Professor Donald
Kagan: For the next couple
of weeks we will be examining
the coming and the fighting of
the Great Peloponnesian War.
It's a subject that had
tremendous importance for the
Greeks themselves and it has
been one of the things that has
occupied people interested in
the ancient Greeks more than
most thing,
partly because of its own
extraordinary importance,
but I think perhaps even more
because of the fact that it was
described for us by a
participant,
a contemporary Thucydides,
the son of Olorus an Athenian,
who by common consent
throughout the millennia has
been agreed upon as one of the
great historians ever,
sort of the second one that we
know of in all of history,
but also one who is much
esteemed.
I would argue that right now
he's probably esteemed more than
he has ever been throughout the
history of the world,
because he's had such a great
influence on thinking in the
West and then in the world as
well--around the world as well.
Ever since the twentieth
century, he really came into his
own as events like the First and
the Second World War,
to be followed then by the Cold
War seemed to observers of the
time, to be much illuminated by
studying Thucydides' account of
the Peloponnesian War.
And as a consequence his own
way of thinking about history
and about war,
and about international
relations and about behavior of
human beings in the mass,
and a whole variety of subjects
in the realm of politics and
diplomacy and war.
So it's for those reasons,
I think, that this story has
been so carefully looked at,
compared to others in history.
You know that for almost
three decades at the end of the
fifth century the Athenian
Empire fought against the
Spartan alliance in this
terrible war that changed the
Greek world and the civilization
of the Greeks forever.
From the perspective of the
fifth century Greeks,
the Peloponnesian War deserves
to be thought of I think as a
world war.
It just involves the Greeks
themselves and that's not quite
right.
That's one of the points
Thucydides makes.
It drew into it other peoples
other than the Greeks who were
very important.
The Persians were to play a
critical role and similarly the
Macedonians, and similarly
peoples in Sicily and in Italy.
So, it really doesn't require
much defense from the Greek
point of view to think of it as
a kind of a world war.
A critical turning point in
Greek history causing enormous
destruction of life and
property,
intensifying factional and
class hostility,
dividing the Greek states
internally--it was the cause of
civil wars throughout the Greek
world,
throughout its history and
subsequently,
de-stabilizing the relationship
of classes within cities and
between the relationships
between cities ultimately.
As we can see from hindsight,
making the capacity of the
Greeks to resist an outside
threat much weaker and helping
to bring about a situation in
which they finally did lose
their independence and their
autonomy.
So, from so many points of
view the war may be seen as a
tragic event,
the end of a period of
confidence and hope,
and I would want to stress
that.
If you look at the fifty year
stretch between the Persian War
and the Peloponnesian War,
it is the great age of Greece
when so many of the things that
we value in the experience of
the Greeks were created and
carried forward,
and a period in which one sees
evidence of all sorts of
confidence in human capacities
and the hope of what will be in
the future.
All of that,
I think, suffered a
considerable reversal because of
the Peloponnesian War,
and began a darker time.
It was a war of
unprecedented brutality in Greek
life, violating even the already
rugged code that had previously
governed Greek fighting and
breaking through that thin
veneer that separates
civilization from savagery.
It is actually to Thucydides
that that way of thinking about
things is old.
Certainly for me;
that's when I first understood
what he's teaching us to such a
degree in his history,
that there is just a very thin
veneer that covers over the
brutal, the bestial,
the worst and bestial that
exists in human beings even in
society, but that society is
what covers that over and
permits something resembling
what we would call civilization.
But warfare tends to put a
strain on that limiting element
which is what society gives you.
Anger, frustration,
the desire for vengeance
increases as the fighting drags
on,
producing a progression of
atrocities that included maiming
and killing captured opponents,
throwing them into pits to die
of thirst, starvation and
exposure, that's what happened
in Sicily and hurling them into
the sea to drown,
which became the practice
towards the end of the
Peloponnesian War.
It was a case of a band of
marauders, murdering innocent
school children,
entire cities were destroyed,
the men killed the women and
children sold into slavery.
I don't say there were no
atrocities before the
Peloponnesian War,
but nothing like the
concentration of them that
developed,
and also I suspect a whole new
range of them also came into
being.
One reason being that in
the past wars had been short,
and one of the messages I think
Thucydides wants to give us is
that the longer a war persists,
the more inevitable is the
sinking below civilized levels
of warfare, if there is such a
thing as civilized level of
warfare,
to a much more horrible way of
fighting.
As I said, although the war
ended over 2,400 years ago it
continues to fascinate readers
today.
I was astonished;
I wrote a one-volume history of
the Peloponnesian War and it
sold 50,000 copies of the damn
thing.
I'm truly amazed;
so was my publisher.
But I think shouldn't have been
amazed, because for maybe a
century now people have been
studying Thucydides and the war,
or when they have not been
studying them they've been
hearing about it;
references that have been made
to it by distinguished people.
General Marshall referred
to it in a famous quotation when
he was Secretary of State and
people keep talking about it,
and so the curiosity I think
rather than the
familiarity--curiosity about
what is this all about may
account for this,
but it's also true that if you
go to--Thucydides and the
Peloponnesian War are taught in
all the military academies.
They are taught in all,
or just about all,
I never heard one that didn't,
in all programs of
international relations
anywhere.
That's one of the first books
along with the Chinese Sage of
Warfare, Sun-tzu both of those
seem to be typically read
everywhere and so on.
I don't think that this is just
an affectation of look at us we
read classical stuff;
I don't think that's what it's
about.
I think it is based on a
conviction and supported by
arguments by scholars,
not classicists,
that there is some continuing
meaning, some continuing value,
something we can learn about
all of these important topics by
reading Thucydides.
So, I want to just comfort
you for the burden I've laid on
you in giving you that book and
all of this stuff to read.
You're not wasting your time;
that's what I'm trying to tell
you.
I'd like to turn first to the
question of the origins of the
war, the causes of the war,
the outbreak of the war,
however you want to look at
that phenomenon,
because Thucydides is very
interested in that subject and
writes about it with a
sophistication that in my
opinion,
has not been superseded and
rarely matched in the years
since that point.
