 
Congress Jerks the General

The Citizen Too

Jean-Marc LeBouquin

Author of "Throw All the Bums Out Legal" –

"Ignoring Zelenskyy; an Impeachment Lark and Contest" –

"Bluster Strike and Beyond; Commentary on the Impeachment Trial of the Decade" Etc.

Copyright © October 26, 2018 Jean-Marc LeBouquin – illustrations under same copyright.

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# Table of Contents

### Congress Jerks the General

Chapter 1 – Historical Recurrence of the Trickster Truffatore

Chapter 2 – Proclamation of Clock on the Mantelpiece

Chapter 3 – A Pandemic Spread of Corruption

Chapter 4 – Historical Note on Bundling Weapons Classes

Chapter 5 – The General's Written Testimony

Chapter 6 – An Interviewer's Opening Remarks

Chapter 7 – The Notoriously Manipulative Interview Itself

Chapter 8 – The General Receives the Second Interlocutor

Chapter 9 – At Children of Woe's Mercy

Chapter 10 – Appendix 1 – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex Chapter 10 – Introduction and Orientation

Chapter 11 – Appendix 2 – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

Chapter 12 – Appendix 3 – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council Resolution's Annex A: JCPOA – from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"

Chapter 13 – Appendix 4 – Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25

Chapter 14 – Appendix 5 – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress

**Chapter 15 –** Appendix 6 – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran

**Chapter 16 – Appendix 7 –** The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Article III; first clause
Congress Jerks the General

* * * * *

Chapter 1

– Historical Recurrence of the Trickster Truffatore –

The Histories are abundant in the many interesting tales providing credible testimony to the tendency of those quick in guile and learned in the manners and usages of trickery, to earn for themselves the best of livelihoods, honor, and commendation by advantaging themselves of many the fortuitous opportunity to ensnare the innocent or gullible; those of us defenseless, who might otherwise have done better to have been left alone to go on about in our own lives, uninterrupted by the intrusive schemes concocted in the interests of important persons, those persons in positions of influence more opportune than ours – we the less happily fortunate;

As persons who seek to do no harm, nor seek the means to do harm to others; we of the lesser people are nevertheless cynically beset upon as a source of possible gain which might be drawn out of us through whatever imagined swindlers' enterprise had possibly been stirred in the minds of the advantaged cynics participating in the covetous schemes of a collective syndicate of professional political opportunists.

This tale tells of an extravagant United States President (Barack Obama) who reaped overwhelming misplaced accolades in his performance of a sweepingly pernicious series of actions all related to promoting and putting into effect a system providing for the procurement of contraband Weapons of Mass Destruction on behalf of the interests and belligerent ambitions of a foreign Prince.

As a result of his menacing malfeasance, and also as a result of the overwhelming accolades rewarding the cheat thereof; this President leaves in his wake the most astonishing openly public display of widespread bi-partisan congressional political corruption in recent United States history – the legacy of such the innocent civilian has already, for several years, been burdened with, and will be burdened with for some indeterminate period until the issue is cleared up and the remnants of the malevolent perpetrators yet clinging to office are sent home under the watchful public eye.

This tale also recounts – to some small extent – some of the history of the President (current President Donald Trump) who succeeds the previous one already referred to. This succeeding President found himself widely pilloried and jeered as retribution for this succeeding President's (Trump) headstrong and rebellious stance publicly disapproving of his predecessor's actions and handiwork in the area of international contraband weapons racketeering.

* * * * *
Chapter 2

– Proclamation of Clock on the Mantelpiece –

Whereby a Clutch of Senators, with superior knowledge and awareness that the facts on an issue were other than what members of Congress were willing to, or did publicly acknowledge; successfully misled a key General by publicly withholding essential national security information which the General had previously unwittingly revealed himself as being ignorant of...

**NOT LONG** afore the telling of this story; there came elected of this land a President who devised and carried out a most singular plan; unique in that it had never been attempted by any United States President since the advent of the Atomic Age, which is generally well thought to have been commenced at the moment of the first cataclysmic use of a nuclear explosive device against the populations of Hiroshima, Japan.

Some time after the devastation wreaked upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but within living memory of those surviving the initial suffering – yet all the while long before the election of said President, who is known by the name of Barack Obama – at the time when the future president was but a mere little brat of about seven years old – there came to be brought before the world community a treaty known as the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ; or more simply as the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT.

This treaty, formulated between the two foremost nuclear powers of the day: the United States and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), is understood as the basic and essential founding international agreement specifying measures of abstinence with regard to promoting the distribution of, or the active distribution of nuclear weapons.

Who could have known at presentation of the treaty that this child who; although living at some distance from the events taking place during the period, had he been paying attention (I know not whether he were or were not), would have witnessed the inception of the treaty;

Who could have known at the opening optimistic moments of that harbinger of the promise of a momentary respite from what was then the ongoing exponential escalation of the production and proliferation of nuclear weapons – at the opening optimistic moments of that harbinger of what might have been the initiation of a period of good will or at least further enlightened caution;

Who could have known that this little brat of seven would one day grow up to be the singular President who would collude with the Ministers of a belligerent foreign Prince in a purposeful attempt to effectively dismantle, or at least dilute that NPT to the evident pleasure and benefit of the pledged warring ambitions of the foreign Prince?

As a unique and most singular adult Barack Obama – later in life elected United States President; reigning over his administration of designated henchmen and henchwomen disciples – devised alongside the Ministers of the Government of Iran, a scheme to institute a novel bureaucracy, which would be sponsored under the auspices of the United Nations. This bureaucracy now known as the _Procurement Working Group_ ; was given a mandate to undertake specific activities in utter disregard for, and in violation of the restraints such as are imposed by the international treaty that both Parties, the Governments of Iran and the United States, were signatories to; this treaty being the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_.

The aforementioned President, Barack Obama, had coyly assumed for himself powers comparable to those of the Sultans of earlier times. He devised, assembled and convened his Procurement Working Group as a kind of faux judiciary; an alternative to the International Court of Justice recognized under the Charter of the United Nations as the official primary judicial body of the United Nations.

The Procurement Working Group would claim the Power to assert judicial application as to when this Working Group panel deemed it necessary and proper to violate international treaty by facilitating, and then approving Iranian acquisitions of weapons assets clearly construed as contraband.

By doing so, the Procurement Working Group effectively takes it upon itself to interpret the meaning of a treaty as it sees fit at any given time; and to decide when such treaty should be expeditiously applied; or when, on which occasions a treaty should be determined as no longer applicable or to be enforced.

Again, in other words: by virtue of its Procurement Working Group mandate – this construction for which Barack Obama is responsible – the Procurement Working Group makes judicial determinations as to when or when not the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty applies; when or when it is not expeditious to violate treaty by expediting and approving sales to Iran of contraband assets associated with expanding and enhancing Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities;

In formulating its judicial opinions and practicing its judicial applications; the Procurement Working Group is given the mandate to behave as no modern Court would be allowed. Its processes and procedures, however, do directly harken to the examples set forth by Secret Courts of the Medieval Age:

This is a closeted, secreted court which needs never discuss with the public any reason behind their by definition arbitrary decisions involving the sales of nuclear weapons associates to Iran in violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ;

As far as having the authority to apply these decisions as to which procurement packages of the sort described may be acquired by Iran: the phony commission of the Procurement Working Group to apply decisions as to when or when not to violate treaty, has been granted by the Security Council through the instrument of its Security Council Resolution 2231;

The Security Council has no authority under the _Charter of the United Nations_ to grant such a commission either to itself, or any body stemming from it, or any group at all.

In its commission to simply, arbitrarily, ignore treaty with or without answer or explanation; the very mandate of the Procurement Working Group constitutes a Security Council sponsored dismissal of established international law which denies any connection to or requirement of established peremptory norm of general international law or of treaty.

As indicated, the reasoning behind any of this medieval judicial body's ongoing decisions to violate treaty on a case by case basis are never publicly discussed, or debated; or accounted for in any public record.

Priority is given to secrecy; to the non-disclosure of the material content of what weapons systems the Procurement Working Group decides to approve for sale to Iran in violation of treaty.

Again, what's going on over there in Iran is prohibited by the decrees formulated and agreed to by Barack Obama along with the Ministers of the Government of Iran prohibit public disclosure of the particulars of the sales carried out under the auspices of the PWG.

* * * * *

One of the known famous tasks mandated to this Procurement Working Group was, is to advertise to vendors world-wide (as the group does on a standing basis) that the Security Council, under the Agency of the Procurement Working Group, seeks to expedite, facilitate and approve for sale to Iranian acquisitions of procurement packages offered by vendors which have bundled both nuclear weapons associated assets with ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services all together.

The Procurement Working Group, at some point in 2016, set up its advertising scheme which promotes this novel enterprise in its document " _Information on the Procurement Channel._ " Some specifications as to the nature of weapons class related assets allowed to be sold Iran under Barack Obama's deal with Iran are found under heading: _B. Further questions and answers_ ; paragraph 18, as follows:

Information on the Procurement Channel

B. Further questions and answers

18. Can a proposal include items which are set out in _S/2015/546_ as well as in _INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part_ _1_ or _INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2?_

A proposal may include items which fall both under _S/2015/546_ , as well as one of the _INFCIRC_ s. Such a proposal should be submitted for review as an activity falling under Paragraph 2 of Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council will decide on such proposals based on a recommendation of the Joint Commission.

That paragraph is found in the United Nations issued document " _Information on the Procurement Channel_ " which is recovered from the United Nations website page: **http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml**

The page directly accessing the document in question is: **https://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/Information%20note_EN.pdf**

It is well-known to vendors world-wide; that the alpha-numeric code " _S/2015/546_ " refers to the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_.

THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME – Equipment, Software and Technology Annex is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry, primarily dealing with ballistic missiles and delivery systems; and other technologies associated with ballistic missiles. This list was developed by the international Missile Technology Control Regime association. The Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was assembled as a list of weapons inventory the M.T.C.R. association considers should be controlled.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (M.T.C.R.) association itself is a voluntary association of (currently) 34 member States joining together to establish and promote guidelines coordinating national export licensing efforts aimed at containing and restraining the proliferation of specific weapons war. The M.T.C.R. is not affiliated with the United Nations, but its members may also be United Nations members. All five of the Nuclear Weapons Nations (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China) as well as Germany are all members of this association; the Islamic Republic of Iran is not.

For a more detailed description of the association's purpose and activities the interested reader may refer to the Missile Technology Control Regime website: http://www.mtcr.info/english/The Missile Technology Control Regime; or, possibly better, http://www.mtcr.info/.

This Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was decided upon to be the chosen officially approved shopping list from which ballistic missile associated technologies should be selected in the interests of developing and advancing the ballistic missile capabilities of the Government of Iran.

[An excerpt of the list is found here [].

* * * * *

The INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 list is the updated version of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2; which is the IAEA list of nuclear weapons associated inventories that the IAEA warns should not be transferred: "... _when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons_."

The IAEA admonishes, concerning the contents of the list:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (Date: 13 November 2013);

GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR-RELATED DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, SOFTWARE, AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

OBJECTIVE

1. With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, suppliers have had under consideration procedures in relation to the transfer of certain equipment, materials, software, and related technology that could make a major contribution to a "nuclear explosive activity," an "unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity" or acts of nuclear terrorism. In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common definitions, and an export control list of equipment, materials, software, and related technology. Suppliers intend to implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation and relevant international commitments.

And some of the Basic Principles are:

BASIC PRINCIPLE

2. Suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, materials, software, or related technology identified in the Annex:

– for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or

– in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or

– when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism.

[An excerpt of the list is found here [].

As of "JCPOA Implementation Day," which was 16 January 2016, Iran would have access to acquiring nuclear and ballistic missile associated weapons assets. We have already, immediately previously, examined the Procurement Working Group world-wide advertisement to vendors:

Information on the Procurement Channel

B. Further questions and answers

18. Can a proposal include items which are set out in _S/2015/546_ as well as in _INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part_ _1_ or _INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2?_

A proposal may include items which fall both under _S/2015/546_ , as well as one of the _INFCIRC_ s. Such a proposal should be submitted for review as an activity falling under Paragraph 2 of Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council will decide on such proposals based on a recommendation of the Joint Commission.

The provisions in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 providing for this bundling of weapons effects is, as mentioned above declared in Paragraph 2 of Annex B; but also – to be more precise than the Procurement Working Group has summon itself to be – in Paragraph 4 of Annex B. Here is Paragraph 2:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2231); Annex B.

As provided by a resolution so deciding, the following provisions would apply on the date on which the IAEA Director General submits a report verifying that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA [this means "JCPOA Implementation Day," which came into effect on 16 January 2016]:

2. All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and **INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2** (or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;

And here is Paragraph 4:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2231); Annex B.

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in **S/2015/546** and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier. *****

***** (Eight years after "Adoption Day," on 18 October 2023, Iran may trade freely (import/export) in ballistic missiles associated assets outside of Procurement Working Group auspices.)

Those provisions are not listed in this "JCPOA" which many still in 2019 mischaracterize as the entire Obama "Iran nuclear deal."

_Annex A: JCPOA_ gives some sense of the extent of the weapons exchange contract arranged between Barack Obama and the Ministers of the Government of Iran – but it does not provide a timeline scheduling of events, or the full range, extent of the weapons transaction as are contained in "Annex _B: Statement_ " of Security Council Resolution 2231.

In any event; by 15 December 2017, 24 proposals to sell INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed nuclear weapons associated assets to Iran had been approved under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group. See: Chapter 15 – Appendix 6 – _Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran_. [[02D]]

* * * * *

Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons prohibits:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and **not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices**.

This agreed upon prohibition meant absolutely nothing to Barack Obama who fashioned his Iran nuclear deal to meet the expeditious wants of the foreign Prince to whom they had bound their affections; and in doing so jettisoned essential fundamental provisions of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty previously signed on to by both Iran and the United States;

The desires, the preoccupations and authority of the foreign Prince enjoyed immediate priority under Obama's administration as the administration, favoring Iranian ambition, asserted its distance from the restraints of the United States Constitution; which does bind the United States Government to accept the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty as an element of the supreme Law of the Land:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article VI - Debts, Supremacy, Oaths

[Clause 2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Barack Obama promoted the most specious fabrications in his attempts to convince the American People of the validity of his agreement with the Ministers of Iran.

He sent out his minions to bear such false witness or false testimony as presumed necessary to the furtherance of the Resolution 2231 project. On July 23, 2015 for example; Barack Obama had his minion Secretary of Energy Dr. Ernest Moniz promulgate this following direct lie before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee:

"Under this deal, Iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including multiple point explosive systems. These commitments are indefinite."

[TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE; Secretary Ernest Moniz; Washington, DC; July 23, 2015; internet access to pdf document is found at: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-23-15%20Moniz%20Testimony.pdf [Last accessed June 24, 2016.]

THIS PURPOSELY FALSE testimony submitted by Obama minion Dr. Ernest Moniz (who as Obama's Secretary of Energy, also played a chief role in negotiating the "Iran nuclear weapons exchange thoroughfare deal") **is disproved by the actual text** of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),

Security Council Resolution 2231 is the authentic and internationally accepted full agreement made between Obama and the Ministers of the Government of Iran. (The much referred to "JCPOA," is only part of that agreement – regardless of the false rumor regularly, even after over three years, bandied about especially by an uninformed delinquent and negligent news media; that the JCPOA is itself the agreement.)

Obama conceded to Iran that as of _JCPOA Implementation Day_ , which turned out to be 16 January 2016, would be permitted to undertake " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ :" The paragraphs below from Resolution 2231; Annex A: JCPOA; declares that this following comes into play:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

A. General

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the **commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day**.

There is nothing mentioned in the Annex V, paragraph _A – General; 1_ cited above, which would indicate that the timeline for putting in to effect the very important Section T following below "... _has otherwise been specified_...;" therefore the following activities described under JCPOA Annex I; Section T have been permitted since _JCPOA Implementation Day_ ; 16 January 2016.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

"... _unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring_..." is the key contingency in all of this. JCPOA Annex I; Section T paragraphs 82.2 and 82.3 both stipulate in the above key contingency that any Iranian engagement in such activity is " _subject to monitoring_." In the above there is no indication of which agency is to carry out the "monitoring."

As is explained in another section of Annex A: JCPOA; the monitoring is to be carried out by any ad-hoc team of monitors the Procurement Working Group itself arbitrarily assembles – when and if the Procurement Working Group should ever bother to assemble such an ad hoc committee of "inspectors."

(So far there is no record of the Procurement Working Group ever having lifted a finger to waste everyone's time in specious pursuit of such an objective – which, incidentally, the Procurement Working Group is certainly not recognized as legally competent to carry out in any event. It is the IAEA which is recognized by the NPT treaty as Agency competent to perform such inspection.)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is prohibited by Resolution 2231 from reviewing this activity w _ith a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices._ "

See: Chapter 12: Appendix 3 – _Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council Resolution's Annex A: JCPOA – from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device;"_ [[2E]

And:

See: Chapter 16 – Appendix 7 – _The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause_ [2G]].

