
Spanish: 
[APLAUSOS]
- Dos de tres
misterios fundamentales
sobre nuestro lugar en el universo
ya han sido resueltos
El primero es literalmente sobre
nuestro lugar en el universo.
Hace muchos años, Copernicus le dijo
nosotros que no estábamos en su
centro, que solo éramos un
pequeño punto suspendido en el abismo.
Esta es una imagen de la tierra
tomado de la sonda Voyager 1
como estaba saliendo de la
sistema solar desde aproximadamente seis
mil millones de kilómetros de distancia.
Toda la historia de la humanidad, todos
la historia de la vida en la Tierra,
ha tenido lugar en
ese punto azul pálido.
El segundo misterio
Darwin luego reveló
que los humanos somos justos
una rama, o una ramita,
de una bellamente rica y
delicado árbol evolutivo.
Y esa gran parte de la
maquinaria de la vida
es compartido incluso con las más humildes
de nuestras criaturas compañeras

English: 
[APPLAUSE]
- Two out of the three
fundamental mysteries
about our place in the universe
have already been resolved.
The first is literally about
our place in the universe.
Many years ago Copernicus told
us that we were not at its
centre, that we were just a
tiny dot suspended in the abyss.
This is an image of the earth
taken from the probe Voyager 1
as it was leaving the
solar system from about six
billion kilometres away.
All of human history, all of
the history of life on Earth,
has taken place on
that pale blue dot.
The second mystery,
Darwin then revealed
that we humans are just
one branch, or one twig,
of a beautifully rich and
delicate evolutionary tree.
And that much of the
machinery of life
is shared even with the lowliest
of our fellow creatures.

Portuguese: 
[Aplausos]
- Dois dos três
mistérios fundamentais
sobre o nosso lugar no universo
já foram resolvidos.
O primeiro é literalmente sobre
nosso lugar no universo.
Muitos anos atrás, Copérnico disse
nós que não estávamos no seu
centro, que nós éramos apenas um
ponto minúsculo suspenso no abismo.
Esta é uma imagem da terra
retirado da sonda Voyager 1
como estava saindo do
sistema solar de cerca de seis
bilhões de quilômetros de distância.
Toda a história humana, todos
a história da vida na Terra,
teve lugar em
aquele ponto azul pálido.
O segundo mistério,
Darwin então revelou
que nós humanos somos apenas
um galho ou um galho
de um lindamente rico e
árvore evolutiva delicada.
E isso muito do
maquinaria da vida
é compartilhado mesmo com o mais baixo
de nossos semelhantes.

Spanish: 
El tercer misterio es
el de la conciencia,
nuestro universo interno
Ahora a principios de este año, por
la tercera vez en mi vida,
Dejé de existir.
Como el anestésico propofol
fluyó desde la cánula
en mi muñeca en mi corriente sanguínea
y luego en mi cerebro,
hubo un derrumbe.
Una oscuridad.
Una ausencia
Y luego, estaba de vuelta.
Somnoliento y desorientado,
pero definitivamente allí.
Y cuando despiertes
de un sueño profundo,
usted puede estar confundido
es el momento, especialmente
en volar a algún lugar, pero lo harás
sabe que ha pasado un tiempo
Parece ser
algo de continuidad básica
entre tu conciencia entonces,
y tu conciencia ahora.
Pero viniendo de
un anestésico general,
podrían haber sido cinco minutos.
Podrían haber sido cinco horas.
Pudo haber sido cinco
días o cinco años.
Simplemente no estaba allí.
Una premonición de la
olvido de la muerte.
Y la anestesia general no
solo trabaja en tu cerebro.
No solo
trabaja en tu mente
Funciona en tu conciencia.
Alterando el delicado
circuitos electroquímicos

English: 
The third mystery is
that of consciousness,
our inner universe.
Now earlier this year, for
the third time in my life,
I ceased to exist.
As the propofol anaesthetic
flowed from the cannula
in my wrist into my bloodstream
and then into my brain,
there was a falling apart.
A blackness.
An absence.
And then, I was back.
Drowsy and disoriented,
but definitely there.
And when you wake
from a deep sleep,
you might be confused what
time it is, especially
in flying somewhere, but you'll
know that some time has passed.
There seems to be
some basic continuity
between your consciousness then,
and your consciousness now.
But coming around from
a general anaesthetic,
it could have been five minutes.
It could have been five hours.
It could have been five
days, or five years.
I was simply not there.
A premonition of the
oblivion of death.
And general anaesthesia doesn't
just work on your brain.
It doesn't just
work on your mind.
It works on your consciousness.
By altering the delicate
electrochemical circuitry

Portuguese: 
O terceiro mistério é
o da consciência,
nosso universo interior.
Agora no início deste ano, para
a terceira vez na minha vida
Eu parei de existir.
Como o anestésico propofol
fluiu da cânula
no meu pulso na minha corrente sanguínea
e depois no meu cérebro
houve um desmoronamento.
Uma escuridão.
Uma ausência.
E então eu voltei.
Sonolento e desorientado,
mas definitivamente lá.
E quando você acordar
de um sono profundo
você pode estar confuso
o tempo é, especialmente
em voar em algum lugar, mas você vai
saiba que algum tempo passou.
Parece haver
alguma continuidade básica
entre sua consciência então,
e sua consciência agora.
Mas vindo de
uma anestesia geral,
poderia ter sido cinco minutos.
Pode ter sido cinco horas.
Poderia ter sido cinco
dias ou cinco anos.
Eu simplesmente não estava lá.
Uma premonição do
esquecimento da morte.
E a anestesia geral não
apenas trabalhe em seu cérebro.
Não apenas
trabalhe em sua mente.
Isso funciona na sua consciência.
Ao alterar o delicado
circuitos eletroquímicos

Portuguese: 
dentro de sua cabeça, o
estado fundamental básico
do que é ser é
temporariamente abolida.
E neste processo está um
dos maiores remanescentes
mistérios na ciência
e filosofia.
Como a consciência acontece?
Por que a vida é na primeira pessoa?
Está indo embora
e voltando.
A encarnação moderna
deste problema
geralmente é traçado para Descartes,
quem no século 17
distinguir entre matéria
coisas, res extensa, o material
que essas mesas são feitas
de que as roupas são feitas.
Mas também os cérebros e corpos
são feitos de material material.
E res cogitans, o material
de pensamento, de sentimentos.
O material da consciência.
E ao fazer isso
distinção, ele deu origem
para o agora infame
problema mente / corpo,
e a vida nunca
foi simples desde então.
Mas Descartes na verdade
gerou ainda mais mal
com sua doutrina de
a máquina da fera

Spanish: 
dentro de tu cabeza, el
estado base básico
de lo que es ser es
temporalmente abolido
Y en este proceso yace uno
del mayor remanente
misterios en la ciencia
y filosofía
¿Cómo sucede la conciencia?
¿Por qué es la vida en primera persona?
Se va,
y volviendo
La encarnación moderna
de este problema
generalmente se remonta a Descartes,
quien en el siglo XVII
distinguido entre la materia
cosas, res extensa, las cosas
que estos escritorios están hechos
de, que la ropa está hecha de.
Pero también los cerebros y cuerpos
y hecho de cosas materiales.
Y res cogitans, las cosas
de pensamiento, de sentimientos.
Las cosas de la conciencia.
Y al hacer esto
distinción, dio lugar
al ahora infame
problema mente / cuerpo,
y la vida nunca ha
sido simple desde entonces.
Pero Descartes en realidad
generó aún más travesuras
con su doctrina de
la máquina de la bestia,

English: 
inside your head, the
basic ground state
of what it is to be is
temporarily abolished.
And in this process lies one
of the greatest remaining
mysteries in science
and philosophy.
How does consciousness happen?
Why is life in the first person?
It is going away,
and coming back.
The modern incarnation
of this problem
is usually traced to Descartes,
who in the 17th century
distinguished between matter
stuff, res extensa, the stuff
that these desks are made
of, that clothes are made of.
But also the brains and bodies
and made of, material stuff.
And res cogitans, the stuff
of thought, of feelings.
The stuff of consciousness.
And in making this
distinction, he gave rise
to the now infamous
mind/body problem,
and life has never
been simple ever since.
But Descartes actually
generated even more mischief
with his doctrine of
the beast machine,

Portuguese: 
que eu vou mencionar agora,
porque antecipa onde
Eu vou acabar como o sino
toca quando termino em uma hora.
Antes de Descartes, as pessoas
comumente acreditado em algo
chamado a grande cadeia de
sendo, com pedras e plantas
em uma extremidade, e outra
animais não humanos, um pouco mais alto
do que os humanos, e depois os anjos
e deuses no topo.
E esta grande escala
de ser também foi
uma escala de virtude moral, de modo que
os humanos tinham mais virtudes morais
que animais e plantas,
e depois pedras e assim por diante.
Agora Descartes, ao fazer
esta divisão entre a mente
e importa, argumentou que apenas
os humanos tinham mentes e, portanto,
status moral, enquanto outros
os animais não tinham mentes.
Eles eram meramente fisiológicos
máquinas, ou máquinas de animais,
moralmente equivalente a
plantas e rochas.
E nesta visão, o
mecanismos fisiológicos
que dão origem ao
propriedade de estar vivo
não eram relevantes
para a presença
de mente ou consciência.
Agora vou propor, no
fim desta conversa, o oposto.

English: 
which I'm going to mention now,
because it anticipates where
I'm going to end up as the bell
rings when I finish in an hour.
Before Descartes, people
commonly believed in something
called the great chain of
being, with rocks and plants
at one end, and other
non-human animals, a bit higher
up than humans, and then angels
and gods at the very top.
And this great scale
of being was also
a scale of moral virtue, so that
humans had more moral virtues
than animals and plants,
and then rocks and so on.
Now Descartes, in making
this division between mind
and matter, argued that only
humans had minds, and therefore
moral status, while other
animals didn't have minds.
They were merely physiological
machines, or beast machines,
morally equivalent to
plants, and to rocks.
And in this view, the
physiological mechanisms
that give rise to the
property of being alive
were not relevant
to the presence
of mind or consciousness.
Now I'm going to propose, at the
end of this talk, the opposite.

Spanish: 
que voy a mencionar ahora,
porque anticipa dónde
Voy a terminar como la campana
suena cuando termino en una hora.
Antes de Descartes, gente
comúnmente se cree en algo
llamado la gran cadena de
ser, con rocas y plantas
en un extremo, y otro
animales no humanos, un poco más alto
arriba que los humanos, y luego los ángeles
y dioses en la parte superior.
Y esta gran escala
de ser también
una escala de virtud moral, por lo que
los humanos tenían más virtudes morales
que animales y plantas,
y luego rocas, etc.
Ahora Descartes, al hacer
esta división entre la mente
y la materia, argumentó que solo
los humanos tenían mentes, y por lo tanto
estado moral, mientras que otros
los animales no tenían mentes
Eran meramente fisiológicos
máquinas, o máquinas de bestias,
moralmente equivalente a
plantas, y a las rocas.
Y en esta vista, el
mecanismos fisiológicos
que dan lugar a la
propiedad de estar vivo
no fueron relevantes
a la presencia
de la mente o la conciencia.
Ahora voy a proponer, en el
final de esta charla, todo lo contrario.

Spanish: 
Que nuestro sentido consciente de
el yo surge por y no
a pesar del hecho de que
nosotros también somos máquinas bestiales.
Entonces, para llegar allí, regresemos
al misterio aparente
de la conciencia
Ahora tan recientemente como 1989, que
Hace bastante tiempo, pero no
eso hace mucho tiempo,
Stuart Sutherland,
quien fue profesor fundador
de psicología experimental
en mi universidad de
Sussex, tenía esto que decir.
"La conciencia es fascinante
pero elusivo fenómeno.
Es imposible especificar
qué es, qué hace,
o por qué evolucionó.
Nada digno de leer
ha sido escrito en él ".
[RISA]
Es bastante pesimista
punto de vista.
Y eso puede tener
sido cierto entonces
No creo que fuera cierto
entonces, pero en cualquier caso
las cosas han cambiado mucho desde entonces.
Y más o menos, acerca de
el momento en que Sutherland
hecho estas observaciones, podemos
ver el nacimiento, o el renacimiento,
del estudio de la conciencia
dentro de las neurociencias.
Y un buen punto de referencia
es este papel

Portuguese: 
Que o nosso senso consciente de
auto surge por causa de, e não
Apesar do facto de
nós também somos máquinas de animais.
Então, para chegar lá, vamos voltar
para o aparente mistério
da consciência.
Agora, tão recentemente quanto 1989, que
há um tempo atrás, mas não
há muito tempo atrás
Stuart Sutherland,
quem foi professor fundador
de psicologia experimental
na minha universidade de
Sussex, tinha isto a dizer.
"Consciência é uma fascinante
mas fenômeno indescritível.
É impossível especificar
o que é, o que faz
ou porque evoluiu.
Nada vale a pena ler
foi escrito sobre isso. "
[RISO]
É bem pessimista
ponto de vista.
E isso pode ter
foi verdade então.
Eu não acho que isso era verdade
então, mas em qualquer caso
as coisas mudaram muito desde então.
E mais ou menos, sobre
o tempo que Sutherland
fez estas observações, nós podemos
veja o nascimento ou o renascimento
do estudo da consciência
dentro das neurociências.
E um bom marco
é este papel

English: 
That our conscious sense of
self arises because of, and not
in spite of, the fact that
we, too, are beast machines.
So to get there, let's return
to the apparent mystery
of consciousness.
Now as recently as 1989, which
is quite a while ago, but not
that long ago,
Stuart Sutherland,
who was founding professor
of experimental psychology
at my university of
Sussex, had this to say.
"Consciousness is a fascinating
but elusive phenomenon.
It is impossible to specify
what it is, what it does,
or why it evolved.
Nothing worth reading
has been written on it."
[LAUGHTER]
It's quite a pessimistic
point of view.
And that may have
been true then.
I don't think it was true
then, but in any case
things have changed a lot since.
And more or less, about
the time that Sutherland
made these remarks, we can
see the birth, or the rebirth,
of the study of consciousness
within the neurosciences.
And a good landmark
is this paper

English: 
by Francis Crick and Christof
Koch, published in 1990.
And they start their paper by
saying that it is remarkable
that most of the work
in cognitive sciences,
and the neurosciences, makes
no reference to consciousness
or awareness at all.
And then they go on to
propose their own theory
of what the neural correlates
of consciousness are.
What it is in the brain that
is responsible for being
conscious.
And since then, over
the last 25 years,
there's been first a trickle,
and now a deluge of research
on the brain basis of
conscious experience.
Some of this work
is being carried out
in my laboratory, the Sackler
Centre, the consciousness
science, which was founded
six years ago with Hugo
Critchley, my co-director.
And there are now even
specialised academic journals,
The Neuroscience
of Consciousness,
which I started last year
with Oxford University Press.
And this is a real
change of the tide.
When I started out
more than 20 years ago,
it was thought to be a
very-- it was thought
to be career suicide to
want to study consciousness,
scientifically.
And it may still
be, we don't know.

Portuguese: 
de Francis Crick e Christof
Koch, publicado em 1990.
E eles começam seu papel por
dizendo que é notável
que a maior parte do trabalho
nas ciências cognitivas,
e as neurociências, faz
nenhuma referência à consciência
ou consciência em tudo.
E então eles vão para
propor sua própria teoria
do que o neural correlaciona
da consciência são.
O que é no cérebro que
é responsável por ser
consciente.
E desde então, mais
nos últimos 25 anos,
houve primeiro um gotejamento,
e agora um dilúvio de pesquisa
na base do cérebro de
experiência consciente.
Alguns desses trabalhos
está sendo realizado
no meu laboratório, o Sackler
Centro, a consciência
ciência, que foi fundada
seis anos atrás com Hugo
Critchley, meu co-diretor.
E agora existem até
revistas acadêmicas especializadas,
A neurociência
da Consciência,
que eu comecei no ano passado
com a Oxford University Press.
E isso é um verdadeiro
mudança da maré.
Quando eu comecei
mais de 20 anos atrás,
foi pensado para ser um
muito-- foi pensado
ser suicídio de carreira para
quer estudar a consciência,
cientificamente.
E ainda pode
Não sabemos.

Spanish: 
por Francis Crick y Christof
Koch, publicado en 1990.
Y comienzan su trabajo por
diciendo que es notable
que la mayor parte del trabajo
en ciencias cognitivas,
y las neurociencias, hace
ninguna referencia a la conciencia
o conciencia en absoluto.
Y luego continúan
proponer su propia teoría
de lo que correlacionan los nervios
de la conciencia son.
Lo que está en el cerebro que
es responsable de ser
consciente.
Y desde entonces, más de
los últimos 25 años,
ha habido primero un chorrito,
y ahora un diluvio de investigación
en la base del cerebro de
experiencia consciente
Parte de este trabajo
se está llevando a cabo
en mi laboratorio, el Sackler
Centro, la conciencia
ciencia, que fue fundada
hace seis años con Hugo
Critchley, mi codirector.
Y ahora hay incluso
revistas académicas especializadas,
La Neurociencia
de la Conciencia,
que comencé el año pasado
con Oxford University Press.
Y esto es una realidad
cambio de marea
Cuando comencé
hace más de 20 años,
se pensó que era un
muy-- se pensó
ser suicida de carrera a
quiero estudiar consciencia,
científicamente.
Y aún puede
ser, no sabemos

English: 
Let's see.
So while the brain
basis of consciousness
is still a mystery,
it is, in some sense,
an accessible mystery.
And the author, Mark Haddon,
put this very nicely, I think.
He said the raw material
of consciousness
is not on the other
side of the universe.
It didn't happen 14
billion years ago.
And it's not squirrelled
away deep inside an atom.
The raw material
of consciousness
is right here, inside
your head, and you can
hold the brain in your hands.
But the brain won't deliver
its secrets very easily.
What's extraordinary
about the brain
is not so much the
number of neurons,
though there are
about 90 billion.
It's not even the
number of connections,
though there are so many that
if you counted one every second,
it would take you about
three million years
to finish counting.
What's truly extraordinary
are the patterns
of connectivity, which
to a large extent,
are still not known, but within
which are inscribed everything
that makes you, you.
The challenge is then this,
at least the the way I see it.
How can the structure
and dynamics

Spanish: 
Veamos.
Entonces, mientras el cerebro
base de la conciencia
sigue siendo un misterio,
es, en cierto sentido,
un misterio accesible.
Y el autor, Mark Haddon,
ponlo muy bien, creo.
Él dijo que la materia prima
de conciencia
no está en el otro
lado del universo.
No sucedió 14
mil millones de años atrás.
Y no está ardilla
lejos en el interior de un átomo.
El material crudo
de conciencia
está aquí mismo, dentro
tu cabeza, y tu puedes
sostén el cerebro en tus manos.
Pero el cerebro no entregará
sus secretos muy fácilmente.
Lo extraordinario
sobre el cerebro
no es tanto el
número de neuronas,
aunque hay
alrededor de 90 mil millones.
Ni siquiera es el
número de conexiones,
aunque hay tantos que
si contó uno por segundo,
te tomaría sobre
tres millones de años
para terminar de contar
Lo que es realmente extraordinario
son los patrones
de conectividad, que
en gran medida,
todavía no se conocen, pero dentro de
que están inscritos todo
eso te hace a ti.
El desafío es entonces esto,
al menos de la manera en que lo veo
¿Cómo puede la estructura
y dinámica

Portuguese: 
Vamos ver.
Então, enquanto o cérebro
base da consciência
ainda é um mistério
é, em certo sentido,
um mistério acessível.
E o autor, Mark Haddon,
coloque isso muito bem, eu acho.
Ele disse que a matéria prima
de consciência
não é do outro
lado do universo.
Isso não aconteceu 14
bilhões de anos atrás.
E não é esquecido
longe dentro de um átomo.
A matéria-prima
de consciência
está bem aqui, dentro
sua cabeça, e você pode
segure o cérebro em suas mãos.
Mas o cérebro não vai entregar
seus segredos muito facilmente.
O que é extraordinário
sobre o cérebro
não é tanto o
número de neurônios,
embora existam
cerca de 90 bilhões.
Não é nem o
número de conexões,
embora existam tantos que
se você contasse um a cada segundo,
levaria você sobre
três milhões de anos
para terminar a contagem.
O que é verdadeiramente extraordinário
são os padrões
de conectividade, que
em grande medida,
ainda não são conhecidos, mas dentro
que estão inscritos tudo
isso faz você, você.
O desafio é então isso,
pelo menos do jeito que eu vejo.
Como pode a estrutura
e dinâmica

