This includes the other Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt and others.

The indicators of conflict and disintegration of the Middle East may very well lie in the movements and aspirations of volunteers like these.

#  Vanguards of the ISIS

It is rather stupefying to see that the ISIS has been able to achieve so much despite so many obstructions. It is impressive because they have been able to do all this in the face of overwhelming opposition from the international community and the lack of allies. Despite these efforts, ISIS has made progress to destroy and capture more territory as its recent actions in Ramadi has shown. They even managed a second attempt to retake Kobani, which was surprising because they were daring to take on the Kurds who are the best bet to fighting the ISIS.

In terms of military strength, it is quite clear that the ISIS has superior fighting skills and very strong determination to see the concept of the Caliphate through. Their adversaries may have clear disadvantages on that front despite being better armed, better staffed and better supported by the international community.

The lack of will by the Iraqi Army to fight the ISIS with all its resolve can be explained by various reasons. Most of it would pertain to the kind of treatment it has received over the years and its misuse by the political class for everything else apart from bringing security.

On the other hand, it shows what the ISIS is made of and what kind of advantages they have militarily. For one, it confirms for us, the identity of those who are behind the scenes. This definitely shows us that the show is dominated by the remnants of Saddam's regime. They know the country and its terrain well, they know how to manage their alliances and even run some administrative functions.

We need to understand that Saddam's army was one of the best in the Middle East and was known for its professionalism and training. Not to mention that it was battle hardened and experienced even before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This didn't end with that. Paul Bremer may have disbanded the army in 2003, but they never stopped being soldiers, they just found a new enemy in the Americans. They adapted and changed, they learned how to fight a guerilla war against the Americans and drive them away. They kept building up networks and experience and we see that playing out right now.

The ISIS also has a very strong military structure where command decisions are delegated to the fighters on the ground without micromanagement and restrictions from the top. The ISIS can afford to do that because it isn't a state and it has no obligations to international law. They are not worried about being condemned for the "excesses of its troops on the ground". In fact, this would be encouraged in order to show their dominance.

The Iraqi Army, then, becomes the exact opposite. They don't have dedication or much experience and they are strictly controlled by Baghdad with a lot of restrictions, which is still not able to control the excesses of the Army or the Popular Mobilization Committees which have been acting as militias and meting out punishments to Sunni tribes because of sect identification.

To survive after sanctions, invasion, disbandment and occupation and still come out strong with the intention of carving out a new state, shows the kind of determination that these men show and it also really puts into perspective what kind of threat the Iraqi army is up against.

This also shows the kind of focus of the leadership. For all the talk about the internationalization of the ISIS, it remains limited in its scope and effect. Foreign fighters still don't constitute the majority of the fighters fighting for the ISIS. The bulk of the fighting force remains local Iraqis either coming voluntarily or fighting for the ISIS through forced conscription. It would still be inaccurate to classify the ISIS as being part of some global Islamic movement with the establishment of the Caliphate. This is not to suggest that the ISIS has no international designs, but the conquest of Iraq remains the primary motive for a long time to come.

This also means that ISIS will be a limited movement in the long run. They may have found tremendous success in Iraq, but it is hard to replicate the same in other states of the Middle East. The only reason they could make inroads into Syria was because Syria was in chaos and the Assad regime was busy fighting at several fronts. There was a clear void which needed to be filled and ISIS took advantage of that. In a scenario where ISIS would have to contend only with itself and the Assad regime, things would have been a lot more different.

Even if you look at Iraq, the reason why the ISIS was successful was because they were able to establish a base in Syria to operate out of. Syria was provided the perfect place to experiment different things such as governance, fighting tactics and most importantly, create a reputation to be the saviour of the people. The ISIS was in Syria for quite a while before they made a foray into Iraq and that is because they were building up capacity to wage a long and drawn out war to establish the Caliphate.

This also means that their international expansion would be limited by several factors of which an important component is their own interest in trying to further the cause abroad. They may want to do it through the lone wolves who are getting inspired and are running operations of their own, or their fighters which would go back to wage war, if they wished. It is unlikely that ISIS would be pro-active in these efforts for a while.

Understanding the leadership of the ISIS and the backgrounds from which they come from helps us determine the long-term goals of the ISIS and why they succeed. From what is apparent to us, the leadership of the ISIS and its command style shows a lot of flexibility which is helping them acquire more territories. It also shows that the Caliphate is not likely going to expand beyond Iraq even at the best of circumstances because even with all the hype of the internationalization of the conflict, it shows that this conflict remains a regional one.

#  The Lone Wolves of the ISIS

When we think about ISIS, the first thought is that we associate them as a successful terrorist group because they hold territory and are able to fend off the forces of Iraq and Syria in the process. This would mean that they have partly achieved their political objectives and therefore can be characterized as successful. This is true, but it hardly remains as the biggest achievement of the ISIS so far.

When it comes to terrorism, ISIS may have had a much larger influence than has been previously anticipated. This is because the larger implications of such an event is hardly seen at the beginning. One would imagine that ISIS holding territory would be the most dangerous thing because then we have territory where terrorist groups can come and train or the ISIS itself can train cadres to conduct terrorist attacks in the other parts of the world.

Such fears are not unfounded. After all, we have seen examples in the past in Sudan and Afghanistan where Osama Bin Laden was hosted and eventually used the territory to train fighters in terrorist attacks. We also have the fact that the Islamic State has appeal from many foreign fighters who come from the West and the largest concern right now is that they would take their new-found skills and go back to conduct terrorist attacks. These are possible scenarios as well.

But there is something that the Islamic State has achieved that supersedes any such plans, and it is the fact that they have become an inspiration to many.

The Islamic State has affirmed to many disgruntled Muslims facing discrimination around the world, that there exists a place in the world where their identity would be a source of pride and not discriminated against. The underlying logic behind the ISIS ideology, is obviously flawed and deceptive, but it still is able to influence the minds of several people who are already angry with the way things are. This is also why ISIS has been able to attract such a large number of people from the West to fight for them.

Their stature and the fact that the ISIS is able to dominate the headlines shows that the ISIS is a serious contender and it is not merely a terrorist organization. They have overthrown the state in many areas and established control where the rule of religion is imposed. In an environment where religious identity has led to persecution and discrimination, this is very inspiring to these individuals.

Which is why, a much more dangerous play is not just the foreign fighters going to the Levant to join the ISIS, but the fact that they could potentially inspire a lot of people to take up arms in the states that they reside in, through the same brutality and horror that the ISIS used.

When we refer to lone-wolf terrorism, we are talking about individuals who become influenced and inspired to conduct activities by themselves. They maintain least ties with the organization that they are fighting for and rely on their own sources to conduct attacks. They may raise their own funds, buy their own weapons, gather their own intelligence and all other activities. This way, there is very little to trace back to the organization and the operative can remain under the radar for a longer time. This is a much more dangerous form of terrorism than we have seen earlier.

The potential for ISIS to scale this up, is immense. After all, ISIS dominates social media as compared to other organizations and their ability to appeal to disgruntled individuals by showing that the ISIS is made up of similar people just adds to the whole picture. Also, the narrative that is being portrayed is that this brutality and violences is what guarantees success, so much so that you could carve out your own state. These are very dangerous factors when we are talking about lone-wolf terrorism.

Lone-wolf terrorism is also much more dangerous than any other form of terrorism for several reasons. For one, the individual is much more motivated than a normal recruit. Lone-wolf terrorists rarely have minders and other supervisory authorities. They are motivated enough to conduct attacks without any supervision, which shows their determination. Secondly, they are much harder to trace because they don't have very pronounced ties to the group, which minimizes exposure. Lone-wolf terrorists are not impossible to catch, because there always will be clues at some stage, but it is much more harder.

It is much more easier to track people who have gone to join the Islamic State to fight at the front-lines because there are a lot of paper trails, travel documents and not to mention, their presence on social media. Tracking their activities should they try and come back home is easy because they have already been identified as individuals. This is not the case when it comes to lone-wolves acting purely on their own because their trails are much smaller. A careful lone-wolf terrorist will be adept at masking his identity and his ties to the organization.

Combating this obviously isn't easy. The main problem is that lone-wolf terrorists would obfuscate their activities to show no involvement. If the authorities were to be on a lookout for lone-wolf terrorists, it would require greater breaches of privacy to ordinary citizens who may be enraged and may even marginalize the Muslim community even more, because they would be specifically targeted. If that is the case, then there is a chance that it would validate the very claims that the ISIS makes to garner more recruits.

To check the problem of lone-wolf terrorism, states need to find weak spots where lone-wolves can be caught, for example, in the process of acquiring weapons. If they are able to trace back weapons to smugglers or other criminals, there can be patterns traced. There could even be loose ends left through communications with the ISIS through handlers or for that matter, clear indications on social media.

A long-term view would be to actively engage in de-radicalization efforts by engaging with religious and community leaders. If discrimination is so deep that they are willing to accept a false picture of Islam which is completely distorted by liars, then society also has a part to play in trying to root out the problem. This is much easier said than done. Xenophobia and stereotyping take years and immense effort to reverse, but is a critical part of long-term planning.

#  If the Islamic State had an Air Force

The idea of a terrorist group having an air force is not new. The LTTE of Sri Lanka had its own air force. Sure, it wasn't a sophisticated one with fighter jets and missiles and all the razzmatazz, but it did have something even if in name.

The LTTE air force consisted of small two seater planes which had guns mounted on them, an improvised air force if you will. But it had caused a lot of damage in war. In the last days of the LTTE, a last ditch effort was made to attack the Sri Lankan army and they used the planes to attack the Colombo airport. The attack didn't really succeed, but it was more symbolic than anything. It was painfully obvious to the LTTE that it was the end of their days.

Recently, there were reports that the ISIS had managed to acquire a fighter jet from an abandoned airbase called Al Jarrah outside Aleppo. What was more disturbing were the reports of the fighter jet being tested to fly. Nothing much was said about it later on. The initial reports came from Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). They claim to have eye-witnesses testify that they saw fighter jets take off from Al Jarrah and were flying low, probably to avoid radar. They still seem unverified and attention to this news soon waned away. Reports of jets taking off didn't resurface so we don't know if they're really working.

But what if the jets were working?

There are sizeable differences between both the fleets of both. The LTTE had smaller planes and retrofitted them with guns, while the ISIS is suspected to have proper fighter jets. This is a big difference because with the right ammunition, there is a lot more damage a fighter jet could do.

In the long run, however, it is unlikely that the ISIS can do much even if this fighter jet was operational. There are several reasons for this.

