At 12:45 hours on the 24th of May 1940, Adolf
Hitler gave the order to halt his tanks just
fifteen miles from the port of Dunkirk. Long
story short, this order allowed the British
to evacuate their army from Dunkirk, and they
lived to fight another day.
At least, that is the way the story is usually
told, and believed. But it’s not exactly
true. In reality, on the 23rd of May 1940,
Generaloberst von Kluge halted his panzer
divisions due to tactical reasons (even though
the British only had one battalion in their
way at the time). And, when Hitler went to
see von Kluge’s superior, Generaloberst
Gerd von Rundstedt, the next day, Rundstedt
advised Hitler that it would be best to consolidate
the ground won, rather than advance with the
armour. Hitler agreed with this assessment.
And, long story short, the British evacuated
their army out of Dunkirk, to live to fight
another day.
At least, that is the way the story is usually
told, and believed. However, after the war,
Rundstedt told a slightly different story.
He said that he had been stopped by the Führer.
“My tanks were kept halted there for three
days. If I had had my way the English would
not have got off so lightly. But my hands
were tied by direct orders from Hitler himself.”
This view is supported by Halder, who wrote
in his diary:
“The left wing… will... be stopped dead
in its tracks upon direct orders of the Führer!
Finishing off the encircled enemy army is
to be left to [the] air force!”
It is also supported by a lot of historians,
like Shirer, in his book, The Rise and Fall
of the Third Reich:
“In the course of preparing this chapter
the author wrote to General Halder himself
for further elucidation and promptly received
a courteous and detailed reply.”
“During the following days it became known
that Hitler’s decision was mainly influenced
by Göring.”
The argument goes that Hitler didn’t think
that the army could defeat the British, and
so decided to encircle them and pound them
into dust with the German air force - the
Luftwaffe.
At least, that is the way the story is usually
told, and believed… even though this argument
is undermined by Halder himself, who not only
wrote in his diary that there were political
reasons for the halt order, but told Shirer:
“...for political reasons [Hitler] did not
want the decisive final battle, which inevitably
would cause great damage to the population,
to take place in territory inhabited by the
Flemish people. He had the intention, he said,
of making an independent National Socialist
region out of the territory inhabited by the
German-descended Flemish, thereby binding
them close to Germany. His supporters on Flemish
soil had been active in this direction for
a long time; he had promised them to keep
their land free from the damage of war. If
he did not keep this promise now, their confidence
in him would be severely damaged. That would
be a political disadvantage for Germany which
he, as the politically responsible leader,
must avoid.”
So, Halder argues that the Army would destroy
the area, and that’s why Hitler decided
to send in the Luftwaffe to bomb the area
to smithereens… because that wouldn’t
destroy the area, would it?
I hate Halder.
But maybe there were genuine political reasons
for the Halt Order. Rundstedt suspected that
Hitler had wanted to help the British, based
on the fact that Hitler had praised the British
empire in a meeting with him. Hitler also
went on to say to Mussolini and Ciano (the
Italian Foreign Minister) that the British
Empire had to be maintained in order to create
a balance of power in the world. Another general
said that, when he asked Hitler why he had
halted the tanks, Hitler told him that he
wanted to make peace with Britain. In 1945,
Hitler also stated that he had, in fact, let
the British leave at Dunkirk.
“Churchill was quite unable to appreciate
the sporting spirit of which I had given proof
by refraining from creating an irreparable
breach between the British and ourselves.
We did, indeed, refrain from annihilating
them at Dunkirk.”
And this has led to (what I’m going to call)
the “pro-peace” theory, which states that
Hitler wanted a peace deal with Britain, and
so let the British Army leave, in the hope
that this would convince Britain to give up
the fight.
“It may be, then, though some doubt it,
that Hitler restrained his armoured forces
before Dunkirk in order to spare Britain a
bitter humiliation and thereby facilitate
a peace settlement. It would have to be, as
he said, a peace in which the British left
Germany free to turn once more eastward, this
time against Russia.”
Of course, as we know, history lies in the
heart of the debate. And some historians do
not believe that the “pro-peace” narrative
is correct, partly because it doesn’t fully
work with the tactical situation (since the
Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were ordered to
destroy the British anyway), and partly because
it doesn’t really make much sense.
I mean, if you think about it logically, if
Hitler wanted peace with Britain, then surely
it would have been better to destroy or capture
their army first, and then call for peace,
since, without an army, Britain would be more
inclined to give in. So by letting the army
get away, that actually strengthens Britain’s
position, and thus encourages them to keep
fighting - which is the opposite of what the
theory said Hitler’s intentions were.