Spanish: 
del cerebro, en relación con
el cuerpo y el medio ambiente,
cuenta para lo subjetivo
propiedades fenomenológicas
de la conciencia?
Y considerando
cosas de esta manera, nosotros
enfrentar lo que
el filósofo David
Chalmers a menudo ha llamado al
problema difícil de la conciencia
Y la idea es esto.
Hay un problema fácil.
El problema fácil es
entender cómo el combinado
operaciones del cerebro y el
el cuerpo da lugar a la percepción,
a la cognición, al pensamiento,
al aprendizaje, al comportamiento.
Cómo funciona el cerebro
en otras palabras.
El problema duro
es entender
por qué y cómo algo de esto
debería tener algo
para hacer con la conciencia en absoluto.
¿Por qué no somos solo robots?
o zombis filosóficos,
sin ninguna en un universo?
Ahora hay una tentación
intuición aquí,
que es eso, incluso si resolvemos
el problema difícil, incluso si
resolver el problema fácil, el
problema difícil aún permanecería
tan misterioso como parece ahora.
Pero esto solo parece
mal dirigido a mí.
Puede que no sea necesario
explicar por qué la conciencia

Portuguese: 
do cérebro, em conexão com
o corpo e o meio ambiente,
conta para o subjetivo
propriedades fenomenológicas
de consciência?
E considerando
as coisas assim, nós
se deparar com o que
o filósofo David
Chalmers tem chamado frequentemente o
difícil problema da consciência.
E a ideia é essa.
Existe um problema fácil.
O problema fácil é
entender como o combinado
operações do cérebro e do
corpo dá origem à percepção,
para cognição, para pensar,
para aprender, para o comportamento.
Como o cérebro funciona
em outras palavras.
O problema difícil
é entender
por que e como tudo isso
deveria ter alguma coisa
a ver com consciência em tudo.
Por que não somos apenas robôs?
ou zumbis filosóficos,
sem nenhum em um universo?
Agora há uma tentadora
intuição aqui,
que é isso, mesmo se nós resolvermos
o problema difícil, mesmo se nós
resolver o problema fácil, o
problema difícil ainda permaneceria
tão misterioso quanto parece agora.
Mas isso parece apenas
errado para mim.
Pode não ser necessário
explicar por que a consciência

English: 
of the brain, in connection with
the body and the environment,
account for the subjective
phenomenological properties
of consciousness?
And considering
things this way, we
come up against what
the philosopher David
Chalmers has often called the
hard problem of consciousness.
And the idea is this.
There is an easy problem.
The easy problem is to
understand how the combined
operations of the brain and the
body give rise to perception,
to cognition, to thinking,
to learning, to behaviour.
How the brain works,
in other words.
The hard problem
is to understand
why and how any of this
should have anything
to do with consciousness at all.
Why aren't we just robots,
or philosophical zombies,
without any in a universe?
Now there's a tempting
intuition here,
which is that, even if we solve
the hard problem, even if we
solve the easy problem, the
hard problem would still remain
as mysterious as it seems now.
But this just seems
wrong-headed to me.
It may not be necessary to
explain why consciousness

Portuguese: 
existe, a fim de
progredir na compreensão
sua base material.
E isso para mim, é o verdadeiro
problema da consciência;
como dar conta de seus
várias propriedades em termos
mecanismos biológicos sem
fingindo que isso não acontece
existe, como você faz se
você resolve o problema fácil,
e sem tentar
conta por que é
partes do universo em
o primeiro lugar, que
é o problema difícil.
E na história
da ciência, nós temos
esteve em algum lugar semelhante antes.
É difícil dizer se é
exatamente a mesma situação.
Mas no nosso
compreensão da vida,
eminentes bioquímicos da época
achei completamente misterioso
como mecanismos biológicos
poderia dar origem
para a propriedade de estar vivo.
E havia
proposta de coisas,
como elan vital
e essência vital,
e todos os tipos de outras coisas.
E embora nós não
ainda entenda tudo
sobre a vida, esta inicial
senso de mistério sobre a vida
tem, para um grande
extensão, dissolvido
como os biólogos acabaram de
prosseguiu com o negócio
de entender as propriedades
de sistemas vivos em termos
de mecanismos.
Uma parte importante
desta história foi

English: 
exists at all, in order to
make progress in understanding
its material basis.
And this for me, is the real
problem of consciousness;
how to account for its
various properties in terms
of biological mechanisms without
pretending that it doesn't
exist at all, as you do if
you solve the easy problem,
and without trying to
account for why it's
parts of the universe in
the first place, which
is the hard problem.
And in the history
of science, we've
been somewhere similar before.
It's hard to say if it's
exactly the same situation.
But in our
understanding of life,
eminent biochemists of the time
found it entirely mysterious
how biological mechanisms
could give rise
to the property of being alive.
And there were
proposed of things,
like elan vital
and essence vital,
and all sorts of other stuff.
And although we don't
yet understand everything
about life, this initial
sense of mystery about life
has, to a large
extent, dissolved
as biologists have just
got on with the business
of understanding the properties
of living systems in terms
of mechanisms.
An important part
of this story was

Spanish: 
existe en absoluto, para
progresar en la comprensión
su base material.
Y esto para mí, es lo real
problema de conciencia;
cómo dar cuenta de su
varias propiedades en términos
de mecanismos biológicos sin
pretendiendo que no
existe en absoluto, como lo haces si
usted resuelve el problema fácil,
y sin intentar
cuenta por qué es
partes del universo en
el primer lugar, que
es el problema dificil
Y en la historia
de la ciencia, hemos
estado en algún lugar similar antes.
Es difícil decir si es
exactamente la misma situación
Pero en nuestro
comprensión de la vida,
eminentes bioquímicos de la época
lo encontró completamente misterioso
cómo los mecanismos biológicos
podría dar lugar
a la propiedad de estar vivo.
Y hubo
propuesto de cosas,
como elan vital
y esencia vital,
y todo tipo de otras cosas.
Y aunque no lo hacemos
sin embargo, entiendo todo
sobre la vida, esta inicial
Sentido de misterio sobre la vida
tiene, a un gran
medida, disuelto
como los biólogos tienen
siguió con el negocio
de entender las propiedades
de los sistemas vivos en términos
de mecanismos.
Una parte importante
de esta historia fue

Portuguese: 
a percepção de que a vida
não é apenas uma coisa,
mas sim uma constelação de
parcialmente dependente, parcialmente
separáveis, processos, como
metabolismo, homeostase,
e reprodução.
Do mesmo jeito,
para fazer progresso
sobre o problema real
de consciência,
pode ser útil distinguir
diferentes aspectos ou dimensões
do que é ser consciente.
O espaço do possível
mentes, se você quiser.
E uma simples classificação
está no nível consciente,
que é a propriedade de
estar consciente de todo.
Por exemplo, o
diferença entre ser
em um sono sem sonhos, ou
sob anestesia geral,
e estar acordado e
consciente como você é agora.
E o conteúdo consciente,
quando você está consciente
você está consciente de alguma coisa.
A miríade de vistas, sons,
cheiros, emoções, sentimentos,
e crenças que povoam o seu
universo interno a qualquer momento.
E uma coisa você está consciente
de quando você está consciente,

English: 
the realisation that life
is not just one thing,
but rather a constellation of
partially dependent, partially
separable, processes, like
metabolism, homeostasis,
and reproduction.
In the same way,
to make progress
on the real problem
of consciousness,
it can be useful to distinguish
different aspects or dimensions
of what it is to be conscious.
The space of possible
minds, if you like.
And one simple classification
is into conscious level,
which is the property of
being conscious at all.
For example, the
difference between being
in a dreamless sleep, or
under general anaesthesia,
and being awake and
conscious as you are now.
And the conscious content,
when you are conscious,
you're conscious of something.
The myriad of sights, sounds,
smells, emotions, feelings,
and beliefs that populate your
inner universe at any one time.
And one thing you are conscious
of when you are conscious,

Spanish: 
la comprensión de que la vida
no es solo una cosa,
sino más bien una constelación de
parcialmente dependiente, parcialmente
separables, procesos, como
metabolismo, homeostasis,
y reproducción.
Del mismo modo,
Progresar
en el problema real
de la conciencia,
puede ser útil para distinguir
diferentes aspectos o dimensiones
de lo que es ser consciente.
El espacio de lo posible
mentes, si quieres
Y una clasificación simple
está en nivel consciente,
que es propiedad de
estar consciente en absoluto.
Por ejemplo, el
diferencia entre ser
en un sueño sin sueños, o
bajo anestesia general,
y estar despierto y
consciente como eres ahora.
Y el contenido consciente,
cuando estás consciente,
eres consciente de algo
La miríada de vistas, sonidos,
olores, emociones, sentimientos,
y creencias que pueblan tu
universo interno en cualquier momento.
Y una cosa que eres consciente
de cuando estás consciente,

Spanish: 
es la experiencia, lo específico
experiencia, de ser tú,
y este es el yo consciente.
Y es el tercero
dimensión de la conciencia
Ahora no reclamo
estas distinciones marcan
aspectos completamente independientes
de lo que es ser consciente,
pero son pragmáticamente
forma útil de descomponer
el problema un poco
Así que comencemos con
nivel consciente
¿Cuáles son los fundamentales
mecanismos cerebrales
que subyace a nuestra habilidad
ser consciente en absoluto?
Y podemos pensar en esto, en
al menos una primera aproximación
como una escala de ser
completamente inconsciente,
como si estuvieras en coma, o
bajo anestesia general,
estar despierto, alerta y
plenamente consciente como lo eres ahora.
Y hay varios estados
entre estar somnoliento,
siendo sedado suavemente y así sucesivamente.
Lo importante es que, mientras
estar consciente y estar despierto
a menudo van de la mano, esto
no es siempre el caso.
Por ejemplo, cuando eres
soñando que estás dormido,
pero estás teniendo
experiencias conscientes
La experiencia consciente
de tus sueños
Y por otro
lado de este diagrama,

Portuguese: 
é a experiência, o específico
experiência, de ser você,
e isso é auto consciente.
E é o terceiro
dimensão da consciência.
Agora eu não reivindico
estas distinções marcam
aspectos completamente independentes
do que é ser consciente,
mas eles são pragmaticamente
maneira útil de quebrar
o problema um pouco.
Então vamos começar com
nível consciente.
Quais são os fundamentos
mecanismos cerebrais
que subjaz nossa capacidade
estar consciente de todo?
E podemos pensar nisso, em
menos uma primeira aproximação,
como uma escala de ser
completamente inconsciente,
como se você estivesse em coma ou
sob anestesia geral,
estar acordado, alerta e
totalmente consciente como você é agora.
E há vários estados
entre estar sonolento,
sendo levemente sedado e assim por diante.
O importante é que, enquanto
estar consciente e estar acordado
muitas vezes juntos, isso
nem sempre é o caso.
Por exemplo, quando você está
sonhando que você está dormindo
mas você está tendo
experiências conscientes.
A experiência consciente
dos seus sonhos.
E do outro
lado deste diagrama,

English: 
is the experience, the specific
experience, of being you,
and this is conscious self.
And it's the third
dimension of consciousness.
Now I don't claim
these distinctions mark
completely independent aspects
of what it is to be conscious,
but they're a pragmatically
useful way of breaking down
the problem a bit.
So let's start with
conscious level.
What are the fundamental
brain mechanisms
that underlie our ability
to be conscious at all?
And we can think of this, at
least a first approximation,
as a scale from being
completely unconscious,
as if you were in a coma, or
under general anaesthesia,
to being awake, alert, and
fully conscious as you are now.
And there's various states
in between being drowsy,
being mildly sedated and so on.
What's important is that, while
being conscious and being awake
often go together, this
is not always the case.
For instance, when you are
dreaming you are asleep,
but you are having
conscious experiences.
The conscious experience
of your dreams.
And on the other
side of this diagram,

Portuguese: 
existem estados patológicos,
como o estado vegetativo,
onde fisiologicamente você vai
passar por ciclos de sono / vigília,
mas não há ninguém em casa.
Não há
consciência acontecendo.
Então, quais são os
mecanismos específicos
que subjazem a ser consciente
e não simplesmente sendo
fisiologicamente acordado?
Bem, há um número
de possibilidades.
É o número de neurônios?
Bem, na verdade, provavelmente não.
Existem mais neurônios
no seu cerebelo,
este pouco no
parte de trás do seu cérebro
do que no resto
seu cérebro juntos.
Na verdade são cerca de quatro vezes
mais neurônios em seu cerebelo
do que no resto do seu córtex.
Mas se você tiver danos
para o seu cerebelo, sim
você terá alguns problemas
com coordenação
e outras coisas, algumas
problemas cognitivos,
mas você não vai perder
consciência.
Não é só o
número de neurônios.
Não parece ser
qualquer região em particular.
De fato, existem regiões
que, se você sofrer dano,
você vai ficar permanentemente
perder consciência;
em thalamina, o
núcleos e o tálamo
profundamente dentro do cérebro.
Mas estes parecem ser
mais como on / off switches
do que geradores reais
de experiência consciente.

Spanish: 
hay estados patológicos,
como el estado vegetativo,
donde fisiológicamente lo hará
pasar por los ciclos de sueño / vigilia,
pero no hay nadie en casa
No hay
conciencia pasando.
Entonces, ¿qué son los
mecanismos específicos
que subyace a ser consciente
y no simplemente ser
fisiológicamente despierto?
Bueno, hay un número
de posibilidades
¿Es el número de neuronas?
Bueno, en realidad, probablemente no.
Hay más neuronas
en tu cerebelo,
este bit en el
parte posterior de tu cerebro,
que en el resto de
tu cerebro juntos.
De hecho, son alrededor de cuatro veces
más neuronas en tu cerebelo
que en el resto de tu corteza.
Pero si tienes daño
a su cerebelo, sí,
tendrás algunos problemas
con coordinación
y otras cosas, algunas
problemas cognitivos,
pero no perderás
conciencia.
No es solo el
numero de neuronas.
No parece ser
cualquier región en particular.
De hecho, hay regiones
eso, si sufres daño,
estarás permanentemente
perder el conocimiento;
en thalamina, el
núcleos y el tálamo
en el fondo del cerebro.
Pero estos parecen ser
más como interruptores de encendido / apagado
que generadores reales
de la experiencia consciente

English: 
there are pathological states,
like the vegetative state,
where physiologically you will
go through sleep/wake cycles,
but there is nobody at home.
There is no
consciousness happening.
So what are the
specific mechanisms
that underlie being conscious
and not simply being
physiologically awake?
Well there are a number
of possibilities.
Is it the number of neurons?
Well actually, probably not.
There are more neurons
in your cerebellum,
this bit at the
back of your brain,
than in the rest of
your brain put together.
In fact are about four times
more neurons in your cerebellum
than in the rest of your cortex.
But if you have damage
to your cerebellum, yeah,
you'll have some problems
with coordination
and other things, some
cognitive problems,
but you won't lose
consciousness.
It's not just the
number of neurons.
Doesn't seem to be
any particular region.
In fact, there are regions
that, if you suffer damage,
you will permanently
lose consciousness;
in thalamina, the
nuclei, and the thalamus
deep inside the brain.
But these seems to be
more like on/off switches
than actual generators
of conscious experience.

Spanish: 
Ni siquiera es neuronal
actividad, al menos no
tipos simples de actividad neuronal.
Tu cerebro es
sigue siendo muy activo
haciendo inconsciente
estados, durante el sueño.
E incluso si tu cerebro
está altamente sincronizado,
uno de los primeros
teorías de la conciencia
¿Depende de las neuronas?
disparando en sincronía
juntos.
Si tu cerebro es
demasiado sincronizado,
perderás la consciencia,
y esto sucede
en estados de ausencia de epilepsia.
Lo que parece ser el caso es
que, siendo consciente de todo,
depende de qué tan diferente
las regiones del cerebro hablan
el uno al otro de maneras específicas.
Y esto fue algo innovador
trabajo de Marcello Massimini
en Milán hace unos 10 años.
Y lo que hizo aquí,
fue estimulado
la corteza del cerebro
con un pulso breve
de energía electromagnética,
usando una técnica llamada
transcraneal magnético
estimulación o TMS.
Y luego usó EEG
electroencefalografía
escuchar los ecos del cerebro
Un poco como
golpeando el cerebro
y escuchando su
respuesta eléctrica
Y lo que notó
cuando haces esto,
y puedes ver en
la izquierda está dormida,
y a la derecha está despierto.

English: 
It's not even neural
activity, at least not
simple kinds of neural activity.
Your brain is
still highly active
doing unconscious
states, during the sleep.
And even if your brain
is highly synchronised,
one of the first
theories of consciousness
was it depended on neurons
firing in synchrony
with each other.
If your brain is
too synchronised,
you will lose consciousness,
and this happens
in states of absence epilepsy.
What seems to be the case is
that, being conscious it all,
depends on how different
brain regions talk
to each other in specific ways.
And this was some groundbreaking
work by Marcello Massimini
in Milan about 10 years ago.
And what he did here,
was he stimulated
the cortex of the brain
with a brief pulse
of electromagnetic energy,
using a technique called
transcranial magnetic
stimulation or TMS.
And then he used EEG
electroencephalography
to listen to the brain's echos.
A little bit like
banging on the brain
and listening to its
electrical response.
And what he noticed
when you do this,
and you can see on
the left is asleep,
and on the right is awake.

Portuguese: 
Não é nem neural
atividade, pelo menos não
tipos simples de atividade neural.
Seu cérebro é
ainda altamente ativo
fazendo inconsciente
estados, durante o sono.
E mesmo se seu cérebro
é altamente sincronizado,
um dos primeiros
teorias da consciência
foi dependia de neurônios
disparando em sincronia
um com o outro.
Se o seu cérebro é
muito sincronizado
você vai perder a consciência
e isso acontece
em estados de ausência epilepsia.
O que parece ser o caso é
que, sendo consciente de tudo,
depende de quão diferente
regiões do cérebro falam
uns aos outros de maneiras específicas.
E isso foi algum inovador
trabalho de Marcello Massimini
em Milão há cerca de 10 anos.
E o que ele fez aqui
ele foi estimulado
o córtex do cérebro
com um breve pulso
de energia eletromagnética,
usando uma técnica chamada
magnético transcraniano
estimulação ou TMS.
E então ele usou o EEG
eletroencefalografia
para ouvir os ecos do cérebro.
Um pouco como
batendo no cérebro
e ouvindo seus
resposta elétrica.
E o que ele notou
quando você faz isso
e você pode ver no
a esquerda está dormindo
e à direita está acordado.

English: 
And this is very
much slowed down.
When you stimulate the
brain in a sleep condition,
there is still a response.
There's still an echo, but
the echo stays very localised
to the point of stimulation.
It doesn't travel
around very much,
and it doesn't last very long.
But when you stimulate
a conscious brain,
there's a spatial
temporally complex response.
This echo bounces around
all over the cortex
in very interesting ways.
What's more, the complexity of
this echo can be quantified.
You can apply some
simple algorithms
to describe how
complex, how rich,
this pattern of
interactivity is.
This is also from
the Milan group.
And what they've done here is,
they basically look at the echo
as it moves around the brain.
And they see the extent to
which you could describe it,
the minimum description length.
How much can you compress
the image of that echo?
Much the same way
that algorithms make
compressed files from
digital images in your phone.
And they came up
with an index called
the perturbational
complexity index.

Portuguese: 
E isso é muito
muito abrandou.
Quando você estimula o
cérebro em uma condição de sono,
ainda há uma resposta.
Ainda há um eco, mas
o eco fica muito localizado
ao ponto de estimulação.
Não viaja
em torno de muito,
e não dura muito tempo.
Mas quando você estimula
um cérebro consciente
há uma espacial
resposta temporalmente complexa.
Esse eco reflete
em todo o córtex
de maneiras muito interessantes.
Além do mais, a complexidade de
esse eco pode ser quantificado.
Você pode aplicar alguns
algoritmos simples
para descrever como
complexo, quão rico
esse padrão de
interatividade é.
Isso também é de
o grupo de Milão.
E o que eles fizeram aqui é
eles basicamente olham para o eco
enquanto se move ao redor do cérebro.
E eles vêem o quanto
que você poderia descrever,
o comprimento mínimo da descrição.
Quanto você pode comprimir
a imagem desse eco?
Da mesma maneira
que os algoritmos fazem
arquivos compactados de
imagens digitais no seu telefone.
E eles vieram
com um índice chamado
o perturbador
índice de complexidade.

Spanish: 
Y esto es muy
mucho más lento.
Cuando estimula el
cerebro en una condición de sueño,
todavía hay una respuesta.
Todavía hay un eco, pero
el eco permanece muy localizado
hasta el punto de la estimulación.
No viaja
mucho,
y no dura mucho tiempo.
Pero cuando estimula
un cerebro consciente,
hay un espacial
respuesta temporalmente compleja.
Este eco rebota alrededor
en toda la corteza
de maneras muy interesantes.
Además, la complejidad de
este eco puede ser cuantificado.
Puedes aplicar un poco
algoritmos simples
para describir cómo
complejo, qué rico,
este patrón de
la interactividad es.
Esto también es de
el grupo de Milán.
Y lo que han hecho aquí es
básicamente miran el eco
mientras se mueve alrededor del cerebro.
Y ven la medida de
que podrías describirlo,
la longitud mínima de descripción.
¿Cuánto puedes comprimir
la imagen de ese eco?
De la misma manera
que los algoritmos hacen
archivos comprimidos de
imágenes digitales en su teléfono.
Y surgieron
con un índice llamado
la perturbacional
índice de complejidad.

