CATHERINE MALABOU:
In my presentation,
I intend to confront Jacques
Derrida's and Peter Singer's
visions of the gift.
Such a confrontation is
risky to say the least,
as the two thinkers obviously
have nothing in common
and may even appear as
radically alien to each other.
I will then proceed
to [INAUDIBLE]
of these philosophical
extremities of using Derrida's
and Singer's mutual
incompatibility as a way
to approach the central
issue they both deal
with, which is precisely the
impossibility of mutualism
itself.
Exploring the reasons both
thinkers provide in order
to sustain this
impossibility will
lead me to address their
respective visions of exchange
and the depth.
So let me express, in
the brief, radical,
and, thus, necessarily
imperfect way,
Derrida's and Singer's opposed
positions of neutralism.
For Derrida, mutualism
is impossible
because he thinks, as
we know, that there is
no such thing as a pure gift.
So for Singer, on the
contrary, mutualism
is impossible because he thinks
that something as a pure gift
does exist.
So the impossibility
of mutualism
signals the impossibility
of the gift, Derrida.
And the impossibility
of mutualism
signals an effectivity
of the gift, Singer.
So a few words, to start
with, about effectivity.
I'm using this term because
Peter Singer is a representant,
the most prominent one,
of this movement called
effective altruism, which
is a specific branch
of this moral philosophy
called utilitarianism.
"Effective altruism,"
Singer writes,
"is based on a very simple idea.
We should do the
most good we can."
And this quote is taken from
his book called The Most Good
You Can Do, How Effective
Altruism Is Changing Ideas
About Living Ethically.
So again, he says,
"Effective altruism
is based on a very simple idea.
We should do the
most good we can."
"Effective altruism,"
he goes on,
"is the project of using
evidence and reason
to figure out how to benefit
others as much as possible
and taking action
on that basis."
And for Peter Singer,
taking action means giving.
So in order to proceed to the
Derrida, Singer confrontation,
I will focus on the
notion of circle,
an image they both
referred to when he comes
to characterize the logic
of economic exchange.
In given time, Derrida writes--
and this has become a
very famous declaration--
I quote, "Now the
gift, if there is any,
would no doubt be
related to economy.
One cannot treat the gift--
this goes without saying--
without this relation
to economy, even
to the money economy.
But is not the gift,
if there is anything,
also that which
interrupts economy?
That which, in suspending
economic calculation,
does not give rise to exchange?
That which opens the circle
so as to defy reciprocity
or symmetry, the
common measure, so as
to turn aside the return
in view of the no-return?"
End of quote.
So as we can understand
from that declaration,
mutuality, understood
here as reciprocity,
would always engage the gift
in the circle of exchange
that is the circle
of the counter-gift
in the circle of debt so
that giving for giving
is impossible.
So breaking the
circle of mutualism,
the term mutualism
appears at a given time
when Derrida analyzes Marcel
Mauss's notion of circulation.
So to break the
circle of mutualism
would imply to show how
the deadlock of reciprocity
is double, even if
only problematically
by this unlimited space that
Derrida calls an economy.
But, well, an economy
would transcend the circle.
But also, it would signal the
necessity to abandon, maybe,
the concept of the gift itself.
Peter Singer argues that
something like this outside can
only be reached from within,
which does not mean that
the Mercantile Exchange circle
cannot be interrupted but that
it can only be interrupted
by the inscription of another
circle within the circle.
Altruism-- that is
the capacity to act
at the cost of
one's own benefit.
Altruism can only be
effective if it takes place
within the very structure
that [INAUDIBLE] composes.
And Singer explains this,
notably in his book,
significantly called
The Expanding Circle.
The circle is expanding.
It has to be expanded.
But once again,
only from within,
that is only from
within economy.
For Singer, there's no
such thing as an economy.
So let me, if you
don't mind, remind you
of a few things about mutualism.
So, for Singer, mutualism
pertains to altruism.
This is why he called his
theory effective altruism.