We don't know if ISIS has the manpower to fly the plane, which belongs to the Syrian air force. Even if they managed to get a pilot (presumably a defector from the air force to the ISIS, or even former Iraqi Air Force pilots during Saddam Hussein's regime), that isn't enough. It has been a long time since Baathist pilots used their jets after being thrown out over 12 years ago. This means that even their most experienced pilot's skills may be really rusty and absolutely unfit to fly them.

We don't even know if they have even the basic ground equipment such as radar which can aid the planes in its missions and most importantly, help them navigate around the air base. Without adequate ground support, every flight the jets make become suicide missions.

Long years of disuse means that maintenance would be shoddy. Bases were evacuated a long time ago with all personnel, including maintenance staff. Even if maintenance staff were alive, it is likely that ISIS has executed them because of their collaboration with the Assad regime. Without knowledge of the parts and the mechanics, it is unlikely that the ISIS will want to pursue it further. To smuggle parts for a fighter jet is a rather hard thing to do unlike small arms, but it isn't impossible. Reportedly, the jets are old Soviet era MIG-21s or MIG-23s. If not from Russia, it maybe possible to either get them from either other former Soviet Republics or even other Arab Air Forces which have decommissioned their old MIGs such as Egypt or Libya.

Another related problem is that of weaponry. These MIGs were not designed to carry a big payload, which means it won't really be effective when it comes to attacking ground forces such as Kurds, Assad regime troops or the Iraqi Army. Smuggling in ordnance for these jets also won't be an easy task. They may be effective against drones such as the Reaper, which has very limited manoeuvrability and air-to-air capacity, but not against other fighter jets, which are much more superior or even flown by more competent pilots.

On maintenance and weapons, there is little ISIS can possibly do. After all, these aren't pick-up trucks which can be retrofitted with guns by relatively minor fixes. Aircraft requires really sophisticated skills, training and precise calculations which the ISIS really lacks when it comes to aircraft.

But an even bigger problem is the challenge posed by the Syrians, Iraqis, Kurds and the international coalition. The jets will come under severe fire air defense systems through anti-aircraft guns and rockets from multiple opponents. Stealth is the last thing we can expect from these jets and they will be down in a matter of a few minutes. Apart from the anti-aircraft artillery on the ground, you have fighter jets from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and even the Americans which can intercept and destroy them.

The best bet for the ISIS is to use the jets for kamikaze missions by using the plane itself as a big missile. Given the kind of problems it already has, it is likely that this too would be ineffective. It is likely that this would probably be tried as a last resort if the ISIS were going to lose the war. This is also reminiscent of the LTTE which used its planes on a suicide mission against the Sri Lankan state after they realized that they were going to lose.

In all likelihood, the ISIS has abandoned the idea of using these jets at all because trying to maintain even a rudimentary air force is very hard and ineffective. There simply isn't enough returns apart from some small propaganda value, which also isn't much if it can't conduct strikes. The ISIS understands tried and tested tactics such as guerilla warfare and fighting on the ground where it has strengths.

Looks like the ISIS doesn't have a prayer in the sky.

#  Command And Conquer: ISIS

When the ISIS catapulted into the news cycle with the fall of Mosul, there was this lingering feeling in my head about the whole situation. Something about it was very familiar, like a deja vu. For a long time, I didn't really remember why it felt so familiar. It felt like it had happened before. Then it struck me that it indeed had happened before.

There was a video-game I used to play as a adolescent titled "Command and Conquer: Generals" by EA Games. It is a strategic third-person game where you had to use tactics to defeat the enemy. The game was divided into three factions: USA, China and an entity called the GLA or the Global Liberation Army. You could play as any one of the sides and either complete campaigns in each or create maps and pit against each other.

The GLA was the adversary to USA and China. The characterization of the GLA in this case, becomes most interesting.

The GLA has been characterized as a terrorist group which operates in Central Asia. There are no explicit identifying features to suggest whether the GLA is Islamic or not, but it definitely sounds and looks like it. When you click on any of its characters, they say something in strong Arabic-accented English. The images used seem like it has been picked up from the Mujahideen War against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

When it was designed, it probably was made in the image of the Taliban. But as it turns out, it looks like EA Games had created a close mock-up of the ISIS in the process. It is clear that they had tried to remove the obvious indication that this was the Taliban, but in its tweaks and changes in the narrative, it created a virtual Frankenstein that came to life in the real world.

The characters which comprise the GLA are very interesting. The GLA's foot-soldier is called a 'Rebel', there is the 'Terrorist' whose job is to suicide bomb himself, 'Hijacker' who hijacks vehicles and turns them into car and truck bombs and so on. They are clearly a terrorist group, but what is more important is that they have proper bases and infrastructure to support their efforts.

Even when it comes to their weapons and their vehicles, it is shown that most of their vehicles are pretty much retrofitted civilian vehicles which make use of parts in order to add function. For example, the 'Technical' is basically a pick-up truck with a gun mounted on top. There is also the 'Truck bomb', 'Quad Canon' and other vehicles. Almost all of them look rugged and look like there has been a lot of improvisation. GLA doesn't seem to have an Air Force, just like the ISIS doesn't.

Their sources of income is also intriguing. The GLA captures Oil Derricks and runs black markets to finance their activities.

But the most important fact here is that the GLA holds territory and is looking to expand. The USA and China are sworn enemies who are to be destroyed. All these similarities to the ISIS puts the current scenario into perspective.

Of course, there are no lessons to be learnt to defeat the ISIS from the game. This simulation while conceptually similar, remains in its essence, a game. In the game, the only way to defeat GLA is to annihilate it with overwhelming force, including the use of nuclear weapons and some other futuristic technologies. Even the GLA is obsessed with the use of chemical weapons in its quest for domination. A particular special weapon is called the SCUD storm which launches a volley of SCUD rockets to destroy the opponent.

The game cannot tell us anything about how to defeat the organization politically, which is the hardest part in any war. But there are a few similarities between the GLA and ISIS that one can't miss.

1. Control of territory is important. The objective is to dislodge the enemy from the area and occupy it. Territory is legitimacy and equips you with more infrastructure to further this legitimacy. For a terrorist group, this is even more important because this is the political objective that they are fighting for. This turns them from being a mere group, to a state. Of course, in the real world, it hasn't translated into becoming a full on state in the traditional sense. But it is bigger step than just being a group.

2. Terrorists don't see themselves as terrorists. They see themselves as soldiers. As the use of the term 'Rebel' for a foot-soldier shows, they are looking for legitimacy. The use of their violent tactics is justified because they don't own the means and the weaponry in order to take on bigger states head-on. The use of guerilla warfare, the emphasis on speed rather than force and other unconventional methods, some of which is not permissible in the laws of armed conflict is justified because states have an undue advantage in numbers as well as in size.

3. Diversify your sources of income. The ISIS, like the GLA, needs huge cash resources in order to buy all manner of things to further their cause. You need to diversify to reduce risks from volatility too. The ISIS diversifies through the sale of oil, kidnapping, extortion and other sources. They most certainly don't get any money from any foreign patron because that just creates dependency and it reduces organizational independence.

4. Keep the population happy. The GLA doesn't seem to have a population component, but it has one unit called the "Angry Mob". This particular unit derives strength in numbers which do a lot of damage because there are so many people in it. The ISIS works on a similar principle, by providing the local population with essential goods and services and demanding their loyalty and support in return. By doing so, the ISIS also gets access to more local recruits for their cause and is keeping territory.

5. You don't need a lot of resources to overwhelm the enemy. The GLA, like the ISIS can be described as 'rag-tag' and working with whatever it has got. But that's all that is required. You don't need big fancy equipment to do the job when there are so many substitutes. Keeping the costs low can help you achieve scale in the operation which will achieve the goals better. ISIS doesn't have any qualms about stealing weapons or using ones which have been abandoned by the enemy. In fact, this is how they save resources for other more important areas, such as recruits. We saw this in the fall of Mosul and many other towns in Iraq, where ISIS overwhelmed a much larger enemy through speed and skill.

6. Just because they are your enemy, doesn't mean you can't use their weapons. The GLA and ISIS are both very pragmatic organizations at the end of the day. They have absolutely no qualms about the use of the enemy's weaponry against them. In the game, the GLA can use parts from destroyed enemy tanks to retrofit and upgrade GLA vehicles. A lot of ISIS fighters use American-made weapons to fight Iraqi and Syrian forces. Most of them come from either dead Iraqi soldiers or raids on armories. The ultimate aim is to attain the objectives. Trying to ensure that the recruits don't use weapons made by the infidel is a futile exercise and a wasteful one at that. Never waste good resources.

The concept of the GLA gives us a vague simulation of how things would be. This of course, is an extremely simplified view of how the ISIS operates. But even in a simulated version, it is the same feeling of fear when a violent group controls territory.

#  How far can ISIS expand?

The possibility of expansion is perhaps the most scariest proposition emerging out of the whole crisis that is playing out with the ISIS. Nobody wants to see the ISIS making inroads from the Middle East into other countries. ISIS claims to have designs over the whole world through its maps which puts many people at edge, especially if they don't understand the kind of mindset that the ISIS represents.

But one cannot speculate on the possibilities on the basis of just the mindset. Expansion is not a current priority but it may become one in the near future. But would ISIS be successful if it chose to expand?

It could be successful because of the kind of foundations they have laid. They have control over territory and they are assuming governance functions over it. They are sovereign in the sense that they are able to procure funds without outside patrons. They have a large network of followers around the globe and some of them are in the Caliphate itself fighting for the Islamic State in the hope of expanding it. They have been trying to incite followers through the aggressive marketing of the Caliphate in Social Media and other outlets. They are trying to prove their brand value and establish that they are more than capable of running a state and conduct governance within its territory. They want to show that their authority is legitimate and is almost no different than any other traditional state.

Their focus is on removing their image as a mere "organization" and more of a real entity with borders, sovereignty and everything that a legitimate state possesses. This image goes a long way in the expansion plan.

Some of the most ardent followers of the ISIS reside in the countries that border the ISIS territories which includes Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other places. Given that expansion is most successful if it is pre-empted through existing borders into other states, this would mean that these places would be more primed for ISIS expansion.

ISIS expansion doesn't seem to be fixed in the traditional idea of forming vanguard forces and lead an invasion. As a terrorist group without formally being a state entity, ISIS adapts to whatever methods are successful, including the use of guerilla warfare and terrorism. They are more than willing to use this as a tool to aid its expansion rather than trying to amass fighters and then push. At least this would be their tactic at the beginning and then they may apply more conventional techniques. We can see this happening in states like Libya and the Sinai region of Egypt where there are terrorist attacks happening in the name of the ISIS.