But, without this theory, we’re left with
a vacuum - a black hole in the middle of the
story - where no other current theory really
fits right. In fact, this has led a lot of
people to conclude that there was “no clear
reasoning” behind the Halt Order. It was
just a blunder.
Yes, there were tactical considerations, and
maybe they were the main reason they didn’t
advance… for a day. But are those tactical
reasons why the panzers were halted for 3
days? Are we certain that there was no clear
reasoning why something in history happened?
Or is it just because we haven’t figured
it out yet?
Okay so, let’s just set aside the idea that
the Halt Order was purely for tactical reasons.
It may have been. But let’s just set that
aside for the purpose of this. And let’s
just assume that there was some sort of clear
reasoning for the Halt Order. Maybe there
wasn’t, but let’s just assume that there
was.
Clearly, the answer doesn’t lie at Dunkirk,
otherwise we would have figured it out by
now. Which means that, if there was a clear
reason for the Halt Order, then it’s probably
a bigger - strategic - reason, which we just
haven’t figured out yet. If so, then what
could that reason be?
The theory that is championed by some, which
at least makes some sense, although isn’t
supported by the evidence, and many historians
now dismiss it, is that Hitler wanted peace
with Britain, and so let the British Army
get away. As I’ve just explained, this doesn’t
make sense, because if Hitler wanted Britain
to give in, surely it would make more sense
to destroy the British Army, which would encourage
Britain to seek peace.
But what happens if Hitler didn’t want peace?
What if Hitler wanted the war with Britain
to continue? And what if that was the reason
Hitler let the British escape at Dunkirk?
Think about it. If Hitler didn’t want peace
with Britain, if he wanted them to keep fighting,
then when Rundstedt halted the panzers and
advised about consolidating the ground won,
Hitler would agree, praise the British Empire,
and give Rundstedt the impression that Hitler
had wanted to help the British. This would
then go in line with what Hitler said to Mussolini
etc, and later in 1945, that he had wanted
to help the British. He could have just told
Halder and his generals that his intention
was to prevent damage being inflicted on the
Flemish people, since he wouldn’t want to
reveal to them his actual goals. Yes, the
tactical situation may or may not have allowed
the panzers to reach Dunkirk anyway, but that
doesn’t necessarily contradict what Hitler’s
strategic intentions were - it could have
just influenced his decision, or confirmed
that his decision was the correct one to take.
And he could still send in the Luftwaffe and
the Kriegsmarine, because, while he wanted
the British not to peace out, he didn’t
want their army to be a threat in the future.
So, if Hitler had wanted Britain to keep fighting
in 1940, then everything fits together quite
well. The only question would be: why? Why
would Hitler want Britain to keep fighting?
The answer doesn’t lie at Dunkirk. By the
end of 1940, Europe is carved up into three
factions: Britain, holding on alone; the Axis
in the centre of Europe; and the Soviet Union,
currently allied (in all but name) with the
Germans. But, what was Hitler’s long term
goal? What was the reason he went to war in
the first place?
Well, I’ve covered this in other videos,
but a quick recap. Hitler’s long term goal
was to unite the German peoples under one
State, and go east to get the land and resources
necessary to produce a thousand year Reich.
This was why he had Anschlussed Austria, taken
down Czechoslovakia, and why he had headed
into Poland, prompting the French and British
to declare war. Hitler was going East, not
West. He only seems to have gone west because
the Allies had declared war on him. But, with
the West subdued at the end of 1940, and with
Germany suffering under a food and fuel crisis
of epic proportions (partly due to their own
policies, and partly the British blockade),
the need to get the land and resources of
the East was growing. This is why, in late
1940, Hitler ordered his generals to start
planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union,
because that’s where he was going: the East.
So, you’d think that the guy in charge of
the Soviet Union, Stalin, would know that
Hitler was coming, right? You’d think that
there’s no way that Stalin would be surprised
by a German invasion. And yet, this is exactly
what happened: Stalin was shocked when the
Germans invaded in 1941. So, why? Why was
Stalin shocked?
It was obvious to everyone else, pretty much,
that Hitler was going East. Oswald Mosley
knew that Hitler was going East because he’d
read Mein Kampf. Friedrich Kellner, a Social
Democrat living in the Third Reich, had also
read Mein Kampf and knew that Hitler was going
East, even as early as 1939. In fact, anyone
who read Mein Kampf would know what Hitler’s
intentions were, so there’s no way that
anyone could have been surprised by this…
unless you didn’t think Hitler would attack
yet.
Everyone knew that Hitler was going East.
But WHEN was he going East?
