 
# My War at Sea

# 1914-1916

Copyright 2014 Mark Tanner

Published by warletters.net at Smashwords.
Table of Contents

Title Page

Preface

1: From England to South America

2: German Ships Approaching

3: The Coronel Action

4: The Defence of the Falklands

5: The Battle of the Falklands

6: On Patrol

7: To the Dardanelles

8: Invasion Preparations

9: Gallipoli Landings

10: At Cape Helles

11: Back to Anzac

12: The Smyrna Patrol

13: The Suvla Landings

14: The Smyrna Patrol (Continued)

15: Sick Leave in Malta

16: Evacuation

17: Operations Against Smyrna

18: Report on Operations

19: Leaving for Home

APPENDICES

1: Canopus Officers

2: Heathcoat S. Grant - Obituary

3: The Cruise of HMS Canopus by Commander P.J. Stopford

4: Sources

5: Introduction to War Letters Vol. 2

6: Letters from War Letters Vol. 2

7. Notes to War Letters Vol. 2

8: Other Books in the Series

9: References from War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 2

Copyright

# Preface

This ebook is published in conjunction with the War Letters 1914-1918 series.

When researching material for the explanatory notes to accompany War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 2, based on the letters of Philip Malet de Carteret, a 16-year-old midshipman on HMS Canopus during the First World War, I came across a series of seven articles from 1923-1924 in the Naval Review written by Heathcoat S. Grant, the captain of the Canopus between 1914-1916.

With the kind permission of the Naval Review, I have brought together all of Grant's articles and reproduced them in a single volume to make them more easily accessible. I have also added the account given by Commander Philip J. Stopford of the Canopus which also appeared in the Naval Review. (The specific references made in _War Letters 1914 -1918, Vol.2_ to the writing of Grant and Stopford can be found by following the links in appendix nine of this book.)

For the first two years of the war the Canopus had as eventful a time as any ship in the Royal Navy, being involved at Coronel, the Battle of the Falklands and the attempt to force the Dardanelles.

As captain of the ship, Grant's account, based on his service reports and diary, is a valuable source for those wanting to know more about such key naval events of the First World War. It has the added advantage of being highly readable.

The report of his conversations with Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock sheds a valuable light on events at Coronel, while his description of the measures taken on land to defend the Falkland Islands details an important aspect of the battle often overlooked in accounts which focus primarily on the battle at sea.

The Canopus also played a critical role at the Dardanelles, getting further up the Straits than any other Allied ship, and Grant's sceptical perspective from inside the higher echelons of the Royal Navy adds further grist, if more were needed, to critics of the campaign. Later his account of the role of the navy in the Smyrna patrol and the subsequent operations against the Turkish coast following the evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula provide a fascinating view into this frequently forgotten aspect of the conflict.

Stopford's account is much shorter and considerably less interesting than Grant's, but it does offer some additional insights.

There are no notes to accompany the accounts given by Grant and Stopford, and therefore a some prior knowledge of the events mentioned is useful. For those wanting to know more, there are extensive notes to accompany the letters of Philip Malet de Carteret in War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 2.

Covering the same events described by Grant and Stopford, Philip's letters describe events from the perspective of a 16-year-old midshipman. The wide-ranging notes presume no prior knowledge of events and almost all include direct links to a vast range of freely available online resources for naval history including official histories, ships' logs, naval memoirs, maps, naval training manuals, and much more.

Almost all the links to online resources in the notes are freely available to anyone with internet access. The main exception are the articles from the _Oxford Dictionary of National Biography_ , which is a subscription service. For British readers who hold a public libraries lending card there should be free online access using your lending card number as most local libraries subscribe to the service.

Short extracts from War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 2 can be read at the end of this volume.

More information about the series can be found at <http://warletters.net>.

Mark Tanner

<http://www.warletters.net>

# 1: From England to South America

It was with somewhat mixed feelings that one commenced the journey from the north of Scotland to Devonport to join the old battleship Canopus, my war appointment. I had only lately arrived in England from the United States of America, where my appointment as naval attaché had expired, and was awaiting in the ordinary course my appointment to one of the then Home Fleet. The course of diplomatic conditions which brought on the war, however, determined differently, and it was not exhilarating to find that on the almost certainty of war with Germany, one would command an almost obsolete battleship of the Battle Squadron.

On arriving on board things were very busy. Besides the necessary coal, stores, etc. required, there were many war conditions to be carried out. Among other things, this included the removal of as much woodwork and inflammable material as could be spared, including furniture. This did not conduce to comfort later as most carpets, cushions and cabin partitions had to disappear. In the rigorous climatic conditions afterwards experienced, these were badly missed.

From the point of view of fighting efficiency, the armament of the Canopus consisted of four 12-inch and ten 6-inch. Her speed obtained at full speed trial, after the late manoeuvres, was approximately 15 knots, but owing to age and wear 12 knots was found her best for any consecutive steaming. The crew were composed of some active service petty officers and ratings but mostly of Royal Naval Reserve, Fleet Reserve and pensioners.

The officers were principally of the Royal Navy, as heads of departments, and of the Royal Naval Reserve, as junior lieutenants, with a small number of Royal Naval Mids.

Here I wish to pay them the tribute that in the whole of the commission, in all difficulties and active service experiences, no officers and men could have carried out their duty with more self-denial and devotion than without exception did the officers and men of the Canopus.

The 8th Battle Squadron, to which Canopus belonged, assembled at Portland on August 1st, war being declared with Germany on August 4th. In the month of August the transport of the British military force to France commenced. Briefly, the Canopus's duty with others of the 8th Battle Squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral The Hon. Sir Alexander Bethell, was to patrol the Channel and to protect the military transports from attack by enemy craft while the military force was effecting its landing in France under destroyer escort.

These operations were not without excitement as, with others, we were in constant expectation of an attack from enemy submarines, destroyers, or even larger craft. So it was with mixed feelings that in the uncertain light of early morning or evening and foggy weather one encountered our French ally's destroyers and submarines.

One misty morning it was most confidently reported that three enemy cruisers were standing directly for us, and their appearance was sufficient to warrant all hands being at their action stations until the doubtful craft were satisfactorily made out to be three of our own destroyers.

However, the transport of all troops was safely effected without casualty. The various ships of the 8th Battle Squadron were now disposed by the Admiralty for different duties, and our existence as a squadron came to a close.

On August 22nd, 1914, Canopus with Albion, under the command of Rear-Admiral H. L. Tottenham, C.B., left for Gibraltar, but unfortunately soon after our departure we began to develop engine room defects which were later to give considerable cause for anxiety.

The passage to Gibraltar was without incident except for the stopping of the steamer Zeelandia which on boarding was found to contain several Germans of military age. As, however, we were anxious to arrive at Gibraltar as soon as possible, she was handed over to the flagship of Sir B. Milne, homeward bound, who opportunely arrived on the scene.

Our visit to Gibraltar, though hurried, was a pleasant break as neither officers nor men had landed for some time. Also, as our supply of fresh provisions had got somewhat low, and although large supplies from the Rock were not allowed, we were able to replenish the canteen to a certain extent. Clothes were also a difficulty and anything in the way of white clothing was eagerly bought.

The engine repairs were taken in hand, and with the assistance of the dockyard we were ready to proceed to sea by August 29th. My original orders on leaving Portland were in company with H.M.S. Albion to defend the trade routes to Gibraltar.

On leaving Gibraltar, my orders were to proceed to Cape Verde Islands, passing Madeira and the Canary Islands, destroying any enemy cruisers met, capturing any enemy merchant ships and finally getting in touch with Rear-Admiral Stoddart, 5th Squadron Cruiser, informing him that I was to protect British trade in these waters using Sierra Leone, Dakar and Cape Verde Islands as temporary bases for coaling, etc.

The Canopus, perhaps, could hardly be recognised as one of the class likely to catch an enemy cruiser of any speed; the programme, however, appeared of considerable interest.

The night of August 29th, by previous orders, we rendezvoused with the armed cruiser Edinburgh Castle and transferred charts and despatches to her. At a rendezvous off Cape Palmas we met Rear-Admiral Stoddart, flying his flag on H.M.S. Carnarvon, and having in company with him the armoured cruiser Highflyer and the A.M.C. Victorian. After visiting the Rear-Admiral we proceeded under orders for Sierra Leone, meeting the A.M.C. Marmora on September 4th and the A.M.C. Empress of Britain the following night, discharging supernumeraries to both.

Various Dutch vessels had been boarded on this passage, but their papers were all found in order according to the existing instructions for contraband, though no doubt most of the cargoes for Rotterdam and other Dutch ports reached the enemy later.

It was not until September 6th that we received instructions by wireless that foodstuffs destined to certain ports were contraband. The same day we boarded a steamer loaded for one of the ports named, finding it necessary to put an officer and prize crew on board and send her to Sierra Leone.

The same night we received orders from the Admiralty, passed by W/T from the Carnarvon, which again upset our previous orders. They were to the effect that on our arrival at St. Vincent, we were to coal and proceed to Abrolhos Rocks and guard the flying base there which was to be formed for supply ships for cruisers in the Atlantic.

7th September. We arrived at St. Vincent, the anchorage of which was a somewhat extraordinary sight, being filled with German merchant craft unable to get coal as they had either voluntarily interned for fear of capture or been involuntarily detained.

The Consul there, an old friend and brother officer, Captain A. T. Taylor R.N., informed me that he was afraid there would be trouble with the German crews, and before leaving the Portuguese Commandant requested assistance in shifting some of the most truculent to another position in the anchorage, but I was obliged to refuse, Portugal at that time being neutral.

Captain Taylor did everything possible for us and among other things presented me with a grey parrot who became a great companion and favourite aboard. He was, however, a rank coward and later, being horribly afraid of guns, had to be sent below whenever in action

Our stay at St. Vincent was short, and on September 9th we sailed for Abrolhos with the Impoco oil steamer in tow, that being the most rapid method of convoying her. En route we sighted several ships and boarded all we could catch but made no prizes.

The constant sea work was something of a strain as all hands, generally, were in three watches, day and night, keeping one third of the armament manned under control officers. The best shelters possible were provided for officers and men at the exposed guns, and the military tops made snug for look-outs and control officers. Coupled with the usual exercises during the day and night, everyone was fully occupied. It was not without incentive as we had reason to believe that enemy armed merchant cruisers might be sighted at any time.

It was with considerable joy that on September 16th, the day before our arrival at Pernambuco, where it was necessary to coal, we intercepted a W/T giving the news of the British A.M.C. Carmania's victorious action with the German A.M.C. Cap Trafalgar, a good fight at even odds.

17th September. One had been looking forward to arrival at this port with some anxiety as being quite unaware of any chance of getting coal at Abrolhos, and being very short on arrival at Pernambuco, it was proposed to take advantage of the usual obligations from a neutral country and to request the Brazilian authorities for sufficient coal and provisions to proceed to our next port of call, nominally Monte Video.

Everything at first seemed promising. The Impoco proceeded into harbour while the Canopus anchored in the roadstead. On visiting the authorities, they expressed themselves as willing to supply all the stores required, but the weather unfortunately prevented the Canopus from coaling at once.

The following day, when the coal was alongside the ship, the Brazilian authorities fired their mine and presented me with a document which ran as follows: "To the Commanders of men-of-war of any of the powers at war which may enter in Brazilian ports to make repairs or to receive provisions and coal will be requested to give a written declaration that they will not capture merchant ships under the flags of their opponents, even outside the Brazilian territorial waters, if these merchant ships be met within the long. 30W parallel of the 4th degree, and thirty minutes North, and that of thirty degrees South, when they have left with cargo received at Brazilian ports, or are carrying any manifests of cargo to the Brazilian ports. It is forbidden that any of the belligerents should receive in Brazilian ports, goods that came directly in vessels of another nation."

On revisiting the Governor he proved obdurate, and, no arguments being of any avail, I was obliged to flatly refuse to sign an agreement that would prevent us from carrying out our proper operations on the enemy's merchant shipping. This would certainly be taken advantage of by all the German craft at present waiting their chance to escape from Pernambuco. We therefore weighed at once and proceeded to sea with what I trusted would be just sufficient coal to enable me to reach Abrolhos Rocks. We had no reason but a trust in Providence that we should find any coal there on our arrival.

To my great relief, on getting outside on September 18th we spoke to the British collier Adampton, bound for Abrolhos, who had made Pernambuco in hopes of finding an escort. The Impoco, meanwhile, was delayed in the inner harbour by her screw having been fouled by a hawser. In the opinion of the skipper, it had been done in the night and on purpose by some enemy agent.

A word on the situation existing at Pernambuco will explain the difficulties placed in our way. Brazil being a neutral power, the German merchant vessels in the vicinity, knowing that British cruisers were in these waters and watching the port, had temporarily interned themselves there. The port regulations were to the effect that these German vessels were to take down their wireless installations while in port. This order had not been observed, and there was no doubt that one or other of these vessels was sending out information to the German cruiser Karlsruhe, who was inflicting considerable damage to our merchant shipping in the adjacent waters.

On landing, one was immediately struck with the number of German officers and men in the town, probably mostly from the ships in harbour. They seemed on the best of terms with the Brazilian townfolk.

The Patagonia, Hamburg-American liner, had escaped from harbour on September 13th, in spite of the feeble protests of the port authorities. There were remaining in the port the German ships Holger, Otan, Eisenagh, Bahia Laura, Cap Villano, Henry Woorman, Blucher, Sierra Nevada, and the Austrian Walborg. On the whole it was quite evident that at this time Brazilian sympathies were with the Hun.

On the evening of September 18th we picked up the Macedonia and Carmania on W/T, making a rendezvous with them on the following day. On the 19th we passed them both at sea. There was very evident German W/T during the night and fairly close.

We made the Abrolhos on September 22nd, and found there H.M.S. Carnarvon with two prizes, the Kelbergen and Santa Caterina, and the British collier the Repton. The Abrolhos was truly a deserted spot, consisting of a small island with a lighthouse and small power W/T. The lighthouse was inhabited by the lighthouse keeper and his coloured family. The animal life consisted of a small herd of goats and the vegetation of a dozen cocoanut trees.

The island itself is surrounded by coral reefs, doubtfully charted, coupled with the fact that they gave little shelter from the prevailing wind and sea, and the bottom gave bad holding ground. It had no attractions from the sailor's point of view. Abrolhos, however, served us well, as otherwise there was no port on the whole coast, except the Falkland Islands, in which British prizes, colliers and supply ships could lie and discharge their cargo, etc. as required. The international conditions were observed as far as possible, and we anchored three miles from the island, shifting the ships from one side to the other according to the direction of the prevailing wind and sea if heavy.

Later the mids. and some of the other officers and men found some relaxation in bathing ashore and fishing from the ship, which afforded excellent sport. Monster rock cod and other fish were captured and made welcome additions to the larder which, with the exception of the bare ship rations, had run out ­- vegetables, potatoes and fresh meat having long since disappeared. Prize crews were at once put on board the prizes and the Canopus completed with coal.

The matter of communications was extremely difficult. There was no way of sending any wireless communication in code except by one of our own men-of-war, if she was in touch, as no station on the coast of any neutral power, with the exception of Monte Video, would receive wireless messages in code "when addressed to the British Charge d'Affaires."

This station was unfortunately out of the radius of the Canopus's wireless. The result was that the Admiralty and Rear-Admiral's orders were often much delayed, and it was necessary to carry out the disposition of the colliers and stores as seemed most reasonable. Fortunately a rough disposition of the British cruisers had been obtained from the British Intelligence Officer at Pernambuco, and was as follows:

H.M.S. Good Hope, the flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir C. Cradock, with the A.M.C. Otranto were sweeping South from Monte Video; their position, however, was unknown.

The cruisers Glasgow and Monmouth were in the vicinity of the Straits of Magellan, probably proceeding to the westward to capture German shipping, etc. Position unknown.

H.M.S. Defence reported to be joining from the Mediterranean, but her position also unknown.

Cruisers Cornwall and Bristol patrolling the Brazilian coast.

A.M.C. Victorian was ordered to relieve the Macedonia as guardship at Abrolhos; as regards these, on our arrival at Abrolhos nothing was known of their movements.

25th September. It was with considerable misgivings that, having received wireless instructions from H.M.S. Cornwall, we sailed for Monte Video with the collier Boldwell and oiler Impoco to take up the duty of protecting British trade off the River Plate, leaving no guardship at Abrolhos.

We had only been at sea a few hours when a wireless message from the Cornwall was received to the effect that the German cruiser Karlsruhe was reported in lat.1.S., long. 3W., and I decided at once to return to Abrolhos, sending the colliers on to their destination.

Fortunately we spoke to the British ship St. Barbary on our way back, and sent despatches to the British Consul, Monte Video, explaining the situation to the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 4th Cruiser Squadron.

I recalled the Cornwall and Bristol to Abrolhos as they were to the southward. After completing with coal, I despatched them in pursuit of the Karlsruhe; subsequent information showed they must have been close to her but had not the luck to sight her.

From September 26th until October 9th, there was continuous and hard work for the officers and men in unloading stores from the supply ships and embarking them in the various colliers for despatch to Monte Video and the Falklands, etc. The work was the more laborious as it had nearly all to be done by open boats, it being generally too rough to put the vessels alongside each other. Their efforts were repaid, however, for on our arrival at the Falklands later, we found that the colliers had arrived safely and the ammunition for Rear-Admiral Cradock's squadron was forthcoming.

# 2: German Ships Approaching

On October 9th, while on patrol outside the anchorage, a W/T was relayed to us from the Admiralty that the German cruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and probably Dresden, were working across from China to South America. The Canopus was to accompany the Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto, under Admiral Cradock, to search for them and protect trade.

At midnight Cornwall passed orders: "Canopus is to take immediate steps to be relieved by a cruiser and proceed to Falkland Island, Port Stanley, with all despatch."

We returned to the Abrolhos anchorage at daylight on October 10th and coaled at once. The A.M.C. Orama, Captain Segrave, having reported that he would arrive at midnight, the conundrum of finding a guardship to relieve us was solved - though much, I am afraid, to the disgust of Captain Segrave.

The Orama had some interesting information. She had left England on September 10th. Calling at St. Vincent, she had received information that the Karlsruhe had boarded a steamer in lat. 0.50 S., long. 31.30 W., and that two German armed cruisers were between Trinidad Island and Pernambuco. This tallied with previous information we had received.

Captain Segrave had been able to rendezvous with the Macedonia and search on his passage to Pernambuco where he had picked up the Bristol. In company with both these, "as per orders given to the Bristol by me," they had searched towards Rocas Island and Fernando Noronha but missed the enemy.

Captain Segrave was positive that there was wireless communication in German cipher going on from some ship or station close to Pernambuco to Karlsruhe or another German cruiser at sea.

The orders, etc. having been transferred to Orama, Canopus sailed for Port Stanley that evening, making some 13 knots. The passage was uneventful except for bad weather, and we made Port Stanley at 9.30 p.m. on October 18th.

On entering Port Stanley, we received a signal from the Good Hope to take up our position on her, not a very easy thing in the dark with no lights showing, but with the usual foresight of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, he had laid out a mark for us and put his searchlight on it.

19th October. We immediately started coaling, having only some 400 tons aboard. We also began our machinery repairs, having had some considerable trouble with our condensers, etc. on the passage down. This was hardly to be wondered at.

Since the commencement of the war in August, we had not been able to put our fires out and had by this time run some 12,000 miles or more. In peacetime, with this class of battleship, it was nearly always necessary to get fresh water for the boilers in harbour. Not only had this been impossible, but we had to make all the fresh water for the ship's use as well, resulting in a severe strain on our condensing machinery.

On visiting the Rear-Admiral, who was an old and intimate friend of mine since the days when we were midshipmen together, we discussed the situation. Sir Christopher was under no delusions as to the relative strength of the force under his command as compared with that of the enemy, i.e., cruisers Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, merchant cruiser Otranto and Canopus, as opposed to the German force which, as far as we could estimate from information received up to date, consisted of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, Dresden and Nürnberg. He was in hopes, however, of being reinforced by the Defence, which did not occur.

The Rear-Admiral informed me that the Glasgow and Otranto were at this time in search of the enemy in the vicinity of Port Laguna, on the other side of the Magellan Straits. He proposed to sail with the Good Hope, Monmouth and Canopus to reinforce them as soon as we had coaled, provisioned and made good our engine room defects.

He arranged with me that if he was fortunate enough to locate the enemy in force, he would endeavour, as far as possible, to keep the action at such a speed as would enable the Canopus to assist him with her heavier armament of 12-inch guns.

This, we both realised, would be a difficult task as the most we could possibly expect to keep up in our present condition would be some 14, possibly 15, knots for a short period. It was expected that the enemy would have an average speed in excess of all of our squadron with the exception of the Glasgow and Otranto. The latter, however, would be a useless unit in any general action against the superior armament of any of the enemy's ships.

There appeared two possible chances: one of catching them separated, and the other if they would stand action if found in force and opposed to our whole squadron. No opportunity, however, occurred of the first, and in the action at Coronel the squadron were scattered and the Canopus was unfortunately unable, possibly, to reach the scene of action in time to participate, being some 200 miles off.

To return to our story, the Rear-Admiral and self landed to call on Governor Allardyce, who afterwards became Sir William Allardyce. He struck me at the time as a most practical and energetic man. Later I found this a correct impression. After the action of Coronel, when we returned to Port Stanley to prepare the Port to the best of our ability against the probable raid of the German squadron, he, the Governor, was of the greatest assistance in every possible way.

He had quite a respectable little force of local volunteers organised for defence, some of whom were good marksmen. In case of necessity, he had made arrangements for the removal of all women and children and non-combatants from Port Stanley if the enemy appeared.

On the following day, October 20th, Admiral Cradock and I went for what was to be our last walk together. We first called at Government House for some charts of the Pacific Coast, of which we were all in want and of which the Governor had fortunately been able to secure a few copies on the island.

It was a lovely day and I think the Admiral enjoyed it as much as myself. He had been rather depressed with what he considered his poor chances of catching the enemy under favourable conditions, if at all. And no wonder with a scratch squadron such as he had, most of the neighbouring coast and ports full of German spies, the Pacific Ocean open to them, and all the innumerable hiding places round the Straits of Magellan in which they could safely conceal themselves before their probable attempts to break through to the Atlantic side.

The island strongly reminded one of the Shetlands with its bare heather-covered hills and patches of peat and grass. It was full of interest to both of us as it was at this time teeming with wild bird life, duck of all sorts, geese and penguins all coming in for their breeding season. We found a goose nest and many others, and later came on a big colony of penguins that had just landed and were very busy making preparations for their future nurseries.

Cradock's dog, Jack, made a determined attack on the penguin army and was with difficulty restrained from despatching a pugnacious old cock bird. Sea lions were sighted and many a seal, and for a time both of us forgot our troubles.

Meanwhile, all were busy on board embarking stores from our old friend the collier Langoe, who we had filled up at Abrolhos, and making good our machinery defects, etc. The Rear-Admiral inspected the ship on the 21st and expressed himself as satisfied with what he saw. Afterwards, with his permission, it was possible to give the ship's company leave for a run ashore which they richly deserved and apparently enjoyed.

I dined that night with the Admiral and said my goodbyes to Captain Franklin and other friends aboard, our final ones. The Admiral sailed in the Good Hope at 4 p.m. on the 22nd, and we never met again.

The collier Benbrook had been despatched previously with orders to call at Punta Arenas, Magellan Straits, with despatches for the British Consul and to try and collect further charts of the Pacific and Straits and any information of value. She was to meet the Canopus after this at Freshwater Bay, situated some few miles to the West of Punta Arenas. Canopus's orders were that she was to sail on the following day, October 23rd, via the Straits of Magellen to Port Laguna in lat. 45.15 S., long. 73.45 W., arranging to pass Punta Arenas during the dark hours. These orders were a very necessary precaution as we were aware this port was full of German spies and sympathisers.

After picking up the Benbrook, Canopus was to proceed with her and the collier Langoe to Port Languna. This latter rendezvous was altered shortly before the Admiral sailed on his receiving a message from the Glasgow, from Vallona Bay, that the Otranto had been ashore and damaged her bottom and that the Monmouth had such serious defects in her boilers that they would take at least four days to repair. In consequence, all three ships were remaining at that port. This news was decidedly disturbing, meaning that one of our two biggest cruisers would probably be a lame duck.

Canopus left as ordered with the Langoe at 9 a.m. on October 23rd. To attempt to make our identity less conspicuous to passing vessels and enemy spies a third funnel was rigged which at a distance was fairly realistic. We passed Punta Arenas just before daylight, October 26th, and at 1.30 that afternoon picked up the Benbrook.

I was somewhat disturbed by the rather close investigation of a passing fishing boat, but have reason to believe that the information of our whereabouts never did reach Admiral Von Spee.

Incidentally, the officer on board the Benbrook entrusted with the duty of obtaining information, etc., was one of our Lieutenants, Donohue, R.N.R., late master of one of the first British merchant ships to fall a victim to the Karlsruhe, and whose services I enlisted at Pernambuco where he had been landed after some considerable time spent on board the German cruiser.

Lieutenant Donohue proved of the greatest value to me at his time with his knowledge of the Straits. He also later did excellent service at the Dardanelles, where he volunteered and was employed in the specially hazardous work carried out by the trawlers employed in sweeping up the enemy's minefield at night under a very heavy cross fire from the shore batteries.

The scenery was wonderful, the weather having cleared, and it was a glorious day as we made our way for Crooked Passage. The mountains on both sides were snow covered down to the timber line on the shore, and on either sides were innumerable little islands, creeks and bays, all of which were carefully searched with our glasses and by the look-outs aloft for any signs of the enemy's ships.

We reached Crooked Passage by 9.30 p.m., but coupled with smoke from bush fires and the usual rapid change of weather in these latitudes, it had become very thick. As it was impossible to make the leading marks, and having only a general chart to go by, we anchored for the night in Fortescue Bay. We intercepted a wireless with news of the war: a German submarine had been sunk, and the allies were holding their own.

The master of the Benbrook reported that there were six German merchant ships in Punta Arenas, that the port was full of Germans, also that the club there had all the German telegrams.

We passed through Long Reach in the evening, and by 1.30 a.m. on October 28th we reached our first rendezvous with Admiral Cradock off Evangelista Light, but finding no ship there proceeded direct for Vallenar.

Unfortunately we again developed engine trouble, this time with the H.P. piston of the starboard engine, but could not afford the time to stop. This was shortly followed by our steering gear jamming, but fortunately not in narrow waters.

An intercepted wireless telegram taken in on the 29th was probably meant as camouflage by the German agents as it said that the German squadron, having coaled at Chilean ports, had left again for the Australian Coast.

30th October. We made the land in the vicinity of Vallenar at daylight, and at 6 a.m. sighted the Good Hope and Monmouth proceeding out of harbour. I signalled to the Rear-Admiral that we had engine trouble but hoped to be able to effect the repairs in a short time. He replied that they were to be taken in hand and that I should find my orders on board the collier North Wales at the anchorage. It was with considerable disappointment that I saw the two cruisers leaving and to find myself left behind to take charge of the colliers and store ships.

The anchorage was a good one, and when well under the land we were out of sight of any passing vessels to seaward. We immediately proceeded to coal, and the sorely tried engine department set to work on our defects. Working in a temperature just bearable, they had a hard time of it getting the cylinder head off.

Admiral Cradock's orders dated October 29th were:

1. To complete with coal and ammunition.

2. That the Good Hope and Monmouth were leaving Vallenar and sweeping to the northward in search of the enemy. Glasgow was in the vicinity of Coronel. Otranto was on her way to reconnoitre Port Montt.

3. That Good Hope had left a signal party on Auchilu Island near the anchorage and we were to take charge of them.

4. That any further orders would be given us by wireless.

In addition to these service orders, I received a private letter from Admiral Cradock, probably the last he ever wrote; it ran as follows:

Dear H,

I think Leipzig is somewhere close and Good Hope and Monmouth go to sea tomorrow at 6 a.m. to sweep to the north and support the Otranto, which sailed this morning to visit Port Montt. I think there may be a German steamer there. Glasgow is off Coronel sending telegrams and cruising.

I shall return here as soon as the situation is cleared up. Of course, it may be the German squadron we hear, however, you will keep steam up while coaling in case I want the Canopus. If we are not back with you, get your stores from Langoe after coaling.

You will see the signal party on the hill, and will you communicate them your wants and theirs? Our whaler is hauled up at the landing place, and they must meet you when you send in as it is very bad walking and a guide is wanted. The bearing, rough, of where the whaler is hauled up is S. 55 W., near a kind of hollow in the rocks. I hope some luck will come to some ship. I am very disgusted. I wanted the Defence and her speed. We may be drawn away for a bit, but you will use your own judgment.

Yours ever,

KIT CRADOCK.

As soon as our coaling had been fairly started, I left to visit the look-out party mentioned in the Rear-Admiral's letter. It was a difficult walk through the densest jungle and missing the rough track they had made on our return, we found ourselves scrambling over a sort of precipice to reach our boat.

About 11 p.m. I received a signal from the Admiral that the collier North Wales was to sail with all despatch to Juan Fernandez Island to await further orders. Canopus, as soon as her repairs were effected, was to sail with the Langoe and Benbrook for Felix Island, lat. 26.18 S., long. 80.11 W.

On October 31st, after embarking the look-out party at daylight and completing engine repairs to the best of our ability, we weighed at 8 a.m. for Felix Island. We got into bad weather immediately with a heavy sea. The Benbrook had a breakdown and the Langoe rolled to such an extent I thought she would roll all her ammunition loose. The result was that we were obliged to reduce to about 8 knots.

During the night we heard German wireless but received no wireless telegram from our ships. 

# 3: The Coronel Action

The weather still remained bad enough to put our main deck guns out of action, and the muzzles of the upper deck guns were often under water. German wireless was again reported and was fairly strong.

When in lat. 41.20 S., long. 76.10 W. at 4.20 p.m., a signal was intercepted from the Glasgow to Good Hope, "one four-funnel cruiser and one three-funnel cruiser." At 4.26 p.m. from Glasgow, "am being chased." 4.56 p.m. from Glasgow, "two armoured cruisers, one light cruiser. Course west."

On the receipt of the first signal, steam was raised for full speed and course was shaped for the estimated position of the Glasgow. Canopus made repeated signals giving her own position and asking for the position of the Good Hope as since noon on October 31st the Admiral's position was not known.

No reply was received until 6 p.m., undoubtedly owing to the systematic jambing of the wireless by the Germans. This left me, meanwhile, between 5-6 p.m. in grave doubts in what direction to shape course. Whether our squadron were in chase of the enemy, or whether the Admiral was attempting to concentrate on Canopus, as was his intention if the enemy was met in force.

At 4.51 p.m. we intercepted, in spite of jambing, a signal from the Good Hope to Monmouth and Otranto to raise steam for full speed and concentrate on Glasgow. At 4.51 p.m. we got a signal from the Good Hope which was partly blocked, but which gave her position as lat. 37.30 S., long. 74 W., approximately 250 miles distant. This was the last that we ever received from her, and must have been made shortly before the squadron went into action.

Course was at once altered for the Admiral's position, but no further signals of any description were taken in until at 8.45 p.m. we received the appalling signal from the Glasgow by wireless telegram, "Fear Good Hope lost, our squadron scattered."

It was a most dreadful shock to everyone, and I cannot describe my own feelings except that at first I refused to believe it. We continued full speed to the northward, making a rendezvous with the Glasgow, who had given her position and was steaming to the southward at 20 knots.

2nd November. We continued on our course to the northward until 1 a.m., but could not get into touch with any of the squadron except the Glasgow. It now being six hours since we had heard from any of them, I considered it was hopeless and altered course to cut off our colliers, who were still on their way to St. Felix. I gave them orders to proceed direct to Port Stanley, and we proceeded to close the Glasgow, who had been badly hit near the water line and had her after compartment full.

With her superior speed she soon passed us and asked permission to proceed to Port Stanley via Magellan Straits, which was approved. The Glasgow was also able to give me the position of the Otranto, who was apparently making 17 knots and going round in the direction of Cape Horn. This was a great relief as I was still doubtful of her fate.

The information given later by Glasgow as to the condition of the Good Hope and the Monmouth at the close of the action left little doubt in my mind that they were lost.

When last seen by the Glasgow, the Good Hope had a column of flame shooting up from her some 200 feet in height, after which there was a heavy explosion. The Monmouth was badly down by the bows and was engaged by two of the enemy. Glasgow, herself, had a miraculous escape having been under fire from two or more of the enemy for a considerable time, but was only hit four times out of the hundreds of rounds fired at her.

The possibility of leaving the damaged Glasgow and continuing the search for the enemy was in my mind, but the absence of any information as to their movements and the possibility of one or more of their cruisers continuing the chase of the Glasgow to the south seemed the most likely chance of sighting them. At our present speed of about 12 knots they would easily overhaul us and have been sighted, though they would probably have avoided action.

There was an overwhelming feeling of depression among us all at the fate of our comrades. There was also intense disappointment that we had not been able to be with them in their gallant fight, and it was quite open to consideration if we had been in company with Admiral Cradock, whether Admiral Von Spee would have attacked as he did.

I determined to pass through the Messier Strait and shorten the distance between the Glasgow and ourselves, she now being well ahead. It was also with the faint hope that some of the enemy might possibly choose this as the shorter route, if chasing. I doubt, however, if the difficulties of the navigation and the weather we were to experience had been foreseen, whether I should have attempted it.

4th November. We passed through the English Narrows, the breadth of which gave no room for loose steering. The weather had now turned bitterly cold, and shortly before we made the worst part of the channel, it came down in thick snow and heavy squalls which entirely hid the land and all the leading marks.