Their ability to create branches and delegate the operations to local commanders would be an invaluable asset in expansion because the holding of local areas is not something that can be centralized and run from Raqqa. It involves a lot of local delegation and ISIS has proved to be great at such matters. Therefore they would be able to make good in-roads.

But the case that ISIS would expand doesn't seem to have a lot of ground for so many reasons.

For one, ISIS doesn't really have that sort of international focus. The leadership is filled with Baathists and people who were mostly involved in fighting the occupation of Iraq. Even while the ISIS claims an Islamist agenda, it is clear that the leadership doesn't reflect the diversity of Islam. Most of them are Iraqis who have mostly concentrated on restoring their power in Iraq itself. The Al Qaeda, for example, has a diverse leadership. Osama Bin Laden was a Saudi, Ayman Al Zawahiri is Egyptian, Nasir Al Wuhayshi was Yemeni, Ilyas Kashmiri was from Kashmir and the list goes on.

Secondly, the ISIS is no Al-Qaeda. ISIS doesn't have a lot of networking going on like the Al Qaeda does. The ability of Al Qaeda to muster up organizations which are diverse and have multiple objectives is not something that the ISIS has. Without such a network, the ISIS may be able to mount individual attacks, but very few to actually bring down the state that they are trying to expand into.

Thirdly, for the ISIS, it is important that the state that they are trying to expand into be already in a weakened state to attempt an expansion. They managed to make inroads into Syria because there was a civil war going on, they managed to get into Iraq and occupy territory making use of the chaos that was going on in its wake, Libya has no proper government to speak for and the list goes on. So can ISIS make inroads into places like Saudi Arabia or Jordan or Lebanon? Unlikely. Most of them are stable states which have been on an all out war against the ISIS. Even if ISIS tried to infiltrate these countries using terrorism and guerilla warfare, it wouldn't help them much because the state is very strong and have been pro-active in trying to stop them.

It won't be easy for ISIS to create that kind of chaos to facilitate an expansion.

Even if the ISIS did expand, it would prove to be a massive headache for the ISIS. Even now in a hypothetical situation where they are able to take Libya, it is almost useless because there is no direct link between Raqqa and the territories in Libya. It is hard for Raqqa to coordinate and control the activities beyond its borders and especially so when there are no direct borders. How is the Islamic State going to transport men and material to sustain their efforts in Libya?

With expansion, the Caliphate would become weak because ISIS is not known to be particularly good at governance. They do their best, but it is very hard to sustain such a system. To expand and try to expand the governance structures within these territories, is not a reasonable prospect and it goes against the trends that the Caliphate itself has established. For one, they are not going to devote resources in places where they feel that their hold is weak. That would include large swathes of territory which don't receive ISIS administration and that would alienate a lot of people.

If the ISIS is able to expand only into areas where there have been chaos, it shows that these areas are unlikely to generate any revenue for the Islamic State. This means that there is no return on investment made by the Islamic State in these areas and the proposition of allocating already dwindling resources to these areas would not sit well with ISIS. It would be in their interest to not pursue expansion at all if this was to be the case.

The ISIS is indeed facing a lot of pressure. Their resources are almost depleted and international action is getting stricter against them. Their capacity to pump oil is becoming limited and their income options are running out because there is no scope to generate economically productive activity for their long-term survival. Expansion is most likely going to be limited to Iraq and Syria where they are familiar with the terrain and can establish effective control over it without straining their resources.

#  Are ISIS Advances a Global Failure?

Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi, in a conference of the anti-ISIS coalition in Paris, said that ISIS advances were a 'global failure'. This came in the light of the takeover of Ramadi and Anbar provinces. Of course, it is rather disconcerting to see the ISIS gain ground when support for anti-ISIS initiatives is perhaps at its peak, but it nevertheless is a very interesting thought.

Abadi was speaking in context of foreign fighters coming to join the ISIS, especially from Saudi Arabia. He implied that the blame could not be solely on Iraq because the foreign fighters were coming from the Gulf, Egypt and the West. He said that this was a failure on the part of the world that the ISIS has been gaining ground.

Abadi's claims have both merits and flaws.

It isn't false that the incursion of foreign fighters haven't stopped. They have been continuing since a while and it is true. The role of Saudi Arabia too is rather murky. We saw them completely divert the issue of ISIS by concentrating on the Houthis in Yemen. Their contribution to anti-ISIS activities is not that great considering the distance from the action. Saudi Arabia adopted a rather defensive mindset against the ISIS, choosing to build a huge state-of-the-art wall to prevent any incursions. One can agree that this isn't a very pro-active or even a helpful approach.

Abadi is also right when he says that a lot more effort needs to be put in by the coalition. This is also agreeable in a way because it was understood that drone strikes wasn't really that effective in the first place. Ideally, the fight against the ISIS requires boots on the ground, but nobody except the Iraqis, Kurds and Syrians are actually willing to do so. Jordan is fighting the ISIS, but whether or not they are ready for a larger commitment against the ISIS remains unclear.

On the question of weapons, Abadi claims that sanctions on Russia has hampered the procurement of weapons. Given that Iraq has been a consistent buyer of weapons from Russia, this is an understandable concern. After all, Russian weapons are cheaper and are suited to the rugged conditions of the Middle East. Iraq had purchased refurbished Su-25 jets from the Russian Air Force after the fall of Mosul last year. This is not being matched up with weapon supplies from other states. The Iraqi fiscal condition also is rather fragile and requires more flexibility in its condition.

But Abadi's claims are also quite flawed.

On the question of foreign fighters, which form the base of his complaints, he has conveniently left out the fact that several foreign fighters transit through Iraq to get to the Caliphate territory. Many come in the guise of pilgrimage and the like, and eventually they cross and become a part of the ISIS. This is happening from Iraq. Abadi can't claim international apathy when there are concerns right at home about foreign fighters. A high profile case, is that of Areeb Majeed from India who transited through Iraq in the guise of pilgrimage and joined the ISIS.

When it comes to the question of stepping up the attacks on the ISIS, there are serious international constraints. Abadi knew right from day one that the international coalition could only offer intelligence and air strikes. The limitations on this approach was crystal clear right at the beginning and it was understood that fighting the ISIS requires boots on the ground. Iraq has made it abundantly clear that foreign troops will not fight its war on the ISIS, which then leaves the international community with very little choice. The ISIS too, is adapting itself to resist the air-strikes by blending in with the population to use them as human shields. This limits the already limited options that are available to fight the ISIS.

If Iraq wishes, it could invite other states, preferably other Arab states to come and fight a ground war against the ISIS. Of course, this seems to be a nearly impossible suggestion because of the kind of dynamics that plays out in Arab politics. Arab politics is characterized by immense pride and ego where mutual trust is thin and even small actions can construe a provocation. The Middle East is a perennial powder keg of conflict for good reasons.

Another thing that Abadi has completely left out, is the question of the Shiite militias. They have been instrumental in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and they are supposed to be in the control of the Prime Minister. Shiite militias known as Popular Mobilization Forces have been known for their ill-treatment and suspicion of Sunnis. With the world expecting Abadi to improve the reconciliation between the government and Sunnis, he has to answer for this crucial detail.

If the fight against ISIS requires that Iraq's Sunnis denounce ISIS and fight them, then the obvious move is to reach out to Sunnis. But is Abadi doing that? Not so much.

Civilians fleeing Ramadi could enter Baghdad only if they could show that they had a sponsor. This was happening to them within their own country. The Abadi government may claim that it was well within their rights to implement security measures in place in case ISIS fighters were embedded amongst the refugees, but it remains a discriminatory measure which would potentially distance the Sunnis and complicate a post-ISIS Iraq.

Abadi has also failed to rein in the militias who have been harassing Sunni tribals and villagers. In a recent video, one of these militias was seen to be burning an ISIS fighter in an attempt to spread fear amongst the ISIS. They may have tried to intimidate ISIS, but they are also alienating the Sunnis whose grievances always stemmed from the harassment by Baghdad. This becomes worse because at least on paper, the militias are under the control of the Prime Minister and when such acts are allowed to happen, then one wonders whether Abadi is wilfully allowing this to happen or if he is in control at all. If he allows this to happen, then there would be no difference between him and Maliki, and if he was too powerless, then he can do nothing for them.

Abadi's attempt to brush his inactions under the carpet by blaming the international coalition is definitely misplaced and he really needs to examine his own actions before trying to alienate people who are genuinely trying to help out.

#  Neither Islamic Nor Stately

The 'Islamic State' as we know it, is neither Islamic, nor a state. What it is, is a terrorist organization in the search of legitimacy in a world of nation-states. This has been acknowledged by many world leaders and there is near consensus that ISIS has been misrepresenting themselves using Islam as a banner.

But the claim of the Islamic nature of this entity is worthy of more scrutiny.

What are the religious origins of the ISIS? They don't have a real religious grounding as such, even in its roots. Its roots are in the Al Qaeda in Iraq after the Americans invaded Iraq in 2003. They consisted mainly of disbanded Iraqi soldiers who fought the Americans. More than religion, it was the fight for reclaiming Iraq and exacting revenge on a foreign country that was occupying their country and taking their dignity away. Even as an affiliate, AQI wasn't really on good terms with the parent organization of Al Qaeda.

Religion probably became a more prominent part of the identity because it was important to highlight the religious aspect for recruiting and branding purposes. The narrative of the 'American war on Islam' was important to create a broader appeal to a larger populace to provide them with support. Abu Musab al Zarqawi's death saw more religious minded cadres taking over leadership, of whom Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi is one.

They never went away of course. They were always around, even during the Sunni awakening and the subsequent shunning of the group by the Iraqis in general. They rose to prominence during the civil war in Syria where they brought their years of expertise fighting with the state and took advantage of the chaos to entrench themselves and carve up territory, which was then followed by their conquest in Iraq and then to present day.

Even though they try to rally support in the name of Islam, we have leading clerics from all over the world ranging from the Grand Mufti in Saudi Arabia to the Al Azhar University in Cairo denouncing the Islamic State and claiming that their activities are un-Islamic and constitute terrorism. Most of highest religious authorities in Islam have denied any credibility to the claims of ISIS being Islamic in anyway. And why is that?

They represent the Salafist thought of Islam, which is very puritan in its nature and refuses to acknowledge that Islam isn't a monolith and that it has gone through many changes with time. Would this by itself constitute the criteria for being un-Islamic? Unlikely.

They are being denied this validity because of the untold crimes that they are committing against innocent civilians in the name of Islam. This also is interesting because it is not as if other groups fighting the Assad regime in Syria are not indulging in savage violence in the name of Islam, they are equally brutal, but what irks everybody is the pride they show in it. In its violence, the ISIS tried to project an image of justice, but all it showed was the blood-lust of the ISIS.