In hindsight, we know that he attacked in
1941. But that’s with hindsight. There’s
no way to know WHEN Hitler was going to attack
the Soviet Union. Many still argue that Hitler
should have waited until 1942 before he attacked,
although I would argue that the food and oil
crisis demanded that he attack in 1941. But
the point is that attacking in 1941 was not
a guaranteed thing, and is questionable even
with hindsight.
The timing of the invasion of the Soviet Union
was the thing that nobody could foresee. Few
at the time knew that Hitler would attack
the Soviet Union in 1941. Instead, many were
looking at one of the KEY indicators, and
that indicator was saying: there’s no way
that Hitler would attack now. Stalin was looking
at this indicator, and knew that, so long
as this remained true, there’s no way that
Hitler would attack.
And what was that indicator?
Well, everyone knows it; we’ve all heard
it a million times.
‘Hitler would not dare risk a war on two
fronts.’
So long as Germany remained at war with Britain,
Hitler would not dare attack the Soviet Union
because he wouldn’t risk a war on two fronts.
And Hitler didn’t want a war on two fronts
because of what happened in the First World
War, and it even goes beyond that.
So, if you’re Stalin, and you’re allied
with Hitler (in all but name), and Hitler
is still at war with Britain, and you know
that Hitler wouldn’t dare risk a war on
two fronts, which was actually what Stalin
thought at the time, why would you expect
Hitler to go to war with you in 1941?
You wouldn’t.
“[Stalin] expected that Germany would end
the war in the west before entering any conflict
with Russia.”
And Hitler knew this.
Hitler knew that nobody thought he would fight
a war on two fronts. So, as long as Hitler
remained at war with Britain, Hitler knew
that his main enemy - Stalin - would think
that Hitler wouldn’t go to war with him.
And, so long as Hitler remained at war with
Britain, Hitler could take Stalin by surprise,
giving the Germans the advantage in the early
part of the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Imagine it this way. If you’re Stalin, and
you see Germany and Britain make peace, and
you know that Hitler’s ultimate aim is to
take the land and resources of the East, then
you know that Hitler will now be coming your
way. So, you’ll prepare for this.
And Hitler knows that if he makes peace with
Britain, that Stalin will know he’s coming,
and would prepare for him. So, the last thing
that Hitler wants, is peace with Britain,
because that will be a big red flag to Stalin
warning him of the incoming German attack.
So, in reality, rather than seeking peace,
Hitler actually wants Britain to keep fighting
in the 1940 to 1941 period, at least until
the invasion of the Soviet Union. After that,
then peace with Britain might be acceptable.
But you might say: okay, great theory, but
where’s the evidence for this? Well, for
starters, we have Dunkirk, where Rundstedt
said he got the impression that Hitler wanted
to help the British. We have Hitler’s own
testimony about this in 1945, and his words
with Mussolini and others. We also have Hitler’s
reaction to the Hess Flight... I’m not going
to get into the rabbit-hole of the Hess Affair
here (although I think the timing of this
event, if it was a destabilization attempt
to overthrow the British monarchy or government,
actually supports my theory), but what I will
say is that Hitler’s reaction to this (faked
or not) was to declare Hess a madman, and
promise Stalin that he wasn’t going to make
peace with Britain.
It’s not clear if this was the original
text of the message sent, but supposedly,
here is Hitler’s letter to Stalin:
“Dear Mr. Stalin,
I am writing this letter at the moment of
having finally concluded that it will be impossible
to achieve a lasting peace in Europe, not
for us, not for future generations, without
the final shattering of England and her destruction
as a state. As you well know, I long ago made
the decision to carry out a series of military
measures to achieve this goal.
The closer the hour of a decisive battle,
however, the larger the number of problems
I face. For the mass of the German people,
no war is popular, especially not a war against
England, because the German people consider
the English a fraternal people and war between
them a tragic event. I will not conceal that
I have felt the same way and have several
times offered England humane peace terms,
taking into consideration England’s military
situation. However, insulting replies to my
peace proposals and the continuing expansion
by the English of the field of military operations
with the obvious intention of drawing the
entire world into war persuade me that there
is no other way out of this situation except
for an invasion of the Isles and the decisive
destruction of that country.
...In order to organise troops for the invasion
away from the eyes of the English opponent,
and in connection with the recent operations
in the Balkans, a large number of my troops,
about eighty divisions, are located on the
borders of the Soviet Union. This possibly
gave rise to the rumours now circulating of
a likely military conflict between us.
I assure you, on my honour as a chief of state
that this is not the case.
From my side, I also react with understanding
to the fact that you cannot completely ignore
these rumours and have also deployed a sufficient
number of your troops on the border.
In this situation I cannot completely exclude
the possibility of an accidental outbreak
of armed conflict, which given the conditions
created by such a concentration of troops
might take on very large dimensions, making
it difficult if not impossible to determine
what caused it in the first place.