Thucydides' whole first
book really is about that
subject, how and why did that
war come about?
That's a subject I just think
is immensely interesting and
important, because we should
face the fact that the history
of civilized mankind is almost
the history of warfare.
There's nothing more typical of
human societies than that they
are organized to fight wars and
do so.
And I think by the twentieth-,
twenty-first century we ought
to have come to the conclusion
this is a bad thing.
Wars, certainly now,
whatever positive functions
they might have had in the past,
and they have been sometimes
glorified for various reasons,
the price of them is just far
too high for us to think that's
fine,
let's keep doing that.
So, the problem why do wars
happen and how can they be
avoided strikes me as important
a question as there is,
and Thucydides I think gives us
some food to chew on as we think
about that.
Well, he examined the
situation in the first book and
concluded with what he calls the
truest cause,
the truest explanation.
I'll quote him now,
"The truest explanation,
although it has been the least
often advanced I believe to have
been the growth of the Athenians
to greatness which brought fear
to the Lacedaemonians and forced
them to war."
Scholars differ a bit on what
that really means,
but I side with what I think
are the majority of the scholars
on this point,
which is to say he is really
saying that this war became
inevitable at a certain point
when the Athenian Empire,
that's the greatness of Athens
reached such a point as to alarm
the Spartans enough to do what
they did,
which was to start a war to
check the growth of that
Athenian power.
Everything I've said is open to
criticism and disagreement,
and just naturally great big
arguments about these things,
but I'm giving you my view
which is not original or unique.
Now, I think it's important
to realize that Thucydides does
not think that sort of an
obvious explanation can be found
by examining the circumstances
that took place when the war
broke out in 431 B.C.,
and the proof of that is not
merely that he speaks about the
truest explanation,
which means he's rejecting less
true ones, which do focus on the
events themselves,
what we might call the
precipitating causes of the war.
He begins his account
explaining how the war came back
to the end of the Persian Wars
and the events that are
important,
from his point of view,
are the forming of the Delian
League which emerges as the
Athenian Empire.
That's one critical thing he
goes back to,
and the other critical thing he
goes back to is the distrust
that emerged swiftly between
Athens and Sparta which turned
into a major division in the
Greek world and produced
ultimately-- suspicion obviously
is something that makes it
easier to bring about fear,
and so we get to that second
element that Thucydides talks
about, the fear that the growth
of Athenian power and gender in
the Spartans.
What is so splendid in my
eyes about Thucydides
understanding of why these
things happened and why it's
superior to what is typically
taught in the graduate schools
that study international
relations is he's talking about
human emotions.
He's talking about feelings;
he's not talking about
structures that you need to be a
professor in order to
understand.
I think that that's one of the
powerful things.
Thucydides is interested in
structures, the first one he
ever looks at.
He thinks it's a very important
thing, but when he comes down to
explaining why nations go to
war,
he looks at the feelings that
the people involved have.
Well, we've talked already
about some of the events that he
describes, taking them mainly
from him.
I'm talking about the beginning
of the Delian League,
the conversion into an Athenian
Empire,
the suspicion that aroused
among the Spartans,
but the fact that they worked
things out until the Thasian
rebellion,
where we see the Athenians
acting more aggressively with
less justification than they
ever have before.
But what I didn't tell you
because I wanted to save it for
this context is that Thucydides
mentions the fact that when the
Thasians launched their
rebellion against Athens in 465,
they went first to the Spartans
and asked them,
if we rebel against the
Athenians will you invade
Attica,
and the ephors,
the officials that conduct
foreign policy in the first
instance in Sparta,
said they would.
Well, they didn't because
before they could do so the
great earthquake occurred which
prevented them doing any such
thing.
It needs to be pointed out that
this message--these talks that
went on between the Thasians and
Spartans were secret,
and we have to believe that at
this time, the Athenians did not
know about these conversations,
because if they had,
there is no way they could have
been persuaded to send help,
4,000 hoplites into the
Peloponnesus to help the
Spartans against the helots.
So, I think we need to accept
Thucydides' assessment of that
situation.
Well, we know it happened.
The Athenians were sent away
because of the suspicion that
the Spartans felt for them and
their way of government,
and this produced a tremendous
anger in the Athenians and it
also led to a revolution
internally in which the Cimonian
regime was replaced by one led
by more radical democrats like
Ephialtes and Pericles,
and also a diplomatic
revolution in which the
Athenians withdrew from the
Greek League under Spartan
leadership,
and in which they made
alliances first with Argos the
great enemy of Sparta and then
with the Thessalians whom they
hoped would supply them with
useful cavalry in case of a
future war.
So, that's a terrific
takeoff point for the first
quarrel of seriousness between
the two sides which modern
historians call the First
Peloponnesian War.
One other thing that happened
at the conclusion of this
previous period,
that is to say,
with the withdrawal of the
Athenians from the scene,
the Spartans finally took care
of the helots.
They never were able really to
defeat them and get them down
from their fort up on Mount
Ithome,
but they finally made a deal
with the people up there saying,
we will allow you to come down
in safety and go away someplace
so long as you leave the
Peloponnesus.
They undoubtedly expected that
the helots would then be
scattered one here,
one there, one other place,
where else would they go?
That's what would have
happened, had it not been that
the Athenians,
who had lately acquired,
we know not how,
control of a town on the north
shore of the Corinthian Gulf
called Naupactus.
It has a very good harbor and
it is so located as to be
wonderful as a naval base for
somebody who wished to be able
to control access to the
Corinthian Gulf.
The Athenians took it and then
turned it over to the helots who
had fled the Peloponnesus.
That was not what the Spartans
had in mind, although there was
nothing in the deal that
prevented this from being done.
But it means that the Athenians
had done another bit of harm to
the Spartans,
putting their bitter enemies in
a position to cause trouble to
them and to their allies on the
Corinthians Gulf.