The claim of justice was a joke given the arbitrariness. Anybody they didn't like or who opposed them, was un-Islamic.

But a more disturbing question is why were people still attracted to the ISIS despite its inherent un-Islamic ways? This even after some of the world's most learned scholars denounced them. The answer lies in many parts.

For one, the kind of recruits joining the ISIS is not the person who goes by scholarly commentary. Complex concepts of Islamic theology is simply too complicated for them to fathom in a world which is already too confusing. The people who do listen to such discourse are not people who would pick up the gun and fight. Even if they didn't agree, most people would do it in the exact same way, which is in a more academic fashion. This way, the work of these religious authorities will reach out to those who are already truly faithful and keep them that way.

Secondly, religious appeal for the Islamic State is not propagated by the highest scholars, but probably by priests in lower rungs which have more engagement on the ground at the grassroots and are more accessible to community members. This is particularly important in the context of the foreign fighters coming from Europe and the mosques that they visited.

Thirdly, the ISIS is simply more accessible, even omni-present to the charged, angry youth who go to the Islamic State to fight. The ISIS is available on social media and on the news, which surrounds everything that they do. With this kind of access, it is quite easy to drown out voices of people who have have come to meaningful conclusions based on their life-long devotion to the study of Islam. And it isn't just about the access, it is also about the content. With the constant affirmation that these methods have produced viable and successful results, the foreign fighter also sees this as the way to go.

It conforms with his ideas of directly confronting the corrupt state through violence and now there is proof that fighting them directly produces results. The Islamic State's results are far greater than that of even the Al Qaeda in the sense that the Islamic State occupied territory in not one, but two states and declared the Caliphate there. These are significant achievements and it is very hard for somebody to question the results.

The only way is to somehow show the weaknesses of the Caliphate and create models for its demise to show that this is nothing but a temporary phenomenon which would crumble like a pack of cards once the cracks became too big to bear.

#  Pin-up

ISIS brutality is best signified in the murders of its hostages like Steven Sotloff, Kenji Goto, James Foley and others. While the ISIS seemed to be a concern at the beginning when it was confined to the Middle East, the executions of these journalists and aid workers caught the attention of the West and suddenly, the concern soon became a scare. ISIS was now a serious entity and something needed to be done about it.

Of these videos, the biggest star was the executioner himself and his biggest USP was his British accent. He was identified as Mohammed Emwazi, a British national born in Kuwait. Emwazi wasn't necessarily the biggest butcher of the ISIS, but he certainly was the most prominent because of the kind of coverage he got from the mainstream media given that the hostages were mostly westerners.

Emwazi's rise to fame is important in the context of two things. One, is the process of radicalization that Emwazi went through in order to become the person that he had become and the next is the use of the image of Emwazi as a carefully crafted message by itself.

Mainstream media already has enough information to understand Emwazi and his background. He was born in Kuwait to Bedoon parents. The Bedoon community in Kuwait are people of Iraqi origin and have been known to be treated as second-class citizens in Kuwait. There was a deep suspicion of the Bedoon during the Gulf War when Kuwait was invaded by Iraq and as a result, the Bedoon have been ill-treated all the more. The Bedoon are for all intents and purposes, stateless. In fact, Kuwait was recently criticized for having had implemented a policy for encouraging the Bedoon to move to Comoros, instead of granting them Kuwaiti citizenship.

So it is a fair assessment that Emwazi didn't felt like he belonged from a very young age. They moved to Britain in 1993 and he lived most of his life there and went to college to have a career in IT. He moved back to Kuwait and had a job where he seemed to have performed quite well. Things start to change once Emwazi comes back to the UK where the police detain him at the airport and questions him and searches his bags citing the Terrorist Act. It became a six-hour interrogation which then turned violent. This is perhaps the first incident which propels him into radicalization and Jihad.

He gets prevented from going back to Kuwait on multiple occasions in the future. This restriction on movement was something he must have equated with him being a Muslim. Here is a case of a well-educated and a well-adjusted citizen of the United Kingdom, getting prone to radicalization due to incidents of state discrimination against Muslims. This doesn't mean that all those who have grievances would take up arms against the state. This very point is validated by the fact that there exist so many watchdogs and NGOs monitoring the situation and taking their concerns with the judicial system of the state to find redressal. Emwazi himself was in correspondence with an NGO called "Cage" which took up Human Rights abuses.

The pattern of radicalization begins when the state proves itself to be systematically discriminatory against Muslims. The West being at War with Islam and Muslims gets credence from personal experiences such as these.

If Emwazi is any lesson, then the West will understand the process of radicalization and stop absolving themselves of any responsibility towards the situation that they have encouraged, if not created.

The second aspect is Emwazi as a message by himself.

The ISIS selected him to conduct the executions for very good reasons. It has been understood that the success of ISIS lies in the ability to keep the people engaged in social media. They do it through constant engagement and the executions is a major pull-factor. The gore, the violence and the constant competition of the ISIS to make it as gruesome as possible has kept people engaged and sadly, entertained.

For executions of other Arabs, the ISIS is content on using other Arabs to do it because their execution is mainly to show the local population about the consequences of being a collaborator with the government, being an informant or worse still, being an apostate.

Emwazi comes into the picture when it comes to the Western hostages. An English speaker was important because it is not just the West that is to be rattled, but the entire English-speaking world, which constitutes a lot of people.

But the most important was Emwazi himself. He is the embodiment of the huge problem of Muslim youth going to Iraq and Syria to fight for the Islamic State. A young man, interested in rap music, grew up in London, is educated and slowly got radicalized due to discrimination. This is a typical profile as far as fighters from the West are concerned. While most of ISIS foreign fighters are Arabs from Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, the focus of the media has always been on Western youth especially from Europe. The use of Emwazi projects the kind of appeal ISIS has amongst a similar demographic, which is huge.

Through Emwazi, the ISIS tells the world that it isn't hard to radicalize people from amongst the population in the West. They are also trying to attract recruits by showing them that the likes of Emwazi will feel perfectly at home in the Caliphate, where being a Sunni Muslim is a matter of being celebrated and not discriminated against. Emwazi becomes a figure to empathize and connect with.

This reinforces the very point that the ISIS is not a rudimentary and crude organization. They have very specific strategies and they work everything out to the last detail. They video-tape several executions, but the one that matters the most, is the one they have thought of to the last detail. Emwazi's role as a executioner is the embodiment of careful planning and strategy. The attention to detail reminds us what kind of an organization that the ISIS truly is. 

#  You're No Longer British

Nigel Farage of the UKIP has suggested that British citizens who have joined the ISIS should be stripped of their citizenship.

"It would be totally unforgivable and unacceptable for U.K. nationals who have made the decision to go and fight for Islamic State militants in the Middle East to be permitted to return to the U.K. and quietly slide back into our communities to take advantage of all that modern Britain has to offer", said Farage.

Farage has suggested that they be stripped of their citizenship. As we know, Nigel Farage was never a fan of immigration. So with the rise of the Islamic State, he has felt that it was most appropriate to reiterate his stand that immigrants were a burden on British society. What is particularly irksome, is that Farage believes that citizenship is a privilege and a favour.

But this proves one thing for certain, which is that Farage knows nothing about either terrorism or the Islamic State, because what he suggests is something that the Islamic State encourages.

This is how the Farage logic on ISIS works:

"Immigrant lads join the Islamic State because they are Muslims. Muslims hate Britain and British values. Since they openly hate Britain, they should be stripped off their citizenship. Should we engage in some retrospection about why they have so many grievances about Britain? Absolutely not. They hate Britain because they are irrational. Our foreign policy has nothing to do with it."

This monolithic, simplistic view of Islam and Britain is misinformed and it is worrying that a mainstream politician would advocate anything on these lines. Farage's idea is to make these people stateless so that they are not offered the protections of Britain and international law.

Jihadis who go and join the Islamic State are more than happy to renounce their citizenship and their ties to the West. Photos have been popping all over Instagram and social media of ISIS fighters posting pictures of them burning their passports to show that they no longer have ties to the West. They would accept the citizenship of the Islamic State.

The concept of citizenship of the Islamic State is much different. One doesn't require a passport to be a citizen. The only criteria is to be a god-fearing Sunni Muslim who believes in the Caliphate, that's it. There are no borders and papers, no international law to govern relations and certainly no solid concept of citizenship. Passports in this case are seen as materialistic ties to an infidel land, and nobody cares about the loss of being British.

This also brings a closure to the deep identity crisis that the average fighter has. If they feel constantly discriminated against and unaccepted in society, they never would have a British identity to begin with. In such cases, people try to hold on to the identity that they do have, which in this case is Islam. Their identity now is Islamic, not British. The British in them died a long time ago.

If anything, this would make it official that they belonged to the Islamic State now. This would bring legitimacy to the Islamic State because it seems like they lost their British citizenship because they became citizens of another state. The Islamic State isn't another country and shouldn't be treated as one. Nigel Farage suggests that this is exactly what is to be done.

Such a denaturalization campaign would just prove to Muslims that Britain is not welcoming to Muslims because at this point, it would seem targeted. This will only alienate British Muslims further and validate the claims of the ISIS that Britain hates Muslims.

Farage's suggestion that they be stripped off their citizenship also speaks to his views on Human Rights. To strip off a person's citizenship, is to violate International Human Rights law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly says that each person has a right to nationality. It is understandable that any state would want to distance themselves from individuals who are indulging in terrorist activity, but this measure just sweeps everything under the rug, including the role of the state which has contributed to the problem.

The ability to revoke citizenship is a potentially dangerous precedent. This would be the dream of any autocratic regime to be able to just disown people at the stroke of a pen. We can see this happen already in places like Bahrain which has revoked the citizenship of anti-government dissidents.

It not only has a potential for misuse by the state, but also is useless against real terrorism because things like citizenship and nationality are abstract concepts without any real meaning to real terrorists. If immigrants working with visas were being harassed by authorities, now this can be extended to British nationals who can now be threatened with this provision, if people like Nigel Farage had their way. As Atossa Araxia Abrahamian says in her article "You Can't Fight Beheadings With Paperwork", this would open up the possibility of McCarthy-style attacks against people of Middle Eastern and North African origins.

This can lead the way for further abuse because terrorism and citizenship proceedings can be very arbitrary with no transparency. Rendering them stateless would bring about a denial of the protections granted to every British citizen because the suspect is an alien by law. Worse still, they could be rendered to other countries for questioning which is a highly controversial practice.

These are practices which would make Britain a hypocrite state with its commitment to human rights on paper but more than willing to make an exception in its own case.

