There are 4 Statements that the Traditional
Narrative gets WRONG about WW2 German and
Italian Divisions. And the first statement
is - in 1941, Hitler wanted to expand the
number of panzer divisions, so what he did
was, he took one panzer regiment from each
of the panzer divisions and formed more divisions
from them. Each panzer division went from
two regiments to one regiment, thus Hitler
weaken the panzer divisions. #It’sAllHitler’sFault
And if you read Guderian’s memoirs, this
is stated quite firmly - “After the [Western]
campaign Hitler ordered a considerable increase
in the number of panzer and motorized infantry
divisions. The number of panzer divisions
was soon doubled, though this involved a halving
of the tank strength of each division. Thus
the German Army, though doubling its nominal
strength in armoured divisions, did not acquire
double the number of tanks, which was after
all what counted.” - Guderian, Panzer Leader,
P138-139
Guderian is suggesting two things - A) that
the panzer divisions were weakened, perhaps
half as weak, because of Hitler. And B) that
the number of tanks per division is what matters
most. Basically, the more tanks you have,
the better. But is this really the case? In
this exact same period, Rommel goes to North
Africa with two panzer divisions. These end
up being the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions.
Both of these divisions have one panzer regiment,
and one infantry regiment - so, half infantry
and half tanks. They also have some support
units like anti-tank, engineers and so on,
but basically, it’s half tanks and half
infantry. And Rommel says, ‘the balance
is off, I need more reinforcements’. And,
being Hitler’s star general, he gets these reinforcements. Do you want to know what reinforcements
he gets? Infantry. He requests, and receives,
more infantry. Not tanks. Infantry. I’m
sure, if Hitler had given him more panzer
divisions, he wouldn’t have complained.
But the point is that Rommel thinks the balance
between his infantry and tanks is off, and
he asks for more infantry. And he gets the
infantry. If the panzer divisions have been
weakened, and tanks are what mattered, then
why is Rommel not asking for more tanks? The
early panzer divisions had three regiments
- two panzer and one motorized infantry regiment.
This is known as a triangular division. Three
sided, three regiments, triangular. Guderian
is complaining that one of the panzer regiments
is removed, thus ‘weakening’ the panzer
divisions by halving the tanks. This new formation
is known as a binary division - two sided,
two regiments, binary. Rommel’s armoured
divisions have one panzer regiment and one
infantry regiment - a binary division. He’s
asking for more infantry because the balance
is off. The British who are against him in
Operation Crusader, have an armoured division
that has two tank brigades, with three regiments
of tanks each, and a Support Group, which
is a mix of infantry and artillery. There
is little to no infantry in the British formation.
Meaning that you have a force that is very
tank-heavy. Yes, it outnumbers Rommel’s
tank force (as well as the Italians), but
despite this, it gets completely chewed up.
The Germans run rings around it.
And why? Surely, if you’ve got more tanks, this
is better, right? That’s what Guderian is
saying? Well, no. Tanks are very very important.
But this isn’t a tank war. This is a combined
arms war. Infantry, with their anti-tank guns,
anti-aircraft guns (like Flak 88’s), air superiority,
naval gun support, artillery, recon, signals
equipment, maintenance formations, logistical
formations, construction companies,
so on and so on. The British tank-heavy force
goes up against the Germans more balanced
force, and their tanks are taken out by the
German infantry and anti-tank guns. Yes, the
panzers play their part, by luring the British
tanks into their anti-tank gun screens. And
this is the lesson that the British have to
learn the hard way - by getting their tanks
wiped out over and over, until someone finally realises that there's a problem here. Same with the Soviets.
Soviet tank divisions in 1941 had two tank
regiments and one infantry regiment - similar
to the British, as well as the previous German
organisation. As David Glantz notes -
“Such divisions were unbalanced, having
far more tanks than other combat arms elements…”
When talking about the Soviet Mechanized Corps,
which would consist of mostly tank divisions,
Isaev says - “Now the overwhelming majority
of the tanks in the Red Army were to be amalgamated
into mechanized corps with a standard combat
strength of 1,031 tanks... The formations
and units designed to support infantry disappeared
completely. Theoretically this put a greater
number of tanks in the hands of the commanders
when undertaking flexible combat operations.
Experience in battle however, would not underpin
this decision.” Isaev, Dubno 1941, P33
Essentially, it seems that reducing the number
of tanks per division is actually a good thing.