The situation was a precarious one: there was barely room to turn the ship; the land was steep-to on both sides; the water was too deep to anchor in, and it was pitch dark. There was, however, a small bay marked on our indifferent chart which Lieutenant Donohue informed me was sometimes used by merchant vessels. There was a small white beacon marking one side of the entrance. We most fortunately picked it up with our searchlights, and, shaving a shoal at the entrance, anchored in a comparatively snug little bay. Having completed my third day and night without sleep, I gladly fell into my bunk as I stood.

I must take this opportunity to pay my compliments to the navigating officer Lieutenant Harry Bennett. He was, without exception, one of the best and coolest navigating officers I have served with, and during the whole of the Canopus's commission was always ready, cheerful and resourceful in whatever work he was employed, and later frequently distinguished himself.

The passage we were making by the Messier channel and Smyth's channel, which we had now nearly completed, had never been attempted by any ship approaching the Canopus's dimensions and reflected the greatest credit on Lieutenant Bennett.

5th November. We were under weigh by daylight and, passing through Smyth's channel, made the Straits of Magellan at 10 a.m. A signal was now received from Glasgow that she had not sufficient coal to reach Monte Video and was waiting until the weather moderated.

Captain Luce, in command, had also forwarded to Admiralty his account of the Coronel action through Falkland station. He had also received information that the Scharnhorst and Nürnberg had arrived at Valpariso on November 3rd. He had reported the sinking of the Good Hope and the Monmouth and had sailed again on the 4th.

6th November. We picked up the Glasgow and sailed in company for Port Stanley with stiff S.W. gale. Glasgow, however, made very fair weather of it at slow speed.

# 4: The Defence of the Falklands

7th November. Blowing hard and our engine trouble began to get worse. Main condensers were leaking badly, H.P. piston bumping badly, and the density of the water in the boilers was rising rapidly. Signalled to Admiralty, through Falkland, our report and the names of the "look-out" party - now the sole survivors of the Good Hope.

Otranto asked permission by wireless telegram to proceed to the northward and join Carnarvon off Monte Video. This was approved.

At midnight the signal reached us from Falkland that the Canopus, Otranto and Glasgow were to proceed, if possible, direct to Rio de la Plata and join the Carnarvon and Defence, and were not to touch at Falkland unless absolutely unable to proceed without so doing. This was impossible without coaling both Glasgow and Canopus, so we continued our course to Port Stanley, making the anchorage at 4.30 a.m. and proceeded to coal at once.

8th November. His Excellency the Governor visited the ship on our arrival and we discussed the situation. Both of us were confident that the German squadron would make an attack on the islands shortly and attempt to destroy the signal station. He was naturally anxious for the safety of the inhabitants, especially as he would be left with no protection when we had sailed.

My chief engineer now broke down, and I was not surprised after what he had been through, especially as he was not a naturally strong man. His next senior, Eng.-Lieutenant Commander Start, took charge, and it was due to his and the engine room staff's unremitting work that we were able to proceed once again at a speed of 10 knots at 7 p.m. with Glasgow. She soon passed us and went on independently for Rio de la Plata.

An intercepted message from the Defence indicated that the Admiralty were concentrating all available ships in these waters on the Carnarvon off Monte Video and that reinforcements were being sent from home.

10th November. About 9 a.m. we received orders from Admiralty, through Defence, that Canopus was to remain in Stanley Harbour. "Moor ship so that your guns command the entrance. Extemporise mines outside the entrance. Be prepared for bombardment outside the harbour. Send down your topmasts. Request the Governor to organise all the local forces and make determined resistance. Arrange observation stations to enable you to direct your fire on ships outside. Land guns or use boat's torpedoes to sink a blocking ship before she reaches the harbour. No objection to your grounding ship in order to obtain a good berth. Send Glasgow into River Plate should she be able to get sufficient start of the enemy to avoid capture; if not, moor her inside Canopus. Repair your defects and await orders." We promptly reversed our course for Port Stanley.

This last and comprehensive signal emanated, as I expected at the time, from Lord Fisher, and I inferred that he was in full expectation of the island being attacked shortly by the German squadron. The possibility of meeting the enemy and of effecting some damage on them in return for the destruction of our late squadron mates heartened up all hands. But it was with some anxiety that we closed the island on November 12th as we did not know whether we had returned in time to be before them in their attack.

All doubts on this head were at rest when we got a signal to say they were all well at Port Stanley. We anchored in Port William at 4.30 p.m. and immediately landed look-outs on the best observation spots ashore and placed a picket boat armed with torpedoes as patrol boat near the entrance.

13th November. Finding that the berth I had first selected was not too favourable for our gun fire to seaward and also had a very rocky bottom likely to damage the ship, we shifted berth into Stanley harbour where a very satisfactory berth was found - though at low water we were just touching the bottom.

Meanwhile, all hands were employed in rigging extemporary mines, fixing mountings for the guns, landing machine guns at the places which appeared possible landing places for the enemy's boats, and improvising temporary shelters for the guns' crews and the look outs. The best that we could do at the time was a poor shelter for the men against the S.W. gale and the driving snow in which they were working day and night.

I fully expected to have an alarming sick list from the shore parties, but was agreeably surprised to have next to none. It was due chiefly, I think, to their all being seasoned men. The average on board was 36 years, not to mention the six grandfathers we had among the chief petty officers.

The gun mountings had to be removed bodily from the ship and then bolted on to heavy baulks of timber which, in their turn, were sunk into the ground and cemented in after being filled round with stone. This was in lieu of the soft peat which formed the foundations and was in some places 20 feet deep.

The mines were improvised out of oil drums by Lieut. Lesley and Mr. Uden, gunner. This necessitated cutting out an aperture in the head for packing the gun cotton charge, replacing this with a water joint, and fitting the detonator and cable ends to the same.

Lieut. Philip Hordern with Mr. Irish, the gunner, were responsible for all the gun mounting work, and were largely dependent on the assistance of the carpenter, Mr. Hughes, and his staff for the woodwork etc. for the mountings. The placing of these guns in the selected positions was no mean job, and the boatswain, Mr. Myers, and his working parties had heavy work transporting the guns from the boats over the peat bogs, etc. Some had to be sent round by sea outside the harbour and landed on the beach, and this was carried out with a heavy sea and in half a gale by the officers and men detailed in spite of all obstacles.

To avoid further details of the work carried out by the officers and men under these trying weather conditions, the following is a summary as reported to the Admiralty of the defence work completed by about the 26th November, i.e., in 12 days:

1. The Canopus was moored head and stern in Stanley Harbour. Having been beached just before high water and her double-bottom compartments being filled, she was immovable and made a solid gun platform. Fortunately the bottom selected was mostly mud and the ship sustained little damage, though in the prevailing gales the sea broke over her. From this position we commanded the entrance with two of the 12-inch guns and four of the 6-inch and covered in the opposite direction a large arc to seaward over the intervening land. The position chosen for the ship rendered her as inconspicuous as possible from seaward, and our topmasts and aerials were struck.

2. To obtain our fire over the land and in any position where the enemy could not be observed from the guns, an observation hut had been built in such a position as to give the best all-round view to seaward. The ranges and bearings were plotted out for the guns from the position of the ship in relation to the hut by Lieuts. Bennett and Hordern. The observation hut itself was placed in telephonic communication with the ship. The ranges were tried from the guns with satisfactory results.

3. All available gun cotton had been used for the minefield which, as before mentioned, had been constructed from oil drums. The mines were laid between Arrow Point and York Point, leaving only a narrow passage for vessels entering piloted by the observation boat. There were in all 10 mines, each containing 94 pounds of gun cotton. The firing point and observation hut were protected by a 12-pounder and machine gun.

4. The Local Volunteer force of 160 men had been raised by the Governor, and it was strengthened by 80 of our Marines who were kept ready to land at a moment's notice. The local force had been supplied with a machine gun and toughly drilled under Captain Hobson of the Marines. They had also a field gun. In case of emergency, the Governor had 50 of his men mounted to enable them to reach any of the distant landing places as soon as possible.

5. The shore batteries were placed at the following places:

Ordnance Point Battery.

Three 12-pounders were mounted at this point. This battery commanded the minefield and any vessel entering the harbour or attempting to pass the examination vessel stationed there. It also covered the bay between York Point and Ordnance Point, in case an attempt was made to land in this water.

Hooker Point Battery.

Armed with a 12-pounder and a machine gun to defend the adjacent water and to cover the neck of land to the westward over which any of the enemy landing force would be obliged to pass if landing on the south side of Port William with the intention of attacking the wireless telegraph station or town. This battery worked in conjunction with a force of 50 of the volunteers who were stationed close to the wireless station.

Arrow Point Battery.

Armed with a 12-pounder gun which commanded the entrance to William Harbour and covered the minefield. It had an all-round fire up to the entrance of Stanley Harbour. It was also used as a look-out station.

Lake Point Battery.

Armed with two 12-pounders and was placed so as to repel any landing force attempting the sheltered waters of Harriot Bay or the adjoining waters.

6. Examination Service. This service was conducted by a steamer, the property of the Administration, and had the duty of stopping any vessel entering the harbour without permission and of piloting any craft entering clear of the minefield. She was manned in the daytime by a crew from the ship and at night by the Administration.

7. Patrol Boats. One of the ship's steam boats armed with torpedoes and gun patrolled off the entrance of the harbour at night. The second boat was kept ready alongside with steam up ready to assist if occasion demanded.

8. Look-Out Stations. The lighthouse close to the entrance of the outer harbour was manned by naval ratings and had orders to stop by signal any vessel entering until boarded by the patrol boat. Their orders could be backed up by the guns of the Canopus and the battery. The second look-out station was at Arrow Point, manned by our men. The third station was at Sappers Point, manned by the Volunteers. In addition to these, the batteries were all in signal communication with Canopus by telephone.

9. Communications. Telephone communication was erected between all batteries, lighthouse, town, observation station and the ship. The wireless telegraph shore station was also connected.

10. Hospital. Had been placed in an efficient condition ashore, extra beds etc., having been placed in the wards and the necessary instruments and medical stores landed from the ship. The hospital was in charge of Staff Surgeon Wernet with one of the junior surgeons to assist.

11. Wireless Communication. Communication from Falkland, via Cerritos station, to the British Minister at Monte Video was the only method of communicating with the mainland, but since our arrival on the 12th November, communication had been almost impossible owing to weather conditions. The ship's wave was used for calls from any of H.M.S. vessels to Falkland, 600 metres, and the shore station remained on 900 metres for Cerritos, MonteVideo.

12. Navy Yard. The old navy yard, of which the buildings were in moderate repair, was put in order as far as possible, and the stores which arrived by store ship Crown of Aragon were disembarked and landed there, a long and arduous job with our appliances.

Here I would mention that we received the greatest assistance from the Governor, the Falkland Island Company and the inhabitants of the Colony, and if it had not been for their services in material, carpentering work etc., we should have fared badly, especially in the matter of huts for the men ashore etc. batteries, lighters for transporting guns and stores etc.

The names of several of the ladies and gentlemen of the colony who voluntarily remained to assist at the hospital when there was every chance of the town being bombarded were forwarded to the Admiralty, and the Secretary of State sent a warm appreciation of their conduct. Their names were: Dr. Richard Wace. Miss E. Henry. Mr. G. W. Royle. Miss V. Sellman. Miss Mabel Brookfield. Sister Mary Usher. Mrs. E. Pearce. Sister Rose Venerone. Mrs. J. Sowter.

On completion of this work, I felt in a measure that the strain was relieved and that with a few exceptions everything had been done that was humanly possible to make a good resistance either from bombardment or landing by the enemy.

During this period, between the 12th and 26th of November, we got scanty news from outside, but on the 17th the enemy were reported as being off Valparaiso, and we received the cheering news that all our colliers on the Pacific side had escaped.

21st November. This was a red-letter day as the Crown of Galicia store ship arrived with our stores and 50 bags of mails for the Canopus. This was the first mail we had received since leaving England in August, and we received letters dating from the 12th August up to 16th September.

The Crown of Galicia had had a most marvellous escape from capture, having sailed from Falkland to Valparaiso after the action of Coronel. She arrived there on the 9th November to find that port crowded with Germans, and just managed to get clear before the return of the Leipzig and Bremen on the following day.

The Master also reported having sighted a three-funnelled cruiser off Evangelista on the 4th November which must have been one of the enemy.

25th November. We at last got in touch with Monte Video and received a signal that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had rounded Cape Horn on the 22nd. This made it seem likely that they would be down at any time and our efforts at defence put to the test. The completion of any remaining work for this was carried on day and night.

The women and children and non-combatants were sent out of the town, inland, to where they would be most probably out of range of the enemy's gunfire if they started bombarding the town or wireless station.

I took the opportunity of making a final tour of inspection of all the batteries etc., and was satisfied that as far as the time allowed, they were now in the position to repel any boat attacks or attempt to land an armed force in the vicinity of the town. We had had several scares at night, generally due to some of the whalers attempting to come in without being boarded, but the prompt action of the batteries soon brought them up.

The movements of these craft had to be severely controlled as their crews were of mixed nationalities, and we had no wish to let what had been going on at Stanley leak out to the German spies on the mainland.

29th November. Being a Sunday and arrangements having been made with the Governor, a memorial service was held ashore in memory of the officers and men of the Good Hope and Monmouth. About 200 of our officers and men were able to attend. The Governor and self discussed the situation, which to all appearances seemed as if we might expect an attack at any time, but except for the already quoted signal received on the 10th November, we only knew that somewhere in the Atlantic our naval force was concentrating and that it might be reinforced from home.

30th November. We received some war news which was not cheering: H.M.S. Bulwark had been blown up in her own port and the Allied troops in France were just holding their own.

The officers and men ashore were now comfortably installed and all the huts were erected with the exception of the observation hut, which we hoped would be completed in a couple of days.

They had some amusement at one of the batteries. The men reported that a strange beast had taken possession of the magazine which was dug out of the side of the hill close to the battery. On closer investigation they found a large seal which evidently thought that comfortable quarters had been prepared for him. He was ejected with difficulty by lassoing him by the tail and the crew hauling their best.

At another battery I found signs of freshly slaughtered sheep. This was explained by the officer in charge as due to the efficient look-out of their sentry on whom the mutton had advanced during the night without giving any countersign and refusing to halt had suffered the penalty. I had no doubt that the Falkland Island Company would excuse this mistaken zeal if they happened to hear of it.

1st December. The new month opened sadly. Some eight of our volunteers attempting to cross one of the creeks in a crazy punt got capsized. As it was in an out-of-the-way spot, they were not seen, and due probably to the temperature of the water and the thick seaweed, they had all been drowned.

During the day a message was received through Cerritos that the Admiralty wished a daily report from us. This was, except on the most favourable atmospheric conditions, impossible: the utmost ordinary range of the station being some 400 miles as against 600 miles to Cerritos.

3rd December. Not being altogether satisfied with the immovability of the ship while firing the 12-inch, owing to her not being fast enough on the bottom at high tide etc., I determined to take a chance against time and ran the ship firmly into the mud in a position we had carefully surveyed. We then filled the double bottoms to help steady her. With the assistance of six anchors laid out from the ship, I had no doubts about her now being a thoroughly immovable platform, being some five feet in the mud.

This was severely tested the following day as it blew a howling gale from the west and the seas broke clean over the ship.

I was sorry for Bennett, our navigator, who owing to our new position had to work out all the elaborate calculations again for the observation station. However, with his usual good humour and hard work, he soon completed this.

5th December. We had the first intimation of any of our ships being within wireless as the Glasgow was reported to have been heard calling Monte Video.

7th December. It was indeed a most pleasant surprise when the report of smoke and vessels being seen in the offing turned out to be the squadron under Admiral Sturdee consisting of Invincible, Inflexible, Cornwall, Carnarvon, Kent, Bristol and Glasgow.

The Macedonia was following up with a squadron of colliers etc. A comparison with our old squadron, which had sailed from Falkland for the same objective, was rather marked. What would not Admiral Cradock have given for either the Inflexible or Invincible, and how easily would the presence of one of these have reversed the action of Coronel?

As soon as the flagship had anchored, I went aboard to see the Admiral, Sir Doveton Sturdee, and gave him the particulars of the defence work etc. He was very well satisfied with it and requested me to take over the duties of Senior Naval Officer of the Port while the squadron were in. This included the coaling and provisioning arrangements of the squadron which had brought quite a small fleet of auxiliaries with them, amounting in all to eleven colliers and two supply ships.

A meeting of all the commanding officers was then held aboard the flagship and the situation was discussed - some later information having been received from one of the whalers. It was decided that as soon as possible after coaling and provisioning, the squadron would sail for the Straits of Magellan. The smaller cruisers were to search the bays etc. in the vicinity while the Inflexible and Invincible watched the Straits in case the others bolted their game. The Canopus was to remain as guard ship at Stanley in case the German squadron did manage to evade our ships.

The general opinion was that they were certain to pass through the Straits shortly and probably make for the African coast and harass our trade from the Cape.

The Admiralty had, however, seen the possibility of the Hun giving the squadron under Admiral Sturdee the slip and, to prevent a recurrence of the Coronel disaster, had reinforced the ships in those waters.

# 5: The Battle of the Falklands

8th December. The squadron were all busy coaling, etc. when at 7.40 a.m. our look-out on the station at Sappers Hill reported smoke to the southward. This was immediately passed to the flagship. The ships coaling at once began to cast off their colliers, raise steam for full speed and clear for action. The same precautions were made aboard the Canopus and the officers sent off to the observation station in case they might come in range of our 12-inch.

It was a perfect day, clear, little wind and smooth sea, when our squadron were about to complete the dramatic finale of Admiral Von Spee's.

It was an extraordinary bit of good fortune that had sent them into the jaws of Admiral Sturdee's squadron in this manner, and we certainly had the gods to thank: one day sooner and our ships would probably have missed them at sea unless Admiral Spee had remained to attack Port Stanley; one day later and they might not have been sighted by our squadron if they had been on their way to Magellan on the night of 8th December as arranged.

The following is briefly the narrative of events as they occurred and were noted from the top of the Canopus in which I had gone as soon as possible to get the clearest view.

7.50 a.m. Sappers Hill reported a four-funnelled and a two-funnelled cruiser approaching. All signals were passed to Flag, Canopus being the telephone central from all the stations.

8.10 a.m. The observation party from the observation station reported that the two cruisers were bearing south from the station and were apparently steaming at high speed directly towards them. The turrets were laid for the approximate bearings.

8.20 a.m. From the fore-top of Canopus more smoke was seen to the southward of the two cruisers approaching. This was distinguished as three more of the enemy's ships steering to the north-eastward and keeping well outside the other two.

9 a.m. By this time the first two cruisers had been recognised as Gneisenau and Nürnberg, and permission was obtained from the flagship to open fire on them when they got in range.

9.15 a.m. When about 11,000 yards from the observation station, the two cruisers apparently eased down. They appeared to be clearing away their guns and training them in the direction of the wireless station.

9.20 a.m. The fore turret guns having been laid from the observation hut, they were fired at the enemy but unfortunately fell just short. They immediately hoisted their colours, put their helms hard a-port and steamed directly to the south-east.

9.23 a.m. While they were still turning, a second salvo was fired. This fell approximately 100 yards short of the Gneisenau, several fragments of one of the shell falling closely round her stern. This last salvo was fired at our extreme elevation, and the rate of their steaming prevented any further firing from the Canopus. Needless to say, it was a bitter disappointment that we had not damaged one of them, and I could not but help thinking if we had only had time to thoroughly again test our range from the ship's new position, we might have had another story. It had, however, the most important effect of driving them clear of the harbour while Admiral Sturdee got his squadron clear of the anchorage.

9.30 a.m. The enemy cruisers altered course to port, apparently with the intention of engaging the Kent, who was outside the entrance to Port William. Shortly, however, they again altered course away from the land, having apparently seen the smoke from the other ships in the harbour, and they then steamed to rejoin the remainder of their squadron.

10 a.m. Soon after our squadron were out and proceeding at full speed after the enemy, who were concentrating on the Gneisenau. By about 11.30 a.m. both squadrons were hull down.

The Canopus was in the unhappy position of not being able to render any service at sea as more than half the crew were ashore at the stations and batteries some miles away, and the tide would not have been high enough to enable us to get off until 9 p.m.

However, she was still to be of service as at 10.50 a telephone message was received from the Governor that it had been reported to him that three of the enemy ships were off Port Pleasant, Fitzroy, some few miles off Stanley, and that they were probably colliers or transports.

The following was then passed to the Macedonia: "Three enemy merchant transports off Port Pleasant, Fitzroy. Ask permission from Admiral to chase them." The Macedonia replied that she was proceeding after them at 11.25, and we sighted the Bristol evidently on the same errand.

We had now got in direct communication by telephone with Fitzroy, and were able to pass by wireless direct to Macedonia and the Bristol the direction in which these enemy craft were steering. We were indebted for this information to two plucky ladies at Port Darwin, one of whom did the look-out while the other sent the messages by telephone.

We heard heavy firing about 2.45 p.m., and it continued intermittently until 6.45 p.m. when we received the signal from the Admiral that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were sunk and that the Leipzig was on fire and sinking.

We were now only waiting for high tide to get the ship off, but this last signal settled the question of any possible use Canopus could be at sea. All hands were at once put on to making preparations for receiving the wounded in the hospital ashore under our surgeons and preparing accommodation aboard the supply ship Galacia for the prisoners. Orama also arrived with her convoy of colliers which had all to be berthed.

9th December. The Macedonia was the first to return. She and the Bristol had accounted for the transport Baden. Unfortunately the Seidlitz had escaped. Glasgow and Cornwall followed.

Later in the afternoon some anxiety was felt about the Kent as she had not been in signal touch for some time, but she now reported that her wireless had been shot away and that she was damaged by the waterline and had run very short of coal.

On the Kent's arrival she showed evident signs of here gallant action: she had unfortunately a number of casualties, due principally to a shell in one of her casements; she had also a nasty hole by the waterline which our carpenters were at once sent to take in hand.

The Kent, Glasgow and Cornwall had between them some 32 officers and 100 men prisoners and casualties of their own: 8 killed with 10 severely wounded.

The following is a brief account of the action as heard at the time from the different commanding officers and others.

After getting clear of the port, the whole of our squadron steamed at their utmost speed for the enemy, who were still in sight and who had by this time concentrated on the Scharnorst. The enemy consisted of the two heavy cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the three light cruisers, Nürnberg, Dresden and Leipzig.

As the Invincible and Inflexible approached them, Admiral Von Spee separated from his light cruisers and, with the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, was soon engaged by the Invincible and Inflexible which were kept at long range as best suited for our heavier craft. Though outclassed, both these enemy cruisers kept up a gallant fight, neither ship surrendering, and going to the bottom with the colours flying.

Both German cruisers shot well, Invincible being hit some twenty odd times, the Inflexible hit, but not so often, and the Carnarvon, under Admiral Stoddart, was also damaged.

There were few survivors picked up from either of these two ships owing, as in the other actions fought that day, to the low temperature of the water and to the fierce attacks on the unfortunate survivors in the water by hundreds of sea birds.

On going around the flagship afterwards with Captain Beamish, he showed me one unexploded shell which had gone through the intervening decks and lodged in the Admiral's store room; another shell had burrowed part of one of the mast tripods near the conning tower. The most serious damage, however, was an underwater hit which had made a hole some seven feet by four feet and filled one of her bunkers. The wardroom and sickbay had also been wrecked. They were very fortunate in having no casualties owing to everyone being kept under armour.

On the light German cruisers separating from their Admiral, they were chased and brought to action by the Kent, Glasgow and Cornwall. Kent and Glasgow first engaged the Liepzig, and on arrival of the Cornwall on the scene of the action, the Kent left her to be sunk by our two cruisers and chased the Nürnberg, now some way ahead. Captain Allen only got in range of her after some extraordinary good steaming, and had a fine single-handed fight which ended in the Nürnberg being sunk.

Having once commanded her, one felt an additional pleasure in the Kent's successes. She flew the ensign presented to me for the ship by the ladies of Kent some years ago.

The Dresden escaped, unfortunately, owing to speed and darkness, her capture and destruction being a matter of much later history.

The naval lessons from the results of the Coronel and Falkland Island actions which most impressed one were: the absolute necessity of superior speed for cruiser work in the open sea and trade routes; the necessity of preserving one's force intact when likely to be opposed by a superior force; the necessity of keeping all personnel under what protection you may have to avoid casualties; the utter futility of slow-speed battleships used in conjunction with cruisers for search, except for means of defending bases.

In respect of Coronel, it was my belief, and it still is, that Craddock would not refuse action as the Monmouth could not have escaped - even if Cradock had been prepared to refuse action to rejoin Canopus - and he would not desert her. Why he was not reinforced before he left Falkland, I do not know, but that he had made the strongest representations on the subject and had been refused, I do know.

Craddock also left a letter with the Governor at Stanley before sailing to the Pacific in which he gave his opinion of the situation and the impossibility of any complete success against the German squadron under Von Spee without further reinforcements. He also told me that he had informed the Admiralty that the Canopus's slow speed made her useless for scouting work with his cruisers and could only be used for protection of his colliers, etc.

9th­-11th December. We were fully occupied getting our own and the German wounded into the hospital, which had been put in order by Staff-Surgeon Wernet and the Canopus's medical staff. With the assistance of Dr. Wace and some volunteer nurses from the ladies of the colony, it was now an efficient and comfortable place. It had originally been prepared for our own use and that of the Colonial force told off for the defence of the island.

The work of fitting up the supply ships Crown of Aragon and the A.M.C. Macedonia for the transport of the Hun prisoners home was also taken in hand by our carpenter's staff. All arrangements for the coaling of the squadron, etc., had to be done.

We had on board about 17 German officers and 60 men prisoners, among them the torpedo-lieutenant of the Liepzig. He was slightly wounded in the back and burnt all over with small fragments of high explosive. He said the very last salvo that hit her before she sank had passed over his head and cut a ridge through his hair. He was in a very excited state and we had to stop the officers talking to him. He also stated, which was true, that nearly all the officers and men were killed before she actually sunk.

13th December. The Inflexible, Glasgow and Bristol left for a hunt after the Dresden, the latest information being that she was seen in the vicinity of Punta Arenas.

Arrangements were made with Admiral Sturdee and the Governor for handing over the defence stores, etc., to the colony, but I had to leave one of my officers and some men as caretakers, much against the grain, but the Governor, who was very much adverse to being left at all without some ship other than the Otanto, insisted.

Admiral Sturdee visited the ship in the afternoon and thanked the officers and men for their work on the defences, their assistance to him and his squadron and for driving the enemy off from the port until he would get his squadron out.

14th December. Kept getting alarmist reports from Fitzroy that there was heavy firing in the vicinity and finally that the Huns had landed at San Salvador. Though confident that it was impossible, we had to take precautions and land the marines. The Admiral sent the Kent out to investigate at sea. By 7 p.m., however, their nerves were restored and they telephoned that it was untrue. The fact was that the ice was breaking up on the icebergs at sea, and the reports of these sounded exactly like heavy guns.

The Hun prisoners were embarked and sent off. The Admiral paid a parting visit to the wounded at the hospital. Of the men, the Kent's were the worst, having been badly burnt with cordite.

The British dead had been buried on the 11th after a very impressive service at the cathedral ashore. Over 500 men and officers were able to attend.

16th December. Getting things squared up before our departure. Got the old ship off the mud, to my relief, without any material damage as far as we would ascertain. Afterwards when in dock at Malta, we found that her bottom was concertinaed but only one plate was injured.

16th-24th December. Admiral Sturdee sailed on the afternoon of the 16th, having given me his parting orders to leave for Abrolhos Rocks which were still being maintained as a base for our colliers for the Atlantic squadrons. On the 18th I paid my parting visit to the Governor to whom I had written a letter of thanks for his and the colony's services. 

# 6: On Patrol

We sailed at daylight and I was glad to find that my fears of choked condensers, after our long sojourn on the mud, were not realised. This was thanks to the efforts of the engine room staff and particularly to those of Engineer-Lieutenant Commander Start, now our Chief.

The squadron now disposed roughly as follows: Inflexible, Glasgow and Bristol hunting up the Magellan Straits for Dresden; Orama and Kent on the Pacific side; Carnavon and Cornwall on the Patagonian coast.

Later, however, an intercepted W.T. signal from the Admiralty was taken in recalling the Inflexible and Invincible to rejoin their home fleet. Meanwhile, on our way to the Abrolhos Rocks we had the most peaceful time on board since the war began at sea and time to read our somewhat ancient mails.

The ship's company had to be put through a pretty severe course of gun drills. This was to get them in sea-going shape after their experience as landsmen ashore at the batteries at Falkland, but they quite realised the necessity.

We kept in touch with the Invincible, who was on the same course inshore of us, but were chary of using W.T. in hopes of picking up some of the German craft which were probably in these waters. Nothing, however, came our way, but we boarded the British ship Sweethope, bound for Buenos Ayres. She had little news, though they had only left England on the 25th November. It had not been announced that the Canopus had not been sunk at Coronel, probably to disconcert the Hun, though at the same time excessively trying for our folk at home.

25th December. A cheery day as far as shortness of grub would allow, but the British sailor takes things as they come and makes the best of it. We got a little home news from a Brazilian coaster that we boarded to the effect that the Hun had bombarded some of our coast ports - Whitby, Scarborough, etc.

26th December. The Invincible arrived at the anchorage off the Abrolhos almost at the same time as the Canopus, and I went aboard on arrival to see Admiral Sturdee. He showed me his despatches, which were most interesting.

What particularly affected me was the fact of the strong rumours that Admiral Sturdee had received that the German cruisers Von der Tan and Konig Albert had broken out and were on the way to these waters. The policy on the part of the Hun seemed sound if he could manage to escape our fleet and patrols at home. Even if the Invincible and Inflexible were in these waters, they were both short of ammunition. We had not a craft able to stand up to them otherwise, and our chances without them would be nil.

In the afternoon I incidentally paid a visit to my old coloured friend at the lighthouse, and with the prospects of an unlimited supply of tobacco, flour and a sovereign or so, he promised to give warning on his wireless if he sighted a suspicious craft. As the lighthouse commands both entrances and had a good all-round view to seaward, this will be invaluable.

27th December. The Invincible sailed and we were coaling all day. Heard rumours that the Dresden had been heard of in Shoal Bay and had left again for Punta Arenas, so hope that our fellows will soon locate her.

It is abominably hot and, as we have no awnings and little white clothing, most uncomfortable. Please heaven may we get elsewhere soon. There is not much attraction here. We cannot catch the Karlsruhe and we should be mopped up if the Von der Tan arrives.

29th December. The Celtic, Captain English, arrived and to our great joy had mails up to December 8th for us. We were also able to get some badly needed stores from her. She is a beautiful craft to look at, but heaven help her if she comes up against anything else than one of her own class. She is an enormous target and in spite of her eight 6-inch guns would not have a chance.

She left ammunition for Inflexible and Invincible at St. Vincent - thoughtful of the Admiralty, who appear to have been thinking things out pretty clearly in spite of the difficulties of communication and intelligence of the enemy ships still at large.

30th December. The Inflexible advertised her arrival sometime before by rather a generous use of wireless which I did not appreciate as I was, as far as possible, trying to keep our presence at Abrolhos dark.

1st January 1915. So begins the new year, and it will be interesting to see what our fate may be by this time 1916.

The Brazilian destroyer Piauhy arrived broken down. I passed a message from them to St. Thome to inform their authorities. They were very grateful and it was good policy as we are really using their property as a base. They gave us a later paper which had the news that the Dresden had been caught off Valparaiso and been sunk.

3rd January. Got a W.T. from the British ship Desna RMSNC to the effect that a German ship, the Hoyler, had escaped from Pernambuco with stores and provisions for the Hun, possibly the Von der Tan or Karlsruhe. Got under weigh at once and shortly after sighted a steamer answering her description; chased and boarded her but found her to be an Italian ship from Genoa.

Shortly after, chased another, a big three-funnelled craft, but after a long hunt and having to fire at her, found she was a British owned craft with no number or signal flags, the Ciudad of B.A.

We then rendezvoused with the Desna and got the latest news from home which included, unfortunately, the sinking of the Formidable. She was a most welcome meeting as they replenished our depleted larder, took our mail home and made the men a handsome present of baccy.

I remained at sea in hopes of some news of the Holyer, and on the 5th boarded the Brazilian steamer Itaqua with our secretary of the Legation at Rio, Beresford White. He informed me that the strongest representations had been made by the Government to the Germans about the German Consul at Pernambuco, who had been making signals to the Karlsruhe and the Crown Prince Wilhelm at Naronha.

I impressed him with the fact that we were utterly cut off from all communication except from Rio or W.T. from passing British ships.

6th-13th January. Most of this time spent in firing practices and boarding any vessels sighted in the vicinity from whom we received various rumours, the latest being that the Karlsruhe had taken refuge in a Brazilian port.

The Australia, late flagship of the China station, Admiral Patey, arrived on the 11th. They had been much disappointed at not being allowed to follow up the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau from that station, and had not actually arrived on the Pacific side until December. They had a stroke of luck on their way up from the Falkland Islands, having caught and sunk the German merchant ship, Elonora Werman, who had, we believed, been supplying the Karlsruhe with provisions etc.

Boarding the passing Brazilian coast boat, got a despatch from Pernambuco that some of the interned German ships where were about to make a run for it, but unfortunately the letter was nearly a month old.

This news was shortly followed by a W.T. message passed from Rio by one of our ships that the German battle cruiser, Von der Tan, was off the Mexican coast. If true, this news was in no way cheering as we have not a single ship capable of taking her on out here, and the Australia is due to sail for Gibraltar today.

13th January. H.M.S. Vindictive arrived, and with no small relief did I turn over the base at Abrolhos Rocks to Captain Payne.