Nigel Farage has in essence, suggested that Britain create a vicious cycle that will alienate Muslims and make Britain a racist state so that they leave. This is a move suggested which is in consonance with the far-right dream of purging their society of all immigrants. Farage has merely used the ISIS as a prop in the big play which is "An immigrant-free Britain, for the Anglo-Saxons".

The British people however, showed their disapproval and their disgust of Farage in the 2015 UK elections by voting him out. The UK clearly, does not deserve a Farage who would dismantle the last shreds of dignity of the United Kingdom.

#  The Caliphate Vs. The Base

The whole Al Qaeda Vs. Islamic State still rages on as to whether the ISIS is really stronger than the Al Qaeda and if it has decimated the Al Qaeda in terms of popularity and influence.

A little history shows us that the Islamic State was formed out of a nucleus built by the Al Qaeda. The organization was headed by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi during the Iraqi insurgency against the American invasion. It was called Al Qaeda in Iraq and had pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda as an umbrella organization. Even then, there were certain clashes between Al Qaeda and Zarqawi. With his death in 2004, the organization went through a transformation, so much so that it dropped the Al Qaeda from its name and became the Islamic State in Iraq.

So we see that there is an intimate link. During the Syrian Civil War, however, it was understood that the differences between the Al Qaeda and the Daesh were irreconcilable and the Al Qaeda then denounced the ISIS. Al Qaeda never liked the fact that the ISIS was gaining influence and had major disagreements with the way it operated. Most importantly, it was worried that the ISIS was dominating the scene and was undermining the Jabhat Al Nusra in Syria, which was an Al Qaeda affiliate.

Ayman Al Zawahiri then goes on to denounce the ISIS and Jabhat Al Nusra now directly fought against the ISIS in Syria.

A lot of commentators claim that ISIS has stolen the thunder from Al Qaeda and that ISIS would dominate the Jihadi scene and dismember Al Qaeda. While it is true that the ISIS seems to be a much more effective force, the assessment has been rather harsh.

For one, comparing ISIS and Al Qaeda is apples and oranges all over again. They both have their own distinguishing characteristics and while there would be certain areas where the two compete, they can't always be compared. Their fundamental disagreements lay in the approach they took and so they can't be compared because both organizations adopted a very different approach even though their common goal is an Islamic Caliphate. In that sense, they're not really competing.

If we were to compare Al Qaeda and ISIS to the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, Al Qaeda would be the Mensheviks and the ISIS, the Bolsheviks. Al Qaeda prefers a slow approach and its circle is really restricted. It is hard to get into Al Qaeda. There is a lot of vetting and most recruits have some familial link with current Al Qaeda members. ISIS on the other hand, embraces everybody into its arms as long as you are a Sunni Muslim willing to create and protect the Caliphate. A vetting process exists even in the ISIS, but they are happy to take on as many people as possible.

The Al Qaeda believes that a slow approach is important to create a long-lasting effect and so its motives have always been to cultivate its agents into western society and create sleeper cells. It also expands through affiliation with already existing Jihadi organizations which are prominent in various parts of the world, for example, the Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, Lashkar-E-Taiba and Al Shabaab. They don't want to expand too fast and want to bring about a change in the attitude of the common Muslim living world-over to topple their governments and set up the Ummah.

ISIS on the other hand is clear with what it wants. It wants to control territory in the name of the Caliphate. It would occupy territory and that in turn would attract recruits, money and influence. Build and they will come.

Al Qaeda believes in a slow hearts and minds campaign which puts emphasis on the legitimacy of Al Qaeda's actions. Al Qaeda spends a lot of its resources trying to justify what it does in the name of Islam. The ISIS on the other hand, doesn't really care about legitimacy and thrives on brutality of its methods and actions. This explains why Al Qaeda doesn't receive as much condemnation as the ISIS does from the clerics and the scholarly community within Islam. This does not mean that the ISIS doesn't care about hearts and minds. It clearly does if we look at their governance patterns in the areas that they have captured, but they are less willing to use reasoning and trying to win over the population to be on their side. Their main resort is to force.

This is where they differ the most because Al Qaeda has repeatedly said that the ISIS excesses in violence would drive away Muslims from Jihad and would create distance and anger towards the Ummah for being built on foundations of violence. ISIS obviously believes in the power of violence to get the Ummah up and running.

ISIS has seen more success lately as opposed to the Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda saw a huge loss with the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Jabhat Al Nusra is unable to make the kind of gains that the ISIS did and are now competing with the ISIS for influence in Syria. It hasn't been able to fully capitalize on the Arab Spring but again, it is hard to determine that because for all we know, Al Qaeda could be using this time to strengthen the organization from within and try to build networks.

The ISIS holds one undoubtedly big advantage, which is the control over territory. That ensures a lot of things. It is also a barometer to see rule under the Caliphate and for Muslims around the world to decide if they wish to see their future in such a scenario and under such a rule. Al Qaeda, exists even today, as an abstraction and an intangible presence. They may be known only if they are conducting terrorist strikes and these days that too seems to be overshadowed with the coming in of the ISIS.

Does this mean that the ISIS has prevailed over Al Qaeda? That is highly unlikely.

The slow calculated approach of the Al Qaeda means that Al Qaeda has a lot of resilience and patience. It can go on for a long time without activity and strike when the guard is down in other countries. The ISIS obsession over fast acquisition of territory means that it is vulnerable with the loss of the same territory. If the Iraqis are able to make headway and break their dominance over land control, then it has disastrous consequences for the Caliphate.

ISIS may not be able to survive long due to several factors, including potentially drying income and the realm exceeding the capacity to effectively govern. Al Qaeda doesn't worry about that. It doesn't have territory to control and services to deliver. They can live without all that because their expenses and overhead are low. Their franchisees take care of themselves and don't need to really ask for Al Qaeda for help. ISIS on the other hand, is self-financed but it needs to understand that there are limits to its sources of income which will definitely dry out.

The reason that this becomes apples and oranges is because ISIS has always had a Levantine bias as opposed to the Al Qaeda which has had a global focus. The leadership of the Al Qaeda and the ISIS reflects the same. Al Qaeda has a global footprint while the ISIS consist of mostly Iraqi Sunnis and namely those who fought for Saddam Hussein's rule. When most of the operations of the Al Qaeda are concentrated abroad and the Daesh concentrates on the Levant, their focus and area of operations become different and the only place where this rivalry plays out is in Syria with the clashes between Jabhat Al Nusra and the ISIS.

So will Al Qaeda lose its importance in the shadow the ISIS? Not as much as its being projected. It is likely that the Islamic State may crumble under its own weight and mismanagement. In its absence, the Al Qaeda can fill a potential void as a replacement. All Al Qaeda needs to do at this point, is survive long enough to out live the ISIS and then take its place to continue its work and push its own agenda. Al Qaeda can use this opportunity with the guns being pointed at ISIS, to train its cadres, increase recruitment and build more networks so that they could be used when necessary.

We also see a lot of people being disillusioned and regretful of the ISIS and abhor the extreme methods with which they kill fellow Muslims. The defectors from ISIS will always have a home with the Al Qaeda.

The unknown here is the scenario where the ISIS will have been vanquished. For an organization that has been built on perception, the defeat of the ISIS would dramatically change those perceptions and that would truly be a litmus test of whether the Al Qaeda or the ISIS was built to last.

#  A Second Chance

The recent takeover of Ramadi by the ISIS has shattered the morale of the Iraqi forces which was making considerable progress in driving the ISIS away. They have been reclaiming villages and towns from the Islamic State with Tikrit being the latest addition to their victories. Tikrit was Saddam Hussein's hometown and a very important center for Iraq's Sunnis. The takeover of Ramadi in this case, becomes a very big blow to the Iraqi Army.

What we have been seeing is a flood of civilians who have been trying to flee the violence that has befallen them. Most of them have come to Baghdad where they hope that the government will protect them and shelter them from the violence and the war. Most of these people are Sunnis and this has a very important bearing on how this plays out. The Iraqi government seems to be making the problem worse by restricting their entry into Baghdad.

The Iraqi government is worried about ISIS militants mingling with the local population in order to gain entry into Baghdad. They have security concerns as well as the fear of a sectarian imbalance. This creates an atmosphere which is unwelcoming to the fleeing Sunni refugees. This is definitely paranoia of the Iraqi state because there are several other ways individual terrorists and militants could enter Baghdad without resorting to this way. Several internally displaced Sunnis are living in Baghdad's mosques and have been restricted there.

Sunnis leaving ISIS held areas is a very good sign because the notion that the Iraqi Sunni would rather survive under ISIS rule than under Iraqi Government discrimination is now demolished. This shows that Sunnis do believe in the Iraqi state and has more faith in it than it has in the ISIS. This is a positive sign. Either it means that the ISIS has lost its support amongst the Sunnis because of their excesses or that the Iraqi State has finally broken through with the Sunnis. Either way, it is positive news.

But this isn't good news if the Iraqi government doesn't engage with them. By making them feel unwelcome by discouraging their movement to the capital, they are being made to feel that they are second-class citizens. These are exactly the kind of grievances which built the ISIS support base amongst the Sunnis in the first place. Earlier, one could have placed the blame on Maliki saying that his sectarian politics was to blame and that was what created such a gulf between the sects in the first place, but with a new government in place which promised to bridge this gap, this excuse no longer plays. After all, even the Sunnis now expect some genuine change in the face of such a grave crisis.

Making them feel like second-class citizens not only validates claims that the government can't protect them and they are corrupt, but it also shows that the government is outright anti-Sunni and that successive governments would be the same way. This would mean that being anti-Sunni is systemic in Iraq's political structure and this would have repercussions not only on the Sunnis within conflict zones and the ones fleeing, but also the Sunnis who are collaborating with the government in various areas, including in the Parliament and in the Army. This would make any post-conflict reconciliation all the more harder.

The Iraqi government should embrace them and reach out to them as much as possible. There are reasonable security concerns, but to treat Sunnis negatively because of that, will create more problems than it would fix. A hostile population will contemplate its support for the ISIS or for that matter any group that would further its interests.

On the other hand, a PR campaign can do wonders and destroy any remaining support. Images of well-treated Sunnis, happy under the care of their government would pose a different reality to Sunnis within ISIS territory. This would create a nice distance from the old Maliki regime and create some hope of a more inclusive Iraq. Sunni tribes may be encouraged to stop support to the ISIS, which is slowly happening. The goal here is to amplify these gains and make it known to all Sunnis that the days of sectarian discrimination and harassment of the Sunnis by the state is over. The message should reflect that there is a much better alternative to the Islamic State, which is the new government.

Moreover, the exodus coming from Anbar province can provide for a wealth of information about the ISIS. If ISIS plans on conscription from the areas that they have captured, the refugees can provide details of their relatives who are military-age males who are willing to fight and would be forced to do so. This makes it much more easier to gather intelligence or even plant intelligence assets to find out what is happening there to conduct a counter-offensive.