In fact, all sides learnt this during the
war. But the Germans actually learnt it earlier
and put it into practice - which
is one of the reasons they did so well in
the early war period. What the Germans realize
is that tanks alone cannot win battles. Combined
arms warfare is essential. In the book, Towards
Combined Arms Warfare by Jonathan House (the
guy who works a lot with David Glantz), he
talks about what the Germans learnt after
the invasion of Poland. “A basic result
of the German invasion of Poland was to begin
the slow evolution of the German panzer division
structure towards greater balance among the
arms. At the time of the Polish campaign,
the six panzer divisions averaged between
276 and 302 tanks each, organized into a panzer
brigade of four battalions. These same divisions
had only three battalions of infantry and
two of artillery. This tank-heavy force proved
too unwieldy for some commanders…” - House,
Towards Combined Arms Warfare, P82.
The Germans also used “Light Divisions”
which were two motorized infantry regiments
and one panzer battalion. Interestingly, this
light division formation would be what the
motorized divisions would form into during
the mid-war period. At the time, these were
viewed as poor-man’s panzer divisions,
but later, they were seen to be an acceptable
division type. And, the main point to note
is that the Germans were experimenting with
different division styles, trying to figure
out which were the best designs. This is the
beginning of the tank-age. Nobody knows what
the ideal armoured formation looks like yet.
And to this day, opinion is still divided.
The reason there was a bunch of light divisions
in the first place was probably so they could
test out this design. They then, by the time
of the French campaign, reduced the four-battalions
in the panzer divisions to three, and placed
the spare battalions into the light divisions,
to make full-panzer divisions. But they didn’t
do this with all of the light divisions, just
some of them. Some light divisions remained
after this conversion. And all the panzer
divisions then went from one panzer brigade
consisting of two regiments, totaling four
battalions, to one panzer regiment of three
battalions, or even two battalions. Not a
single old two-regiment panzer division remained.
This meant the panzer divisions had three
infantry and three tank battalions at the
time of France. As House concludes - “This
trend towards a more balanced division would
continue throughout the war.” If this move
to less panzers per division was so bad, you
think they’d retain at least a couple of
two-regiment panzer divisions. But they didn’t.
Certainly by the time you get to Stalingrad,
the panzer divisions have two infantry regiments
and one panzer regiment. There’s more infantry
than tanks. And this is because, tank-heavy
forces are vulnerable, and you need infantry
to do the tasks the tanks can’t do - like
take out anti-tank guns. Thus, what Guderian
is saying here is false. Taking one panzer
regiment from the panzer divisions to create
more panzer divisions, is actually a good
thing. It means there’s more panzer divisions.
There’s greater flexibility for those divisions.
There’s more balance in the force. In fact,
the Germans had already started doing this
after the Polish campaign, not prior to Barbarossa,
as Guderian implies. The German Panzer Divisions
went from four panzer battalions in Poland,
to three panzer battalions in France, and
then two panzer battalions by the time of
Barbarossa. And this has nothing to do with
tank production. The French armoured division
had four tank and one infantry battalion.
This was seen as too tank heavy at the time.
The Italian Ariete Division also had two tank
regiments and one infantry regiment - again,
tank heavy. The British had two tank brigades
with one mixed artillery and infantry brigade.
By 1942, they’d realised that this was too
tank-heavy and got rid of one of the armoured
brigades, and replaced the mixed support group
with a full infantry brigade. But they only
did this in 1942. The Germans had already
done this far sooner, because they’d learnt
that you didn’t want a tank-heavy force.
If you look at the German Army today, 10th
Panzer Division has one Armoured Brigade,
and essentially three infantry brigades. 1st
Panzer Division has one panzer brigade and
two motorized brigades. Yes, it also has an
“Armoured Demonstration Brigade” but this
only has one panzer battalion within it, and
most of the other units are actually infantry
or other units.
And, if we look at the modern day German Army
and compare them to the 1945 German divisions,
there’s some interesting comparisons to
be made. On the left we have the standard
1945 panzer division template, minus supply
and artillery. On the right we have the modern
day 21st Panzer Brigade, minus it’s supply
battalion. Now, if we compare the two, what
we can see is that the 1945 division has the
same number of reconnaissance and engineers,
but twice as much infantry and tanks. Ok,
and a modern panzer division has three or
four of these brigades - so it’s much bigger.
But here’s the point - if we times the modern
day brigade by four, and double the 1945 panzer
division, to make them equivalent units, we’d
get the same number of tanks and infantry,
but double the amount of engineers and reconnaissance.