So in calling his theory
effective altruism,
he opposes, well, let's
say, a classic vision
of mutualism that first appeared
in Kropotkin, Peter Kropotkin,
the Russian anarchist,
thinker, in his book from 1902
called On Mutual Aid,
A Factor of Evolution.
In this book, Kropotkin
affirmed that altruism
was a biological fact.
He stated that species in
nature did not only compete.
They also collaborated.
So according to him, mutual
aid among living beings
is primordial for survival
and is even more important
than natural selection
in this respect.
Kropotkin argues, from
this biological fact,
in favor of an imminent
social rationality,
orienting humanity towards
solidarity and cooperation.
And this became the
basis for anarchism.
So the problem is
Kropotkin's vision
has opened an immense debate
among philosophers, biologists,
and economists all
along the 20th century.
And in this debate,
Kropotkin's ideas
were defeated because a
vast majority of thinkers,
or again, philosophers,
biologists, and economists,
have argued against Kropotkin
that altruistic behaviors,
in reality, always proceded from
a hidden egoism or selfishness.
There would be no pure
altruistic behavior
in nature or in society to the
extent that, in both cases,
self-interest is
always primordial.
This would be true from
a biological evolutionary
perspective, but also from
the perspective of morals.
And we can, here, think of
Richard Dawkins's book called
The Selfish Gene.
So in a certain sense, in
the critique of mutualism,
addressed against Kropotkin,
we find the same conclusion
that Derrida does, even from
a very different perspective,
which is that pure gift that
is pure sacrifice of oneself
for others, pure generosity
without any return
or expectation of
return, it is impossible.
Because it's always the mask
of a kind of selfishness
or egoism.
So some biologists have
shown that the only form
of altruistic behavior is
for nature where it's always
reciprocal, such as monkeys,
for example, when they take off
the lice from each other.
So I do this for you
if you do this for me.
So it's called tit for tat.
Robert Axelrod wrote
a book about that.
It would be always
limited to reciprocity,
limited to the individual's
family members, or so.
Like, for example, in
nature but also in society,
people would only sacrifice
themselves for their children
or for their kids.
So in all cases, we would
find again, once again,
the impossibility
of a pure gift,
altruism being
linked with the debt
contracted toward the
kinship or the group.
So, as I announced, Peter Singer
contradicts such a vision.
In his book, The Expanding
Circle, once again--
so the whole title is The
Expanding Circle, Ethics
Evolution and Human Progress--
Singer argues that
reason is what
expands the circle of
biological altruism
that expands the circle limited
to care, growth, and reciprocal
altruism.
And it opens to
effective altruism.
Effective altruism definitely
means non-reciprocal altruism.
So let me quote Singer,
"Altruistic impulses, once
limited to one's kin
and one's own group,
might be extended
to a wider circle
by reasoning creatures who can
see that they and their kin
are only one group among others,
and from an impartial point
of view, no more
important than others.
Biological theories
of the evolution
of altruism through kin
selection, reciprocity,
and group selection can be made
compatible with the existence
of non-reciprocal
altruism toward strangers
if they can accept
this kind of expansion
of the circle of altruism."
End of quote.
So we see that
non-reciprocal altruism
means altruism
towards strangers that
is toward people
we will never be
able to meet with or identify.
So what Singer
clearly challenges
is this idea that
one would always
give in order to
be given in return,
a logic which once again
fosters the logic of the debt.
So I come back to
this statement that I
quoted at the
beginning of my talk,
"We should do the
most good we can."
And again, it means for
Singer that we should give
and we should give to strangers.
And what strangers?
The strangers who suffer.
Singer writes, I quote, "I
began with the assumption
that suffering and death
from lack of food, shelter,
and medical care are bad.
Good, then,
characterizes everything
that can prevent
suffering and death.
And preventing it implies,
once again, giving.
Or more exactly,
earning to give.
Earning to give," Singer
says, "is a distinctive way
of doing good.
The principle is
apparently very simple.
People from affluent
countries should
give to people
from poor countries
without expecting anything
in return to the extent
that the givers and the
receivers remain anonymous."
Singer lists the
fundamental elements linked
with the injunction to give.