The Vindictive had been doing some useful work on her way out and had practically established a W.T. base both at Madeira and the Island of St. Vincent and was probably going to Ascension to install a powerful plant there. This would give direct communications from the Admiralty to our ships in the Atlantic, a most valuable asset - Rio being the only port on this side which would forward any code message to us, and even this was out of reach of Canopus.

14th January. We sailed for St. Vincent in the morning, and up to the 18th little of interest occurred. Boarded a number of neutral and British steamers, but none of them were suspicious, except one Dutchman with a cargo of grain for Amsterdam. He was made to give a certificate that he would call at Plymouth en route and was reported home from St Vincent.

A great number of these steamers give a lot of trouble before they will heave to, and one has frequently to bring them up by gunfire. It would seem hard to mistake the old Canopus for a Hun. We had to relinquish chasing steamers as our limited speed and coal consumption would not allow it. Made the Island of Fernando Naronha but sighted nothing there.

19th January. Intercepted a code message from the British ship, Demarara, that she heard German wireless in lat. 1 N. and long. 25, 30 W., and as this was not very far off our track, we altered course to pass through the position. Unfortunately, had a bad breakdown in engine room and had to draw fires in some of the boilers, and it was not until the following morning that we could get speed again.

Our stokers and engine room staff are getting played out: the temperature in the stokeholds has been over 100 for some weeks now and our fresh grub gave out a long while ago. We have had to take the hospital rations such as soup, etc. to keep them going. We have also had to relieve the stokers with deck hands, though it is hard to spare them as the guns have to be manned day and night.

I have the impression that the signals heard were probably from the K. Wilhelm. Made for St. Paul's rocks, a rendezvous of theirs, which we made on the 20th but found no signs.

21st January. Sighted a wreck which turned out to be the schooner, Wilfred M., of Nova Scotia. Though dark, there was no life about on boarding her, but it was significant that she had all her boats aboard and had evidently been rammed. The work of the Hun, I have no doubt. The smell of decomposed fish cargo was awful, and the water was swarming with sharks. This gave me a few anxious minutes while the men were boarding her in a big swell. Finally sunk her by ramming - rather a dangerous process which nearly fouled our screw.

23rd January. With great relief got a W.T. message from the Vengeance off St. Vincent that Admiralty orders were that Canopus was to proceed to Malta via Gibraltar.

Indifferent food, continuous work and long hours are telling on the men, and the engines and machinery generally require a good overhaul if we are to be of any use at sea.

24th January. On arrival at St. Vincent, we found the harbour full of German shipping still interned and unable to get coal or get away with our cruisers about. The A.M.C. Edinburgh Castle and Dartmouth were in along with two Portuguese craft. The Highflyer was away on a hunt for the K. Wilhelm whom she afterwards got.

Dined with Napier in the Edinburgh Castle and thoroughly enjoyed a decent meal. Captain Taylor, our Consul, is on the best of terms with the Portuguese commandant and we shall be able to stop in as long as we want to repair machinery and coal. Two piston rings and evaporator coils about done. Kept our engine staff hard at it until we sailed again on the 28th.

On passage to Gibraltar. No mails for weeks, but gather that Roumania may join in with Serbia and that Italy and Portugal are sitting on the fence. We made Gibraltar on February 3rd and after coaling left the following morning and arrived at Malta without incident on the 7th February, 1915.

# 7: To the Dardanelles

8th­-24th February. On arrival at Malta we found the harbour and most of the dockyard facilities in the hands of the French Battle Fleet. They had left the Adriatic and were now using Malta as their headquarters.

The dockyard made a rush at our defects as the Admiral-Superintendent, Limpus, had intimated that we were to sail for the Dardanelles on the 10th, i.e. two days' refit after some five months' continual steaming. We should not be even moderately efficient, if that was even possible.

Admiral Limpus gave me my first information as to the operations. It was proposed to make a determined effort with the naval force available under Admiral Carden to force the passage of the Straits to Constantinople. The force under his command would consist of: 4 French battleships; 8 British battleships; 2 armoured cruisers; 4 light cruisers; 8 minesweepers. This force was, needless to say, considerably augmented later.

Admiral Carden arrived on the 10th. Our sailing was again postponed to fit a mine-catcher for our journey up the Straits. We also had to fit howitzers on the turrets for high-angle firing at the shore batteries. The former was a mass of fittings and was perfectly useless at any speed over eight knots, though possibly during our night work up the narrows it may have fended off some unseen floating mine, of which there were plenty about.

The new fitting and our defects kept us all as busy as we wanted. One managed to give the men as much leave as possible. This they thoroughly enjoyed, not knowing when they would see a decent port again.

The naval force for the expedition kept arriving, and among them were a couple of transports with a mixed lot of the Crystal Palace men and marines, later to be known as the R.N. Division.

I note in my diary having wondered where necessary troops were to be found to hold the Straits once we were up as we were under the impression that the Turks could put some 100,000 men against us.

The latest news from the Dardanelles was to the effect that on the 19th the forts at the entrance had been heavily bombarded by the battleships, but unfortunately bad weather had set in and the job had not been completed until the 26th when the landing parties had completed the work of destroying the undamaged guns, not without some resistance. Rather like knocking at the door to say we were coming!

During our stay at Malta I found a number of old acquaintances: Mr and Mrs Overy, who had been at the British Embassy, Washington, when I was there; they had only left Constantinople in October.

He said that the Huns had been making every effort to get the Turks under their influence for the last two years, and had assisted them in reorganising all the defences of the Dardanelles, which were by now fairly formidable. They had an unpleasant time before leaving as, owing to German intrigue, an attempt had been made to blow up the British Embassy and also to assassinate the Minister. Curious, the ways of diplomacy.

Admiral Limpus, lately the head of the Naval Commission in Turkey, is the Admiral-Superintendent here, though the man with the best knowledge of any officer of the Turkish defences, Admiral Carden, originally meant for Admiral-Superintendent, is Commander-in-Chief vice Limpus. The only explanation of this curious anomaly being, I believe, that it was thought it would tend to irritate the Turk and help to place him in the arms of the Hun if Limpus was made Commander-in-Chief.

My old friend, Charlie Sowerby, was in and sailed with his fine ship, the Indefatigable, on the 14th. This was the last I saw of him as Jutland was to claim him and nearly all his crew.

Admiral Troubridge is on a secret mission to Bulgaria. I think he feels the Goeben affair and subsequent court-martial very much.

After a strenuous time and with hearty good assistance from the dockyard, we completed and sailed with sealed orders for Skyros Island on the 24th February to take our share in this historic, if disastrous, Dardanelles campaign.

25th-26th February. We arrived at Skyros after dark but had only been in about an hour when we got orders to proceed to Tenedos, then used as the base for the operations of the Dardanelles campaign until Mudros was organised.

27th February. We made Tenedos Island at daylight, blowing very hard. There was a crowd of shipping of all sorts there - colliers, ammunition ships, battleships, etc. - and I found myself the S.N.O. with no idea of who they all were. Captain Fitzmaurice of the Triumph came aboard and from him I got an inkling of how things stood.

The French and British battleships were organised in two divisions, and I had command of the fourth sub-division, Canopus, Swiftsure, Cornwallis; the destroyers were also organised as minesweepers. The mines were supposed to have been swept up for some miles up the Straits, but as we shortly found out, they were being continually floated down by the Turks on the chance of catching any of us. There was more work to be done on the forts at the entrance.

We started coaling as soon as we could get hold of a collier. This was not until 11 p.m., and with the added joy of a gale of wind it was not too much fun. In the middle of it, I got orders to take the Vengeance's place in the operations next day and was occupied in deciphering what there was through the wireless until 4 a.m. It consisted of bombarding the outer forts again and landing an armed force to complete the destruction of the guns. Weather, however, made it impossible. I did not regret this as we had hardly got the coal-dust off. (We were taking the place of the Vengeance as she had been rather badly hit the day before.)

1st March. Got orders to proceed with our sub-division to patrol the entrance of the Straits as the enemy battleships were supposed to be on the move inside, and our minesweepers were up sweeping and wanted more backing than their destroyers could give them.

About midnight there was a good deal of heavy gun firing inside, and for a moment or two one had visions of the Goeben and others arriving on the scene. However, it was nothing more than the sweepers being fired on by the enemy, and shortly after they appeared with their destroyer escort.

During the night we saw the explosions at the Seddul Bahr and Kum Kale forts where the landing parties were doing the final destruction.

2nd March. Rendezvoused with my little lot off Tenedos at daylight and went aboard to see Rear-Admiral de Robeck in the forenoon. He gave me a good general idea of the work up to date, and informed me that the Albion and Triumph had been up the Straits and got rather a warm time from the howitzer and other batteries there. The question is how were we to get at them. It seems impossible to have any real effective results from the sea against hidden batteries unless a strong landing force were to follow up the bombardment, and I told him so. Got orders from the Rear-Admiral to make a reconnaissance of the upper forts. After having had a look at some of the sketches of the forts, it appeared to me that fort 8, as we knew it, was important and also gave a good target from the European side.

We entered the Straits just before noon and ordered the Cornwallis to watch the Asiatic side and try and keep down fire from the batteries there while Swiftsure and Canopus, keeping close to the European side, got within about 8,000 yards of No. 8. We passed a good few floating mines en route and one exploded close under our stern.

Swiftsure and Canopus had had the fort under fire for some minutes when the Turk woke up. In addition to fire from No. 7 and the howitzers from Aren Kioi, this made it too hot for us at close ranks, so ordered the Swiftsure to increase to 11,000 and drew out ourselves.

It was my first experience of this game, and I must admit that though one did not mind the really heavy ones so much, the swish-bang of the quick-firing stuff was most annoying. By about 3 p.m. the Turk had enough of it, and we ceased fire at No. 8 just after the Cornwallis had come across to help, and at 3.30 p.m. I ordered cease fire.

We were singularly lucky in casualties, having only one man wounded in the division, but we were almost all badly knocked about. Our main topmast was shot away, boats were knocked to pieces, the main derrick was damaged and the wardroom was wrecked. The lack of casualties was certainly due to insisting on all officers and men remaining under armour. On first going up I had a few observers in the tops, but these were being sniped from the shore at a very early stage and I soon had them down.

My impressions were that it was almost impossible to do any good against the concealed batteries without aeroplane spotting. It also took a large amount of valuable ammunition to damage even a visible battery in the forts. The Turk, I think, was driven out of fort 8 by the fire of our 12-inch, but I believe only two of the heavy guns were actually knocked out. I doubt that any damage was done to No. 7 as the guns were well hidden - as were also the field and howitzer batteries at Aren Kioi.

3rd March. We were busy most of the day repairing our damages to the best of our ability. Lieut. Bennett, my navigator, unfortunately went down with the flu, a severe blow to me as on these occasions one wants all one's attention on the firing when the ship is in action.

4th March. Got orders in the morning to proceed to Bashika and Yule Kari Bays and drive out any troops seen and to shell the batteries while our landing parties were disembarking at Kum Kale to destroy guns.

We located some troops to the south of the bay at Yeni, made some good shooting at them and drove them out. Our best success, however, was at the back of Gheyhill village where we managed to enfilade the Turk while he was busy getting three howitzer batteries up - evidently with the intention of trying to drive us out. We got their range at 5,000 at the first shot, and they immediately limbered up and fled up the hill, but we picked them up and both guns and men were accounted for.

Later in the afternoon we worked up Rashika Bay and joined the other ships which were bombarding Kum Kale to cover the landing of our Marine detachments and others. The landing parties met with some considerable resistance and we lost some 15 men.

From what we had seen, both Gheyhill and Yeni Shehr villages are full of troops and ought to be thoroughly bombarded before attempting to land any men in their vicinity.

We finished the day by going on night patrol with the Cornwallis off the entrance, a not too pleasant job on account of the mines which the gentle Turk, with unpleasant regularity, floats down the Straits with the tide.

5th March. After sending Lieut. Bennett to the hospital ship, we went up with the Irresistible and Cornwallis with the Rear-Admiral to spot on fort 13 for the Queen Elizabeth, who was going to shoot from outside.

The Irresistible led up and we could see that she was getting it pretty hot from our old friends No. 8 and Aren Kioi. We relieved her and soon had them ranging on us. They went over with the heavies, but got us as we turned, luckily on armour, and though it shook the old ship up, it did not get in.

As an operation it was not very successful: it was hard to spot any shots and they had our range pretty quickly; eventually we had to haul out. We had no casualties. I do not remember what they were aboard Irresistible.

6th March. We had a spell and got some ancient mails from the Atlantic side.

7th March. Lunched aboard the Vengeance with Admiral de Robeck, Keyes, Chief of Staff, and Coombe in command of destroyers.

The afternoon programme consisted of Cornwallis and Canopus going up the Straits in support of the destroyers who, with some of the ship's picket boats, were to try and sweep the mines up off Kephez during the night. The results were not very satisfactory as the destroyers ran into floating mines shortly after they got in and then again further up. On reporting this to the Rear-Admiral, he ordered the battleships to come out.

8th March. We were under weigh again about 8 a.m., and were joined by the Rear-Admiral at about 10 a.m. with Cornwallis, Irresistible and Vengeance. Our duty, with the other three, was to try and cover the Queen Elizabeth from the battery fire while she took on forts 13, 17, 19.

The Irresistible and Cornwallis got some pretty heavy fire, were hit and had a few casualties; we were lucky and, bar one mine which exploded pretty close, had little fire; the light got bad in the afternoon so fire was stopped.

The Irresistible reported sighting a submarine. If correct this will make our night patrol somewhat lurid tonight. One is beginning to feel the want of sleep. Pretty nearly every day in action and on the bridge, and night patrol when one cannot even lie down, takes it out of one.

9th March. Our night patrol passed off without incident. We had to coal, so I took advantage of it and had a good snooze. The minesweepers were at work trying to sweep up the minefield by Kephez, and a nasty job it was, being enfiladed on both sides by the batteries.

10th March. We had a meeting of all the Captains on board the flagship to consider the best way of sweeping the minefield. Up to date, this had not been very successful on account of the heavy cross fire from the batteries at Chanak and Kilid Bahr.

The situation at this time was roughly as follows: the outside forts at Seddul Bahr and Kum Kale had been reduced and the heavy armament destroyed, but owing to the lack of any military force ashore to hold them, the enemy were able to place howitzer and other batteries on both the European side, between Morto Bay and Soghandere fort, and on the Asiatic side, between Erenkeui and the forts at Kephez.

All these were well hidden behind earth works, and without aircraft they were almost impossible to distinguish from the ships. Our ships, on the other hand, gave the enemy an excellent target as they passed up. Our supply of aircraft was very limited and was reserved mostly for directing the fire from the Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon and Lord Nelson.

It was thought Fort Dardanos had been practically destroyed, but both it and the fort at Soghandere showed renewed signs of life after their bombardment by the battleships, and it was again impossible to put a sufficiently large landing party ashore to complete the work of the ships. This was due to the enemy having already shown that they could quickly out-number any landing party we could afford to put ashore and their having inflicted heavy casualties on our men at the second landing at Kum Kale.

The main objective, however, was to destroy, as far as possible, the heavy forts at the Narrows, Chanak and Kilid Bahr, and first to clear away the minefields which were laid close to them, so as to enable the fleet to rush the Narrows.

The result of our conference was that the Commander-in-Chief determined to risk the mines. The Canopus was detailed to go up during the night and get as close as possible to the searchlights below the minefield and try and destroy them. After this, the minesweepers were to follow with the picket boats backed by the destroyers. Getting above the minefield, they were to sweep down with the tide.

Captain Keyes came with us and I had command. By 8 p.m. our force was ready off the entrance, and by 9 p.m. Canopus was above Soghandere and opened on the searchlights at the Narrows on both shores. Shortly after, the batteries sighted us by their lights and opened up. They shot badly and all the heavy went well over us. The minesweepers now passed up ahead of Canopus, and shortly before 10 p.m. were in position.

We ceased fire at 10.30, being afraid of hitting our own boats. The Turk then put his lights out, and our sweepers made the most of their time. Unfortunately two of the furthest up boats exploded one of the mines via their sweep. This made the enemy realise what was up, and they promptly poured in a very heavy cross fire on the sweepers.

I ordered the destroyers to back them up and stood by in case we could give any further support. All the boats were back about 12.30 a.m.

We had lost one sweeper and there were a few casualties among the others, but owing to the darkness it was impossible to say how many mines had been cleared.

As Captain Keyes remarked, we had been the furthest north of any of the battleships. How we escaped bumping any of their floating mines I cannot say. It was pitch dark and impossible to see any, and they had been reported by Majestic by the entrance before we got up.

11th March. We were relieved from our patrol by one of the French ships and got back to Tenedos in time for a meeting aboard flagship. It was decided that it was not worth the risk to take a battleship in at close quarters to the minefield, and that the support for the minesweepers should be done by cruisers and destroyers. It was also decided that volunteers from the officers were to be called for to take command of the sweepers and picket boats. This was because it had been found impossible to get the trawler skippers to stick to their allotted sweeping billets - no easy thing in the dark.

12th March. We had an easy time while the French had a dig at the minefield. They got it pretty hot, but we did not hear the casualties they had. They cut some of the mines out.

13th March. The operations, as far as we were concerned, consisted of another attempt to clear the minefield. I had the command, Coode (Captain 'D') had the destroyers and the minesweepers, and Davidson with the Cornwallis opened the ball with a bombardment of the searchlights at about 10 p.m.

The sweepers passed up shortly before midnight supported by the destroyers and Amethyst. We could see heavy fire was opened about 1.30 a.m. from the forts and batteries on the boats, and later found that we had lost one sweeper. Amethyst had had bad luck, and with one shell which had landed in the stokers' bathroom, they lost 20 killed and a number wounded.

The Cornwallis returned with the boats about 3.30 a.m., and we proceeded up the Straits to look for the wreck of our sweeper and also to support a French submarine which was returning from up the Straits. The latter appeared and notified the fact of her breaking surface in rather a singular manner: she had picked up a mine on her planes which cleared and shot up in the air as she started to rise.

We spent a most unpleasant day dodging floating mines. We sank six from the ship and only missed hitting one with our ram by a few feet.

15th March. We had a peaceful day as far as operations, but I had my time occupied in reading up the orders for the general bombardment to take place on the 18th. There was a general meeting aboard the flagship when the bombardment orders were discussed. In general they consisted of long-range fire from Inflexible, Agamemnon, Queen Elizabeth and Lord Nelson on the Chanak forts. On these being considered to be sufficiently demoralised, the older battleships were to close them and finish them off. Having silenced the batteries off the minefields, the minesweepers were to get to work and sweep a passage for the fleet.

There was little discussion regarding the orders, but I was not the only one who, even if we were successful in passing the Narrows, could see little gain if we could not consolidate our ground behind us.

From experience we knew we could not destroy the heavy armament of the forts completely, and the Turk would return the moment our ships had passed, even if temporarily driven away. Our communications would then be cut as we had no land force to hold the enemy. Personally, I have no belief in the effect on the Turk's attitude of the remnants of our fleet appearing off Constantinople.

Admiral Carden appeared to be wretchedly ill at the meeting, and on the following day he went sick and Admiral de Robeck took command. The Captain of the Ocean, Hayes-Sadler, became senior officer of the 2nd Division and our place was changed in the bombardment orders: Ocean took our place while under my command Canopus and Cornwallis were to remain in the Straits after the fleet had gone up and keep the forts down and communications open with a portion of the destroyers.

16th March. Cornwallis and Canopus ordered to make a demonstration off Gaba Tepe; it was rather interesting. We got out our boats and made a pretence of landing which brought the Turk out of his trenches. Before he found out that he was being fooled, we got into him with our 6-inch, his return fire being feeble.

We were on patrol off the Straits until the evening of the 17th when Canopus returned to the anchorage at Tenedos. I received the final orders for the general bombardment on the following day.

18th March. This was to be the supreme test of the capability of a naval force against shore defences and one in which I candidly admit that I had no confidence of success, even for the temporary effect of driving the enemy away from the fixed armament and giving the fleet time to get through before they manned their guns again at the Narrows.

It was a beautiful day, calm and clear, and the bombardment started as arranged by the long-range fire from the heavy craft. After the fire of the heavier ships had been on the forts for some little time, the attack was followed up by the French division of old battleships strengthened by two of ours.

From what one could see from the position of the Canopus near the entrance, they made very fair practice on the Chanak and other forts, but they were, in their turn, getting a very hot fire from both the forts and the howitzer and other batteries on both sides of the Straits. The Bouvet was hit by one or more heavy shells followed by heavy explosions on board her. In five minutes or so she had sunk and was unfortunately lost with most of her complement of 760 officers and men.

Observing that the Gaulois was also hit hard and in a dangerous condition, being down by the bows up to her hawse pipes, Canopus and Cornwallis closed her and sent their boats alongside in case she went down. Her Captain, however, managed to run her ashore in shallow water near Mairo Island, his only chance of saving her.

Shortly after, the Irresistible was seen to be in serious trouble: there was a heavy explosion on board her or close to. This afterwards turned out to have been a mine. It had blown in her starboard engine room and she filled and sank shortly after. Our destroyers, however, were soon alongside her, and in spite of a very heavy fire from the enemy, they were successful in rescuing all the crew with just a few casualties - one being a stoker who returned under a heavy fire to rescue the ship's cat and was killed by shrapnel. The Wear (destroyer) alone took off some 300 of the crew.

The Ocean was now hit either by a torpedo from the shore or ran on a mine and had the greater part of her stern blown off. She, however, did not sink for some time, and the destroyers, again to the rescue, took off all the crew under heavy fire. To add to the casualty list, the Inflexible came out down by the bows and had to run for shallow water off Tenedos: she had also struck a mine which had blown in her submerged flat. She unfortunately lost a number of men who had been sent there from disengaged guns as probably the safest place under armour and water protection.

The French battleship Suffren was also badly hit but managed to keep afloat. Shortly after sunset the Admiral ordered the cease-fire: the light was failing, and the effect on the enemy to his armament had not shown sufficient signs of damage to warrant any attempt to pass the batteries or to sweep the minefield with any possibility of success.

The Phaeton was up the Straits for some time during the bombardment, and I believe General Sir Ian Hamilton was on board.

Up to a late hour we were busy with our boats, shifting the rescued crews from one ship to another. We then took up our old station on patrol off the Straits for the night. This wasn't a cheering occupation as the Turk had evidently been floating down mines for all he was worth, and we had a decided reverse to meditate on.

19th March. The Admiral made a signal regretting the loss of the ships and men and ordered all captains to repair damages with the greatest despatch in view of the possibility of another attack shortly. I was appointed in command of the 2nd Division of battleships, now numbering eight, Hayes-Sadler of the Ocean being without a ship and rather the worse for his experiences.

At daylight we went up the Straits to see if any signs of the Ocean or Irresistible wrecks could be seen, but we could see nothing. A few bits of upper deck fittings was all that was ever seen of either ship again.

Later, in reply to signal, I went aboard the Queen Elizabeth to see the Admiral. Admiral Carden had left for Malta and Admiral de Robeck was now in command. We had a long talk over the situation, and I expressed my views quite plainly to the effect that we had proved the inutility of a Naval offensive against shore armaments without the support of land forces to hold what we had driven the enemy out of. Land forces were also needed, in my view, to assist in silencing the hidden batteries we could not observe from seaward. In addition, if the minefield was to be swept, it would have to be done systematically, day and night. During the daytime, this would have to be done under cover of heavy ships as it was quite possible that mines swept out at night would prove a danger to our own ships if not properly located after sweeping.

Admiral de Robeck informed me that the military were not in favour of landing and that Sir Ian Hamilton was doubtful of the practicability of landing at all.

I have an idea that Keyes, Chief of Staff, is in favour of having another attempt with the fleet alone to force the passage. This is a hopeless thing to do as if twenty per cent of us get up, our communications will be cut off, and the appearance of a few isolated battleships in various states of damage from close action with the forts and mines would not be likely to produce any moral effect at Constantinople, not to mention the likelihood of submarine attack from the enemy after they had got to their goal.

Undoubtedly pressure is being brought to bear to induce de Robeck to attempt it again with the Naval forces.

20th-24th March. With the Chief of Staff being away with the Admiral at Mudros, my time was fully occupied at Tenedos as S.N.O. re-organising the minesweepers. Most of the R.N.V.R. crews had been sent home, and the boats were being now manned with volunteers from R.N. officers and men along with some R.N.R.

We had already sent a number volunteers for the mine-sweeping work, both men and officers, and Lieut. Donohue, Mid. de Carteret, P.O. Heath and Signalman Watkins had done some excellent work in trawler 224 on the worst nights of the sweeping.

Mid. Durrant with P.O.'s Soloman and Deadman, A.B.'s Seaman Rooke, Stevens, Blew, Harrod, Sennett and Sexton along with Stoker Green had been employed under Lieut. Robinson in one of the picket boats directing the sweepers. Reports from their commanding officers showed that they had all done well.

# 8: Invasion Preparations

The principal work that I had in hand at this time was: the construction of the Aerodrome in preparation for the arrival of the Air Force under Commander Samson; the repairs of the Gaulois, which kept the carpenters and divers of our division busy; assisting the Inflexible to repair her damage; the patrol of the Straits and all the ordinary work for the division under war conditions.

As at this time my staff consisted of myself and my invaluable chief writer, Mr. Jaines, it was with the greatest relief that the Admiral informed me that he had appointed Commander Lambart, the French liaison officer Commander Milot, and Mr. Smith, signal boatswain, to assist me. They were invaluable, especially the former to whom I was much indebted at this time and later for his cheerful and indefatigable work.

25th March. Admiral de Robeck and Admiral Thursby came over from Mudros. The latter had been appointed as second in command and was to relieve me later. We visited the Aerodrome which was by now in a fair way of completion, but Samson had to land his machines and there was a W.T. plant to erect.

I was delighted to hear from the Admiral that in spite of pressure from home, he had refused to be moved from his now considered opinion that for success the operations must be a combined one with the military forces.

Sir I. Hamilton refuses, however, to take any action with the troops at present out here until they have been thoroughly re-organised, and proposes to take the whole of them to Egypt for the purpose. This is not hard to understand as the men are distributed in different troopers and the material is mixed in any way in different ships, and at Mudros there is no possibility of unloading and re-loading.

The naval operations during the re-organisation of the army are to consist of: harassing the enemy positions and forts assisted by aero spotting; clearing the minefields by systematic sweeping with the reorganised minesweepers; submarine attacks on the enemy above the Narrows.

26th March. Today we had two somewhat significant reports. The first was an enemy aero being reported over Tenedos, and later a French minesweeper reported a submarine in the Straits.

The advent of the latter would vitally affect all naval operations as up to date we had battleships and all supply and transport ships operating without any regard to possible submarine attack. Tenedos as an open anchorage will become untenable as no large craft will be able to lie off the beaches for any length of time.

It had been blowing a gale for the last two days, but in spite of the weather Commander Samson had, with the assistance of the Squadron working parties, managed to get six of the air machines ashore. I hope they will shortly be able to give the Hun machines a run for their money as they have been rather too evident of late.

27th March. In the morning I turned over the command of the 2nd Division to Admiral Thursby, and with the Cornwallis, who had been sharing our fortunes for some time, we left for a 48 hours' spell at Mudros - not undeserved, I think, as we had practically been employed day and night and generally under fire since the 26th of February.

It was our first visit to Mudros and the harbour was full of every description of craft. Fortunately, for space, the British troopers were mostly away taking the British troops to Alexandria to be re-organised for the prospective landing. There were, however, some 5,000 British and French military forces encamped ashore.

Rosie Wemyss was the Governor of Mudros and had had a trying time. He was responsible for supplying the wants of the army, berthing the craft, and loading and unloading transports and supply ships with no natural facilities. He also had to keep an eye on the Greeks, of whom hundreds had come over to make what they could out of the Army and Navy. If reports were true, Turks clothed as Greeks had also come to do a little spying. The completion of several good landing piers had, however, made things easier in some respects.

28th March. We all enjoyed our first night in for some months when the men and officers had not to be at their action stations. I had rather a curious experience: I woke up at midnight being sure I had been called, but the sentry was positive no one had been in. The explanation arrived in the shape of a telegram next day to say that my wife had presented me with another boy about midnight.

Wemyss took me round the encampments, etc., and I recognised many of the favourite haunts of the red-legged partridge in peace now occupied by the tents of the French or other troops. In the evening we had a visit from a Hun aero who shot at the Ark Royal but did not hit her.

29th-30th March. Canopus left with the Albion for Tenedos. We coaled and then went on the night patrol. Admiral Nicholson arrived and hoisted his flag aboard the Swiftsure. He now relieves me from the command of the third Division.

1st-2nd April. I was in charge of the minesweeping operations, which are being done in a systematic way from the entrance - the mines being taken out when possible clear of the Straits.

The Turk field and howitzer batteries opened on the sweepers, but as a general rule we were able to keep them in order with 6-inch fire from the supporting battleships, Albion and Canopus, and there were no important casualties. Albion and Canopus were attacked by an aero, but he missed both, though he was not far off the former and was later chased off by one of ours.

3rd-4th April. On being relieved by the London and Implacable, we went over to Mudros, coaled and landed our howitzer for the army's use. The Inflexible, which was still in, was patching up under the direction of Mr. McGuiness, the constructor from Malta, and hopes shortly to be able to sail for that place. The Admiral informed me that the Canopus would chaperone her, anyhow, part of the way.

Phillimore told me that young Verner, a son of a very old friend of mine, Colonel Willoughby Verner, had been killed at his observation station in the top. The shell had also set fire to the top, and he could not be got down before he died, poor boy.

As it was still blowing hard, the Inflexible and ourselves did not get away until the evening when the wind went down. We are to accompany her for part of the way and then meet the troopships from Alexandria taking the R.N. Division to Skyros, Trebuki Island, where I am to get them into shape with the General-in-Command preparatory to landing. It will be somewhat of a problem collecting their particular lot at sea.

On the 7th the weather improved - but not the conditions of the Inflexible whose pumps gave out. The result was that she was making water freely in spite of her patch. In reply to a signal to the Admiral to this effect, we received orders to proceed with her to Malta.

We varied the day's work by chasing and heaving-to one of the American Archipelagoe Co., whose boats had been suspected of smuggling arms, and sent her to Mudros for examination.

On the 8th matters improved somewhat, and the Inflexible was able to make some eight knots, but on the 9th she got in serious difficulty about fifty miles from Malta: it was blowing the best part of a gale, her patch was leaking and she was making so much water that she was unable to steam against it.

Phillimore and I arranged to try and turn her round stern to wind, and the Canopus was to try and take her in tow while she steamed full steam astern. This was accomplished with some difficulty in a nasty sea. We eventually got off Malta just before dark when the tugs got hold of her and she was safely docked.

11th-13th April. The next day we spent coaling, provisioning, etc., and got away again by 6 p.m. for Skyros to meet our transports.

I was delighted to see some of the new minesweepers at Malta as our old trawlers, which had been doing the work up to date in the Straits, were hardly capable of steaming against the tide. They generally had to work it by towing down when sweeping. This was a serious handicap, especially while under heavy fire.

The Press rumours were to the effect that Italy was likely to join fortunes with the Allies and that American feeling was getting strong on the subject of Hun methods of warfare.

On our arrival at Skyros we found that none of the transports had arrived, so we started to make our own look-out and signal station. The pilot, Lieut. Bennett, our navigator, was busy surveying the harbour and putting up leading marks for the ships to anchor by on their arrival.

14th April. The Doris, Dartmouth, Jed and Kennet arrived, and then on the 16th the ten transports with the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the R.N. Division under the command of General Paris. I got to work with him as soon as he arrived, and with the assistance of Colonel Richardson and Majors Sketchley and Olivant we made some progress in getting things in order.

The men were a strange collection of marines, bluejackets, stokers and odd recruits - all cheery and ready for anything but with little training in the art of warfare. The junior officers had naturally little experience, though some of them and the men had had some hard fighting at Antwerp where they had been put straight into the trenches. They had had three days of it and a rearguard action - the retreat having been most ably handled by General Paris for whom they all had a great respect. I shared that respect later after some experience of his imperturbability.

The work was now incessant, consisting of organising the transports for their handling at sea, exercising the troops in boat work, landing them for attacking manoeuvres, etc.

The orders for the landing operations at the Dardanelles were roughly as follows:

1. The 29th Division of troops with two Marine battalions were to land near Seddul Bahr.

2. The Australian Division with the New Zealand Division to land at Sari Bahr, later called Anzac.

3. The French Division to land at Kum Kale.

4. The R.N. Division to make a feint of landing at Xeros Bay near the Bulair lines.

Each of these divisions was supported by battleships, cruisers and destroyers, separately detailed for their respective work.

One could not help regretting that this force had not been available when the operations against the Dardanelles had first been commenced some three months ago. Then they would have met with little opposition as compared with what they may expect now.

The landing exercises, organisation, etc. were carried out without ceasing, and before leaving on the 24th for the attack, we had been able to land in their own boats some 8,000 men in a very short time and on a limited front.

The commanding officers of the troopers were now quite good in their signalling, etc., and I was able to feel fairly comfortable about taking them to sea and handling them as a convoy with the assistance of the Doris and Dartmouth.

Even at Skyros we were not out of the range of the enemy's activity, though he was doubtless surprised at finding British Naval Forces in the vicinity.

I was attending a meeting with the General and his staff when a signal was reported from the signal station saying that a torpedo boat was in sight. Not expecting any of ours, I ordered the Kennet out to examine her. She had hardly got under way when I received an S.O.S. signal from the Minatou troopship that she had been torpedoed. The Dartmouth, Doris and Jed were at once sent to her assistance.

