>> Welcome back to intro to philosophy 1010.
The summer 2019 session.
Our book is Introduction to World Philosophy.
And in this video, we're going
over Plato and Aristotle.
This is for exam four.
And the question is for part B number seven.
How is Plato's concept of
the three parts of the soul
in the Republic similar to
Aristotle's virtue theory?
So, Aristotle's virtue theory is in the
Nicomachean ethics which starts on page 90.
So, in the previous video, we compared the part
of the soul and the Republic to the three parts
of the soul in Plato's dialog
called Lathagerous.
And then we compared that to Ishvara
[phonetic] Krishna [phonetic]
and Petongolese [phonetic]
explanations of the three modes
of nature of the three goonas [phonetic].
Goodness, passion, and ignorance.
[ Foreign Language ]
So, in this video, we're going on to
Aristotle and the Nicomachean ethics.
And we'll be going over Aristotle
again in subsequent videos.
So, this one I'm just going to focus
on the idea of three parts of the soul.
And then in the next video, I'll get more
into the depths of Aristotle's virtue theory.
So, on page 93.
This is Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics.
My right-hand column about halfway down
he says, "Some things are said about it."
All right the soul.
So, he's saying, "The student
of politics must study the soul.
And some things are said it
about adequately enough even
in the discussions outside our school.
And we must use these.
For example, that one element in the soul
irrational and one has a rational principle."
So, this is Aristotle who was
a student in Plato's academy.
He started his own school the Lyceum.
But he's saying, some things were
said well enough in that other school.
And I think he's talking about Plato.
So, the soul has two parts.
Now, it's going to expand into three
just like we saw in the Republic.
Socrates first started out saying there's
a rational and irrational part of the soul.
And then he inserted a third in
between the two which is passion.
And we'll see Aristotle doing the same
most likely just following what he learned
from Plato.
So, two elements in the soul.
One element is irrational.
And one has a rational principle.
And then he goes on to say, "Whether
these are separated as the parts
of the body or of anything divisible are.
Or are distinct by definition, but by nature.
Inseparable like convex and
concave and a circumference
of a circle does not affect
the present question."
So, is the soul a simple thing with no parts?
Or is it a composite thing made up of parts?
Are these elements of the
soul separate from each other?
Or are they just different ways
of expressing the same thing?
He says it doesn't matter for our
purposes which is political science.
It's - he's writing how a
politician should think and behave.
And the politician should study the soul because
the politician's looking for the ultimate good.
And to make the people in the society good.
So, the politician has to know what a
soul is in order to make it virtuous.
So, we'll get into all that.
But right now, we're just
the three parts of the soul.
So, he says, "Of the irrational
element one division seems
to be widely distributed
and vegetative in nature.
I mean that which causes nutrition and growth.
For it is a kind of power of the soul that
one must assign to all nurslings and embryos.
Now, this excellence of the soul
seems to be common to all species."
Okay, so, his categorizations
get a little complicated.
And there doesn't exactly parallel
the Republic, Plato's Republic.
So, what he's going to say
is all right, there's a soul.
Now, let's break it into two parts.
You've got the rational and the irrational.
And then he says - then he
breaks up the irrational part
of the soul into three subdivisions.
Vegetative which all life forms have in common.
They just absorb nutrients and grow.
The next one is perception
which even animals have.
You know vegetables can't see,
or smell, or hear, but dogs can.
So, dogs have the vegetative part of the soul.
And also, the power of perception.
And then also, there's desire
which is what we saw in Plato.
For Plato and the Republic, there's reason
there's passion or the spirited element.
And then there's desire.
The appetitive.
The appetites.
And we're going to see Aristotle
make the same basic division.
Because of the irrational part you've got the
vegetative that all life forms have perception.
That animals have in common with vegetables.
And then desire.
So, animals desire too.
And then he'll talk about desire some people
are continent and some people are incontinent.
So, that's the breakdown for desire.
When a person is continent they have
this passionate desire to obey reason.
And that is just exactly what we
saw Plato say in the Republic.
So, continuing here on - I'm
going to move over to page 94.
The left-hand column.
The second paragraph.
"There seems to be also another
irrational element in the soul.
One which in a sense however
shares an irrational principle.
For we praise the rational principle of
the continent man and of the incontinent.
And the part of their soul
that has such a principle
since it urges them aright
and towards the best objects.
But there's found in them also another element
naturally apposed to the rational principle
which fights against and
resists that principle."
Alright. So, I'll stop there.
So, there seems to be also another
irrational element in the soul,
but it shares an irrational principle.
So, the desiring part of the
irrational part of the soul.
One of those parts of desire
is - tends to obey reason.