"Effective altruists
should," I quote,
"live modestly and donate a
large part of their income,
often much more than
the traditional tenth."
So we should give at least 10%
of our income and maybe more
if we can.
Second, research and
discuss with others
which charities are the most
effective, drawing on research
done by other
independent evaluators.
Third, choose the career in
which they can earn most,
not in order to be
able to live affluently
but so they can do more good.
Fourth, talk to others,
in person or online,
about giving so that the idea of
effective altruism will spread.
And the last one, the
most controversial one,
give part of their body, blood,
bone marrow, or even a kidney
to a stranger."
End of quote.
The effective altruist asks--
I'm sorry, the sound is echoing.
Well, anyway.
SPEAKER 1: I think it's OK.
CATHERINE MALABOU: So the
effective altruist asks--
It's
SPEAKER 1: OK.
SPEAKER 2: It's OK.
SPEAKER 1: It's OK.
CATHERINE MALABOU:
Can you hear me?
I'm sorry.
SPEAKER 1: It's OK.
CATHERINE MALABOU: It's OK.
OK.
The effective
altruist asks how he
can make the biggest
possible reduction
in the suffering in the
larger universe of suffering.
Singer's important
article called
"Famine, Affluence,
and Morality"
was written in regard
of the famine situation
in East Bengal in 1971.
In this article,
he wrote, "People
are dying from lack of food,
shelter, and medical care.
The decisions and
actions of human beings
might have prevented
that kind of suffering.
Unfortunately, human
beings have not
made the necessary decisions.
At the individual level, people
have, with very few exceptions,
not responded to the situation
in any significant way.
At the government
level, no government
has given the sort
of massive aid
that would enable the
refugees to survive
for more than a few days."
But instead of concluding from
this inertia of governments
that it is a proof
against altruism,
Singer goes on affirming
on the contrary
that such an inertia proceeds
from a lack of reasoning.
Not from a lack of altruism,
but from a lack of reasoning.
Because, as you understand,
reason is naturally altruistic.
Reasoning teaches us that help
is indifferent to proximity
or distance.
I quote Singer again,
"It makes no difference
whether a person I can help is
a neighbor, is the neighbor's
child 10 yards from me, or
a Bengali whose name I shall
never know 10,000 miles away.
I do not think
that I need to say
much in defense of the
refusal to take proximity
and distance into account.
The fact that the person
is physically near to us
so that we have personal
contact with him
made it more likely that
we shall assist him,
but it does not
show the we ought
to help him rather
than another who
happens to be further away."
And later on, Singer even argues
that giving to someone we know
is a misguided
grounds for giving.
For example, he says, like, I
gave to breast cancer research
because my wife died
from breast cancer.
Or whenever we give because
we know the person we give to
or we know the condition
this person is suffering from
is a misguided reason to give.
So once again, the principle is
giving to no one for nothing.
I mean, we don't expect
anything in exchange.
As we previously saw, opening
the circle for Derrida
also meant getting out of
the circle of reciprocity,
moving to the space
of an economy.
And what is the
space of an economy?
Really, Derrida identifies
the space of economy
with calculation.
Debt, exchange,
counter-gift, et cetera
are always linked with
modes of calculation.
So what is interesting precisely
in Singer's position is not
expanding the circle,
as I said, from within.
And this, I want to explain now.
Expanding the circle
from within is only
made possible out of calculation
thanks to economy calculation.
It is a way of
disrupting economy
by using economy
means that never
breaks with quantification.
On the contrary, it
uses quantification
against quantification.
It is, in a certain
sense, calculation
against calculation.
Let me give you some examples
about the use of calculus
or calculation.
First, it says that
effective altruism
is about maximizing happiness
or pleasure in order
to minimize pain.
Maximizing also means maximizing
the effects of the gift
by calculating how many people
it will be beneficial to
and choosing, each time,
the largest quantity.
Let me give you an example.
This person, called
Toby Orid, Singer said,
has given another
example of the cost
differences between helping
people in affluent countries
and helping people elsewhere.