So, all of that suggests
that on the next day,
so to speak,
after all of these changes had
taken place,
the world was very different
and the prospects,
I would have thought,
for peace between Sparta and
her allies and Athens and her
allies had been badly reduced.
There's no longer an
association between the two.
The Athenians had allied
themselves with Spartan enemies;
the Athenians had taken the
halots and put them in this
terrific place.
This is not a recipe for good
relations in the future--this is
where the cliché
seems to me to be useful;
people talk about a powder keg
which only needs a spark to set
it off into a great explosion.
People use this about the
outbreak of many wars.
Sometimes it is an apt thing,
and sometimes it is not.
This time it is,
as we shall see;
it didn't take very much to
produce an explosion between
Athens and Sparta after these
events.
The spark was provided by a
quarrel that took place between
two Spartan allies in the
Peloponnesus,
Megara and Corinth,
neighbors on that isthmus that
leads into northern Greece and
into Athens.
Since they are both members of
the Spartan alliance,
the Spartans had choices to
make about what has happening.
And the choice was soon forced
upon them, because when it was
clear that the Corinthians were
winning the argument,
winning the war I should say,
that they were fighting against
Megara, the Megarians came to
Sparta and asked for their help
in putting down this war and
ending it.
The Spartans said,
"no we are not interested;
it is your business, not ours."
Now, that is interesting.
We cannot really tell,
because there is nothing
written about it,
what obligations the Spartans
had when two allies who are
autonomous states,
according to the theory,
decide to fight each other.
It looks to me,
because nobody complained about
it in terms of constitutional
irregularity,
that the Spartans had every
right to ignore what was going
on.
We must assume,
I suppose, that in the
centuries or century or so
before, the Spartans must have
ignored other quarrels between
allies and allowed them to fight
it out or settle it any way they
want.
The Spartans don't give a damn,
who wins between Corinth and
Megara.
And why should they get
involved.
I think that hands-off attitude
must have been encouraged by the
fact that they had just,
probably were still recovering
from the earthquake and the
helot rebellion that came after
it.
They really didn't need more
trouble.
So, they let the thing go.
Now, the reason the
Spartans could take such a
caviler attitude in the past was
that they were the only great
power in the Greek world.
But in 461 that was not true.
The losers, Megara,
had a choice.
They could, and did,
go to Athens and say,
"won't you help us against
Corinth?
If you do, we will leave the
Peloponnesian league and join
the Athenian side."
Now, that is brought about,
as I say, by the new
circumstances.
This is one of those places
where those of us who remember
the Cold War are immediately
stuck by similarities.
There were troubles all over
the world so long as it was
known that NATO was on one side
and the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw pact was on the other.
All kinds of places that
neither had any interest in
would call when they were in a
war or some kind of a fight in
their own places,
Africa for instance,
they would go to one side or
the other and say "help us,
or we will seek help from your
enemy."
That confronted each side with
a hard problem.
I don't give a damn about what
happens in country X,
you might say,
but I do not want the Russians
there and vice versa.
This is the kind of problem
that one sees in this situation.
So, the Athenians were
confronted by an extremely tough
decision.
I want to try to communicate to
you my sense of how difficult
the calls are in this situation.
Now, one natural reaction would
be this, it seems to me.
Why in the world should we
accept this defection from the
Peloponnesian league,
because it is bound to anger
the Spartans and very likely
bring us a war with the
Peloponnesians,
which is a very hard thing to
face?
What do we care about the
quarrel between Megara and
Corinth?
The opposite assumptions would
be, no we don't care about who
wins the quarrel between Corinth
and Megara,
but we do care about having
Megara on our side,
because if we control Megara,
if the Megarians are on our
side--Megara is situated on the
side of the isthmus right next
to Athens.
More than that,
there is a mountain range that
runs through Megara that makes
it very difficult for somebody
to make his way through that
territory,
if they are opposed by military
force.
In short, with the help of the
Megarians, the Athenenians could
cut off access to Athens and
probably for the most part to
central Greece to the
Spartans.Let me put it more
sharply.
The Athenians could feel
invulnerable to a Spartan
attack, if they could control
Megara.
Now, they would have to know
that if they took this offer,
it might bring a war with
Sparta.
But there would have been
plenty of Athenians,
who would have thought that is
going to happen anyway.
The only question before us is,
"do we want to have a war with
Sparta on these wonderfully
positive conditions,
or do we want to fight in the
old way in which we have no way
to stop the Spartans from
marching into our territory and
destroying our field" and in
fact defeating us,
because the Athenians as yet
had not built walls,
connecting Athens to the port
of Piraeus.
So, the Spartans could cut off
the Athenians from their port,
just by invading their
territory.
And as we know the Athenians do
not produce enough food to feed
themselves.
So, these would be the thoughts
that were going through the
minds of the Athenians.
Notice, the critical element in
your decision,
it seems to me,
is your prediction about what
is likely in the future.
If you think there really is
not danger of a war with Sparta,
why bring it on.
But if you think there is a
real danger of a war with
Sparta, why leave yourself
vulnerable to the Spartans.
Whichever call you make,
there are dangers and
uncertainties at the other end,
which I simply say,
welcome to the real world.
It is almost always that way.
And it is a beautiful lesson in
how real those hard decisions
are.
Well, the Athenian decision was
to take Megara into the Athenian
alliance and to take the dangers
that went with that.
And to make their task easier,
they built long walls
connecting the city of Megara
with the port of Nicea on the
Saronic Gulf,
which is where Athens is
located as well and also to gain
control of the town of Pegai,
which is on the--I guess I
would say--the northern side of
the isthmus and to fortify and
put forces between there.
In other words,
to build a barrier to Spartan
capacity to move into Attica.
That was the great gain that
they made of it.
One of the great prices
they paid;
Thucydides says this in his own
voice, this he says was the
beginning of Corinthian hatred
for Athens.
It is a fact,
if you look at Corinthian and
Athenian relations in the
past--we don't know a lot about
them,
but what we know suggests that
they were not unfriendly.