Naturally, the Resolution 2231 prohibition of IAEA inspections of nuclear weapons associated assets acquired through the Procurement Working Group; or inspections of Iranian " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ " are in violation of _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ Article III; first clause:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive **purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**...

Naturally the leadership in Iran accepted nothing less than a guarantee from Obama that the IAEA should be kept from inspection of any Iranian undertaking involving " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_."

It was the least President Obama could do for his new Masters to allow them this satisfaction. But the Iranian leadership might subsequently have been surprised at how easily their new, voluntarily self-conscripted acquisition, this United States President Barack Obama, did slavishly go about out-performing what must have been their highest expectations of him.

Obama publicly initiated a phony rumor, a mendacious national campaign propagating the malicious lie that the transferring of nuclear weapons associated technologies while preventing IAEA verification that these were not being diverted "... _from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices_...;" is separate from the issue of the Iranian Republic's material or moral support for its Foreign Terror Organization proxies, or its publicly pledged intention that neighboring populations be extinguished and, or that certain neighboring governments be terminated.

In fact, as we shall review shortly, international law long established before Barack Obama was ever born forbids any separation of the matter. Nevertheless, Barack Obama, perhaps feeling his position as being unassailable; set about with the minions of his administration in tow, spreading his pernicious political propaganda.

Initially, upon the very publicly display of conclusion of the JCPOA aspect of Resolution 2231 in Vienna, 15 July 2015 – Obama immediately broadcast a speech from the East Room of the White House, saying:

"...that doesn't mean that this deal will resolve all of our differences with Iran. We share the concerns expressed by many of our friends in the Middle East, including Israel and the Gulf states, about Iran's support for terrorism and its use of proxies to destabilize the region.'

"But that is precisely why we are taking this step, because an Iran armed with a nuclear weapon would be far more destabilizing and far more dangerous to our friends and to the world.'

"Meanwhile we will maintain our own sanctions related to Iran's support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program and its human rights violations. We will continue our unprecedented efforts to strengthen Israel's security, efforts that go beyond what any American administration has done before."

Naturally it's all a pack of lies characteristic of the documented habitual unrelenting mendacity of this Barack Obama person. For one thing, Obama conceded to appease Iran by actively supporting Iranian demands that he should terminate certain U.S. laws which had been put in place to combat terrorism.

Obama odiously agreed with the Ministers of the Government of Iran that the United States would terminate a law requiring a president to report to Congress on issues of surreptitious financial interests of Foreign Terror Organizations intruding on the use of U.S. port facilities. An explanation is needed and follows:

Barack Obama, along with the Ministers of the Government of Iran, had decided between themselves that a crucial provision of the _Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012_ , which prohibits the provisioning of shipments associated with terrorist weapons trafficking; be terminated. The Provision of the document agreed by U.S. President Barack Obama; that Provision determined to be terminated is as follows:

Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012

Title II — Expansion of Sanctions Relating to the Energy Sector of Iran and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Iran

Subtitle B — Additional Measures Relating to Sanctions Against Iran

SEC. 211. Imposition of Sanctions With Respect to the Provision of Vessels or Shipping Services to Transport Certain Goods Related to Proliferation or Terrorism Activities to Iran.

(a) IN GENERAL.— Except as provided in subsection (c), if the President determines that a person, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly sells, leases, or provides a vessel or provides insurance or reinsurance or any other shipping service for the transportation to or from Iran of goods that could materially contribute to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support for acts of international terrorism, the President shall, pursuant to Executive Order No. 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters) or Executive Order No. 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism), or otherwise pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the persons specified in subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(b) PERSONS SPECIFIED.—The persons specified in this subsection are—

(1) the person that sold, leased, or provided a vessel or provided insurance or reinsurance or another shipping service described in subsection (a); and

(2) any person that—

(A) is a successor entity to the person referred to in paragraph (1);

(B) owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the person that owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph (1) had actual knowledge or should have known that the person referred to in paragraph (1) sold, leased, or provided the vessel or provided the insurance or reinsurance or other shipping service; or

(C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the person owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with (as the case may be), the person referred to in paragraph (1) knowingly engaged in the sale, lease, or provision of the vessel or the provision of the insurance or reinsurance or other shipping service.

That law, previously enacted, gives a United States President the Authority to take action against arms trafficking in the ports of the United States; for example:

... _if the President determines that a person, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly sells, leases, or provides a vessel or provides insurance or reinsurance or any other shipping service for the transportation to or from Iran of goods that could materially contribute to the activities of the Government of Iran_ _with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support for acts of international terrorism_ _, the President shall... block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the persons specified in subsection (b)... if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person_.

The provision as it stands allows a U.S. President the possibility of blocking provable business transactions relating to "... _the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support for acts of international terrorism_...;"

Obviously a President is not empowered as a Legislature by the Constitution. It is well known that a President does not have any authority under the Constitution to overturn or terminate a law already on the books– even by some specious "Executive Order;" Nevertheless, Barack Obama decided on his own that he would unilaterally terminate the law without necessary consultation with Congress.

If Obama presumed that the 114th Congress wouldn't even flinch over his decree and his usurpation of Legislative Authority, he was correct. It's not certain that any member read through Resolution 2231 with any diligence or comprehension; but not one member of Congress even raised an eyebrow over Obama's flagrant legislative acts.

Obama put his illegal decree down in the text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; and now it is there for all to read and no one could dispute the reality of what he and the Ministers of the Government of Iran wanted;

MAD KING GEORGE III of England was big into terminating laws with barely an acknowledging chuckle. Resistance to and the desire to be free of primitive despotic arbitrary governance is what the American War for Independence was about.

If a President wants some modification of legislation, he must go to the Congress before he goes scraping and bowing off to agree with the whims of his own chosen foreign Prince.

It is assumed that Barack Obama, being a Harvard Law School graduate and all; might know what just about any Junior High School student knows about in this country.

But Obama nevertheless decided to publicly insert another one of his characteristically flamboyantly stupid gossip pieces into the front pages of the United States and International news media. Obama wanted populations world-wide, and in the U.S. to believe that he was authorized to use his newly self-appointed super-powers to do many things he was not authorized by the Constitution to do.

On April 17, 2015, in a Joint Press Conference between himself and Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi conducted from the East Room of the White House; Barack Obama informed the Italian Prime Minister (with the U.S. and foreign press in attendance) of a grievance of his; Obama voiced a particular grievance of his pertaining to a potential vote in Congress over whatever it was Obama had agreed, or would agree to with Iran.

Obama was naturally concerned with the possibility of a very negative reaction of the 114th Congress to the wild deal that Obama had been cooking up with the Ministers of the Iran over the previous approximately two years.

In his meeting with the Press and Italian Prime Minister Mr. Renzi; Obama expressed belief that the vote in the Congress with regards to Obama's "Iran Nuclear Deal" was really about a contention over:

"... an issue of presidential prerogatives.... This is not a formal treaty that is being envisioned. the President of the United States, whether Democrat or Republican, traditionally has been able to enter into political agreements that are binding with other countries without congressional approval..."

[This quote is archived and can be found at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/17/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-renzi-italy-joint-press-conference]

The characteristic little cheat Obama resorted to one of the classic swindlers' oldest tricks; which is to suggest that there is some mysterious rule which no one can remember; and which neither the swindler, nor anyone else favoring the cheat's disposition, could ever bring themselves to point to; a mysteriously forgotten rule which only the Harvard educated double dealing grifter can remember as existing somewhere ( he doesn't suggest where) but which nevertheless grants this charlatan President some magical healing property or some mystical power of authority over matters in general; an unaccountable authority the details of which must not be questioned or doubted by the likes of us.

Following Obama's declaration of 17 April 2015, no one ever did point on record to some traditional presidential prerogative which might distantly imply that a United States President has the right to overturn United States statute, or international treaty, or the United States Constitution in order to please the foreign potentate – not without at least consulting Congress first.

Mad King George III should have been proud of the intrinsically anti-representative-government absolutist, Barack Obama, for asserting a fictitious authority which would effectively in fact, were it plausible or allowed, disband any relevance of the national assembly of representatives to the Process of decision making; this upon such occasion of any indefinable and unascertainable whim a given Executive administration felt at any time disposed to execute.

* * * * *

Returning for review of Barack Obama's 14 July 2015 pack of lies broadcast from the East Room of the White House; recalling that Obama asserted:

"...that doesn't mean that this deal will resolve all of our differences with Iran. We share the concerns expressed by many of our friends in the Middle East, including Israel and the Gulf states, about Iran's support for terrorism and its use of proxies to destabilize the region.'

Hypocrite Obama says a lot of things; but one of the ways, already pointed out, in which he shares concerns about terrorism with friends in the Middle East and the U.S. Citizen is by attempting – in his agreement with Iran, to take some heat off organized terror in giving some access to organized terror financial interests' intrusion upon the shipping resources available in U.S. ports and waterways.

"But that is precisely why we are taking this step, because an Iran armed with a nuclear weapon would be far more destabilizing and far more dangerous to our friends and to the world.'

This from the guy who has made his deal with the Ministers of the Government of Iran to establish the Procurement Working Group bureaucracy dedicated to expediting ands approving sales to Iran of Weapons of Mass Destruction associated assets necessary to the development of nuclear weapons capacity.

Nevertheless, Obama can't help himself for expressing sympathetic acknowledgment of public concern over the danger of a nuclear weapons armed Iran: "... _because an Iran armed with a nuclear weapon would be far more destabilizing and far more dangerous to our friends and to the world_." :

"Meanwhile we will maintain our own sanctions related to Iran's support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program and its human rights violations. We will continue our unprecedented efforts to strengthen Israel's security, efforts that go beyond what any American administration has done before."

Obama's Resolution 2231 seeks its U.S. support from an uninformed, at that time, U.S. citizenry – which he seems to delude himself into believing will remain, in his favor, uninformed forever into perpetuity.

Obama is showing signs, in his early speech, of the line of false gossip he is preparing his high ranking rumor monger minion staff to propagate among the public.

Clearly as is documented, Obama had no intention of maintaining "... _our own sanctions related to Iran's support for terrorism_...;" whereas some sanctions might be retained, others might not, evidently depending on the whims of the foreign sovereign.

Enough has been said about Obama's desire that the latest ballistic missile technologies were to be approved for Iran by the United States Government and the other direct Parties to the JCPOA as of 16 January 2016 – and that operations on this aspect of the Procurement Working Group project began in November 2016, in the latter months of Obama's tenure in office. There is no "meantime" about maintaining pre-existing sanctions against Iran in the area of ballistic missiles.

Proceeding now to more detailed investigation Obama's deliberated stance on Iranian support for terror, and for that government's pledged and promised overthrow of neighboring governments and the extinguishing of neighboring populations should Iran feel the need that the occasion should arise or be brought to bear.

* * * * *

Obama and loyal team decidedly advocated and publicly promoted the false premise that the approval of nuclear weapons associated transfers to Iran, a non-nuclear-weapons-State which professed its sponsorship of organized terror and regularly pledged and reiterated its vow that certain States not to its liking should be overthrown and neighboring populations should be exterminated as need be;

Obama and team reported their view that approving nuclear weapons associated transfers to Iran was a separate issue from Iranian involvement in supporting terror and Iranian belligerence in the region.

Barack Obama asserted these following in his August 5, 2015 on the campus of American University:

"We have no illusions about the Iranian government or the significance of the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force. Iran supports terrorist organizations like Hezbollah. It supports proxy groups that threaten our interests and the interests of our allies, including proxy groups who killed our troops in Iraq."

"They tried to destabilize our Gulf partners. But Iran has been engaged in these activities for decades."

[BARACK OBAMA; Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal; American University, Washington D.C.; August 5, 2015; This file has been archived, find it on google at: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal]

Obama's Secretary Of State, John Kerry, on September 2nd, 2015, speaking before an audience gathered in the National Constitution Center of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, offered that:

"The reality is that if we trusted Iran or thought that it was about to become more moderate, this agreement would be less necessary than it is. But we don't. We would like nothing more than to see Iran act differently, but not for a minute are we counting on it...'

'... Through these steps and others, we will maintain international pressure on Iran. United States sanctions imposed because of Tehran's support for terrorism and its human rights record – those will remain in place, as will our sanctions aimed at preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and transfer of conventional arms... "

[JOHN KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE: Remarks on Nuclear Agreement with Iran – National Constitution Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: (September, 2, 2015): http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/09/246574.htm]

Barack Obama's Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, Ben Rhodes; speaking in a March 31, 2016 White House Press Briefing, claimed:

"...And we've always been very clear that the JCPOA is about rolling back and constraining Iran's nuclear program. We were also clear that they were going to continue to be engaged in behavior that we found counterproductive -- ballistic missiles, support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the region. That's not the nuclear deal; it's a separate set of issues in which we have the ability to respond... "

[THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY; Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Nuclear Security Summit; March 31, 2016 (For Immediate Release); internet address: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/31/press-briefing-senior-administration-officials-nuclear-security-summit [last accessed May, 2016].]

All three of these speakers admit to the general knowledge that Iran is a belligerent; and this admission is an essential and damning one.

Although the Obama administration, or the remnants thereof yet circulating, will never admit that Obama's "Iran nuclear agreement" is established exactly for the purpose of approving and condoning and to some extent lending material assistance to a project of nuclear weapons development in Iran.

Barack Obama's refusal; and the refusal of his supporters to admit to this, is immaterial to the facts;

The text of Resolution 2231 irrefutably provides for and details the process of how this nuclear weapons program is to be assisted and advanced, by the United States Government along with the other five permanent Members of the Security Council States and Germany; and as well, continuing Security Council officially issued progress reports indisputably document the implementation of the plans developed in the resolution carried out on an ongoing basis by those active participants in the plan.

Aside from violating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the acknowledgement of awareness of Iranian warring ambitions, along with the approving of, and participation in the furnishing Iran with Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities; is also prohibited as falling under the codified under international law definition of a War Crime falling under the category of Crimes against Peace, as follows:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and **not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices**.

The acknowledgement of awareness of Iranian warring ambitions, along with the approving of, and participation in the furnishing Iran with Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities; is also prohibited as falling under the codified under international law definition of a War Crime falling under the category of Crimes against Peace, as follows:

CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) **Crimes against Peace**. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, **or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing**.

It would be naïve to imagine that, given the horrors of the World War II conflict, there would never have developed a body of international law which would seek to deter or, when necessary to punish, the abuses that were brought about by the instigators of that conflagration.

In acknowledging that his administration was very much aware of Iranian belligerent pledges to, at some unspecified point, wage a war of aggression; while at the same time approving and materially assisting Iran in its pursuit of acquiring ballistic missile bundled with nuclear weapons associated assets (while preventing the IAEA from verifying that such assets are not being diverted from _peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices_ );

In acknowledging his knowledge of Iranian pledged future belligerence – and assisting Iran in this pursuit nevertheless; Obama and the hawk troglodytes of his administration can most reasonably be construed as participating in preparations for Iranian pledged waging of "... _a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances_...;"

Thereby Obama and the colluding members of his administration can justifiably be thought of by the electorate as sharing, at best, the amoral character of the War Criminal falling under the War Crimes category of " _Crimes against Peace_."

Any pretence of Hawk Obama being anything like a Progressive Pacifist is mockery.

The sparkling little nonsense rhetoric campaign which Obama's pro-weapons proliferation Hawk _Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications_ , Ben Rhodes; played out on the public – asserting that United States Government approvals of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile goods, support services, and technologies all bundled in procurement packages intended for sale to Iran – are somehow a separate issue from Iranian pledged and promised war of aggression, and possibly extermination of neighboring populations;

That sparkling little absurdist campaign spreading the false rumor that illegal actions pertaining to unrestrained weapons proliferation, falls flat in the face of the definition of the War Crime category _Crimes against Peace_.

As noted, the Obama administration's refusal to publicly admit to the facts of the matter in no way excuses the participants colluding in the surreptitious policies and practices of the administration regarding Obama's "Iran nuclear deal," United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. As well, Barack Obama's denial, and the denial of his supporters of the facts, does not in any way alter the facts.

* * * * *
Chapter 3

– A Pandemic Spread of Corruption –

As Democratic Party candidate for the President in 2016, Hillary Clinton was unable to achieve any kind of decent plenary support from the national electorate. Indeed, Hillary Clinton, wife of former President W Clinton, and naturally a strong supporter of Obama's Iran scheme; and who considered in some quarters as being a broadly popular politician herself, had been unable to muster a third of the popular vote to her cause. Worse and inexplicably; her election campaign was lost to a dark-horse candidate who himself was not very popular with the electorate from the outset and of whom; most thought could never gain a foothold of a chance in a national election.

* * * * *

As it so happened; when entering office in 2017, this new President elect succeeding Obama did not seem of the mind to carry on with the plot against international law and the safety of world communities which former President Obama had formulated with the Ministers of the Government of Iran;

Proponents of Obama's Iran nuclear deal were alarmed by noises Trump had made, even before the election, about pulling the U.S. out of the deal. Political activism in favor of remaining in the deal began to heat up in the new 115th Congress in response to this. Agitation began as early as the first few months of President Trump's first term in office; and an ingenious argument or device was sought after that this green President may be swayed by those of the 115th Congress to continue to cooperate with the plan indefinitely.