You may have received
appeals for donations
from charities in
African countries
providing blind people
with guide dogs.
That sounds like a
case worthy of support,
until you consider the costs
and the alternative to which you
could donate.
It costs about $40,000 to supply
one person in the United States
with a guide dog.
Most of the expense is
incurred in training
the dog and the recipient.
But the costs of
preventing someone
from going blind
because of trachoma,
the most common and
preventable blindness,
is in the range of
between $20 and $100.
If you do the math,
you will see the choice
is to provide one
person with a guide dog
or prevent anywhere between
400 and 2000 cases of blindness
in developing countries.
Another example,
giving for animals.
Therefore, by giving
more than 5 pounds,
I would prevent more
suffering than I
would if I gave just 5 pounds.
So it's another example,
when it comes to giving
to animal shelters, et cetera.
So another example
of calculation
is what is an average
budget for Julia, who
is another effective altruist.
So she has calculated
her realistic breakdown
of expenses.
For example, 900 on rent,
100 on utilities each month,
150 a month for groceries,
300 on health insurance,
70 for a public transport pass.
And Sarah is [INAUDIBLE].
So she can save
10% of the income,
and she donates 10% of income.
But of course, the last
and maybe most important
calculation is to set limits
to the circle's expansion
because, I quote
Singer again, "We
ought to give until we reach
the level of marginal utility.
That is the level at
which, by giving more,
I would cause as much suffering
to myself or my dependents
as I would relieve by my gift."
So it is also a matter of--
it's not like a totally
disinterested sacrifice.
The limit of
calculation, of course,
is I stop donating when it
risks putting me in danger.
And if I cannot give,
if I'm too poor to give,
I of course don't donate.
OK?
So you see how calculation
can be used, once again,
against the logic of the debt,
of the calculation of surplus
value, et cetera, et cetera.
So of course, very often,
people object Singer.
Oh, in fact, your
effective altruism
proceeds from guilt.
In affluent countries,
we should feel guilty
because of our situation.
But Singer, I quote,
says, "Effective altruists
don't see a lot of
point in feeling guilty.
They prefer to focus on
the good they are doing.
Effective altruism
does not require
the kind of strong
emotional empathy
that people feel for
identifiable individuals."
End of quote.
Once again, it's reason
alone that is at work here.
Singer writes, again, "The
imperative duty which tells us
what we must do, function
as to prohibit behavior
that is intolerable if
men are to live together
in society, such as killings,
stealing, and so on.
Poverty, illness, homelessness
are not considered intolerable
for the life of the community.
Giving is not requested.
Charity then becomes
what we substitute
for the absence of law
against social exclusion."
So charity is not
a moral imperative,
if by moral we understand to
be indebted, morally indebted.
That is, if we originate the
imperative to give in guilt,
no, it is, on the
contrary, a calculation
of consequences that is what
is the best form of a society.
And how can we compensate
for the lack of legislation
about poverty?
Killing is prohibited.
Stealing is prohibited.
But poverty is not.
So giving is a way to
compensate the absence of law
against poverty.
Reasonable charity, then,
is a categorical imperative
in the absence of law.
And the last thing
I want to mention
about effective altruism
is that it presents itself
as a way to dismantle
the sovereignty
of personal identity.
By giving to strangers,
to people I won't ever
be able to meet in person,
I did subject [INAUDIBLE]
to myself and
their circumstance.
By giving to people
I don't know,
I also become anonymous to
myself, and in that sense,
disobey the government
of the self.
The other, in Singer,
is justified as a life.
And I, myself, am a life.
I have an affluent life.
And in that sense,
I can do whatever
I can in order to sustain the
poor life, precarious life.
Singer never tries
to define what
he means by this term, life.
But we can easily understand
that life, in his thinking,
has to be understood as
the unity of symbolic life,
like what [INAUDIBLE] would call
qualified life and biological
life, what [INAUDIBLE]
would call zoé.
Life, for Singer,
is both a symbolic
and a material
empirical fact, a unity
that both continental
philosophers and biologists,
according to him, have
failed to conceptualize.