English: 
And what you find
is, you now have
a number that you can attach
to how conscious you are.
This is, I think,
really intriguing,
because it's a first
step towards having
an actual measurement
of conscious level.
This graph on the bottom
shows this measure
applied to a variety
of conscious states,
ranging from pathological
conscious states,
like the vegetative
state, where there
is no consciousness at all,
all the way through locked
in syndrome, and
then healthy waking.
And you can immediately
see that techniques
like this might already have
clinical value in diagnosing
potential for
consciousness patients
might have after
severe brain injury.
Now at Sussex, we are continuing
work along these lines.
We actually look,
instead of bashing
on the brain with a
sharp pulse of energy,
we want to see whether we can
get something similar just
by recording the spontaneous
activity of the brain.
So we look at
spontaneous dynamics
from, in this case, waking
states and anaesthesia.
This is work with my PhD
students Michael Schartner
and Adam Barrett.
We measure its
complexity, and indeed, we

Portuguese: 
E o que você encontra
é, agora você tem
um número que você pode anexar
como você está consciente.
Isto é, penso eu
realmente intrigante
porque é o primeiro
passo para ter
uma medição real
de nível consciente.
Este gráfico na parte inferior
mostra essa medida
aplicado a uma variedade
de estados conscientes,
variando de patológico
estados conscientes,
como o vegetativo
estado, onde há
não é consciência alguma,
todo o caminho através bloqueado
na síndrome, e
depois, a vigília saudável.
E você pode imediatamente
veja que técnicas
como isso pode já ter
valor clínico no diagnóstico
potencial para
pacientes conscientes
pode ter depois
lesão cerebral grave.
Agora em Sussex, continuamos
trabalhe ao longo destas linhas.
Nós realmente olhamos
em vez de bater
no cérebro com um
pulso afiado de energia,
nós queremos ver se podemos
obter algo semelhante apenas
registrando o espontâneo
atividade do cérebro.
Então olhamos para
dinâmica espontânea
de, neste caso, acordar
estados e anestesia.
Isso é trabalho com meu doutorado
alunos Michael Schartner
e Adam Barrett.
Nós medimos sua
complexidade e, de fato, nós

Spanish: 
Y lo que encuentras
es, ahora tienes
un número que puedes adjuntar
a cuán consciente eres.
Esto es, creo,
realmente intrigante
porque es una primera
paso hacia tener
una medición real
de nivel consciente
Este gráfico en la parte inferior
muestra esta medida
aplicado a una variedad
de estados conscientes,
que van desde patológico
estados conscientes,
como el vegetativo
estado, donde hay
no hay conciencia en absoluto,
todo el camino a través de bloqueado
en el síndrome, y
luego sana la vigilia.
Y puedes inmediatamente
ver que las técnicas
como esto ya podría tener
valor clínico en el diagnóstico
potencial para
pacientes con conciencia
podría tener después
lesión cerebral grave.
Ahora en Sussex, continuamos
trabajar a lo largo de estas líneas.
Nosotros miramos,
en lugar de atacar
en el cerebro con un
agudo pulso de energía,
queremos ver si podemos
obtener algo similar solo
registrando lo espontáneo
actividad del cerebro
Entonces miramos
dinámica espontánea
de, en este caso, despertar
estados y anestesia.
Esto es trabajo con mi doctorado
estudiantes Michael Schartner
y Adam Barrett.
Medimos su
complejidad, y de hecho, nosotros

Spanish: 
encuentra que podemos
distinguir diferentes niveles
de la conciencia solo por
la actividad espontánea
del cerebro
En cierto modo esto no es
eso sorprendente,
porque sabemos
Varias cosas cambian.
El balance de
diferentes frecuencias
de sus cambios de actividad cerebral
cuando pierdes el conocimiento
Pero esto no
tiene que ver con eso.
Esto es independiente de eso.
Hay algo específico
eso está siendo detectado
por estos cambios en la complejidad.
Más recientemente, hemos aplicado
las mismas medidas para dormir,
en este caso tomando
ventaja con colegas
en Milán de grabaciones
tomado de directamente
dentro del humano
corteza cerebral.
Estos son electrodos implantados.
Y vemos mucho la misma historia.
Si compara donde
las dos áreas son,
usted compara la complejidad
de descanso reparador,
y el sueño sin remordimientos temprano, donde
no estás soñando mucho
Ves esa complejidad
tontos una gran oferta.
Lo que es interesante aquí es, si
usted compara el descanso despierto con REM
dormir, donde la gente a menudo
reporta sueños si los despiertas
arriba, el nivel de
la complejidad es mucho
como es durante
el estado de vigilia.
Hay algo
más aquí,

English: 
find that we can
distinguish different levels
of consciousness just by
the spontaneous activity
of the brain.
In a way this isn't
that surprising,
because we know
various things change.
The balance of
different frequencies
of your brain activity changes
when you lose consciousness.
But this doesn't
have to do with that.
This is independent of that.
There's something specific
that is being detected
by these changes in complexity.
More recently we've applied
the same measures to sleep,
in this case taking
advantage with colleagues
in Milan of recordings
taken from directly
within the human
cerebral cortex.
These are implanted electrodes.
And we see much the same story.
If you compare where
the two areas are,
you compare the complexity
of wakeful rest,
and early non-rem sleep, where
you are not dreaming very much.
You see that complexity
fools a great deal.
What's interesting here is, if
you compare wakeful rest to REM
sleep, where people will often
report dreams if you wake them
up, the level of
complexity is very much
as it is during
the wakeful state.
There's something
else going on here,

Portuguese: 
achar que podemos
distinguir diferentes níveis
de consciência apenas por
a atividade espontânea
do cérebro.
De certo modo isso não é
isso é surpreendente
porque sabemos
várias coisas mudam.
O equilíbrio de
freqüências diferentes
de suas mudanças de atividade cerebral
quando você perde a consciência.
Mas isso não
tem a ver com isso.
Isso é independente disso.
Tem algo específico
que está sendo detectado
por essas mudanças na complexidade.
Mais recentemente, aplicamos
as mesmas medidas para dormir,
neste caso, tendo
vantagem com os colegas
em Milão de gravações
tirado diretamente
dentro do humano
córtex cerebral.
Estes são eletrodos implantados.
E vemos muito a mesma história.
Se você comparar onde
as duas áreas são,
você compara a complexidade
de repouso,
e sono precoce não-rem, onde
você não está sonhando muito.
Você vê essa complexidade
engana muito.
O que é interessante aqui é, se
você compara o repouso ao REM
dormir, onde as pessoas muitas vezes
relatar sonhos, se você acordá-los
acima, o nível de
complexidade é muito
como é durante
o estado de vigília.
Há alguma coisa
mais acontecendo aqui,

English: 
which is that the complexity in
the frontal part of the brain
seems to be higher than in
other parts of the brain.
And that's something we still
don't understand fully, yet.
I just wanted to
give you something
hot off the press, so to speak,
which is where you've also
been applying these
measures now to data taken
from people under the
influence of psychedelic drugs;
psilocybin, ketamine, and LSD.
And what we find, at least in
our hands to start with here,
is that the level of
complexity actually
increases as compared to the
baseline state, which is not
something we've seen before
in any other application
of these measures.
So what's important about
this way of looking at things
is that, it's grounded
in a theory that
tries to explain why certain
sorts of brain dynamics
go along with being conscious.
And put very simply,
the idea is this--
and it goes back to Guilio
Tononi and Gerald Edelman,
people that I went to work with
in America about 18 years ago--
the idea is very simple.

Spanish: 
que es que la complejidad en
la parte frontal del cerebro
parece ser más alto que en
otras partes del cerebro
Y eso es algo que todavía
no entiendo completamente, todavía.
solo quería
darte algo
caliente de la prensa, por así decirlo,
que es donde también has
estado aplicando estos
medidas ahora a los datos tomados
de personas debajo de
influencia de drogas psicodélicas;
psilocibina, ketamina y LSD.
Y lo que encontramos, al menos en
nuestras manos para comenzar aquí,
es ese el nivel de
complejidad en realidad
aumenta en comparación con el
estado de referencia, que no es
algo que hemos visto antes
en cualquier otra aplicación
de estas medidas.
Entonces, ¿qué es importante acerca de
esta forma de mirar las cosas
es eso, está fundamentado
en una teoría que
intenta explicar por qué cierto
tipo de dinámica cerebral
ir junto con ser consciente.
Y ponlo muy simple,
la idea es esto--
y vuelve a Guilio
Tononi y Gerald Edelman,
personas con las que fui a trabajar
en América hace 18 años--
la idea es muy simple.

Portuguese: 
que é que a complexidade em
a parte frontal do cérebro
parece ser maior do que em
outras partes do cérebro.
E isso é algo que ainda
não entendi completamente, ainda.
eu só queria
te dar algo
quente fora da imprensa, por assim dizer,
que é onde você também
aplicando estes
medidas agora para dados tomados
de pessoas sob o
influência de drogas psicodélicas;
psilocibina, cetamina e LSD.
E o que encontramos, pelo menos em
nossas mãos para começar aqui,
é que o nível de
complexidade na verdade
aumenta em comparação com o
estado da linha de base, que não é
algo que vimos antes
em qualquer outra aplicação
destas medidas.
Então, o que é importante sobre
essa maneira de ver as coisas
é isso, é aterrado
em uma teoria que
tenta explicar por que certas
tipos de dinâmica cerebral
vá junto com ser consciente.
E coloque de forma muito simples
a ideia é essa
e volta para o Guilio
Tononi e Gerald Edelman,
pessoas que eu fui trabalhar com
na América há cerca de 18 anos
A ideia é muito simples.

Portuguese: 
Consciência é
extremamente informativo.
Toda experiência consciente
você tem ou teve
ou vai ter, é diferente
de todos os outros conscientes
experiência que você teve
estão tendo, ou terão.
Até a experiência
da pura escuridão
exclui um vasto repertório
de alternativa possível
experiências que você poderia ter,
ou pode ter no futuro.
Há uma quantidade enorme de
informação para o organismo
em qualquer experiência consciente.
Ao mesmo tempo, cada
experiência que você tem
é altamente integrado.
Toda cena consciente é
experiente, como tudo de uma peça,
está ligado em conjunto.
Nós não experimentamos cores e
formas separadamente de qualquer forma.
São experiências conscientes
ao nível da fenomenologia
combinar essas propriedades.
Eles são de um lado
altamente informativo, composto
de muitas partes diferentes.
Por outro lado, obrigado
juntos em um todo unificado.
E isso nos motiva a pesquisar
para medidas matemáticas que
tem a mesma propriedade,
que não são nem
falta de informação.
À esquerda, você
veja um sistema que

Spanish: 
La conciencia es
extremadamente informativo.
Toda experiencia consciente
tienes, o has tenido,
o tendrá, es diferente
de todos los demás conscientes
experiencia que has tenido,
están teniendo, o tendrán.
Incluso la experiencia
de la oscuridad pura
descarta un vasto repertorio
de alternativa posible
experiencias que podrías tener,
o podría tener en el futuro.
Hay una gran cantidad de
información para el organismo
en cualquier experiencia consciente
Al mismo tiempo cada
experiencia que tienes
está altamente integrado.
Toda escena consciente es
experimentado, como todo de una pieza,
está unido
No experimentamos colores y
formas por separado de cualquier manera.
Son experiencias conscientes
a nivel de fenomenología
combine estas propiedades.
Ellos son la única mano
altamente informativo, compuesto
de muchas partes diferentes.
Por otro lado,
juntos en un todo unificado.
Y esto nos motiva a buscar
para medidas matemáticas que
tener la misma propiedad,
que no son ni
falta de información.
A la izquierda, tú
ver un sistema que

English: 
Consciousness is
extremely informative.
Every conscious experience
you have, or have had,
or will have, is different
from every other conscious
experience you have had,
are having, or will have.
Even the experience
of pure darkness
rules out a vast repertoire
of alternative possible
experiences that you could have,
or might have in the future.
There's a huge amount of
information for the organism
in any conscious experience.
At the same time every
experience that you have
is highly integrated.
Every conscious scene is
experienced, as all of a piece,
is bound together.
We don't experience colours and
shapes separately in any way.
It's conscious experiences
at the level of phenomenology
combine these properties.
They are the one hand
highly informative, composed
of many different parts.
On the other, bound
together in a unified whole.
And this motivates us to search
for mathematical measures which
have the same property,
which are neither
lacking in information.
On the left, you
see a system which

English: 
is all connected together,
so it can't enter
very many different states.
On the right is a system which
is completely dissociated,
so they can enter states,
but it's not a single system.
We want measures that track
this middle ground of systems,
that combine both integration
and differentiation.
And a number of these
measures now exist.
There are some
equations here, which
we can talk about
later if you like,
that try to target
this middle ground.
And time will tell whether,
by applying these more
phenomenologically
grounded measures,
we come up with even more
precise practical measures
of consciousness.
Now why is this business
of measurement important?
And I want to make a
general point here,
which is that, if you're
trying to naturalise
a phenomenon which
seems mysterious,
the ability to measure it
is usually one of the most
important steps you can take.
And we've seen numerous
examples of this.
The history of our understanding
of heat and temperature
is one very good example
Here's an early thermometer
from the 18th century, which
used the expansion of air.

Spanish: 
está todo conectado,
entonces no puede ingresar
muchos estados diferentes
A la derecha hay un sistema que
está completamente disociado,
para que puedan ingresar a estados,
pero no es un sistema único.
Queremos medidas que rastrean
este punto medio de los sistemas,
que combinan ambas integraciones
y diferenciación.
Y varios de estos
las medidas ahora existen.
Hay algunos
ecuaciones aquí, que
podemos hablar de
más tarde si lo desea,
que intentan apuntar
este terreno intermedio.
Y el tiempo dirá si
aplicando estos más
fenomenológicamente
medidas puestas a tierra,
se nos ocurre aún más
medidas prácticas precisas
de la conciencia
Ahora por qué es este negocio
de medida importante?
Y quiero hacer un
punto general aquí,
que es eso, si eres
tratando de naturalizar
un fenómeno que
parece misterioso,
la capacidad de medirlo
es usualmente uno de los más
pasos importantes que puede tomar.
Y hemos visto numerosos
ejemplos de esto.
La historia de nuestro entendimiento
de calor y temperatura
es un muy buen ejemplo
Aquí hay un termómetro temprano
del siglo XVIII, que
utilizó la expansión de aire.

Portuguese: 
está tudo conectado,
por isso não pode entrar
muitos estados diferentes.
À direita está um sistema que
está completamente dissociado,
para que eles possam entrar nos estados
mas não é um sistema único.
Queremos medidas que acompanhem
este meio termo de sistemas,
que combinam a integração
e diferenciação.
E um certo número destes
medidas existem agora.
Há alguns
equações aqui, que
podemos falar sobre
mais tarde se você quiser
que tentam segmentar
este meio termo.
E o tempo dirá se,
aplicando estes mais
fenomenologicamente
medidas fundamentadas,
nós inventamos ainda mais
medidas práticas precisas
da consciência.
Agora, por que esse negócio é
de medição importante?
E eu quero fazer uma
ponto geral aqui,
que é isso, se você é
tentando naturalizar
um fenômeno que
parece misterioso
a capacidade de medi-lo
é geralmente um dos mais
passos importantes que você pode dar.
E nós vimos numerosos
exemplos disso.
A história do nosso entendimento
de calor e temperatura
é um bom exemplo
Aqui está um termômetro inicial
do século XVIII, que
usou a expansão do ar.

English: 
But of course there
are many problems
in generating a
reliable thermometer
and a scale of temperature,
if you don't already
have fixed points.
And if you don't
know what heat is you
get trapped in a kind
of vicious circle
that took a long
time to break out of.
But people did
break out of this,
and the development
of the thermometers
catalysed our
understanding of heat
from being something that flowed
in and out of objects, to being
something that was identical
to a physical property.
The mean molecular kinetic
energy of molecules
in a substance.
And having that
concept of heat now
allows us to talk
about temperature
far beyond the realms
of human experience.
We can talk about
the temperature
on the surface of
the sun, in a sense,
the way we can talk about the
temperature of interstellar
space, close to absolute zero.
None of these things
make any sense
and in our phenomenological
experience of hot and cold.
So this brings me to my
first take-home message.
Measurement is important, and
consciousness, conscious level,

Portuguese: 
Mas é claro que
são muitos problemas
na geração de um
termômetro confiável
e uma escala de temperatura,
se você ainda não
tem pontos fixos.
E se você não
sabe que calor é você
ficar preso em um tipo
do círculo vicioso
que demorou muito
hora de sair.
Mas as pessoas fizeram
sair disso,
e o desenvolvimento
dos termômetros
catalisou nossa
compreensão do calor
de ser algo que fluía
dentro e fora de objetos, para ser
algo que era idêntico
a uma propriedade física.
A cinética molecular média
energia das moléculas
em uma substância.
E tendo isso
conceito de calor agora
nos permite conversar
sobre a temperatura
muito além dos reinos
da experiência humana.
Nós podemos falar sobre
a temperatura
na superfície de
o sol, em certo sentido,
a maneira como podemos falar sobre o
temperatura de interestelar
espaço, perto do zero absoluto.
Nenhuma dessas coisas
faz algum sentido
e no nosso fenomenológico
experiência de quente e frio.
Então isso me leva ao meu
primeira mensagem para levar para casa.
A medição é importante e
consciência, nível consciente,

Spanish: 
Pero, por supuesto,
hay muchos problemas
en generar un
termómetro confiable
y una escala de temperatura,
si aún no lo haces
tener puntos fijos
Y si no lo haces
saber que calor eres
quedar atrapado en un tipo
de círculo vicioso
eso tomó un largo
hora de salir de.
Pero la gente lo hizo
salir de esto,
y el desarrollo
de los termómetros
catalizó nuestra
comprensión del calor
de ser algo que fluyó
dentro y fuera de los objetos, a ser
algo que era idéntico
a una propiedad física.
La cinética molecular media
energía de las moléculas
en una sustancia.
Y teniendo eso
concepto de calor ahora
nos permite hablar
sobre la temperatura
mucho más allá de los reinos
de la experiencia humana.
Podemos hablar sobre
la temperatura
en la superficie de
el sol, en cierto sentido,
la forma en que podemos hablar sobre el
temperatura del interestelar
espacio, cerca del cero absoluto.
Ninguna de estas cosas
ningún sentido
y en nuestra fenomenología
experiencia de calor y frío
Entonces esto me lleva a mi
primer mensaje para llevar a casa.
La medición es importante, y
conciencia, nivel consciente,

Spanish: 
depende de un equilibrio complejo de
diferenciación e integración
en la dinámica del cerebro,
que refleja el hecho
ese consciente
experiencias en sí mismas
son ambos altamente informativos
y siempre integrado.
Ahora cuando estamos conscientes,
son conscientes de algo
Entonces, ¿qué son el cerebro
mecanismos que determinan
el contenido de la conciencia?
Y el héroe para esto
parte de la historia
es el físico alemán y
Fisiólogo Hermann Von
Helmholtz.
Y él propuso el
idea de que el cerebro es
una especie de máquina de predicción
Eso lo que vemos,
escucha y siente son
nada más que el cerebro
mejor adivinar sobre las causas
de entradas sensoriales.
Y la idea básica es,
de nuevo, bastante simple.
El cerebro está encerrado dentro
su cráneo huesudo en casa,
y tiene acceso muy indirecto
al mundo externo.
Todo lo que recibe son ambiguos
y ruidosas señales sensoriales,
que son altamente
y directamente relacionado
a este mundo externo
de objetos, y así sucesivamente,
si hay un mundo externo
de objetos en absoluto.

Portuguese: 
depende de um equilíbrio complexo de
diferenciação e integração
na dinâmica do cérebro,
refletindo o fato
que consciente
experimenta-se
são altamente informativos
e sempre integrado.
Agora, quando estamos conscientes, nós
estão conscientes de alguma coisa.
Então, quais são o cérebro
mecanismos que determinam
o conteúdo da consciência?
E o herói para isso
parte da história
é o físico alemão e
fisiologista Hermann Von
Helmholtz.
E ele propôs o
idéia de que o cérebro é
um tipo de máquina de previsão.
Aquilo que vemos
ouça e sinta
nada além do cérebro
melhor palpite sobre as causas
de entradas sensoriais.
E a ideia básica é:
novamente, bem simples.
O cérebro está preso dentro
seu crânio ósseo em casa,
e tem acesso muito indireto
para o mundo externo.
Tudo o que recebe são ambíguos
e sinais sensoriais ruidosos,
que são altamente
e diretamente relacionado
para este mundo externo
de objetos e assim por diante
se existe um mundo externo
de objetos lá fora de todo.