They did okay,
no problems really between
them, but from now on you're
going to have tremendous trouble
with Corinth,
and this as you know from
reading your Thucydides in the
textbook--Corinth will play a
critical role in 431 in bringing
on the Peloponnesian War that is
the Great War.
So, that was one of the prices
the Athenians paid for this
decision.
Now, if you apply
Thucydides' judgment to the
great Peloponnesian War and
apply it to this situation,
it seems to me to ring very,
very true.
He said, you remember,
that the growing power of the
Athenians caused fear among the
Spartans and led them--forced
them to work.
Well, there's no question that
the Athenian power has grown.
These alliances that they have
just made and this new
geo-political advantage they
have gained through their
alliance with Megara suddenly
make Athens much more
formidable,
and there's no question that
the Spartans become fearful
about that, and ultimately as we
shall see,
fearful enough to join in a war
against the Athenians.
So, I agree with Thucydides,
if you're talking about the
First Peloponnesian War,
but that's not what he's
talking about.
One great question that I would
like to confront when we get to
the big war is "does it work?"
Does his evaluation work for
the big war?
I should warn you at once that
most scholars throughout the
years have accepted Thucydides'
explanation and interpretation
of the great Peloponnesian War,
and I don't.
So be careful.
He was there,
he knows much more about it
than I do, and he's much smarter
than I am.
So, if I say he's wrong,
I better have a good case;
that's all I can say.
We need not say very much about
the war in detail.
Essentially,
the Athenians took the
initiative and in a general way
when they fought battles at sea
they won,
when they fought battles on
land they didn't.
No great battles were fought
for a couple of years;
the fighting took place in and
around the eastern Peloponnesus
for the most part and nothing
decisive happened.
Then we get down towards the
year 457--I keep warning you
that the dates here are
uncertain.
These are sort of consensus
dates although we don't have
certainty.
The Athenians received an
invitation from a ruler in Egypt
who wanted to launch a rebellion
against the Persian Empire,
and he invited the Athenians to
send a force to help.
The Athenians agreed to do it
and according to Thucydides they
sent a fleet of two hundred
ships for the purpose.
That's an enormous fleet up to
this point.
The Athenians by now have a
fleet that's bigger than that,
and they can afford to do it,
but I want you to understand
this is a major undertaking.
Now, why did they do it?
They do it because the
opportunities in Egypt are
tremendous.
Egypt is the greatest grain
grower in the Mediterranean area
and we know the Athenians are
always interested in sources of
grain,
but Egypt is fantastically
wealthy, because of its great
fertility.
So, the Athenians if they can
gain a share of that wealth will
of course profit from that.
Finally, the Athenians are
still officially at war with
Persia.
So, it's perfectly reasonable
to try to strip the Persians of
possibly their richest profits.
All of those things make their
decision understandable.
Now, on the other hand,
you might ask the question now
you know you're engaged in a war
with various Peloponnesians and
that although the Spartans
haven't taken any action yet,
you can expect some from them,
is this a great time for you to
tackle yet another war against
the Persians?
Well, they thought so,
and I think it's evidence of
the tremendous confidence that
the Athenians had acquired by
this time,
and as we shall see,
it was over confidence.
Of course, this whole story
fits beautifully into Greek
feelings, Greek ideas,
Greek religion and mythology.
This will be a beautiful
example, if Herodotus were
writing the history instead of a
very, very--I want to say
atheistic Thucydides.
I'm not sure he was an atheist
but he was certainly very,
very skeptical.
Herodotus would have been
talking about hubris all
over the place,
because that's the kind of a
situation that we have.
Well, let's forget about
that Athenian force in Egypt for
the time being and let's look at
what the situation is in the
year 457.
We have a wonderful piece of
evidence, rare piece of
evidence, actually an
inscription from that year which
is a part of a dedication,
a funeral dedication,
from a single Athenian tribe in
which they list the war dead
from their tribe by where they
fought and died and they're
proud of this.
I mean, of course,
they're proud of the heroism of
their men, but they're proud I
think also about the range of
places that they're fighting,
unheard of, unexampled in all
of Greek history--Egypt,
Phoenicia, Halias,
which is a town in the
northeastern Peloponnesus,
Aegina the great island that
sits in the Saronic Gulf
opposite Athens,
Aegina being a great
traditional enemy of Athens and
Megara,
of course, as you know.
So, here they are fighting
battles in all of these places
at the same time.
It's a kind of an ape man
pounding on his chest to show
how great he was.
A piece of arrogance,
you might say,
calling for vengeance by the
gods, but no vengeance came
right away, instead another
victory.
Aegina, the island of Aegina,
was taken by the Athenians.
Aegina had been a great naval
power.
So, here was a naval power
taken away from the enemy and
added to the Athenian side.
They now have without question,
although they've had it really
before, command of the seas.
Nobody can withstand them at
sea and they now have complete
security from their northwestern
frontier because of the Megarian
alliance and that's not all that
happened.
Finally,
moved, I would guess,
in part by seeing all of this
happening and worrying
desperately about the growing
power of Athens,
Sparta took action.
I think they were moved
specifically--the critical
element that was an opportunity
presented to them by a small
region in central Greece called
Doris.
It's the root of the word
Dorian.
This is theoretically the
ancestral home of all Dorians.
So, they obviously had friendly
relations with the Spartans.
The Dorians were having trouble
with some of their neighbors,
one of the standard quarrels
between neighbors in the Greek
city state world,
and they asked the Spartans to
send a force up to help them.
I'm not sure,
if the Spartans would have done
so in the normal course of
events, because it does mean
that they have to get up to
central Greece.
When you think about that,
given what the Athenians have
done in Megara,
they can't do it in the usual
way by walking.
The only way they can get up
there is by getting on boats and
sailing across the Corinthian
Gulf,
but if the Athenians or those
helots who are occupying
Naupactus are aware of that,
they could very well be taken
at sea and have their army
destroyed as that fleet is sunk.
They have to sneak across if
they're going to go that way.