An oldest trick was referred to and pulled from the unwritten book of the _Comprehensive Lexicon of Tawdriest American Politics_. Those in Congress who wanted to trick the Current President Trump into staying in the Obama "Iran nuclear weapons transfer deal" pretended a phony story that there was some law on the books that legally compelled this President to remain in "The Deal."

The pro-Obama Iran nuclear weapons transfer agreement partisans asserted in their interpretation that under the law; the " _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ ;" Trump was to "recertify" the Iran agreement every ninety days.

It was strongly implied that this "recertification" would be considered the equivalent of a public endorsement of the Iran nuclear agreement – thus compelling the President to remain in the deal again for yet another ninety days until the next "recertification...," and so forth and so on.

It is true that the Nuclear Agreement Review Act does insist that the President "re-certify" under specified conditions. The act calls for the President to re-evaluate and re-affirm, under specified conditions; that a given deal with Iran over the issue of nuclear power/nuclear weapons was being carried on with per specifications declared in the law;

The basic thing first required for "recertification" – or reaffirmation of the deal – is that there was any kind of a deal which had been initially affirmed or acknowledged by a President to exist in the first place; and that the given arrangement had been transmitted to Congress which would then vote to approve it, or disapprove it, or –

The 114th Congress never did vote on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Obama's "Iran nuclear deal."

Obama never transmitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 – his "Iran nuclear deal" to the 114th Congress. The Congress has since never voted on, or even given any public indication that anyone over there has even looked at the Security Council resolution from the time that the 114th Congress allowed itself to be manipulated into not voting on it.

The " _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ ;'' is the statute which requires a president to:

Public Law No: 114-17

*SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 134 the following new section:

''SEC. 135. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN.

''(a) TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS OF NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN AND VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT WITH RESPECT TO SUCH AGREEMENTS.—

''(1) TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership—

''(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes*;

''(B) a verification assessment report of the Secretary of State prepared under paragraph (2) with respect to the agreement; and

''(C) a certification that—;

''(ii) the President determines the agreement meets United States non-proliferation objectives, does not jeopardize the common defense and security, provides an adequate framework to ensure that Iran's nuclear activities permitted there under will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and ensures that Iran's nuclear activities permitted there under will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including for any research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related military purpose.

T ***** [The (h)(i) definition of "Agreement is as follows:

''(1) AGREEMENT.—The term 'agreement' means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.]

Instead of transmitting United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to Congress – Obama resorted to a cheap little ruse that was sure to trick, and did; an already disinterested, self-indulgent and negligent frivolous 114th Congress into ignoring taking a vote on the full weapons trade agreement between Iran and the leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council and Germany. The full agreement is, of course, the version contained in full text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

To avoid Congress taking a vote on this; Obama simply lied in order to leave the impression with the Congress and the national news media that the President had transmitted the full agreement to 114th Congress for the assembly to vote on

The 114th Congress did vote on 10 and 11 September 22015 on something. The national assembly voted on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 " _Annex A_ " only. _Annex A_ is the portion of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 known as the " _Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action_ ;" and it is by no means the entire agreement made.

Obama had lied directly in pretending that the JCPOA was all there was to the agreement. The 114th Congress proceeded as if that was a fact. Although it was well known that the Security Council had voted on the Iran agreement on 20 July 2015 (the Security Council vote to accept Security Council Resolution 2231), not one member of either Party or either House of Congress cared enough to look into the matter to find out whether what had been voted on in the Security Council was identical to what the Congress would vote on in September 2015 (the instruments were was not identical).

[Chapter 14 – Appendix V – _Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress_ , explains the details of how Obama's tawdry farce was carried out; and documents the proof that Obama never did submit Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress.]

Only the most disinterested, negligent, the most careless assembled Congress could possibly have been taken in by such a ploy. And so, on 10 and 11 September 2015, the Senate and House of Representatives went through the motions of voting on that portion, of the Security Council resolution – Annex A; which itself failed to gain approval in either House in the event.

Once that vote had been taken the issue was never again debated by the 114th Congress. Obama was free throughout the remainder of his term, which extended through 2016 and into January 2017, to oversee the implementation of his handiwork, Resolution 2231 without any further discussion.

* * * * *

The Trump administration took office in 2017. Trump had made it clear he didn't like the Iran deal (although he never elaborated on specifics of the deal he didn't like. This President treated as though it was enough that he simply didn't like the deal, and say no more that was that).

Regardless of whatever was on his mind that President Trump wouldn't share with the public, the " _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ " declares the following:

Public Law No: 114-17

Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 [Section 2]

(6) COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION.— After the review period provided in subsection (b), the President shall, not less than every 90 calendar days—

(A) determine whether the President is able to certify that—

(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program;

Per the terms and specifications of subparagraph iii above, Trump couldn't recertify the deal because, although it wasn't being publicly voiced about too much by political circles gentry; the United States Government was (at the time it was participating in the Resolution 2231 fiasco) lending special assistance to Iran in the furtherance of significantly advancing its nuclear weapons program.

As mentioned earlier, Trump had been making noises since the beginning about how much he wanted the U.S. out of the deal;

And as mentioned, the 115th Congress in response to the possibility that the United States might end its participation in the Security Council resolution program; began to agitate.

By 4 October 2017, 115 House of Representatives members David Price and Ted Deutch had put together and sent off to Trump a letter of complaint summarizing Congressional members' of both Houses recorded-on-the-Congressional-Record griping about possible U.S. withdrawal from the Iran deal. It was signed on to by almost all of the Democratic Party membership of the House of Representatives.

This excerpt furnishes the jist of the letter (and the jist of the gripes):

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing to urge that you do not withhold certification on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) absent credible evidence of a material breach by Iran...

...The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) requires the President to provide to Congress credible evidence of Iranian noncompliance should violations of the JCPOA occur. We have received no such information to date. On the contrary, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and career U.S. military and intelligence officials continue to verify that Iran has honored its obligations under the agreement, and we remain unaware of any material change in Iranian activity since you last certified compliance to Congress on July 17.

Absent credible and accurate information confirming a material breach, we are concerned that withholding certification of Iran's compliance or walking away from the JCPOA would harm our alliances, embolden Iran, and threaten U.S. national security. We are further concerned that noncertification based on justifications beyond the scope of the nuclear agreement would threaten global on-proliferation efforts and send exactly the wrong message to North Korea at the moment we are trying to diplomatically defuse that crisis. Countries should know that unless Iran commits a material breach of the JCPOA, the United States will keep its word...

[The letter may be downloaded from: https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/10.4.17_td_dp_iran_recert_letter.pdf [last accessed Oct., 17, 2017] A facsimile of the letter follows:

It's pretty high-minded stuff: sticking with the noble allies; stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation world-wide...

Too bad the 115th House of Representatives had to go and spoil it all by, in a few short weeks before the month was out; by passing, almost unanimously, a bill exactly promoting weapons proliferation activities of the Procurement Working Group.

* * * * *

The 115th House of Representatives just couldn't wait to get right down to business. On 26 October 2017 the House of Representatives passed a bill promoting sales of ballistic missile weapons assets to Iran under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group.

And as we have previously learned from the document: _Guidelines For Transfers Of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology_ presented in Chapter 2; sales of ballistic missiles through the Procurement Working Group also entails sales of procurement packages to Iran of ballistic missile associated weapons assets bundled with nuclear weapons associated assets; which the IAEA is also prohibited from looking into.

The 115th House of Representatives the bill was titled the _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698_. Almost the entire 115th House of Representatives voted in favor of it (two members opposed – seven not voting). It was a landslide victory in favor of United States participation in Procurement Working Group activities violating treaty.

The 115th House of Representatives was concerned that if the situation arose where Iran was buying ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services, there should be some reporting on this by the President – if it turned out Iran was doing this outside of Security Council auspices.

House Bill HR 1698 made it clear – that if ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services, combined with nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies and support services, this while prohibiting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from verifying that these combined classes of assets are not being diverted to furtherance of the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran;

If such assets were shunted to Iran under the official auspices of the Procurement Working Group – then the 115th House of Representatives was satisfied that there would be no need for any reporting or announcement of any of that sort of thing to Congress. Here are two salient excerpts from _HR 1698_

Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698

SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES.

(e) SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILES.

''(B) ADDITIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGY.—

''(iv) PROCUREMENT WORKING GROUP DEFINED.—In clause (iii)(I), the term 'procurement working group' means the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established under Annex IV of the applicable provisions in Annex A of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698

SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES.

''(I) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of subclauses (I), (II), and (III) of clause (i), and except as provided in subclause (II) of this clause, efforts by the Government of Iran with respect to ballistic missile-related goods, services, and technologies described in this subsection are efforts by the Government of Iran to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, test or use ballistic missiles or associated goods, services, or technology by the Government of Iran, including efforts by the Government of Iran to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, purchase—

''(aa) goods, services, or technology listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of October 8, 2015, and subsequent revisions that have been acquired outside of the Procurement Working Group or not otherwise approved by the United Nations Security Council;

Politicians are always going about mouthing off on how virtuous they are; about how they are motivated only by the highest ideals and are simply not influenced or driven by base incentives. These office holding elitists have to characterize themselves like that; these elected officials must always present some justification for holding their positions

However the Democratic Party membership of the House of Representatives presented themselves and their phony concerns in the Price/Deutch letter of October 4, 2017; the attempt to have _HR 1698_ enacted as law makes it obvious that it is understood that Obama's Iran nuclear deal isn't about preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capacity; and that bi-partisan concern over U.S. withdrawal from the "nuclear deal" was clearly over United States potential weapons profiteering interests losing access to Iranian contraband weapons associated markets in this for-profit venture to assist Iran in the development of its nuclear weapons capability.

If the Congress, and the Democratic and Republican Parties then and now were more concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons than these currently are about how U.S. interests might profit from the nuclear deal venture; then the Congress would be screaming "bloody murder" over the pernicious, ongoing activities of the Procurement Working Group under the malevolent system devised by Barack Obama and the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

The contents of all procurement packages acquired by Iran under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group are kept secret; these are known only to the Procurement Working Group, the direct Parties to the sale, and to the Security Council.

As sales to Iran of goods, technologies or services through the Procurement Working Group may involve the secret transfer to Iran of prohibited nuclear weapons related assets in conjunction with whatever ballistic missile associated assets are being sold; it must be most reasonably construed that doing business with the Procurement Working Group is a direct violation of Article I of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_.

In their late October vote, as the concerned Republican and Democratic Party population of Congress demonstrated that both political party machines were overwhelmingly in favor of the weapons sales to Iran provided for in the Security Council resolution; it might have been thought that if the bill had been enacted into law as formulated U.S. policy said _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act_ would prevent President Trump from implementing threatened U.S. withdrawal out of Obama's deal.

After passing in the Lower House, the 115th House of Representatives Bill _– HR 1698_ was sent up to the Senate where it was read twice on the floor and then was officially disappeared for good in Senate Committee.

The Senate had thought twice about depositing the bill on President Trump's desk for signature. Any intention of using _HR 1698_ as an attempt to prevent Trump's withdrawing the United States from Obama's nuclear deal; to pressure the President into reaming in Obama' Iran nuclear weapons transfer deal was abandoned.

However, the episode does reveal how distracted the membership of the 115th House of Representatives was by its fanatical support of Obama's Iran nuclear weapons transfer scheme.

Had _HR 1698_ made it to Trump's desk, the President would have had to raise a public stink about it. The Congress as a whole had avoided; and still does in mid 2019, drawing public attention to the Resolution 2231 weapons sales provisions.

It would have been too politically risky by far to send that _HR 1698_ out for Trump's signature. The Senate quietly set the approach aside and thereby, for the time-being, avoided forcing a confrontation and possible ensuing public revelation of the weapons sales scheme.

It seems clear that to even the most obtuse or enthusiastic supporter of the international protocol of profiteering through contraband weapons sales to Iran, the whole premise of making nuclear weapons associated assets available for Iranian acquisition – or the premise United States Government involvement in and assistance to the proliferation of nuclear weapons abroad; is activity generally perceived by the public as so contrary to the moral conscience of the electorate; so dangerous to the maintenance of a reasonable degree of order and peace; that even the most self-serving opportunistic politician might fear that the voter would refuse to tolerate such activity if the question were put directly.

Despite that they show no respect for or appreciation of the menace posed by Obama's negotiated weapons sales project; it seems evident that even the frivolous politician of the day could certainly appreciate that as an individual office holder, the given politician might suffer unfortunate political consequences if what their political parties actually support; what they support in, at best, quietly accepting the party's doctrine; were revealed or generally known.

* * * * *

Also; the 115th Congress, above, wanted sanctions placed on those contraband weapons purchases when these purchases were not carried out under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group or the United Nations Security Council.

The 115th House of Representatives voted that the Security Council Procurement Working Group was to be given a United States endorsed monopoly on the United Nations Security Council sponsored contraband weapons smuggling intended for sale to Iran. When purchases were made through that channel, there would be no need for the President to report on those;

But when and if such purchases were made outside of Security Council auspices – there'd better be some reporting by the President on that so that the Congress would have something to really keep busy with raising a stink about.

The House of Representatives had dutifully sent their bill to the Senate for appropriate review and approval. However, after a little bit of a pause, even the 115th Senate realized how demented the approach was.

The dreadful little effort almost universally favored by the House of Representatives was shunted into Senate committee and there discretely disappeared into obscurity within the confines of Senate Committee; with the Congress perhaps hopeful that no outsider had noticed the attempt or would forget it by whenever.

Which nearly brings us to our interview with the General:

* * * * *
Chapter 4

– Historical Note on Bundling Weapons Classes –

Some historical perspective on the prohibition against the bundling of nuclear and ballistic weapons assets may be of interest to the reader reflecting on the egregiously pernicious nature of the Procurement Working Group mandate.

Reviewing the first, basic Article I of the NPT:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and **not in any way to assist,** encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to **manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices** , or **control over such weapons or explosive devices**.

Clarification of the intent of the meaning, the definition, of control over such weapons is necessary. This is found in the correspondence of the two nations authoring the NPT – the then Soviet Union, and the United States touched upon earlier in this writing.

On January 1, 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union presented a joint draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation to the United Nations Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee; thus confirming that earlier efforts at consolidating differing points of view were not simply intended as political grandstanding marked by competitive one-upmanship – as has been so often the case – rather, the sincere efforts at cooperation were evidently the product of seriously frightened parties motivated by a deeply felt desire to avoid a perceived inevitable disastrous and irreversible harm to humanity and to the planet that could result from a single act of negligence, error in judgment, or madness.

It is through the documentation of the discussions relating to the development of a mutually agreed upon terms between the Soviet Union and the United States that one learns of part of the intention and meaning of Articles I and II of the NPT, and the meaning of control of nuclear weapons. This writing mentions two documents that it feels may be helpful to clarify the aspects of the intentions of the NPT, and the interpretation of those first two articles.

Four question between the U.S. and NATO allies were reproduced in a then classified document titled: Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together with Answers Given by the United States. This document is comprised of a set of four questions with corresponding responses. The questions and answers outlined the United States' position on the first two proposed articles of the NPT. The document was considered classified at the time; these have since been declassified. The questions and answers contained therein were intended to be presented to the Soviet Union for correction or approval. These were presented on April 28, 1967 and met with no objection from the Soviet Union. The Questions and Answers follow:

Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty asked by U.S. Allies together with answers given by the United States.

1.Q. What may and what may not be transferred under the Draft Treaty?

A. The Treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted.

It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of "nuclear weapons" or control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosives devices because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use.

It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipients, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads.

2.Q. Does the Draft Treaty prohibit consultations and planning on Nuclear Defense among NATO Members?

A. It does not deal with allied consultation and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of Nuclear Weapons or control over them results.

3.Q. Does the Draft Treaty prohibit arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons owned or controlled by the United States within the territory of Non-Nuclear NATO members?

A. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer on nuclear weapons or control over them, unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the Treaty would no longer be controlling.

4.Q. Would the Draft prohibit the unification of Europe if a nuclear-weapon State was one of the Constituent States?

A. It does not deal with the problem of European Unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European State to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to been so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federate state, the Treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.

IN A LETTER, DATED APRIL 10, 1968 from Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, Mr. Katzenbach indicated that:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Before you go to The Hague for the Nuclear Planning Group meeting on April 18-19, I believe you should be familiar with the US interpretations of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regarding alliance arrangements for nuclear defense...

...The language of Articles I and II of the NPT was chosen in order to protect alliance consultations on nuclear defense as well as on nuclear defense deployment arrangements. These are not explicitly sanctioned by Articles I and II, since the USSR was not prepared to provide such an endorsement of NATO arrangements.