So, effective altruism
might be a way
of reconciling the true
understanding of life
with one another, like the
material and the symbolic,
the empirical and the political.
It would be, maybe, a way to
cut through self-ownership
and, in that sense, to open
within capitalism a breach that
might look in a certain sense
as some kind of new anarchism,
as a kind of revision
of Kropotkin's vision.
So in conclusion, I would say
that effective altruism is not
restricted to the domain
of morals but has,
also, crucial political aspects.
It is an attempt, as we
saw a moment ago, to remedy
to government's inertia.
It is a way to temporarily cope
with this government inertia.
"In the long run,"
Singer says, "we
can hope that effective
altruists can become
numerous enough to
influence the giving culture
of affluent nations."
That is, we might hope that
effective altruism can create,
foster a genuine political
and social sense among an even
always larger group of
people and, in the end,
maybe convince governments.
I find this position highly
interesting for at least three
reasons that I want to
comment a little bit
on in this conclusion.
First, because the
autonomous self-calculation
of the good that
it advocates for
opens within the circle
of capitalist economy,
the other circle that I just
called an anarchistic mode
of distribution.
Effective altruists have
no guides, no masters,
no supreme authorities
commanding the act of giving.
Nothing comes from above.
A calculation always
remains horizontal.
The second reason is
that the strangers
to whom we should give without
expecting any mutuality.
The second reason is that
the strangers to whom we give
include, of course, humans,
but also animals, plants,
and, Singer says,
"even, perhaps,
mountains, rocks, and streams."
So it might give way to
a philosophy of ecology
and anti-speciesism
that seems, perhaps,
the point of compatibility
with Derrida's
thinking, the point
of compatibility that
would have to be developed.
The third reason is that it
forces the Darwinian argument
that gift is not possible.
It forces the Darwinian
argument to respond
to this notion of effectivity.
To state that pure
gift is impossible
is perhaps just a pretext
for not giving at all.
So this is, I think,
how Singer challenges,
really, Derrida's position.
So, of course, in
response, Derrida
would no doubt have argued
that escaping guilt and debt
was irresponsible
and impossible.
He would maybe,
or no doubt, have
argued that consequentiality--
because utilitarianism
is a consequentiality.
You calculate the
consequences of your actions.
Consequentiality,
Derrida would have said,
always obeys the
logic of interest,
because it has in mind the
survival of life on Earth.
And in that sense, it
remains the logic of game.
And in that sense, it does
not expand the circle,
which is another way to say
that we cannot give anything
but counterfeit money.
When we give to strangers,
we might just perpetuate,
instead of breaking it, the
logic of poverty and dependency
instead of coping with it.
And it is true that whether
effective altruism proceeds
from a genuine critique or
from a defense of capitalism,
it is not always clear.
There is for sure a strong
ambiguity in Singer's project.
Let me read the last passage
from The Most Good You Can Do,
Singer writes, "Effective
altruism typically
values equality, not for its own
sake, but for its consequences.
It isn't clear that
making the rich richer
without making the poor poorer
has bad consequences overall.
It increases the ability of
the rich to help the poor.
And some of the
world's richest people,
including Bill Gates
or Warren Buffett,
have done precisely
that, becoming,
in terms of the
amount of money given,
the greatest effective
altruists in human history.
It would not be easy to
demonstrate that capitalism
has driven more people
into extreme poverty
than it has lifted
out of [INAUDIBLE]..
There are good
grounds for thinking
that the opposite is the case."
So you see this
ambiguity that situates
Singer's position, in
fact, in-between anarchism
and capitalism.
So, maybe, effective
altruism is just
a way of blurring the
limits between charity
and neoliberalism.
Maybe, it remains
absolutely ambiguous.
Nevertheless, there are numerous
debates on this question.
Nevertheless, Singer's position
is extremely influential.
And I think that effective
altruism deserves
to be taken seriously,
as it orients
the logic of the
impossibility of mutualism
toward the possibility
of a new solidarity,
not in reciprocity,
may perhaps become
the new form of cooperation.
Thank you very much.
[CLAPPING]