By embracing the exodus, giving proper treatment and more importantly, using this for an extensive PR campaign, would show that the new Abadi government is one that can be counted on for the future of Iraq. They need to set their goals to re-establish the pre-1980 era Iraq which was concentrating on getting their fundamentals right and was a centre of education and culture in the Middle East. Those are fond memories of Iraq and they need to be revived.

#  The Libyan Route

Abdul Basit Haroun, an adviser to the Libyan government has come out and said that ISIS is smuggling operatives by boat into Europe. For most people, this would set a lot of alarms. This is also particularly alarming because of the recent incidents where boats carrying illegal immigrants from North Africa have sunk, killing immigrants in the hundreds. This has also reinvigorated a fierce immigration debate in Europe. Such a statement will obviously give ammunition for the conservatives in most European countries who are mostly anti-immigration. Nigel Farage of the UKIP had raised similar concerns during his election campaign in the UK in the recent 2015 elections.

It is not really prudent to rubbish the claims. Haroun's sources are apparently smugglers who operate out of ISIS held areas in Libya. For one, we have to acknowledge that the ISIS is making in-roads into Libya and so it is possible that they are going to export it to Europe due to the proximity. We also have to agree that ISIS thrives on such human smuggling networks and other criminal activities to make money.

But is this enough to claim that ISIS is effectively exporting fighters to Europe? It isn't enough, even if the concerns cannot be rubbished off completely.

There are several problems to such claims. First of all, the ISIS is currently trying to consolidate its gains in the Levant. International expansion isn't really on their minds. Even if the West and the other Arab governments are making progress in fighting the ISIS, they seem to have a really long way to go. Recruits are still coming in and the fighting is fierce as ever. With other world events gaining primacy in terms of attention, the ISIS has managed to buy more time to survive. It may even change tactics from fighting head-on to resorting to guerilla tactics. This seems to already be in effect given that ISIS fighters are starting to integrate within the civilian population. With so many problems in consolidation in the Levant itself, they are too preoccupied to think about Europe.

The ISIS leadership also have a very specific region focus. It is true that their appeal is to a universal um mah and all Sunni Muslims, but the fact remains that the leadership is almost completely Iraqi with the combination of Salafists, Naqshbandis and former Baathists. They haven't thought about expansion beyond the Levant. The fact that they have not tried anything with Lebanon despite being so close and having many factors and reasons to get into it, also shows that it may be being circumspect about its expansion.

The ISIS idea of export of Jihad is to inspire people in various countries to take their own initiative and start jihad there. In effect, the idea of export is to rely on lone-wolf terrorism to increase the range. Perhaps the only thing that the ISIS is responsible for is to provide the brand that would take responsibility for the attacks. In several attacks around the world, from the Charlie Hebdo attacks to the Sydney hostage situation, the first thing that was suspected was the ISIS. But the attackers in most of these cases had almost no direct link with the ISIS but were greatly inspired by them. This is one of the greatest successes of ISIS where they have managed to make an impact in the Western world without having had to invest any resources.

Another cheap method exists in the form of the current fighters in the Islamic State, many of them are from Europe. When they go back to their home countries, they bring with themselves a wealth of knowledge and experience, not to mention a large level of indoctrination. They already have a pool of recruits who can easily blend and will carry out the objectives of the ISIS. So lone-wolf terrorism along with the use of its own fighters after their retirement has solved their problem of expansion into the West.

Besides, the sending of recruits to Libya to get on boats and then go to Europe seems to be wasteful and strategically inconsequential. To begin with, fighters need to be trained and then sent back. ISIS is currently trying to get as many fighters as they can to fight the Iraqi, Syrian and the Kurdish armies and keep their existing territory. The hope that ISIS may someday wage war in unfamiliar Europe, is too drawn-out a fight and too little gained in the process, which is why they would abstain from doing so.

But Haroun's statement actually is more deep than that. There are hints of deception in his blame of the ISIS for smuggling in fighters to Europe. Haroun here may be absolving responsibility and is trying to say that the Libyan government is blameless.

Libya was liberated from Gaddafi's rule in 2011. Since then, Libya has been plagued by all sorts of political problems. Fighting has become so frequent and there almost exists nothing called the Libyan state. Its own Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan was kidnapped once by gunmen in October 2013. That is the kind of instability that exists within Libya. In a situation where things just turn for the worse, what are the prospects for the creation of meaningful economy? Almost none.

Worse than the prospects of a better economy, is the basic instability of Libya where people can't lead normal lives. There is no law and order and the government is nearly powerless. When you are at the mercy of militias and warlords who control parcels of land, then there is no choice but to leave and find refuge elsewhere. By claiming that the migrants going to Europe are possibly ISIS, Haroun masks the root causes behind why migrants are going away in the first place. A statement like this assumes that people are not fleeing because they fear persecution and a rotten life, but because they are terrorists. Haroun doesn't call all the immigrants terrorists of course, but he is fermenting a suspicion which have big consequences for those who are making this perilous journey in the hope for salvation.

Now why would the Libyan government take a stand like this?

To begin with, this can garner some attention and support to the Libyan government which is fighting the ISIS in Derna. Such a claim may bring in funding and weapons from Europe, which can then be used to fight the ISIS. The current focus is to fight the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, which means that the fight in Libya, or that ISIS is even present there, is being ignored.

Secondly, the government may want receiving states in Europe to treat the refugees with suspicion. After all, the refugees will hardly have anything good to say about the Libyan government and one way to take away their credibility is to call them terrorists. If refugees and asylum-seekers are willing to make the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean through human traffickers, often after giving them all their possessions to make this journey, then we can be certain that things are much worse in Libya than it seems. These raise some very uncomfortable questions for Libya in their international human rights obligations.

Whatever their reasons may be, this is a rather dreadful attempt by the Libyans to wash off responsibility of refugees originating from Libya. The concerns may have some foundation but it doesn't consider the various other factors on the ground which makes this an unlikely scenario. The ISIS has better ways to create terrorist attacks in Europe which doesn't involve Libya at all. ISIS maybe profiting from the human smuggling and trafficking operations, but using this method to smuggle in fighters seems to be pointless and filled with vulnerabilities.

Libya should really think about the situation at home and why they have not been able to resolve this political deadlock.

#  Can the Islamic State penetrate the Cedar Nation?

Lebanon's situation is perhaps the most interesting of all the dynamics that are playing out in the Middle East. For a country that has deep cleavages between its constituent communities and which is surrounded by conflict from almost all sides, Lebanon has managed to keep itself away from most problems that are currently plaguing the Middle East. This is not to suggest in any way that Lebanon doesn't have problems or that it has been untouched from the wave of problems that have been brought about by the Islamic State.

There have been clashes at the Syrian-Lebanese border between Lebanese forces and ISIS like the attack on Arsal in 2014 and claims that IS militants were trying to capture villages in the Qalamoun mountains to secure some territory as a buffer.

But what makes it all the more interesting is that Lebanon is perhaps the most vulnerable of all countries in the Levant. To begin with, Lebanon has a very delicate balance in its sectarian composition which has come about after over two decades of civil war. It wasn't as if Lebanon did not live in peace before, but an alteration in the demographic composition of Lebanon is what mainly caused the whole war. The 1975 Civil War can be attributed to the arrival of Palestinians who came to Lebanon from Jordan and upset the demographic balance as they started trying to interfere in Lebanese politics, which then led to tensions and finally, the civil war itself.

Right now, we see a very similar situation repeating itself with Syrian refugees. Lebanon hosts nearly a million Syrian refugees, many of them Sunnis. This time, however, the Lebanese authorities are very clear about keeping them away from Lebanese politics or anything that may end in the repeat of the Civil War. The memories of the Civil War and what caused it still runs deep in the minds of the Lebanese people. So far, it doesn't seem like it has upset the balance in Lebanese society.

Part of this also must have to do with the Lebanese mistrust of the Syrians. After all, Syria did try to intervene during the Civil War and had left Lebanon only as late as 2005 which has implanted a sense of suspicion and mistrust for the Syrian government. The Lebanese government also has been alert to the situation. Recently, Lebanon had decided to restrict the entry of Syrians when it was found out that many come claiming to be refugees but were constantly crossing back and forth the border, putting into question if they were really fleeing persecution and availing refuge.

The ISIS doesn't seem to have plans for the takeover of Lebanon as yet. After all, they are currently busy trying to consolidate their gains made in Syria and Iraq. But the ISIS would definitely be interested in taking on the Hezbollah which has been active in fighting the ISIS in Syria. Hezbollah has openly backed Bashar Al Assad and has sent fighters there. By involving itself in conflict, the Hezbollah increases the risk of ISIS trying to attack Lebanon.

The large number of refugees who are mainly Sunnis from Syria also is a point of concern should they have plans to join the ISIS. While the threat exists, it doesn't look like Syrian Sunnis have grievances against the Lebanese state. It also doesn't seem like ISIS has that kind of influence amongst decision-makers in these camps or in Lebanon itself to get them interested in bringing Lebanon under the new "Caliphate".

Opening up new fronts doesn't seem to be a very prudent idea, especially when they are already under attack from multiple fronts. The ISIS understands strategic planning well. It is instances like these which go on to show that the ISIS carefully plans all its moves and are very perceptive about their future plans. They know how to avoid strategic blunders.

Besides, the international community is also behind protecting Lebanon. Saudi Arabia spent $3 billion in modernizing Lebanon's military. Most of this money went to France to supply Lebanon with the latest armaments, training and equipment maintenance. There is no evidence to suggest that merely spending on armaments helps to curb the ISIS incursion, as evidenced by the fall of Mosul despite the Iraqi government having numerical as well as qualitative advantages in terms of weapons. Yet, it is believed that Lebanon may not have that kind of baggage that the Iraqi Army did, and therefore would be able to fight better.

If ISIS were to attempt a take-over of Lebanon, it would definitely not win the war on the political front. ISIS cannot assume that Lebanon is the same as Iraq. The one thing that differentiates Lebanon from Iraq is that Lebanon has learnt to accommodate each other and build a national identity which is distinct from sect. The identity may still be forming and it may take a while for it to consolidate itself, it has a much better foundation than Iraq does. The ISIS managed to make inroads into Iraq because it was able to convince disgruntled Sunni tribes to align with it as well as use scare tactics and kill dissenters.

That wouldn't work in Lebanon.