I want you to understand how
unlikely is that undertaking in
a normal situation,
but what I think makes it not
so normal is something that
Diodorus of Sicily tells this,
that Thucydides doesn't
mention, which is at that moment
the Thebans, the leading city of
Boeotia,
which had ambitions of its own,
always wanting to gain complete
control of Boeotia and always
having some Boeotian cities hold
out against them,
they saw the opportunity to get
the Spartans to help them out.
So, they told the Spartans
that if they would come and
assist them in gaining control
of Boeotia,
the Boeotians would join them
in an attack on Athens,
and so I think it was that that
made it possible for the
Spartans to agree and to act.
They do so;
they take an army much more
than they need to deal with the
Dorian problem,
they slap that down right away,
and then what do you know,
they come marching down to the
Athenian frontier with Boeotia
to a town or a place near a town
called Tanagra.
The Spartans,
of course, were able to sneak
across the Gulf of Corinth.
You may ask,
why were the Athenians and the
helots so sleepy?
It never occurred to them,
is what I say,
that the Spartans would ever do
a thing like that and so there
they were.
A battle is then fought and
we're talking about large forces
now.
The Spartans send 11,000 men
and that's a very big--they
don't have 11,000 of their own.
Spartans and their
Peloponnesian allies go up
there, and now they are put
together with Boeotian forces.
Boeotians are very good
fighters.
The Athenians send their army
out to the frontier to meet
them, the greater part of the
Athenian army.
This is a very big battle by
Greek standards and the result
is almost a standoff.
The Spartans technically win.
That means that they were able
to command the field after the
fighting was over,
put up a trophy,
and collect their own dead.
The Athenians of course were
required to come and ask them
for permission to collect their
dead,
so there wasn't any question if
you follow the rules of hoplite
warfare at the time who won;
the Spartans won.
But if we think of it from
the standpoint of warfare and
you ask about what were the
strategic consequences of the
battle,
that's how today we would say
who won that battle.
It was a standoff,
and I guess you could say the
Athenians won because the
purpose of the Spartans was to
defeat the Athenians and to
compel them to abandon all the
things that they were doing and
had done,
and in this they failed,
because they had suffered heavy
casualties in the fighting and
were not in a position to renew
the battle and to force the
Athenians back or to crush the
Athenians in fighting.
The Spartans simply marched
back into the Peloponnesus;
the Athenians were in no
condition to stop them.
So that was that.
As one sees from what
happens after that,
it really looks more like a
strategic victory for the
Athenians,
because now A) they have not
been destroyed,
they have not been defeated in
any useful way,
they have not been stopped in
what they were doing and to
prove it the Athenians take an
army northward when the Spartans
have withdrawn into Boeotia,
defeat the Boeotian army at a
place called Oenophyta,
and the next thing you know,
establish democratic
governments in all the Boeotian
cities which are friendly to
Athens.
I put it that way,
but again a Cold War analogy
strikes me as helpful here.
In the same way as wherever the
Soviet army was victorious,
whatever land they occupied,
there was a Communist
government set up whose function
was to be a tool of the Soviet
Union.
I don't claim that that's
exactly what it was in the fifth
century;
this is a much more simple and
less sophisticated world,
but the general idea is the
same.
The guys who run those towns,
they are partisans of Athens.
Athens, in other words,
is the dominant force in
Boeotia.
Now, step back a moment,
stand up there on the Acropolis
in Athens and look around,
and you will see a situation
that is so splendid,
it's the kind of a thing almost
any nation would want as its
ideal situation.
If you look to the north you're
safe;
there can be no invasion
through Boeotia for the reasons
I've just said.
If you look to the northwest
Megara, an ally of yours,
your forces are in there in
part, but you have that area
blocked off.
There is no way,
and of course now that you know
that the Spartans can take boats
across the Corinthian Gulf
you'll see to it that that never
happens again.
The Spartans and their allies
are bottled up in the
Peloponnesus.
The sea is controlled
completely by you.
I've also neglected to
mention that the Athenians have
just now concluded the building
of long walls connecting Athens
with Piraeus.
So, even if somehow,
hard to imagine as it is,
the Spartans got into Attica
the Athenians need not fight
them and need not give way to
them,
because nobody knows how to
take walled cities very well
anymore and the Spartans never
learn how to do it.
So, if you look at it from that
point of view,
until somebody invents an
airplane,
Athens is absolutely
invulnerable and they still have
2,000 years before anybody
invents an airplane so this is
an amazing moment where you
could readily think we are
invulnerable,
we are safe,
and we can do what we like with
impunity.
I think this is a very
important moment in Athenian and
in Greek history.
I think then there were
Athenians who never got over
remembering that's what we
achieved,
that's what we can achieve,
and that's what we must aim for
in all future circumstances.
We get into the
Peloponnesian War and there will
come moments when it seems
possible that the Athenians can
make a negotiated peace with the
Spartans that's okay in the war,
and they turn it down,
I think Thucydides and others
suggest that they're just out of
their minds.
Maybe they are,
but they have something they
can focus on,
a memory of how it once was and
how it might be again.
Well, the gods are not going to
put up with this;
you and I know that.
The Athenians suffer a terrible
reverse that begins to undermine
their situation.
In Egypt there is a
terrible disaster;
they lose.
The Persians defeat them;
there's a great argument about
how many ships they lose but
whatever it is they lose a lot.
They lose a strategically
significant number.
The disaster is so great as to
cause a whole rash of rebellions
in the Delian League or the
Athenian Empire,
or whatever you want to call
it, and the Athenians will be
occupied with trying to put down
these rebellions for some time.
By the way, the probable date
of this defeat is probably
around 455, because it's in the
following year,
and this date is a good date,
454-453 that the Athenians
decide to move the treasury of
the league from Delos to Athens,
up on the Acropolis in the back
room of the Parthenon which they
will be building very shortly.
Another important point
about that is up to now all
money put into the league
treasury was being used for
supporting the navy and
ostensibly for league purposes,
usually for league purposes,
but as we know the Athenians
could also use it for their own
purposes like they did at
Thasos,
but still only for ships and
men.