In Secretary Rusk's October 10, 1966 talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko, it was clearly understood that Articles I and II of the NPT deal only with what is prohibited and not what is permitted. Article I of the NPT prohibits the transfer of ownership or control of nuclear weapons (understood to mean warheads and bombs and not delivery vehicles). It does not mention alliance consultations or deployment arrangements not involving a transfer of nuclear weapons. We worked out interpretations on these and other aspects of Articles• I and II with our allies (and in particular the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany, the nation of then divided West Germany]) which were presented to the Soviets on April 28, 1967 in the form of answers to questions posed by our allies (Tab A). *****

***[** This letter and related correspondence can be found under: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964–1968 Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 232. Document 232 refers to the particular letter, Volume XI provides related items of interest. **]**

This excerpt from the April 10 letter confirms that Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko, and hence the Soviet government, understood the U.S. position as early as the end of April, 1967. As previously mentioned, on January 1, 1968 the United States and the Soviet Union presented a joint draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation to the United Nations Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. This Joint Draft between the US and the USSR (presented long after the April 28, 1967) supports that the Questions and Answers document presented to the Soviet Union was considered an appropriated interpretation of Articles I and II by both parties.

A facsimile of the full April 10, 1968 letter is reproduced on following pages for the readers' interest (the Addressee's name, Clark Clifford, is listed on the bottom of page 1). The reproduction of the Questions and Answers document follows. Both documents were considered sensitive at the time, but they have long since been declassified. And so, as unclassified government documents, they are in the public domain. These documents are presented following:

With that background – the examination proceeds.

So it is clear that _HR 1698_ does very egregiously violate the treaty and therefore is repugnant to the United States Constitution.

And the Procurement Working Group mandate is not only about giving Iran whatever it wants to pay for in terms of hardware – it's about giving that belligerent non-nuclear-weapons-State anything it wants pertaining to the development of a well-rounded world-class nuclear weapons program of the first order.

It's about every kind of transfer of technology and services to Iran. Iran can theoretically access and buy anything it wants off of the INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 list – any asset it feels that might be useful to it; including support services and step-by-step instruction booklets if they're there to be bought.

The "definitions" section of INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 explains it:

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

DEFINITIONS

"Technical data" --

"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

"Technology" --

means specific information required for the "development", "production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance".

"Technical assistance" --

"Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

Naturally the Ministers of the Government of Iran wanted the best they could get out of the Obama administration – and on their end what they got was outrageous. Among the many concessions Obama handed out in his frantic effort to give away the farm, was permission for Russia, China, maybe even the United States or whoever else; to transfer to Iran, for whatever return consideration: " _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals_...etc." as listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2.

And the Ministers of Iran got much more than goods, services and technologies. Barack Obama effectively gave Iran the implied pledge that the United States was no longer interested in maintaining treaty and established peremptory norm of general international law as guideline by which this nation would conduct its international affairs.

It is well known that Iran regularly threatens some its neighbors with destruction – and has openly pledged to, sometime in the future, extinguish at least one nearby State. The United States Government under Obama discounted this when he created and then implemented United States participation in Resolution 2231 assistance in developing Iranian nuclear weapons capacity.

United States assistance to Iran in this affair must be reflected upon and obviously considered as, by definition, culpable United States support for, and participation in Iranian preparations for its pledged waging of war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances.

This business of current day U.S. politicians playing dumb; publicly ignoring; and refusing to openly discuss Procurement Working Group assistance to the development of nuclear weapons capabilities in Iran is an aspect of this participation which should not be as readily excused and ignored as it is;

* * * * *

The _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ resulted from a real appreciation, on the part of the leaderships of the United States and the Soviet Union; of the cataclysmic danger posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

That the United States and the Soviet Union came a hair's breadth away from obliterating human life on the planet in the famous event known as the _Cuban Missile Crisis_ , is well known.

That frenzied fanatically based confrontation between the two superpowers forced the leaderships of both nations suddenly to recognize the immediacy of the threat posed to humanity by their own mutual extreme paranoia and rivalry;

The two governments came to an understanding of sorts; they would have to contend with their mutual fears and distrust of one another in a more constructive manner or the species which created the bomb eventually, probably at a next opportunity, would be stricken from the face of the Earth of its own doing.

THE LUNATIC Democratic and Republican parties' politician of today certainly seems to have gotten much better at distancing himself from anxiety or apprehension over a misfire. It's not that the impact of these weapons has dulled over time; if anything the devices have become more formidable.

Yet over time the modern day office holding gentry of Congress seems to have developed among themselves some sense of reassurance, some furtive hope that perhaps a nuclear armed Government of Iran would simply not use what it might develop.

No matter by what rationale they try and console themselves; the decision to appease Iran through assisting in its development of nuclear weapons capacity in violation of treaty was never a choice the United States Congress was entitled to make.

As it happened, the spectacularly negligent, disinterested 114th Congress never even looked at the official version Obama's Iran nuclear deal before Congress voted on only a portion of it on 10 and 11 September 2015; mistakenly thinking that Annex A was the whole deal. [Chapter 14 – Appendix V – _Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress_ , tells the story.]

And now the issue is out of Congress's hands. But even with the U.S. withdrawal from participation in Resolution 2231 fiasco, the other major arms dealing nations: Russia, China, France, the U.K. and Germany are still involved in this project bestowing nuclear weapons capacity upon Iran.

If it were, as it should be, the objective of the United States Government to put a halt to the leaderships of the great arms dealing nations assistance to the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran then;

The matter must be brought in petition before the International Court of Justice; which is the only body with the authority to nullify Resolution 2231; to demand conformance to treaty and put a halt to this Weapons of Mass Destruction arms dealing travesty.

Although President Trump pulled the U.S. out of the Obama Iran nuclear deal; he so far has shown no inclination to seek recourse in the Rule of Law for redress of this disastrous situation.

* * * * *
Chapter 5

– The General's Written Testimony –

Commonly, and this is a widely understood truism; anyone relying on faulty information from the outset will most likely arrive at a poor or erroneous evaluation of a given situation. This maxim applies to military generals as well as to civilians.

It is expected that a military general be properly informed – both by his or her own research, and by the knowledge of those assigned to keep the general's intelligence on a given concern fully complete and up-to-date.

Just so, the Congress, when it knows something that the general does not – if the general is called before that body; then the Congress is expected to inform the general of what is known by that body, just as the general is expected to report to Congress what the general knows. It is to be a reciprocal communication.

In a society which had a representative government, where the representatives of the People had some sense of social responsibility and a social compact, one might anticipate that such representatives of an assembly would be concerned that a United States General should be up-to-date informed with best information; and if finding that said General had some blank spot; then the representatives of the welfare of the People should be eager to share best knowledge with the General – this in the interest of the General Welfare.

Sadly, the documentation shows that we do not currently live in a society graced by conscientious and honorable leadership. We currently live in a land led by infantile grasping fool politicians who so delight in their pettiness that the only thing that can be expected of them is that they will play unrestrained children's mischievous farce games teasing and confusing a trusting General, whom they know to be badly informed;

The documentary evidence of the informs us that we are led by imbecile self-serving politicians who purposefully misled a General with incorrect information based on a politically motivated false premise and assertion – this evidently in order to extract the answers told from him from him they obviously wanted noted on the record regardless of accuracy of information.

In this following account we review one example of this sometimes typical nasty politicians' tawdry practice as played out on 13 March 2018.

* * * * *

115th Senate members of the Senate Armed Services Committee were careful to avoid questioning Four Star General Joseph Votel in certain areas. He had been called before that committee, on 13 March 2018, ostensibly to inform and review matters of strategic importance faced by the United States. The Senators on the SASC carefully, in that interview, avoided asking the General essential questions on issues threatening to national security interests brought about by continued participation in, or brought about by the very existence of Resolution 2231.

The members of that Senate Committee – although posing some very safe questions designed to make Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" appear a panacea to Iranian ambitions exerted in pursuit of nuclear weapons capacity (these questions will be reviewed presently) never did ask the General if it was in his better judgment that as a best means of furthering the national security interests of the United States; should the United States continue to participate in and support expediting and approving Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets in conjunction with ballistic missile associated assets while at the same time prohibiting the IAEA from verifying that such acquisitions were not being diverted towards the development of nuclear and ballistic missile capacities.

Members of Senate Armed Services Committee all knew about the ongoing practices of the Procurement Working Group. The 115th House of Representatives had just recently sent the Senate a bill for review, Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698 which the House of Representatives had voted almost unanimously in favor of.

The bill, as earlier discussed, promoted an official United States Government endorsement of the Procurement Working Group mandate specifically concerning that bureaucracy's regular practice of violating treaty in promoting and ensuring Iran had access to the bundled procurement packages that Government had decided on for purchase.

The Committee knew all about the vote in the Lower House. The 115th House of Representatives had dutifully sent the Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698 for Senate concurrence, and the House Bill was read twice in the Senate.

Everyone in the Senate consequentially knew of the House of Representatives bill, couldn't deny it, and was well aware of the activities of the Procurement Working Group (see below):

The information furnished above is found at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115-congress/house-bill-1698/actions

The salient information documenting what the bill's fate was in the Senate is presented under the heading "Latest Action:"

" **Latest Action** : Senate - 10/30/217 Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations."

It was evidently too obvious to the 115th Senate membership; that members of the House of Representatives, in their frenetic enthusiasm, had gotten too carried away; and risked publicly exposing the central point of the whole Obama "Iran nuclear deal" – the whole point being that exactly of which the 115th House of Representatives in its fanatical histrionics wanted to have, as is documented on the Congressional Record, openly turned into United States Statute.

As discussed, the House of Representatives wanted to create under law, an official U.S. Government endorsement declaring that the United States Government condoned and supported the expediting and approving of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear and ballistic missile associated assets by all States represented on the board of the Procurement Working Group bureaucracy.

As everyone in the Congress knew very well; Obama's "Iran nuclear agreement" had been publicly promoted as a thing which would permanently guarantee Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

In their haste to accommodate Iranian ambitions; the 115th House of Representatives had overwhelmingly passed a Bill which clearly demonstrated Obama's promotional campaign to be entirely false – and that the clear intention of Resolution 2231 is to develop nuclear weapons capacity.

Everyone on the Senate Armed Services committee knew all about the real inclinations of both Parties in Congress; and certainly must have been aware that there could be a great deal of money to be made for some, in selling Iran that nuclear weapons capacity.

And the population of the SASC knew by the General's written testimony that General Votel himself was unaware of the machinations of the 115th House of Representatives, or the mandate of the Procurement Working Group.

* * * * *

The Senate Committee had earlier been presented with a written statement by the General; and from that could easily perceive the naïveté of the general's expressed opinions regarding Barack Obama's "Iran nuclear deal;" that General Votel had been very poorly informed on the issue and was evidently entirely unaware of the Procurement Working Group and its mandate – of what activities the Procurement Working Group was engaged in on an ongoing basis..

The general also showed no indication of having any knowledge of the fact that Iran had been allowed, as of 16 January 2016, to engage in experimentations in: " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ ," this again, without any interference by IAEA inspections.

The entire 115th Senate, by 13 March 2018 clearly knew about both issues. Regarding Iranian permitted engaging in: " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ ;"

In late previous October 2017, several Republican Senators sent a letter to President Trump's U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley expressing concerns over some aspect of the "JCPOA." I produce the part of the letter which is salient to the issue of " _activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device_ :"

The letter was sent by the Offices of Georgia Senator David Purdue, and co-signed by Texas Senator Ted Cruz and a handful of others. The text of the letter relevant to the issues discussed in this chapter is presented below. It is apparent from the letter that those people authoring the letter were confused about the issue – and so I will presently answer the questions asked therein. Proceeding to the questions:

David Purdue – Georgia:

October 26, 2017

Ambassador Nikki Haley

United States Ambassador to the United Nations

United States Mission to the United Nations

799 United Nations Plaza

New York, NY 10017

Dear Ambassador Haley,

We write to you to express concern regarding shortcomings in the inspection and verification regime of the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

When unveiling the JCPOA, President Obama promised that "inspectors will also be able to access any suspicious location. Put simply, the organization responsible for the inspections, the IAEA, will have access where necessary, when necessary." He stressed that Iran's nuclear program "faces strict limitations and is subject to the most intrusive inspection and verification program ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program." In practice, it appears that this is not the case.

Most notably, disputes over the meaning of Section T of the JCPOA, as well as a deterioration in the amount and quality of information provided by IAEA inspections, have prevented the inspection and verification regime of the JCPOA from being as thorough and transparent as possible. It is vital to ensure that the IAEA inspection coverage of Iran is comprehensive enough to ensure that estimates on breakout times remain legitimate and to detect early if Iran makes any efforts to leave the JCPOA abruptly or gradually.

Uncertainty over the boundaries of Section T, regarding "activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device, still exist between the signatories of the nuclear deal. IAEA Director Yukiya Amano has stated that "more clarification would be helpful" regarding mandate of the IAEA for verifying Section T. As you have astutely noted, "The JCPOA made no distinction between military and non-military sites. There are also numerous undeclared sites that have not been inspected. That is a problem." We believe that without visits to military sites, the IAEA cannot make a credible conclusion that Iran is meeting its section T obligations. We encourage you to continue to stress this point of view to the signatories of the deal, as well as to the IAEA.

The Senators asking the questions way back in October 2017 clearly had salient questions about what might be going on with Iranian practice with " _activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device_ ;"

The Senators weren't going to get any answers about what was going on with that, not from the IAEA anyway; and the Ambassador wouldn't probably have been considered, in her job description, as the one competent to be answering or responding to those questions either. The best she might do is to forward those to her department head – the President of the United States.

Why is it, one might ask, that there hadn't been any IAEA inspections of whatever it was that Iran has being allegedly doing over there in Iran Land in the area of Section _T_? – That was essentially the question asked by the Senators.

The answer to that question is that the IAEA is not allowed to look into anything having to do with assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2;

[See Appendix 3 how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council Resolution's _Annex A: JCPOA_ – from reviewing " _Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device._ " []];

And all activity associated with Section _T_ involves the very INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 inventories the IAEA is not allowed to look into.

I bring up both the allowance, since 16 January 2016; that Iran could engage without any IAEA interference, "... _activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device_ ;" and the Iranian acquisitions of bundled packages of nuclear weapons associated assets in conjunction with ballistic missile associated assets; as these are both areas of concern that people had been talking about.

AS WE WILL EXAMINE – General Votel's very honest and innocent testimony presented before the committee on 13 March 2018 makes it apparent that the United States military evidently simply has no idea about Procurement Working Group activities or U.S. involvement in this; or about U.N. sponsorship of Iranian engagement in "...activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device;" – and he is not to be faulted for not knowing,

Barack Obama had selected General Votel to his current position. But it would be no surprise if Barack Obama, in practiced habitual paranoid mendacity on the issue of Resolution 2231, did omit to bring his General's on board about any potential liability to U.S. National Security Interests posed by the Procurement Working Group mandate and ensuing activities. It is perfectly reasonable to infer that Barack Obama was simply not interested in hearing about his Generals' possible concerns regarding this Procurement Working Group affair and its activities; Barack Obama wanted the deal he had worked out with the Ministers of the Government of Iran; and as seems evident – as his General was in the dark about the Procurement Working Group – Obama wasn't willing to tolerate any word of common sense caution from some appointed military guy.

Noting also the ongoing habitual political obfuscation, direct lies, omissions and overall mendacity which has swept the Congress in particular, and national level civilian government politics in Washington in general since the Resolution 2231 inception date of 20 July 2015 – it is apparent the military has had no reliable government source informing them of any intelligence on Resolution 2231 which might allow for a reasonable assessment or accounting of what assets Iran has been working with or currently is in possession of – and what danger this might pose to the United States.

General Votel, in his writing, doesn't even seem to be aware that it was, at the time of his testimony, the United States Government itself that was assisting the Government of Iran to acquire the assets which the General was not aware of and simply would not have had enough information to assess or evaluate had he been aware, of the existence of those.

We proceed to the General's comments on the JCPOA in his written testimony.

* * * * *

General Votel's 13 March 2018 written comments on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; which he continues to refer to as the JCPOA, are set out in various places in his testimony – but he writes his most extensive commentary under his item: Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

"Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Regional conflicts and power imbalances drive nations to seek and acquire nuclear weapons and extend ballistic missile capabilities to secure their influence. As an example, Iran continues to develop advanced ballistic missile capabilities and also transfer them to the Houthis and to its Hizballah proxies. This will enable them to strike U.S. partners and allies, and the possibility Tehran will reinvigorate its nuclear program in the out-years of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains a potential risk. Nuclear proliferation, combined with proxy warfare, increases opportunities for miscalculation and generates a serious threat to the region and the United States." ~ General Joseph Votel

The poor assessment of the progress of Iran's nuclear weapons program is inadequate and uninformed – but it's not Votel's offense and we know the reason why.

Nevertheless; Votel judges that: "....the possibility Tehran will reinvigorate its nuclear program in the out-years of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains a potential risk."

The General is under the mistaken impression that it is only a conjecture that it is within the realm of possibilities that the Government of Iran might eventually decide to "...reinvigorate its nuclear program in the out-years of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)..."

The General's testimony is completely ignorant of the fact that this is not about any conjecture over a something far off in the possible future. Iran is already enhancing its nuclear weapons program with essential United States Government assistance just at the same time as the General writes and speaks before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 13 March 2018.