The ratio for infantry and tanks remains the
same, but the modern day army has more support
units - engineers, reconnaissance, and if
I’d included it, more supply services too.
This tells us that the ratio for the later-war
German units is better than the early war
period, and the formations are more balanced.
Same applies when you look at the other formations in the German Army units.
The balance between the tanks and the other arms does not favour the tanks. When
you look at the British Army prior to 2014
(because it’s changed since and I don’t
have the up-to-date ratios), what you find
is that, yes 1st Armoured Division had two
armoured brigades within it. But when you
look into it, they had two tank battalions,
and three infantry battalions. Again, more
infantry than tanks. When you look at the
1st US Armoured Division today, the same thing
applies. Yes, they have two armoured brigades
and one infantry brigade, but again, there’s
infantry in the armoured brigades. When you
add it up, there’s more infantry than armoured
battalions. And this is the army which has
the most money spent on it in the world today.
If the US Army isn’t deploying tank-heavy
forces, then you know it’s not because they
can’t build enough tanks. If the lesson
was, more tanks is better, then you’d see modern armies deploying more tanks vs infantry units.
But you’re not seeing that. What you are
seeing are far more balanced forces. Tanks,
infantry, recon, support, artillery, engineers,
logistics, and so on. So, this traditional
narrative, which states that the reduction
of panzer forces in the panzer divisions is
bad, is completely false. It was actually
a good idea, based on the experience they’d
learnt in the early part of the war, and this
is backed up by a ton of evidence from the
time and also since then. It either shows
that Guderian’s concept of tank warfare
was immature - which might be the case - or,
it shows that he is taking advantage of his
readers’ lack of knowledge on the principles
of warfare. The average reader isn’t going
to understand force organizational structures
or combined arms doctrine. Most of the readers
think - and people today still think this
- that tanks are the main element in a modern
army. Tanks, Tank Museums, World of Tanks,
World of Tanks 2, tanks a lot for supporting
me on Patreon. Please consider supporting
me on there and make these videos as good
as they can be. So, really, Guderian is taking
advantage of the reader’s ignorance to give
weight to his argument that Hitler was a madman
who didn’t listen to his generals. Even
though Hitler wasn’t making decisions in
a vacuum, and in this case, this had very
little to do with Hitler. This was actually
what the German Army wanted to do, based on
their experience so far in the war. And, in
reality, it proved to be a successful concept
to reduce the size of their panzer divisions.
The second statement of the traditional narrative
says: in 1938, Mussolini wanted to expand
his army, but didn’t want to introduce conscription.
So what he did was he took one regiment from
each of his divisions and created more divisions
with the spare regiments. Thus he weakened
the individual divisions, and this helps explain
why the Italian army wasn’t much good in
the Second World War. So, the Italians went
from triangular divisions to binary divisions
in 1938. Binary divisions are smaller divisions
than triangular ones, therefore binary divisions
are bad. Problem - Rommel lands in North Africa
with two panzer divisions. These were the
15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. And what did
we say before? They only have one panzer regiment,
and one motorized infantry regiment. They’re
binary divisions. And this is 1941, before
Barbarossa. The Germans do have the option
of giving Rommel more reinforcements at this
stage. But they don’t, they give him binary
divisions. And, if binary divisions are so
bad, why was Rommel able to do so well with them? And you might be thinking, but TIK, you said before
Rommel asked for more infantry. And yes, he
did. He received two additional infantry regiments.
But do you want he did with those infantry
regiments? He created a whole new division
with them. The Afrika Division (also known
as the 90th Light Division). This was an infantry
division with two infantry regiments. Another
binary division. So Rommel didn’t give his
two panzer divisions an extra infantry regiment
each to make them triangular divisions. Instead
he made another binary division, and now had
three binary divisions. If binary divisions
are so bad, why was Rommel using them? And why was he choosing to use them? And why did he
do so well with them? In late 1940,
the Germans changed the Motorized Divisions
to binary divisions, removing the third regiment.
This then allowed them to create more divisions.
But, just like the old light division design,
they added a panzer battalion or an assault-gun
battalion to each division to give them 
more firepower. So, they don’t have enough
tanks to form panzer divisions, but they’ll
waste their panzer battalions in motorized
divisions? This is, in fact, a debate recognised
at the time, but clearly, there must be some
sort of advantage that binary divisions have
over a triangular division. What’s also
interesting to note is that these binary divisions
are basically at brigade strength - bearing
in mind that brigades in the German Army at
the time are being phased out. If you look
at the Soviets, they were also producing brigade-strength
units, as I’ve talked about in another video.