She had been attacked by a Turkish torpedo boat from Smyrna who, after giving them three minutes to clear out from the ship, had missed her with two torpedoes. Apparently sighting the Kennet, she had then made off. Unfortunately there was some bungling about the boats being lowered which resulted in the loss of some fifty men and the Commanding Officer. The remainder were picked up in the water by our ships and two of our tugs, the Reclaimer and Mont Blanc.

Meanwhile the destroyers Jed and Kennet had got well in chase of the enemy torpedo boat, and by good use of their wireless had called up the Wear and Minerva who helped to head her off. The torpedo boat gave it up and ran ashore on one of the islands with the crew and officers escaping before our boats reached her. She was destroyed after being searched. The officers were apparently Huns and the crew Turks.

There was a sad incident the night before we were to sail in the death of Rupert Brooke, the poet, serving as a lieutenant in the R.N. Division. We buried him by torchlight ashore that night. It was an impressive scene as we carried his body up the valley to a little olive grove chosen as his resting place. The night was beautifully still and the last post could be heard echoing over the harbour by everyone afloat. It was not long before he was joined by many of his companions in arms.

# 9: Gallipoli Landings

24th April. We weighed with the transports, etc. at 5.30 a.m. to make our rendezvous in Xeros Bay by 5 a.m. on the following day, the 25th. It was no easy matter handling these ten big craft in narrow waters, and we found that our previous signal drill and instructions to the masters now came in good stead, and they handled them well, though the signalling was a little weak. I had them in three divisions:

1. Canopus, troopers Franconia, Grantully Castle, Minnetonka, Almerick Castle.

2. Dartmouth, troopers Royal George, Inkonha and Cawdor Castle.

3. Doris, troopers Gloucester Castle, Castrian and Somali.

The Doris met us at the rendezvous with six trawlers for sweeping the bay for enemy mines. The actual operations I have copied from my official report sent in to the Commander-in Chief, and it is evident from their tenor that the Turk either had very good information, or he took a big chance and had moved all his available troops from Bulair, the short cut to the forts at the Narrows, and placed them to resist our main attack at Helles and Anzac.

I believe that the question of landing at Bulair had been previously seriously considered, but it had been rejected on account of the distance from our main base at Mudros and the openness of the bay to bad weather. The two combined to make it impossible for the Navy to maintain the supplies for a large military force when landed there for any length of time in bad weather.

25th April. At 4.30 a.m. the squadron reached the rendezvous, and the Doris and Dartmouth were ordered to carry out a bombardment of the Bulair lines and positions to the eastward; the trawlers were to sweep Bakla Liman Bay by Cape Xeros.

7.30 a.m. The seaplane was sent up from H.M.S. Doris to make a reconnaissance and reported as follows: no guns visible at forts Sultan or Napoleon; two small camps east of Bulair; no troops visible anywhere.

7.45 a.m. H.M.S. Kennet was sent with Naval and Military officers to make a reconnaissance round the north end of Xeros Bay by Karachali and as far east as Liman Bay. No troops were sighted, but at the landing place just east of the village of Karachali, Kennet was fired on by some small field gun.

Canopus proceeded up to the Bulair lines and examined the coast and forts but could see no signs of troops. A second reconnaissance by seaplane reported that Bulair lines were apparently deserted. At midnight, according to orders, a feint at landing was made by a number of the troops near Karachali but without attracting any movement on the part of the enemy. This was followed by lighting flares on the beach placed by Lieutenants Freyburgh and Asquith of the R.N. Division who swam ashore, but these were also ineffectual in revealing any enemy force.

April 26th. At 2 a.m. orders were received for Canopus to proceed and help Majestic and Doris to reinforce the Triumph in the bombardment at Anzac in support of the landing. Orders were also received to send as many boats as possible.

It transpired that this latter order was on account of the heavy fighting and losses of the Australian Division landed at Anzac. Their position, clinging on the face of the cliffs in face of the enemy, was most precarious and at one time looked as if it might mean their being beaten back to the sea and having to re-embark.

They stuck it, however, though with some 2,000 casualties. On our arrival on the scene at about 7.30 a.m., one was struck with the difficulties of the landing: high cliffs with ravines rising directly up from a narrow beach commanded by high hills and the ground covered with thick brush wood which made excellent cover for the enemy infantry.

We started to back up our men with fire from the ship as soon as we got there, and with the Majestic I think we kept the enemy in check and prevented them rushing our men until they were well entrenched.

In the meanwhile, our boats and beach were busy in bringing off the wounded and landing ammunition, etc. on the beach, which at this time was being continuously shelled. We had five casualties among our shore party.

27th April. The fire during the night was very heavy from both our lines and the Turks', and the Bay looked as if there was a thunderstorm with spent bullets dropping in.

Directed by the military as to where they most required it, Majestic and Canopus kept up a heavy fire during the day. In the forenoon we had some heavy shell placed pretty close to us from one of the Turkish craft in the Straits.

April 27th. We were busy all day firing as required by the military. It appears that in the attack here by the Australians, they got the Turks on the run after they landed but chased them too far. Rallying, the Turks then attacked in their turn. Our men had run out of ammunition and were pushed back with heavy losses, being nearly driven back to the beach. They held them, however, and got trenched in, but are they still in a very nasty position.

The attack at Helles had also succeeded in getting a landing, but there had been heavy casualties at Seddul Bahr, where the Clyde had been run in. The French force at Kum Kale had also effected a landing, but it had to retire in face of a very large force of the enemy and had re-embarked on the 26th.

We had practically only landed on the European side of the Straits and were holding the most awkward narrow fronts with our backs to the sea and the enemy entrenched only a few yards from our front. The army at this time was dependent on the fire from the ships for their artillery and also for every supply they required in support.

28th April. We had a somewhat close thing with the heavy stuff from our friend in the Straits. He had got the range and dropped one close enough to splinter us. My messenger had his collar ripped off. Getting rather tired of it, I arranged with the Rear-Admiral of Queen that Majestic, Canopus and Queen should give him a salvo in the morning before he began operations. Because the Straits are hidden by the intervening hills, we hoped to spot him by bearing with the assistance of one of the aeros.

29th April. As arranged, the three battleships opened on bearing of our enemy battleship friend, and the aero reported that several of the 12-inch had dropped close to him and he was making off up the Straits.

Shortly afterwards, as I wanted to get the correct position of our front lines, I landed. It was most interesting. The beach was a congested mass of stores, mules, ammunition and men. There was a central W.T. station in the centre and auxiliary ones on each flank run by naval ratings.

The central hospital was in the centre of the beach while its clearing branches were between it and the front trenches. All wounded who could be moved, however, were transported at once by the ships' boats to the hospital ships for transport to Mudros and Malta.

I was met by Colonel Malone and together we walked up the left of the lines on the extreme flank. They had been badly sniped on this side as they had not yet been able to clear away the brush wood which came close up to the trenches and was used by the enemy sniper. At one place we had to run and duck as the parapet was not high enough to prevent the attentions of a sniper who had already unfortunately bagged two or three men and an officer. He was, I believe, successfully stalked a few days later.

Went on to the front line and found that our men were not more than thirty or forty yards from the enemy trenches. They were sat with their bayonets fixed to prevent a rush while the others were doing the shooting.

While talking to the Colonel shortly after, I saw that the Canopus was being shelled, and I hurried down with my coxswain. As we left they started shelling the beach good and hearty. We had a most unpleasant walk, or rather double down, to my waiting boat. Saw some poor fellows get it. Found the boat had not suffered, and the mid. was very pleased at having picked up a dud as a trophy, but I made him put it overboard.

Here I would mention that our mids. were for the best part of three weeks perpetually under fire in their boats bringing off the wounded, etc. All of them, without exception, did most excellent work and showed great pluck and true naval spirit.

30th April. There was very heavy firing during the night, but we did not have an attack by the enemy as one expected might be the case. They have, however, got the range of our trenches with their guns and at present our troops are dependent on our heavy gun fire to reply, the military heavy guns not yet being in position. If we could capture Hill 720, we should have a fine observation position.

1st May. In the morning we had a salvo with the 12-inch at the Turgood Reis in the Straits and apparently demoralized him a bit as he left his shooting area.

There was a meeting aboard the Queen to arrange the covering fire for an advance by the troops to try and secure a more favourable line of trenches. Our given area for this was rather an awkward one as we have to fire over our own men but not over 500 yards ahead.

Most unfortunately, we are at this most critical time short of shrapnel. This and the want of aircraft are the greatest drawbacks to our advancing without heavy casualties and dislodging the Turk from his best positions.

2nd May. At daybreak we had an interlude and with two of the destroyers and some of our troops made a reconnaissance at Nebrunessi Point where the enemy were suspected of having an observation post for their artillery and which had a full view of the beach.

We got as close as we could with the ship and landed the men from the destroyers under command of Commander Lambert. They found and rushed the trench occupied by the Turks, captured a dozen or so and killed three or four, but the enemy did not give much resistance.

At 7 p.m. we started our barrage for the advance which took place at 7.30 and which, I believe, was quite successful, the troops making good several of the Turk trenches.

I am afraid that A.E.2 submarine has been lost up the Straits. E.14 is still up, but they are rather anxious about E.15.

We went off at 8 p.m. to get ammunition at Imbros and coaled on May 3rd. We got back in time to shell the Turk on the left flank where our men were fighting to get some awkward trenches from him. They got them, but lost them again later in a very determined counter-attack by the Turk. Our Marine division suffered badly: 200 to 300 casualties.

4th May. Both sides, apparently, were agreeable to a rest and the fighting was on a minor scale. One was not surprised as from the day the troops had landed it had been almost continuous.

Bad news from Helles: the Agammenon and Lord Nelson had got rather a doing up the Straits and had heavy casualties. However, the Queen Elizabeth and Triumph had made some very good indirect firing on Maidos, the enemy's landing port up the Straits, and blew up a magazine there and sunk a transport.

5th May. The right flank at Anzac had a very bad time. The enemy had got some guns at the back of the rising ground at Gabe Tepe which quite enfiladed them. It was settled to have an effort to dislodge them by a landing party as the guns could not be observed from the sea.

Our boats were away all night on the operation and returned at 6 a.m. with, I am glad to say, no casualties. There were, however, a good many, and one of the destroyers had a very bad time.

6th May. It was a trying day for our troops and ourselves. The enemy had the range of the trenches and were pouring in shrapnel from batteries we could not spot, and we had no aeros to assist. The wounded were coming off in hundreds, and I sent the whole of our medical staff to the Gloucester Castle, the nearest trooper doing duty as hospital ship and of which the army were painfully short.

There were some 700 wounded aboard her and only three doctors and indifferent appliances and accommodation. They had as much as they could do to give first aid to them. It was satisfactory to hear that the ship fire on the night of the second had been most effectual and that the enemy were piled up in front of our trenches, so much so that it was all our men could do to stand the stench in this weather.

# 10: At Cape Helles

7th May. It was with some regret that I received orders to relieve the Majestic at Helles. We were now well in touch with the situation at Anzac which, though it was not favourable to our troops at the moment, made it all the more interesting as we had good hopes of getting the better of the enemy's artillery.

At noon we relieved the Majestic, who was stationed on the right flank of the French division. The French position reached the shores of the European side of the Straits by a ravine, Kerivese Dere, the opposite side of which was held by the Turks.

By request of the French General D'Armade, we started fire on the Turkish trenches shortly after arrival. We targeted just ahead of their lines and were spotted for by a British and a French officer. Our fire was reported as being very effectual, and the proof was not long coming as we were shortly under fire from a battery on the European side and another from the Asiatic. The latter got our range and burst a good many shrapnel over us, but we had no casualties except one signalman slightly wounded.

8th May. We were on duty again at noon. The French signalled that they were about to attack and wished heavy fire on the enemy trenches. This we proceeded to do. The enemy batteries, however, made it too hot for us in our first position as they got the range with some 9-inch battery we could not locate. Finding that we could get the same advantages by fire without giving the enemy a target, we went into Morto Bay and fired over the French lines, firing by direction of the spotting officers.

It was interesting as from our position we could follow a great deal of the advance of the troops, and they evidently made good some important ground on their front.

10th-11th May. Nothing of any importance. On the 10th we drove the Turks out of a trench they had re-captured from the French, and on the 11th, at their request, we searched for a concealed battery opposite their front and were lucky enough to find it. They reported that the Turks had retreated from it and that the guns had been destroyed. They again got our range and peppered the Saint Louis and ourselves with shrapnel, the heavy projectiles being close enough, but there were no hits.

12th-14th May. We had what was a day off on the 13th, having to go over to Mudros for ammunition. This kept the men busy all night. We sailed again at daylight. The situation at this time from a naval point of view was as follows:

We have two principal bases. One at Mudros, now defended against submarine and other craft by nets and land armament. The other base is at Imbros, just inside Kephalo Point. It's not nearly such a good anchorage as Mudros, but it is only some 18 miles from the beach at Anzac. It was also the headquarters of the Headquarter Staff and was protected from submarine attack by nets.

The work of the Navy entails practically the transport of everything required by an army in the field: some 20,000 men at Anzac and 60,000 men at Helles. In addition, the duty of bombarding the enemy batteries in the Straits and the support of the troops by artillery fire falls on the battleships and cruisers.

There are naval signal stations on both beaches, visual and wireless, manned by the R.N., and the work of disembarkation of troops, stores, ammunition, etc. is mostly done by the R.N. beach parties under the naval beach masters. There are, in addition, two naval transport officers on each beach acting under the Director of Transport at Mudros, who handles all troopers and their auxiliaries. The naval responsibility is therefore not a small one, and it will become a more difficult matter if the enemy start a submarine campaign, which seems probable when they get them put together at Constantinople.

15th May. On returning to Morto Bay, the Majestic, who we relieved, reported that they had been shelled out. The French, however, were anxious for fire on the enemy trenches and we had to take the chance. We had just got the range nicely when the batteries opened on us. I think this was from Achi Baba. They got our range shortly and we had rather a warm time. They knocked out our fore top, shot away our fore topmast and damaged some of the boats. After a while I considered it was advisable to shift our position.

As the enemy were now in force close to Kerivese Dere, I raised steam and proceeded as if we were leaving for the entrance of the Straits. Then turning, we went up at full speed. Passing Kerivese Dere at close range, we gave the Turk a real belly full from every gun on the port side. As we turned, their heavy battery opened out and made some useful shooting, but it wasn't good enough, and we got in a salvo from the other battery. The Turk vacated his trenches, and I don't wonder.

16th May. We were on our flanking position at noon, and the enemy had evidently spotted our observation position by Tots Battery ashore as they made it very hot for our military observers. They, however, were splendid and carried out their observation and spotting in a hail of shrapnel and shell. The observers got us on to one of the enemy's heavy batteries which we called Black Maria and which we had never really located before. Our picket boat sunk a floating mine off the ship.

17th May. Nothing of importance, but we had another run past the Turk trenches off Kerivese Dere and I think shook them up. Relieved Admiral Thursby in command at Anzac.

# 11: Back to Anzac

18th May. Admiral Thursby and his flagship the Queen were ordered off to the Adriatic, and I got orders to take his place in command at Anzac. Our ships consisted of the cruiser Bacchante, Captain Boyle, battleships Triumph. Captain Fitzmaurice, Vengeance, Canopus and four destroyers.

The situation had not much improved since we left. Our Australian and New Zealand troops under General Birdwood were holding on to a small front of about 5,500 yards. The distance from the beach to the front trenches is not more than about 1,800 yards with an almost direct rise of some 400 feet. The enemy's front trenches in some places are not more than 20 yards from our own. The beach is enfiladed by the enemy's artillery on both flanks. The position on the whole is a poor one, and the beach parties responsible for the landing of stores and men have a poor time and have had heavy casualties.

Captain Vyvian was the beach master and Captain Loring the transport officer. Commander Lambart joined me for duty as chief of staff, and I was heartily glad of his assistance.

Things shortly got very busy. It started by the enemy opening a very heavy fire on our trenches and also a fairly heavy fire on us in the bay. During the night the Turk made a determined attack on our lines, but the troops were ready for him and drove him back with heavy losses. The Turk lost some 2,000 men with our casualties being, I believe, some 600 killed.

19th May. Early there was some heavy gun practice at the ships from the Straits but no damage. Having obtained the services of an aero for spotting, Canopus and Vengeance were able to drive them up the Straits with indirect fire from our 12-inch. The Turks again attacked our lines but were driven off. During the night we were busy landing troops to reinforce and fill up casualties.

20th May. The enemy attacked again in the morning but were met by the same gallant and stubborn resistance by our troops. From the ships we were able to render some considerable assistance by keeping down the enemy's fire on the flanks.

In the evening the enemy hoisted white flags and asked for an armistice. This General Birdwood would not hear of that night, but it was settled that they should send their representatives on the following morning to discuss the question. This mainly consisted in a temporary truce to bury the dead which were heaped up in front of the trenches.

21st May. While the interment of the dead was going on, I took the opportunity of visiting the General and also of going round the trenches and having a good look at the Turks' positions as far as one could see them.

It was an extraordinary sight: the space between our sentries and the Turkish ones was not more than some twenty yards in some of the positions, and both the Turks and our men were in the no-man's ground hastily burying the dead while a lot of scowling Hun officers and N.C.O's were watching our men and their own.

The rifle fire must have been deadly as the accoutrements and bodies were simply riddled with it, and one cannot understand how anyone could have lived there for a second.

There was one amusing incident when two or three of the enemy, having evaded the watchful eye of the Hun, rushed into one of our trenches and deserted. From what we heard from them, they were having a poor time under their Hun officers and were badly fed and worse clothed.

Loring and self, who were doing the rounds together, were both struck with the fact that we could, without much risk to our men, fire over our trenches on to the Turkish lines. We made suggestions to this effect to the General who was then, I think, quite ready to accede. Unfortunately submarine activities shortly prevented our making the experiment.

22nd May. My worst fears were realised as at 11 a.m. one of our patrol trawlers reported sighting a submarine. I despatched Commander Lambart in the destroyer Usk to confirm the report which he shortly did.

There was no other course open, and I at once cleared out all the transports and large ships including the Bacchante and Vengeance and remained with the Albion and Canopus to take our chance.

This makes the question of supplies and transport of troops trebly difficult as it is impossible to keep big ships as easy targets for the submarine, and all the work will have to be done by tugs, trawlers and destroyers.

The submarine was again reported, this time unpleasantly close off near Kebrunessi Point.

23rd May. We spent a most unpleasant night cruising about the bay and assisting in a raid on the enemy trenches by Suvla Point with the very good possibility of being torpedoed.

Just before daylight, the Albion, who was on patrol off Gaba Tepe, signalled me that she had run ashore. We at once closed her as fast as possible, and I signalled to the Admiral asking him to send tugs and if possible the Lord Nelson to keep down the probable fire from the enemy ships in the Straits.

We got down and shortly had her in tow with their 6-inch hawser, but she was heavily ashore and the current was still setting her on. The tow parted and in the meanwhile the destroyers had an effort but got no movement. I then anchored the Canopus as close astern of the Albion as we could go without grounding and got our hawsers aboard her.

The enemy had now realised the position and opened a heavy fire on us from the direction of the olive groves and also from the Straits. Albion and Canopus replied to the best of our ability, but it was not until the Admiral arrived with the Lord Nelson at about seven a.m. that the ships in the Straits were driven off. Lord Nelson effected this by spotting from a balloon.

Meanwhile, we were towing all we knew. The Albion was going astern at full speed and the destroyers were doing their best, but it was beginning to look very bad when shortly before 9 a.m. she started to move and a cheer from the Albion made it clear she was coming off.

I admit to being extremely thankful as they had the range of both of us and were hitting pretty frequently. Albion had several casualties but we were again fortunate, though we nearly got bagged with one over the bridge.

Albion was rather badly damaged by shell fire and got orders to repair to Malta for refit. She had hardly got clear when she was attacked by an aero who only just missed her but made a worse shot at us.

Commander-in-Chief made a congratulating signal to Canopus. Lieutenant Bennett the navigator handled the ship very well, and all hands worked extremely well under somewhat trying conditions.

25th May. The Vengeance was to relieve the Canopus this morning, and I had arranged to go aboard Triumph on her arrival. However, on her way over and close to the Bay, she made a signal that she had been attacked but missed by a submarine.

Signalled her to close Canopus at full speed and getting aboard her, I sent Canopus off to Mudros. Fortunately I had cleared off all the transports and big craft the day before, and now the Triumph, cruising off Gaba Tepe, and Canopus were the only ones left. Having sent the patrol boats to stand by the Triumph and signalled asking permission to remove the battleships, we awaited events steaming about at speed.

At about 12.15p.m., before we got a reply to our signal, we heard a report and saw the Triumph had been torpedoed. She heeled over to about 30 degrees and at about 12.20 p.m. turned completely over, remaining bottom up for a short time and then sank. The destroyers and patrol boats closed her, and with the exception of, I think, 70 men, mostly stokers, the remainder of the ship's company were picked up. She had been torpedoed at close range through her nets.

I at once closed on the island of Imbros in Vengeance and later picked up one of the destroyers and returned to Anzac, sending Vengeance on to harbour. On our way back in the destroyer, we had a hunt, one of the patrol having sighted the submarine, but it got too dark and we could not locate her. On the whole a hectic day.

26th May. The situation from the naval point of view was now extremely difficult. It was impossible to use the battleships and cruisers, as before, for the support of the military positions or to allow the transports or heavy supply ships to be off the beaches exposed to submarine attack.

I left in the forenoon for Kephalo to visit the Vice-Admiral and confer with him as to the position. I particularly wanted to see if he could spare me any of the heavier armed destroyers to take the place of the battleships in protecting our troops from the enemy artillery fire on their flanks at Anzac. He was, I am glad to say, able to spare the Rattlesnake and the Pincher, both of which had 4-inch guns.

I also reported that the Cornwallis was, in my opinion, in a dangerous position and liable to attack at any time from a submarine, and she was recalled to Mudros.

The V.A. is short of staff: Roger Keyes, Chief of Staff, is busy with the Military Headquarters and official correspondence from home, and the details of operations have to a great extent to be left to the S.N.O's at the respective bases. This sometimes results in clashes with the military orders from want of coordination and mutual information.

As an example of this, I found on my return to Anzac that reinforcements of troops had arrived in destroyers without previous warning and had approached the beach under heavy fire from the enemy batteries. It resulted in some four killed and fifteen wounded. They would not have been allowed to land until after dark under these conditions if one had known in time.

27th May. In the forenoon we received a signal that the Majestic was sinking. She had been torpedoed while at anchor off Helles but was surrounded by other ships. This meant that though, like the Triumph, she was down in some few minutes, the greater part of her ship's company were saved.

I was thankful the Cornwallis had been recalled. I changed my quarters to the destroyer Pincher, and although sleeping on the ward room table was not the height of comfort, I enjoyed my time in her and the later operations in the destroyers better than any time at the Dardanelles. This was probably due to the fact that in a battleship one had the perpetual anxiety of being mined or torpedoed with some 700 men and officers on board, whereas in a destroyer one can take the chances and are not nearly so vulnerable to either of these forms of attack.

Went to see General Birdwood in the afternoon and made arrangements with him for a combined raid on the enemy's outposts on the right on the following day. They were, in his opinion, preparing to place machine guns or artillery of some sort that enfiladed our trenches.

The position was about 1,200 yards north of Gaba Tepe and had a road leading down to their trenches. The plan after dark was for Rattlesnake to search the trenches on the right of our lines and give them heavy fire. As she moved along, our troops ashore were to rush the trenches. When the road was reached, the destroyer was to concentrate on it in hopes that the remaining Turks that had not been caught by the troops or gun fire would attempt to escape that way.

28th May. The morning opened with a very heavy fire from the enemy from both flanks. I was busy with both destroyers trying to locate the enemy batteries and keep down their fire, and we were fairly successful. At 9 p.m. the Rattlesnake and the troops detailed commenced their raid as arranged, and they were completely successful in clearing the Turk trenches. The final fire from the destroyer accounted for the remainder who were escaping by the road.

29th May. The Turk was apparently out for some reprisals for last night's raid and attacked our front and right wing trenches heavily in the morning. They were repulsed with heavy losses and the General estimated that they had some 2,000 dead.

Submarine reports came in from both Cape Helles and off Gaba Tepe, but neither the patrols or destroyers could locate them. Shelled the enemy batteries in the evening.

30th May. Had some early morning practice at Cojadere Village at the enemy troops. Embarked some of Birdwood's staff to make a reconnaissance of the enemy positions from the sea so as to get information as to their most vulnerable points for our fire. We also shelled some of their outposts.

In the afternoon I left for Kephalo to see the Vice-Admiral. Got reliefs for the beach parties and boat crews at Anzac who have mostly been there since the landing. Admiral de Robeck was naturally rather anxious about the submarine defences of Kephalo and Mudros. There were no heavy nets, and the old pattern ones had long ago proved unequal to the duty of keeping out the modern torpedo.

I doubt if any naval Commander-in-Chief has ever had a more continual succession of difficult propositions put before him than Admiral de Robeck during this campaign. I also doubt if there was one who dealt with them in a more efficient and cheerful manner.

He had a task no man could envy. There was the responsibility of the entire supply of an army in the field with no proper base in the vicinity or modern appliances. He also had the duty of supporting this army to the best of his ability with the naval force under his command. Then there was the protection of all the transports, supply ships, etc. from enemy attack and the operations in the Straits to clear minefields and keep the enemy batteries in check. All at the same time.

He was, however, having some very cheering results up the Straits from the operations of our submarines who were doing splendidly and making history for themselves.

31st May. I returned to Anzac in the early hours and en route had a submarine hunt, having been signalled by one of the aircraft that he had bombed one close to us. We did not sight him, however, but I cleared all the supply ships out of the anchorage and was glad as it was shortly after sighted.

The Colne and Rattlesnake had made some good practice during the night. Combined with the troops, they had captured some of the enemy outpost trenches, but our men had to leave one at daylight, being commanded from the heights above by the Turk.

Made a reconnaissance of the coast between Suvla point and Gaba Tepe in the destroyer Pincher. We first located some of the enemy troops near Kuchuli Anafasta and shelled them with, I think, good effect.

Off Gaba Tepe we surprised an observation party of the Turks and drove them off. Passing the point by Gaba Tepe, we came on the enemy who was very busy at some emplacement work by their trenches. They bolted on seeing the destroyer, but we passed and having given them time to resume their occupation, we got well within range and practically accounted for the greater part of them. They shelled us heartily as we left, right up to the anchorage, but they made indifferent shooting.

# 12: The Smyrna Patrol

2nd June. To my sorrow I got orders from the V.A. to return to my ship as she was to go to Malta and refit. I was to turn over my command at Anzac to Captain Algernon Boyle, of Bacchante, on arrival.

Landed to say my farewells to General Birdwood and his staff and the naval officers ashore, and incidentally had a glorious bathe with the General. It was hot and the trenches were nasty, crawling with vermin, and the stench near the front line was awful from hastily buried dead to the number of thousands.

Reached Kephalo in the evening and dined with the Admiral. Tried hard to get leave to remain, but was unsuccessful and left at daylight for Mudros to rejoin my old Canopus.

6th June. We left for Malta with a cargo of German and Turk prisoners and had a parting present from a submarine when off Strati Island. I sighted him from the bridge just before the after gun fired. I didn't see the torpedo but a hospital ship following us did and reported that they had missed us astern.

8th-25th June. We were making good our defects and giving the men and officers as much leave as possible. Malta can hardly be called gay at this time, being now the centre hospital for all the wounded from the Straits.

The war news did not improve while we were here. At the Dardanelles the enemy batteries on the Asiatic side seem to have been strengthened. They make it very awkward for the troops at Helles, and we have gained no perceptible advantage in ground.

The enterprise of the Hun was evident by a capture made by one of the Malta patrols of a number of Hun officers carrying money and papers. This demonstrated that the German's objective was the Arabs on the Egyptian front who, I presume, they wish to stir into activity against us.

I note at this time that I landed my journal as a second visit to the Straits might mean its disappearance in the briny.

1st July. We left for Mudros after a good refit and rest for the officers and men. In the morning there was an unfortunate incident in the shape of an explosion in the dockyard. This was close to the ship and off the jetty where the French ship Mirabeau was lying. It apparently originated where they were filling bombs, and resulted in the death of several workmen and some casualties aboard the Mirabeau.

As I happened to be passing, we landed and with some of our officers and men we got to work and did our best to put the fire out until dockyard assistance could come.

3rd July. We arrived at Mudros in the evening, having escaped any attention on the part of the submarines reported en route. The harbour was full: eight of our battleships, four cruisers and five French men-of-war. This was besides transports, etc.

There had been hard fighting ashore during the last few days, and our casualties had been very heavy, numbering some 1,400 officers and 40,000 men killed and wounded up to the 3rd of June. They are now expecting another 3,000 casualties; the Turks are reported to have lost more.

4th July. Went aboard the Triad to report to the Admiral and lunched with him. He told me he wished me to take command of the Smyrna patrol. This patrol, as I found out later, was of considerable importance. It consisted of the blockade of the Turkish coast from Cape Kaba to Latitude 38.30, a stretch of some 200 miles with many bays and coast towns. The most important was the Gulf and town of Smyrna which was held and fairly strongly fortified by the Turks and their Hun assistants.

The base for our ships was at Port Iero in the Island of Mytelene, a Greek island with a garrison of Greek troops - full of spies as I found afterwards - and possessing energetic German and Austrian Consuls who were not checked in any way by the Greek authorities.

The Greeks were presumably neutral, but in practice they were hostile to our interests. This was perhaps natural as we were holding the island by force majeure and curtailing what might have been a source of big profit to the Greeks by preventing the smuggling of supplies of any sort to the mainland.

The harbour was well suited to our requirements as it had a very narrow entrance which I had mined and otherwise defended against submarines and other craft as soon as I could. It opened to a splendid anchorage capable of holding a large number of ships of heavy draft. It is surrounded by high hills and gave excellent positions for our look-out stations to seaward and over the town of Mytelene, which was fortunately at some distance from the anchorage.

The principal offensive objectives were to prevent any food, ammunition, etc. being smuggled on to the coast for the use of the enemy; to contain as many enemy troops as possible on the area by raiding the coast and the defences; to capture or prevent any enemy craft from making any use of Smyrna or the other harbours on the coast. Also, with what force I had under my command, to try and hunt the submarines.

The town of Smyrna itself was not to be attacked, though the fortifications inside were to be harried. The reason for the exemption of the town was chiefly on account of the French and British interests involved in the surroundings, and the fact that a large European population was still in the town and up to date had received good treatment from the Turkish officials.

These details were necessarily acquired after some time and experience of the situation there, and my instructions were chiefly confined to general orders to blockade and hunt the submarine on my arrival on the 5th July.

5th July. My force was much too small for the work, and at first it only consisted of the Euryalus, Captain Burmester, destroyers Wear and Welland, sloops Heroic and Gazelle, trawler 48, a motor boat and the aircraft ship Ben Ma Chree.

6th-14th July. No time was wasted in making the ports as safe as possible from attack from submarines or other enemy craft, establishing signal stations and look-out stations for communication with the patrol outside and keeping a lookout on the craft passing the island.

Several air reconnaissances were made by the Ben Ma Chree of the ports of Aivali and Smyrna. This resulted in finding only two small craft of the torpedo boat class at Smyrna and the position of some of the batteries at both places.

Malone, of the Ben Ma Chree, had been experimenting with torpedoes attached to his seaplanes. His object was to attack enemy craft in the harbour of Smyrna and elsewhere, but unfortunately we found that they were not equal to the weight and the attempt failed. Malone was successful later, I believe, in an attack in the Straits with the torpedo carrier.

The railway station at Smyrna was attacked by the seaplanes who made some good shooting.

I lost the services of my first Lieutenant, Andrew Kerr, who to my regret had been ordered home. He had been the whole commission with us and was a most popular officer on board.

14th July. I have an addition to our small squadron in the shape of the French cruiser Bruix, Captain Tirard, who has a number of trawlers with indicator nets for submarine hunting. They are not, however, at present up to concert pitch in this work and will want a good deal of experience to make them of use.

The Heroic, one of the patrol, secured a Turkish sailing vessel, and the Grampus carried out her orders successfully and destroyed a number of Turkish caiques which had been previously located in Kemer Bay off the coast.

My small force was further strengthened by the arrival of three motor boats which, though not able to keep the sea in very bad weather, were extremely useful for work up the Gulf of Smyrna and among the islands.

They were the Dorethea, Marie Rose and the Penelope which were all rather the worse for wear on arrival, but we shortly got them to rights. They were officered by R.S.V.R. and manned with R.M.A. and mechanic ratings who all proved capable and good men.

Their commanding officer was Commander Smart, R.N.V.R., an extremely capable and energetic officer, by profession a well-known doctor and motor yacht enthusiast. He had been engaged in the bombardment work at Ostend and had also served in South Africa as a private in the Boer war.

Heathcote Smith, our Consul here and also Intelligence Officer, came aboard with Captain Mackenzie of G.H.Q., and we discussed the situation. In view of the constant reports of enemy submarines being sighted in the vicinity of Aivali and Smyrna Gulf, I rather rashly agreed to allow H. Smith to place Greek look-outs on the islands commanding these places.

H. Smith, in my opinion, is in rather an unfortunate position as in the position of Consul he should use his diplomacy to conciliate the Greek authorities and make our, at present, somewhat arbitrary tenure of their island as easy as possible. On the other hand, he has to defeat the spying and smuggling machinations of the Greek ashore to the best of his ability. The Greek authorities, not being by any means foolish, are quite aware of H. Smith's double capacity and act accordingly, resulting in the most awkward questions being decided by me.

I am still dreadfully short of ships to harry the coast and to carry out the patrol as I should like. Our operations are also being somewhat hampered by the perpetual stream of refugees from the mainland. Turko-Greeks and Armenians who, poor things, in their headlong flight from the Turk, embark in any crazy old craft they can find to take them. They are continually being picked up half-starved and in danger of sinking by our patrols. Feeding these pro tem. while they are inspected, interrogated, etc. before landing is quite a business, their Greek compatriots at Athens having refused to send any assistance in rescuing them.