#  The Kurdish Question

In the fight against the ISIS, one of the most potent and important players are the Kurds. Erbil is the nearest safe spot amidst the fighting that is going on in Iraq. At the beginning itself, it was understood that the Kurdish involvement in the war against ISIS would be crucial. It was painfully obvious that the Iraqi Army couldn't go alone into this. Besides, it was also understood that the Kurdish Peshmerga operating through the Kurdish Regional Government was at par or even more powerful than the Iraqi Army.

The involvement of the Kurds, however opens up a slew of many other issues and questions. The Kurd identity is not a monolith. The fight against the ISIS especially involves a variety of Kurdish actors, some who are at odds with other governments and others who are in favour. For example, the PKK and YPG are fighting the ISIS, but is opposed to Turkey. Turkey would try and scuttle any support for these groups and would be more worried about their successes than the successes of the ISIS.

The nationalisms of Syrian, Iraqi, Turkish and Iranian Kurds are different. An independent Kurdistan is not necessarily one idea and it has multiple variations depending on where you come from and what you believe in. But interestingly enough, they have enough cohesion to unite and fight against the ISIS and this unity has made them into a very potent force.

The Kurds are well armed, well-trained and well-supported by most parties and has been doing a very decent job. They have been instrumental in providing some form of relief for minorities like the Yezidis and Erbil seems like the safest place to be despite being almost in the centre of the conflict. Even when they are not part of an institutionalized army, they have achieved a lot of success even as guerilla groups such as the PKK and YPG has shown. They managed to evict the ISIS from towns such as Kobani and prevented them from trying to take the city again. This is significant when you look at it in comparison to the fact that the Iraqi Army despite being an institutionalized and legitimate force couldn't prevent the fall of Ramadi to the ISIS.

The Kurdish angle, however, becomes so much more significant now. There already existed problems between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad over jurisdiction. KRG always tried to assert its own autonomy over Iraqi Kurdistan and went so far as to undermine Baghdad by negotiating oil contracts on its own without consulting Baghdad.

The Kurds have always believed that given the years of suffering that they have been through, they deserve special consideration. Their mistrust of Baghdad goes back to many years and the fact that successive Iraqi governments have done so little to improve the situation and abate sectarian conflicts hasn't helped change the perception. Under Saddam Hussein, the Sunnis dominated the scene while under successive regimes, it was the Shiites and Nouri Al Maliki had institutionalized the sectarian bias which was simply out there in the open to see.

KRG always had the power to defy Baghdad. It had a well-trained, well-armed force in the form of the Peshmerga which was not affiliated with the Iraqi Army or integrated. Major oil producing areas of Iraq actually fell within Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad was always weak due to the lack of unity and inability to come to consensus. Iraqi Kurdistan always had the liberty to defy Baghdad and Baghdad didn't have the means to keep Kurdistan under control.

The Kurds also had the advantage of the narrative because the Kurds were always seen as a people that were being constantly persecuted and attacked. The Kurds were always seen as a more appropriate partner by the west, and therefore was more favored. The ultimate vote of confidence lies in the fact that the Peshmerga was involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and were active allies of the US in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. It has always remained in the interest of the West to keep the Kurds a little more powerful.

The narrative is also aided by the use of legends. In social media circles, one of the most discussed topics remains that of the women fighters of the Kurds who are fighting alongside men and are quite successful at it too. It definitely breaks the old notions of the curtailment of women's rights. The right for women to fight alongside men is something not even seen in the West where fighting still remains a male-dominated area. Breaking such stereotypes bodes well with the west which views them as "progressive" and "forward-thinking".

This comparison becomes important because it is in glaring contrast to traditional images of the Middle East and the Arab people. This determines the support that the governments are willing to accord to the state and the imagery attracts western audiences. Not to mention the fact that the Kurds have been pro-active in protecting Christian sects such as the Yazidis, which means that they would get support from the conservatives in the West to support their activities.

The truth is that even the Kurds have their own flaws. Human Rights Watch has found that the Kurds were discriminating against Arabs in the territory they control and are restricting their movement. Arabs have not been allowed to come back to the towns that they fled during the violence, while Kurds could come back. They have also occupied houses that were left behind by Arabs and have been using them to rehabilitate Kurds and Yazidis who have been fleeing all the violence of the ISIS. Arabs are treated with a lot of suspicion and as a result are unable to find jobs or access to essential services in Kurdish areas.

Politically, this changes the game completely. The ISIS crisis has actually strengthened the Kurds to a really big extent. In every victory against the ISIS, they get to control the territory that they have liberated. They don't submit to either the Damascus or Baghdad and given that they are in such disarray, it is highly unlikely that they would take any action against the Kurds. The Kurds are also bolstered by the international support that they get from states around the world who even today consider the possibility of the Peshmerga and other Kurdish forces being the vanguard and main fighting force against the ISIS as opposed to the Iraqi army.

The Kurds in that sense not only becomes about the future, but also about the present. Baghdad wants to stem the activities of the ISIS, but also doesn't want the Kurds to take complete control. This puts them in a real fix because they don't seem to win either way. Tensions already exist between Baghdad and Erbil. Baghdad is quite insecure about the Kurds getting more power. The KRG and Peshmerga could simply stop supporting the Iraqi army if it had problems with Baghdad.

The question now is about the endgame after the ISIS. What happens to the Kurds in the new political equation of Iraq post-ISIS?

The KRG in this case would have several options, almost all favoring them due to the fact that they have acquired new territory. For one, they could demand their own country and given their effective control over the areas, it won't be hard to establish themselves as a state. Second, they could choose to remain autonomous but can ask for additional concessions and freedoms such as foreign relations and defence of their own realm, all within the confines of the Iraqi state. It also depends on the political situation of Iraq at that time.

Turkey will vehemently oppose any idea of a separate Kurdistan because it would complicate the question of Turkey's treatment of its own Kurdish population. Given that Turkey was considering military action in Syria due to Kurdish advances, shows the concerns that are being played out in the Turkish mind. However, the AKP's loss of majority in their recent elections and the rise of the HDP party which represents Turkey's Kurdish population shows that Turkey will have to re-evaluate its stand. What would be most interesting to see is how the United States and the West would perceive this news and what they would do about it.

The immediate consequence of the ISIS endgame would mean the re-examination of the Question of Kurdistan and whether a new state will be born. The Kurds seem to be acting very purposefully with the full intention of eventually occupying and annexing territory which they have been fighting for.

And this doesn't seem to be a mere dream, but we see signs of it already happening. Masrour Barzani, the intelligence head of the KRG has advocated that accelerated Kurdish independence would help defeat the ISIS. He reasoned this out by saying that this would enable the Kurds to purchase their weapons and ammunition and conduct attacks on their own terms without worrying about Baghdad.

In the Daesh's pursuit of a legitimate Islamic State, it seems to have given its enemies the ability to make a state of their own.

#  The Crimes We Are Blind To

The reason ISIS is so popular is because of its violence and brutality and its openness and pride in displaying it. As days pass, we see that the ISIS seems to be competing with itself to make the killings more gruesome and violent. Media, both mainstream and social, seem to have a huge role in broadcasting and elevating the threat perception.

The ISIS flourishes in the attention because it assures them notoriety and also finds them believers. The ISIS has adopted some rather novel ways to show kill people such as drowning them inside cages, setting cages on fire, throwing homosexuals from tall structures to their deaths and many other such rather bizarre and shocking ways to kill people. Distributing these disturbing images of course, shows what a brutal and criminal organization the ISIS is. The undocumented crimes could be much worse and not understood.

But for all the imagery portraying the ISIS to be criminals, what is often not spoken about is the crimes of those who are fighting the ISIS. There are a wide range of actors fighting the ISIS and almost all of them have their own dirty laundry which comes out in the media from time to time, yet nobody really delves into those issues in the way that should be done.

The fact remains that the Iraqi Army, Peshmerga, the Syrian rebels and almost every other group have engaged in atrocities of their own. Some of it has been documented and others just ignored. To the international observer looking at the situation, this isn't much of a focus, but this plays out in the minds of the local Arabs, especially Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria, who are being branded as ISIS sympathizers and collaborators and this will snowball into the future once a post-ISIS world has been realized.

The Iraqi Army, who are mainly Shiite have been troubling the Sunnis since years. The flourishing of the ISIS and the reversal of the gains made during the Sunni Awakening could actually be attributed to the army constantly hounding the Sunni areas with the blessing of Nouri Al Maliki in some craze of trying to redeem their pride taken away from Saddam's days of being an anti-Shiite. Several instances exist where the Army has cleansed areas of the ISIS and have been harassing citizens.

Next within the scheme are the Popular Mobilization Committees who are mainly Shiite Iraqi youth who have picked up arms against the ISIS to support the army. These paramilitaries are known to be under the command of the Iraqi government and are actually indulging in all manner of witch-hunts against the Sunnis. Recently, one such fighter was seen in a video to be roasting a dead ISIS fighter by hanging him from the ceiling above a fire. While they keep saying that the fight is against the 'Daesh', we invariably see the hounding of the Sunnis because of guilt by association.

The Iraqi government has its own flaws while dealing with the affair. There is no visible attempts by the government to curb the witch-hunts by the Mobilization Committees or the Army. It has been treating the Sunnis fleeing from the violence of the ISIS as criminals and second-class citizens and even tried to restrict their entry within the country. For example, when refugees were fleeing Ramadi and had come to Baghdad, the authorities restricted entry to those who had a sponsor in Baghdad. For this to happen in one's own country, is discriminatory.

The Kurds have also had their own share of issues for all the talk of them being the frontier force in the fight against the ISIS. Human Rights Watch had found that the Kurds have been appropriating houses left by Arabs to Kurdish families and have been turning away Arabs and restricting their entry. The point of discrimination seems to be their ethnicity. This of course, is vehemently denied by the Kurds who insist that they have been doing everything to protect the Arabs.

Everybody has been indulging in murders and executions of captured ISIS fighters including the Iraqi Army, the Kurds, the Christians, the Syrian rebels and the Mobilization Committees. They all match up to the ISIS when it comes to brutality and most importantly, the display of this brutality to the outside world.

Not a lot of people would find this objectionable because what we're being bombarded with is the constant imagery of the ISIS killing indiscriminately and brutally. One would think that this would be appropriate treatment for people who indulge in the same. The savage nature of the ISIS doesn't justify extra-judicial killings and executions in such a gruesome fashion.

This is not a moral argument made in order to stress the humanitarian aspect of a situation where the enemy needs to be treated with mercy. Not indulging in such practices have a real pragmatic purpose for the long-term. For one, if state entities like Iraq allows its soldiers and the mobilization committees (under the command of the Prime Minister) to execute and mutilate people by branding them as ISIS, then how do we know that Iraq would respect laws of armed conflict that Iraq is a party to?