For the Italians, it was actually their experience
in Ethiopia (as well as other places) that
prompted them to turn their triangular divisions
into binary divisions. You see, the Italians
developed a combined arms doctrine called
“the War of Rapid Decision”. This was,
essentially, their “Blitzkrieg” doctrine
- although, it wasn’t quite the same. Basically,
the Italians wanted to fight a mobile war,
and they thought they would fight it in Northern
Italy (because that’s where they had fought
in the First World War, so that’s where
they’d fight again, right?). So, coupled
with their experience in Ethiopia, Spain and
other conflicts, they thought binary divisions
could offer a flexible solution to the problem
of fighting in the mountain passes. What they
wanted was to achieve rapid penetration of
the enemy lines, by using flanking movements,
and more support units. Unlike during the
Great War, the Italians would seek to flank
the enemy, rather than attack straight at
his front - getting mowed down. This meant
that they wanted lots of smaller, but more
mobile divisions, which were more flexible
(in order to outflank the enemy). These smaller
divisions would have better support units,
and would be faster-moving formations overall.
So, speed was the essential component of this
combined arms doctrine. What they did then
was create binary divisions. So, an infantry
division would have two infantry regiments,
and one artillery regiment, plus other support
units. The idea was that these smaller divisions
would simply be more maneuverable, and there
would be more of them. So, if you imagine
that the enemy has ten divisions along a front,
then the Italians would have fifteen smaller
divisions, and would be more flexible and
able to get around the enemy (in theory at
least). And the thing is, the binary division
concept is not a bad idea in itself. What
we have to remember is that Rommel is also
using binary divisions in North Africa. Some
British units, like the 1st South African
Division, are also binary divisions - and
these fought in Ethiopia as well. If you want
flexibility and maneuverability, like in Africa,
go binary. It doesn’t, by itself, explain
why the Italians fought so badly in World
War Two. However, it is a factor - but not
solely because of the binary division concept.
The issue is that the Italians create three
problems by changing to binary divisions that
are unique to them at the time. The first,
is that, any maneuverability the Italians
gain by changing their infantry divisions
to binary divisions, is negated because they’re
not facing standard foot-infantry divisions.
Yes, they may be faster and flexible than
a typical non-motorized triangular
division, but you’re not facing non-motorized
divisions. The British are motorized. So any
maneuverability that the Italians might have
picked up by changing to binary divisions,
is completely off-set by the fact that they’re
not using motorized divisions.
And O’Connor completely runs
rings around them during Operation Compass.
So the main advantage of using binary divisions
is completely negated. The second problem
is that the Italians forget to sort out their
logistical services in their new divisions.
They reduced the number of support units - thinking
that smaller divisions required less support.
This meant that they couldn’t go too far
before they outran their supply lines, and
because they had less support units, their
maneuverability was curtailed. So this was
a double-whammy on the mobility scale. But,
the third reason is, for me, the most important.
What happens when you take two triangle divisions,
and turn them into three binary divisions?
You have roughly the same number of troops
- but you have an additional divisional staff-level.
So, you need more officers to fill that staff
unit. Where do these officers come from? The
lower units. You have officers promoted above
their ranks. You have officers pulled from
the NCOs. You have new officers and NCOs coming
into the army who are completely new. And,
if you think about it, what you hear most
about the Italians in the Second World War
- is not that their men are bad fighters - but
that their officers were poor. Rommel himself said they were poorly led. Rommel doesn’t have this issue
because the Germans have a pool of experienced officers to pull from - so Rommel can create binary
divisions. But the Italians do not have the
same luxury. It’s bad because the Italians
do not have the experienced officers, or the
logistical or motorized resources, to make
it work. So next time you hear this idea that
binary divisions are what weakened the Italian
army - yes, but not necessarily because it
reduced the number of men in the division,
as is often said.
The third statement is - the Germans could
not replenish their losses in tanks or infantry.
The Germans up until Kursk in 1943, did replenish
their manpower and tank losses. I’ve said
this a thousand times now, but the Germans
had the most tanks in December of 1942 (at
7,798), and had the most men ever at the front
in July of 1943 - at 3,483,000 men. The Germans
more-than replaced their manpower losses in
the first three years of the war. And every
time I say this I get a bunch of people in the comments section crying because the Germans didn't write this
in their memoirs and it doesn’t reflect the reality. But, don’t worry guys! I’m about to show you
why the German memoirs are correct, as are
these statistics. In fact, they compliment
each other perfectly.