The French Admiral Nicol arrived with a small squadron and informed me that he was on his way to make an attack on Sighalik, a Turkish garrison south of Samos. From what I gathered later, they were not a great success. He took the cruiser Bruix and left me the Latouche Treville, Captain Dumesnil, who proved a most excellent ally and with whom I established a strong mutual friendship.

21st-25th July. The next important work we had on hand was the mining of the approaches to Smyrna which had only been deferred until the mines could be obtained in sufficient numbers. The French miner Drome arrived with some four hundred. Unfortunately the mines were of the same pattern as those that been used before in an attempt to carry out this operation. This had resulted in the blowing up of the French minelayer Casa Blancha and nearly the same fate to our minelayer the Gazelle. However, they were carefully examined and overhauled by Captains Burmester and Dumesnil and our torpedo staff and successfully laid on the 22nd by the Gazelle without accident.

I had the misfortune to lose the motor boat Dorethea who caught fire from her galley stove and was burnt out in a few minutes.

26th July. Though stationary, the Canopus was more than fully employed. The officers, such as I could spare, were relieving those in patrol boats as required. The men had to be drafted to relieve those sick in them. The engine-room staff and carpenter staff were fully employed in repair work and cleaning the boilers of the squadron, and a considerable number were landed permanently to man the outpost guns, look-out station and entrance defences. Fatigue parties were building piers, watering the patrol from the shore and every sort of odd job.

Personally, with a limited clerical staff and one officer, I found that my correspondence alone was as much as one could manage, and I frequently had to make up in the small hours for necessary trips to sea and elsewhere. This, coupled with a distinctly trying heat, made one sometimes feel somewhat done. Captain Burmester is, however, of the greatest assistance as also his officers and crew in the Euryalus.

I had received orders to be ready to berth transports as a division of British troops were being sent to Port Iero. The Auliania was the first to arrive, followed shortly by the Andania, Novian and Canada.

The Auliania's arrival was the occasion of a submarine scare. The sub had been sighted by the master of the Auliania just outside the entrance, but the duffer had, for some reason best known to himself, thought she was a friendly craft and had not mentioned the fact until he reached the anchorage. Although he had two of the patrol in attendance on his ship, a fruitless hunt ensued.

This division are mostly composed of Irish regiments: raw and with few regular officers. They are under the command of Brigadier General Hill who is a particularly young looking man and I believe had a reputation as a smart officer.

From instructions, the first impression that it is wished to convey to the Greek, and thence to the enemy, is that they are intended for operations against Smyrna itself with the object of getting as many of the enemy troops concentrated in this direction as possible.

The real object, which at the time was kept entirely secret, was to be the landing of these troops, in company of the other force from Mudros detailed for the purpose, in the now historical landing at Suvla when it was hoped to take the enemy's flank and allow of a general advance on the whole front and capture of the forts up the Straits.

Meanwhile, because the men had been for some time aboard, we were to assist the General to land and exercise them for route marching on every possible occasion and to get them fit for what they were likely to have before them.

There were at this time continual reports from Greek and other sources of submarines, but they were generally too delayed to be of any practical use. But I was glad when on the 31st, with the assistance of Captain Dumesnil's trawlers, we had effectually netted the approaches of Fouges Harbour and Sandarli Bay, two of their most probable ports of refuge on the mainland on my patrol.

We had also about this time run a line of nets for about three miles off Cape Zeitum, a likely place off which there had been frequent reports of enemy submarines, commanding as it did the Mytelene channel.

# 13: The Suvla Landings

31st July. Sir J. de Robeck arrived aboard the Chatham and I went aboard at once. The V.A. then told me in the strictest confidence the destination of the division but not the date of the operations.

After talking over the state of affairs here, he went round the posts and defences at the entrance. Hankey, the secretary of the War Staff, accompanied us. He practically represents Winston Churchill, I understand, who has not been able to pay his threatened visit out here.

The Admiral was satisfied and the question of further offensive against the Turkish defences was considered. It will only be possible when he can spare me monitors, all my craft being too lightly armed and the Euryalus being too vulnerable to submarine attack to keep her hanging about the coast.

The Chatham sailed in the evening. Shortly after we had another submarine report off Aivali, which was on the Chatham's route to Mudros. I was glad when I received the report of her arrival there.

1st August. The patrol captured another Turkish craft which was converted into a water tank and proved useful. Another submarine hunt around Aivali proved fruitless, but I left a patrol off the port and netted the approaches.

2nd August. General Sir Ian Hamilton arrived in the Chatham and inspected the troops. It was with considerable surprise that I found later that he had given General Hill no information as to his future movements.

3rd August. With the assistance of Heathcote Smith and some pressure on the Greek authorities here, we at last induced them, and those of Chios and Samos, to issue identification certificates to the passengers in their Greek ships. Searching them for suspects and spies had been otherwise a most lengthy and annoying business.

This was unfortunately later cancelled by our Embassy at Athens who stated that the Greek authorities there would not consent. It appears as if it required a stronger hand there to deal with their wiles.

Lieut. Mackenzie and Captain Aubrey Herbert, the M.P., arrived on Intelligence work and stopped the night aboard. MacKenzie is the author of Sinister Street and other books. He appeared a delicate, rather high-strung man, but very good company. Aubrey Herbert, a clever fellow with original ideas, was brimming over with sympathy for some of the rascally suspects we had aboard under temporary duress.

5th August. I received the orders for the landing at Suvla in the evening. Our part of the operations was to embark the division here into smaller craft - the Fauvette, Sarnia, Osmanieh, Heroic, Honeysuckle and Snaefel - in time for their arrival at daylight at the rendezvous off Nebrunesi Point on the 7th.

As there was little time to spare, I at once went aboard to see the General and arrange for the details of the embarkation. To my intense surprise I found that he was entirely ignorant of the nature of the operations of his division, the nature of the country, in fact of anything about it.

As it was little more than 24 hours before the division would be in action, I gave General Hill all the information at my disposal. Fortunately this included the maps of the country at Suvla from the intelligence staff.

Under the conditions, I also thought it only right to inform the Admiral that the General had received no army instructions whatever. If the other army commanding officers are in the same plight, I do not think much of the chances of the success of the troops.

General Hill at once called a meeting of all the C.O's of the regiments and the preliminary orders were issued. Captain Burmester, in naval charge, took charge of the embarkation and will leave with the division,

6th August. The troops were got aboard their respective craft and sailed separately according to their speed for the rendezvous. It was rather a sad sight to see these lads, all full of go and spirits at the idea of a chance at the enemy, with little idea of what they would be up against in the next 24 hours.

Directly the first transport had sailed, I sent the destroyer Wear with what apparatus we could improvise to cut the marine cable to prevent any chance of reports reaching the enemy of the direction they had left.

The French destroyer Rateau arrived in the evening with one Carl Racher, a German spy who they had succeeded in capturing at Samos. I gathered that he had been found in a café and that he had later accidentally(?) fallen into the water and been rescued by the Rateau boat and taken aboard. We had been after him for some time.

August 7th. It was with some considerable anxiety that we waited for news of the general advance at the Dardanelles, but we did not get any reliable information for some days. It was then terribly disappointing. The troops had landed as arranged at daylight at the rendezvous, and at first they had made excellent headway, having completely surprised the enemy. Later, however, when the first line had met a determined resistance on the part of the Turk, they were eventually obliged to retire, principally on account of want of water and that the supports were not up in time.

From what I was told, the water supply was landed and on the beach, but there was no organised commissariat supply to take it to the fighting line. In the present temperature, and with raw troops, it was naturally an essential.

The Turks then advanced. Our front line had to retire and the enemy then fired the scrub which was the finale for the wounded. It was all the more unfortunate, this failure at Suvla, for the troops at Anzac had at last thought that their hour had come. After some incredibly hard fighting, they had succeeded in taking Hill 971, which practically commanded the ground to their front and overlooked the forts. This, however, had to be relinquished on the troops' retreat on their flank at Suvla.

Of the whole expedition, all we could claim was the possession of a precarious front in Suvla Bay where our troops had entrenched themselves. It is a terrible disappointment, and what should have been a Sedan for the Turk was a costly failure to ourselves, though the troops had been landed without a hitch and the enemy surprised.

August 7th. The transports from Port Iero were all despatched to Mudros where their first duty was to render assistance as hospital ships for removing the wounded.

# 14: The Smyrna Patrol (Continued)

9th August. Our work went on as usual again. We were still continually having our operations interrupted by the salving of the refugees. A large consignment arrived today taken by one of the patrols from Long Island in the Smyrna Bay. This time they included the Italian Consul General, Italian Vice Consul and the Greek Consul of Vourlah (or Vurla) and several nuns -Vourlah being a town of practically entirely Greek population which had now been occupied by Turkish troops.

One has a considerable amount of sympathy for them, especially the small children of whom there are always a number and who have a poor chance of living through the privations. These particular ones had existed for three or four days on grapes.

11th August. I lost the services of the Euryalus who was ordered to Mudros. Captain Burmester had not returned from the landing. I took advantage of her departure to send off our spies and suspects with their dossiers from the Intelligence Officer.

13th August. Left with Captain Dumesnil to inspect the net barrage that his trawlers had laid off Cape Zeitim versus the submarine. They extend for about three miles from the coast and are about ten feet under the surface. They will, I hope, keep the submarines on the surface and possibly in sight of our patrol boats if they choose this as a cruising ground against our transports.

While still at sea we intercepted an S.O.S. call from the trooper Royal George. She had been torpedoed outside my beat, but unfortunately did not give her position when she made the call, and it was not until we got a signal from the Soudan that we guessed where she was and got the patrol boats and other craft available down as soon as we could.

The greater part of the survivors were picked up by the Soudan and the patrol boats, but the loss of life was heavy and totalled some 700. She was unfortunately without escort.

14th-17th August. The last consignment of refugees was interesting. They were mostly Turko-Greeks who had deserted from the enemy, who had been employing them in digging trenches, etc., between Fouges and Smyrna. By report, the Turks are making every preparation for an attack by us on Smyrna. The longer we keep up this idea the better as they have already a large number of their troops held here who might be otherwise up the Straits.

My patrol were busy all this time harrying their outposts on the coast and had frequent skirmishes with their troops. What I was really badly in need of was flying craft and some light craft with heavy guns to get at the fortifications and other inland batteries.

Despatched two of our intelligence officers, Mons. Charnaud and Professor Myers. The latter has a thorough knowledge of the islands, where in more peaceable times he used to conduct his researches. His researches are now confined to intelligence and spies, in lieu of antiquarian, but he takes to the new pursuit like a duck to water, and I hope he will have some success at Chios, his beat at present.

18th August. I went over to inspect the minefield and nets which had been placed to block the entrance to Smyrna and the other ports in the bay. I am satisfied that we have them now safely bottled and that the only traffic that goes on is between Vourlah and Long Island, situated about midway in the bay. I am loathe to stop this traffic altogether as it is the only means of escape for the unfortunate refugees, but they are under the eye of the guard on the island assisted by a patrol afloat.

While out, the guard at Long Island signalled that they had a large number of refugees, so I took them off and got some valuable information as there were some deserters among them who had been employed at the defences in the vicinity. These defences are getting more formidable every day, and I hope sincerely I may get some craft to deal with them.

18th-22nd August. I lost the services of two of our lieutenants: Lieut. Donahue was invalided, and Bird was appointed to a good command, the Hythe. Captain Dumesnil was relieved by the Bruix, Captain Tirard.

The Snaefell, one of the patrol, managed to get ashore badly in Adramyti Bay while harrying some Turkish troops. I got a W.T. from him saying he was expecting momentarily to be attacked by their mountain batteries, so left with the Rattlesnake and other patrol craft available, and we were fortunate enough to be able to get her off before they got their guns on her.

She was badly damaged and had to go to Alexandria for repairs. The motor boats had several little skirmishes with the troops at Aivali, who had made several attempts to remove our torpedo nets.

23rd-31st August. The activity of the Turks at Aivali was followed by a definite report of a submarine being in the harbour. I was doubtful, but under the circumstances got the aircraft ship Ben Ma Chree from Mudros and made several reconnaissances, but the reports were all to the effect that there was no signs of one there.

We made a good many arrests of Greek craft at this time for carrying contraband. As all cases had to be gone into before handing them over to Mudros to be dealt with, my time was full, and it was with the greatest relief that I found an officer had been appointed to assist with this particular branch.

1st-11th September. The troopship Southlands was torpedoed close to Strati Island. Our patrol boats are getting shelled with heavier artillery, and I am anxious to get heavier guns.

The Greek Press, probably inspired by the Hun, has printed all sorts of false news, so I have started a Press propaganda in the local editions.

The minefield was extended in Smyrna Bay. The Turks showed some objections and shelled the Carron while laying out the buoys.

12th-15th September. The general news of the war was better and there appears some hope of getting Bulgaria in on our side if the Balkan conference is successful: Macedonia is the bone of contention between Greece and Bulgaria.

As far as our campaign here goes, we have a further extension of our military front at the Dardanelles with a large army in the field. The naval duties in the support of these and the maintaining of the supplies is increasingly difficult on account of the activity of the submarines and the winter weather.

We have been fortunate in this area, but the submarines have been very active to the southward and west, especially near Crete, and we are handicapped by the shortage of destroyers and patrol craft to keep them off the troopers and supply ship routes.

The results of an understanding with the Greeks is that the contraband regulations v. their ships have been much relaxed. This gives us much less work in that respect as they can now trade between their own ports with anything except fuel and mineral oil, which can be used by submarines.

The Vice-Admiral forwarded me a definite report that one of the German officers of the Breslau was at Smyrna preparing to take out some submarines. One took all precautions, but was able to assure the Vice-Admiral that I was certain there were none in there or any harbours in the vicinity.

In view of reports from the motor patrol of Long Island, I had doubts of the integrity of the Greek inhabitants left on the island and of the adjoining one, Kilsali. They had shown signs of too much friendly interest with the enemy, and I had my suspicions that they were getting correspondence over to Vourla. Because of this I proceeded to clear them out and leave only our guard with the Marines to look after them.

Much to my joy I got the two monitors M. 22 and M. 30, and if we can get some aircraft will be able to get at the defences on the coast and approaches to Smyrna.

I had some interesting visitors on board in the shape of the war correspondents: Bean the Australian, Ashmead-Bartlett, Daily Telegraph, Lawrence for Reuter's, Ross for the Canadian Press and Maxwell the Censor.

On the whole they were not in a cheerful mood about the campaign, and one was not surprised. Ashmead-Bartlett was distinctly caustic about the G.H.Q., but probably it was reciprocated. They were all unanimous about the behaviour of our troops, especially the Australian work at Anzac

16th-21st September. The examination of the suspects and refugees takes up a lot of my time. To complicate matters I have a couple of women, an Austrian and a Greek, who have to be housed in my cabin.

From a confidential message from the Vice-Admiral, I am to expect a strong French military force here. Their objective is not known at present, but I infer that it will be landing somewhere on this coast.

The final additional line of mines was completed in the Bay.

22nd-25th September. Winter weather had now set in and I had to shift the anchorages of the Canopus and her auxiliaries, petrol store craft, etc., and all converted prizes.

M. 30 was shelled in Sandali Bay while making a reconnaissance and silenced the battery, but without aircraft it is not much use trying indirect fire.

The morning of the 25th September we had our first visit in Port Iero from the enemy's aircraft. She dropped bombs at both the French ships Henry 4 and the Bruix, but her shooting was poor. Another appeared in the afternoon but did not attack.

The Greek Military Commandant, who is openly on the side of the Allies, informed me that Greece was mobilizing on account of the attitude of Bulgaria. One wishes that a combination of Serbia, Greece and Roumania were possible and that with a backing of Allied troops we could land at Dedeagach or Salonika and cut in behind Constantinople.

M. 30 got to blows with a battery at Ali Agra.

26th­-27th September. Went over to Mytelene to interview our new F.O. man, Chafy, who has been appointed for intelligence work re submarines and contraband. He is at present entirely ignorant of the conditions of either.

The Euryalus arrived with Captain Burmester, who I was very glad to see. His remarks on the Suvla landing coincided with my first impressions. Generals Stopford and Lisle are ordered home, but the general impression is that G.H.Q. is the most to blame.

Burmester looks very thin and worn. He lost his brother, who had only been landed for three days at Suvla and who had come from California to rejoin his regiment. My brother, Ewen, is also at Suvla with his regiment, I believe, and being rather older than myself he will have a hard time in the trenches.

I got a peculiar document in the afternoon from the French Captain. It had been found on the body of a Turk whose remains were discovered in the interior of an enormous shark caught in the anti-submarine nets. It had no information of value except that he had been buying cattle for the enemy troops. Otherwise his fate was a mystery, except to the shark.

28th September. There was better news from the Western Front where they have captured a number of guns and made a good many prisoners.

There was an S.O.S. call from the Andonia, but later news was that another British ship had been attacked near her and torpedoed about the same position in which the Ramazan was sunk. This area is getting a favourite resort of the submarines and also the waters near Crete.

29th-30th September. Am now trying to find suitable sites for an aerodrome and hospital in view of the possibility of getting a Flying detachment here and also of establishing a sanatorium for our sick and wounded from Gallipoli. I had also secured some ground for a recreation ground for the men, who badly want something of the sort in between their work on patrol, etc.

For myself, to my disgust, I got laid up with an attack of bronchitis from a chill, but I have the consolation of having two really good men like Burmester and Stephenson, my Commander, to carry on, who can do it as well as myself.

The situation at Long Island I am now happy about, having got a reliable guard of Marines there and a constant patrol of motor boats and one of the monitors to keep the Turk batteries in order.

As an advanced post it is somewhat near the enemy as Smyrna is well in sight from the look-out station, but they must embark to make any direct attack on the island.

1st­-5th October. I got continual reports from Greek sources that a submarine had been seen off Mytelene, but have now been convinced that their reports are, as a rule, absolutely unreliable.

My French colleagues are being ordered away. Their destination is Salonika, probably with the view of an offensive against Bulgaria. Greece is difficult to understand as they resented the landing of the allied forces at Salonika, but the temptation of getting square with their old enemy Bulgaria and getting some of Macedonia in their hands again may tempt them to the arms of the Allies.

6th-9th October. I am laid up still and only woke up when a Hun aero attacked the Euryalus ahead of us but missed her and got rather a warm reception.

The political news at this time was very interesting: Bulgaria undoubtedly about to attack Serbia; the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, defeated by the Royalist party, anti-allied, who have declared an armed neutrality and left Serbia in the lurch.

# 15: Sick Leave in Malta

10th-12th October. Arrived at Mudros in the morning. Admiral Rosie Wemyss came aboard shortly after and gave me kind messages from the V.A. and his ultimatum that I was to go to Malta, first chance, and stop there until reported fit.

Left in the hospital ship Nevasa. There were some 800 poor fellows aboard, mostly enteric. They are going down like flies with it at Gallipoli, and about 800 a day are evacuating. It will be impossible to keep up the numbers at this rate. It is due to the heat and the unavoidable congestion of the troops in a small area surrounded, as the camps are, with a cemetery of the dead of both sides.

Had a visit from one of the Lovat Scout men who was being invalided for rheumatism. He says their trenches at Suvla are pretty bad: ankle deep with water and being badly shelled. Ewen was all right, up to date. Arrived at Malta on the 14th and was packed off to hospital.

15th-20th October. Found it very restful. Had some of my Malta friends up to visit me and got a cable from my wife to say that she was coming out. I am very glad of this, but at the same time anxious as she will have to do the journey from Marseilles by sea, and the S.M.S. are active.

Things are not too good with us at present. The sick and wounded are pouring in from Gallipoli. The Western campaign is costing us an enormous loss in men and money, and we will have a third campaign to keep going at Salonika with the submarines taking a heavy toll, en route, of all our supply ships and transports. The P.M.O. threatens me with three weeks in this place; I trust I shall not require it.

I have some French sailors in my next ward who had been torpedoed by these beastly Huns and had been fired at by the submarines while in their boats. All were suffering from gun wounds. They were wonderfully plucky and very glad to get someone to talk in their own language with them.

Sir Ian Hamilton has been called home to make his report, and General Sir C. Munro has gone out to Gallipoli to size up the situation, which is a tough one. If we cannot advance and get into better positions before the winter, which will require more men and artillery, both of which we are short of, we shall have to consider the question of evacuating.

21st October. The French Admiral in Command here left for France. They say it's on account of the sinking of a very valuable store ship which had over a million's worth of guns and ammunition aboard and which he allowed to leave without escort.

Dedeagach has been bombarded.

Ethel arrived in the French boat Yassar from Marseilles. It was a dirty uncomfortable craft and had not even got wireless. She arrived too late to pass the boom defences and anchored all night in St. Paul's Bay where she might have been torpedoed any time; these Frenchmen are casual.

26th-28th October. Ethel and self got comfortably installed in one of the small houses in Florian near our old house. We got Professor Gulland, who is here in charge of all the hospitals, to vet me. He was reassuring and said that another two or three weeks would see me all right.

29th October. I heard from Commander Stephenson in the Canopus. She is now off Suvla and has been busy shelling Turkish positions there. The position is rather a precarious one for a battleship as the defences v. the submarine are nil, and the anchorage is well commanded by the Turk batteries.

1st November. Got finally vetted at the Naval Hospital and hope to leave to rejoin by about the 11th November. Ethel returning home by the Yarnak on the 13th.

The submarine campaign is worse, and in the last few days we have lost four French boats off Algiers and six British and French ships in the East including the Tara, one of the armed patrol.

Professor Gulland dined with us. He has some 12,000 patients here now from the Straits. They are mostly enteric, but there also are a large percentage of wounded.

We went to look up Lord Lovat, who is in hospital down with fever and dysentery. He had heard from Ewen, who is at Suvla and was well, but he says they had no whisky and were short of grub and got rather a doing from the Turks' artillery.

General Munro is to report to Kitchener when he comes shortly as to the general situation at the Dardanelles. I presume the decision will rest with the latter as to whether we evacuate or have another push at the Turk.

10th-13th November. Commander Stopford, my old Commander in Canopus, turned up from Mudros invalided. He brought me a letter from John de Robeck who wishes me to stop until quite fit, which I am now in my opinion.

The news was bad of the submarines. The Ancona was sunk with a lot of harmless emigrants on board, and the Merian trooper was shelled and had a lot of casualties from gunfire but escaped being torpedoed.

Winston Churchill has retired from the Cabinet.

The Italians are keeping up the farce of not being at war with the Hun, and Lockyer says they will not take any action against their submarines.

14th-18th November. Ethel sailed on the 15th for Marseilles. I shall be anxious until I hear of her arrival.

Left myself in the Wahire for Mudros on the same day. We had bad weather on the way up which probably saved us from the attentions of the submarines.

# 16: Evacuation

19th November. On arrival at Mudros found they had had a bad gale which had played the devil with all the floating craft, piers and the landings etc. I expect my hands will be full when I get to Suvla.

Rosie Wemyss was most kind and made me very comfortable aboard the Europa. I got a destroyer in the evening to take me over.

Greece is to get our ultimatum by next week and will have to make her choice one way or the other.

Arrived at Suvla in the forenoon and soon found myself busy. The gale had done its worst. Most of the troop lighters, piers, etc. were swept up on the beach, and we had lost both of our steam boats. The Commander told me that it was one of the worst gales he had seen and that the old ship had only just managed to ride it out by steaming head on with both anchors down, sea breaking clean over her. They had a bad time in the trenches.

Most of the ship's company were away salving, but we did some bombarding at one of the Turk battery positions which I think are the ones commanding the Lovat Scouts' trenches.

Monitor 29 and the Earl of Peterborough along with Scourge were bombarding the enemy positions on our left flank when I got a signal from the Scourge saying that she had had a bad boiler explosion and had five men killed and two badly scalded. It happened very shortly after I had left her. She was towed back to Mudros.

Our submarine defences are gone, not that they were much use, but they possibly kept the Hun off attacking us, which he can do any time now.

20th November. I definitely took over as Senior Officer from Captain Campbell of the Prince George, who was leaving. The situation is not very cheering. The Turks hold commanding positions on rising ground which dominate both our front line trenches and the ships in the bay. The trenches are very bad in certain places, being wet and liable to be flooded out if there is any heavy fall of rain which one is certain to get at any time now. The piers are damaged and it is a matter of some difficulty to land the necessary stores, ammunition, etc. required by the troops.

General Byng is in command and is an energetic and cheerful commander, but he is short of artillery to deal effectively with the Turkish batteries and will require reinforcements before he can advance and better our positions.

As the enemy had been especially aggressive on our left flank, the monitor, Peterborough and Kennet were ordered to bombard their positions. In the afternoon I had a visit from my brother, Ewen, and some of the Scouts, Alistair Fraser and others. They thoroughly enjoyed a bath and some decent grub.

General Hill also arrived aboard with some of his staff and we talked over things. Ewen gave me some useful information re the Turkish battery positions which I hope to make use of later.

They had had some sharp fighting on our left flank during the night, and we lost five officers killed and some 40 men.

I met General Byng and his A.D.C., Brooks, in the evening aboard the Prince George, and he gave me a general idea of the situation. He is anxious to push up our left and get better positions for our trenches. I arranged to land tomorrow and see how far we could help from the sea.

21st November. Landed in the morning and went round the left flank with the General and General Fanshawe, who is in command of the left wing.

The artillery struck me as being of too small calibre, and there were too few guns to do much good in the way of preparing an advance. I was also struck with the fact that there was a very fair shelter for small craft round the other side of Suvla Bay which might be utilised for landing or embarking stores and which was not under the guns of the Turk. In fact it was blind water for them. We arranged to support the left flank operations and also to have a go at some of the more aggressive batteries on the right flank. On my return I started Bennett, the navigator, on making a survey of the other harbour in view of its possible requirement later if evacuation was decided on.

The idea of possible evacuation is seriously being considered, but it is being kept very secret among the senior officers. The decision, I presume, will be made by Lord Kitchener when he arrives.

22nd November. We shelled some of the Turk positions which had been settled yesterday. They replied and made some good shooting, straddling us but not hitting. We were obliged to shift berth.

The observation officer ashore reported afterwards that our 12-inch had apparently knocked out one battery altogether. Commander Unwin, V.C., who is the Beach Master here, came aboard and we talked over the best prospects for evacuation, etc. and the possibilities of making use of the other harbour.

23rd November. We were bombarding some of the Turkish positions in the forenoon. Monitor 29 was on position 136 which had been trying to get on to our observing station on Chocolate Hill. The weather having improved somewhat, we were able to get on with the salving work.

From reports it seems as if Greece has at last to make up her mind. She has practically had an ultimatum from the Hun to go for Serbia and from the Allies to come in with us or disarm.

Expecting Lord Tullibardine aboard as he has been ordered a spell.

24th November. Had a busy forenoon with the ships carrying out a programme of bombardment the General wanted. The Canopus, Prince George, destroyer Grampus and M. 29 were all at it along with the Peterborough at Ungerdere. The rest of the ship's company were busy salving and we got off various craft.

Rather to my disgust, we received orders that we were to return to Mudros and thence to Port Iero again to take up our old job there. Though probably quite as useful, it gives one double the work and half the excitement. It is a pity that the same S.N.O. does not remain longer at the same base as he gets the hang of what the Army wants and the new arrival has to pick it all up again.

25th November. My relief in the shape of the Glory arrived during the night, and we got ready for our exit to Mudros.

Said my farewells to my brother, Ewen, and gave him our parting gift of whisky, oatmeal, etc. for his brother Scots in the trenches. Sir Julian Byng came aboard in the evening. He informed me that it was now nearly certain that we should evacuate, and we arranged the site for the proposed new pier as Bennett had finished the survey of the bay. It should be of considerable assistance to them in embarking the troops without the Turks having any idea of what was going on.

He told me that he had asked for more ammunition and artillery. If he had been able to get it, he felt confident in being able to force the Turks back on his left flank. As these were not available, he had been obliged to inform Kitchener that he did not think that it was possible to hold the present positions through the winter months as the lower trenches would be probably flooded out.

Lord Kitchener's visit apparently confirmed Byng's opinions, and he had already begun to evacuate quietly all heavy stores not required. I see no option: the harbour is a bad one, exposed to weather and dominated by the Turks' fire.

26th November. The military had an artillery attack on the left flank of the Turk, but it was impossible to tell the results.

We sailed at 2 a.m. for Mudros. On arrival went aboard the Lord Nelson where Wemyss was flying his flag, Admiral de Robeck having gone home to report. I found that Keyes and Wemyss were much adverse to the idea of evacuation. They are both in favour of a further attack by the fleet on the Straits and an advance by the Army. This is, however, in as far as I can tell, in direct opposition to Kitchener's ideas and those of de Robeck. Unfortunately Churchill appears to back up this programme, and it will take some resolution on the part of de Robeck and Kitchener to prevent it.

My instructions consisted of returning to Port Iero and making arrangements for the landing, etc., of some 20,000 troops at Mytelene.

27th November. Blowing a gale of wind. I was occupied during most of it on a court of enquiry and getting our wants attended to.

Captain Davidson came aboard for information re Suvla. I was able to give some and Tullarbardine the rest. The headquarters staff kept me busy until late re the possibilities of the island for the support of the troops proposed to be detailed for Mytelene, and General Altern and self spent some time over the necessary details. We finally got it down and handed it over to Keyes to raise the naval details required.

There is a decided division of opinion between the military and our present head of naval staff on the question of evacuation. The military are quite convinced that they are going to withdraw, while the troops and our staff are equally determined that they won't consider it until it is officially announced from home.

28th November. Tullarbardine informed me that his regiment had been definitely ordered to Alexandria after evacuating, so that seems as if the military authorities at home had definitely made up their minds on the subject.

Had long conference with G.O.C. General Sir C. Munro, who is laid up with a sprained ankle, and General Campbell. The discussion concerned action to be taken at Mytelene and the preparations for the arrival of the troops if it is finally decided to send them there.

The weather has gone from bad to worse, and both at Suvla and Kephalo all the motor and other small craft have suffered severely just at the time we are likely to want them most. The trenches must be awful at Suvla, especially as it is snowing and freezing hard.

30th November. We spent the day embarking mules and transport materiel of every description for Mytelene. We had just completed and were about to weigh, in a condition somewhat like the ark, when the Lord Nelson arrived and we got orders to disembark the lot.

Things appear to me to be somewhat chaotic with Naval Staff still having the idea of no withdrawal and G.O.C. making all preparations for the same.

The water supply steamer for Kephalo is ashore and hardly a lighter left at Anzac, Helles or Suvla.

Serbia appears to be done if Italy does not land troops to assist them, and the Russian troops are unable to do anything unless Roumania lets them through. Greece is still hedging, and our expedition from Salonika is unable, as yet, to advance.

1st-2nd December. We had finished unloading our menagerie by the evening and got away after dark, arriving at Mytelene at 11.30 p.m.

Burmester, Captain of the Euryalus, arrived aboard in the morning and reported that he had orders to return to Mudros. Our small squadron here will then consist of the destroyer Jed, sloop Gazelle, Monitors 30 and 32, and three motor boats.

Received a cable that G.O.C. had been informed from Athens that no British troops were to be landed at Mytelene for the present, and preparations for the camps were to be discontinued. This was rather a blow as Colonel Williams and his Company of R.E. had made excellent progress with road making and water supply, etc.

There was a mass of business to get through with Burmester. All the old business is going on, and there are two suspects to examine and refugees to overhaul. I was able to send some of them off to Mudros by the Euryalus when she sailed.

The Greek reply to the Allies was distinctly bellicose. In view of the same, I arranged with the French C.O. of the Daphne to land some of his men and a machine gun to strengthen our guards ashore. Warned Colonel Williams that I might want the assistance of his men if the Greek troops took up the offensive. I then left for Mytelene town, and informed the Consul that if things came to a head that I would land as many of our men as could be spared and take possession of the telegraph stations, W.T. station, arrest any German or Austrian officials and put a monitor off the town in case they objected.

4th-7th December. Most of this time was taken up with handling a rather complicated position. The town of Aivali, on the mainland opposite Mytelene, was inhabited by a large population of Greeks under anything but the paternal care of Turkish troops. A party of these had thought it a seasonable time to maraud the adjacent island, which was tenanted by Greeks, and walk off with some of their cattle, incidentally killing some of the Greek owners.

Our motor patrol boat under the command of one Hadkinson, a bit of a buccaneer, had landed and with his small force accounted for four or five of the Turks. This immediately led to reprisals by the Turk on the unfortunate Greeks at Aivali.

I was at once interviewed by the Greek Bishop of Aivali, who wished me to land and assist them. This, it had to be explained, was impossible as Greece was not our ally; moreover, I had no troops to land. He then asked for arms. This request I had also to refuse, and I informed him that the proper person to apply to for assistance was the Greek Governor of Mytelene, but if permission was obtained from our authorities to break the blockade on the Turkish coast, we would assist the refugees to escape and defend them from the Turks if they molested them.

They are curse these Greeks. They have twice the number ashore there than there are Turks, and their own Governor here will not help them in any way. It ended by our having to embark some 3,000 refugees who we deposited at Mytelene and other places, the Turks having only killed a few.

The native Greek hates his brother from Turkey. I was in conversation with one who remarked that he wished they had all been killed before they came over to Mytelene and ate up all the food.

8th-11th December. Submarines were reported off Cape Baba and near the Molivo channel but were not sighted by the patrol.

The press report was to the effect that Greece had refused to disarm and withdraw from Salonika. They would not come in with the Allies unless they were forced to retreat from the German Bulgar force, and only if we gave up the Balkan campaign.