I want to be absolutely candid with you.
I fear that some of my generals might deliberately
embark on such a conflict in order to save
England from its fate and spoil my plans.
It is a question of no more than a month.
By approximately 15-20 June I plan to begin
a massive transfer of troops to the west from
your borders.
In connection with this, I ask you, as persuasively
as possible, not to give in to any provocations
that might emanate from those of my generals
who might have forgotten their duty. And,
it goes without saying, try not to give them
any cause. If it becomes impossible to avoid
provocation by some of my generals, I ask
you to show restraint, to not respond but
to advise me immediately of what has happened
through the channel known to you. Only in
this way can we attain our mutual goals, on
which, it seems to me, we are clearly in agreement.
I thank you for having agreed with me on the
question known to you and I ask you to forgive
me for the method I have chosen for delivering
this letter to you as quickly as possible.
I continue to hope for our meeting in July.
Sincerely yours,
Adolf Hitler”
Why would Hitler promise Stalin that he wasn’t
going to make a separate peace with Britain?
Just think about that for a second: what would
drive Hitler to write a letter to Stalin promising
him that he wouldn’t make peace with Britain?
The only reason that makes logical sense,
is that Hitler knew that if Stalin suspected
that Hitler wanted peace with Britain, that
this would tell Stalin that Hitler was going
East. So Hitler had to convince Stalin that
he wasn’t wanting peace with Britain, and
that’s why he wrote the letter.
At the same time, the British were wanting
to break up the Axis-Soviet Pact, and used
the Hess Affair to their advantage, whispering
in Stalin’s ear that Hitler (or, at least,
some members of the National Socialist Party)
were wanting to go East.
“...the message that Stalin and his cohorts
duly gleaned was that Hess, and by extension
Hitler, was trying to woo the British and
that if Moscow was not careful it could find
itself facing the Nazis alone. As Khrushchev
noted in his memoirs, the idea of Hess’s
flight being unauthorized by Berlin was unthinkable.
In addition, he knew that Sir John Simon had
been involved in the debriefing of Hess would
have worried Moscow deeply; after all, Simon
was viewed by many on the left as one of the
architects of appeasement, an avowed ‘Man
of Munich’.”
Regardless of whether the Hess Affair was
a planned coup attempt by Hitler and certain
members of the Royal Family in Britain (whose
documents on the case remain locked away in
the Royal Archives 80 years after the events
in question, being exempt from the Public
Records Act of 1958 and the Freedom of Information
Act of 2000, with William Hague being the
last politician to confirm that the documents
would remain sealed for “national security”
reasons)... regardless of that, Stalin did,
in fact, believe that the Hess Affair was
an anti-Soviet conspiracy.
So, for the purposes of this discussion, it
doesn’t matter what the Hess Affair was
actually about. All that matters is that,
as a result of the Hess Affair, Hitler had
to persuade Stalin that he wasn’t seeking
peace with Britain. And this suggests that
Hitler didn’t want peace with Britain in
the 1940 to 1941 period prior to the invasion
of the Soviet Union, because, if he got peace
with Britain, this would tell Stalin that
Hitler was on his way.
“Hitler’s ‘madness/derangement’ alibi
would supposedly cover why Hess chose to do
what he did, and thus allay any suspicions
the Russians might have that an Anglo-German
peace was being negotiated before an eastward
invasion was mounted.”
If this is the case, that Hitler wanted to
keep Britain in the war in the 1940 to 1941
period, then it makes sense then why he would
still want to do damage to the British Army
in its evacuation from Dunkirk. He sent in
the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine to do a
lot of damage to the British because, while
Hitler wanted Britain to keep fighting, he
didn’t want them to have the ability to
harm him in return. It would make sense to
cripple the British Army and prevent it from
doing any damage to Germany in the short term,
while he took the Living Space of the East.
Now, I would like to make this absolutely clear: this
isn’t a hill that I’m willing to die upon.
This is more of an alternative theory, which
may or may not stand up to scrutiny in the
long-run. But I wanted to offer it to you
because the current explanation about what
happened at Dunkirk doesn’t sit right with
a lot of people, me included. Yes, it could
just be that the Halt Order was done for purely
tactical reasons. But I also think there is
some merit to the idea that, if Hitler peaced
out with Britain, Stalin would know Hitler
was coming for him. It would also fit in line
with some of the better theories on the Hess
Affair, which happened on the eve of the invasion
of the Soviet Union. So, let’s see what
you guys think. Did Hitler want to keep the
British in the war? Was this the reason for
the Dunkirk Halt Order? Thanks for watching,
bye for now.