English: 
depends on a complex balance of
differentiation and integration
in brain dynamics,
reflecting the fact
that conscious
experiences themselves
are both highly informative
and always integrated.
Now when we are conscious, we
are conscious of something.
So what are the brain
mechanisms that determine
the content of consciousness?
And the hero for this
part of the story
is the German physicist and
physiologist Hermann Von
Helmholtz.
And he proposed the
idea that the brain is
a kind of prediction machine.
That what we see,
hear, and feel are
nothing other than the brain's
best guess about the causes
of sensory inputs.
And the basic idea is,
again, quite simple.
The brain is locked inside
its bony skull home,
and has very indirect access
to the external world.
All it receives are ambiguous
and noisy sensory signals,
which are highly
and directly related
to this external world
of objects, and so on,
if there is an external world
of objects out there at all.

English: 
They know about that.
Perception in this
view is, by necessity,
a process of inference in
which the brain interprets
these ambiguous and noisy
sensory signals with respect
to some prior
expectations or beliefs
about the way the world is.
And this forms the
brain's best guess
of the causes of the
sensory signals that
are impacting our sensory
surfaces all the time.
What we see is the brain's
best guess of what's out there.
I want to give you
a couple of examples
that illustrate this process.
It's quite easy to do, in a way.
This first example is a
well-known visual illusion
called Edelstein's Checkerboard.
Now here, you'll
see two patches.
You'll see patches A and B. And
I hope to you they look to be
different shades of grey.
Do they?
They look to be
different shades of grey.
Of course they are exactly
the same shade of grey.
I can illustrate that by
putting an alternative image,
and joining up
those two patches.
You'll see that's it's
the same shade of grey.
You may not believe
me, so what I'll do

Spanish: 
Ellos saben sobre eso.
Percepción en esto
la vista es, por necesidad,
un proceso de inferencia en
que el cerebro interpreta
estos ambiguos y ruidosos
señales sensoriales con respeto
a algunos antes
expectativas o creencias
sobre la forma en que es el mundo
Y esto forma el
la mejor suposición del cerebro
de las causas de la
señales sensoriales que
están impactando nuestra sensorial
superficies todo el tiempo.
Lo que vemos es el cerebro
mejor suposición de lo que hay por ahí.
quiero darte
un par de ejemplos
que ilustran este proceso.
Es bastante fácil de hacer, en cierto modo.
Este primer ejemplo es un
ilusión visual bien conocida
llamado Tablero de Edelstein.
Ahora aquí, vas a
ver dos parches.
Verás parches A y B. Y
Espero que parezcan ser
diferentes tonos de gris.
¿Ellos?
Ellos parecen ser
diferentes tonos de gris.
Por supuesto que son exactamente
el mismo tono de gris
Puedo ilustrar eso por
poniendo una imagen alternativa,
y uniéndose
esos dos parches.
Verás que es eso
el mismo tono de gris
Usted no puede creer
yo, entonces que haré

Portuguese: 
Eles sabem disso.
Percepção neste
visão é, por necessidade,
um processo de inferência em
que o cérebro interpreta
estes ambíguos e barulhentos
sinais sensoriais com respeito
para alguns anteriores
expectativas ou crenças
sobre a maneira como o mundo é.
E isso forma o
melhor palpite do cérebro
das causas do
sinais sensoriais que
estão impactando nosso sensorial
superfícies o tempo todo.
O que vemos é o cérebro
melhor palpite do que está lá fora.
eu quero te dar
alguns exemplos
que ilustram esse processo.
É muito fácil, de certa forma.
Este primeiro exemplo é um
ilusão visual bem conhecida
chamado Tabuleiro de Damas de Edelstein.
Agora aqui você vai
veja dois patches.
Você verá os patches A e B. E
Eu espero que eles pareçam ser
diferentes tons de cinza.
Eles?
Eles parecem ser
diferentes tons de cinza.
Claro que eles são exatamente
o mesmo tom de cinza.
Eu posso ilustrar isso
colocando uma imagem alternativa,
e juntando-se
essas duas manchas.
Você vai ver que é isso
o mesmo tom de cinza.
Você pode não acreditar
eu, então o que vou fazer

Spanish: 
es, lo cambiaré, y
Verás aún más claramente.
No hay bordes filosos.
Es el mismo tono de gris.
Que esta pasando
aquí, por supuesto, es
que el cerebro es inconscientemente
aplicando su conocimiento previo
que una sombra de yeso se oscurece
la apariencia de las superficies
que se vierte
Entonces, por lo tanto, vemos
el parche B como
más ligero que
realmente es, en orden
para dar cuenta de ese efecto.
Y esto es por supuesto
una ilustración
del éxito de lo visual
sistema, no su falla.
El sistema visual es muy
mal medidor de luz física,
pero eso no es lo que
se supone que debe hacer.
Se supone que, o uno
Lo que se supone que debe hacer,
es interpretar el
causas de las señales sensoriales
en términos de significativo
objetos en el mundo.
También es un ejemplo
de lo que a veces
llamar impenetrabilidad cognitiva.
Incluso si conoce los parches
son del mismo tono de gris,
cuando retiro ese bar,
ellos nuevamente se ven diferentes.
No se puede hacer mucho al respecto.
El segundo ejemplo
solo te muestra

English: 
is, I'll shift it along, and
you'll see even more clearly.
There are no sharp edges.
It's the same shade of grey.
What's going on
here, of course, is
that the brain is unconsciously
applying its prior knowledge
that a cast shadow dims
the appearance of surfaces
that it casts onto.
So we therefore see
the patch B as being
lighter than it
really is, in order
to account for that effect.
And this is of course
an illustration
of the success of the visual
system, not its failure.
The visual system is a very
bad physical light metre,
but that's not what
it's supposed to do.
It's supposed to, or one
thing it's supposed to do,
is to interpret the
causes of sensory signals
in terms of meaningful
objects in the world.
It's also an example
of what we sometimes
call cognitive impenetrability.
Even if you know the patches
are the same shade of grey,
when I take that bar away,
they again look different.
Can't do much about that.
The second example
just shows you

Portuguese: 
é, eu vou mudar isso, e
você verá ainda mais claramente.
Não há bordas afiadas.
É o mesmo tom de cinza.
O que está acontecendo
aqui, claro, é
que o cérebro é inconscientemente
aplicando seu conhecimento prévio
que a sombra de um elenco escurece
o aparecimento de superfícies
que ele lança para.
Então, nós vemos, portanto
o remendo B como sendo
mais leve que
é realmente, a fim
para ter em conta esse efeito.
E isso é claro
uma ilustração
do sucesso do visual
sistema, não o seu fracasso.
O sistema visual é muito
medidor de luz física ruim,
mas não é isso que
é suposto fazer.
É suposto, ou um
coisa que deveria fazer,
é interpretar o
causas de sinais sensoriais
em termos de significado
objetos no mundo.
É também um exemplo
do que às vezes nós
chamar impenetrabilidade cognitiva.
Mesmo se você conhece os patches
são o mesmo tom de cinza,
quando eu levar esse bar embora
eles novamente parecem diferentes.
Não posso fazer muito sobre isso.
O segundo exemplo
apenas mostra

English: 
how quickly the brain can
take in new prior information
to change the nature of
conscious perception.
This is a so-called
Mooney image.
And if you haven't seen
it before, hopefully what
you will see here
is just a passing
of black and white splotches.
Does everybody kind of get that?
Black and white splotches?
Some of you might
have seen this before.
And now what I'm going
to do is fill it in,
and you see something
very different.
What you'll see is a very
meaningful scene here involving
at least two objects, a
woman, a hat and a horse.
Now if you stare at
this for a while,
I won't leave it
up for too long--
but if you just look
at it for a little bit,
and then I take that
image away again,
you should still be able to see
the objects within that image.
Now for me this is
quite remarkable,
because the sensory information
hasn't changed at all.
All that's changed are your
brain's prior expectations
about what that
sensory data signifies.
And this changes what
you consciously see.
Now this also works in
the auditory domain.
Here are two spectrograms.

Spanish: 
qué tan rápido puede el cerebro
tomar nueva información previa
para cambiar la naturaleza de
percepción consciente.
Este es un llamado
Imagen de Mooney.
Y si no has visto
antes, espero que
verás aquí
es solo un paso
de manchas blancas y negras.
¿Todo el mundo lo entiende?
Manchas en blanco y negro?
Algunos de ustedes podrían
he visto esto antes
Y ahora lo que voy
hacer es llenarlo,
y ves algo
muy diferente.
Lo que verás es una muy
escena significativa aquí involucrando
al menos dos objetos, un
mujer, un sombrero y un caballo.
Ahora si miras fijamente
esto por un tiempo,
No lo dejaré
por demasiado tiempo--
pero si solo miras
por un momento,
y luego tomo eso
imagen de nuevo,
todavía deberías poder ver
los objetos dentro de esa imagen.
Ahora para mí esto es
bastante notable,
porque la información sensorial
no ha cambiado en absoluto.
Todo lo que ha cambiado es tu
las expectativas previas del cerebro
sobre eso
datos sensoriales significa.
Y esto cambia lo que
Tu conscientemente ves.
Ahora esto también funciona en
el dominio auditivo
Aquí hay dos espectrogramas.

Portuguese: 
a rapidez com que o cérebro pode
receber novas informações prévias
para mudar a natureza do
percepção consciente.
Este é um chamado
Imagem mooney.
E se você não viu
antes, espero que
você vai ver aqui
é apenas uma passagem
de manchas pretas e brancas.
Todo mundo meio que entende isso?
Manchas pretas e brancas?
Alguns de vocês podem
já vi isso antes.
E agora o que eu vou
fazer é preencher,
e você vê algo
muito diferente.
O que você verá é muito
cena significativa aqui envolvendo
pelo menos dois objetos, um
mulher, um chapéu e um cavalo.
Agora, se você olhar para
isso por um tempo,
Não vou deixar
por muito tempo
mas se você apenas olhar
nisso por um pouquinho,
e então eu levo isso
imagem de novo,
você ainda deve ser capaz de ver
os objetos dentro dessa imagem.
Agora para mim isso é
Bastante notável,
porque a informação sensorial
não mudou nada.
Tudo o que mudou é o seu
expectativas anteriores do cérebro
sobre o que isso
dados sensoriais significam.
E isso muda o que
você conscientemente vê.
Agora isso também funciona
o domínio auditivo.
Aqui estão dois espectrogramas.

English: 
This is something
called sine wave speech,
and what you see here are two
time frequency representations
of speech sounds.
The one on the top has all the
sharp acoustical features that
provide normal speech removed.
A little bit like
thresholding an image.
And the bottom is
something else.
So I'm going to
play the top first,
and let's see what
it sounds like.
[STRANGE BEEPS AND NOISES]
And now I'll play
you something else.
(BOTTOM SOUND - A MAN'S
VOICE): Jazz and swing fans
like fast music.
- So I hope you all understood
that piece of sage advice.
And now if I play the
original sound again--
[BEEPS AND WHISTLES THAT SOUND
 LIKE THE SENTENCE]
- Yeah?
This is exactly the same.
Again, all this
change is what we
expect that sound to signify.
[SAME SOUND PLAYED AGAIN]
- One more time, just for luck.

Portuguese: 
Isto é algo
chamado discurso de onda senoidal,
e o que você vê aqui são dois
representações de freqüência de tempo
de sons da fala.
Aquele no topo tem todo o
características acústicas nítidas que
fornecer discurso normal removido.
Um pouco como
limiar uma imagem.
E o fundo é
algo mais.
Então eu vou
jogue o topo primeiro,
e vamos ver o que
parece.
[BEEPS ESTRANHOS E RUÍDOS]
E agora eu vou jogar
você outra coisa.
(BOA SOM - UM HOMEM
VOZ): fãs de jazz e swing
como música rápida.
- Então eu espero que todos vocês entendam
aquele pedaço de sábio conselho.
E agora, se eu jogar o
som original de novo
[BEEPS E assobios que o som
 COMO A SENTENÇA]
- Sim?
Isso é exatamente o mesmo.
Mais uma vez, tudo isso
a mudança é o que nós
espere que o som signifique.
[O mesmo som tocou novamente]
- Mais uma vez, só por sorte.

Spanish: 
Esto es algo
llamado discurso de onda sinusoidal,
y lo que ves aquí son dos
representaciones de frecuencia de tiempo
de los sonidos del habla
El de arriba tiene todo el
agudas características acústicas que
proporcionar un habla normal eliminada.
Un poco como
umbralizar una imagen.
Y el fondo es
algo más.
Así que voy a
juega primero arriba,
y veamos qué
suena como.
[EXTRAÑOS BEEPS Y RUIDOS]
Y ahora voy a jugar
usted algo más.
(SONIDO INFERIOR - EL HOMBRE
VOZ): Jazz y fanáticos del swing
como la música rápida.
- Así que espero que todos hayan entendido
ese pedazo de consejo sabio.
Y ahora si toco el
sonido original otra vez--
[BEEPS Y SILBIDOS QUE SONAN
 COMO LA ORACIÓN]
- ¿Sí?
Esto es exactamente lo mismo.
Nuevamente, todo esto
el cambio es lo que
espera que ese sonido signifique.
[MISMO SONIDO JUGADO OTRA VEZ]
- Una vez más, solo por suerte.

Spanish: 
No es solo un montón de
silbidos ruidosos, es discurso.
Ahora esto típico
marco para pensar
acerca de este tipo de efectos
es la Inferencia Bayesiana.
Y esta es una forma de
razonamiento probabilístico, que
es aplicable en todos
tipo de dominios,
no solo en neurociencia,
en el diagnóstico médico,
y todo tipo de cosas,
como encontrar submarinos perdidos.
Pero en neurociencia, hablamos
sobre el cerebro Bayesiano.
Y es una forma de
formalizando la idea de Helmholtz
esa percepción es una
forma de las mejores conjeturas.
Y la idea es que sensorial
señales y creencias previas
puede ser representado como
Distribución de probabilidad.
Entonces, por ejemplo,
esta curva amarilla
es la probabilidad de
algo siendo el caso,
tal vez que tienes un breve
vislumbre de un objeto en movimiento
a la derecha.
Los datos sensoriales pueden
di algo diferente.
Puede tener un
probabilidad de que los picos
en un diferente
ángulo de movimiento.
Tal vez está a la deriva en
una dirección diferente.
Y lo óptimo
combinación de lo anterior,
y la probabilidad, el amarillo
curva y la curva roja,

Portuguese: 
Não é só um monte de
assobios barulhentos, é discurso.
Agora isso típico
quadro para pensar
sobre esses tipos de efeitos
é inferência bayesiana.
E esta é uma forma de
raciocínio probabilístico, que
é aplicável em todos
tipos de domínios,
não apenas na neurociência,
no diagnóstico médico,
e todo tipo de coisa
como encontrar submarinos perdidos.
Mas na neurociência, falamos
sobre o cérebro bayesiano.
E é um jeito de
formalizando a ideia de Helmholtz
essa percepção é um
forma de melhor adivinhação.
E a ideia é que sensorial
sinais e crenças prévias
pode ser representado como
distribuição de probabilidade.
Então, por exemplo,
esta curva amarela
é a probabilidade de
algo sendo o caso,
talvez você tenha um breve
vislumbre de um objeto em movimento
para a direita.
Os dados sensoriais podem
diga algo diferente.
Pode ter um
probabilidade de que picos
em um diferente
ângulo de movimento.
Talvez esteja à deriva
uma direção diferente.
E o ótimo
combinação do anterior,
e a probabilidade, o amarelo
curva e a curva vermelha,

English: 
It's not just a bunch of
noisy whistles, it's speech.
Now this typical
framework for thinking
about these kinds of effects
is Bayesian Inference.
And this is a form of
probabilistic reasoning, which
is applicable in all
sorts of domains,
not just in neuroscience,
in medical diagnosis,
and all sorts of things,
like finding lost submarines.
But in neuroscience, we talk
about the Bayesian brain.
And it's a way of
formalising Helmholtz's idea
that perception is a
form of best guessing.
And the idea is that sensory
signals and prior beliefs
can be represented as
probability distribution.
So for instance,
this yellow curve
is the probability of
something being the case,
maybe that you've got a brief
glimpse of an object moving
to the right.
The sensory data may
say something different.
It may have a
probability that peaks
at a different
angle of movement.
Maybe it's drifting in
a different direction.
And the optimal
combination of the prior,
and the likelihood, the yellow
curve and the red curve,

Spanish: 
es esta curva verde, que
llamaremos el posterior
distribución.
Y eso representa el
la mejor combinación óptima
de estos dos tipos de evidencia.
Y la idea es, bueno
eso es lo que percibimos
Pensando en
percepción de esta manera
hace algo bastante
extraño en el camino,
Clásicamente en
neurociencia, personas
he pensado en la percepción
La vista clásica
es que el cerebro
procesos sensoriales
información en un plano ascendente,
o dirección de avance.
Esta es una imagen de
sistema visual del mono,
y la idea es esa información
entra por la retina,
luego pasa por el tálamo.
Luego va al
parte posterior del cerebro.
Y a medida que las señales sensoriales
percola más y más
y más profundo en el
cerebro, codifican
o representar progresivamente
características más sofisticadas
de objetos
Entonces comienzas temprano
nivela la corteza visual
con respuesta a
luminancia y bordes
y luego más arriba a los objetos,
incluyendo otros monos.
Lo que es importante aquí es
el levantamiento de pesas perceptual
se hace por información
fluyendo en este bottom-up o

Portuguese: 
é essa curva verde, que
nós chamaremos o posterior
distribuição.
E isso representa o
melhor combinação ideal
desses dois tipos de evidências.
E a ideia é, bem
é isso que percebemos.
Pensando sobre
percepção desta maneira
faz alguma coisa
estranho ao caminho,
classicamente em
neurociência, pessoas
tenho pensado em percepção.
A visão clássica
é que o cérebro
processos sensoriais
informações de baixo para cima,
ou direção de avanço.
Esta é uma foto do
sistema visual do macaco,
e a ideia é que a informação
entra pela retina,
depois atravessa o tálamo.
Então vai para o
parte de trás do cérebro.
E como os sinais sensoriais
percolate mais e mais profundo
e mais fundo no
cérebro, eles codificam
ou representar progressivamente
recursos mais sofisticados
de objetos.
Então você começa cedo
Nivela o córtex visual
com resposta a
luminância e bordas,
e mais alto até objetos,
incluindo outros macacos.
O que é importante aqui é
o levantamento pesado perceptual
é feito por informação
fluindo neste bottom-up ou

English: 
is this green curve, which
we will call the posterior
distribution.
And that represents the
best optimal combination
of these two sorts of evidence.
And the idea is, well
that's what we perceive.
Thinking about
perception in this way
does something rather
strange to the way,
classically in
neuroscience, people
have thought about perception.
The classical view
is that the brain
processes sensory
information in a bottom-up,
or feed-forward direction.
This is a picture of the
visual system of the monkey,
and the idea is that information
comes in through the retina,
then goes through the thalamus.
It then goes to the
back of the brain.
And as the sensory signals
percolate deeper and deeper
and deeper into the
brain, they encode
or represent progressively
more sophisticated features
of objects.
So you start out at early
levels the visual cortex
with response to
luminance, and edges,
and then higher up to objects,
including other monkeys.
What's important here is
the perceptual heavy lifting
is done by information
flowing in this bottom-up or

Spanish: 
dirección de avance.
Ahora la idea del cerebro bayesiano
dice algo muy diferente.
Dice que lo que es realmente
importante son los de arriba hacia abajo
o conexiones de adentro hacia afuera
ese flujo del centro
del cerebro hacia atrás.
Y hemos sabido por
Hace mucho tiempo que hay
un gran número, un muy grande
número de estas conexiones,
y algunas descripciones más
que fluya al revés.
Pero la función tiene
sido bastante misterioso.
Pensando en
el cerebro bayesiano
nos da una buena manera
para interpretar esto
Que es que es exactamente
estos de arriba hacia abajo o de adentro hacia afuera
conexiones que
transmitir predicciones
desde altos niveles del cerebro hasta
niveles más bajos, a niveles más bajos,
volver a la
superficies sensoriales.
Entonces estas flechas azules transmiten
las predicciones del cerebro
sobre las causas
de señales sensoriales
Y luego, ¿qué fluye en el
feed-forward o bottom-up
dirección, desde afuera hacia adentro,
esa es solo la predicción
área, la diferencia entre
lo que el cerebro espera
y lo que se obtiene en cada
nivel de descripción.
Así que esto a menudo se llama
codificación predictiva,

