Let me introduce members of the doctoral thesis committee:
Andás Lányi, opponent
Anna Vári, opponent
Gábor Molnár, adjunct professor of the Kaposvár University
Gergely Prazsák, secretary of the committee
and myself, György Csepeli, head of the committee.
This is then the committee that will oversee the doctoral thesis defense of Gábor Sarlós.
In my research I come to the conclusion that
 
it is primarily through the perception and manifestation of risks and benefits that we form our views on nuclear energy.  
This is how we look upon nuclear development projects,
about the issue of generating energy of uranium,
and that we eventually build the electric energy supply of a whole country on the utilization of nuclear power.
Participants of a discourse need to have a self-reflective approach. 
They need to be able to look at, and if needed, revise their own views.
Another important criterion is to level informational inequalities.
As it is seen in the case of nuclear energy, it is hardly possible to conduct any discourse in case of an inherent imbalance
between those who are having and those who are lacking access to information. 
The third important element of Dahlberg’s theory is that a set of monologues does not constitute a discourse.
The ability and openness to reflect upon and reconstruct other narratives than our own is a prerequisite of the creation of a public sphere.
Castells describes in detail the creation and functioning of a new dimension of social build, the network society.
The existence of the network society has a significant direct impact on the nuclear discourse.
Discourse in the network society implies each actor having equal rights and equal chance to the ownership of media.
Traditional media loses its privileged role of being the single most important tool in forming public opinion.
Language and media play a critical role in forming individually created realities of social constructions,
for example about nuclear energy or about the expansion plans of the Paks nuclear power plant. 
All this leads to dominant narratives becoming descriptors of parallel realities. 
Each of us creates their individual filter system with which we collect and select information that support our own views, 
leading us having totally different associations emerging in relation, for example, to the name of Paks.
Over a period of 3,5 years and through the content analysis of over 200 parliamentary speeches, I studied the nuclear energy related political discourse.
It is my conviction that a Risk Perception Index can be set up, where the risk bearing profile of a political party 
– or, as a matter of fact, of any other individual or organizational player is drawn.
If this is regularly followed over a period of time,
it becomes apparent if the narratives of the political parties on Paks are changing and if yes, to what direction and extent.
The work of the Aarhus roundtable and working group has been in the center of my analysis of the professional discourse. 
This institution is dedicated to the guaranteeing of access to environmental information
to various organisations and to the general public in Europe.
For a period of 2 short years, I was able to join the work of the Aarhus roundtable as the facilitator of the process.
This enabled me to adapt a significant element of sociological research, that of participant observation. 
The unmanageable imbalance between those having and lacking access to information
leads to certain organisations having the exclusive monopoly of information, 
while others are totally deprived of it at all.
If there is no openness to the sharing of information,
then, and let me refer again to Dahlberg’s thoughts on this, 
the chance for the construction of any public discourse is made impossible.
A totally different set of risks and benefits is perceived by the different players.  
Media analysis shows that supporters see benefits of existing or planned nuclear projects in a rather linear structure, 
while opponents’ views reflect a systemic approach.
Critics look at risks in relation to the full cycle of nuclear activities,
from uranium mining to the processing, handling and disposal of nuclear waste – stretching over many thousand of years. 
The two approaches result in two distinct sets of perceptions of risks and benefits.
In the 2012 period, differences in media were not significant.
They turned visible in 2013 
and became striking following the signing of the Hungarian – Russian nuclear deal in January 2014 - articles began to reflect confronting views.
Media dynamics changed and reporting started to reflect and challenge contrasting views.
This is a notable trend, even if we are all aware that it would have represented a significantly higher value,
had this been the case before the signing of the nuclear contract and not only in the aftermath of it.
In the case of public opinion polls, research companies have a range of tools to influence the outcome of their specific research.
With a specific communication objective in mind, this can even serve manipulation intentions. 
To give you an example, hardly a month following the Fukushima disaster in 2011, 
an opinion poll started by asking if the pollee was ready to consume food produces of Japanese origin, 
and then asked their views about nuclear energy. 
This is a clear case of influencing the outcome of the following questions.
Let me quote another question, this one from the yearly MVM research of TNS Hoffmann on nuclear energy.
The question asks if the person agrees with the statement that a nuclear plant operates in Paks, Hungary.  
This question regularly receives a “yes” answer from 74-75% of the pollees,
as they simply confirm a fact.
However, this is then communicated by claiming that 74-75% of the population supports the operation of the nuclear plant. 
Need not say, this is manipulation of a gross kind.
There is hardly any country on the list,
that, at some stage, would not have changed their standpoint about nuclear energy.  
In the case of Sweden, for example, in 1979 a national referendum supported the phasing out of nuclear energy,
however, 20 years later, this was then overruled by a simple parliamentary resolution.  
There are movements in all directions. 
For example there are decisions on phasing out also in the case of Belgium and Spain,
however, strong lobby forces seems to challenge these decisions.
This is the perspective of which it is worthwhile looking at the well-known German case as well. 
All this is important to consider, when I say that we may all think that in the case of Paks a final and irrevocable decision has been made,
and this is especially the conviction of those who made the decision.
But the examples show that in the case of nuclear development projects,
the time span of which ranges from 50 to 100 years,
one can not necessarily consider decisions final. 
We are in the phase when we cannot simply speak about parallel realities
but of millions of realities where each of us individually construct their own realities. 
Of course, these do follow certain patterns.
In relation to nuclear issues, there is no such thing as a final decision.