And, to show you this, we’ll look at the
fourth statement. In the early war period,
the German divisions had 9 battalions. But
because of losses, these were reduced to 6
battalions. Therefore, the German divisions
became weaker as the war progressed.
So, what we have is a problem - a contradiction.
On the one hand we have statistics showing
that the Germans replenished their losses,
but their divisions were also getting smaller.
Each German infantry division has three regiments,
and each regiment has three battalions. They
then reduced the number of battalions in the
regiments down to two battalions. So they
went from nine to six battalions. But, if
they are replacing their losses - which they
are - then why would they do this? Alright,
let’s do some quick math here. The Germans
have 100 standard infantry divisions going
East in 1941. There’s other infantry divisions,
like motorized, mountain and light, but let’s
just go with the standard infantry for now.
Let’s say they take three battalions from
every single one of these divisions (they
don’t, but for argument’s sake, let’s
say they do). Thus, these 100 divisions go
from 9 to 6 infantry battalions. And this
is classed as a bad thing. But, here’s the
deal. In 1942, they increase the number of
standard infantry divisions to 127. That’s
an extra 27 divisions. Plus, we know, that
these new divisions coming onto the Eastern
Front, have the full 9 battalions.
If 100 divisions
reduce their battalions from 9 to 6, they
go from 900 battalions to 600 battalions.
So there’s an reduction of 300 battalions.
27 divisions are created. What’s 27 times
9? It’s 243. Plus, you have an increase
in other divisions, like motorized, mountaineer,
and light, which probably took the manpower
from the other 50 or so spare battalions.
So, what we have here is a conscious decision
to reduce the number of battalions per division
to create a bunch of new divisions. It has
nothing to do with manpower losses. If the
Germans wanted to, they could have kept their
current 100 divisions at 9 battalions each.
But they chose not to do that. They chose
to reduce the battalions per division to put
them in the new divisions. This then backs
up what the German memoirs were saying about
the reduction of manpower per division,
but it also doesn’t contradict the fact
that the Germans did replace their manpower
losses. Let’s look at North Africa again.
You have two panzer divisions with one regiment
of panzers and one of infantry. How many panzer
battalions were there in the regiments? Two.
And how many infantry battalions in the regiments?
Two. That’s four in total battalions. And,
in the Afrika Infantry Division, you have
two infantry regiments. One with three infantry
battalions, and one with two infantry and
one artillery battalions. So, at the very
least, it seems that the Germans were toying
with the idea of reducing their battalion
numbers in mid-1941. And, in the case of Rommel’s
panzer divisions, this is before the Eastern
Front even begins. Let’s look at the 24th
Panzer Division. You have a panzer regiment
(which actually has three panzer battalions
for some reason), and two panzergrenadier
regiments. How many battalions are in each
of the two infantry regiments? Two. These
are the elite German formations, and they’re
deployed with two infantry battalions in their
infantry regiments. Yes, sometimes they have
three, but not always. And I suspect, it’s
the newer or less experienced formations that
have the full 3 battalions for each regiment.
But, as the war progressed, it seems that
the Germans consciously shifted to smaller
divisions. And, let’s go back a bit, how
many battalions are in a binary division?
Six. And how many are in these new smaller
German divisions? Six. The difference is the
Germans have three regiments rather than two.
Why? Maybe it’s because they have a lot
of experienced officers, unlike the Italians
or many of the other powers. They can afford
to create smaller divisions, because they
have enough experienced officers that can
manage them. And, let’s not forget, just
because you’ve taken three infantry battalions
from the divisions, doesn’t mean you’ve
reduced the support units of those divisions.
You’ve still got artillery regiments. You’ve
still got engineer battalions, and recon battalions.
In fact, the number of these units across
the whole front has increased. You have an
additional 27 infantry divisions, with an
additional 27 reconnaissance units, 27 artillery
regiments, 27 engineer battalions, and so
on. So, when you hear ‘yes, but the new
divisions weren’t at full strength’, well,
yes, because they’ve got to fill the ranks
of these extra units as well. Alright, why
then didn’t they just keep the old 9 battalion
divisions? Why move to the 6 battalion divisions?