This is the legacy left behind by Votel's previous Commander in Chief Barack Obama, who in 2013 installed Votel in the General's current position as Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and then proceeded to immediately stab Operations and the General (and the American People) in the back by not informing the General that as of 16 January 2016 Iran had been allowed to engage in experimenting with multi-point explosive detonation systems and the other delightful activities and technologies which are involved when engaged in "Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device;" and also by failing to inform his General and Commander of CENTCOM of the procurement packages which the United States, along with Russia, the U.K., China, France and Germany would begin to facilitate and approve of later in the year (2016).

This is not a question of risk assessment on the shores of a distant possibility;

The 13 March 2018 SASC meeting was presumably set up to formulate a risk assessment of the national government's course of policy at that time, in the era just before Votel's latest Commander in Chief, President Trump, decided to pull the U.S. out of Resolution 2231;

But of course it's not possible to formulate a risk assessment of the national government's course of policy if the course of activities are kept secret from those who would develop a reasonable analysis.

Naturally, Votel effectively came in to the discussion unprepared to answer relevant questions pertaining to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (not that he would under any circumstances be asked anything essential to the Obama "Iran nuclear deal" by the Senate Armed Services Committee – as we shall soon learn) – he simply didn't have the necessary data;

And just as Barack Obama had refused to give his Commander of CENTCOM the information, the "intel;" the help that Votel deserved and (I feel as a Citizen) he (along with the U.S. Citizen) should have necessarily been entitled to; so then too, in consequence of Obama's scheming and faithless behavior, the CENTCOM Commander subsequently couldn't give his later Commander in Chief the help and good intel that President Trump, as President, deserved and should have been entitled to.

The difference between the two failures was that Obama's motivation for withholding was clearly mischief driven; and General Votel's failure was due to his guilty credulity (military discipline aside) in simply accepting the former President's word for just anything Obama had to say on the topic; and Votel's failure could also be ascribed to a subsequent evident consequential uncharacteristic lapse in attentiveness in pursuing his own research (again, possibly due to his misplaced trust in Obama's word);

However, Votel's failure can in no way be understood as motivated by any inclination to insubordination towards his later Commander in Chief, Donald Trump – or to any conscious undermining of issues of national security.

In review of his entire writing of 13 March 2018 (not just the part I'm critical of – the part which I presented in this writing), to my mind Votel is a man of deep integrity, honesty and great capacity; a man gifted with top-shelf intelligence and penetrating insight in perceiving subtle patterns which possibly might have gone unnoticed had he not been present to offer his contribution;

This is a man with the ability to simultaneously evaluate complex and extensively tangled issues (except in the case of the topic at hand, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015); which is the blank spot where he uncharacteristically flopped).

To my mind, it is primarily the U.S. Government which is responsible for the grievous wrong in holding back on the General the help, the good Intel, and the support he needs in order to function effectively in his command – this is a kind of highly reprehensible and inexcusable mutiny on the part of the civilian national level Government.

* * * * *

Votel does note correctly: " _Iran continues to develop advanced ballistic missile capabilities and also transfer them to the Houthis and to its Hizballah proxies_ ;" but the General might be missing an essential aspect of this ballistic missile development regime.

Votel continually refers to the pact Obama devised with the Ministers of Iran as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), officially agreed to on 14 July 2015 in Vienna.

There is dispute over whether or not the deal was actually concluded on that date and in Vienna. The Obama administration has claimed, in a 19 November 2015 letter sent by the administration to then Republican Senator Mike Pompeo, that the deal was never signed. The importance of this in assessing the overall situation will shortly become evident; but first, here is the text of the letter:

Dear Mr. Pompeo.:

Thank you for your September 18 letter regarding the nuclear deal with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or an executive agreement, **and is not a signed document**. **The JCPOA reflects political commitments** between Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the European Union. As you know, the United States has a long-standing practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in political commitments.

The success of the JCPOA will depend not whether it is legally binding or signed, but rather on the extensive verification measures we have put in place, as well as Iran's understanding that we have the capacity to re-impose and ramp up – our sanction if Iran does not meet its commitments.

Everything the JCPOA and its annexes are commitments Iran made, and must keep, to remain in compliance. Iran breaks these commitments, we can snap back both unilateral and UN sanction.

We provided Congress with everything agreed to between the P5+1 and Iran in the JCPOA, in full compliance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INAEA). There are no "secret deals" between the P5+1 and Iran, and no JCPOA document that Congress does not already have. The Administration is fully committed to providing information to Congress to ensure full transparency as we implement the JCPOA.

We hope this information is useful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Julia Frifield; Assistant Secretary; Legislative Affairs.

The letter can be found at: http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/11.24.2015.state.dept.letter.jcpoa.pdf]

The point of mentioning this is that the JCPOA is not the full agreement internationally in play; it is only Annex A, a portion of the full agreement which was officially concluded by Security Council vote at its New York 7488th meeting of 20 July 2015.

As previously noted the JCPOA is not the full agreement internationally in play; it is only Annex A, a portion of the full agreement which was officially concluded by Security Council vote at its New York 7488th meeting of 20 July 2015. Frifield here is maintaining the shoddy lie by omission perpetuated by her boss Obama.

The difference and distinction between a portion of the document, and the entire document is essential. The rest of the world is reading off of Resolution 2231. If our generals are successfully tricked by our government into believing that the JCPOA is all there is; and are only reading the JCPOA annex of the Security Council resolution;

Then the nuclear, the ballistic missile and conventional weapons concessions – among the other concessions which are provided for in other parts of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015); these concessions essential to any reasonable and creditable analysis of the case, would then go by completely unnoticed. It is as elementary as that – and it seems clear this critical aspect of the Charter of the United Nations resolution has not (or had not at the time) been brought to the attention of, and discussed with, the military.

Clearly the clandestine weapons sales to Iran of material content unknown must weigh heavily in on any guesswork evaluation as to what extent Iran might have managed so far to advance its weapons capabilities; or any evaluation of the overall domestic and international menace posed by Security Council Resolution 2231.

* * * * *
Chapter 6

– An Interviewer's Opening Remarks –

The 13 March 2018 examination of General Votel by the interlocutors of the Senate Armed Services Committee concerned a great many issues regarding particular theatres of Operations and overall Operation under the General's Command.

Votel is spectacular perceiving and coordinating, pulling together, far flung operations over multiple terrains and languages; which superficially might seem to have nothing to do with each other, and yet in the larger view, each to a greater or lesser degree influence another.

The questions posed to the General regarding Barack Obama's JCPOA constitute only a comparatively tiny portion of the interview. The questions in this area are shallow and manipulative, seeking only to extract the desired answers – and as I indicated from General Votel's written testimony, he is quite evidently uninformed on the issue and therefore unprepared to present any helpful, constructive information regarding it.

The very short sham questions of the two Senators who even discussed the "JCPOA;" as it is the politically partisan wont of the day to not discuss the "JCPOA," studiously misrepresented Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" as being only the JCPOA _Annex A_ while scrupulously avoiding mention of the official document _United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)_.

As observed, the intentional misrepresentation of the JCPOA as being the "Official" name for Resolution 2231 is a political ploy. The ploy derives from the fact that Obama never transmitted Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress, and the Congress had never voted on it, much less returned it to its originator for signature and ratification into law.

Nevertheless, the Obama "Iran nuclear agreement" existing as some sort of a rumor of a law of some kind, is treated as though it has any force of rule of law whereas it has absolutely no legal standing domestically, and its international legal standing in asserting the right to violate treaty with the objective of furthering the pledged war aims of a belligerent government has never been internationally recognized; it is highly questionable as to whether it has any international legal standing at all.

Referring to the international definition of Treaty as provided by the _Vienna Convention on the law of treaties_ :

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART I. INTRODUCTION

_Article 2_. Use of Terms

1. For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States **in written form and governed by international law** , whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation;

There is some question as to whether Resolution 2231 openly disavows that it will be governed by international law in several places. Several provisions may be construed as disclaiming the rule of law; such as the establishment of the Procurement Working Group as a faux judiciary with the judicial power to interpret when treaty does or does not apply. That is one of the issues in Security Council Resolution 2231 which no doubt would be of enormous interest to the Court.

The establishment of that judicial aspect of the Procurement Working Group mandate – the power to annul the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ at will – is perhaps a faux judicial application which the real Court, the International Court of Justice; will find repugnant to, and a disavowal of peremptory norm of general international law.

Issues like that, and the ensuing overall menace posed by the Security Council resolution are things which the International Court of Justice must decide on.

It is the opinion of this author that it is highly unlikely that United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 would survive a challenge before the International Court of Justice. That aside:

The very questions of the two Senators who even discussed the "JCPOA" at the SASC meeting were wholly manipulative and entirely inappropriate – explaining:

DEMOCRATIC PARTY SENATOR Jack Reed; a hard-line supporter of Obama's "JCPOA" which provides for the facilitation of the expediting and approving of Iranian acquisition of bundled nuclear and ballistic weapons associated assets with complimentary prohibition on IAEA inspection of these;

This Senator Reed, the Democratic Party bloc leader in the Senate Armed Services Committee, naturally knows about the fanatical 26 October 2017 vote of the 115th House of Representatives in support of continued U.S. cooperation with the program of expediting and approving of Iranian acquisition of bundled defined nuclear and ballistic weapons associated assets with complimentary prohibition on IAEA inspection of these.

The 115th House of Representatives had shown itself suffering such extreme anguish over the issue of President Trump at the time threatening to withdraw from this international travesty; United States Government participation in a project which, by some standards of the international law earlier cited; could be most reasonably construed as constituting a War Crime falling under the category of _Crimes against Peace_.

The 115th House of Representatives showed itself to have driven itself into such distress over this withdrawal; that the population constituting that body fell into a kind of primitive mob delusion such that they ended up actually spurring themselves on to succeed in passing, almost unanimously in the Lower House, a bill attempting to have a United States endorsement of the Procurement Working Group activity under discussion, put into law.

The as cited bill, _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698_ , would probably have been vetoed had it ever reached President Trump's desk.

The Senate reacted to the 115th House Bill with cold feet, perhaps sensing that by sending a bill to that president which endorsed said Procurement Working Group program, they might tip over the big bonus keg of nitro-gasorine fire-starter and publicly expose the whole mess earlier than they imagined they'd like it exposed. A larger civic percentage of citizen consumers would surely have been introduced to the electrifying reality of ongoing Procurement Working Group activities; the news of which might reflect poorly on the 115th Congress and the assembly might easily have been identified as promoting, and colluding in the messy business.

So, as noted, the Senate let the thing sink quietly into oblivion, and the House of Representatives hasn't mentioned the thing since (it is now past the midway point of 2019 at the writing of this).

THIS NATIONAL LEVEL entrenched Democratic Party partisan Senator Reed; a self-proven self-made regressive entirely familiar with the irrefutable almost complete support of the 115th House of Representatives for the U.S. Government (at the time of the 13 March Interview) remaining in this business of continuing to participate in the dedicated documented, well-known nuclear weapons proliferation policy instigated by the Obama administration; and which is well-known and documented on record to support the aggressive implementation of that policy's provisions...

This Senator Reed, on 13 March 2018, continued to pretend along the lines of Obama's 5 August 2015 American University campus speech, that : "... _we have achieved a detailed arrangement that permanently prohibits Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. It cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb_...;"

Reed maintained the partisan politicians' absurd pretense that Procurement Working Group international assistance to Iran in advancing nuclear and ballistic missile weapons capabilities, in the manner described and as provided for in Resolution 2231, would somehow do something like give a U.S. Government reassurance that continuing with the Obama doctrine would guarantee cutting off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb.

The 13 March 2018 Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) interlocutory session interviewed two Generals; Votel and Waldhauser; but questions concerning the JCPOA were directed only to Votel, so I only mention him in this writing.

This session was ostensibly to be a fact-finding tour, and for the most part it was; but when it came to questions about the Obama "Iran nuclear deal," the exercise was transformed into a mealy-mouthed manipulative lecture series designed to jerk the General around and ensnare public credulity.

Snappy Jack Reed, Senator from Rhode Island and leader of the Democratic Party political wing of the SASC, sallied forth with some conniving opening false assertions foreshadowing the basis of the sham line of questioning Reed intended to pursue with General Votel; Reed said:

On Iran, the president risks creating foreign policy crisis by threatening to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. By all accounts, the JCPOA is working as intended and Iran is verifiably meeting its commitments under the agreement.

Let there be no doubt, Iran continues to be a state sponsor of terror and an abuser of human rights. Iran continues to destabilize the region through its development of ballistic missiles and its support for proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere.

The JCPOA was not intended to address all of Iran's bad behavior, just the nuclear aspect. If Iran behaves this way without a nuclear weapon, imagine how much worse it would be with a nuclear-armed force.

_Withdrawing from the JCPOA would be a devastating blow not only to the Middle East, but also for our efforts diplomatically with North Korea and for any future diplomatic efforts to constrain aggressive behavior by our adversaries._

[Transcript of the 13 March 2018 Senate Armed Services Committee interview can be found at: http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Votel-SASC-Testimony-13-MAR-2018/]

Snappy Jack can hardly be said to exhibit coldly analytical impartiality in his remarks. He might have presented a fuller picture had he rounded out his sermon with a little surprise honesty. He said:

Let there be no doubt... Iran continues to destabilize the region through its development of ballistic missiles...

He could have added a little bit more to that special remark:

_Let there be no doubt... Iran continues to destabilize the region through its_ United States assisted _development of ballistic missiles..._

But United States politicians; and certainly United States Senators – are not in the business of making themselves look as if it's a bad thing by admitting to a wrong. That given, we examine some more assertions in turn. Senator Jack says:

The JCPOA was not intended to address all of Iran's bad behavior, just the nuclear aspect. If Iran behaves this way without a nuclear weapon, imagine how much worse it would be with a nuclear-armed force.

One thing Jack does here is imply that the Security Council with its famous resolution (the resolution which Washington politicians insist on identifying by its misleading misnomer) and hence the United States Government inclusive, is not deeply involved (at the time of the interview) in assisting Iran it its development of ballistic missiles. Clever Jack who knows better insists that the Security Council resolution is only about preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.

Of course Senator Reed knows about the Procurement Working Group mandate to approve sales to Iran of procurement packages bundling nuclear and ballistic missile weapons assets – everyone in the 115th Congress does. So yes, his pontificating sermon pretending that the Iran nuclear deal is about keeping Iran from getting the bomb is a direct lie;

And it's a direct lie intended to cover up U.S. direct involvement critical activity existentially threatening to United States security.

Snappy Jack is well aware, as everyone in the 115th Congress is aware; that the House of Representatives passed its bill: _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698_ , revealing almost unanimous House of Representatives support favoring a U.S. law which would endorse the (at the time) ongoing U.S. cooperation in expediting and approving the Iranian weapons related acquisitions facilitated through the Procurement Working Group exchange program.

That bill was read twice out load in the Senate, as the record shows; and no one can deny knowledge of it.

Jack has the information under his belt. Jack goes ahead and points out in his opening remarks that " _Iran continues to destabilize the region through its development of ballistic missiles_...;" what snappy Jack Reed doesn't want to point out on the record is what all the Senate interlocutors know, and is what General Votel seems unfortunately unaware of;

Reiterating: Iran, at the time of snappy Jack's statement, continued to destabilize the region through its development of ballistic missiles, _with_ the ongoing material and pledged assistance of the United States to advance Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile weapons capacities; this under the Obama doctrine which Senator Jack Reed was strongly in support of continuing.

President Trump was suggesting at that time that he wanted to put an end to U.S. involvement in the ongoing travesty. And as expected, Trump was running into some fierce partisan rhetoric and resistance from regressive entrenched national level Democratic Party politicians perhaps looking to save themselves some political embarrassment from a little bit closer public scrutiny of the issue; or looking to maintain U.S. interests' access to profiting from the Iranian contraband weapons market.

That said, it is worthy of note that Senator Reed, leading Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee left the U.S. Military with a Major's rank. One might have hoped that Senator Reed would do General Votel, and the Citizen, the courtesy on record, of telling a little bit more of what he knew about the U.S. Government's troubling contribution to the overall strategic dynamic. Senator Reed might have offered something to the effect of:

"Incidentally General, as this fact-finding detail is understood as being reciprocal in its nature, I thought it might be helpful that you be informed to some extent that the 115th Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, are in the process of promoting the back-stabbing undermining of Operations under your Command in their maintenance and promotion of the current policy originally developed under the former Obama administration; this policy designed to assist Iranian efforts to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.'

"General, I would be interested to hear your assessment, or any evaluation you would care to make at this time, or at a later time; as to what you might consider as possible consequence which might arise from continuing further with an approach along current lines."

WHEREAS that sort of thing might make for excellent news-media copy; I'm not sure it's in the Democratic Party play book to broadcast that kind good information openly all around the town. It wasn't in that meeting.

* * * * *

Reviewing those two paragraphs:

Let there be no doubt, Iran continues to be a state sponsor of terror and an abuser of human rights. Iran continues to destabilize the region through its development of ballistic missiles and its support for proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere.