Portuguese: 
direção de alimentação.
Agora a ideia do cérebro bayesiano
diz algo muito diferente.
Diz que o que é realmente
importante é o de cima para baixo
ou conexões de dentro para fora
esse fluxo do centro
do cérebro de volta.
E nós sabemos por
há muito tempo há
um grande número, um muito grande
número dessas conexões,
e algumas descrições mais
do que fluir ao contrário.
Mas a função tem
foi bastante misterioso.
Pensando sobre
o cérebro bayesiano
nos dá um bom caminho
para interpretar isso.
O que é que é exatamente
estes de cima para baixo ou de dentro para fora
conexões que
transmitir previsões
de altos níveis do cérebro para
níveis mais baixos, para níveis mais baixos,
de volta para o
superfícies sensoriais.
Então essas setas azuis transmitem
as previsões do cérebro
sobre as causas
de sinais sensoriais.
E então o que flui no
feedforward ou bottom-up
direção, de fora para dentro,
essa é apenas a previsão
área, a diferença entre
o que o cérebro espera
e o que ganha em cada
nível de descrição.
Então isso geralmente é chamado
codificação preditiva,

English: 
feed-forward direction.
Now the Bayesian brain idea
says something very different.
It says that what's really
important are the top-down
or inside-out connections
that flow from the centre
of the brain back out.
And we've known for
a long time there's
a large number, a very large
number of these connections,
and some descriptions more
than flow the other way around.
But the function has
been rather mysterious.
Thinking about
the Bayesian brain
gives us a nice way
to interpret this.
Which is that it's exactly
these top-down or inside-out
connections that
convey predictions
from high levels of the brain to
lower levels, to lower levels,
back out to the
sensory surfaces.
So these blue arrows convey
the brain's predictions
about the causes
of sensory signals.
And then what flows in the
feed-forward or bottom-up
direction, from the outside-in,
that's just the prediction
area, the difference between
what the brain expects
and what it gets at each
level of description.
So this is often called
predictive coding,

Portuguese: 
ou processamento preditivo,
em alguns quadros formais.
E a ideia é que
minimização de previsão
erro ocorre em todos
níveis dessa hierarquia
ao mesmo tempo,
e o que nós então
perceber é a consequência
desta minimização conjunta
de erro de previsão.
Então você pode pensar em
percepção como uma espécie
de controlado
alucinação, em que
nossas previsões perceptivas são
sendo refreado em todos os pontos
por informações sensoriais de
o mundo e o corpo.
Agora há bastante
monte de experimentos
que mostram que
algo assim
provavelmente vai
no cérebro.
Estes são alguns exemplos.
E já que eles são--
Eu estava procurando
o melhor exemplo
então eles não vêm
do meu laboratório em tudo.
[RISO]
Isto é de Lars
Muckli em Glasgow.
Ele mostrou usando avançado
técnicas de leitura do cérebro, que
Eu não vou descrever que você
pode decodificar o contexto do que
uma pessoa está vendo de partes
do córtex visual que
nem está recebendo nenhuma entrada.
E mais, você
pode decodificar melhor

Spanish: 
o procesamiento predictivo,
en algunos marcos formales.
Y la idea es que
minimización de la predicción
el error ocurre a través de todos
niveles de esta jerarquía
al mismo tiempo,
y lo que entonces
percibir es la consecuencia
de esta minimización conjunta
de error de predicción
Entonces puedes pensar en
la percepción como un género
de controlado
alucinación, en la cual
nuestras predicciones perceptivas son
ser frenado en todos los puntos
por información sensorial de
el mundo y el cuerpo
Ahora hay bastante
muchos experimentos
eso muestra eso
algo como esto
es probable que vaya
en el cerebro
Estos son un par de ejemplos.
Y dado que son--
estaba buscando
el mejor ejemplo
para que no vengan
de mi laboratorio en absoluto.
[RISA]
Esto es de Lars
Muckli en Glasgow.
Él se muestra usando avanzada
técnicas de lectura del cerebro, que
No describiré, que tú
puede decodificar el contexto de lo que
una persona está viendo por partes
de la corteza visual que
ni siquiera está recibiendo ninguna entrada.
Y además, tú
puede decodificar mejor

English: 
or predictive processing,
in some formal frameworks.
And the idea is that
minimization of prediction
error occurs across all
levels of this hierarchy
at the same time,
and what we then
perceive is the consequence
of this joint minimization
of prediction error.
So you can think of
perception as a sort
of controlled
hallucination, in which
our perceptual predictions are
being reined in at all points
by sensory information from
the world and the body.
Now there's quite a
lot of experiments
that show that
something like this
is probably going
on in the brain.
These are a couple of examples.
And since they're--
I was looking for
the best example
so they don't come
from my lab at all.
[LAUGHTER]
This is from Lars
Muckli in Glasgow.
He's shown using advanced
brain reading techniques, which
I won't describe, that you
can decode the context of what
a person is seeing from parts
of the visual cortex that
isn't even receiving any input.
And what's more, you
can decode better

Spanish: 
cuando descifras desde la parte superior
parte de la corteza, que
se supone que debe recibir
predicciones de niveles superiores.
Entonces eso sugiere que hay
predicciones retroalimentadas
Y otro estudio de Andre
Bastos y Pascal Fries
en Alemania, utilizaron un método
llamada causalidad Granger, que
es sensible a la información
flujo en sistemas.
Y encuentran que de arriba hacia abajo
señales y señales de abajo hacia arriba
se transmiten en
diferentes bandas de frecuencia
en la corteza,
que es lo que
predecir a partir de la codificación predictiva.
Un último experimento que yo
encontrar particularmente interesante
es un experimento de un japonés
grupo de Masanori Murayama.
Y solían
optigenetics, que
es una forma de usar luces
para girar selectivamente
dentro o fuera de los circuitos neuronales.
Y en esto
experimento que mostraron
que simplemente desactivando
niveles superficiales superiores
de somatosensorial
Corteza en un ratón
cerebro, la parte
del cerebro del ratón

English: 
when you decode from the top
part of the cortex, which
is supposed to receive
predictions from higher levels.
So that suggests there are
predictions being fed back.
And another study by Andre
Bastos and Pascal Fries
in Germany, they used a method
called Granger causality, which
is sensitive to information
flow in systems.
And they find that top-down
signals and bottom-up signals
are conveyed in
different frequency bands
in the cortex,
which is what you'd
predict from predictive coding.
One last experiment which I
find particularly interesting
is an experiment from a Japanese
group of Masanori Murayama.
And they used to
optigenetics, which
is a way of using lights
to selectively turn
on or off neural circuits.
And in this
experiment they showed
that by just deactivating
top superficial levels
of somatosensory
cortex in a mouse
brain, the part
of the mouse brain

Portuguese: 
quando você decodificar a partir do topo
parte do córtex, que
é suposto receber
previsões de níveis mais altos.
Então, isso sugere que existem
previsões sendo realimentadas.
E outro estudo de Andre
Bastos e Fries Pascal
na Alemanha, eles usaram um método
chamado causalidade Granger, que
é sensível à informação
fluxo em sistemas.
E eles acham que de cima para baixo
sinais e sinais ascendentes
são transmitidos em
bandas de frequência diferentes
no córtex,
que é o que você
prever a codificação preditiva.
Um último experimento que eu
achar particularmente interessante
é uma experiência de um japonês
grupo de Masanori Murayama.
E eles costumavam
optigenética, que
é uma maneira de usar luzes
seletivamente virar
ligar ou desligar circuitos neurais.
E neste
experimento eles mostraram
que apenas desativando
níveis superficiais superiores
de somatossensorial
córtex em um rato
cérebro, a parte
do cérebro do rato

English: 
that's sensitive to
touch, they could
affect how well that
mouse was able to do
tactile discriminations.
Those top-down connections were
coming from a motor cortex.
So there's a lot of evidence
that top-down connections
in the brain are
important for perception,
is the basic message there.
But what's rather strange,
and what I'm going to tell
you next is that all this
stuff is all very good,
but predictive processing is
not a theory of consciousness.
Nothing I've said has anything
to do with consciousness,
at all.
It has to do-- it's a
very general theory of how
brains do what they do.
How they do
perception, how they do
cognition, how they do action.
So somewhat
counter-intuitively, I
think this is exactly why it's
a great theory of consciousness.
And the reason I think
this is because it
allows us to ask all
sorts of questions
about the real problem.
About what it is,
what happens in brains
that underlies what you happen
to be conscious of right now,
without getting sucked into the
metaphysical pluckhole of why
you are conscious
in the first place.

Portuguese: 
isso é sensível a
toque, eles poderiam
afetar o quão bem isso
mouse foi capaz de fazer
discriminações tácteis.
Essas conexões de cima para baixo foram
vindo de um córtex motor.
Então, há muitas evidências
que as conexões de cima para baixo
no cérebro são
importante para a percepção,
é a mensagem básica lá.
Mas o que é estranho?
e o que eu vou dizer
a próxima é que tudo isso
tudo é muito bom
mas o processamento preditivo é
não uma teoria da consciência.
Nada do que eu disse tem alguma coisa
fazer com a consciência,
em absoluto.
Tem que fazer-- é um
teoria muito geral de como
os cérebros fazem o que fazem.
Como eles fazem
percepção, como eles fazem
cognição, como eles fazem a ação.
Então, um pouco
contra-intuitivamente, eu
acho que é exatamente por isso que é
uma grande teoria da consciência.
E a razão pela qual eu penso
isso é porque
nos permite perguntar a todos
tipos de perguntas
sobre o problema real.
Sobre o que é,
o que acontece nos cérebros
que subjaz ao que acontece
estar consciente agora,
sem ser sugado para o
pluckhole metafísica do porquê
você está consciente
em primeiro lugar.

Spanish: 
eso es sensible a
toque, podrían
afecta lo bien que eso
el ratón fue capaz de hacer
discriminaciones táctiles.
Esas conexiones de arriba hacia abajo eran
viniendo de una corteza motora
Entonces hay mucha evidencia
que las conexiones de arriba hacia abajo
en el cerebro son
importante para la percepción,
es el mensaje básico allí.
Pero lo que es bastante extraño,
y lo que voy a contar
tu siguiente es que todo esto
todo es muy bueno,
pero el procesamiento predictivo es
no una teoría de la conciencia.
Nada de lo que he dicho tiene nada
para hacer con la conciencia,
en absoluto.
Tiene que hacer-- es un
teoría muy general de cómo
los cerebros hacen lo que hacen.
Cómo lo hacen
percepción, cómo lo hacen
cognición, cómo hacen acción.
Así que algo
contraintuitivamente, yo
Creo que esto es exactamente por qué es
una gran teoría de la conciencia.
Y la razón por la que pienso
esto es porque
nos permite preguntar todo
tipo de preguntas
sobre el problema real.
Acerca de lo que es,
lo que sucede en el cerebro
eso subyace a lo que sucede
estar consciente de ahora mismo,
sin ser absorbido por el
brote metafísico de por qué
eres consciente
en primer lugar.

Spanish: 
En otras palabras, proporciona
un enfoque poderoso
a buscar neuronal
correlatos de conciencia,
esas cosas en el cerebro que
ir junto con ser consciente.
Porque podemos
ahora toma ventaja
de una teoría muy general
de cómo los cerebros hacen qué
ellos lo hacen, más bien
que solo mirar
en esta región o esa región.
Entonces que hace
procesamiento predictivo,
o el cerebro bayesiano dice acerca de
conciencia, específicamente?
Bueno, hace muchos años, algunos
experimentos influyentes
reveló una muy
conexión fuerte
entre señalización de arriba hacia abajo
y contenido consciente.
En este ejemplo de Alvaro
Pascual-Leone y Vincent
Walsh, ¿qué
lo que hicieron fue que tenían
la gente mira el movimiento visual,
ejemplos de movimiento visual.
Y usaron TMS, esto
técnica de intervención
donde puedes borrar el
cerebro muy brevemente.
Lo mencioné antes.
Pero lo usaron
aquí, específicamente
para interrumpir el
señalización hacia abajo superior-M
eso fue evocado por este
percepción del movimiento visual.
Y el resultado fue que, si
interrumpiste específicamente

Portuguese: 
Em outras palavras, ele fornece
uma abordagem poderosa
à procura de neural
correlatos de consciência,
aquelas coisas no cérebro que
vá junto com ser consciente.
Porque nós podemos
agora aproveite
de uma teoria muito geral
de como os cérebros fazem o que
eles preferem
que apenas olhando
nesta região ou naquela região.
Então, o que
processamento preditivo,
ou o cérebro bayesiano diz sobre
consciência, especificamente?
Bem muitos anos atrás, alguns
experimentos influentes
revelou um muito
conexão forte
entre a sinalização de cima para baixo
e conteúdos conscientes.
Neste exemplo por Alvaro
Pascual-Leone e Vincent
Walsh, o que eles
fez foi que eles tinham
as pessoas olham para o movimento visual,
exemplos de movimento visual.
E eles usaram TMS, isso
técnica intervencionista
onde você pode zapear
cérebro muito brevemente.
Eu mencionei isso antes.
Mas eles usaram
aqui, especificamente
interromper o
sinalização top-M para baixo
que foi evocado por este
percepção do movimento visual.
E o resultado foi que, se
você interrompeu especificamente

English: 
In other words, it provides
a powerful approach
to looking for neural
correlates of consciousness,
those things in the brain that
go along with being conscious.
Because we can
now take advantage
of a very general theory
of how brains do what
they do, rather
than just looking
at this region or that region.
So what does
predictive processing,
or the Bayesian brain say about
consciousness, specifically?
Well many years ago, some
influential experiments
revealed a very
strong connection
between top-down signalling
and conscious contents.
In this example by Alvaro
Pascual-Leone and Vincent
Walsh, what they
did was they had
people look at visual motion,
examples of visual motion.
And they used TMS, this
interventional technique
where you can zap the
brain very briefly.
I mentioned it before.
But they used it
here, specifically
to interrupt the
top-M down signalling
that was evoked by this
perception of visual motion.
And the result was that, if
you interrupted specifically

Spanish: 
la retroalimentación de arriba hacia abajo,
tú abolirías
la percepción consciente
de movimiento visual,
incluso si dejaras el
Señalización de abajo hacia arriba intacta.
Entonces esa fue una clave temprana.
Ahora, más recientemente, en nuestro
laboratorio y en muchos otros laboratorios
por todo el lugar, hemos estado
haciendo algunas otras preguntas
sobre la relación
entre lo que esperas
y tu que
experiencia conscientemente.
Uno de los más básicos
preguntas que puedes hacer
es, ¿vemos conscientemente
¿Qué esperamos ver?
¿O vemos lo que viola nuestra
expectativas de lo que esperamos?
Y un estudio reciente de nuestra
grupo, liderado por Yair Pinto,
utilizó un método llamado
supresión de flash continuo
para abordar esta pregunta.
Está ilustrado aquí.
Ves imágenes diferentes
en los diferentes ojos
En un ojo, ves esto rápidamente
cambiando el patrón de Mondrian
de cuadrados.
Y en el otro ojo, tú
o ver una cara o una casa.
Y ellos cambian
contraste como este.
Entonces, inicialmente, la persona
solo ve este patrón al azar,
y luego verán
ya sea una casa o una cara.
Y simplemente, solo
pídales que esperen

Portuguese: 
o feedback top-down,
você aboliria
a percepção consciente
de movimento visual,
mesmo se você deixou o
sinalização de baixo para cima intacto.
Então essa foi uma das primeiras chaves.
Agora, mais recentemente, na nossa
laboratório e em muitos outros laboratórios
em todo o lugar, estivemos
fazendo algumas outras perguntas
sobre o relacionamento
entre o que você espera
e o que você
conscientemente experiência.
Um dos mais básicos
perguntas que você pode perguntar
é, nós conscientemente vemos
what we expect to see?
Or do we see what violates our
expectations of what we expect?
And a recent study from our
group, led by Yair Pinto,
used a method called
continuous flash suppression
to address this question.
It's illustrated here.
You see different images
in the different eyes.
In one eye you see this rapidly
changing Mondrian pattern
of squares.
And in the other eye, you
either see a face or a house.
And they change
contrast like this.
So initially, the person would
just see this random pattern,
and then they'll see
either a house or a face.
And simply, you just
ask them to expect

English: 
the top-down feedback,
you would abolish
the conscious perception
of visual motion,
even if you left the
bottom-up signalling intact.
So that was an early key.
Now, more recently, in our
lab and in many other labs
all over the place, we've been
asking some other questions
about the relationship
between what you expect
and what you
consciously experience.
One of the most basic
questions you can ask
is, do we consciously see
what we expect to see?
Or do we see what violates our
expectations of what we expect?
And a recent study from our
group, led by Yair Pinto,
used a method called
continuous flash suppression
to address this question.
It's illustrated here.
You see different images
in the different eyes.
In one eye you see this rapidly
changing Mondrian pattern
of squares.
And in the other eye, you
either see a face or a house.
And they change
contrast like this.
So initially, the person would
just see this random pattern,
and then they'll see
either a house or a face.
And simply, you just
ask them to expect

English: 
to see-- you just tell
them a face is more likely
or a house is more likely.
And what we find over
a number of studies
is that we see faces
more quickly when that's
what we're expecting to see.
It may seem obvious, but it
could be the other way around.
At least in these studies,
we see what we expect to see,
not what violates
our expectations.
That's the data.
And the same goes for houses.
These kinds of studies
support the idea
that it's the top-down
predictions that
are really important
for determining
what we're conscious of.
There's another experiment
which I will just mention.
We did pretty much
the same thing.
This is called motion
induced blindness.
If you are in a lab rather
than in a lecture theatre,
and you stare at this
central point here,
then this red dot might
disappear from time to time.
And what we did was
after it disappeared,
we changed its colour and we
led people to expect the colour
change to be one
thing or another.
And again, it reappeared more
quickly if it changed colour
in the way you were expecting.
Again, I am confirming that
once your expectations were

Portuguese: 
to see-- you just tell
them a face is more likely
or a house is more likely.
And what we find over
a number of studies
is that we see faces
more quickly when that's
what we're expecting to see.
It may seem obvious, but it
could be the other way around.
At least in these studies,
we see what we expect to see,
not what violates
our expectations.
That's the data.
And the same goes for houses.
These kinds of studies
support the idea
that it's the top-down
predictions that
are really important
for determining
what we're conscious of.
There's another experiment
which I will just mention.
We did pretty much
the same thing.
This is called motion
induced blindness.
If you are in a lab rather
than in a lecture theatre,
and you stare at this
central point here,
then this red dot might
disappear from time to time.
And what we did was
after it disappeared,
we changed its colour and we
led people to expect the colour
change to be one
thing or another.
And again, it reappeared more
quickly if it changed colour
in the way you were expecting.
Again, I am confirming that
once your expectations were

Spanish: 
para ver-- solo dices
ellos una cara es más probable
o una casa es más probable.
Y lo que encontramos sobre
una serie de estudios
es que vemos caras
más rápido cuando eso es
lo que esperamos ver
Puede parecer obvio, pero
podría ser al revés.
Al menos en estos estudios,
vemos lo que esperamos ver,
no lo que viola
nuestras expectativas
Esa es la información.
Y lo mismo vale para las casas.
Este tipo de estudios
apoyar la idea
que es de arriba hacia abajo
predicciones que
son realmente importantes
para determinar
de lo que somos conscientes
Hay otro experimento
que solo mencionaré.
Hicimos bastante
la misma cosa.
Esto se llama movimiento
Ceguera inducida.
Si estás en un laboratorio en vez
que en una sala de conferencias,
y miras fijamente esto
punto central aquí,
entonces este punto rojo podría
desaparecer de vez en cuando.
Y lo que hicimos fue
después de que desapareció,
cambiamos su color y nosotros
llevó a la gente a esperar el color
cambiar para ser uno
cosa u otra.
Y nuevamente, reapareció más
rápidamente si cambió de color
en la forma en que estabas esperando.
De nuevo, estoy confirmando que
una vez que tus expectativas fueron

Spanish: 
validado, luego eso se aceleró
tu conciencia
de algo en el mundo.
Ahora eso es solo
evidencia conductual.
Eso es solo preguntarle a la gente qué
ellos ven y cuando lo ven
También nos ha interesado
en los mecanismos cerebrales que
subyacer y dar forma a cómo
nuestras expectativas cambian,
lo que conscientemente vemos
Y hemos sido particularmente
interesado en algo
llamado el ritmo alfa
Ahora el ritmo alfa
es una oscilación
de alrededor de 10 hertz o
10 ciclos por segundo.
Eso es especialmente prominente
en la corteza visual,
en la parte posterior del cerebro.
En un estudio, dirigido por
este caso un estudiante de doctorado,
Maxine Sherman, con
Ryota Kanai, en Sussex.
Lo que hicimos aquí, lo manipulamos
las expectativas de las personas
de lo que somos
es probable que vea.
Y es muy aburrido
experimento, esto fue
Lo único que podían ver
era lo que llamamos parches de Gabor.
Son solo muy tenues
parches de líneas que
son borrosas alrededor de los bordes.
Pero el sistema visual ama
este tipo de cosas

Portuguese: 
validated, then that accelerated
your conscious awareness
of something in the world.
Now that's just
behavioural evidence.
That's just asking people what
they see and when they see it.
We've also been interested
in the brain mechanisms that
underlie and shape how
our expectations change,
what we consciously see.
And we've been particularly
interested in something
called the alpha rhythm.
Now the alpha rhythm
is an oscillation
of about 10 hertz or
10 cycles per second.
That's especially prominent
in the visual cortex,
across the back of the brain.
In one study, led by in
this case a PhD student,
Maxine Sherman, with
Ryota Kanai, in Sussex.
What we did here, we manipulated
people's expectations
of what they we're
likely to see.
And it's a very boring
experiment, this was.
The only thing they could see
was what we call Gabor patches.
They're just very dim
patches of lines that
are blurry around the edges.
But the visual system loves
these kinds of things.