Good question. However, you’re assuming
that 9 battalions is better than 6. But, is
this really the case? Well, this new structure
allows you to have more divisions across the
entire front. It provides as much support
per division (in terms of artillery and engineers
etc), which means you have more firepower
across the whole front. It also means you
have more logistical services across the whole front as well, since there were bakers and logistical
services in each division. And it probably
provided greater flexibility to the German
divisions. Just like the Italians had realised
that smaller divisions could be more maneuverable
- but weren't able to implement that because
they had poor officers - the Germans didn’t
have poor officers, and they were able to make
the 6 battalion division work with three regiments
each, because their officers were trained
and experienced. Also, what we have to remember
is that at this stage in the war, the Soviets
are using smaller divisions and even just
brigades to fight the Germans. So smaller
German divisions are still larger than their
opponents. Maybe, the Germans were finding
themselves getting outflanked or counterattacked
constantly on the flanks, and needed a more
flexible and smaller divisional organisation?
That would actually make a lot of sense. Now,
I’m not saying that the German divisions
didn’t sustain losses, or that they weren't
replacing their men with high-quality replacements.
Of course, the divisions and the battalions
were reduced in strength, even with the replacements
coming in. Replacements didn’t trickle to
the front, they came in waves. And between
these waves, the divisions would be reduced
in manpower. And they didn’t have full equipment
stocks either for the same reason. But, organizationally
at least, it could be argued that the German
army wasn’t reduced in it’s capabilities
by changing to a 6 battalion divisional structure.
The question really is, what was the main reason they did it? Was it because this allowed the Germans
to focus their new units on the south for
Fall Blau? Is it a good way of getting new
units without mobilizing a total-war economy?
Is it because defence was the name of the
game in the north and centre, so you no longer
need full 9 battalion divisions? Was it because
this was a more efficient divisional organizational
structure? Was it because your officers are
better trained and can handle two battalion
regiments without the need for a third? Or
is it because you need to expand your army
and there’s a lack of officers overall,
so you can’t just raise up a bunch of new
divisions, you need to take the officers from
the other divisions to fill in the gaps? Currently,
I don’t know the answer. I suspect it’s
a combination of several of these factors,
and perhaps more as well. But what I can confirm
is that this was a conscious choice made by
the army. They could, if they had wanted to,
simply not have created more divisions, and just
raised the current divisions back to 9 battalions.
They replaced their manpower losses,
so why not do this? Well, they chose not to
do it. It's as simple as that. They chose to create a bunch of new divisions in 1942, and send them south. And
this comes back to the idea that German units
were depleted, and steadily got more depleted
as the war went on. Post Kursk 1943, yes things
start going south. But the statistics tell
a different story prior to Kursk.
Yes, there will be months were the army is
short. Yes, there will never be a division
in combat at 100% strength. But it is not
a gradual decline prior to Kursk. It’s more
like a wave. You have losses for a couple
months, then a new wave of replacements comes is. Then another dip, and then more replacements again.
And it keeps going like this until at least
Kursk. And, coupled with the prioritization
of where the replacements go - which I’ve
already covered in a previous video for
1942 - reinforcements may end up going
to Army Group Centre, rather than Army Group
South, for various reasons. This then leaves
units short in Army Group South, but not in
Army Group Centre. You then obviously have
certain prioritizations within the armies
themselves. With one division favoured over
another for one reason or another. It makes
sense to keep your panzer divisions at full strength and not have some random infantry division at full strength
because what's the point?
But in general, the Germans are able to replace
their losses. So this explains why you have
accounts of German units being reduced in
strength, and having a lack of manpower, and
why the statistics show the Germans are able
to replace their losses prior to Kursk. Post
Kursk, the Germans aren’t able to recover,
and that’s when you see units getting properly
depleted. But prior to Kursk, the Germans
are able to replenish their losses, and there
are other reasons as to why they’re reducing
the size of their divisions. Organizationally,
bearing in mind they’re trying to figure
out the best unit for a combined arms doctrine,
it makes a lot of sense for smaller units.
So, there we go. I’d be interested to hear your thoughts on this, because very very little
has been written on this in the literature, and some of what has been written, I’ve questioned in
this video, because this is contradicted by
other examples. So, I’m certainly not going
to pretend to know all the answers. But clearly
there are assumptions about the way things
were that aren’t necessarily correct, and
it’s good to question them. Can’t wait
to hear the counter-arguments. That's going to be fun! Anyway, I’ll leave it there. Thanks for watching.
thanks for supporting if you are a Patreon. Bye for now.