Our troops have apparently had to retire on to Salonika, and the unfortunate Serbians have had to retreat into Albania. Our Salonika campaign appears to have been too late, and we have put our foot in it by promising what the Greeks consider their territory to the rascally Bulgars if they came in. We have got neither party and riled the Greek.

Am preparing to make a coup with what forces we have and take the island if Greece goes to the other side. I would not expect much difficulty as the feeling here, especially among the refugees, of whom we have now brought out some thousands, is very bitter against their own Government. I am convinced they would offer no opposition and probably assist.

12th December. Went over to Long Island and inspected our motor patrol there under Commander Smart. He has done excellent work blockading the approaches to Smryna and keeping an eye on possible spies, etc. from the mainland.

13th December. In view of reports of submarine, I visited Khios and Psao Islands but sighted nothing.

14th-20th December. The position as regards our Salonika campaign is bad, and the Dardanelles shows no improvement. We are losing men from sickness and exposure with no chance of making any advance unless more troops and artillery can be spared there.

At Salonika the Allied troops are retreating before the advancing German Bulgar force and are entrenching and fortifying the lines on the outskirts of Salonika, in spite of Greek protests. Reinforcements are being hurried up there.

America is being stirred by the sinking of the Ancona, and has now sent in her second note to Austria on this.

Here, I received orders to stop our road and campsite making and to send our company of engineers and other military ratings back to Mudros. Later got orders to be prepared to receive a division of French troops in lieu of British.

These will be of considerable value if Greece gets actively hostile and we wish to retain this island as a base. In the meanwhile, Greece is in the throes of an election which, if it puts Venizelos in as Prime Minister, will probably mean that she will join the Allied cause. The feeling here, and I believe in most of the other Greek islands, is in his favour, and on visiting Mytelene the inhabitants in all the cafes and public places were distinctly friendly, the band playing God save the King, etc.

There has been little hostile action on the part of the Turk here lately. Only one of the patrol has had any firing to speak of, but we have had continued trouble with the smugglers. They are mostly Greek and principally trade in petrol, of which the Turks are very short and giving fabulous prices.

21st-31st December. The evacuation of Anzac and Suvla took place on the 21st without the loss of a man and not a great deal of materiel. It was apparently exceedingly well carried out both by the Naval and Military, but it was astonishing that the Turk did not find out - not only that it was being carried out, but they were apparently ignorant that the troops had left for some time afterwards. There were, of course, many devices used to keep up the idea that the men were still in the trenches such as the automatic firing of rifles and machine guns and the occasional explosion of mines.

Personally I am delighted that the decision was arrived at, and I shall be more so when one sees every man off the peninsula. It was an ill-fated expedition. It was originally delayed too late to be likely to succeed, and it was always badly equipped. If it had not been for the extraordinary fighting qualities of the men, it would have resulted in a disaster.

A belated letter from my brother, Ewen, in the trenches at Suvla gave a good idea of what our men had been going through lately at Suvla. He said that in November the floods came down followed by hard frost, and our men were actually drowned in the front trenches. They had then to retire to the second line trenches which were waist deep with frozen water - the stream carrying the bodies of Turks and our own men over the trenches. They had roughly about some 12,000 men and officers evacuated in three days.

Meanwhile, we have retreated on Salonika too late to relieve the Serbian army and are pouring reliefs into that place. The situation at Salonika is almost comic. The Greek forces there are nominally neutral, and the Bulgars have undertaken not to invade Greek territory, but the Austrian, German and Turkish forces are open to attack our forces "com volo." However, in spite of Greek remonstrances, we are fortifying the outskirts of Salonika and have really completely taken command of the town.

# 17: Operations Against Smyrna

1st-7th January, 1916. My time was fully occupied as the French division of troops were arriving and their camps, etc., had to be arranged with their General Simonier.

The Greek authorities having arrested two of our Greek agents on a trumped up charge, I had a somewhat unpleasant interview with the Governor which ended in having to inform him that if he could not see his way to release the men, I should have to rigorously enforce the stoppage and search of Greek ships arriving at Mytelene. After a few days of this, to them very unpleasant delay in traffic, he had the good sense to release them.

Having orders from the Admiral that I was to take the necessary steps to arrest all enemy officials and agents in Mytelene, and also to make a reconnaissance of the fortifications of the Smyrna Gulf with the aid of the Ben ma Chree aircraft ship, arrangements for both these operations were made as soon as possible.

Relative to the first part of the programme, the officials and enemy agents concerned comprised the German and Austrian Consuls and some twelve other agents. Arrangements were made with the French Admiral here, Du Bon, and the French General to co-operate, and on the night of the 6th the marines of the Canopus, Bacchante and a seaman company from Canopus left in the destroyers Jed and Basilisk for Mytelene. The houses of the men we required had been carefully pointed out to the officers in charge who were to effect the arrests at the same moment.

The town was surrounded by the French troops who marched up overland. My chief anxiety was the attitude of the Greek troops, but these fortunately did not interfere in any way.

The German Consul gave some trouble and was foolish enough to open fire, but he was shortly brought to reason and was marched off with some satisfaction by the Royals. There was very little resistance from the others, and by four in the morning we had them safely aboard the French trooper Chili with their dossiers and despatched to Mudros.

The preliminary work of the reconnaissance was well underway by the Ben ma Chree, and her Captain, Malone, had secured a number of excellent photos from the aircraft. In time I hope to have them plotted on scale, and we shall then have an opportunity of giving the various batteries a systematic bombardment with the monitors and spotting aircraft.

The Latona, who had arrived with a further supply of mines, successfully laid them between Cape Alanguli and Apostula Island.

7th-12th January. The most prominent enemy agents having been removed from Mytelene, I decided that the other danger of espionage lay in the W.T. station, as yet in the hands of the Greek authorities. Under protest from the Governor, this was placed under the supervision of the French military.

To make things clear, it was decided between General Simonier and myself that he should do the duty of Military Governor ashore and be responsible for the order of the island while I should be responsible for the harbour approaches and all operations outside.

12th-15th January. The arrangements for the operations against the fortifications of Smyrna were now progressing. I had an excellent flying corps of French military aviators who had improvised a temporary aerodrome above the town of Mytelene. For facility of operations, however, we were preparing an advance base at Long Island, up the Smryna Gulf, and by making a gate either side for the monitors through the minefield, we had two very fairly defended little shelters for them to lie in.

A guard of marines and others were established on the island with light Q.F. and machine guns. With the motor boat patrol, I expected they would suffice to tackle any force that might be embarked to attack us there.

16th-19th January. The patrol were busy as usual and the work of stopping the contraband and surveillance of the suspects, here and in passing steamers, as well as the transport of refugees from the mainland, was increasingly heavy.

From information by our agents in Smyrna, the Turks are getting very uneasy and expect a landing near Smyrna. Reinforcements have arrived along with German officers to assist in the strengthening of the defences.

I was obliged to arrest one of our leading lights among the Greek agents we employed who had, without doubt, forwarded correspondence to the enemy and also extracted bribes from the unfortunate refugees when on their way to Long Island. (This is where they resort if they can escape from the mainland in hopes of being rescued by our patrol boats.) He was despatched to durance vile at Malta.

I was also disgusted by permission being given to an American vessel by the F.O. to embark liquorice from Smyrna - her captain having the cheek to request that he might be piloted through our minefield. This I flatly refused and informed him he could ship his stuff off Scala Nuova, outside and under the surveillance of one of our patrol.

20th-21st January. The greater part of our energies were concentrated on getting the advance base completed. We had some 300 natives at work on the aerodrome, and the ships' mechanics and working parties making huts, landing places, erecting W.T. station, telephone and look-out huts, etc. I was glad when the Admiral arrived in the Triad to show him the work was well advanced.

The French airmen are doing a course of spotting drill from our ships, and I think by the time we are ready they will be very useful. I hope to get good results from our monitors with their assistance.

The monitors who are going to take part have arrived and consist of Nos. 16-32, the Raglan and Earl of Peterborough. The Raglan with her 14-inch American guns ought to put the fear of God into the Turk if they can shoot straight.

Admiral Jaures arrived in the Kleber and will take command of the French squadron here, but I am glad to say his arrival was on the distinct stipulation by the Commander-in-Chief that I remained Senior Officer of the Port and Smyrna patrol. It is a curious position, but one which, after a while, he was quite reconciled to and became rather a friend of mine.

The Turks are evidently getting more aircraft as they have been over Long Island twice lately.

1st-8th February. The Turks are getting the wind up, and by our spies' reports, they are fortifying frantically and getting all available guns down. They attempted to mount one on the main land opposite our base on Long Island, but were spotted by our patrol and two of the motor gun boats drove them out with some rapidity and loss.

Preparatory to starting the offensive on the Smyrna defences, the Monitors 16 and 30 made a reconnaissance round Sandarli Bay, and they were successful in getting some Turk troops under fire and on the following day in cutting the telegraph lines ashore at Andrymati.

9th February. The French Air Squadron having now been well exercised with the monitors at spotting and wireless signalling, we started on our first serious bombarding of the Smyrna defences.

The programme was carefully drawn out with the assistance of the plan of the enemy's fortifications and batteries made from the photos and observations of the air staff of Ben ma Chree, Commander Malone. The monitors very shortly got on and made accurate shooting, the Frenchmen spotting admirably.

The first objective was the anti-air gun batteries on Kerisman which had been straffing our aircraft while reconnoitring. These were quickly silenced, much to the satisfaction of our airmen.

We then took on the batteries and military depot at St. Georges. The Raglan, with her 14-inch guns, had this job, and a heavy explosion soon showed that she had obtained good results. After, reports were that some of the guns were badly damaged, that an ammunition dump had been exploded and that the Turks had suffered some 300 casualties.

We got no return fire except at the aircraft. I can only imagine that they had deserted their guns or that they could not bear on the monitors, who were 12,000 to 14,000 yards out. They made an attack on one of the patrol craft by aero but no casualties on our side.

10th-13th February. I had been living aboard the Raglan, where Captain Raikes was my kindly and excellent host. It had been interesting watching the Raglan's shooting as she was armed with 14-inch American guns. They certainly shot accurately but showed an extraordinary whip on discharge, and the old Raglan used to make a regular stern wave as the guns recoiled.

Bad weather now came on and prevented the aircraft from spotting. As the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral de Robeck, was arriving at Port Iero, I left in Ribble to meet him there, leaving Captain Raikes in command in Raglan.

14th February. The Admiral left with me in the morning to inspect Long Island, and as the weather had improved I was able to get the monitors and the aircraft out and made another attack on the batteries.

Incidentally, as we had got a gun or two, I was able to give the Admiral some partridge shooting. The island was full of them as they had had the benefit of all the grape crop which had not been touched since the Turks had driven the inhabitants off the island, massacring those that had not managed to escape.

The enemy aircraft appeared and attacked our kite balloon and bombed the island, but they were quickly driven off by the French aircraft, one of which reported his man had made a forced landing on the racecourse at Smyrna.

Returned to Port Iero in the evening with the Admiral. I left Raikes, M. 22 and 30 to carry on the bombarding as I had to arrange for a raid on the island of Khios to arrest a batch of spies.

15th February. Our intelligence officers having certain information regarding some of the enemy inhabitants of Khios who had been assisting the enemy, I had sent some officers there to locate their houses, and on the evening of the 17th I sent a detachment of marines and seamen from the Canopus aboard the Anemone. Under the command of Commander Stephenson, they sailed in company with the destroyer Usk and one of the trawlers so as to arrive in the small hours at Khios.

Stephenson carried it off excellently and returned with all the culprits on the following day. They were sent off at once to Mudros.

19th February. The weather continued and was too bad for aerial work. This was most disappointing as the bombarding work had to be postponed along with an attack by the aircraft on the railway lines outside Smyrna which I had hoped to carry out. However, the Frenchmen succeeded in dropping a lot of propaganda literature over the town of Smyrna. This was all to the good as the Turks have kept news of any of our successes carefully secreted from their men.

We had another raid in the evening of the 19th. A detachment from the ship under Lieutenant Bennett, supported by a French detachment of their troops, surrounded the village in Mytelene where the suspects lived, capturing the men we required without any resistance. They had been supplying the enemy with information and their cypher was found.

21st February. Taking advantage of any fine weather, I had arranged to try and destroy the enemy's line of communications by rail. This was to be done by bombarding the railway bridges between Ajasaluk and Scala Nuova, where the line is vulnerable from the sea, and also the big bridge over the Mendere river, north of Scala Nuova.

The expedition was under the command of Captain Larken in the Doris. He had the monitors 16 and 22, the Earl of Peterborough and a seaplane for spotting which we had secured from Mudros. They sailed on the 22nd, and Larken reported by wireless on the 23rd that the Mendere bridge had been hit four times with a 12-inch from the Peterborough and that monitors 22 and 16 had destroyed two of the smaller bridges on the main line to Scala Nuova. Monitor 32 had also been successful in damaging the bridge across the Kaleobaki river on the south side of the Smyrna Gulf.

The motor boat California brought over a released prisoner from Vourlah by arrangement with Rahmi, the Vali. Lieutenant Fitzgerald by name, he had been captured during the Dardanelles operations and had been a prisoner in Constantinople for some considerable time until released and sent down by Enver Pasha. He stated that his treatment had been fairly good, except for five days' solitary confinement by way of reprisal. He said that the Turk had later apologised and given him five days' leave in Constantinople.

The Turkish troops are told nothing except that they are always victorious, so perhaps our air propaganda may be of use. Fitzgerald had a list of all the British and foreign officers he had met as prisoners in the Turks hands. I forwarded this to the Admiral.

When he had been on his say to Vourlah, he had had the bad luck to be quartered with his Turk guard at St. Georges. On the evening when Raglan was bombarding it, all his guard fled and left him among the debris. As Fitzgerald was very played out, he stopped with me for a day or two before going on to Mudros.

22nd February. An attack with the aircraft on the railway line at Smyrna had to be put off as the weather was hopeless. It was all the more disappointing as my information was to the effect that Enver was collecting a large number of troops at Smyrna, and I had hoped to catch them on the line.

23rd February. The Admiral was sending me a British air squadron to reinforce the Frenchmen and to assist in the operations on the coast while the bombardment on the Smyrna defences was being carried out. They were to fly over from Avros when we were ready for them, so I arranged with Lamasse, the French Air Squadron Commander, to quarter them with the others in the aerodrome at Thermi.

The Turks had now expressed their intention of removing all the Greek inhabitants of Aivali to the interior where, doubtless, they would be no more heard of. Having informed the Admiral, he cabled that the Government had approved of our removing the refugees if no other course was open. The Greek authorities themselves had refused any assistance.

I had no belief in the Turk's statement as they knew quite well that the only reason we had not raised the town was on account of the Greek inhabitants and neutrals. They knew that the moment they took on the offensive, then we should do the same in reply on them. However, as there were persistent reports from the Greeks that the Turks had commenced operations on the inhabitants there, I had a fly over the town in one of the French machines to reconnoitre. There was no sign of anything unusual, and the only offensive was directed at us as we went over.

24th February. Much to my regret, half of the French air squadron received orders to return to Mudros. They were unlucky on their passage: one dropped into the Muselim Channel, but thanks to one of our French patrol trawlers, the crew were saved. The crew of another, which had a forced landing at Strati, were picked up, but both machines were lost.

25th February. Owing to another report from the Greeks that the Turks were about to attack Aivali, I had to keep the greater part of my patrol off the town, but nothing transpired.

26th February. Left for Long Island with Admiral Jaures and his staff who wanted to see the place. En route we received a signal that the Austrian fleet had put to sea, so after visiting the island and making the necessary signals to the squadron, I returned to Canopus, coaled and got ready to join the Admiral at Mudros.

I got some interesting news from our spies and the refugees:

1. That Perteb Pasha had arrived at Smyrna with some 60,000 troops and were camped at Paradiso.

2. That some 2,000 troops had been in the barracks at Vourlah when we bombarded it and that they had fled to the village of Kirgular.

3. That the forts at Kerezuman and St. Georges had been badly damaged, with a good many casualties, and that Yeni Kale fort had also suffered.

27th February. Having arranged operations for bombarding and air attack on the railway heads and forts, I went over to Long Island and remained there until the 3rd March. Raikes kindly put me up most of the time aboard the Raglan.

The railway near Menemen was successfully bombed by the French aircraft, and some good work done by the monitors. The Turks attacked my kite balloon soon after it was up, and there was an interesting chase by our Avion de Chasse which made him take ground near the racecourse at Smyrna. The weather got too bad for any further bombardment work, so returned to Port Iero.

5th March. The patrols were as busy as usual boarding steamers and capturing any small craft which attempted to run the blockade to the mainland.

Some of the survivors of the French troopship Provence were landed, and we were fortunate enough to be able to supply them with some of the necessaries of life.

One Monsieur Galli, first dragoman of the Italian Embassy at Constantinople, was brought over from Long Island, having been released by the Turks. His account of the situation there was interesting. He was of the opinion that if Talat and Enver Pasha could be removed, there would be a good chance of a reversal of the attitude of the Turk, but as Enver is so intimately in touch with the Hun, there is no chance until he is disposed of.

The Hun is promising pay to the Turk army, and they were distinctly implicated in the massacre of the Armenians, whose property was confiscated and devoted to the Government funds.

The weather having broken again, we had to stop our operations for the time, but we were able to get the aerodrome ready for our new air squadron.

6th-7th March. Had some effective bombing operations on the railhead, and Raglan and M. 22 did some good work on the forts.

9th March. On request of Admiral Jaures, the French Admiral, I landed to attend a review of the French troops quartered here. They numbered about 7,000, mostly black. It took some four hours as they had several decorations, etc. to present.

I had a dinner party on board to finish the day. Under the circumstances this was a curious one, consisting of the French Admiral and his staff, the French General commanding, the Greek General commanding the troops, and our Consul. It spoke volumes for the entente, I think, that it went off without a hitch, having this day shipped off a cargo of Greek suspects.

10th March. To my regret, and that of most of us, the remainder of the French Aviation Corps got orders to leave for Salonika. They are without exception the best observers I have seen and yet always ready to go on any stunt. Lamasse, who is in command, and Allier are most pleasant and capable men to deal with. They all dined with us and we had a most cheery evening.

I sent one Monsieur Messir into Smyrna under a flag of truce accompanied by some motor tyres for the Vali of Smyrna, Rahmi Bey. The latter is responsible for the good treatment that the Europeans still receive at Smyrna, and bar taking advantage of the present conditions to fill his pockets, is, I think, really well disposed to us.

11th to 19th March. The aerodrome at Thermi was attacked by aircraft, but no damage was done. Two of our Greek guards were shot while trying to get off one of the intelligence agents from Vourlah. The British air squadron arrived by air with only one slight casualty. The French General commanding troops was relieved by one Colonel Mas. I regret General Debrieuve's departure.

20th March. The Vice-Admiral arrived and went up with me to inspect the new aerodrome. I was glad to be able to introduce him to the departing Frenchmen, who were just leaving. I have forwarded several of their names for the recognition I hope they may get.

Admiral de Robeck informed me that I had been awarded the C.B. I am naturally pleased as it shows a recognition of the services of the men and officers of the old Canopus. I also received orders to be ready to return home and transfer the Smyrna patrol to Captain Larken of Doris. The Admiral approved my next programme of operations.

21st March. Dined aboard the Triad with the Admiral. He sailed for Mudros the same night. I was rather anxious as a submarine had been reported in the vicinity, and I ordered the Reindeer to escort the Triad clear of the Muselin channel. He unfortunately collided with her in the dark, damaging himself badly, but fortunately only hit Triad on the stern and she proceeded and got in safely.

Had a successful raid on the main land carried out by the Whitby Abbey and some others, and we got some welcome loot in the way of livestock. They captured some 400 head which we added to our stock on Long Island, now a regular farm for the squadron. We only had one casualty and got about half a dozen of the Turks.

22nd March. Having got two of our aircraft over to the base at Long Island, I was able to start the bombarding operations again with the Raglan, M. 16 and 22. The time was mostly taken up between the operations and turning over the command to Captain Larken as I am due to sail for Mudros on our way home on the 27th March.

The new aviators were not up to the last, who had reached a pretty high level at spotting on the forts and finding any new batteries that the enemy put up on the surrounding hills. These were the ones I was most anxious about as the island was commanded by any long range gun they could manage to put up without our locating it. This they managed to do some little time after Canopus left, effectively sinking one of the monitors and driving us off the island eventually.

27th March. We sailed for Mudros at ten o'clock that night, and this practically ended the Canopus's active service in the war.

# 18: Report on Operations

With regard to the work in which we had been employed at Mytelene, the copy of a report sent before leaving to the Admiral explains its object and importance as regards the general position of the main operations versus the Turk and his German assistants.

**Copy of Report Sent Commander-In-Chief: Mytelene Island**

The arrival of the French troops on the island and the subsequent arrest of the most flagrant spies with the assistance of the troops had a most salutary effect. The conditions of this island, in this respect, are difficult as there are a large number of Turkish born natives who have never left it but whose sympathies are entirely with the enemy. They are mostly in the outside villages, and there are a considerable number in the ports of Sigri and Molivo who undoubtedly take any opportunity of smuggling contraband to the Turkish coast and of carrying information of our movements to the enemy.

If war conditions last much longer, and Mytelene becomes an essential base for Allied forces, drastic steps will have to be taken to evict all Turks on the island.

The attitude of the Greek authorities is mixed, due to the presence of the Allied forces and the attitude of their own Government, but there is no direct hostility owing to their pro-Venizelist tendencies and the number of refugees now on the island who have suffered at the hands of the Turks and owe their lives for the greater part to the British patrol who rescued them, their own Government having refused to assist them in any way in their escape.

**Gulf of Sandarli**

Contains the small but well-protected harbour of Ali Agra. It is accessible to enemy submarines and requires careful watching. As is the case with the other ports on the mainland of this patrol, it is garrisoned with Turks, who take the offensive v. the patrol when closing the harbour.

**Pogia Nuova, Fouges**

Following the coast down from Smyrna, these two ports may be placed under the same category as Ali Agra.

**Gulf of Smyrna**

The only channel for water-borne supplies to Smyrna, it is one of the principal ports on the coast of Asia Minor. It is confidently believed that this has been effectively blockaded by means of the patrol and minefield for some nine months.

Since the first naval bombardment, the enemy have devoted considerable time and energy to the elaborate defence of the approaches to the town and the entrances from the Gulf of Koja Dere and Sanjak especially. This has been done both by gun emplacements and earthworks. The eastern side is defended from land attack by lines of trenches and light artillery from Menemen to the coast.

The bombarding operations which have been conducted against the gun positions in the Gulf have, I believe, to a large extent reduced the defensive power of these batteries and shaken the morale of the personnel of the forts. They have also been the means of holding a large number of Turkish troops in the vicinity under the impressions that an attack by Allied forces was imminent.

**Long Island**

The island is also a sanctuary for refugees from the mainland who may have been able to escape the hands of the Turk. There have been some 4,000 to 5,000 of these removed by the patrol. The island is also a convenient point of departure for our spies in and out of Smyrna and the vicinity.

The enemy have realised the importance of this base, and it would be unwise to leave it without a monitor and the necessary aircraft to destroy any of the enemy batteries which he may endeavour to erect in the vicinity.

**Mytelene Channel**

This is the ordinary route of the Greek coasting steamers trading with the islands. It necessitates a large amount of boarding and search work and the establishing of a standing boarding service at the ports of Mytelene and Port Iero. This is carried out by the French and British naval forces respectively.

**Smyrna Patrol Ground**

Is contained between a line-drawn from Cape Baba to Cape Sigri and from Cape Nicholo to Chios Island, and on the west, by a line drawn through Cape Bianco to Chius Island. The Muselim Channel requires careful watching on account of the ports of Molivo and Sigri.

The Gulf of Andramayti is skirted by a caravan road along which supplies to the Turkish guards and outposts on the shores of the gulf are frequently brought. It also contains the island of Mosko and the town of Aivali, now garrisoned by Turkish troops. Mosko has been raided by the Turks and some 2 to 3,000 refugees have been rescued by the patrol and removed to Mytelene and other islands.

**Prefect of Mytelene**

Is a Government official attached to the party now in power. He is a weak personality but will give trouble if he can.

**Military Governor**

Is a straightforward soldier with a strong antipathy to the Turk and decidedly pro-Entente.

**Military Situation**

The French troops have the country adjacent to their camp well in hand, but owing to the size of the island, it would be advisable if French military posts were extended, especially to the ports of Molivo and Sigri. The main port of Iero and its surrounding anchorage is entirely under the control of the Senior Naval Officer, British, and is treated in all respects as a defended naval base.

**Naval Air Station**

Is established at Thermi about five miles north of the capital, Mytelene.

**Long Island**

For operations in the Gulf of Smyrna v. the enemy batteries and forces in the vicinity. It was also found necessary to have an advanced base to guard the minefields laid to block the entrance to Smyrna. Long Island was chosen on account of its protected anchorages. An aerodrome was laid out on this island, net defences laid round the anchorages and the island garrisoned with a Greek guard and marines from Canopus; a wireless station was also erected.

**Chios and vicinity**

By report, the island is the happy hunting ground of Greek contrabandists. It offers great facilities on account of the chain of islands between it and the mainland. The Turkish town of Chesme, connected by main road to the towns of Smyrna and Vourlah, is only seven miles from the Island of Chios, and is therefore an excellent base for contraband.

The main duties of the S.N.O. of Smyrna Patrol are therefore:

1. Maintenance of the defences and communications of Port Iero and Long Island.

2. Defence and control of the air station at Thermi.

3. Maintain the Examination Service at Port Iero and Mytelene.

4. Active operations against the enemy's defences in the Smyrna Gulf and communications, where possible from the sea.

6. Blockade of the mainland in the area of the Patrol.

7. Surveillance of suspects on Mytelene Island.

8. Suppression of enemy submarine activity on the patrol area.

9. Assistance to refugees from mainland.

# 19: Leaving for Home

28th March. We arrived at Mudros, which was a very different looking place from what it appeared on our last visit nearly a year ago. Admiral Christian was in charge and came aboard to say his farewells and give the ship's company and officers the Commander-in-Chief's thanks for their services.

30th March. Sailed for Malta. All went well until the 31st when our sadly tried boilers began to go. Luckily we were close to Malta. It was extraordinary that they had not done so before, having had almost constant trouble with them since we commissioned in August, 1914.

We managed to crawl in with ten boilers in lieu of twenty. The repairs to boilers, etc. kept us until the 18th April. We then sailed for Gibraltar where we arrived on the 23rd April.

Found a good many old friends including Lady Goodrich, Admiral Currey and Adam, Admiral Thursby's flag captain, who was still up the Adriatic. Dined at the Mount with the Admiral and little thought that in about a year's time I would be occupying the house myself.

28th April. We reached Plymouth in the morning and having reported to the Admiral, Sir George Warrender, got orders to sail for Chatham next day. The Commander-in-Chief came aboard in the afternoon and saw the ship's company, congratulating them on their safe return, and informed them that they would have three weeks' leave after paying off.

The Canopus had a great reception on going into harbour. We arrived safely at Chatham, and on the 3rd May had our orders to pay off, which was done on the 5th.

Of the Canopus ship's company, I cannot speak too highly. If ever men and officers were highly tried and answered well, it was they. Every sort of active service came their way, from patrol work in the Channel to cruising in the Atlantic; guardship at Abrolhos and Falkland Islands; on shore garrisoning defences; later, operations at the Dardanelles, bombarding the forts, patrol work inside and out of the Straits; then, garrisoning advance base in Smyna Gulf, manning the defences at Mytelene and Long Island, building piers, making roads, mounting guns, etc., etc.

They were always cheerful, steady and hard workers, and one of the best conducted crews I ever had. They consisted nearly entirely of R.N.R., Pensioners, and Fleet Reserves with a few R.N. ratings, petty officers. The average age on board, I think, was nearly thirty-six, and we had six grandfathers among the chief petty officers.

Of these loyal and devoted gentlemen, it is difficult to particularise any individuals, but naturally the greatest strain fell on those who were heads of departments.

Lieutenant Hordern, as gunnery officer, showed himself an able and most resourceful officer in every sort of situation.

Lieutenant Bennett was, I consider, one of the best navigators I have met, and was always ready in any emergency, cool and self-possessed in the worst situations.

Lieutenant Lesley. The same applies to him as of Lieutenant Hordern, and I much regretted when he was ordered home.

Engineer Lieutenant Commander Start was for a considerable time the senior engineer and went through as trying a time with our worn machinery as I trust did not fall to the lot of many engineer officers during the war. (During the Commission we had three chief engineers.)

Chief Boatswain Myers and Chief Carpenter Hughes were types of the very best of our warrant officers. They were called on for every sort and description of service, and were always ready to meet the situation, indefatigable and splendid examples to the men.

Of the Middies, I can only say they kept up the highest traditions of the Service without exception; the tightest places gave them the most joy. I regret that many of these were later killed in action in the Grand Fleet, as also Lieutenant Lesley.

# APPENDICES

The appendices includes: a list of all Canopus officers; Heathcoat S. Grant's obituary from The Times, 27 September, 1938; Commander, P.J. Stopford's wartime recollections; the original sources for both Grant and Stopford's accounts; extracts from War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 2, based on the letters of Philip Malet de Carteret, a midshipman aboard the Canopus. 

#  1: Canopus Officers

The original list of officers was as follows on commissioning in 1914:

Captain Heathcoat S. Grant.

Commander Philip Stopford, relieved by Commander Gilbert Stephenson, 1915

Lieutenant Commander Andrew Kerr, relieved in 1915.

7 1 (G) Philip Hordern.

Lieutenant (N) Harry Bennett.

Lieutenant (T) Henry Lesley. Ordered home 1915 for W.T. duty.

Lieutenant (E) Owen Phillips.

Engineer Commander Mi. Denbow. Invalided 1914.

Lieutenant Commander, R .N.R ., C. Milner.

Lieutenant Commander A. Bird. Appointed to Patrol 1915.

Lieutenant, R .N .R ., C. Cartwright.

Lieutenant, R .N .R ., Donohue. Invalided 1915.

Lieutenant, R .N .R ., C. Keigwin.

Lieutenant, R .N .R ., D. Clark.

Lieutenant, R .N .R ., M. Powell.

Engineer Lieutenant Commander, Sidney Start.

Captain, R.M., Gerald Hobson.

Chaplain, Rev. J. de Vitre.

Staff Surgeon, .A. Wernet.

Fleet Paymaster, A. Greenwood.

Surgeon, R.N.V.R., Charles Atkinson.

Temporary Surgeon, Michael Vlasto. Appointed Hospital Ship 1915.

Sub-Lieutenant, W. Williamson.

Assistant Paymaster, Harold Lutt.

Chief Gunner (T), Walter Uden.

Chief Boatswain, John Myers.

Chief Carpenter, Albert Hughes.

Chief Artificer, Walter Morris.

Gunner, Henry Irish.

Gunner, William Hills.

Boatswain, William Honey, left in charge Falkland 1914.

Boatswain, William Evans.

Artificer Engineer, Ernest Morey.

W.T. Engineer, R.N.R., S. Greenwood.

Midshipman R. Young.

Midshipman C. Burge.

Midshipman P. Malet de Carteret.

Midshipman J. Storey.

Midshipman H. Durrant.

Midshipman R . Orde.

Midshipman R. Dickson.

Midshipman B. Cockrane.

Midshipman T. Henderson.

Midshipman L. Booth.

Assistant Clerk, Jean Lejeune.

# 2: Heathcoat S. Grant - Obituary

The Times, 27 September, 1938, p. 14.

Admiral Sir Heathcoat Grant, K.C.M.G., C.B., of Boath, Nairn, who died in Edinburgh on Sunday, served for 43 years on the active list of the Royal Navy, including the whole period of the Great War.

As Captain of the Canopus he took part in the operations connected with Craddock's reverse at Coronel and Sturdee's victory at the Falklands; he served in action at the Dardanelles, and was afterwards Admiral-Superintendent at Dover and Senior Naval Officer at Gibraltar He was a practical officer of wide experience, who with greater opportunities might have become more famous.

Heathcoat Salusbury Grant was born on February 13, 1864, and was the son of Captain John Grant, of Glenmoriston. He received his early education at Stubbington School, Fareham. Entering the Navy in July, 1877, at the same time as Lord Wester Wemyss and other admirals who also served with distinction in the Great War, Grant first went to sea in 1879 in the Minotaur, flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir A.W.A Hood (afterwards Lord Hood of Avalon), then Commanding the Channel Squadron, but two years later he went to Australia to join the Nelson, flagship of Commodore J.E. Erskine.

Having passed for lieutenant, he joined the gunboat Wrangler, in which he gained most valuable experience. The vessel was attached successively to the Cape and North American Stations, and Grant being second-in-command had many opportunities, of which he was not slow to take advantage, of exercising his initiative and capabilities which would have been denied him in larger vessels.

The rest of his lieutenant's time, however, was all passed in big ships: in the Dreadnought and Colossus, in the Mediterranean; the Royal Sovereign, flagship of Vice-Admirals Fitzroy and Lord Walter Kerr, in the Channel Squadron; and in the Renown, flagship of Lord Fisher in North American waters, from which he was promoted to commander in June, 1899.

The high opinion held of Grant by Lord Fisher was indicated by the manner in which the latter, on being appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean in the summer of 1899, secured the transfer of the new commander to the Admiral's yacht Surprise. This little vessel Grant commanded for three years, during which he made many cruises to ports and bases up the Straits.

Promoted to captain in 1910, he commanded the cruiser Kent in reserve at Chatham and the light cruiser Diana in the Mediterranean, but in December 1908, in a vacancy occurring in the command of the Scottish Coastguard District, he transferred his energies to that administrative post.