Now the Athenians institute a
new policy, and I think whatever
you think about anything before
this,
when the Athenians do what I'm
about to describe,
they surely have made this an
empire,
no longer anything like a
voluntary confederacy,
because they take one sixtieth
of what is put into the treasury
every year as a donation to
Athena,
which is another way of saying
to Athens.
They are now collecting a
profit, a tax from the league
members which they,
as we shall see--there will be
an argument about how this money
is to be used.
They will argue it's our money;
we can use it any way we want
to.
So, two things are going on in
two different directions and all
the trouble that they have in
the league,
it leads them however to change
the character of the league in a
very significant way.
Well, things are so difficult,
the problem of fighting the
Spartans now is so serious that
the Athenians recall Cimon
because they would like to make
peace with the Spartans and they
know Cimon is just the man to do
it as no one else can.
So, he comes back--well,
I should back up a second.
There was some talk about Cimon
coming back earlier but he
certainly comes back in 451,
because his ten years of
ostracism are over,
and it's now that he negotiates
a five-years truce with the
Spartans,
with the understanding that the
purpose of the truce is to allow
negotiation to go forward to
bring about a long term peace
agreement between the two.
Cimon achieves that and to
show you how ostracism can work
he is immediately elected
general.
It's as though he had never
gone away, and being Cimon he
immediately turns to an activity
that's a continuation of what he
did before he left,
namely, let's go fight Persians.
So, he takes a fleet and sails
to Cyprus, part of which is in
Persian hands,
fights a battle against the
Persians, defeats the Persians,
but has the bad fortune to be
killed.
So, Cimon is now removed from
the scene in Athens.
I think this is a significant
thing, because it means that the
only individual politician,
who had the kind of support,
the kind of charisma,
the kind of backing that could
challenge the new important
leader in Athens,
Pericles, is gone.
This helps explain why Pericles
still at a relatively young age
is able to become a person of
unprecedented influence and
power in the Athenian state.
It's not that he takes to
himself new constitutional
powers or gets military guards
or anything.
Nothing changes except that he
can count on persuading the
assembly to do what he wants
almost all the time,
and there's nobody out there
for the moment,
who looks like he can challenge
him.
We shall see that shortly that
he will meet an important
challenge, but we'll come back
to that later on.
But let's go on with the story
of the war.
In 449, two years after the
truce was negotiated,
we find Sparta attacking the
city of Phocis,
the polis of Phocis,
again up in central Greece.
They must have--again,
we don't know how it was that
they found their way up there,
but they did find their way up
there, and they took back
control of the Delphic Oracle
from the neighboring Phocians,
who had--over the years they
had frequently tried to gain
control of the Delphic Oracle
from the priest and it was on
behalf of those priests that the
Spartans fought.
They defeated the Phocians and
went home.
Two years later in 447,
the Athenians send an army up
there.
The Athenians are allied to
Phocis and they once again take
back the Delphic Oracle and give
it over to the Phocians.
These are signals that the
truce is not really working.
That the two sides are not
finding a way to live together
peacefully for the future,
and sure enough,
in the year 446 a series of
events occurs that upsets the
peace and the balance that the
Greek world had found
temporarily.
First of all,
there is an oligarchic
rebellion throughout the cities
of Boeotia and,
of course, they drive out the
pro-Athenian democratic regimes
and suddenly Boeotia is a
hostile place,
no longer a friendly place,
one from which the Athenians
can expect trouble.
There's a big argument in
Athens as to what should we do.
Pericles says,
let's not do anything,
we really can't afford to
engage in ground campaigns
against serious opponents.
We tried it,
but we can't keep Boeotia,
we'll just have to let the
Boeotians go.
Against him was a general,
an Athenian general--sometimes
I'm astonished by the names that
crop up in Athenian history.
You wouldn't dare do it;
you wouldn't invest names like
this if you were writing a
novel, because people would
laugh.
This guy's name is Tolmades;
it comes from the Greek verb
tolmao which means to be
bold, to be daring;
that's what he is â€“
bold and daring.
He marches an army into Boeotia
to get the place back for the
Athenians.
In other words,
he defeated Pericles on this
issue, because he couldn't do
that without getting the
assembly's approval.
But the Athenians must have
been mad too and said,
let's go beat those Boeotians
up and force them back into our
control.
Tolmades runs into a terrific
defeat, suffers extremely heavy
casualties by anybody's
standards and Boeotia is lost
for good.
The battle, by the way,
in which Tolmades is killed in
the Battle of Coronea.
Athens is now driven from
central Greece and that glorious
picture I painted for you has
been marred by a hostile force
on the northern enemy.
But that isn't all that's
happened.
Seeing that the Athenians were
troubled, were weak,
were vulnerable,
and can be beaten,
suddenly all of the unhappy
folks that were around took
advantage of the opportunity.
On the island of Euboea to the
east of Attica,
there is a rebellion.
This is really deadly even from
Pericles point of view.
He cannot permit rebellions in
the empire on islands;
it threatens the control of the
sea.
It's not just that he can't
have Euboea be independent;
he cannot let rebels in your
empire succeed because it
encourages other rebellions,
and they've just been through
that.
They've had to fight their way
through a whole rash of
rebellions after the defeat in
Egypt.
So, Pericles personally
takes an army and sends it,
takes it, I should say,
to Euboea and while he is gone
with his army off in Euboea,
remember with Boeotia now
hostile, there is a rebellion in
Megara.
This alliance with Megara was
always a very iffy thing.
We should remember two things
about the past.
One is that Megara and Athens
have been bitter enemies for
centuries;
so, the alliance was an
unnatural one,
the product of momentary
agreement.
But there would certainly have
always been lots of Megarians,
who were against it,
and so seeing an opportunity
these guys would have moved.
And the other thing is that the
Athenians were,
of course, being distracted and
their forces were sent off
someplace else.