The JCPOA was not intended to address all of Iran's bad behavior, just the nuclear aspect. If Iran behaves this way without a nuclear weapon, imagine how much worse it would be with a nuclear-armed force.

Reed demands the reader or listener indulge in conjecture over a false premise: " _If Iran behaves this way without a nuclear weapon, imagine how much worse it would be with a nuclear-armed force_."

Oh, but perhaps Iran is behaving with such confidence and sense of immunity because tired congressional hypocrites, such as Mr. Reed, insist on promoting surreptitious U.S. Government support for, and assistance in the development of Iranian nuclear weapons capacity.

Reed knows very well that Iran is to be construed as behaving this way exactly with United States, Obama doctrine support and assistance in advancing the development of an Iranian domestic nuclear weapons development project – and with the support of the leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council. With the assurance of the kind of weapons support that the Iranian is getting from those Governments, it's no wonder that the Government of Iran feels confident acting with impunity;

* * * * *

By all accounts, the JCPOA is working as intended and Iran is verifiably meeting its commitments under the agreement.

In the above Reed endorses a false characterization of Obama's Iran nuclear weapons exchange deal.

The Senator is not suggesting in the phrase "... _is working as intended_...; that the Iran nuclear deal is working as the authors of the project designed it to work. Reed is not referring to the fact of Procurement Working Group assistance expediting Iranian acquisitions of procurement packages bundling nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets proceeds favorably.

Although that's all going along swimmingly, Reed is referring to the public misrepresentation of Resolution 2231's being a system preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capacity. The public may take note that the Security Council resolution is certainly not about working to prevent that.

The Iranians never agreed to simply give up their development of nuclear weapons capabilities; the provisions of Resolution 2231 conclusively testify to this. Although the Iranians insist on prohibiting _International Atomic Energy Agency_ (IAEA) inspections of Iranian weapons associated acquisitions, the Iranians did agree to allow for _International Atomic Energy Agency_ inspection of the uranium enrichment process (nuclear energy related) and some other things in exchange for the as described and documented international assistance in the development of Iranian weapons capabilities.

ON August 5, 2015, Barack Obama made a speech on the campus of the American University. In this speech he claimed, among other things:

"...Even before taking office, I made clear that Iran would not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon on my watch..."

[Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal; American University, Washington D.C.; August 5, 2015; this file has been archived, find it on google at: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.]

The general idea had been that the agreement between the United States and Iran which Obama had negotiation was something along the lines of, as Obama falsely claimed of his "Iran nuclear deal" in the above speech:

"...a detailed arrangement that permanently prohibits Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. It cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb..."

Somewhere in the negotiation process the plan to prevent Iran from ever getting a nuclear weapon had altered course.

Obama wasn't much of a negotiator as it turned out. He had started out with all the leverage on his side; and ended by setting up a procedure to sell Iran nuclear weapons associated goods, services and technologies in conjunction with ballistic missiles associated weapons assets while all the while the organized leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council syndicate safeguarded the guarantee that the International Atomic Energy Agency would keep its inspecting nose out of this aspect of the business.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL had earlier been passing resolutions since 2006 which placed various levels of sanctions on Iran; this because the Iranians had been harassing and impeding IAEA inspections of nuclear facilities within the country. None of those sanctions worked to deter Iranian obstructionist behavior hounding International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and inspections.

It was only in 2010 when Russia and China, generally friendly and supportive of Iran; for whatever reasons of their own sided with the United States, United Kingdom and France and voted in favor of Resolution 1929 (2010); a Security Council resolution that put a bite on, which finally left an impression on the Iranian Government. The resolution leveled stiff sanctions on Iranian access to ballistic and conventional weapons and weapons systems. For example:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010)

8. [The Security Council] Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) ("the Committee"), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;

The Iranians, then known to be inflexibly hostile towards the United States, decided after United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 was passed; that they would talk things over after all with Mr. Barack Obama, President of the "Great Satan." ***** to see if some accommodation could be reached.

*" _Great Satan_ _:_ " _Famous Iranian moniker used when it is at times found necessary to refer to the contemptible; loathsome and unholy United States_.

Obama happily tangled himself up in negotiations with those man handlers – the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

The President, in his arrangement with the Ministers of Iran, concluded that previous Security Council resolutions, including the painfully toothy and notorious Resolution 1929 (2010), and the sanctions imposed under those, would be put aside in favor of this new Security Council resolution which, among the other things, would allow for Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets after the fashion described;

And yes; prohibit International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iranian weapons related acquisitions just like the Iranian Government had always wanted.

And in return for his indispensable service to the foreign Prince and Potentate; Obama was allowed to return home to a Hero's Welcome with a deal of undisclosed particulars – lugging suitcases filled with improbable claims about how he had turned the tide on catastrophe:

The public face the Obama administration put on the story was that Iran would no longer seek to acquire, or pursue development of the bomb – not on Obama's watch it wouldn't. This is what had so been promised.

PERHAPS the Ministers of Iran had taken Mr. Obama to be a man of notable venality. The President of the _Great Satan_ , very soon after election to his first devilish term in Office in 2008, was offered the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize by the respective respectable Norwegian Committee.

It wasn't as though the Nobel Peace Prize committee had pointed out anything the President elect had done to deserve the famous prize. So far all he was, was a newly elected President. There did seem however, to be an implied expectation in the air that this Barack Obama would inevitably eventually end up doing something great.

In any event, one thing one could honestly say about Obama was that he seemed to have been lifted to his new high office out of nowhere. That is one thing; and without a doubt Obama gets high marks for his dramatic speech reading capacity in the public arena.

Obama accepted the award even though he hadn't yet done anything all that special to perhaps deserve it. He gave away the money associated with the Prize; but kept the trophy gold medallion award which had publicly flattered and validated him.

Given that early public demonstration of character, maybe the Ministers of Iran considered it might be possible that Obama was spoiling for a chance to do something that would really appear like something big and important; something like making an impossible deal with famed U.S. intransigent nemesis, Iran. It could be that the U.S. President might so much want a deal – that outrageous, seemingly inconceivable concessions which no one would ever had anticipated, could be got out of him.

Maybe poor Obama was so desperately smitten with the notion of a deal with Iran that he might even go so far as to convince the other leaders of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council to consent to setting up a U.N. sponsored bureaucracy with a mandate to expedite and approve Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated goods, services and technologies listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2; maybe something as outlandishly preposterous as that.

Watching the spectacle of the prideful leader of the armies of The Great Satan succumbing in his conceit to the most peculiar and fantastical demands of the Ministers of Iran; this in his insatiable hunger to make any deal for which he might, however temporarily, be celebrated in the United States;

The spectacle of such self-abasement in the unrestrained search for self-aggrandizement would fill governments and peoples around the globe with awe-stricken terror and wonder.

The provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 testify that the Ministers successfully did try the angle out on Obama to very profitable effect.

OBAMA NEEDED TO HAVE DONE to have avoided getting the extravagant concessions knocked out of him by the Ministers of the Government of Iran; was to adhere to treaty and rule of law. When it were to come down to a moment a demand was made by the Ministers, concession to which would violate the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ for example; Obama could have answered to such a demand with something like:

"I'm sorry no, we can't agree to that. That would put us both in violation of a treaty we both are already signatories to. We would be betraying our commitments to the rest of the world."

But the text of Resolution 2231 tells us that's not the kind of guy Obama was. Obama didn't allow himself to get bogged in the niceties of treaties and prior commitments (as the provisions of Security Council Resolution 2231 inform us).

Had he stuck with the rule of law and with treaty he might not have succeeded nailing down a deal with the Ministers. He might have ended up coming home empty handed instead. In that case he would probably have received no accolades for bullying an accord out of the Ministers.

Obama got his accolades and a hero's welcome home. He did so returning to the United States a deal he knew to be so appallingly bad that he wouldn't send it (Security Council Resolution 2231) to Congress for review as he had committed to under the law he had ratified in early May 2015: the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015._

Instead he spread about his silly; gossipy false rumor pretending that Annex A of Resolution 2231 was the entire agreement between Iran and the United States. And of course the entire population of the embarrassingly negligent, disinterested 114th Congress swallowed the fiction down whole without any member bothering to check if Obama was being entirely honest with the legislature (details of the episode are presented in Chapter 14).

The legacy of the puerile little ploy story remains with us today with Resolution 2231 still being referred to as the JCPOA by some politicians either pretending ignorance, or trying to draw attention away from the larger picture – or possibly (although not likely) as a memorial honoring the imbecile lethargy of our National Assembly.

* * * * *

A little more background is worth noting in adding a bit of perspective to the matter.

The Republican counterpart to Democratic Senator Reed, leader of the Democratic Party bloc of the SASC in this proceeding, is Republican Senator Inhofe of Oklahoma.

ON 10 January 2018 – two months before Votel's interview; Senator Inhofe had pointed out:

...Since Kim Jong Un took power in 2009, he has already conducted more than 80 ballistic missile tests. That is far more than his father and his grandfather conducted.

North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests of increasingly powerful weapons. The latest test was in September of last year. The major test actually came after that, and that was on November 28. On November 28, he demonstrated that he had the range of the United States and the central part of our country. In other words, it was stated by others who observed that he now has the capability of reaching any target in mainland United States...

Here is the scary part of this. Those who are not wanting to believe that the threat is real and the threat is there are saying: Well, we don't know that the missile he demonstrated on November 28 could have reached that range if it had a full payload, a load of a nuclear warhead.

_We don't know if they had one or not, but that doesn't give me much comfort. They_ [analysts] _also questioned whether or not it could sustain the reentry back into the atmosphere._

The point is that they now have that capability, and that is something we have to keep in mind as we are making decisions, because we have decisions to make...

Sure, sure; we can't be certain, and he can't be certain. Although we can't be certain of exactly what assets the Iranians have acquired through Barack Obama's novel and innovative Procurement Working Group bureaucracy structure, we know from what nominal information the Security Council is willing to disclose, that on page 12 of the _Presentation by the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group on the Procurement Channel_ – presented and published on 14 July 2017 – the Procurement Working Group lists several classes of inventory procured by Iran under the explanation: _Spectrum of current Proposals_.

[The July 14, 2017, presentation is found on http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/briefings-by-the-facilitator.shtml ; document file: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/PWG_PC_Presentation-14%20July%202017.pdf]

The first class of inventory listed is " _Machine tools_." Although, due to the Secrecy Arrangements (documented and explained in Appendix VII – _Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed inventories_ [FOOTNOTE19 see haranguing memories]), the presentation can't furnish exact details on where these acquisitions are headed in Iran. Although the exact end-use location is never specified; it is suggested that acquisitions are destined, in general, possibly to flow into the " _Automotive Industry_ " in some capacity.

(There is no way to actually verify where these inventories; ostensibly destined for the "automotive Industry" actually did end up, or what they are or were put to use for.)

Naturally this wouldn't be a matter of concern if "Machine Tools for the Automotive Industry" meant something commonplace like socket wrenches;

But these aren't the kind of "machine tools" that one finds in the home garage or at your local auto-repair shop. The Procurement Working Group doesn't deal with small stuff. The Procurement Working Group is approving INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a defined and listed "machine tools" of a very specific character. Let's have a look at part of what's listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a regarding machine tools:

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology *****

1. INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

1.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

1.B.2 Machine tools, as follows, and any combination thereof, for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites, which, according to the manufacturer's technical specifications, can be equipped with electronic devices for simultaneous "contouring control" in two or more axes:

a. Machine tools for turning, that have "positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning) for machines capable of machining diameters greater than 35 mm;

b. Machine tools for milling, having any of the following characteristics:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988)* along any linear axis (overall positioning); [* Editors Note: " μm" means "micrometers," "microns;" ISO represents by the standards set up by the International Standards Organization."]

2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or

3. Five or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

Note: Item 1.B.2.b. does not control milling machines having both of the following characteristics:

1. X-axis travel greater than 2 m; and

2. Overall "positioning accuracy" on the x-axis worse (more) than 30 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988).

c. Machine tools for grinding, having any of the following characteristics:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);

2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or

3 Five or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

The INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list sample just presented first identifies the type of work, and the class of machinery dedicated to the performance of such. This gives us the sense of what is being discussed. And then it goes into specific qualities the machinery must have in order to be placed on this list.

This list is meant as a caution, an advisory as to what is needed to produce nuclear weapons – so it doesn't deal with just general types of inventories; this list deals specifically with inventories of a variety of classes which could be used to make a nuclear weapon.

The kinds of machining – milling, grinding tools for example – which are listed here are of a kind capable of extraordinarily fine precision work. This is why they are of such interest to the auto industry; and not coincidentally the industry of developing very capable advanced ballistic missile systems; along with complimentary aerodynamically suitable warhead casings to match, and along with other necessary components.

The first bomb makers at Los Alamos had nothing nearly as sophisticated to work with as machining tools which the United States Government now assists Iran in acquiring.

Considering, in this following, the level of precision under discussion in the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a document:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);

* INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2; (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents

Or as an alternate source: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-III.pdf

This above sampling of the kinds of tools being referred to gives us the sense of the quality under discussion.

This list is meant as a caution, an advisory as to what is needed to produce nuclear weapons – so it doesn't deal with just general types of inventories; this list deals specifically with inventories of a variety of classes which could be used to make a nuclear weapon.

The kinds of machining – milling, grinding tools for example – which are listed here are of a kind capable of extraordinarily fine precision work. This is why they are of such interest to the auto industry; and not coincidentally the industry of developing very capable advanced ballistic missile systems; along with complimentary aerodynamically suitable warhead casings to match, and along with other necessary components.

The first bomb makers at Los Alamos had nothing nearly as sophisticated to work with as machining tools which the United States Government now assists Iran in acquiring.

Considering, in this following, the level of precision under discussion in the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a document:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);

The specification "all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm;" makes clear that for such a device to be listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a it must be able to grind the material to a degree of accuracy better than a difference of 4 microns; or, in other words, a deviation of accuracy of 4 microns is too much – therefore the tool must be able to fit and match the targeted shape to within less then 4 microns of any deviation.

This is the type of accuracy wanted for the construction of your modern day nuclear warhead. That is why such equipment – aside from the other categories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a, are placed on list.

This is also the type of accuracy and level of detail wanted in fabrication of the nice, most up-to-season styled aerodynamically shaped intercontinental ballistic missiles.

It is well-known that Iran and North Korea are best trading buddy allies. This is not to say that Iran is going to sell its acquired machining tools to Korea. But it isn't so far fetched unlikely that the Government of the Islamic Republic might be enthusiastic about setting up some cottage industry outposts here and there in Iran which could produce nifty custom made parts, per North Korean specifications, which nicely produced could be packaged and sent on to North Korea for the purpose of exponentially advancing the range capabilities of North Korean ballistic missile assets.

* * * * *

Inhofe was all concerned about the nuclear tipped ballistic missiles a couple of months earlier – but now it's March 13 and he's keeping his mouth shut in front of the General. Inhofe knows like everyone else on the committee knew that the U.S. government had been deeply involved, since November 2016 in assisting Iran, and in approving Iranian procurement of Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities. The whole project originated in the United States.

Inhofe didn't mention to the General the potential consequences of a menacing North Korea-Iran connection spreading back into the theatre of Votel's command; not while the General was sitting right there on the committee floor. Not one of the Senators talked about anything like that.

Doing what they do, how do any of these esteemed politicians think things are going to turn out?

They're not giving the General information he needs; information that they've got. They're not telling the General anything. And they're certainly not going to talk to the voters about any of this; regardless of the fact that more and more of the electorate is learning of the facts of the matter all the time.

The "representative" lies to the People knowing that he/she goes against the electorate; knowing that the voter would never tolerate that the U.S. Government was expediting and approving Weapons of Mass Destruction capacity to Iran. The "representative" joins in with the others of that political class to suppress information by simply refusing to discuss it.

These "representatives" lie to the People knowing that their choice is made in extreme disregard for, and contempt of the moral conscience of the communities they pretend to serve.

These "Representatives" lie to the People knowing that they use their advantage of being elected to public office in order to serve some interest of their own – not that of the People.

I don't know if or how many of these Congresspersons have big fat stock investment portfolios banking on weapons sales to Iran – I don't know that these rule-makers and regulators don't.

I couldn't speak to which connections to domestic arms industry interests these Congresspersons may have – however:

At the time of the 13 March 2018 interview the United States had not yet been withdrawn from Resolution 2231.

If the U.S. would stay in the deal, a Congressperson with a good investment portfolio could hope for a lucrative return on the fact that in 2020, two years down the road from the interview; on 18 October 2020 the floodgates are open to sell conventional weaponry to Iran – as provided for in Paragraph 5; Annex B of Resolution 2231:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2231); Annex B.

As provided by a resolution so deciding, the following provisions would apply on the date on which the IAEA Director General submits a report verifying that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA [this means "JCPOA Implementation Day];

5. All States may participate in and permit, provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any **battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems,** as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, and the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in this subparagraph...

This paragraph shall apply until the date five years after the **JCPOA Adoption Day** or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

"JCPOA Adoption Day" occurred on 18 October 2015. Therefore conventional weapons sales to Iran are permitted to begin as of 18 October 2020 – just before the U.S. election for the Presidency in early November.