English: 
validated, then that accelerated
your conscious awareness
of something in the world.
Now that's just
behavioural evidence.
That's just asking people what
they see and when they see it.
We've also been interested
in the brain mechanisms that
underlie and shape how
our expectations change,
what we consciously see.
And we've been particularly
interested in something
called the alpha rhythm.
Now the alpha rhythm
is an oscillation
of about 10 hertz or
10 cycles per second.
That's especially prominent
in the visual cortex,
across the back of the brain.
In one study, led by in
this case a PhD student,
Maxine Sherman, with
Ryota Kanai, in Sussex.
What we did here, we manipulated
people's expectations
of what they we're
likely to see.
And it's a very boring
experiment, this was.
The only thing they could see
was what we call Gabor patches.
They're just very dim
patches of lines that
are blurry around the edges.
But the visual system loves
these kinds of things.

Portuguese: 
They activate early visual
cortex very, very well.
And people were expecting
either that a patch
was there, or that it wasn't
there, in different conditions.
And while doing this we
measured brain activity.
And to cut a long story
short, what we found
was that there were certain
phases, certain parts
of the cycle, this
10 Hertz cycle,
at which your expectation
had a greater effect on what
you said that you saw.
So there was part of this
cycle, as the alpha rhythm,
there was part of it where
your expectations dominated
your perception.
And there was another
part of it which
was the opposite, where
your sensory signals were
more important in determining
what you saw at that point.
So this suggests
that this oscillation
in the back of the
brain is orchestrating
this exchange of predictions
and prediction errors.
And that's the
sort of cycle that
might be the neural mechanism
for conscious vision.
And other theories about what
the alpha rhythm is doing,
there are many.
One is that it's doing
nothing, it's just the brain

English: 
They activate early visual
cortex very, very well.
And people were expecting
either that a patch
was there, or that it wasn't
there, in different conditions.
And while doing this we
measured brain activity.
And to cut a long story
short, what we found
was that there were certain
phases, certain parts
of the cycle, this
10 Hertz cycle,
at which your expectation
had a greater effect on what
you said that you saw.
So there was part of this
cycle, as the alpha rhythm,
there was part of it where
your expectations dominated
your perception.
And there was another
part of it which
was the opposite, where
your sensory signals were
more important in determining
what you saw at that point.
So this suggests
that this oscillation
in the back of the
brain is orchestrating
this exchange of predictions
and prediction errors.
And that's the
sort of cycle that
might be the neural mechanism
for conscious vision.
And other theories about what
the alpha rhythm is doing,
there are many.
One is that it's doing
nothing, it's just the brain

Spanish: 
Actúan temprano visual
corteza muy, muy bien.
Y la gente estaba esperando
ya sea que un parche
estaba allí, o que no era
allí, en diferentes condiciones.
Y mientras hacemos esto
mide la actividad cerebral.
Y para cortar una larga historia
En resumen, lo que encontramos
era que había ciertos
fases, ciertas partes
del ciclo, esto
10 ciclo de Hertz,
a lo que tu expectativa
tuvo un mayor efecto en lo
dijiste que lo viste
Entonces, había parte de esto
ciclo, como el ritmo alfa,
había parte de ella donde
sus expectativas dominadas
tu percepción.
Y había otro
parte de eso que
era lo opuesto, donde
tus señales sensoriales fueron
más importante para determinar
lo que viste en ese punto.
Entonces esto sugiere
que esta oscilación
en la parte posterior de la
el cerebro está orquestando
este intercambio de predicciones
y errores de predicción
Y ese es el
tipo de ciclo que
podría ser el mecanismo neuronal
para la visión consciente
Y otras teorías sobre qué
el ritmo alfa está haciendo,
Hay muchos.
Una es que está haciendo
nada, es solo el cerebro

Portuguese: 
idling away, and I think this is
at least a more interesting way
para pensar sobre isso.
Another experiment we've
done with another PhD student
Asa-Chang, we showed
people these very fast
changing luminance sequences.
And it turns out
that your brains
will learn to predict
the specific changes
in these sequences that
change you very quickly.
And the signature
of this learning,
again, happens to be
in the alpha rhythm,
and suggests that this
oscillation has something
important to do with how
the brain learns and updates
predictions about
sensory signals.
But we do not go around the
world looking at Gabor patches
or rapidly changing
coisas assim.
We go around the world
looking at people and objects.
And that's what our visual
world is composed of.
So can any of these
ideas say anything
about our everyday
visual experience?
And I think that's a
very important challenge
in neuroscience to cross.
Get out of the lab and think
about real world experiences.
So we've been using virtual
reality over the last few years

Spanish: 
al ralentí, y creo que esto es
al menos una forma más interesante
pensar en eso
Otro experimento que hemos
hecho con otro estudiante de doctorado
Asa-Chang, mostramos
gente estos muy rápido
cambiando las secuencias de luminancia.
Y resulta
que tus cerebros
aprenderá a predecir
los cambios específicos
en estas secuencias que
cambiarte muy rápido
Y la firma
de este aprendizaje,
de nuevo, pasa a ser
en el ritmo alfa,
y sugiere que esto
la oscilación tiene algo
importante hacer con la forma
el cerebro aprende y actualiza
predicciones sobre
señales sensoriales
Pero no vamos por el
mundo mirando parches Gabor
or rapidly changing
cosas como esta
We go around the world
looking at people and objects.
And that's what our visual
world is composed of.
So can any of these
ideas say anything
about our everyday
visual experience?
And I think that's a
very important challenge
en neurociencia para cruzar.
Get out of the lab and think
about real world experiences.
So we've been using virtual
reality over the last few years

English: 
idling away, and I think this is
at least a more interesting way
to think about it.
Another experiment we've
done with another PhD student
Asa-Chang, we showed
people these very fast
changing luminance sequences.
And it turns out
that your brains
will learn to predict
the specific changes
in these sequences that
change you very quickly.
And the signature
of this learning,
again, happens to be
in the alpha rhythm,
and suggests that this
oscillation has something
important to do with how
the brain learns and updates
predictions about
sensory signals.
But we do not go around the
world looking at Gabor patches
or rapidly changing
things like this.
We go around the world
looking at people and objects.
And that's what our visual
world is composed of.
So can any of these
ideas say anything
about our everyday
visual experience?
And I think that's a
very important challenge
in neuroscience to cross.
Get out of the lab and think
about real world experiences.
So we've been using virtual
reality over the last few years

Portuguese: 
to try to get at
some of these ideas.
This is an Oculus Rift, which is
now available to buy, I think.
And we've been using
these to address
some of these real world
aspects of visual perception.
And one of these
real world aspects
is called perceptual presence.
And this is the
observation that,
in normal perception, objects
really seem to be there,
as opposed to being
images of objects.
And this is, of
course, what Magritte
plays with in his
famous painting,
The Treachery of Images.
For instance, this is an object.
I think it's there,
and in some sense
I can perceive the back
of it, even though I
can't see the back of it,
even though the back of it's
not giving me any sensory
data, I perceive it
as an object with a back.
How does one explain that?
Well one idea you can come up
with within this Bayesian brain
framework is that,
the brain is not only
predicting the possible causes
of the sensory signals getting
right here, right now.
But it's also predicting
how sensory signals

Spanish: 
to try to get at
some of these ideas.
This is an Oculus Rift, which is
now available to buy, I think.
And we've been using
these to address
some of these real world
aspects of visual perception.
And one of these
real world aspects
se llama presencia perceptual.
Y este es el
observation that,
in normal perception, objects
really seem to be there,
en lugar de ser
images of objects.
And this is, of
course, what Magritte
plays with in his
famous painting,
La traición de imágenes.
Por ejemplo, este es un objeto.
I think it's there,
and in some sense
I can perceive the back
of it, even though I
can't see the back of it,
even though the back of it's
not giving me any sensory
data, I perceive it
como un objeto con una espalda.
¿Cómo se explica eso?
Well one idea you can come up
with within this Bayesian brain
framework is that,
the brain is not only
predicting the possible causes
of the sensory signals getting
aquí y ahora.
But it's also predicting
how sensory signals

English: 
to try to get at
some of these ideas.
This is an Oculus Rift, which is
now available to buy, I think.
And we've been using
these to address
some of these real world
aspects of visual perception.
And one of these
real world aspects
is called perceptual presence.
And this is the
observation that,
in normal perception, objects
really seem to be there,
as opposed to being
images of objects.
And this is, of
course, what Magritte
plays with in his
famous painting,
The Treachery of Images.
For instance, this is an object.
I think it's there,
and in some sense
I can perceive the back
of it, even though I
can't see the back of it,
even though the back of it's
not giving me any sensory
data, I perceive it
as an object with a back.
How does one explain that?
Well one idea you can come up
with within this Bayesian brain
framework is that,
the brain is not only
predicting the possible causes
of the sensory signals getting
right here, right now.
But it's also predicting
how sensory signals

Portuguese: 
would change were I to
make particular actions.
Were I to pick this object
up and move it around,
or just move my eyes from
one place to another.
There's a long paper.
I wrote about that which I--
please don't read it.
[RISO]
- But that's the basic idea.
And how do you test
an idea like that?
So we've been using some
innovative virtual reality
methods, or augmented
reality methods,
with my post-doc,
Keisuke Suzuki.
And what we do is, we
have virtual objects,
and these virtual objects,
they either behave
as a normal object would.
They're all weird,
unfamiliar objects.
But they can either behave as
a normal object would behave,
so you can learn to
predict what would happen.
This one is weird.
It always shows
you the same face,
a little bit like having
the moon on a plate
in front of you.
And then there are
other conditions
where objects respond
to your movements,
but they do so in
unreliable and strange ways.
So the question is,
what does the brain

English: 
would change were I to
make particular actions.
Were I to pick this object
up and move it around,
or just move my eyes from
one place to another.
There's a long paper.
I wrote about that which I--
please don't read it.
[LAUGHTER]
- But that's the basic idea.
And how do you test
an idea like that?
So we've been using some
innovative virtual reality
methods, or augmented
reality methods,
with my post-doc,
Keisuke Suzuki.
And what we do is, we
have virtual objects,
and these virtual objects,
they either behave
as a normal object would.
They're all weird,
unfamiliar objects.
But they can either behave as
a normal object would behave,
so you can learn to
predict what would happen.
This one is weird.
It always shows
you the same face,
a little bit like having
the moon on a plate
in front of you.
And then there are
other conditions
where objects respond
to your movements,
but they do so in
unreliable and strange ways.
So the question is,
what does the brain

Spanish: 
would change were I to
make particular actions.
Were I to pick this object
up and move it around,
or just move my eyes from
one place to another.
Hay un papel largo.
Escribí sobre eso que yo--
por favor no lo leas
[RISA]
- Pero esa es la idea básica.
And how do you test
una idea como esa?
So we've been using some
innovative virtual reality
methods, or augmented
reality methods,
with my post-doc,
Keisuke Suzuki.
And what we do is, we
have virtual objects,
and these virtual objects,
they either behave
como lo haría un objeto normal.
They're all weird,
unfamiliar objects.
But they can either behave as
a normal object would behave,
so you can learn to
predict what would happen.
Este es extraño.
It always shows
you the same face,
a little bit like having
the moon on a plate
frente a ti
And then there are
other conditions
where objects respond
to your movements,
but they do so in
unreliable and strange ways.
Entonces la pregunta es,
what does the brain

English: 
learn about these objects,
and how do we experience them?
Do we experience them as
objects in different ways
when they behave differently?
And we're still doing
those experiments.
Another way we can use
VR, is to investigate
what happens in visual
hallucinations of the kind
experienced in psychosis,
and in certain other more
pharmacologically
induced conditions.
What we're doing here
is, we're coupling
immersive virtual
reality, imagine
you've got a headset
strapped to your head
again, with clever image
processing that models
the effects of overactive
priors on visual perception
to generate a highly
immersive experience.
This is Sussex campus,
actually, but now it
seems quite different than
it did at lunchtime today.
I'll tell you that.
What we've done, we've
recorded this panoramic video
which we can feedback
through VR headset.
And we've processed
this video through one
of these Google deep dream
algorithms you might have seen,
that can generate
sort of bowls of pasta

Portuguese: 
learn about these objects,
and how do we experience them?
Do we experience them as
objects in different ways
when they behave differently?
And we're still doing
those experiments.
Another way we can use
VR, is to investigate
what happens in visual
hallucinations of the kind
experienced in psychosis,
and in certain other more
pharmacologically
induced conditions.
What we're doing here
is, we're coupling
immersive virtual
reality, imagine
you've got a headset
strapped to your head
again, with clever image
processing that models
the effects of overactive
priors on visual perception
to generate a highly
immersive experience.
This is Sussex campus,
actually, but now it
seems quite different than
it did at lunchtime today.
I'll tell you that.
What we've done, we've
recorded this panoramic video
which we can feedback
through VR headset.
And we've processed
this video through one
of these Google deep dream
algorithms you might have seen,
that can generate
sort of bowls of pasta

Spanish: 
learn about these objects,
and how do we experience them?
Do we experience them as
objects in different ways
cuando se comportan de manera diferente?
And we're still doing
those experiments.
Another way we can use
VR, is to investigate
what happens in visual
hallucinations of the kind
experienced in psychosis,
and in certain other more
pharmacologically
induced conditions.
What we're doing here
is, we're coupling
immersive virtual
reality, imagine
you've got a headset
strapped to your head
again, with clever image
processing that models
the effects of overactive
priors on visual perception
to generate a highly
immersive experience.
This is Sussex campus,
actually, but now it
seems quite different than
it did at lunchtime today.
Te lo diré.
What we've done, we've
recorded this panoramic video
which we can feedback
through VR headset.
And we've processed
this video through one
of these Google deep dream
algorithms you might have seen,
that can generate
sort of bowls of pasta

English: 
that looks like animals.
And this might seem
like a lot of fun.
It is fun, but there is
a serious purpose here,
because it allows us to
model the effects, model very
unusual forms of
perception and how
they might play out in different
ways in the visual hierarchy.
And understanding how visual
hallucinations might happen,
and how the wider effects they
have on the mind, I think,
is a very important part of
studying visual perception.
So that brings us to the
second take-home message,
which is that what
we consciously see
is the brain's best guess of
the causes of its sensory input.
Normal perception is a fantasy
that is constrained by reality.
Now before I move on
to the last section,
I want to pay tribute to an
unlikely character in a talk
about neuroscience,
which is Ernst Gombrich.
Ernst Gombrich was one of
the foremost historians
of art of the 20th century.
And it turns out that Gombrich's
approach to understanding art

Spanish: 
que se parece a los animales.
And this might seem
like a lot of fun.
It is fun, but there is
a serious purpose here,
because it allows us to
model the effects, model very
unusual forms of
perception and how
they might play out in different
ways in the visual hierarchy.
And understanding how visual
hallucinations might happen,
and how the wider effects they
have on the mind, I think,
is a very important part of
studying visual perception.
So that brings us to the
second take-home message,
which is that what
we consciously see
is the brain's best guess of
the causes of its sensory input.
Normal perception is a fantasy
that is constrained by reality.
Now before I move on
to the last section,
I want to pay tribute to an
unlikely character in a talk
about neuroscience,
which is Ernst Gombrich.
Ernst Gombrich was one of
the foremost historians
de arte del siglo 20.
And it turns out that Gombrich's
approach to understanding art

Portuguese: 
that looks like animals.
And this might seem
like a lot of fun.
It is fun, but there is
a serious purpose here,
because it allows us to
model the effects, model very
unusual forms of
perception and how
they might play out in different
ways in the visual hierarchy.
And understanding how visual
hallucinations might happen,
and how the wider effects they
have on the mind, I think,
is a very important part of
studying visual perception.
So that brings us to the
second take-home message,
which is that what
we consciously see
is the brain's best guess of
the causes of its sensory input.
Normal perception is a fantasy
that is constrained by reality.
Now before I move on
to the last section,
I want to pay tribute to an
unlikely character in a talk
about neuroscience,
which is Ernst Gombrich.
Ernst Gombrich was one of
the foremost historians
of art of the 20th century.
And it turns out that Gombrich's
approach to understanding art

Spanish: 
had a lot in common with
ideas and the Bayesian brain.
And more specifically,
with the idea
that perception
is largely an act
of imagination, or construction,
on the part of the perceiver.
And this is most apparent in
his concept of the beholder's
share, which emphasises
that the viewer brings
an awful lot to the table in the
act of experiencing an artwork.
So he had this to say in his
1960 book, Art and Illusion,
"the artist gives the beholder
'more to do', he draws them
into the magic circle of
creation and allows him
to experience something of the
thrill of making which had once
been the privilege
of the artist."
I think for me this
is very powerful
when looking at, especially,
things like Impressionist art.
And here, one way
to think about this
is, that the artist
has reverse engineered
the whole perceptual
process, so that what's
there are not the objects,
the end points of perception,
sino más bien las materias primas;
los patrones de luz que
engage our perceptual
machinery in doing its work.
And for me this might be
why paintings like this

English: 
had a lot in common with
ideas and the Bayesian brain.
And more specifically,
with the idea
that perception
is largely an act
of imagination, or construction,
on the part of the perceiver.
And this is most apparent in
his concept of the beholder's
share, which emphasises
that the viewer brings
an awful lot to the table in the
act of experiencing an artwork.
So he had this to say in his
1960 book, Art and Illusion,
"the artist gives the beholder
'more to do', he draws them
into the magic circle of
creation and allows him
to experience something of the
thrill of making which had once
been the privilege
of the artist."
I think for me this
is very powerful
when looking at, especially,
things like Impressionist art.
And here, one way
to think about this
is, that the artist
has reverse engineered
the whole perceptual
process, so that what's
there are not the objects,
the end points of perception,
but rather the raw materials;
the patterns of light that
engage our perceptual
machinery in doing its work.
And for me this might be
why paintings like this

Portuguese: 
had a lot in common with
ideas and the Bayesian brain.
And more specifically,
with the idea
that perception
is largely an act
of imagination, or construction,
on the part of the perceiver.
And this is most apparent in
his concept of the beholder's
share, which emphasises
that the viewer brings
an awful lot to the table in the
act of experiencing an artwork.
So he had this to say in his
1960 book, Art and Illusion,
"the artist gives the beholder
'more to do', he draws them
into the magic circle of
creation and allows him
to experience something of the
thrill of making which had once
been the privilege
of the artist."
I think for me this
is very powerful
when looking at, especially,
things like Impressionist art.
And here, one way
to think about this
is, that the artist
has reverse engineered
the whole perceptual
process, so that what's
there are not the objects,
the end points of perception,
but rather the raw materials;
the patterns of light that
engage our perceptual
machinery in doing its work.
And for me this might be
why paintings like this

Portuguese: 
are particularly powerful.
Now the final dimension
of consciousness
I want to talk about
is conscious self.
The fundamental experience
of being someone.
Being someone like you.
There are many aspects
to our experience
of being a conscious self.
There is the bodily
self, the experience
of being and identifying
with a particular body.
A bit of the world goes
around with you in the world
o tempo todo.
There's the perspectival
self, the experience
of seeing the world, or
experiencing the world,
from a particular first
person perspective,
usually somewhere in the
body, but not always.
There is the volitional
self, the experience
of intending to do things,
and of making things
happen in the world of agency.
And these ideas are, of
course, often associated
with concepts of will.
Then there's the narrative self.
This is where--
only until now, we
don't have to worry
about the concept of I,

English: 
are particularly powerful.
Now the final dimension
of consciousness
I want to talk about
is conscious self.
The fundamental experience
of being someone.
Being someone like you.
There are many aspects
to our experience
of being a conscious self.
There is the bodily
self, the experience
of being and identifying
with a particular body.
A bit of the world goes
around with you in the world
all the time.
There's the perspectival
self, the experience
of seeing the world, or
experiencing the world,
from a particular first
person perspective,
usually somewhere in the
body, but not always.
There is the volitional
self, the experience
of intending to do things,
and of making things
happen in the world of agency.
And these ideas are, of
course, often associated
with concepts of will.
Then there's the narrative self.
This is where--
only until now, we
don't have to worry
about the concept of I,