So, now Pericles realizes how
dangerous this is,
because if Megara succeeds in
the rebellion which it does,
now they have no protection
from a Spartan invasion which
they need to expect and that is
indeed what happens.
Pericles,
having put down the Euboean
rebellion adequately,
races back to Athens to meet
the Peloponnesian army when it
invades,
and then we have this
extraordinary event in the
plains to the north of Attica.
Spartans invade,
Pericles leads the Athenian
army out to meet them.
This is the scenario for an
Athenian defeat,
because the numbers of the
Peloponnesians are likely to be
greater and their reputation as
a superior fighting force has
some merit.
We've seen that it's not going
to be a walk over,
we've seen that the Athenians
are capable of putting up one
hell of a fight,
but they can expect not to win,
is the way I see it.
So, they are facing each other,
and the battle is about to
happen, when all of a sudden a
delegation comes out from the
Spartan army.
Pericles goes out to meet them,
they have a little
conversation,
they all go back to their
armies,
the Spartans led by their King
Pleistoanax who was the guy who
was confirmed with Pericles,
and marched their army back
home to Sparta.
They declare that they have
agreed upon a four-months truce
for the purpose of negotiating a
permanent peace.
What in the world is going on
here?
Well, the Spartans receive the
news in a complicated way.
The first reaction is fury
against Pleistoanax.
Why didn't you clobber those
Athenians when you had them
finally sticking their heads out
there for battle?
They finally take action
against him and against his
advisor, a certain Clearidas and
send them off to exile,
so angry are they at this lost
opportunity.
But after all,
if that's all there was to it,
there was nothing to stop them
from marching into Attica again,
and either fighting against the
Athenians, or at least doing
terrible harm to the farms and
the houses of the Athenians out
in the country,
which at the very least,
would make the Athenians
unhappy and might force them to
come out and fight.
Why didn't they do that?
But they didn't,
and I think that's
evidence--well,
it's evidence of two things.
There was a very special
opportunity that Pleistoanax had
lost, namely,
everything was falling apart on
all fronts in Athens at the
moment when the battle was
available.
On the other hand that's
now--they've been put down.
Euboea is quiet and the
Athenians have adjusted to
everything else.
Still what I said in the first
place is still true,
they could come in and force
that fight if they want to.
Why didn't they?
I think the answer is because
Pericles had convinced
Pleistoanax of something that
was essentially true and that
the Spartans when they had time
to cool down could see that
there was some reason for doing
this,
and it was this.
What happens if we fight?
Look we only fought each other
a little while ago and what
happened then?
Well, you beat us,
but you didn't clobber us.
You took a lot of casualties,
and you weren't able to exploit
it.
That is even truer today than
it was then, because if you
defeat us, what will we do?
We'll run back to our walls,
we'll go through our gates,
and you won't be able to lay a
pinky on us,
and we don't have to fight you
if we don't want to,
because we own the fleet that
dominates the sea.
We have the money from our
allies that pays for the fleet.
As long as we have control of
the sea you can ravage our
country all you want to.
We can get all the grain we
need through imports.
So, what are you going to do
then?
You'll have taken casualties
for nothing and you still won't
be able to compel us to do what
you want.
I think that's the argument
that Pericles must have given to
Pleistoanax.
Pleistoanax's whole career
suggests he was not a man eager
for war and he was glad to have
that opportunity to avoid it.
But remember,
the Spartans could have
overdone that,
and they didn't.
I think it shows you that this
was an argument that had some
reality and had some appeal.
So, that four-month truce was
successful.
It led to the negotiation a
peace between Athens on behalf
of its allies and Sparta on
behalf of its allies,
the thirty-years peace which is
concluded over the winter of 446
- 445.
The arrangements of that
peace are that Athens would give
up all of its holdings on the
continent that is to say outside
the Aegean Sea,
except Naupactus,
which they would continue to
leave in the hands of the
helots.
In tacit recognition,
nobody formally did it,
but the point is they let the
Athenian allies be included in
the Athenian decision that meant
the Spartans granted,
recognized, the legitimacy of
the Athenian Empire.
Then they had a few rules meant
to prevent the outbreak of war
in the future,
and like most of these peace
treaties, who decide to try to
prevent war in the future,
they basically looked back to
how this war started and try to
prevent this war happening
again.
For instance,
this war came about because the
ally of one side changed sides
to the other;
that was forbidden under the
new treaty.
Somebody must have thought,
yeah right, but what if there's
a neutral state that wants to go
from one side to the other,
and what if that state had a
significant strategic
importance, wouldn't that test
the peace at all or would it?
They concluded it wouldn't,
because they said neutrals were
free to join either side.
So, in other words,
if a neutral joined one side,
nobody could say okay that's a
cause for war because it wasn't.
Finally, the most remarkable,
and I believe original,
absolutely original idea of its
kind ever.
I don't believe there's ever a
time in history that we have a
record of such a thing being
present.
I'm talking about a clause in
the treaty, which provided that
if in the future there were any
disagreements between the two
signatories,
any complaints that they had
against one another,
these must be submitted to an
arbitrator for a decision.
Remember,
I'm not talking about a
mediator who says,
"let's talk it over boys."
I'm talking about an arbitrator
who has the right and
responsibility to say,
"you're right," "you're wrong,"
or some version of such a thing.
If that clause had been adhered
to, it's only a matter of logic
that says there could never be a
war between these two sides.
It's an amazing idea,
and I'm going to claim with no
proof--I'll be doing this again
and again for a while,
I think this is Pericles' idea.
Because I mean everything that
I'm going to point to that's so
unusual and unheard of before
Pericles is involved with it,
and I think he just had that
kind of mind,
very inventive,
ready to find new ways to meet
old problems.
I think this was his notion and
I'm convinced it was his
determination that this would be
the case that in the future
there would not be a settlement
of differences by the threat of
war,
but by arbitration that helps
explain the very determined
position he will take in 431.
This is very important.
I don't know how much the
Spartans felt that way or knew
about what was going to happen,
obviously they didn't,
but they bought it.