And that's why he's saying he further
subdivides the irrational part.
So, that it kind of shares in reason,
and yet it also connected to desire.
And so now I'll continue here.
So, "It urges them aright
and towards the best objects.
But there's found" all right.
"For exact is paralyzed limbs
when we intend to move them
to the right turn on the contrary to the left.
So it is with the soul.
The impulses of incontinent people
move in contrary directions."
Contrary to reason.
"But while in the body we see that which
moves astray in the soul we do not.
No doubt however we must none
the less suppose that in the soul
to there is something contrary
to the rational principle.
Resisting and opposing it."
So, he says, "In what sense it is distinct
from the other elements does not concern us."
So, he's not worried about - is - are
there really three parts of the soul?
Or is it one?
I talked abo that in the previous
video about the mortal soul
that the subtle material body is
subject to the three modes of nature.
Which Plato calls reason,
passion, and appetites.
Okay, so, the next - the bottom paragraph.
The left-hand column.
Page 94. "Therefore, the irrational
element also appears to be two-fold.
For the vegetative element in no way shares
an irrational principle but be appetitive end,
in general, the desiring
element in a sense shares in it.
In so far it listens to and obeys it."
Meaning it obeys the rational principle.
"This is the sense in which we speak of taking
account of one's father or one's friends.
Not that in which we speak of
accounting for a mathematical property.
That the irrational element
is in some sense persuaded
by a rational principle is indicated also by the
giving of advice by all reproof and exhortation.
And if this element also must be
said to have a rational principle,
that which has a rational principle as well
as that which has not will be two-fold."
One subdivision having it in
the strict sense and in itself.
That's just the rational part of the soul.
And the other having a tendency
to obey as one does one's father.
So, we see the basic parallel
with Plato's Republic.
You've got three parts of the
soul for Plato in the Republic.
Reason, passion, and appetites.
And passions intermediary.
Although it's part of the
irrational part of the soul.
The irrational has two parts.
Appetites and then this passion.
But the passion can also be said to be a part of
reason in a sense that it tends to obey reason.
And then try to force the appetites inline.
What we saw in Plato's Republic
what happens more often than not is
that the desiring - no it was in the Phaedrus.
The desire part tends to
overwhelm reason and passion.
So, just to go back over.
In the Republic on page 87.
The left-hand column.
He says, "And if you suppose something
which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink
that must be different from the thirsty
principle which draws him like a beast to drink.
For as we were saying the same thing can't at
the same time with the same part of itself act
in contrary ways about the same thing."
So, if you've ever had a desire to drink water.
And then something in you
says no don't drink right now.
Now's not the time.
There's - that proves there're
two parts of our soul.
And so, continuing down on the left-hand column.
"And the forbidding principles derived from
reason and that which bids and attracts proceeds
from passion and disease clearly.
Then we may fairly assume that they are two.
And that they differ from one another.
The one with which a man reasons we may
call the rational principle of the soul.
And the other one he calls the appetitive."
This is page 87.
The right-hand column.
"Then let's finally determine that there
are two principles existing in the soul.
And one of passion or spirit.
Is it a third or akin to one of the preceding?"
So, he'll go on to say that passion is a part
of the irrational element, but it obeys reason.
Like a - the - in the state, these three modes
are manifest in the three, in the three classes.
The philosopher kings, the
philosophers at the top.
Their auxiliaries which are the mode of passion.
And then the other classes which are
presided over by bodily appetites.
So, on page 88 he says, "But when he
thinks that he is the suffer of the wrong."
Okay, so this is the passionate part.
It tends to support justice.
If you do something wrong and then
people have your - their revenge on you,
you don't get overwhelmed with
indignation because you think I deserve it.
It's just, just.
But if someone wrongs you, and you didn't
deserve it then the passionate part becomes
inflamed because it wants justice.
And so, he says, "The illustration
is perfect he replied.
And in our state, as we were saying
the auxiliaries were to be dogs
and to hear the voice of the
rulers who are their shepherds."
So, the shepherds are the philosophers.
The sheepdogs are the auxiliary
class kind of the people
who run the political affairs day-to-day.
And then the sheep are the rest of the people.
And he's saying that you have these
three justice is these three divisions
of the soul each acting according
to it's what reason dictates.
So, when the appetite obey passion
which obeys reason then you have justice
in the individual soul.
And then the philosopher class
instructs the political class
who then keep the appetitive class
harmonized then you have a just [inaudible].
So, those are the three parts of
the soul for Plato and the Republic.
And we compare them to the three parts of
the soul in Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics.
So, that was exam four, part B question seven.
How is Plato's concept of
the three parts of the soul
in the Republic similar to
Aristotle's virtue theory?