Spanish: 
son particularmente poderosos.
Now the final dimension
de conciencia
I want to talk about
is conscious self.
The fundamental experience
of being someone.
Ser alguien como tú
There are many aspects
to our experience
de ser un ser consciente.
There is the bodily
self, the experience
of being and identifying
with a particular body.
A bit of the world goes
around with you in the world
todo el tiempo.
There's the perspectival
self, the experience
of seeing the world, or
experiencing the world,
from a particular first
person perspective,
usually somewhere in the
body, but not always.
There is the volitional
self, the experience
of intending to do things,
and of making things
pasar en el mundo de la agencia.
And these ideas are, of
course, often associated
con conceptos de voluntad.
Luego está el yo narrativo.
This is where--
only until now, we
don't have to worry
about the concept of I,

Spanish: 
but when we get to the narrative
self, there is now and I.
There is a continuity of self
experience from hour to hour,
from day to day,
from month to month,
and from year to year, that
you associate a name with,
and a particular set of
autobiographical memories.
And finally, there's
a social self.
The way I experience
being me is partly
dependent on the way I
perceive you as perceiving me.
I'm just going to talk,
in the minutes remain,
sobre el yo corporal.
This is something we're working
on quite a lot in Sussex.
The experience of
identifying with, and owning,
un cuerpo en particular
And the basic idea I want to
convey, is again, very simple.
It's just that we should think
of our experience of body
ownership in the
same way that we
think about our experience
of other things, as well.
That is, it's the brain's
best guess of the causes
de señales relacionadas con el cuerpo.
And the brain is always
making this inference.
It's making its inference
about what in the world
is part of the body, and
what is not part of the body.
But it has access, in
this case, to other sorts

English: 
but when we get to the narrative
self, there is now and I.
There is a continuity of self
experience from hour to hour,
from day to day,
from month to month,
and from year to year, that
you associate a name with,
and a particular set of
autobiographical memories.
And finally, there's
a social self.
The way I experience
being me is partly
dependent on the way I
perceive you as perceiving me.
I'm just going to talk,
in the minutes remain,
about the bodily self.
This is something we're working
on quite a lot in Sussex.
The experience of
identifying with, and owning,
a particular body.
And the basic idea I want to
convey, is again, very simple.
It's just that we should think
of our experience of body
ownership in the
same way that we
think about our experience
of other things, as well.
That is, it's the brain's
best guess of the causes
of body-related signals.
And the brain is always
making this inference.
It's making its inference
about what in the world
is part of the body, and
what is not part of the body.
But it has access, in
this case, to other sorts

Portuguese: 
but when we get to the narrative
self, there is now and I.
There is a continuity of self
experience from hour to hour,
from day to day,
from month to month,
and from year to year, that
you associate a name with,
and a particular set of
autobiographical memories.
And finally, there's
a social self.
The way I experience
being me is partly
dependent on the way I
perceive you as perceiving me.
I'm just going to talk,
in the minutes remain,
about the bodily self.
This is something we're working
on quite a lot in Sussex.
The experience of
identifying with, and owning,
a particular body.
And the basic idea I want to
convey, is again, very simple.
It's just that we should think
of our experience of body
ownership in the
same way that we
think about our experience
of other things, as well.
That is, it's the brain's
best guess of the causes
of body-related signals.
And the brain is always
making this inference.
It's making its inference
about what in the world
is part of the body, and
what is not part of the body.
But it has access, in
this case, to other sorts

English: 
of sensory signals, not
just visual signals,
or tactile signals, but
also proprioceptive signals.
The orange arrows here.
These inform the brain about
the body's configuration
and position in space.
And then also, and
often overlooked,
are interoceptive signals.
These are signals that originate
from within the body, that
tell the brain about
the physiological state
or condition of the inside
of the internal physiological
milieu.
And you can think the idea
is that our experience
of embodied self-hood
is the brain's best
guess of the causes of all
the signals put together.
Yeah, that's just to
emphasise interoception.
An important part
of this idea is
that interoception, the sense
of the body from within,
should work along the same
principles, the same Bayesian
principles that we've
been thinking about,
vision and audition, previously.

Spanish: 
of sensory signals, not
just visual signals,
or tactile signals, but
also proprioceptive signals.
Las flechas naranjas aquí.
These inform the brain about
the body's configuration
y posición en el espacio.
And then also, and
often overlooked,
son señales interoceptivas.
These are signals that originate
from within the body, that
tell the brain about
the physiological state
or condition of the inside
of the internal physiological
medio.
And you can think the idea
is that our experience
of embodied self-hood
is the brain's best
guess of the causes of all
the signals put together.
Yeah, that's just to
emphasise interoception.
An important part
of this idea is
that interoception, the sense
of the body from within,
should work along the same
principles, the same Bayesian
principles that we've
been thinking about,
visión y audición, previamente.

Portuguese: 
of sensory signals, not
just visual signals,
or tactile signals, but
also proprioceptive signals.
The orange arrows here.
These inform the brain about
the body's configuration
and position in space.
And then also, and
often overlooked,
are interoceptive signals.
These are signals that originate
from within the body, that
tell the brain about
the physiological state
or condition of the inside
of the internal physiological
milieu.
And you can think the idea
is that our experience
of embodied self-hood
is the brain's best
guess of the causes of all
the signals put together.
Yeah, that's just to
emphasise interoception.
An important part
of this idea is
that interoception, the sense
of the body from within,
should work along the same
principles, the same Bayesian
principles that we've
been thinking about,
vision and audition, previously.

English: 
That is, our experience of
the inside of our bodies
is the brain's best guess of the
causes of the signals that come
from the inside of our bodies.
So we can think of, again,
top-down predictions
carrying predictions about
what the bodily state is like,
and bottom-M up
prediction errors that
report the differences
between what's going on
and what the brain expects.
So what is our experience
of the inside of our bodies?
Well, way back at the
beginning of psychology,
William James and
Carl Langer proposed
that emotions,
emotional experience,
was really about the brain's
perception of changes
in its physiological state,
rather than perception
of the outside world.
So, in this classic
example, seeing a bear
does not in itself generate
the experience of fear.
Rather seeing the
bear sets in train,
a load of physiological changes
preparing for fight and flight
responses.
And it's the perception
of those bodily changes
in the context with the
bear being around that leads
to our experience of fear.

Portuguese: 
That is, our experience of
the inside of our bodies
is the brain's best guess of the
causes of the signals that come
from the inside of our bodies.
So we can think of, again,
top-down predictions
carrying predictions about
what the bodily state is like,
and bottom-M up
prediction errors that
report the differences
between what's going on
and what the brain expects.
So what is our experience
of the inside of our bodies?
Well, way back at the
beginning of psychology,
William James and
Carl Langer proposed
that emotions,
emotional experience,
was really about the brain's
perception of changes
in its physiological state,
rather than perception
of the outside world.
So, in this classic
example, seeing a bear
does not in itself generate
the experience of fear.
Rather seeing the
bear sets in train,
a load of physiological changes
preparing for fight and flight
respostas.
And it's the perception
of those bodily changes
in the context with the
bear being around that leads
to our experience of fear.

Spanish: 
That is, our experience of
the inside of our bodies
is the brain's best guess of the
causes of the signals that come
desde el interior de nuestros cuerpos
So we can think of, again,
top-down predictions
carrying predictions about
what the bodily state is like,
and bottom-M up
prediction errors that
report the differences
between what's going on
y lo que el cerebro espera
So what is our experience
of the inside of our bodies?
Well, way back at the
beginning of psychology,
William James and
Carl Langer proposed
that emotions,
emotional experience,
was really about the brain's
perception of changes
in its physiological state,
rather than perception
del mundo exterior.
So, in this classic
example, seeing a bear
does not in itself generate
the experience of fear.
Rather seeing the
bear sets in train,
a load of physiological changes
preparing for fight and flight
respuestas.
And it's the perception
of those bodily changes
in the context with the
bear being around that leads
a nuestra experiencia de miedo

Portuguese: 
So the Bayesian perspective
just generalises that idea,
and says that
emotional experience
is the brain's best
guess of the causes
of interoceptive signals.
And this fits very nicely
with a lot of evidence.
And this is just one study
done by a Finnish group.
And all they did here was,
they had people report
where on their bodies they felt
various emotions to take place.
And so you feel anxiety
in one part of your body.
You feel fear in
another, and so on.
So our experience
of emotion does
seem to be
intrinsically embodied.
Now another part of our
experience of being a body
is the body as a physical
object in the world.
And this might seem quite
easy to take for granted,
since our physical body
is just always there.
It goes around with us,
it changes over the years,
in unfortunate ways.
But it's always there.

Spanish: 
So the Bayesian perspective
just generalises that idea,
y dice que
emotional experience
is the brain's best
guess of the causes
de señales interoceptivas.
And this fits very nicely
with a lot of evidence.
And this is just one study
done by a Finnish group.
And all they did here was,
they had people report
where on their bodies they felt
various emotions to take place.
And so you feel anxiety
in one part of your body.
You feel fear in
another, and so on.
So our experience
of emotion does
seem to be
intrinsically embodied.
Now another part of our
experience of being a body
is the body as a physical
object in the world.
And this might seem quite
easy to take for granted,
since our physical body
is just always there.
It goes around with us,
it changes over the years,
en formas desafortunadas
Pero siempre está ahí.

English: 
So the Bayesian perspective
just generalises that idea,
and says that
emotional experience
is the brain's best
guess of the causes
of interoceptive signals.
And this fits very nicely
with a lot of evidence.
And this is just one study
done by a Finnish group.
And all they did here was,
they had people report
where on their bodies they felt
various emotions to take place.
And so you feel anxiety
in one part of your body.
You feel fear in
another, and so on.
So our experience
of emotion does
seem to be
intrinsically embodied.
Now another part of our
experience of being a body
is the body as a physical
object in the world.
And this might seem quite
easy to take for granted,
since our physical body
is just always there.
It goes around with us,
it changes over the years,
in unfortunate ways.
But it's always there.

Portuguese: 
But it would be a mistake to
take our experience of body
ownership for granted.
And there are some
classic experiments
that demonstrate how malleable
our experience of body
ownership is.
This is the famous
rubber hand experiment.
Probably some of
you have seen this.
What happens here is that a
volunteer has their hand hidden
under a table, and the fake
hand is put on top of the table,
and then both hands
are simultaneously
stroked with a paintbrush.
And it turns out that just
seeing a hand-like object where
a hand might be, feeling
touch, and then seeing
the object being touched,
is enough evidence
that the brain's best guess
becomes that fake hand is,
in fact, part of my body.
Sort of part of my body.
This is what it looks
like in practise.
Here you can see the fake
hands, focusing on it.
There's the real
hands, not focusing
on it, simultaneous
stroking-- and there are
various ways you can test it.

Spanish: 
But it would be a mistake to
take our experience of body
propiedad por sentado.
And there are some
classic experiments
that demonstrate how malleable
our experience of body
la propiedad es
Este es el famoso
rubber hand experiment.
Probably some of
you have seen this.
What happens here is that a
volunteer has their hand hidden
under a table, and the fake
hand is put on top of the table,
and then both hands
are simultaneously
acariciado con un pincel.
And it turns out that just
seeing a hand-like object where
a hand might be, feeling
touch, and then seeing
the object being touched,
is enough evidence
that the brain's best guess
becomes that fake hand is,
de hecho, parte de mi cuerpo.
Una especie de parte de mi cuerpo.
Esto es lo que parece
like in practise.
Here you can see the fake
hands, focusing on it.
There's the real
hands, not focusing
on it, simultaneous
stroking-- and there are
varias formas en que puedes probarlo.

English: 
But it would be a mistake to
take our experience of body
ownership for granted.
And there are some
classic experiments
that demonstrate how malleable
our experience of body
ownership is.
This is the famous
rubber hand experiment.
Probably some of
you have seen this.
What happens here is that a
volunteer has their hand hidden
under a table, and the fake
hand is put on top of the table,
and then both hands
are simultaneously
stroked with a paintbrush.
And it turns out that just
seeing a hand-like object where
a hand might be, feeling
touch, and then seeing
the object being touched,
is enough evidence
that the brain's best guess
becomes that fake hand is,
in fact, part of my body.
Sort of part of my body.
This is what it looks
like in practise.
Here you can see the fake
hands, focusing on it.
There's the real
hands, not focusing
on it, simultaneous
stroking-- and there are
various ways you can test it.

Portuguese: 
[AUDIENCE LAUGHTER]
- I found in doing this, it
works even better on children,
by the way, if you do that.
So that's interesting,
because that's
using visual and tactile
signals to convince
the brain that this object
is part of its body.
In my lab, we've been
interested in whether these
signals that come from inside
the body also play a role.
So we set up a virtual reality
version of this rubber hand
illusion, where people
wear these goggles,
and they see a
virtual fake hand.
And we also record
their heartbeats.
And now what we can do is,
we can make the virtual hand
flash either in time or out
of time with their heart beat.
And we asked the
question, do people
experience this
virtual hand as more
belonging to them
when it's flashing
in time, rather than out of
time, with their heartbeat?
And the answer is that it does.
And this is just some
data, basically that,
bigger than that, which means
that, indeed, they experience
the hand as more their own.

English: 
[AUDIENCE LAUGHTER]
- I found in doing this, it
works even better on children,
by the way, if you do that.
So that's interesting,
because that's
using visual and tactile
signals to convince
the brain that this object
is part of its body.
In my lab, we've been
interested in whether these
signals that come from inside
the body also play a role.
So we set up a virtual reality
version of this rubber hand
illusion, where people
wear these goggles,
and they see a
virtual fake hand.
And we also record
their heartbeats.
And now what we can do is,
we can make the virtual hand
flash either in time or out
of time with their heart beat.
And we asked the
question, do people
experience this
virtual hand as more
belonging to them
when it's flashing
in time, rather than out of
time, with their heartbeat?
And the answer is that it does.
And this is just some
data, basically that,
bigger than that, which means
that, indeed, they experience
the hand as more their own.

Spanish: 
[RISA DE LA AUDIENCIA]
- I found in doing this, it
works even better on children,
por cierto, si haces eso.
So that's interesting,
because that's
using visual and tactile
signals to convince
the brain that this object
is part of its body.
In my lab, we've been
interested in whether these
signals that come from inside
the body also play a role.
So we set up a virtual reality
version of this rubber hand
illusion, where people
wear these goggles,
and they see a
virtual fake hand.
And we also record
their heartbeats.
And now what we can do is,
we can make the virtual hand
flash either in time or out
of time with their heart beat.
And we asked the
question, do people
experience this
virtual hand as more
belonging to them
when it's flashing
in time, rather than out of
time, with their heartbeat?
Y la respuesta es que sí.
Y esto es solo algo
data, basically that,
bigger than that, which means
that, indeed, they experience
la mano como más suya.

Portuguese: 
The way we measure
that actually,
is that first we can ask them.
That's the easiest way.
Then we can also
ask them to point
to where they think
their hand really is,
and we can see
how far they drift
from where their hand really is
to where the virtual hand is.
And that provides a
more objective way
of measuring the
strength of the effect.
Here's what it looks
like in practise.
Again if you can see this,
that's the real hand.
That's somebody's virtual hand.
Again, imagine you're
wearing a headset
so you'll see this
in 3-D. And you
can just about see it pulsing
to read and back, I hope.
And you can also do
some other things
with these virtual
reality rubber hands
that you couldn't do
with real rubber hands.
For instance, you can map
movements of the real hand
to the virtual hand, so you
can start to ask questions
about the extent to which
the virtual hand moves
as I predict it to move.
How much does that affect
the extent to which I
feel it to be part of my body?
You can make it change colour.

Spanish: 
The way we measure
that actually,
es lo primero que podemos preguntarles.
Esa es la forma más fácil.
Then we can also
ask them to point
to where they think
their hand really is,
and we can see
how far they drift
from where their hand really is
to where the virtual hand is.
And that provides a
more objective way
of measuring the
strength of the effect.
Here's what it looks
like in practise.
Again if you can see this,
that's the real hand.
Esa es la mano virtual de alguien.
Again, imagine you're
wearing a headset
so you'll see this
in 3-D. Y tu
can just about see it pulsing
to read and back, I hope.
And you can also do
some other things
with these virtual
reality rubber hands
that you couldn't do
with real rubber hands.
For instance, you can map
movements of the real hand
to the virtual hand, so you
can start to ask questions
about the extent to which
the virtual hand moves
como predigo que se mueva.
How much does that affect
the extent to which I
siento que es parte de mi cuerpo?
Puedes hacer que cambie de color.

English: 
The way we measure
that actually,
is that first we can ask them.
That's the easiest way.
Then we can also
ask them to point
to where they think
their hand really is,
and we can see
how far they drift
from where their hand really is
to where the virtual hand is.
And that provides a
more objective way
of measuring the
strength of the effect.
Here's what it looks
like in practise.
Again if you can see this,
that's the real hand.
That's somebody's virtual hand.
Again, imagine you're
wearing a headset
so you'll see this
in 3-D. And you
can just about see it pulsing
to read and back, I hope.
And you can also do
some other things
with these virtual
reality rubber hands
that you couldn't do
with real rubber hands.
For instance, you can map
movements of the real hand
to the virtual hand, so you
can start to ask questions
about the extent to which
the virtual hand moves
as I predict it to move.
How much does that affect
the extent to which I
feel it to be part of my body?
You can make it change colour.

Portuguese: 
So you can have somebody embody
a skin colour associated with
a cultural out-group, and see
if they become less racist
as a result.
And then my favourite is where
you can change, actually,
the size of the body.
And that's coming up here.
So here what we do is, we
can have the hand telescope
up and down in size.
And again, this might seem
like fun, and it is fun,
but there is a serious purpose.
There are various conditions.
There's in fact,
a condition called
Alice in Wonderland
Syndrome, where people report
that all parts of their body
are, indeed, telescoping
up and down in size.
And in a more subtle way, there
are lots of body dysmorphias,
of subtle misperceptions
of body shape, which
might be associated
with eating disorders.
And so these sorts of
techniques allow us to approach,
in a very fine grained
way, how people might
mis-perceive their own bodies.
That brings me to the third
take-home message about self.
And with apologies to
Descartes, the take home message

Spanish: 
So you can have somebody embody
a skin colour associated with
a cultural out-group, and see
if they become less racist
como resultado.
And then my favourite is where
you can change, actually,
el tamaño del cuerpo
Y eso viene aquí.
So here what we do is, we
can have the hand telescope
arriba y abajo de tamaño.
And again, this might seem
like fun, and it is fun,
pero hay un propósito serio.
Hay varias condiciones.
There's in fact,
a condition called
Alicia en el país de las Maravillas
Syndrome, where people report
that all parts of their body
are, indeed, telescoping
arriba y abajo de tamaño.
And in a more subtle way, there
are lots of body dysmorphias,
of subtle misperceptions
of body shape, which
might be associated
with eating disorders.
And so these sorts of
techniques allow us to approach,
in a very fine grained
way, how people might
mal percibir sus propios cuerpos.
That brings me to the third
take-home message about self.
And with apologies to
Descartes, the take home message

English: 
So you can have somebody embody
a skin colour associated with
a cultural out-group, and see
if they become less racist
as a result.
And then my favourite is where
you can change, actually,
the size of the body.
And that's coming up here.
So here what we do is, we
can have the hand telescope
up and down in size.
And again, this might seem
like fun, and it is fun,
but there is a serious purpose.
There are various conditions.
There's in fact,
a condition called
Alice in Wonderland
Syndrome, where people report
that all parts of their body
are, indeed, telescoping
up and down in size.
And in a more subtle way, there
are lots of body dysmorphias,
of subtle misperceptions
of body shape, which
might be associated
with eating disorders.
And so these sorts of
techniques allow us to approach,
in a very fine grained
way, how people might
mis-perceive their own bodies.
That brings me to the third
take-home message about self.
And with apologies to
Descartes, the take home message

English: 
is that, I predict
myself, therefore I am.
In the last nine minutes,
before the bell rings,
I want to go full circle and
return to this Cartesian idea
of the beast machine.
To try to convince you that
our experience of being
a conscious self is intimately
tied up with our beast machine
nature.
And to do this, I need to
mention one final aspects
of perceptual inference,
which has a lot
to do with Karl Friston,
who's done a lot of work
in the Bayesian brain
UCL here in London.
And if we think of the brain
as being in the business
of minimising prediction
errors, this can be done either
by updating our
perceptual predictions,
which is what I've been
talking about so far.
And this what Helmholtz said.
Or we can minimise prediction
errors by making actions.
We can change what
we predict, or we
can make an action so that
our predictions come true.
You can change
with sensory input,