That's the treaty;
the two sides swear to it and
for thirty years they must
adhere to these provisions.
That is the thirty-years peace
and I think we need to evaluate
it to get at this argument I'm
engaged with Thucydides that
you're listening in on.
That is, there are peaces and
there are peaces.
They're not all the same.
I, for my own purposes,
have come up with I think three
categories of peace and want to
suggest which one this belongs
in.
There is such a thing as
a--people have spoken of the
First World War the--I'm sorry
the Peace of Versailles was
often referred to by its critics
as a Punic peace.
They're talking about the
peace--they think they're
talking about the peace that
concluded the second Punic War
with Hannibal,
but no;
they're talking about the third
Punic War in which the peace was
the City of Carthage was
destroyed.
The Carthaginians were driven
away, those who were not killed.
The fields were plowed up and
salt put in the furrows,
so they thought nobody could
grow anything there again.
That's a Punic peace and
there's something to be said for
a Punic peace.
You'll never have a war again
with that country,
because it doesn't exist
anymore.
That's one extreme.
At the other extreme is
where, I suppose,
the winning side can impose a
harsh peace,
but chooses to impose a gentle
peace in the hope that in the
future they will have friendly
relations with the other side,
and so they trust the other
side, even though it's not
destroyed, to be good.
There are such examples of such
things.
They're usually a case where
the defeated side has been so
weakened that it's highly
unlikely in the future that they
will be a problem.
Then there's a kind of
a--let me back up a step.
Then there's the kind of a
peace that people say was
represented by the peace of
Westphalia in 1648 that ended
the Thirty Years War in Europe
in which arrangements are
made--nobody has actually been
defeated.
There is no clear-cut winner;
there are no just plain losers.
Everybody has fought so long
and the cost has been so great
that they decided we can't hold
out for victory.
We got to cut the best deal we
can.
Such a peace depends--it may
work, it may not,
it depends upon circumstances
in the future that are very hard
to predict.
Then we come to what I
think is probably the worst kind
of peace.
One example of it is the peace
that the Prussians imposed upon
the French in 1870,
after the Franco-Prussian War
in which the big issue was they
took Alsace-Lorraine from the
French and annexed it to
Germany,
but at the same time they did
not so harm France that France
could never again be a menace.
But they could be sure that for
the foreseeable future,
and who knows maybe forever,
the French would be angry and
dissatisfied and determined to
recover Alsace-Lorraine,
even if it meant war.
That was true,
to a degree,
although we need to be aware
that the best evidence we have
is that by 1914 the French
actually had pretty well given
up on Alsace-Lorraine,
although people kept talking as
though that's why the French
went to war, but wasn't true.
But also there,
of course, there were Frenchmen
who did believe that way,
but on balance it probably
wasn't so.
I suppose the best example
of that unsatisfactory peace
though is the peace that ended
the First World War,
the Peace of Versailles,
where the Germans were treated
very harshly,
in their own opinion,
although much harsher solutions
were available that were
rejected, but also they lost a
lot of territory and had a lot
of restrictions put upon them,
but also there was no permanent
harm that guaranteed that
Germany would not be able,
when it recovered from the war,
to reverse that decision.
That is the same kind of thing,
terrible situation in which the
defeated power is totally
dissatisfied with the peace and
is in a condition down the road
to be strong enough to break it.
Now, where does the
thirty-years peace fit in here?
The closest analogy,
in my opinion,
is Westphalia.
I think that the two sides
had both found this a very
unpleasant, uncomfortable war,
producing dangers and risks
that neither had ever
anticipated, and that the forces
who were in control at the time
that the peace was made felt it
just wasn't worth having a fight
to the finish for the gains that
could be made.
So, this is the key thing.
If that is true,
then peace was possible.
Then the Peloponnesian War that
follows is not inevitable.
Scholars argue still did
Thucydides say it was
inevitable?
I think he did;
most scholars do.
Some people think not,
but whatever he may have said
that is certainly a view many a
scholar has taken.
So I'm saying no,
and the reason I'm saying that
is--first of all because of the
facts I've just laid out before
you,
but I think also this is
important, so much depends not
only on objective conditions but
on intention.
This is one place where
historians differ typically from
political scientists.
Political scientists like to
have everything--what's the word
I want?
Not having to do with human
intention in any case.
They had to be automatic;
they like to be systemic.
That's what they like.
Nations are billiard balls.
You can't look inside them;
they're not made up of people.
They're not even made up of
factions or parties.
The state does what it has to
do because of the place on the
pool table where it is located.
Historians like to ask what
were these guys interested in,
what did they want,
what were they afraid of,
who were they made at?
That's the way proper
historians--it's true that
proper historians are harder and
harder to find.
Too many sort of political
scientists hidden among the
historians.
But a key question to whether
this peace rather would last has
to do with, in my opinion,
with these human questions.
How do the players really feel
about it?
Do they see it as this is the
way that it's going to be,
we want it to be peaceful or
are they just accepting it
because they can't avoid it?
Well, I think the evidence
suggests that the people who
made the treaty certainly were
persuaded that peace was better
than war,
and they would like to bind
their hands to some degree to
make it harder for a war to come
out.
Pericles, I think,
will prove that by the time we
get a chance to examine his
behavior in 431,
but I think it was the peace
party, and there are parties in
Sparta as I've told you before,
that group of people who
typically was conservative and
reluctant to risk what they had
already for what they might gain
in future warfare,
and I believe that they were
the normal party in Sparta,
and this is all debatable,
but I think that that's the
normal situation in Sparta.
To break the peace you need
for that situation to be undone
by something and events,
opportunities,
fears, chances to succeed have
to fall into place in a certain
way to break that.
So, what I'm telling you is,
from my point of view,
it's not at all clear that
there needs to be another war.
Well, anybody who says that has
the obligation of examining why
did the war break out?
Why did the peace fail?
And that's what I will turn to
next.
I will examine the years
between 445 and 431 in which the
peace is tested to see whether
it really had any viability
before it failed.
We'll have a look at that next
time.
 