Usually a coastguard appointment is the prelude to retirement, but it was not so with Grant, who in January, 1911, returned to sea duty in command of the cruiser Black Prince, afterwards sunk at Jutland. Then in June, 1912, he was selected to proceed to Washington as Naval Attaché, where he was stationed for two years.

When the War began he had only just returned to England, and on mobilisation was appointed to command the old battleship Canopus, from the reserve, in the Channel Fleet. That vessel was shortly afterwards appointed to the guardship at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and from there was sent to reinforce the squadron of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock in South American waters.

Owing to her slow speed, however, the Admiral found her unsuitable for the search of the German light cruisers then raiding commerce in the neighbourhood, and decided to employ her on the necessary convoying of colliers. When it was believed that the German armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were in the vicinity the Admiralty informed Craddock that they were sending the Defence immediately to join him, and he was not expected to attack the enemy without the Canopus.

According to Sir Julian Corbett's official History of the Great War, Cradock "was to keep his squadron concentrated on her (the Canopus), detaching the Glasgow to get in touch with the enemy, and to make every effort to form a junction with the Defence at the earliest possible moment." But the telegram never reached him.

When Cradock met the German squadron off Coronel and fought them most gallantly against tremendous odds, with the loss of his own ship and the Monmouth, Captain Grant in the Canopus was some 300 miles away, toiling slowly with the colliers, and quite unable to give that support which might well have turned the scale of defeat into victory.

After the battle, Captain Grant was directed to remain at Port Stanley, in the Falklands, in anticipation of an attack by the German Admiral von Spee, to moor his ship so as to command the entrance, and cooperate with the Governor for the defence of the place.

The gunnery officer was established ashore in an extemporised observation hut, and when the German squadron appeared off the islands on December 8, 1914, it was the guns of the Canopus which fired the first shots at them. The old ship, however, was unable to go out with the rest of Admiral Sturdee's squadron and assist in the destruction of the enemy forces which took place later in the day.

The danger passed, she took up duty as guardship at Abrolhos Rocks, used as a British coaling base, and early in 1915 was sent to the Dardanelles. After taking part in the bombardments of the Gallipoli forts during March, Captain Grant was ordered to Port Trebuki, in Skyros, in charge of a group of ships and transports connected to the expedition.

At the landing of the army in the peninsula, Captain Grant was senior officer of the Third Squadron which covered the feint at Bulair. This diversion completed, he came down to join the Majestic on the left of the Anzacs, where he rendered much-needed help. For his services on those and other occasions at the Dardanelles, right up to the evacuation, Grant was commended in dispatches and was made C.B.

At the end of 1916, when owing to its increased work the dockyard at Dover was brought under the control of a flag officer, he was appointed Admiral Superintendent there, having been promoted to rear-admiral six months earlier.

Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, who then commanded the Dover Patrol, stated in this book that Rear-Admiral Grant "was of the greatest assistance to me. It was with great regret to all that, early in 1917, he was appointed to the important post of Admiral and Senior Officer at Gibraltar."

He hoisted his flag on the Rock on June 19, 1917, and served there for two years, including the period when the submarine menace in the Mediterranean was at its height.

For his services he was created K.C.M.G., and he retired on promotion to vice-admiral in March 1920. For some time, however, he continued in the employment as Admiralty representative on the Conference with the War Office on the responsibility for the protection of defended ports.

In 1929 he was promoted to Admiral on the retired list. His foreign decorations included the Legion of Honour (Commander), the United States Distinguished Service Medal, the Order of the Crown of Italy, the Portuguese Order of the Aviz (Commander), and the Spanish Order of Merit.

In 1899 he married Ethel, daughter of Mr Andrew Knowles, of Swinton Old Hall, Lancashire, who survives him with three sons and three daughters.

# 3: The Cruise of HMS Canopus by Commander P.J. Stopford

To South America / Coronel Action / Defence of the Falklands / Battle of the Falklands / Malta / The Dardanelles / The Fateful 18th and After / The Gallipoli Landings

**To South America**

After mobilisation the Canopus left Devonport on August 8th and joined the Eighth Battle Squadron at Portland the same evening. Leaving Portland next day, the following four days were spent patrolling a line across the Channel during the passage of the Expeditionary Force. Returned to Portland on 13th, and on 17th and 19th went out for target practice.

On August 21st we left for an un-named destination, having received boxes of charts marked "South Atlantic set."

On the 23rd we carried out target practice, in company with Albion (R.A. Flag), and on 27th arrived at Gibraltar. Completed with coal, ammunition, provisions and stores, and left on 29th for St. Vincent. By this time we were much regretting having landed all awnings and stanchions at Plymouth, but at Gibraltar we drew an old awning returned from another ship and, cutting it in half, managed to improvise some sort of shade for the quarter deck and forecastle.

Passed Madeira on 1st Sept., Las Palmas on 2nd, and on 3rd met Highflyer and Victorian (armed merchantmen) to both of whom we transferred drafts. Arrived at St. Vincent on 7th where we found the Marmora. There were a lot of German ships in port.

Coaled from lighters in a heavy swell. This was very slow work and resulted in considerable damage to the (empty) net shelves. The day before arriving, we had boarded the British S.S. Dalton with a cargo of grain for Rotterdam which, being contraband, an officer and a prize-crew were sent to take her to Sierra Leone.

At this time our orders were to patrol between St. Vincent and Sierra Leone, but we now received instructions to proceed to Abrolhos Rocks, off the coast of S. America between Pernambuco and Rio, and left St. Vincent for that destination on the 8th.

We found at St. Vincent a small "oiler", the Impoco, with oil for the ships in S. American waters. We took her under our convoy, and on the day after leaving took her in tow. Twelve hours later we had to slip her to go in chase of a steamer. Our destination was again altered, and on 17th we anchored off Pernambuco. Here again we found the harbour full of German ships, and we were unable to obtain any supplies.

The Impoco went into harbour to coal and rather mysteriously was found to have a wire hawser foul of her screw when we wished her to leave. We proceeded to sea the next morning, and to our relief the Impoco rejoined us later in the day. We picked up an Admiralty collier outside and took her also under our convoy.

One night at this time, we stopped to examine a Dutch steamer that the telegraphists reported they had heard. This was the Dutch steamer Maria. We heard, some time afterwards, that she was sunk the next day by the Karlsruhe, the ship we were in search of.

German wireless very close, whereupon we went to general quarters, but nothing turned up.

On the 19th we met the Macedonia and the Carmania, the latter on her way to Gibraltar after her victorious action with the Cap Trafalgar.

Arrived at Abrolhos Rocks on 22nd and met the Cornwall whom we relieved as guardship. Coaled from a collier under great difficulties in a very heavy swell, "sweeping" her. Two days later we coaled again.

On the 25th we started for Monte Video, but on the following day received news that caused us to turn back and we anchored off Abrolhos on 27th. The Cornwall, in the meantime, had gone to Rio and thence to Trinidad and Martin Vas to see whether the Germans were using them as a base. We left Abrolhos again the same evening to get into wireless touch with her, returning to Abrolhos on 29th. Bristol arrived.

The storeship Crown of Aragon had arrived on 27th and we proceeded to clear her, taking all that we could stow on board and putting the remainder into colliers for transport to the ships further south.

9th October. Went to sea for the night and were relieved next day by the Orama when we sailed for the Falkland Islands to join Sir Christopher Cradock's command. We had spent 18 days on guard at Abrolhos during which we had coaled four times. Had some very rough weather before reaching the Falklands and found it very cold.

18th October. Arrived at Port Stanley and found there the Good Hope.

20th October. Admiral Cradock visited the ship and inspected the ship's company.

21st October. Leave was given to the hands for the afternoon, all public-houses being closed. The Good Hope left for the west coast on 22nd.

23rd October. Left Port Stanley for a rendezvous on the Chilean coast, proceeding by way of Magellan Straits. Before entering the Straits we rigged up a dummy third funnel, which probably looked exactly what it was.

30th October. Arrived at our destination (Vallenaz) in the Chonos Archipelago. Sighted Good Hope and Monmouth leaving as we arrived. Proceeded to coal.

The Good Hope had left behind, on an island, a signal party consisting of a mate and four men with a whaler. We had expected to stay at this anchorage for a day to clean boilers etc., but during the night of 30th we received orders to proceed northward and accordingly left at 8 a.m. on 31st.

**The Coronel Action**[top]

The next afternoon, the fatal 1st November, we intercepted a signal from Glasgow to Good Hope, "Enemy in sight, one four-funnelled cruiser, one three." And later "Two four-funnelled, apparently armoured cruisers, am being chased."

By this time we had increased to full speed and cleared for action, telling two colliers that had been accompanying us to make the best of their way to Juan Fernandez.

The next news we got was a fragmentary message from Glasgow at about 9 p.m. "Fear Good Hope lost, our squadron scattered." At this time we knew nothing about the Otranto, except that she was in the neighbourhood. The next thing was a message from Glasgow: "Am proceeding at utmost speed for Magellan Straits, have only just sufficient coal to reach Port Stanley. Have three holes in hull and four men wounded." (These messages are not given verbatim.)

At about 2 a.m. next morning - 2nd November - seeing the hopelessness of continuing our present course, we altered course to intercept our colliers. Having succeeded in this, we shaped course to the southward, keeping well out from the coast to avoid being seen. We then went to the eastward, entering Smyth's Channel by Messier Strait on the night of the 3rd.

We believed that we were the first battleship to make use of Smyth's Channel, and the successful navigation of it reflects the greatest credit upon our navigator. We anchored only once, when a blinding snowstorm at night obscured all possible marks.

Reached Magellan Straits on the morning of the 6th and picked up the Glasgow off Punta Arenhas. We escorted her to Port Stanley. Before leaving Magellan Strait, we received orders to proceed direct to Monte Video, if possible avoiding the Falklands unless absolutely compelled to go there. In view of the amount of coal remaining, the state of the engines and the condition of the Glasgow, it was judged imperative to go to Port Stanley, where we arrived on the morning of the 8th.

Coaled at once and sent divers and carpenters to examine the Glasgow to see what repairs were possible. Received a further order to proceed to Monte Video and consequently left the same evening after the Glasgow.

On the night of the 9th we intercepted a message to the R.A. in Carnarvon to the effect that "Canopus was to remain at Port Stanley, to place herself in the best position for commanding the entrance with guns and to make the best arrangements for defending the harbour."

As we had left and were nearly half-way to Monte Video, we continued our course whilst instructions were requested. On the afternoon of the 10th we got a signal from the R.A. repeating the former message, "Return to Port Stanley etc." We therefore shaped course once more for the Falklands and arrived there on the afternoon of the 13th, half expecting, I think, to find the Colony in German hands. All, however, was well.

**The Defence of the Falklands**[top]

We first of all moored in Port William, the outer harbour, with a spring on one cable to keep her broadside-on to the entrance. This, however, proved impracticable, so the following day we shifted berth into Port Stanley where we moored with the sheet anchor laid out on one quarter, the stream on the other, and with one foot of water under the bottom.

An elaborate plan for controlling the fire of the guns from an observation station ashore was drawn up with infinite labour by the navigator. The guns were covering the position outside from which an attack on the wireless station could be made. (There is no telegraph cable to the Falklands.)

A look-out party had been landed immediately on our arrival and were posted on the north side of Port William (Sparrow Cove). Three positions were selected for batteries and were manned and armed with 12-pounders. The landing and mounting of these guns called for seamanship and was ably carried out under the direction of the 1st Lieutenant.

A line of extempore observation mines, constructed of oil-drums, was prepared and laid across the entrance. The topmasts were struck, yards sent down and landed, and masts and funnels painted "rainbow fashion" in splodges of red, green and yellow.

On December 1st the storeship Crown of Galicia arrived bringing us the first mail we had received since leaving England exactly three months before. We had just missed getting this mail at Abrolhos from the Edinburgh Castle, which arrived soon after we had left.

The Crown of Galicia had had a marvellous escape from being captured as she had been round to Valparaiso and had actually sighted a German cruiser just before entering Magellan Straits on her return.

We next started in to clear this storeship, stowing the stores in the Admiralty sheds that had been built some years ago and never used hitherto. It seemed to be an interminable job. We started with our own boats and those carried by the storeship. Later we had the use of lighters and a tug, but as the depth of water in the camber would only permit of these entering or leaving at half-tide, progress was very slow. Moreover, there was no means of hoisting-out ashore except two pairs of sheers which we rigged and worked by hand.

By the 6th December the ship was cleared and ready for sea. During this time our medical staff had been busy equipping and furnishing a new hospital. This had been built as a memorial to King Edward and been placed at our disposal by the colony.

The climate of the Falklands has been described by one of the residents as consisting of "nine months winter and three months bad weather" and our experience bore that out. Although it was getting on for midsummer, we had several falls of snow and the wind blew with hurricane force at times. A remarkable fact is that few, if any, of the Islanders can swim as the water is always too cold for bathing.

We had a sad example of this during our stay when a punt containing seven of the volunteer force capsized when crossing a creek in the harbour and all were drowned. Added to the cold, the amount of kelp that grows in the water takes away most of the chance that even a good swimmer might have.

On Advent Sunday we attended a Memorial Service in the Cathedral for those who were lost in the Good Hope and Monmouth. This was concluded with the "Last Post" sounded by our buglers.

By December 3rd we found that it was impossible to keep the ship steady enough for our purpose without grounding her. This we had permission to do, so we shifted berth to the eastern end of Port Stanley and moored at high water, and at about half-tide she settled comfortably in the mud. The sheet-anchor was out on the starboard quarter from which direction the prevailing wind blew, and the stream-anchor was on the port quarter.

We did not flood the double-bottoms that night, and unfortunately at high-water next morning it came on to blow hard from the eastward and round we went eight points, dragging that stream-anchor as if it was not there. Luckily during the day the wind veered to the westward, and as the tide rose in the afternoon she blew back into place. I have rarely, if ever, experienced a harder blow than that afternoon. Some idea of its force may be gleaned from the fact that heavy seas - not mere spray - were breaking over the quarterdeck.

We took no more risks, but flooded the double-bottoms and borrowed two more 2-ton anchors, one of which was laid out on the port quarter and one right astern.

The before-mentioned plan had now to be made out again, and telephone cables to the observing hut and the town were laid. The picket-boat had been armed with her dropping-gear and torpedoes and was kept on patrol outside the minefield every night. We also took up a local steamboat which we used for examination purposes.

**The Battle of the Falklands**[top]

On 7th December the dramatic arrival of the squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. D. Sturdee occurred. So well had the secret been kept that we knew nothing of its composition, nor even the name of the Admiral.

We were expecting the Invincible, but it was quite a surprise to see a second battlecruiser. The squadron consisted of:

Invincible (Flag), Capt. P. H. Beamish,

Inflexible, Capt. K. Phillimore,

Carnarvon (Flag of Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart), Capt. H. C. E. Skipwith,

Cornwall, Capt. W. H. Ellerton,

Kent, Capt. J. D. Allen,

Glasgow, Capt. J. Luce,

Bristol, Capt. B. H. Fanshawe,

Macedonia, Capt. R. E. Evans.

They brought us another mail from England, which was most welcome. The next day, 8th December at 7.45 a.m., two strange cruisers were reported to us by telephone. This was passed to the flagship, and the squadron was ordered to raise steam for full speed and prepare for sea.

We went to general quarters and landed our observation party consisting of the Lieutenants. G, T, and N, a gunner's mate and a torpedoman.

Word soon reached us that the Gneisenau and _Nürnberg_ were approaching the wireless station and that three other ships were to be seen to the southward. These two were just visible from our control-top.

We asked permission to open fire - the bearing and elevation having been telephoned from the observation station. This being approved, we fired both fore-turret guns when it was sadly apparent that the enemy were outside our range with maximum elevation. We fired five rounds and gathered from the survivors afterwards that one had ricocheted on to the Gneisenau and that a piece of another shell had hit the _Nürnberg_. This had the satisfactory effect of causing them to turn and steam away at full speed.

In the meantime the other ships were unmooring, and the Kent and Glasgow were out of harbour in a remarkably short time.

There ensued a period of anxious expectation for news of the result. The Bristol and Macedonia had been sent to destroy the colliers and transports which had been reported to be with the enemy.

Our captain decided to get the ship off the mud at the evening high-tide and to be prepared to put to sea. Just as we began preparations for doing this, there came the welcome news: "Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sunk, Nürnberg burning," and then later, "Leipzig sunk." So we stayed where we were.

It may be worth mentioning that the grounding of the ship in Port Stanley was in accordance with directions received from the Admiralty. The official despatch describing this action caused some people to ask why the Canopus did not proceed out of harbour to take further part in the engagement.

On the return of the Macedonia, the German officers and crews who had been removed from the colliers that had been sunk were transferred to us. Later we received some of the officers and men of the Leipzig and Nürnberg from the Glasgow.

The wounded were landed and placed in the King Edward Hospital, Cottage Home, and the Schoolroom, and the killed were buried with naval honours.

11th December. The Orama, Capt. J. R . Segrave, arrived, having convoyed a collection of vessels including our old friends the storeship Crown of Aragon and the oiler Impoco.

13th December. The Inflexible, Glasgow and Bristol left to continue the search for the Dresden. The same day we received the honour of a visit from the Vice-Admiral Commanding who, addressing the officers and ship's company, expressed his entire satisfaction with the part played by the ship and his sympathy with us in our tantalising position.

**To Malta**[top]

The flagship left on 16th December, and the Otranto, Capt. H. McI. Edwards, arrived. The same day we left our mudbed and moored in our old position. Coaled next day and on the 18th left for Abrolhos. This voyage occupied eight days, but after two months in cold weather we found the return to great heat very trying.

We had Christmas Day at sea on "bare navy" and arrived at Abrolhos Rocks next day. Here, coaling from two colliers at once, we found the Invincible again. She left for Gibraltar the next morning.

29th December. H.M.S. Celtic arrived and brought us mails. She left for the south the same evening.

31st December. The Inflexible arrived, coaled and left for Gibraltar. When we were at this place before, there was a German steamer, a prize, which had had a fire in her bunkers going on more or less for some time. When we returned, we found she had sunk, leaving her mastheads from the eyes of the lower rigging above water. We rigged a target between these masts and carried out some heavy-gun practice. We also took the opportunity, whilst lying at anchor, of doing some aiming-rifle practice. We got under weigh several times to meet passing steamers and boarded all steamers passing through the Abrolhos Passage.

10th January 1915. We got news that the Vindictive was on her way to relieve us and that we were to proceed to St. Vincent. This, being looked upon as the first step homewards, was received with cheers.

12th January. H.MA.S. Australia, flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Sir George Patey, passed through, proceeding homewards after coaling.

14th January. Vindictive arrived. After turning-over to her, we left for St. Vincent.

18th January. We passed Fernando Noronha and went rather out of our course to pass St. Paul Rocks to see if there were any Germans in the vicinity. We passed it on the 20th but drew blank.

21st January. Just at sunset we sighted a derelict. We closed and found it to be the fore-part of a schooner named Wilfrid M. As she was a danger to navigation, we spent some time trying to sink her with the ram, but being built of wood it had no effect, so after narrowly escaping having one of our screw fouled by her rigging, we left her. We heard afterwards that the wreck was the work of one of the German auxiliary cruisers. Her cargo was salt-fish, which advertised itself widely.

We arrived at St. Vincent on 25th January, eleven days out. There we found the Dartmouth, who sailed just afterwards, and the Edinburgh Castle. Started coaling from a collier which knocked about a great deal in the heavy swell, so we cast her off at 10 p.m., got her alongside again at 7 a.m. and finished at 7.30 p.m.

Left St. Vincent on 28th, the Cornwall arriving as we went out. We were now bound for Gibraltar. Had three days' very rough weather passing the Canaries, which was on 31st.

Arrived at Gibraltar on 3rd February and coaled from North Mole, leaving next day for Malta where we arrived 7th. Here we were at once taken in hand by the dockyard for some much-needed repairs and were fitted with a "bow mine-catcher."

Leave was given for the first time in six months ­- with the exception of the two afternoons at Port Stanley and canteen leave at Gibraltar. We spent seventeen days at Malta, which made a pleasant break. We left on 24th to join the Flag of the Vice-Admiral in the "Eastern Mediterranean ."

**The Dardanelles**[top]

Leaving Malta on February 24th, we arrived two days later at Port Tribuki in the Island of Skyros. This had been used as a base for the Fleet, but we found no ships there except one storeship. We received orders the same evening to proceed to Tenedos, and anchored to leeward (south side) of that island next morning. Here we found the Triumph and Cornwallis, but ships were constantly coming and going.

We coaled and remained at anchor for the next two days. On the evening of 1st March we proceeded to take up our station for patrolling the entrance of the Dardanelles - the mine-sweepers and destroyers operating inside. The next day we went inside and engaged the forts to the southward of Kephez Point. On the way in we saw the result of the previous bombardment of the forts at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale, which had been reduced to ruins.

2nd March. On this day the ship was hit three times, once on the quarterdeck (probably by a 6-inch howitzer) which split the bulkhead on the afterside of the wardroom creating some havoc. Pieces penetrated the deck and were brought up in the flat below. Another hit the main topmast just in line with the lower cap, bringing down everything above it. The third pierced the after funnel. Bursting outside, it riddled the first cutter and picket boat and cut up all the ropes in the vicinity such as cutter's falls and derrick guys. There was also a hole in the main derrick and a chunk cut out of the wooden forederrick.

We were relieved in the evening and anchored off the north side of Tenedos. Remained at anchor next day coaling and repairing damages.

4th March. We were detailed for searching the coasts of Besika and Yerkyub Bays. We claimed to have knocked out two field guns and dispersed a body of troops, but we drew no fire.

In the meantime, under cover of the ship's guns, an attempt was being made to land some Marines of the R.N.D. at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale, but the positions were found to be dominated by concealed trenches, and our men mere unable to obtain a foothold and were forced to retire to the ships with some losses. Both points, however, were set on fire by the ship's guns. We saw the Dartmouth making some fine practice.

The next day we were employed with three other ships spotting inside the Straits for the Queen Elizabeth, who was firing over the land from outside. We followed each other at certain intervals of time along the sides of an imaginary oblong, firing as well at any target that presented itself.

The spotting corrections for the Queen Elizabeth, which were passed down from the top, sounded most satisfactory, but though we credited her with several hits on the fort that she was firing at (in Kilid Bahr), there is reason to believe that not much permanent damage was done.

We were not hit on this day, though shells fell all round us, and down below the water a knock that followed a miss led one to suppose that the armour bad been hit. The writer picked up some splinters of shell on deck afterwards.

The next time we entered the Straits was on the 8th when four battleships were stationed on the bows and quarters of the Queen Elizabeth to deal with flanking batteries while she bombarded Kilid Bahr with direct fire at long range.

On the night of the 10th we went in, in support of the destroyers and trawlers, and attempted to extinguish searchlights by gunfire.

We were again on night patrol on the 13th, and spent the next day inside the Straits supporting minesweepers. During the day we sank five or six mines ­- or what we took to be mines, as it was afterwards said that some were buoys on indicator-nets. Others were unquestionably Carbonit mines with horns, but none exploded when our shots hit them. The Cornwallis relieved us in the evening, and we saw her having what looked like a warm time as we went out.

On the 16th we made a demonstration to the northward off Gaba Tepe, hoisted out boats and put the Marines into them as if to land. This had the effect of drawing a few shots from field guns.

**The Fateful 18th and After**[top]

On the fateful 18th, the whole fleet - except the Cornwallis and ourselves, who were detailed for the night patrol - advanced to attack the forts. Coming up in good time so as to have a look in, we saw the Ocean and Irresistible in a bad way, the Gaulois coming out very much down by the head, and the Inflexible very much damaged.

It was not till a good deal later that we learned that the two first named ships and the Bouvet had sunk. We escorted the Gaulois as far as the Rabbit Islands and sent our boats to assist in taking off her crew if necessary. We also got ready to take her in tow, which she declined. The Inflexible reached Tenedos safely under her own steam where she anchored in shallow water.

It was unfortunate that just at this time the weather turned bad, but we were under the lee of the Island until the 21st, when the wind suddenly shifted round and we all had to weigh and move round to the other side.

About this time Commander Samson arrived with aeroplanes, and the erection of an aerodrome was begun on Tenedos Island.

On the 26th the Queen and Implacable arrived, the former flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Thursby.

The next day we went for the first time to Mudros in the Island of Lemnos where a naval base had been established. Transports had collected there and troops were encamped on shore. We remained there two days and then returned to Tenedos where we found the other ships on the north side.

We spent the night cruising round the island as it was reported that the enemy's torpedo-boats had got out and had been seen in the Gulf of Smyrna.

On the 31st we were again on patrol outside the Straits, and next day were employed covering minesweepers at work inside

On Good Friday, 2nd April, we were attacked by an enemy aeroplane which dropped bombs at us and the Albion, luckily missing both. We went inside covering sweepers again, and fired a few rounds of 6-inch at the lighthouse on Cape Helles as it was suspected that the enemy were using it as a signal station. Returned to Tenedos in the evening and next day went to Mudos.

Spent Easter Day coaling and provisioning. We had been fitted at Malta with a 6-inch howitzer on the foreturret, but as it was considered that it would be more useful on shore, we got it out and turned it over to the military.

The Inflexible was in port repairing damage in order to steam to Malta, and we, with the Talbot, received orders to escort her. It was originally intended that we should not go further than Cape Matapan, but the captain of the Inflexible decided that it was desirable to take us further. Events proved the wisdom of this for on the 10th we met a head wind. The pad that had been fitted over the hole in the Inflexible's bottom worked loose, and eventually we had to take her in tow by the stern until reaching the entrance to Grand Harbour where she was taken in charge by dockyard tugs. (We subsequently had the gratification of receiving a congratulatory telegram from the V.A. for this performance.)

We went into harbour after her, coaled, provisioned and stored, and left again within 24 hours.

We were next ordered to Tribuki again. We arrived on the 13th and awaited the arrival of transports with the Royal Naval Division from Egypt. They began to arrive on the 16th, and when some had arrived and anchored, we heard that one, the Manitou, was being attacked by a Turkish torpedo boat. The destroyers Jed and Kennet, which were with us, were immediately ordered in chase, and the latter succeeded in getting within range of her, driving her to the eastward where she was headed off by the Minerva and Wear and ultimately ran herself ashore on the Island of Chios where the crew escaped to be interned by the Greek authorities. The boat was destroyed.

We heard that she had fired three torpedoes at the transport at a range of about 100 yards which all missed!

The next few days were spent in organising and practising the landing of troops from the transports. We were daily in expectation of getting orders to move, and at last put to sea on the morning of 24th April.

**The Gallipoli Landings**[top]

25th April. The business which was entrusted to us was making a feint of landing in the north part of the Gulf of Xeros, with which intention the Doris and Dartmouth bombarded Bulair lines early in the morning. Meanwhile, the landing of the Expeditionary Force was being carried out: the 29th Division at Cape Helles and the Australian and New Zealand army corps (Anzac far short) at the north of Gaba Tepe.

During the night we received orders to proceed to Gaba Tepe. We did this at full speed, arriving there in the morning. We found the Queen, Prince of Wales, London, Majestic, Triumph and Bacchante anchored in a line off the beach. We were ordered to send our launch and pinnace, with a steam boat to tow each, to work for the London in bringing off wounded. We then anchored at the northern end of the line and laid out a kedge to keep our broadside to the beach.

We were now able to see something of what had been done and to appreciate the dash and determination with which the troops had gained a foothold. At this point the cliffs rose steeply from the beach, and no praise can be too great for the men who had stormed and carried them.

When we arrived, they were busily entrenching themselves just under the summit, and the rifle and field gun fire was literally incessant. At one point there was a transport's boat that was surrounded by and half-full of dead men, and it was not until dusk fell that they could be removed. We could see several temporary shelters with the Red Cross flag over them, and the stretcher-parties were busy on the beach all the time.

Occasionally we fired our 6-inch by order, laying and training by scale and bearing in order to reach certain positions on the "squared" chart with which we were supplied, but it was impossible to see the results of our own fire.

At night each ship was told off to illuminate certain sections with searchlights. This routine was continued during the week.

On Sunday, 2nd May, we were detailed to cover two destroyers that embarked 50 New Zealanders and landed them on a point (Nibrunesi Point) forming the northern end of our anchorage. Here, the existence of an observation station was suspected on a hill called Mount Falcon near the point. Landing on the reverse or northern side of this, they surprised a party of 23 Turks of whom eight were killed and the remainder taken prisoners.

The same evening the troops made an advance under cover of a heavy bombardment by the ships, and at dark we moved off to Imbros Island to replenish ammunition. The ammunition ships had been sent there to keep out of the way. This was on account of a little habit that one of the Turks' ships - probably the Torgut Reis - had adopted of sending a few 11-inch shells into our anchorage daily. It became known as the "morning hate." But, with the assistance of a seaplane, as soon as our ships - particularly the Triumph, and occasionally the Queen Elizabeth - replied, she retired towards the Sea of Marmara.

After 11 days spent off this beach, we were ordered to exchange duties with the Vengeance, which had been working off Cape Helles.

On 7th May we did so and spent that afternoon, from 12 to 7 p.m., in the Dardanelles off de Tott's battery supporting the French. They were holding the right of the Allies' line across the peninsular.

Running diagonally across their front was a ravine known as Kereves Dere which became of considerable importance in subsequent operations as it afforded excellent cover for the enemy. With our 6-inch guns we thoroughly searched the far side of this, and whenever we opened fire, we drew a reply from a gun, about 9-inch, known as "Whistling Willie" which was concealed somewhere about Suandere Point. But although the shells fell all round us, they never got us.

We had the Goliath, Albion and Majestic taking turns with us on this job, and it happened that we had the same trick next day. Then we had 24 hours off, and then from seven p.m. Sunday to eight a.m. Monday we did the same. And so on.

On Wednesday 12th the Goliath relieved us at seven p.m. and was torpedoed at midnight. We had just left for Mudros for coaling, etc.

We returned to Cape Helles on Friday 14th and found that the night work had been given up, and we had to divide the daylight hours with the Majestic. For the next four days we were on duty from 1 p.m. till 8 p.m, and on the 15th we were hit three times by (about) 5-inch shells. One cut through the heel of the fore topmast, wrecking the instruments in the top, but the mast did not come down and one man who was in the top was untouched. Another went through the side of the sailing pinnace and did some slight damage. The third just grazed the side of the quarterdeck and broke a guard-rail stanchion. Several heavy ones just missed us.

On the 18th we were sent back to "Anzac" where we relieved the Queen as senior officer's ship. Abut this time there were rumours that German submarines had managed to reach the Mediterranean, and on the 21st we got definite reports that one at least had been sighted in the Aegean. Consequently from that date we kept under weigh.

On Sunday 23rd, at 4.10 a.m., we received a signal from Albion that she was aground off Gaba Tepe Point. We proceeded at full speed to her assistance. At 5.30 we took in her 5½ in. wire hawser and started towing on her beam, or slightly before it. This was found to be a mistake. We therefore slipped the hawser and at 6.09 anchored astern of her, with our stern towards her, and took in her 6½ inch wire.

6.28. started steaming ahead. No sooner had we taken the strain than the splice drew, leaving the thimble on our ship. We anchored again and passed our 6½ inch wire to her.

7.00. Weighed and proceeded ahead, revolutions set for eight knots. No sign of movement.

7.08. Enemy opened fire with shrapnel at both ships. Albion hit frequently.

7. 15. Sounded "action" and opened fire with 6-inch.

8.40. Both ships being straddled by heavy projectiles. Seaplane reported enemy's ships in Straits. Hoisted out sailing pinnace with the intention of sending her to Talbot for bower anchor, but this was not required. Lord Nelson arrived and opened fire on enemy's ships, driving them off.

9.05. Ship moving.

9.09. Albion floated. Heavy shrapnel fire continued, also heavy howitzers.

9.14. Albion coming off fast. Steered to westward.

9.15. Albion slipped hawser and proceeded to westward. Stood by Albion.

9.50. Stopped, hauled in hawser. Lord Nelson proceeded. Signal from Vice-Admiral, "Well done Canopus!"

10.50 Taube aeroplane attacked Albion with bombs but missed her. Opened fire with anti-aircraft guns. Taube flew towards Anzac where she dropped bombs at 11.06.

11.20. Proceeded to our former station.

3.05 p.m. Triumph relieved Albion. Latter proceeded, steaming round Canopus and cheering ship. Her mainmast and main-derrick were too much damaged to hoist in her picket boat, and she therefore left her behind with us. She was towing her launch which she was able to hoist in after making temporary repairs.

Next day, Monday 24th, an armistice was granted to the Turks to bury their dead of whom there were estimated to be over 3,000 in front of our lines.

On the 25th Vengeance arrived to relieve us and reported that a torpedo had been fired at her by a submarine on her way from Mudros. Our captain transferred to her to remain as S.N.O. while we went to Mudros. Just as we were leaving the bay escorted by a destroyer, two of our officers distinctly saw a periscope break the surface. It was well on the quarter, and unfortunately the gun to which one of them (Lieutenant Clarke R.N.R.) ran to lay it, would not bear. It would he interesting to know where this hawser was fitted.

We reported this, and destroyers proceeded to search, but without success. A few minutes later we heard the report "Triumph sinking" and looking round we were just able to see her going over and turn bottom-up, in which position she remained for 25 minutes.

The destroyer that was accompanying us was sent back to save life, and we proceeded at full speed. Later on, another destroyer, the Usk, caught us up and escorted us by describing circles round us while we steered zigzag courses to Mudros.

We stayed 12 days at Mudros and were then ordered to Malta. Shortly after leaving harbour, a submarine was reported on the quarter. Whether it was one or not, we do not know, but the captain of a hospital ship that we had just passed told us afterwards that somebody on board her saw the track of a torpedo.