But President Trump had already pulled the United States out of Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" about a month and a half after the General's interview; hence precluding continued U.S. participation in the enterprise. And given that withdrawal, Trump now had two floundering and frustrated political parties to deal with throughout his first (if only) term in the White House.

THAT THE United States Government is controlled by two political parties is unquestioned.

These two political parties are distinguished by the moral and intellectual cowardice of the handful of the privileged partisan elite which populate them.

Neither of these two political machines, in this current affair, has produced one man or woman to explain either party's version of the reasoning behind, or the benefits to be gained by expediting and approving the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran; or their silence on the facts of the matter.

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, as history has often taught us, are not always principled and motivated by the highest ideals.

As often as not these can be triggered by cabals of individuals unified in a shared perception of calculated gain, a unanimous infatuation with avarice.

Avarice is a powerful motivator which can wipe from some minds any sense of morality or restraint which might have at one time been present. Greed, avarice, is a powerful glue which, as in the present case of Obama's "Iran nuclear deal;" can join individuals together into partisan political movements dedicated to propagating and acting upon perverse, self-destructive inclinations, also destructive to innocent others; destructive inclinations and preoccupations which they refuse to explain or reason through.

The Citizen has every justification for considering and feeling that we currently live in a time where the two controlling political machines, overwhelmingly held together and motivated by the powerful glue of avarice, cannot be reached by reason.

There is a clear tension between the Peoples' desire for arms control; and the handful of persons enlisted in Congress, in control of government and rule-making, who want profits to be generated from contraband weapons sales to Iran; regardless of what menace this may pose to the United States and other nations; and regardless that treaty and trust is to be egregiously violated in the process of making these sales.

Proof of the commitment of these two political machines to involving the United States Government in assisting Iran in its development of nuclear weapons capacity is the 27 October 2017 overwhelming House of Representatives vote in favor of the _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act_ – HR 1698; which endorses sales through the Procurement Working Group, of ballistic – and hence necessarily nuclear weapons – associated assets to Iran; in violation of treaty and as documented and explained.

This vote reveals an aspect of the cultural perspective energizing the movement in favor of profiting from the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran. What is exposed here is the infantile perspective that U.S. engagement in the program violating treaty is justified because other nations are involved in the activity. We can be bad because they're being bad.

House of Representatives Congressman Jim Costa from California gives us an example of the viewpoint. Speaking in the House on 11 October 2017, just a couple of weeks before the 27 October vote on the _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act_ , Costa argues against President Trump's plan to leave the Resolution 2231 arrangement:

... Doing so would strip the United States of our credibility in future international agreements not just with Iran, but with our allies as well.

In addition to Iran, we negotiated the Iran nuclear agreement with the United Kingdom, Germany, European Union, China, and Russia, and we must keep our word. In other words, to remain credible, the United States cannot change positions on international agreements from one administration to another without serious justification and without the consent in working with our allies.

The People want arms control; and for arms control treaty to be honored. But the politician pretending to represent the People says: because the U.S. Government had previously, under a different administration, agreed to violate treaty in assisting Iran in the development of its nuclear weapons development project – we must continue along the lines of this illicit and destructive activity.

Leading Democratic Party Senator Diane Feinstein; another proponent of the project dedicated to the expediting and approving of Iranian acquisitions of defined nuclear weapons associated assets in combination with ballistic missile technologies, on 26 April 2018; pronounced this following:

The Iran nuclear agreement is the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated. It blocks Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon, protecting our security and the security of our partners in the region.

Here Feinstein frivolously dismisses the existence of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been established as the cornerstone of U.S. nuclear arms control policy since long before Feinstein came to office. The Senator substitutes in its stead a program developed to assist Iran in its acquisition of nuclear weapons capacity.

The view of Costa and of the others promoting the Resolution 2231 program is that, because the agreed to program is in action; it must be treated as credible and remain in action. The odious substance of the program is not a consideration. "Credibility" arises only from adherence to an agreement no matter how arbitrary and destructive it may be.

President Trump, by returning the U.S. to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, restores to some extent the credibility of the United States in its demonstrated desire to adhere to treaty. Trump was implementing a correction.

The Obama administration's previous departure is perceived and understood as aberrant.

Yet the issue persists; both political partisan monopolies persist in unanimously refusing to publicly acknowledge fact;

And by January 2016, almost four years into this nuclear weapons sales project, the Democratic Party announced in its platform for election to the White House in 2020:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because... **it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb**...

Proceeding on to further examination:

* * * * *

Chapter 7

– The Notoriously Manipulative Interview Itself –

The various assertions of Senator Reed of Rhode Island made in his opening having been noted; this writing proceeds to his interlocution of the General regarding the "JCPOA" as conducted under the elocution of Senator Reed of Rhode Island."

**Senator Reed** asks of the General:

...General Votel, as I indicated in my opening remarks, consistent with the secretary of defense, Secretary Mattis, and General Dunford, do you believe that it's in our national security interest to stay within the confines of the JCPOA?

**Votel** :

I -- I think, from my -- from my perspective, the JCPOA addresses one of the principal threats that we deal with from Iran. So, if the JCPOA goes away, then we will have to have another way to deal with the nuclear weapons program. So, yes, I share their -- I share their position.

(?)

No, I'm not kidding; that's all there was to it. After all that big wind-up based on all those phony assertions; this was all that Senator Reed caricature could summon up the interest to ask on the "JCPOA" story he had just earlier squawked so vehemently about.

Reed had wanted the opportunity to make a speech; he made one. Maybe he wanted to see if he could get the General to be taken in by Reed's blandly false characterization of the Security Council resolution. The General seemed to be.

The end result is that Reed leaves the General in the dark. That was Senator Reed's big contribution to the issue of national security on the occasion. Keep the General in the dark for politics' and policy's sake.

Had Reed been paying attention that day, or had anyone been taking notice, General Votel had also observed in another part of his testimony:

Both China and Russia not only seek to fill in perceived gaps in U.S. influence with increasing defense cooperation **and sales of their equipment to regional partners, but they are also cultivating multidimensional ties to Iran**.

The indication here, if my reading of this is correct, is that the General perceives that "sales of their equipment" poses a competitive threat to U.S. efforts to stabilize the volatile region; although he doesn't explicitly put it that way.

As I have mentioned it seems clear from the General's written report; he seems unaware of the nuclear and ballistic missile associated weapons assistance Iran is on an ongoing basis receiving from Russia, China, the U.K., France, Germany and (at that time) the United States. Even if General Votel had known about the Procurement Working Group practice of seeking vendors world-wide to provide for sale to Iran procurement packages combining nuclear and ballistic missile associated assets, the General still wouldn't have any clear idea of what assets were finding their way into Iran. As mentioned, this precludes developing a reasonable assessment of what assets Iran may be in possession of.

Reviewing the Procurement Working Group offer:

Information on the Procurement Channel

B. Further questions and answers

18. Can a proposal include items which are set out in _S/2015/546_ as well as in _INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part_ _1_ or _INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2?_

A proposal may include items which fall both under _S/2015/546_ , as well as one of the _INFCIRC_ s. Such a proposal should be submitted for review as an activity falling under Paragraph 2 of Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council will decide on such proposals based on a recommendation of the Joint Commission.

I perceive, from the General's written report and from his subsequent verbal testimony that he is unaware, and has been kept in the dark by our own Government about what transpires in this regard.

The General registers some concern over China and Russia "... _sales of_... _equipment to regional partners_ , [and, this while] _cultivating multidimensional ties to Iran_."

General Votel, through the fault of our Government, is insensible to the depth of the problem; that it is not just Russia and China that are cultivating sinister undisclosed weapons associated trading ties to Iran – it is also our NATO "partners;" and at the time of the 13 March 2018 interview – it is also ourselves who were working hard to destabilize the region by assisting Iran to acquire that which we would not give control of to our closest allies.

Given that under the conditions of Obama's arrangement between his administration and the Ministers of Iran; the IAEA is denied access to verify end use, or end use location of Iranian procurements of anything having to do with INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed inventories acquired through the Procurement Working Group.

Basically only the vendors of those officially recognized as nuclear weapons associated inventories are allowed to check up on where these purchases end up in Iran – that is, if those vendors feel like cutting into profit margins to take another trip over to Iran to investigate, it's agreed they can investigate.

This following Resolution 2231 provision explains the procedure:

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or **if the Joint Commission deems necessary** when approving a proposal for transfer, **the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification**.

Paragraph 6.8 above stipulates that if the Joint Commission (this Commission is the Security Council bureaucracy which nominally oversees the Procurement Working Group. The Joint Commission is comprised of representatives from exactly the same States which populate the Procurement Working Group.)

The Joint Commission is not the IAEA and is not required by treaty to report on any end-use Iranian activity relating to nuclear or ballistic weapons associated merchandise acquired through the Procurement Working Group. To date there has been no Joint Commission report from any ad hoc committee of "experts" it might have pulled together to investigate any end-use of merchandise.

And why should anyone be naïve enough to anticipate there would be reporting, given the entirely crooked outlay of the set-up.

It's not even clear, in Resolution 2231, if the vendors are even allowed under the JCPOA to either protest end-use location, or report to the outside world on anything having to do with that. Not that vendors, desiring to maintain good business relations with Iran, probably want to do any of that either. Iranian potential purchasers might take a dim view of this sort of imposition and curtail or suspend future business.

Without any reasonable possibility of verification or any intel on any chain of custody; on any end-use location; or indeed, any possibility of verifying end use – what use these inventories are really being put to;

Without any ability to verify end use, it becomes impossible to provide any reasonable assessment on how far or how fast presumed Iranian weapons programs advancement may have progressed. Given the inability to assess what is unknown, what preparation is General Votel's CENTCOM Command able to make for just about anything the Islamic Republic of Iran might try suddenly, surprisingly to pull out of the hat?

Also:

What could be the General's response to the fact that Barack Obama's has allowed Iran to begin engaging in " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device,_ " such as experimentation with multipoint explosive detonation systems; the designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources; &c. and the other activities cited earlier in this writing.

Naturally the General has no precise knowledge of the exact progress of Iranian practice with and study of these. However we can force some deduction for what it might be worth.

On 10 January 2018; Senator Inhofe, who later is to sit (13 March 2018) as Republican Party lead on this Senate Armed Services Committee meeting with the General, had pointed out:

...Since Kim Jong Un took power in 2009, he has already conducted more than 80 ballistic missile tests. That is far more than his father and his grandfather conducted.

North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests of increasingly powerful weapons. The latest test was in September of last year. The major test actually came after that, and that was on November 28. On November 28, he demonstrated that he had the range of the United States and the central part of our country. In other words, it was stated by others who observed that he now has the capability of reaching any target in mainland United States...

Here is the scary part of this. Those who are not wanting to believe that the threat is real and the threat is there are saying: Well, we don't know that the missile he demonstrated on November 28 could have reached that range if it had a full payload, a load of a nuclear warhead.

_We don't know if they had one or not, but that doesn't give me much comfort. They_ [analysts] _also questioned whether or not it could sustain the reentry back into the atmosphere._

The point is that they now have that capability, and that is something we have to keep in mind as we are making decisions, because we have decisions to make...

Although we can't be certain of exactly what assets the Iranians have acquired through Barack Obama's novel and innovative Procurement Working Group bureaucracy structure, we know from what nominal information the Security Council is willing to disclose, that on page 12 of the _Presentation by the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group on the Procurement Channel_ – presented and published on 14 July 2017 – the Procurement Working Group lists several classes of inventory procured by Iran under the explanation: _Spectrum of current Proposals_.

The first class of inventory listed is " _Machine tools_." Although, due to the Secrecy Arrangements (documented and explained in Appendix VII – _Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed inventories_ [FOOTNOTE19 see haranguing memories]), the presentation can't furnish exact details on where these acquisitions are headed in Iran. Although the exact end-use location is never specified; it is suggested that acquisitions are destined, in general, possibly to flow into the " _Automotive Industry_ " in some capacity.

(There is no way to actually verify where these inventories; ostensibly destined for the "automotive Industry" actually did end up, or what they are or were put to use for.)

[The July 14, 2017, presentation is found on http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/briefings-by-the-facilitator.shtml ; document file: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/PWG_PC_Presentation-14%20July%202017.pdf]

Naturally this wouldn't be a matter of concern if "Machine Tools for the Automotive Industry" meant something commonplace like socket wrenches;

But these aren't the kind of "machine tools" that one finds in the home garage or at your local auto-repair shop. The Procurement Working Group doesn't deal with small stuff. The Procurement Working Group is approving INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a defined and listed "machine tools" of a very specific character. Let's have a look at part of what's listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a regarding machine tools:

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

1. INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

1.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

1.B.2 Machine tools, as follows, and any combination thereof, for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites, which, according to the manufacturer's technical specifications, can be equipped with electronic devices for simultaneous "contouring control" in two or more axes:

a. Machine tools for turning, that have "positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning) for machines capable of machining diameters greater than 35 mm;

b. Machine tools for milling, having any of the following characteristics:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988)* along any linear axis (overall positioning); [* Editors Note: " μm" means "micrometers," "microns;" ISO represents by the standards set up by the International Standards Organization."]

2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or

3. Five or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

Note: Item 1.B.2.b. does not control milling machines having both of the following characteristics:

1. X-axis travel greater than 2 m; and

2. Overall "positioning accuracy" on the x-axis worse (more) than 30 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988).

c. Machine tools for grinding, having any of the following characteristics:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);

2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or

3 Five or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

This above sampling of the kinds of tools being referred to gives us the sense of the quality under discussion.

This list is meant as a caution, an advisory as to what is needed to produce nuclear weapons – so it doesn't deal with just general types of inventories; this list deals specifically with inventories of a variety of classes which could be used to make a nuclear weapon.

The kinds of machining – milling, grinding tools for example – which are listed here are of a kind capable of extraordinarily fine precision work. This is why they are of such interest to the auto industry; and not coincidentally the industry of developing very capable advanced ballistic missile systems; along with complimentary aerodynamically suitable warhead casings to match, and along with other necessary components.

The first bomb makers at Los Alamos had nothing nearly as sophisticated to work with as machining tools which the United States Government now assists Iran in acquiring.

Considering, in this following, the level of precision under discussion in the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a document:

1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);

The specification "all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm;" makes clear that for such a device to be listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a it must be able to grind the material to a degree of accuracy better than a difference of 4 microns; or, in other words, a deviation of accuracy of 4 microns is too much – therefore the tool must be able to fit and match the targeted shape to within less then 4 microns of any deviation.

This is the type of accuracy wanted for the construction of your modern day nuclear warhead. That is why such equipment – aside from the other categories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a, are placed on list.

This is also the type of accuracy and level of detail wanted in fabrication of the nice, most up-to-season styled aerodynamically shaped intercontinental ballistic missiles.

It is well-known that Iran and North Korea are best trading buddy allies. This is not to say that Iran is going to sell its acquired machining tools to Korea. But it isn't so far fetched unlikely that the Government of the Islamic Republic might be enthusiastic about setting up some cottage industry outposts here and there in Iran which could produce nifty custom made parts, per North Korean specifications, which nicely produced could be packaged and sent on to North Korea for the purpose of exponentially advancing the range capabilities of North Korean ballistic missile assets.

* * * * *

There's plenty more to that little Easter Bunny weapons gift basket to share with between Iran and therefore North Korea. When the Procurement Working Group says:

Information on the Procurement Channel

B. Further questions and answers

18. Can a proposal include items which are set out in _S/2015/546_ as well as in _INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part_ _1_ or _INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2?_

A proposal may include items which fall both under _S/2015/546_ , as well as one of the _INFCIRC_ s. Such a proposal should be submitted for review as an activity falling under Paragraph 2 of Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council will decide on such proposals based on a recommendation of the Joint Commission.

As previously noted, that paragraph is found in the United Nations issued document " _Information on the Procurement Channel_ " which is recovered from the United Nations website page: **http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml**

The page directly accessing the document in question is: **https://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/Information%20note_EN.pdf**

WHEN THE PROCUREMENT WORKING GROUP says that vendors can sell to Iran items off of _INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2_ , they mean that the following free exchange of technical data may be included in procurement packages designated for sale to Iran:

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

ANNEX CONTENTS

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013) ;

DEFINITIONS

"Technical assistance" --

"Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

"Technical data" --

"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

"Technology" --

means specific information required for the "development", "production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance".

*[ INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents \- or as an alternate https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]]

THAT THE Procurement Working Group has been expediting and approving sales to Iran of procurement packages which might contain assets such as "... _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions_..." since November 2016 doesn't seem to arouse any suspicion or alarm in our genius membership of the 115th Congress. Nobody on the Committee asked the General what he might think of the documented transmittal of the noted sensitive technical information to the Iranians might result in.

Without the knowledge that the Congress is withholding; the U.S. Government is holding back from the military; how does the Military figure out what Iran has got and where it's hidden at?

This could indeed be construed by the electorate as an unworkable situation.