This puts the Iraqi government in another dilemma. If it said that it knew the activities of its troops and the militias, then the government is complicit in murder and war crimes. On the other hand, if it didn't know about these killings, it means that the Iraqi government is incapable to lead and has absolutely no control over the activities of the militias or its troops. This becomes a serious legitimacy crisis for the Iraqi state.

Can such a government run a state in the future with such deep ethnic fractures? Is the Iraqi army furthering divide and therefore prolonging the fight against the ISIS because of its treatment of the Sunnis and branding them collectively guilty by association? These are serious questions as far as the question of Iraq in the post-ISIS future is concerned.

When it comes to conflicts in the Middle East, this seems to be a perennial problem because the warning signs always exist and yet they are ignored. Experts would always claim certain historic factors that were being ignored and we see that today. We saw that happen when Saddam's Iraq used chemical weapons against the Kurds, we saw it when America was colluding with the Gaddafi, Mubarak and Assad regimes before the Arab Spring when it came to the war against terror and many other instances where the signs were quite clear that this was a bad idea in the long-term.

Nobody denies the work of the actors fighting against the ISIS, but given the role of imagery used in describing the fight and the unfettered support to such entities, it becomes important to know what kind of skeletons lie in every closet.

#  Is International Law futile against the ISIS?

When crises like the emergence of the ISIS comes about, one of the biggest punching bags blamed is 'International Law'. People start lamenting about the powerlessness of the international law regime in fighting the menace of groups like the ISIS. To an extent one can agree with a characterization like that. To be fair, however, the debate on the question of non-state actors is a very pressing one and is being vigourously debated in the international fora.

What does international law say about terrorists? The closest instrument that we can rely on is the Geneva Conventions which talks about laws of armed conflict. The Geneva Convention has no provisions to define terrorism. To be fair, there is no single definition of terrorism which the world uses with states and agencies using multiple definitions as it suits them but with mostly the same elements involved. The Geneva Convention doesn't even have that. The reason for this is that the Geneva Conventions were finally formulated in 1949 when terrorism of the kind we face today was not really something they could foresee.

In fact, the presence of the Geneva Convention has created a new legal hurdle to overcome when it comes to terrorism.

The Geneva Convention says that states are not to use force against civilians. Anybody who is not a combatant is a civilian and are given the protections of the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention distinguishes between the combatant and non-combatant by saying that combatants are clearly distinguishable and different from the common populace because of the use of uniforms and carrying state authority. This is an important if the circumstances is of war between two states.

Here, the law is not clear about a situation where a non-combatant wields arms and uses force against either other civilians or to combatants. Legal perspectives vary here and that is because there is no consensus on whether this is legitimate action. Some say that the Geneva protections need to be given nevertheless because they are clearly non-combatant, while there are other views that such non-combatants become 'unlawful combatants' and that they cannot be given the protections of the Geneva Convention. This brings another question as to whether they are refused protections given to civilians or protections given to combatants or both.

The variation in views is because of the legitimacy of the action of the non-combatant. The argument is that sometimes non-combatants may try and use force because they have a right to self-determination and that makes it legitimate for them to use force because essentially non-combatants fight for national liberation. On the other hand, the opposite view is that this is the use of violence to achieve political objectives and this is tantamount to terrorism. These arguments are at the heart of the debate on terrorism. The differences are so sharp that it will take a very long time to have some consensus on what it constitutes or at least implement a system of guidelines and criteria which will make it easier to label.

It all boils down to "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"

When it comes to ISIS, the problem of classification wasn't so acute because there was consensus in the international community that this was outright terrorism. What helped was that ISIS has no state allies that support it from the outside. Those lengthy debates that precede action against terrorist groups did not happen here. This points to another reality about international law.

International law is only as strong as the consensus that is evolved amongst states. In a situation where ISIS had state allies, things would be much different. This would have meant that the language of the resolutions adopted in the UN would be watered down for the sake of consensus, and then the actions for the ejection of the ISIS would be really ineffective. Even now, the bombings of ISIS targets within Syrian territory has been watered down on insistence of the veto-wielding Russians who are looking out for the Assad regime.

International law is not effective if the only thing that they are presenting is 'moral deterrent'. The ISIS does not believe in the modern concept of nation-state, international relations and it is definitely not scared of the United Nations and international law. International law can give states the permission and the mandate to carry out punitive actions against the Islamic State, but at the end it is the contributions of member states to this fight that is going to bring ISIS to its knees. This action needs to be swift and consistent and it is only as strong as the states want it to be.

Is international law then ineffective? No, it is not. International law has a key role. You require international law to determine where state action against such groups begins and ends and what are its limits. Due to international law, there is legitimacy in state actions against the ISIS. International law has also helped to establish blockades on the ISIS in terms of weapons and other essentials, it has helped fight the funding of the ISIS abroad and has been more or less trying to bankrupt it to death. Without embargoes on the ISIS, its oil infrastructure would be much more efficient and it would have more buyers with lesser obstructions which would make fighting the ISIS much more hard.

Definitely, International Law isn't perfect, but it remains integral. The basic structure of international law is necessary for the larger global order to survive and that way international law provides the necessary checks and balances that are required to keep the fighting from getting into larger geopolitical strategies by states. What is required is the tweaking of international law to provide rapid action against such groups, which will come about only when the larger debates on terrorism has been settled and a consensus on what it constitutes become clear.

#  Is the splitting up of Iraq the only viable solution left?

The identity of Iraq as a state was always under question since time immemorial. Saddam Hussein was the last person who was able to hold it together in some fashion, but the use of dictatorial and repressive methods may not be the way to go about it today. It is disputed as to whether we can even credit Saddam Hussein with stability because he did that at the expense of all other communities and promoted the Sunnis. This has led to some long-term effects for Iraq as a nation-state which we can see today.

The idea of splitting up Iraq is not a new one. This idea has floated about since a long time and right now is when the question hits hard the most because of the ISIS and their control over territory. Any talk of Iraq's political future will have to be decided after ISIS has been defeated or at least ejected from Iraqi territory.

There were concrete plans for the division of Iraq early on itself with the Biden/Gelb plan in 2006 to decentralize the country on the basis of the three main ethnicities which are the Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. This wouldn't mean that the country would split up into smaller states, but it would enjoy a status like how Bosnia and Herzegovina does on the basis of ethnic identity.

Such a plan was vehemently rejected by the Iraqis in the Parliament and the Americans didn't really take it forward.

Things as it stands today, are a lot different. The power is concentrated in the hands of the ethnic communities through their paramilitaries rather than the Iraqi Army. The Army is hardly an institution that the entire country trusts or for that matter, accurately reflects the demographics of Iraq as a state and as a people. The repeated defeats of the Army has showed its weakness and has led to further distrust as an institution.

With the Shias, it is mainly the Popular Mobilization Committees along with the Mahdi Army of Muqtada Al Sadr who call the shots, with the Kurds, it is the Peshmerga and other affiliate groups like the YPG, PKK and others and the Sunnis don't really have a lot to rely on except the ISIS, which is a real quagmire because there exist tribes and communities within the Sunnis who disavow ISIS rule. Even so, if there was a chance to split and run their own regions autonomously, the Sunnis would pick up and create their own forces.

With the fight against the ISIS, the political equations have changed. The Army's ineffectiveness and the delegation of power to the paramilitaries means that these paramilitaries have more political power now. On the ground, this has been reflected the most with the Kurds and the Peshmerga. It is almost evident that they favour their own state and would break away from Iraq at the first opportunity that they find.

The Peshmerga is already re-purposing the homes that was left behind by the Arab exodus fleeing ISIS violence and are giving to Kurdish families. They have restricted the movement of the Arabs and are denying entry to the Arabs trying to return to their homes in these areas. The Kurds maintain that there is no discrimination, but at the same time these are subtle ways which aim at ethnic and demographic engineering. Senior Kurdish officials including Masoud Barzani has indicated that more autonomy would help in "fighting the ISIS". As a critical force to keep the check on ISIS, these statements appeals to foreign governments who view the Kurds as sharing their interests.

They are lobbying for their own country and they are serious about it.

Besides, we don't know what the status of re-integration be after all of this blows over. Iraq has been under sectarian conflict since decades with very little progress on creating and building a national identity. Nouri Al Maliki may have been instrumental in destroying whatever gains were made previously with his sectarian purges and witch-hunts, but it doesn't seem that Haider Al Abadi is really concerned about trying to make more gains. He has failed to rein in the Popular Mobilization Committees which are under the control of the Prime Minister's office and these militias have been meting out punishments to the Sunnis for retribution against the ISIS.

How can the Sunnis trust their lives to a country which is more than willing to collectively punish them on the basis of their sect and build a nation in the process? When everybody thinks the best idea is to split, perhaps the best idea is a dissolution of Iraq and the formation of new states on the basis of sect and ethnicity or at least a decentralized federation with autonomy like Bosnia and Herzegovina.

But this gets more complicated. Most Iraqis say that they are not interested in the split of their country based on sect. The viability of such a trifurcation has not been fully evaluated. After all, a state isn't merely an expression of ethnic or sectarian identity. In this scenario, the most contentious issues would be the division of the resources amongst the people. The Sunni areas have almost no productive assets to talk about. Most of the industries and oil fall within either the Shia or the Kurdish areas. Iraq's lack of diversification means that it would suffer from shocks various events in the world economy.

The Sunnis would be vehemently against against the trifurcation of Iraq unless it involved some re-allocation of resources, especially the oil fields and the oil refineries. This is something neither the Shias nor the Kurds would accept. The Kurds have already gone really far with the whole idea of the division especially when they have always had problems with Baghdad in the past about the oil revenues. They had no qualms about inviting oil companies for exploration directly into Kurdistan rather than running it by Baghdad.

With the kind of muscle they hold now, this is only going to be a stronger demand. The longer the fight draws out, the more power that these militias will acquire and it is going to be all the more harder to reach consensus on anything. In a situation where it is not possible to reach consensus on anything, the process of nation-building and state formation comes to a stop. The state can't grow and it is going to degenerate.

ow the Iraqis will choose to decide the future, is yet to be seen. Iraq is in a place where they are better off with a split, but at the same time, the split is not viable without making it unfair for some parties. Broader geopolitical problems will follow because of this split. The Middle East will face a slew of new problems, all pertaining to self-determination.

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#  Note from the Author

It is my sincere hope that you have enjoyed this book. Please do look for forthcoming editions and volumes of this book which would expand the discussion on the ISIS. If you would like to contact me regarding this book, please do get in touch with me through email at a_komath@rediffmail.com

Please don't forget to give your review of this book at your favourite retailer!

Thank you very much

\- Ashwath Komath