Portuguese: 
is that, I predict
myself, therefore I am.
In the last nine minutes,
before the bell rings,
I want to go full circle and
return to this Cartesian idea
of the beast machine.
To try to convince you that
our experience of being
a conscious self is intimately
tied up with our beast machine
natureza.
And to do this, I need to
mention one final aspects
of perceptual inference,
which has a lot
to do with Karl Friston,
who's done a lot of work
in the Bayesian brain
UCL here in London.
And if we think of the brain
as being in the business
of minimising prediction
errors, this can be done either
by updating our
perceptual predictions,
which is what I've been
talking about so far.
And this what Helmholtz said.
Or we can minimise prediction
errors by making actions.
We can change what
we predict, or we
can make an action so that
our predictions come true.
You can change
with sensory input,

Spanish: 
is that, I predict
myself, therefore I am.
In the last nine minutes,
before the bell rings,
I want to go full circle and
return to this Cartesian idea
de la máquina de la bestia.
To try to convince you that
our experience of being
a conscious self is intimately
tied up with our beast machine
naturaleza.
And to do this, I need to
mention one final aspects
of perceptual inference,
which has a lot
to do with Karl Friston,
who's done a lot of work
in the Bayesian brain
UCL here in London.
And if we think of the brain
as being in the business
of minimising prediction
errors, this can be done either
by updating our
perceptual predictions,
which is what I've been
talking about so far.
Y esto es lo que dijo Helmholtz.
Or we can minimise prediction
errors by making actions.
We can change what
we predict, or we
can make an action so that
our predictions come true.
Tu puedes cambiar
with sensory input,

Portuguese: 
or you can change
what you believe
about your sensory input.
One point of doing this is,
that you can make actions,
then, to find out more about
the world that surrounds you.
And this is what
Helmholtz has in mind
when he says that
each movement we make,
by which we alter the
appearance of objects,
should be thought of as
an experiment designed
to test whether we've
understood correctly
the invariant relations of
the phenomena before us.
Which Gregory, much later,
said something similar
when he talked about perception
as hypothesis testing.
The point of this
is, that we make
eye movements, and other
kinds of movements,
to understand what
the world is like.
That, in fact, there was is
tomato there, for instance.
But there's another way to
think about active inference,
which is that, when we
minimise prediction error,
what we're actually doing is
controlling a sensory variable.
We're preventing
it from changing,
because we're making our
prediction about what
it is come true.
And this is the use
of active inference,
to control or
regulate something,

English: 
or you can change
what you believe
about your sensory input.
One point of doing this is,
that you can make actions,
then, to find out more about
the world that surrounds you.
And this is what
Helmholtz has in mind
when he says that
each movement we make,
by which we alter the
appearance of objects,
should be thought of as
an experiment designed
to test whether we've
understood correctly
the invariant relations of
the phenomena before us.
Which Gregory, much later,
said something similar
when he talked about perception
as hypothesis testing.
The point of this
is, that we make
eye movements, and other
kinds of movements,
to understand what
the world is like.
That, in fact, there was is
tomato there, for instance.
But there's another way to
think about active inference,
which is that, when we
minimise prediction error,
what we're actually doing is
controlling a sensory variable.
We're preventing
it from changing,
because we're making our
prediction about what
it is come true.
And this is the use
of active inference,
to control or
regulate something,

Spanish: 
or you can change
lo que crees
acerca de su entrada sensorial.
One point of doing this is,
that you can make actions,
then, to find out more about
the world that surrounds you.
And this is what
Helmholtz has in mind
when he says that
each movement we make,
by which we alter the
appearance of objects,
should be thought of as
an experiment designed
to test whether we've
understood correctly
the invariant relations of
the phenomena before us.
Which Gregory, much later,
said something similar
when he talked about perception
as hypothesis testing.
The point of this
is, that we make
eye movements, and other
kinds of movements,
to understand what
the world is like.
That, in fact, there was is
tomato there, for instance.
But there's another way to
think about active inference,
which is that, when we
minimise prediction error,
what we're actually doing is
controlling a sensory variable.
We're preventing
it from changing,
because we're making our
prediction about what
se hace realidad
And this is the use
of active inference,
to control or
regulate something,

English: 
rather than to understand what
the causes of that something
are.
And this brings a very
different tradition
to mind, which is 20th
century cybernetics.
And this is Ross Ashby,
who was a pioneer
of this way of thinking.
And he, with Roger Conan
right at the end of his life,
wrote a paper.
The title of the paper,
was "Every good regulator
of a system must be a
model of that system".
The idea here is, if you want
to regulate something very
precisely, then you
need a good model
of what effects that system.
Now you could apply this idea
to the external world, as well.
When you try to
catch a cricket ball,
you are actually trying
to control the level
of the angle above the horizon.
But it applies more
naturally, I think,
to the internal
state of our body.
So really, what matters about
my internal physiological
condition, I don't
really need to know
exactly what it's like inside
my body, and care about it.

Spanish: 
rather than to understand what
the causes of that something
son.
And this brings a very
different tradition
to mind, which is 20th
century cybernetics.
And this is Ross Ashby,
who was a pioneer
de esta forma de pensar.
And he, with Roger Conan
right at the end of his life,
escribió un papel.
The title of the paper,
was "Every good regulator
of a system must be a
model of that system".
The idea here is, if you want
to regulate something very
precisely, then you
need a good model
de qué efectos ese sistema.
Now you could apply this idea
to the external world, as well.
When you try to
catch a cricket ball,
you are actually trying
to control the level
del ángulo sobre el horizonte.
But it applies more
naturally, I think,
to the internal
state of our body.
So really, what matters about
my internal physiological
condition, I don't
really need to know
exactly what it's like inside
my body, and care about it.

Portuguese: 
rather than to understand what
the causes of that something
estamos.
And this brings a very
different tradition
to mind, which is 20th
century cybernetics.
And this is Ross Ashby,
who was a pioneer
of this way of thinking.
And he, with Roger Conan
right at the end of his life,
wrote a paper.
The title of the paper,
was "Every good regulator
of a system must be a
model of that system".
The idea here is, if you want
to regulate something very
precisely, then you
need a good model
of what effects that system.
Now you could apply this idea
to the external world, as well.
When you try to
catch a cricket ball,
you are actually trying
to control the level
of the angle above the horizon.
But it applies more
naturally, I think,
to the internal
state of our body.
So really, what matters about
my internal physiological
condition, I don't
really need to know
exactly what it's like inside
my body, and care about it.

English: 
But I need to control it, and
my brain needs to regulate it.
So this way of thinking
about active inference
applies more naturally
to interoception.
Think about it this way that.
Having good predictive
models are always useful,
but we can have a pendulum
that swings, on the one hand,
towards control.
We can use these predictive
models for control,
and that's more applied to the
state of our internal body.
Or we can swing the other way,
and think about perception,
understanding.
You could think of the
instrumental, epistemic ways
of thinking about the role
of action and perception.
And this brings to mind--
I mentioned Karl Friston.
He's come up with this
thing called the free energy
principle.
And I can only nod
to the vast body
of work he's done here on this.
With the slogan, which is that
organisms, over the long run,
maintain themselves in states
in which they expect to be in,
in virtue of having
good predictive models
about their own
internal condition.

Spanish: 
But I need to control it, and
my brain needs to regulate it.
So this way of thinking
about active inference
applies more naturally
to interoception.
Piénsalo de esta manera que.
Having good predictive
models are always useful,
but we can have a pendulum
that swings, on the one hand,
hacia el control.
We can use these predictive
models for control,
and that's more applied to the
state of our internal body.
Or we can swing the other way,
and think about perception,
comprensión.
You could think of the
instrumental, epistemic ways
of thinking about the role
of action and perception.
Y esto me trae a la mente--
Mencioné a Karl Friston.
He's come up with this
thing called the free energy
principio.
And I can only nod
to the vast body
del trabajo que ha hecho aquí en esto.
With the slogan, which is that
organisms, over the long run,
maintain themselves in states
in which they expect to be in,
in virtue of having
good predictive models
about their own
internal condition.

Portuguese: 
But I need to control it, and
my brain needs to regulate it.
So this way of thinking
about active inference
applies more naturally
to interoception.
Think about it this way that.
Having good predictive
models are always useful,
but we can have a pendulum
that swings, on the one hand,
towards control.
We can use these predictive
models for control,
and that's more applied to the
state of our internal body.
Or we can swing the other way,
and think about perception,
compreensão.
You could think of the
instrumental, epistemic ways
of thinking about the role
of action and perception.
And this brings to mind--
I mentioned Karl Friston.
He's come up with this
thing called the free energy
princípio.
And I can only nod
to the vast body
of work he's done here on this.
With the slogan, which is that
organisms, over the long run,
maintain themselves in states
in which they expect to be in,
in virtue of having
good predictive models
about their own
internal condition.

Spanish: 
So this takes us right
back to Descartes,
pero de una manera muy diferente.
As I said right at the beginning
of this lecture, for Descartes
our physiological
reality was rather
irrelevant to our minds, our
rationality, our consciousness.
This is a quote from a 1968
paper on his beast machine
argument, "without minds to
direct their bodily movements,
animals must be regarded as
unthinking, unfeeling machines
ese movimiento como un reloj ".
Now I think if you
try to think how
this idea of our
predictive models
controlling our internal
physiological states,
and the resulting experiences
that perceptual content that
might give rise to, you
can make the opposite case.
And the opposite case would
be that conscious self-hood
emerges because of, and
not in spite of, the fact
que somos máquinas bestiales

English: 
So this takes us right
back to Descartes,
but in a very different way.
As I said right at the beginning
of this lecture, for Descartes
our physiological
reality was rather
irrelevant to our minds, our
rationality, our consciousness.
This is a quote from a 1968
paper on his beast machine
argument, "without minds to
direct their bodily movements,
animals must be regarded as
unthinking, unfeeling machines
that move like clockwork."
Now I think if you
try to think how
this idea of our
predictive models
controlling our internal
physiological states,
and the resulting experiences
that perceptual content that
might give rise to, you
can make the opposite case.
And the opposite case would
be that conscious self-hood
emerges because of, and
not in spite of, the fact
that we are beast machines.

Portuguese: 
So this takes us right
back to Descartes,
but in a very different way.
As I said right at the beginning
of this lecture, for Descartes
our physiological
reality was rather
irrelevant to our minds, our
rationality, our consciousness.
This is a quote from a 1968
paper on his beast machine
argument, "without minds to
direct their bodily movements,
animals must be regarded as
unthinking, unfeeling machines
that move like clockwork."
Now I think if you
try to think how
this idea of our
predictive models
controlling our internal
physiological states,
and the resulting experiences
that perceptual content that
might give rise to, you
can make the opposite case.
And the opposite case would
be that conscious self-hood
emerges because of, and
not in spite of, the fact
that we are beast machines.

Spanish: 
And I think this is a deeply
embodied view of consciousness
and self, and it speaks to this
fundamental link in continuity
between what it is to be alive,
what it is to have a mind,
and what it is to
be a conscious self.
So I repeat, the third
take-home message should
tiene aún más sentido ahora.
That I predict myself,
therefore I am.
And I am a conscious
self because I'm
a bag of self-fulfilling
predicciones
about my own physiological
persistence over time.
Ahora, ¿por qué importa esto?
It's a lot of interesting
ideas, but why should we
be interested in
studying consciousness?
Well it's a very
interesting thing,
Espero haberte convencido.
But there are lots
of practical reasons
estar interesado también
There are between 20 and
60,000 patients in the UK
alone, who are in
disorders of consciousness.
You are in the vegetative
state, or in coma,
or in some other
severely abnormal state
de la conciencia
Having better measures
of conscious level,
as I described at
the beginning, is
going to really
change again, and how

English: 
And I think this is a deeply
embodied view of consciousness
and self, and it speaks to this
fundamental link in continuity
between what it is to be alive,
what it is to have a mind,
and what it is to
be a conscious self.
So I repeat, the third
take-home message should
make even more sense now.
That I predict myself,
therefore I am.
And I am a conscious
self because I'm
a bag of self-fulfilling
predictions
about my own physiological
persistence over time.
Now why does any of this matter?
It's a lot of interesting
ideas, but why should we
be interested in
studying consciousness?
Well it's a very
interesting thing,
I hope I've convinced you.
But there are lots
of practical reasons
to be interested as well.
There are between 20 and
60,000 patients in the UK
alone, who are in
disorders of consciousness.
You are in the vegetative
state, or in coma,
or in some other
severely abnormal state
of consciousness.
Having better measures
of conscious level,
as I described at
the beginning, is
going to really
change again, and how

Portuguese: 
And I think this is a deeply
embodied view of consciousness
and self, and it speaks to this
fundamental link in continuity
between what it is to be alive,
what it is to have a mind,
and what it is to
be a conscious self.
So I repeat, the third
take-home message should
make even more sense now.
That I predict myself,
therefore I am.
And I am a conscious
self because I'm
a bag of self-fulfilling
predictions
about my own physiological
persistence over time.
Now why does any of this matter?
It's a lot of interesting
ideas, but why should we
be interested in
studying consciousness?
Well it's a very
interesting thing,
I hope I've convinced you.
But there are lots
of practical reasons
to be interested as well.
There are between 20 and
60,000 patients in the UK
alone, who are in
disorders of consciousness.
You are in the vegetative
state, or in coma,
or in some other
severely abnormal state
of consciousness.
Having better measures
of conscious level,
as I described at
the beginning, is
going to really
change again, and how

Spanish: 
tratamos a las personas de esta manera
Y por supuesto, en psiquiatría.
Psychiatric disorders are
increasing that prevalence
across all modern
societies, and it's
estimated one in six
of us, at any one time,
are suffering from a
psychiatric condition.
And understanding the mechanisms
that underlie conscious
content and conscious
self, because a lot
of psychiatric disorders
include disturbances
of the way we
experience our body,
even though that might not
be the most obvious symptom,
can help us understand
the mechanisms
envuelto en
psychiatric disorders,
no solo los síntomas
There are also some
more general reasons
for studying consciousness,
which bring up
algunas preguntas éticas
When does consciousness
emerge in development
en recién nacidos conscientes?
Or does consciousness
start even in the womb?
Maybe different dimensions
de conciencia
emerger en diferentes momentos.
¿Son conscientes otros animales?

Portuguese: 
we treat people like this.
And of course, in psychiatry.
Psychiatric disorders are
increasing that prevalence
across all modern
societies, and it's
estimated one in six
of us, at any one time,
are suffering from a
psychiatric condition.
And understanding the mechanisms
that underlie conscious
content and conscious
self, because a lot
of psychiatric disorders
include disturbances
of the way we
experience our body,
even though that might not
be the most obvious symptom,
can help us understand
the mechanisms
involved in
psychiatric disorders,
not just the symptoms.
There are also some
more general reasons
for studying consciousness,
which bring up
some ethical questions.
When does consciousness
emerge in development
on newborn babies conscious?
Or does consciousness
start even in the womb?
Maybe different dimensions
of consciousness
emerge at different times.
Are other animals conscious?

English: 
we treat people like this.
And of course, in psychiatry.
Psychiatric disorders are
increasing that prevalence
across all modern
societies, and it's
estimated one in six
of us, at any one time,
are suffering from a
psychiatric condition.
And understanding the mechanisms
that underlie conscious
content and conscious
self, because a lot
of psychiatric disorders
include disturbances
of the way we
experience our body,
even though that might not
be the most obvious symptom,
can help us understand
the mechanisms
involved in
psychiatric disorders,
not just the symptoms.
There are also some
more general reasons
for studying consciousness,
which bring up
some ethical questions.
When does consciousness
emerge in development
on newborn babies conscious?
Or does consciousness
start even in the womb?
Maybe different dimensions
of consciousness
emerge at different times.
Are other animals conscious?

English: 
Well I think it can make a
very good case for mammals
and primates, but what
about the octopus?
The octopus has more
neurons in its arms
than in its central brain.
They're very smart creatures.
Here, you have to ask the
question not only, what
is it like to be an
octopus, but what is
it like to be an octopus arm?
And finally, with the rise
of artificial intelligence,
we should begin to ask
questions about what would it
take for a machine to have some
kind of subjective experience.
I don't think we're
anywhere near that yet,
but we should consider
what science can tell us
about its possibility, because
that would raise some very,
very tricky ethical questions.
But, fundamentally,
consciousness
remains fascinating for
me for the same reason
that it's motivated people
throughout the ages.
I mean, Hippocrates, the
founder of modern medicine,
put it one way.
He said, from the brain and
from the brain alone arise
our sorrows, our joys.

Portuguese: 
Well I think it can make a
very good case for mammals
and primates, but what
about the octopus?
The octopus has more
neurons in its arms
than in its central brain.
They're very smart creatures.
Here, you have to ask the
question not only, what
is it like to be an
octopus, but what is
it like to be an octopus arm?
And finally, with the rise
of artificial intelligence,
we should begin to ask
questions about what would it
take for a machine to have some
kind of subjective experience.
I don't think we're
anywhere near that yet,
but we should consider
what science can tell us
about its possibility, because
that would raise some very,
very tricky ethical questions.
But, fundamentally,
consciência
remains fascinating for
me for the same reason
that it's motivated people
throughout the ages.
I mean, Hippocrates, the
founder of modern medicine,
put it one way.
He said, from the brain and
from the brain alone arise
our sorrows, our joys.

Spanish: 
Well I think it can make a
very good case for mammals
and primates, but what
about the octopus?
The octopus has more
neurons in its arms
que en su cerebro central.
Son criaturas muy inteligentes.
Here, you have to ask the
question not only, what
is it like to be an
octopus, but what is
me gusta ser un brazo de pulpo?
And finally, with the rise
of artificial intelligence,
we should begin to ask
questions about what would it
take for a machine to have some
kind of subjective experience.
I don't think we're
anywhere near that yet,
but we should consider
what science can tell us
about its possibility, because
that would raise some very,
preguntas éticas muy difíciles.
But, fundamentally,
conciencia
remains fascinating for
me for the same reason
that it's motivated people
throughout the ages.
I mean, Hippocrates, the
founder of modern medicine,
ponlo de una manera.
He said, from the brain and
from the brain alone arise
nuestras tristezas, nuestras alegrías

Portuguese: 
And he also had his
first view of psychiatry
that madness comes
from its moistness.
And then Francis Crick,
in the 1990s, who
I mentioned in the beginning.
He gave birth, if you like,
to the modern neuroscience
of consciousness.
He said much the same thing
in his astonishing hypothesis.
But there is this
mystery and wonder still,
about how the biological
machinery inside our heads
gives rise to the rich
inner universe that
makes life worth living.
And despite this mystery, modern
science is making progress.
I hope I've given you a flavour,
even though we don't understand
how consciousness happens, we
can begin to understand its
mechanisms.
So we should not be afraid of
naturalising consciousness.
Não é uma coisa ruim
to understand its basis
in the material world.
As so often in science,
with greater understanding
comes a larger sense of wonder,
and a greater realisation
that we are part of, and not
apart from, the rest of nature.

English: 
And he also had his
first view of psychiatry
that madness comes
from its moistness.
And then Francis Crick,
in the 1990s, who
I mentioned in the beginning.
He gave birth, if you like,
to the modern neuroscience
of consciousness.
He said much the same thing
in his astonishing hypothesis.
But there is this
mystery and wonder still,
about how the biological
machinery inside our heads
gives rise to the rich
inner universe that
makes life worth living.
And despite this mystery, modern
science is making progress.
I hope I've given you a flavour,
even though we don't understand
how consciousness happens, we
can begin to understand its
mechanisms.
So we should not be afraid of
naturalising consciousness.
It's not a bad thing
to understand its basis
in the material world.
As so often in science,
with greater understanding
comes a larger sense of wonder,
and a greater realisation
that we are part of, and not
apart from, the rest of nature.

Spanish: 
And he also had his
first view of psychiatry
that madness comes
from its moistness.
And then Francis Crick,
in the 1990s, who
Mencioné al principio.
He gave birth, if you like,
to the modern neuroscience
de la conciencia
He said much the same thing
in his astonishing hypothesis.
But there is this
mystery and wonder still,
about how the biological
machinery inside our heads
gives rise to the rich
inner universe that
hace que la vida valga la pena vivir
And despite this mystery, modern
science is making progress.
I hope I've given you a flavour,
even though we don't understand
how consciousness happens, we
can begin to understand its
mecanismos.
So we should not be afraid of
naturalising consciousness.
No es algo malo
to understand its basis
en el mundo material.
As so often in science,
with greater understanding
comes a larger sense of wonder,
and a greater realisation
that we are part of, and not
apart from, the rest of nature.

Portuguese: 
[AUDIENCE APPLAUSE]

Spanish: 
[APLAUSO A LA AUDIENCIA]

English: 
[AUDIENCE APPLAUSE]