We made a good run to Malta in 47 hours where our defects were taken in hand, and there this account is being closed for the present.

# 4: Sources

PDFs of the original Naval Review journals in which the articles of both Grant and Stopford appeared are all available at no cost from the Naval Review website. <http://www.naval-review.com/pastiss.asp>

Grant, H., 'HMS Canopus, August 1914-March 1916, I', The Naval Review, Vol. XI, 1923, No. 1, pp. 143-52.

Grant, H., 'HMS Canopus, August 1914-March 1916, II', The Naval Review, Vol. XI, 1923, No. 2, pp. 324-37.

Grant, H., 'HMS Canopus, August 1914-March 1916, III', The Naval Review, Vol. XI, 1923, No. 3, pp. 526-37.

Grant, H., 'HMS Canopus, August 1914-March 1916, IV', The Naval Review, Vol. XI, 1923, No. 4, pp. 717-36.

Grant, H., 'HMS Canopus August 1914-March 1916, V', The Naval Review, Vol. XII, 1924, No. 1, pp. 136-56.

Grant, H., 'HMS Canopus August 1914-March 1916, VI', The Naval Review, Vol. XII, 1924, No. 2, pp. 369-74.

Grant, H.,'HMS Canopus August 1914-March 1916, VII', The Naval Review, Vol. XII, 1924, No. 3, pp. 543-61.

Stopford, P.J., 'The Cruise of the Canopus I', The Naval Review, Vol. III, 1915, No. 2, pp. 259-69.

Stopford, P.J., 'The Cruise of the Canopus II', The Naval Review, 1918, Vol. VI, pp. 68-73. 

# 5: Introduction to War Letters Vol. 2

The following is the introduction to War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 2, based on the letters of Philip Malet de Carteret, a 16-year-old midshipman who sailed with the Canopus during the first two years of the First World War. This extract includes the first five notes from the introduction along with the associated links.

**Introduction**

On Sunday 1 August 1914, four days before war was declared, a thick summer fog had descended on the west coast of England. In the grounds of the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, a group of young cadets were playing cricket when suddenly, as one recalled, 'We were startled by people charging through the fog and shouting orders to mobilise, whereupon everyone dropped their cricket gear and fled for the college, cheering like hell.'

From all corners of the college, boys ran to their rooms, 'some with mouths still full from the canteen, others clutching cricket pads and bats, and yet others but half-dressed, with hair still dripping from the swimming bath.'

'It had come at last,' wrote one boy, 'our dreams were realised. It was war!'

Philip Malet de Carteret, a cadet at the college, was just sixteen years old at the time. Many of his fellow cadets were even younger. Although born in Sydney, Australia, Philip's father was from Jersey, and the family had returned there not long after Philip was born.

In 1911, when he was thirteen years old, Philip had won a place at the Royal Naval College, Osborne, on the Isle of Wight, an essential first step to a future career as a naval officer and possibly, one day, a ship's captain. Leaving his parents, his older sister, Ellie, and younger brother, Guy, he sailed across to England to take up his place at Osborne.

Opened in 1903, the college was part of a major reform of navy education introduced by the then Second Sea Lord, John 'Jackie' Fisher, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne.

When Philip began at Osborne, boys started studying at the age of twelve to thirteen, and after two years went to the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, where they spent another two years. Lord Selborne considered twelve to thirteen years old to be the ideal age to start a naval education because, he argued, it was the age at which 'the history of the Navy shows that boys have been most successfully moulded to sea character.'

The two colleges were effectively the navy's own public schools. The boys wore naval uniform, and their parents paid annual fees of £75 for tuition and board, similar to the cost of many public schools at the time. Despite the fees, competition for places was high. The navy, though, had a very clear idea of the type of boy they were looking for.

'What ever the variety of talent,' said an Admiralty pamphlet for aspiring cadets, 'a naval officer is a man of action. Accordingly that boy who has the best chance is resourceful, resolute, quick to decide, and ready to act on his decision. He must be no slacker but keen in work and play ... and will within the limits natural to his age, show initiative and readiness for responsibility.'

The navy was also clear on the type of candidates they didn't want: 'The boy of sensitive, poetic spirit, the ruminating young philosopher, the scholar whose whole heart is in his books are types that have a real use in the world, but their proper place is not the Navy.'

Bright, eager, good at sport, with an unusual maturity for his age, Philip was the ideal candidate. At Osborne, and then at Dartmouth, he studied seamanship, but also engineering, science and mathematics as well as history, geography, English, French and German.

The navy's intention was that after finishing at Dartmouth, all the boys would then spend a further six months on a training ship before finally being made midshipmen - or 'snotties' as they were more commonly known. In Philip's case, and that of many others, the war would intervene before they could complete their education.

As conflict began to seem inevitable, the navy wanted all the personnel it could muster, and when the order came through to mobilise, every cadet at Dartmouth, even those in their first term as young as fourteen, was rapidly designated a ship and given their orders. One boy recalled how the news 'was a terrible shock to my poor mother, who had not the faintest idea that we "first termers" would in any eventuality be sent to sea.'

Although he hadn't completed his course, Philip was made an acting midshipman and given instructions to head to Chatham to board the Canopus, an ageing, pre-dreadnought battleship.

Every cart from Dartmouth and the surrounding farms was requisitioned, and as the boys passed through, the town people 'turned out en masse and cheered us in a very inebriated fashion.' After struggling across the River Dart in a commandeered passenger boat, the boys boarded the trains to take them to their waiting ships.

At Chatham Philip was in for a slight surprise. 'Of all the biggest blunders I have ever met,' he wrote to his father, 'the Admiralty really are the worst. Not a single ship which we had been sent to join was at Chatham or anywhere near. I can't make out what possessed them... Next morning, or rather the same morning, we learnt that the Canopus was in Devonport which is a considerable distance the other side of Dartmouth!'

Eventually the boys made their way to Devenport and their waiting ship. Launched in 1898, the Canopus had been the lead ship of her class, but by the time the war began she been superseded by the much faster and more heavily armed dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts and was due to be scrapped in 1915. Now, with the imminent threat of war, the navy needed every ship it had.

The naval arms race that had dominated the years leading up to the war had seen Germany transformed from a naval backwater to become the world's second greatest sea power. For the first time since the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Britain's traditional dominance of the seas was being challenged.

As an island nation dependant on imported food and materials, there was a real fear was that if Germany were to gain supremacy at sea, then Britain could be blockaded and literally starved of food and resources. Defeat would almost inevitably follow.

From the very outset of the conflict, it was therefore decided that the best strategy for Britain was to try and keep the German navy penned close to their home ports. Based at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, the British Grand Fleet blocked the exists from the North Sea, while cruiser squadrons swept southwards in search of German ships. In the English Channel, a smaller fleet guarded the vital link to France.

The aim, says naval historian Paul J. Halpern, was to convince the Germans that they couldn't 'hazard their fleet far from its bases without the serious risk of running into overwhelming force.'

For the first weeks of the war the Canopus took part in the patrol of the Channel, protecting the British Expeditionary Force from possible attack at it crossed to France. But it wasn't long before she received orders to head for South America to guard Abrolhos Rocks off the coast of Brazil, intended as a base for supply ships to British cruisers patrolling the Atlantic.

Although most of the German navy had effectively been pinned into their bases by the British blockade, lone ships such as the Dresden were still loose. The German East Asiatic Cruiser Squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee, was also still roaming the seas. Comprising the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the light cruisers Nürnberg, Leipzig and Emden, the squadron posed a considerable threat to Allied shipping in the Pacific.

As the Canopus began its guard at Abrolhos, an Allied wireless station in the Pacific intercepted a signal indicating that some of the ships in von Spee's squadron could be heading for South America. The Admiralty immediately sent an urgent message to Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, commander of Britain's South America Station: 'It appears that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are working across to South America. You must be prepared to meet them in company, possibly with a Dresden scouting for them.'

Based at the Falkland Islands in his flagship the Good Hope, Cradock replied with his own additional information: 'Indications show possibility of Dresden, Leipzig, Nürnberg joining Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. Have ordered Canopus to Falkland Islands where I intend to concentrate and avoid division of forces.'

Compared to the well-armed German ships, Craddock's forces were notably inferior. The only fast, modern warship Craddock had under his command was the Glasgow. Of the other ships, the Good Hope and the Monmouth were two ageing cruisers that had both seen better days, while the Otranto was a converted passenger ship.

As Cradock waited at the Falklands for the Canopus, the Glasgow searched the coast of Chile for von Spee's squadron. When the Canopus finally arrived, Grant and Cradock, close friends since they had been midshipmen together, discussed the situation. 'Cradock was under no delusions,' wrote Grant, 'as to the relative strength of the force under his command as compared with that of the enemy.' The situation wasn't helped by what Grant had to tell him about the speed of the Canopus.

Based on reports from his chief engineer, Grant informed Cradock that the top speed the Canopus could reach would be 'some 14, possibly 15 knots for a short period.' A reduced speed of 12 knots was estimated as the more likely speed for any considerable distance.

Cradock believed this would hinder his pursuit of von Spee, and told Grant to follow later escorting two collier ships once the Canopus's repairs were finished. 'The Admiral then sailed in the Good Hope at 4 p.m. on the 22nd,' recorded Grant, 'and we never met again.'

The Canopus sailed the next morning accompanying the squadron's two collier ships. Four weeks later, sitting in the gunroom, Philip began to write home to his father.

When he had been selected as a cadet, the navy had said they were looking for the type of boy who gave the 'promise of being responsive and observant, closely in touch with his surroundings but master of himself.' Despite being just sixteen years old and having been at sea for nearly four months, Philip showed no signs of homesickness or anxiety. Instead he wrote with a calmness and maturity the navy must have been hoping they would find in their young officers.

# 6: Letters from War Letters Vol. 2

War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 2 has twenty-nine of Philip Malet de Carteret's letters. The following are a selection of four of them along with the accompanying notes to the first letter.

H.M.S. Canopus

November 20th, 1914

My dear Dad,

Perhaps you would like an account of our late doings, so I will tell you what happened since we were at the Falkland Islands.

We left the Islands on October 23rd and made for the Straits of Magellen which we entered the next day. Although the mountains on each side were not very high, the tops of them were covered with snow, and they looked quite like Swiss mountains. The sea was as calm as anything, and the scenery was for all the world like the lake of Geneva from Lausanne.

Of course it was very cold. I took several photos of both Tierra del Fuego and the American side, but they did not come out very well. We got out of the Straits on the evening of the 27th and proceeded northwards up the coast of Chile, well out of sight of land. We had two store ships in company which we were escorting.

It was about 5.30 p.m. of a Sunday evening, November 1st, that we got a wireless signal from the Glasgow saying that she had sighted some of the enemy's ships.

The Glasgow did not give her position for some considerable time but sent out such signals as "Enemy has been sighted." "Two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers." "I am being chased," and so on. All this time we had heard nothing of the Good Hope or Monmouth until dark when the Good Hope made a signal to raise full speed and concentrate on the Glasgow.

It was during this night that we lost touch with our convoy as we increased speed. The captain spent a long and anxious time until he learnt they had reached port safely and his responsibility was over. All night we could hear the German wireless going but we "jambed" by means of meaningless signals which made it impossible for the German operators to distinguish their own signals from ours. The crew slept at their "action" stations ready for a fight at any minute.

Later the Glasgow signalled to us, "Fear Good Hope lost - our squadron scattered." The Glasgow then left the scene of action and joined us at a prearranged rendez-vous. All this time we had heard nothing of the Monmouth.

We finally got an account of the action from the Glasgow. She said they had met the Germans at 5.30, but they (the Germans) declined action till the sun had set and the moon had come up. They then manoeuvred into such a position that the British ships were between them and the moon, thus offering an excellent target, while they themselves were invisible in the dark. It was a very subtle move and they were more than repaid for their cunning.

The Germans opened fire at 14,000 yards and the third broadside hit the Good Hope. A mast, a funnel and a gun were seen to blow sky high. Immediately after, she caught fire and was enveloped in flames over 200 feet high. When the flames reached the magazine she exploded with a deafening roar and sank. It must have been awful for the people on board. The Monmouth also sank. They sunk with all hands. We were all frightfully sick at missing the action.

We and the Glasgow then proceeded South again. On the evening of November 3rd we entered a channel called Messier Channel which runs parallel to the Chilean coast and joins the Straits of Magellen east of the ordinary entrance. We had no charts of this channel, but luckily we had an officer on board who had been through it 31 times and practically knew the navigation of it by heart, and he took us through without charts. In some places this channel was no more than 200 yards across! However nothing happened and we reached the Straits on the 5th.

We had orders to proceed to Monte Video but we simply had to stop at Falkland Islands for a day to coal which we reached on the 8th. When we had finished we proceeded to Monte Video. But when we were half-way there our orders were suddenly cancelled and we were told to return to the Falkland Islands which we reached on the afternoon of the 12th. We have been there ever since.

There is one great advantage in staying at one place and that is that we will probably get our mails fairly regularly. I hope everyone at home is quite well. I have got hold of some month old newspapers and am very pleased with life.

With much love to all,

Phil

H.M.S. Canopus

December 9th, 1914

My dear Dad,

The reinforcements we had sent home for after the action off the Chilean coast arrived the day before yesterday when a large fleet came here comprising the Invincible, Inflexible, Carnarvon, Cornwall, Kent, Glasgow and Bristol.

Up to this time we had heard nothing of the Germans. The very next day (yesterday) the whole fleet of Germans which had been in the action of November 1st - Scharnhost, Gneisenau, Leipzig, Dresden and Nurnberg - turned up. They couldn't have come at a more opportune moment, as if they had arrived earlier our fleet would not have been here, and if they had arrived later the fleet (which was to have left today) would have gone!

We, the Canopus, went to General Quarters about 10.00 a.m. and opened fire with our 12-inch guns. Our other ships could do nothing, as the land was between them and the enemy, and most of them were coaling. We fired a lot of shots and hit the Gneisenau. By this time the fleet had weighed anchor and were coming out at full speed. The Germans turned tail and fled with the fleet at full speed after them.

Of course the Canopus could not follow as we were on the mud. Still we had opened up the action, prevented the enemy from shelling the Wireless Station and saved the fleet from being attacked while at anchor. All that day we waited anxiously for news. Towards evening we got the welcome news that the Invincible and Inflexible had sunk the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. Later we heard that the Leipzig was on fire fore and aft, and she sank soon after. Then the signal came through from the Kent, "Have sunk the Nurnberg." We were frantic with joy.

We have got a lot of prisoners on board. The officers are being kept in the Captain's lobby, where they are guarded by sentries with fixed bayonets. They get quite respectable food, however! The men are all forrard. One prisoner who can talk English told us they had intended to destroy the Wireless Station, to land by night and sack the town and sink all the colliers and store-ships in the harbour, sink the Canopus, if we made any resistance, and decamp to West Africa taking the crew of the Canopus with them. There was only one thing they didn't know all about and that was the arrival of our fleet.

If the fleet had arrived only two days earlier or two days later, it would have been all up with us and everyone else on the Falkland Islands.

However it turned out all right. I am only sorry we were not able to go out and settle some of them ourselves, but anyhow we could not have kept up with the fleet.

Still we did our little lot.

Philip

H.M.S. Canopus

March 6th, 1915

My dear Dad,

I wish you many happy returns of the day. I hope this letter will arrive more or less on the right date, but of course one can't choose one's own time for letter writing nowadays - one take's one's chance.

We have been having an exciting time lately. After leaving Malta, we went up to the Dardanelles where there are heaps of other ships bombarding the place. We have made a base of a small island just outside the entrance and take turns to bombard. The other day it was our turn.

We went up about 10 miles, past all the forts which have already been silenced, till we came to those we had not. It was our business to silence "No 8" fort, which is on the European side. We opened fire on it and got the range pretty quickly, and then kept on firing with our 6-inch guns and an occasional shot from our 12-inch.

It was not until about 1½ hours after the start that the fort thought of returning our fire, but when they did so they were pretty accurate. They bought our main topmast down, made a large hole in the Quarterdeck, the shot going through and damaging the Wardroom, and a hole was made in our after funnel. Besides the damage being done to the superstructure, boats, bridge etc, I picked up a small fragment of shell (they had been firing shrapnel) which I found on the Quarterdeck after the action. Anyhow we went on firing till sunset which was about 6 o'clock, and then we chucked it in having silenced the fort.

Next day we went along the Asiatic coast outside the Dardanelles hunting about for hidden field guns and things which might open fire if we attempted to land men or anything. We rooted out several and silenced them with our 6-inch - blew most of them into the air since we were at such close range. Today we were mostly employed in watching where the shots from the big ships went who were firing overland, and correcting their range for them since they could not see - we fired a few desultory shots ourselves.

With much love to all,

Phil

H.M.S. Canopus

March 12th, 1915

My dear Dad,

The other night we delivered a night attack on the Dardanelles, the whole ship being pitch dark herself. The mine-sweepers went ahead to sweep for mines, of which they picked up several, while we followed on astern firing at any lights or searchlights we could see on either shore. Some batteries replied to our fire, but no shells hit us. However it seemed that the Turks did more damage to us than we did to them, for although we only managed to extinguish one or two searchlights, they sank two of our mine-sweepers, one I am afraid going down with all hands - in the other all were saved.

The Admiral has called for volunteers of officers (including Gunroom officers) to go in these trawlers and mine-sweepers. All the Gunroom of the Canopus has volunteered, but then so many other people have, so I don't suppose we will get much of a chance.

I am enclosing a picture of the Dardanelles taken out of a daily paper. It may help to give you some idea of how far we have got up them. If you hear any fatuous rumours about our having advanced 18 miles up the Dardanelles you may be pretty sure they are false, as I don't suppose we are more than 8 or 10 miles up at the very most, but then of course things always do get exaggerated don't they?

I believe we are going to start on the bigger forts in a day or two - the Canopus always seems to be in the thick of things.

Hoping you are all well at home.

With much love to all,

Phil

# 7. Notes to War Letters Vol. 2

Almost all the links to online resources in the notes are freely available to anyone with internet access. The main exception are the articles from the _Oxford Dictionary of National Biography_ , which is a subscription service. For British readers who hold a public libraries lending card there should be free online access using your lending card number as most local libraries subscribe to the service.

In terms of website addresses, I have generally listed the full URL, but in some cases I have had to use a shortened version. In theses instances, I have put the name of the site in brackets afterwards. Links to books at the Hathi Digital Trust connect to the catalogue record and you then need to find the specific page as direct page links are not currently reliable.

[1a] **'we were startled by people charging through the fog and shouting orders to mobilise** **...'** The description is given in a letter home from H.W. Williams, a fifteen year-old cadet at Dartmouth and a contemporary of Philip's. Quoted in Thompson, J., The Imperial War Museum Book of the War at Sea 1914-1918, p. 57.

[1b] **'orders to mobilise...'** A test mobilisation of the Third Fleet had begun on 15 July 1914. This was followed on 17 and 18 July with a grand review of the whole fleet at Spithead. 'It constituted,' said Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, 'incomparably the greatest assemblage of naval power ever witnessed in the history of the world. Churchill, W., World Crisis, p. 201, <http://bit.ly/1pe0YT6> (archive.org).

Due to the worsening situation in Europe, the decision was made not to disperse the fleet. As events unfolded, this meant that the navy was in a state of high readiness when the full call to mobilise was issued on 1 August 1914. As First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill clearly wanted to take some credit for the decision, saying that Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, had given the order for the fleet not to disperse 'in accordance with our conversation'. Ibid., p. 209.

Prince Louis, however, would claim the decision was his alone. According to the Prince, Churchill had told him, 'I [Prince Louis] was in charge of the Admiralty and should act without waiting to consult you [Churchill].'  The Times Documentary History of the War, Vol. 3, p. 4, <http://bit.ly/1kKSVNs> (archive.org).

Nearly 100 years later the question of who gave the order for the fleet not to disperse would still cause debate amongst historians as can be seen in the exchange at <http://www.gwpda.org/naval/mobrn01.htm>

[2] **'From all the corners of the college boys ran to their rooms, "some with mouths still full from the canteen"...'** A vivid description of the excitement in the college when the call to mobilise came through can be found in Forester, W., From Dartmouth to the Dardanelles, pp. 24-33, <http://bit.ly/1gdwH7s> (archive.org).

[3] **'Philip's father was from Jersey...'** Philip was the eldest son of Reginald Malet de Carteret, Seigneur of St Quen's Manor, Jersey.

[4] **'the Royal Naval College, Osborne, on the Isle of Wight...'** The college was located in the converted coach house, stables and grounds of Osborne House, the royal residence where Queen Victoria had died in 1901. For a detailed history of the college see Partridge, M., The Royal Navy College Osborne: A History 1903-1921.

[4b] **'possibly, one day, a ship's captain...'** Several of the boys in Philip's term at Dartmouth who survived the war would go on to have successful naval careers, including Philip's friend, Robert K. Dickson, who served with him as a midshipman on the Canopus and later went on to become a rear-admiral.

[5a] **'Second Sea Lord... First Lord of the Admiralty...'** The Admiralty was the department of the British government responsible for the administration of the Royal Navy. The Admiralty itself was run by the Board of Admiralty and included the First Lord of the Admiralty, who was a civilian politician and member of the Cabinet, and four Sea Lords, all admirals. The Board also included a small number of other members. Despite their titles, members of the Board did not need to be peers.

There is a useful explanation of the structure and function of the Admiralty as it was in 1914 in The Times Book of the Navy, pp. 129-144, <http://bit.ly/1iFJhvw> (archive.org).

For the names and dates of those who served in the key positions at the Admiralty from 1904 onwards see <http://www.admirals.org.uk/appointments/board/index.php>

[5b] **'Second Sea Lord, John 'Jackie' Fisher...'** A colourful and controversial character, John Arbuthnot Fisher is one of the legendary figures of British naval history. Likened in many aspects of his personality to Winston Churchill, he is generally credited with dragging the British navy into the 20th century and modernising it in readiness for war. For a good, short biography of Fisher see Halpern, P., 'Fisher, John Arbuthnot, first Baron Fisher 1841-1920', <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33143>

Two important books by Fisher himself are: Fisher, J. A., Memories, <http://archive.org/details/memoriesbyadmira00fishuoft> and Fisher, J. A., Records, <http://archive.org/details/recordsbyadmira00fishgoog>

[5c] **'First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne...'** Lord Selborne was First Lord of the Admiralty from 1900 to 1905. For a biography see Boyce, D. G., 'Palmer, William Waldegrave, second Earl of Selborne (1859-1942)', <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35373>

Lord Selborne was also the father of Robert Palmer whose letters feature in War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 4.

[5d] **'part of a major reform of navy education...'** This was widely known as the Selborne Scheme or sometimes as the Fisher-Selborne Scheme. The Selborne Memorandum, outlining the plan for reform, was published on 25 December 1902, and is one of the most important documents regarding naval education in the pre-war period.

The full document was published in The Times, 25 December 1902, p. 4. <http://warletters.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The-Selborne-Memorandum.pdf> (9 MB). (The document needs magnifying to at least 400% but can then be read quite clearly.)

# Notes to Letters

[1] **'the scenery was for all the world like the lake of Geneva from Lausanne...'** Before starting at Osborne, Philip had attended the Ebor Preparatory School in Lausanne, Switzerland, which would account for the reference.

[2] **'We had two store ships in company which we were escorting...'** The ships were the colliers Benbrook and Langoe.

[3] **'The Glasgow did not give her position for some considerable time but sent out such signals as "Enemy has been sighted"...'** The unclear signals led to a period of uncertainty on the bridge of the Canopus. Captain Grant said that between 5-6 pm he had 'grave doubts in what direction to shape course. Whether our squadron were in chase of the enemy, or whether the Admiral was attempting to concentrate on Canopus as was his intention if the enemy was met in force.' Grant, H., My War at Sea, p.22.

Grant's statement underlines that Cradock had, when they were both on the Falklands together, clearly given the impression that he still intended to use the Canopus in any confrontation with a significant number of enemy ships.

[4] **'We finally got an account of the action from the Glasgow...'** There are numerous online accounts of the action at Coronel. The most comprehensive is in Bennett, G., Coronel and the Falklands, pp. 24-42, <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000400645>

Churchill gives a summary of the events from the official record in Churchill, W., World Crisis, pp. 457-60, <http://bit.ly/PSJRvS> (archive.org).

The first report of the battle by the Admiralty, based on the account it received from Captain Luce of the Glasgow, can be read in The Times Documentary History of the War, Vol. IV, pp. 4-6, <http://bit.ly/1oyp6Bj> (archive.org).

The original log of the Glasgow for the day of the battle can be accessed at http://s3.amazonaws.com/oldweather/ADM53-42828/ADM 53-42828-102_0.jpg

For a first hand account from an officer aboard the Glasgow see The Times Documentary History of the War, Vol. VII, pp. 86-9, <http://bit.ly/1lS1PbV> (archive.org).

For the German account of the battle, see the letters of Admiral von Spee. The Times Documentary History of the War, Vol. IV, pp. 9-12, <http://bit.ly/ODQTTU> (archive.org).

Even though the Canopus did not actively take part in the battle, the account given by Captain Grant still makes for interesting reading. 'There was an overwhelming feeling of depression among us all at the fate of our comrades,' said Grant. 'There was also intense disappointment that we had not been able to be with them in their gallant fight; and it was quite open to consideration if we had been in company with Admiral Cradock, whether Admiral Von Spee would have attacked as he did.' Grant, H., My War at Sea, p. 24.

For the relevant logs of the Canopus see: http://oldweather.s3.amazonaws.com/ADM 53-69505/ADM 53-69505-032_0.jpg; http://oldweather.s3.amazonaws.com/ADM 53-69505/ADM 53-69505-032_1.jpg

The British casualty lists for what Churchill later called 'the saddest naval action of the war' can be read at <http://www.naval-history.net/WW1Battle1411Coronel.htm>

[5] **'We had no charts of this Channel, but luckily we had an officer on board who had been through it 31 times...** ' They had decided to attempt a passage through the narrow Smyth's Channel in order to shorten the distance. According to Grant, the passage had never been attempted by a ship of the Canopus's size before. 'The situation was a precarious one,' he said. 'There was barely room to turn the ship; the land was steep-to on both sides; the water was too deep to anchor in, and it was pitch dark.

'I doubt,' he added, 'if the difficulties of the navigation and the weather we were to experience had been foreseen, whether I should have attempted it.' Grant, H., My War at Sea, p. 24.

The navigating officer was Lieutenant Harry Bennett who was described by Grant as being 'without exception one of the best and coolest navigating officers I have served with.' Ibid.

[6] **'we were told to return to the Falkland Islands...'** The order came from the Admiralty. Churchill says, 'We learned that her continuous fast steaming had led to boiler troubles in the Canopus and we had to direct her to the Falklands.' Churchill, W., World Crisis, p. 470, <http://bit.ly/1lS2j1V> (archive.org).

[7] **'There is one great advantage in staying at one place and that is that we will probably get our mails fairly regularly...'** The Canopus hadn't received any mail since 18 August 1914, but on 21 November, the day after Philip began this letter, the Crown of Galicia store ship arrived at the Falklands with fifty bags of mail. Grant, H., My War at Sea, p. 31.

# 8: Other Books in the Series

There are eight other books in the War Letters 1914-1918 series. More details can be found at <http://warletters.net>

**Volume 1**

Based on the letters of Wilbert Spencer, a seventeen year-old British officer who enlists in August 1914 and dies in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915. Published April 2014.

**Volume 3**

The letters of Frederick Muir, a private in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). They describe his leaving Australia, the arrival of the AIF in Egypt, the landings of 25 April 1915 on the Gallipoli peninsula and the time there until his death in November 1915. Published April 2014.

**Volume 4**

The letters of Robert Palmer a British officer in the Territorial army who served in India and Mesopotamia until his death in January 1916 in the attempt to relieve Kut. To be published September 2014.

**Volume 5**

The letters of thirty-five-year-old New Zealander Harry Norton, a sniper with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Written to his wife and children they cover his departure from New Zealand in January 1916, his time in Egypt and his experience of the Western Front until his death in September 1916 during the Battle of the Somme. To be published November 2014.

**Volume 6**

Based on the letters of a nineteen-year-old Australian who comes over to Britain in the autumn of 1916 with one intention: to become a pilot in the Royal Flying Corps (RFC). His letters provide, in my opinion, one of the best accounts of RFC pilot training ever put to pen. Like many, he would die in a training accident before ever crossing to France. To be published autumn 2015.

**Volume 7**

The story and letters of a young Canadian private who sails to England from Canada in September 1916. Fighting and injured at Vimy Ridge in the spring of 1917, he finally returns to the Western Front only to die in September 1918, just two months before the end of the war. To be published spring 2016.

**Volume 8**

Based on the letters of a twenty-nine-year-old American officer who joined the US army in the spring of 1917 and sailed to Europe in November the same year. His letters provide a fascinating insight into what motivated some Americans to be willing to give their lives in a conflict thousands of miles away. To be published autumn 2016.

**Volume 9**

This final volume is based around the letters of a young British pilot who begins his training in January 1918 only to die on 10 November 1918 as his aircraft is shot down over Germany. To be published spring 2017.

# 9: References from War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 2 which refer to My War at Sea.

If you are looking up a reference made in War Letters 1914-1918, Vol. 2 to My War at Sea, simply click on the specific reference number. This will take you to the relevant part of the book.

[1-5] [6-10] [11-15] [16-20] [21-25] [26-30] [31-35]

. 'the old battleship Canopus, my war appointment ...'

. 'From her duties in the Channel, _Canopus_ was first sent to Gibraltar on 22 August 1914 and then, after a brief period at St.Vincent, to Abrolhos Rocks.'

. 'Sir Christopher was under no delusions as to the relative strength of the force under his command as compared with that of the enemy...'

. 'Grant informed Cradock that the top speed the _Canopus_ could reach would be "some 14, possibly 15 knots for a short period." '

. 'he would endeavour as far as possible to keep the action at such a speed as would enable the Canopus to assist him with her heavier armament of 12-inch guns.' [top]

. 'Captain Grant said that between 5-6 pm he had "grave doubts in what direction to shape course ..." '

. 'it was quite open to consideration if we had been in company with Admiral Cradock, whether Admiral Von Spee would have attacked as he did.'

. 'I doubt,' he added, 'if the difficulties of the navigation and the weather we were to experience had been foreseen, whether I should have attempted it.'

. 'on 21 November, the day after Philip began this letter, the _Crown of Galicia_ store ship arrived at the Falklands with fifty bags of mail.'

. 'Grant gives a detailed account of all the various measures taken to defend the islands.' [top]

. 'I found signs of freshly slaughtered sheep.'

. 'It was a lovely day and I think the Admiral enjoyed it as much as myself...'

. 'Some eight of our volunteers attempting to cross one of the creeks in a crazy punt got capsized...'

. 'A remarkable fact is that few, if any, of the Islanders can swim, as the water is always too cold for bathing.'

. 'The Canopus was moored head and stern in Stanley Harbour...' [top]

. 'The view of the battle from the bridge of the Canopus...'

. 'We fired five rounds, and gathered from the survivors afterwards that one had ricocheted on to the Gneisenau and that a piece of another shell had hit the Nürnberg.'

. 'For the time at Abrolhos Rocks...'

. 'Lieut. Donohue and Mid. de Carteret, P.O. Heath and Signalman Watkins had done some excellent work in trawler 224 on the worst nights of the sweeping...'

. 'Their position clinging on the face of the cliffs in face of the enemy was most precarious...' [top]

. 'perpetually under fire in their boats bringing off the wounded, etc....'

. 'Stopford's own account of events from leaving England in August 1914 to the early campaign at Gallipoli...'

. 'The submarine was again reported, this time unpleasantly close off, near Kebrunessi Point.'

. 'two of our officers distinctly saw a periscope break the surface...'

. 'Malta can hardly be called gay at this time, being now the centre hospital for all the wounded from the Straits.' [top]

. Captain Grant actually records the woodwork being stripped out in August 1914...'

. 'The principal offensive objectives were to prevent any food, ammunition, etc., being smuggled on to the coast...'

. 'most of the time officers, such as I could spare, were relieving those in patrol boats as required.

. 'Captain Grant had become ill with suspected bronchitis at the end of September and had been ordered to go Malta to recover.'

. 'recreation ground for the men, who badly want something of the sort in between their work on patrol, etc.' [top]

. Our motor patrol boat under the command of one Hadkinson, a bit of a buccaneer, had landed and with his small force accounted for four or five of the Turks.'

. 'preparing for the bombardment of the fortifications of Smyrna.'

. 'an "advanced base" with facilities for ships and an aerodrome along with W.T. station and look-out huts.'

. 'They were always cheerful, steady and hard workers, and one of the best conducted crews I ever had.'

. 'Three weeks leave.' [top]

# Copyright

First published by WarLetters.net in 2014

17 Regent Street

Lancaster LA1 1SG

Heathcoat S. Grant © 1924

Published courtesy of the Naval Review.

Philip J. Stopford © 1918

Published courtesy of the Naval Review.

Philip Malet de Carteret letters copyright © Charles Malet de Carteret 2014.

Philip Malet de Carteret introduction and notes copyright © Mark Tanner 2014.

ISBN: 978-0-9566902-7-2

The right of Heathcoat S. Grant, Philip J. Stopford, Philip Malet de Carteret and Mark Tanner to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved.

This publication may be shared and distributed on a non-commercial basis provided that the work remains in its complete original form. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

Naval Review c/o <http://www.naval-review.com>

Charles Malet de Carteret c/o St Quen's Manor, Jersey

Mark Tanner c/o <http://warletters.net>

This book was produced using Jutoh

Anthemion Software Ltd.

28/5 Gillespie Crescent

Edinburgh

Midlothian

UK EH10 4HU

http://www.jutoh.com