* * * * *
Chapter 8

– The General Receives the Second Interlocutor –

The second interlocutor is a Senator from Maine, claiming himself as independent; Mr. Angus King. However, independent as he might pretend to be, his questions are as are designed to conform to the usual expected evasions customarily practiced by members of both political parties. Mr. King in the interview would not tell the General what he knows; what would profit the General and the public he should be made aware of.

By the 13 March 2018 Senate Armed Services Committee interview, the 115th House of Representatives had already distinguished itself as the singular United States assembly since the dawn of the Atomic Age to vote almost unanimously in favor of establishing as United States policy that the United States Congress would, despite treaty made under the Authority of the United States. The United States Government, under the Obama administration, had now practiced the surrender of that treaty to the priorities of the Government of Iran regardless, or perhaps in part because of the feature that Iran, also a signatory to the same treaty – could be counted as also violating that same treaty in favor of the arrangement it had made with Obama;

The 115th House of Representatives had irrefutably asserted its position favoring the transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction associated assets, including ballistic missile delivery systems technology, which might be thought of as necessary at the discretion of the Government of Iran, in effectively making an instructive and persuasive impression on any potentially targeted recipient of the prize;

The 115th House of Representatives enthusiastically overwhelmingly supported engaging the United States Government in the of this violation of treaty, this United States complicity in the War Crime, _Crimes against Peace_ ; by attempting to enact as United States Governments policy that participation in preparations openly materially aiding preparations of another nation's pledged, publicly promised, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; was to be forgiven as long as this United States participation in providing assistance in preparations for the Iranian promised War Crime was carried out under the auspices of the proprietary Procurement Working Group monopoly shop;

When the deed was carried out under Procurement Working Group auspices; then it was to be henceforth the policy of the United States Government, according to the 115th House of Representatives; that regardless of treaty or previous assurances made – the United States was to be permitted to assist in preparations for the pledged planned War Crime.

The deviant 115th House of Representatives discovered itself uniquely voting in favor of United States Government support which not only offered material assistance to Iran in the advancement of its nuclear warheads development project; this United States support, was expressed by not only actively expediting sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets; but also by allowing that Iran should engage in undertaking " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ :" as of 16 January 2016; all the while using five permanent Member States of the Security Council's overriding influence to curtail any International Atomic Energy Agency investigations in these areas.

* * * * *

Self-styled "Independent" Senator of Maine, Senator Angus King, caucusing with the Democrat Party in all other respects; also made no attempt to engage the General on the issues – some of them mentioned just above.

King had nothing original to contribute in his line questioning the General.

So; given that King is, like all the others entirely mired in the corrupt paranoid secrecy which has saturated the 115th closed society Congress by this time; and that it is easily apparent General Votel is unaware of the 26 October 2017 House of Representatives vote, and is just as unaware of the true disposition of the 115th Congress; here's how King's manipulative line of questioning proceeds:

**Senator King** asks of the General:

Turning to Iran, I understand all the testimony is Iran is abiding by the JCPOA in terms of inspections and what they are doing. What would be implications for the region if the United States abruptly terminated the agreement? And what would Iran do?

**Votel** :

Senator, I can't speculate on what Iran would do. You know the implications for the region, I think there would be some concern, I think, about how we intended to address that particular threat, if it was not being addressed through the JCPOA.

Of course, our approach here is one of assuring our partners, maintaining deterrent capabilities in the region, and then, of course, where we can...

**Senator King** :

But, if the agreement were terminated, wouldn't the Iranians then be free to pursue a nuclear weapon within a matter of months?

**Votel** :

Theoretically, they would be able to do that.

**Senator King** :

And that certainly wouldn't contribute to -- if the Iranians had a nuclear weapon, we'd have two rogue states with nuclear weapons on our hands instead of one, the other one being North Korea.

**Votel** :

Right. This could certainly be the case again. We're speculating that that would be the direction...

**Senator King** :

Do you think it would be in the national security interests of the country to maintain the Iran agreement, at least for the near term?

**Votel** :

I share the secretary of defense's and chairman's comments on this. Right now, I think it is in our interest.

**Senator King** :

And there may be a different point of view in four or five years, when it's near the end of its term. Is that correct?

**Votel** :

That that could be true.

**Senator King** :

Thank you.

* * * * *

A further signature moment, illustrating the imbecile pettiness of a Congress entirely unequipped and unwilling to deal the seriousness of the issue of United States Government responsibility for our Government's one-sided promotion of proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities in the Middle-East is presented; center column page S1820 of the Congressional Record; dated Tuesday, March 20, 2018; Volume 164; Number 48.

Senator Udall of New Mexico has this to relate about the earlier 13 March interview of General Votel conducted by the SASC:

The President's hostility toward Iran's agreement to disarm its nuclear weapons program is mind-boggling. Director Pompeo reportedly shares this hostility. But just last week, the commander of U.S. Central Command, Army GEN Joseph Votel, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Iran deal is in our national interest. Defense Secretary Mattis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Gen. Joseph Dunford, also agree. Our close allies —also signatories to the deal — agree it is in the international community's interests.

This is not the United States the world has come to know, rely upon, and believe in. The President's failure to protect our national interest weakens our position within the world community...

So the whole charade event was an opportunity to enable some later political grandstanding on the Congressional record – not unexpected.

Speaking to Trump's position Udall says: "... _This is not the United States the world has come to know_...;" and Udall is right, after a fashion; after all, Trump's view does not coincide with the United States the world has come to know since Barack Obama took office and decided for the rest of us that the United States would cease adherence to the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_.

The United States the world has come to know since Obama took and left office is that world of the 115th House of Representatives which voted in favor of making it official that it should henceforth be the policy of the United States to choose loyalty to the doctrine of the Procurement Working Group mandate over the prohibitions and restraints imposed by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The United States the world has come to know since Obama took and left office is that of the 115th United States Congress which, realizing it may have announced its pro-proliferation stance a little too indiscreetly, simply tries to pretend that the 26 October whole-hearted announcement had never happened.

The United States the world has come to know since Obama took and left office is that of a nation that actively supports the arming of a non-nuclear-weapons-State which continually pledges the overthrow of neighboring governments;

The United States the world has come to know is the one which supports that, if by some collateral accidental damage it is deemed necessity by the non-nuclear-weapons-State the United States currently supports; then the extinguishing of neighboring populations might very well be an unavoidable option at the disposal of the chosen non-nuclear-weapons-State's discrete choice of opportunity or chance inclination; thanks to the indispensable United States Government contributions to Iran's preparations for its pledged war of aggression; promised to be carried out some time in the future at the convenience of the Government of Iran.

Iran is the foreign nation which the 115th House of Representatives chose, with extreme prejudice, to favor in its attempted endorsement of the procurement packages of bundled nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets Iran actively acquires on an ongoing basis from the venue of the United Nations Security Council chartered Procurement Working Group monopoly shop.

In supporting that nation with all the benefits it receives from its participation in the activities of the Procurement Working Group, the United States Government, as noted, participates in that non-nuclear-weapons-State's preparations for pledged future war of aggression – and this is defined as War Crime, falling under the category of _Crimes against Peace_.

It was the United States that the world used to know, before the Obama administration's rise to power, which is largely responsible for contributing to the international definition of _Crimes against Peace_ – reviewing:

CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) **Crimes against Peace**. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, **or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing**.

The United States that the world used to know, before the Obama administration's rise to power; once spoke out, in the voice of Nuernberg Trial Case III, Chief Counsel for the Prosecution, Brigadier General Telford Taylor, who said:

... although this indictment is brought in the name of the Government of the United States, this case in substance is the people of the world against these men who have committed criminal acts against the community we know as the world. For surely few spots on this earth are so remote that they have not felt in some degree... the destructive, impact of the criminal acts of these men or those others whom they served and with whose acts they were criminally connected.

... **unless all the countries of the world fight a continuous struggle to match the moral conscience of the world which has been asserted here, the result will be... an apathetic amoral world which drifts aimlessly because it sees no national conduct which matches the standards of moral conduct which are proclaimed here**. The true significance of these proceedings, therefore, far transcends the mere question of the guilt or innocence of the defendants. They are charged with murder, but this is no mere murder trial.

**These proceedings invoke the moral standards of the civilized world, and thereby impose an obligation on the nations of the world to measure up to the standards applied here**...

Although this Tribunal is internationally constituted, it is an American court. **The obligations which derive from these proceedings are** , therefore, **particularly binding on the United States**...

That was the United States the world used to know before the rise to power of the Obama administration.

The United States the world used to know was the one that, along with the Soviet Union – presented the world with the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_.

The United States the world has come to know since the Triumph of the Will of the Obama Administration, is a United States led by entrenched fool politicians presenting themselves unambiguously as clearly favoring Obama's Resolution 2231 over the supremacy of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_.

Mr. Udall of New Mexico advocates in favor of the United States the world has come to know since the rise of the administration of Barack Obama – a United States which promotes the discriminatory one sided proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction favoring the Government of Iran with extreme prejudice; Mr. Udall agitates in favor of this new practice of violating international treaty, and conducting United States Government business in defiance of the internationally recognized and codified definition _Crimes against Peace_ ; this to the benefit of Iranian weapons ambitions; and this in support of Iranian preparations for its pledge eventual waging war of aggression in violation of treaty and international assurances.

Mr. Udall of New Mexico insultingly vilifies the Citizen who opposes the United States weapons support for and assistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran, devised and put into effect by the Obama administration. Udall suggests that it is "mind-boggling" that anyone should not share Udall's vision of what the United States should become – perchance meaning to suggest that it is somehow "Un-American" for the Citizen to be opposed to Udall's own neo-fascist thug image of his idealized United States led by the ideologues of a partisan political movement expressing inherent xenophobic tendencies in favor of a nation effectively promising genocide and a war of extermination.

Udall must mock the United States citizen, perhaps hoping against hope that ignorance of the true nature of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 might hold up long enough for that neo-fascist thug faction, which Udall stands by, and which has gained control of the national level Democratic Party in recent years, might opportunistically again reassert its pre-eminence in Washington in the midterm elections of 2018 and, or the national election of 2020; provided that the public can be kept in the dark long enough – as long as the pro-proliferation partisans' manage to sustain their crooked opportunistic charade.

Mr. Udall from New Mexico has presented us with another clear example demonstrating that these political "fact finding" missions are not necessarily about facts or analysis; but rather are presented as a venue for engaging in manipulative questioning intended to extract answers which may be used for future political grandstanding on the floors of Congress at some later date.

* * * * *

Returning to Senator King's conniving little 13 March 2018 line of questioning for brief analysis and review – King says:

Turning to Iran, I understand all the testimony is Iran is abiding by the JCPOA in terms of inspections and what they are doing....

Yes, it is true; Iran is taking advantage of its new found weapons purchasing powers. And the IAEA Board of Governors has never dared issue a report on IAEA inspectors' taking the opportunity to review the whereabouts, or any end-use of any of the secret procurement packages the IAEA is prevented from even knowing the contents of. So yes, Iran is abiding, not complaining about the non-existent inspections regime.

**Senator King** :

But, if the agreement were terminated, wouldn't the Iranians then be free to pursue a nuclear weapon within a matter of months?

...if the Iranians had a nuclear weapon, we'd have two rogue states with nuclear weapons on our hands instead of one, the other one being North Korea.

King sheds crocodile tears. It is essential that the Senator maintain the universal face-saving hypocritical pretence of concern for Iran developing a nuclear weapon exactly at the time of the 13 March 2018; when the United States, in conjunction with the other participating States, is actively assisting Iran in its nuclear weapons development project.

King shows himself to be a strong proponent supporting that project. King doesn't want the United States to withdraw from the arrangement – so he actively fabricates and promotes a fictitious arrangement very unlike the actual Security Council resolution. This is what all the supporters of the project must do. Not one of them could possibly discuss the facts of the matter with the constituencies. The embarrassment of it might finish political careers.

Democratic Party passionate partisan support for the legendary reputation of their preceding iconic President Obama had been and still seems to be (even now in 2019) clearly felt as necessary for election or re-election political efforts, which have been shown to take every priority over any shred of decency, honesty, or morality individual members of the national level Democratic Party incumbency might once have possessed.

The current national level Democratic Party incumbency hasn't so far shown any inclination to break ranks with the neo-fascist thug policy promoting United States assistance to Iran in approving Iranian acquisitions of nuclear and ballistic missile procurement packages in violation of an international treaty made under the Authority of the United States Constitution, and contravening the internationally recognized definition of _Crimes against Peace_.

Best evidence is that the obsession with sticking to the policy of the Obama administration as sheltering security which ensures re-election overrules common sense honestly working towards peaceful ends.

The incumbency of the national level Democratic Party; and really, the incumbents of the entire 115th Congress, Republicans and Democrats, were in the process of proving themselves too cowardly to break away from conformity with the bellicose malfeasance of the Party; too shallow to appreciate the potential consequential damages of supporting Iranian efforts to develop home grown domestic nuclear weapons capacity.

Among the other things; a myopic 115th Congress has not acknowledged the implication of the international community communicating to Iran advanced weapons technology through the Iranian acquisitions of Procurement Working Group expedited procurement packages.

Receipt of combinations of advanced Russian, Chinese and Western weapons technologies which Iranian scientists – as clever and talented as they are known to be – might have had to spend years developing on their own without the benefit of the international support endowed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231;

Without that hands-on exposure to the endowed technology; certain lines of technological investigation might not have occurred to those scientists. – Who knows?

Now everything is there for Iranian scientists to backwards engineer. From such a wealth of information gathered, Iranian teams of scientists will no doubt develop their own interesting, and creative assorted hybrid innovations.

And then, there was the business about allowing Iran, as of 16 January 2016, to engage in experimentations in: " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ ," this without any interference by IAEA inspections.

One can begin to appreciate the seriously warped attitude of a domestic, partisan political movement that supports all this giving out of nuclear weapons development assistance to Iran; a self-declared worst enemy of the United States;

One begins to appreciate the seriously twisted perspective of a United States Government, which wouldn't give to its best friends the hand-offs it gives to Iran; but instead approves and assists transferring Weapons of Mass Destruction capacity to a State which continually pledges the destruction of some of its neighbors;

In his interlocution of the General; Paleolithic hawk throwback Senator from Maine, Angus King, expressing pretend concern for possible Iranian weapons development while at the same time mightily advocating for continued surreptitious United States participation in the morally criminal approval of contraband weapons sales conducted under Procurement Working Group auspices; asks:

...if the Iranians had a nuclear weapon, we'd have two rogue states with nuclear weapons on our hands instead of one, the other one being North Korea.

Senator King states the irrelevant obvious here. King, like all the others arguing in favor of keeping the United States in "Iran nuclear agreement;" presents himself as the innocent little lamb. He wrings his filthy, deeply involved hands, and sniveling, begs the question: Oh my, but what if the Iranians had a nuclear weapon?

I'm no respecter of persons promoting transfers of nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear-weapons-State sponsors of terror; and then trying to keep the United States Government in the game by actively carrying on with the cheap pretense that this Obama "Iran nuclear weapons approval deal" isn't about garnering a certain degree of public praise possibly contributing to Democratic Party electoral point gains; or isn't about lucrative financial fortune making opportunities to be gained by domestic contraband weapons profiteering interests; when this "Iran nuclear weapons approval deal" clearly is about such things.

* * * * *

It is only natural that nations targeted by either Iran and, or North Korea, or both, might consider it a formidable threat that this weapons axis partnership is supported by the leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council Oligarchy along with Germany;

The weapons monger policy instigated and put into effect under the Obama administration may have been understood by many outside the United States as a United States betrayal of former allies such as South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the others threatened by this formidable syndicate of elite powerhouse arms trading nations newly allied to the ambitious posturings of Iran and North Korea.

Those most powerful nations hold almost all the cards, and those nations – whatever their individual reasons, and regardless of whatever marketing promotional campaign they have practiced upon the public – are confirmed in their own written and published agreement; and by ongoing United Nations Security Council published progress reports; to have decided, and do, support and assist Iran in its ambitious weapons development project; which also can be understood by corollary as aiding and assisting Iran's best friend North Korea in its own related progressing adventure.

The weapons dealerships of the great arms dispensing nations of France, the U.K., Germany, Russia and China might have calculated that if it were possible to scare the hell out of the smaller nations – then a bonanza of weapons sales profiteering opportunity might, fortunately for them, be developed through a universal panicked arms build up buying shopping spree.

That could be a very likely result – but the fear generated by the well-known fact of the larger nations having suddenly turned so unreliable in their assurances – that fear could get national leaderships thinking also along the lines of how to defend themselves against the existential threat imposed upon themselves by a United Nations rejecting its own Charter in favor of supporting the international arms dealing syndicate made up of the five permanent Members of the Security Council and Germany.

Nations other then Iran might also begin to give top priority to acquisitions of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. – Why not?

The authors of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 anticipated this likely development resulting from their handiwork when they wrote the following provision into their Security Council resolution:

Security Council Resolution 2231;

[Section] **Other Matters**

27. [the Security Council]... Decides that **all provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran** and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices;

"... _only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran_...

"... _should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State_..."

The authors of the Security Council resolution in question expected that approving Iranian acquisitions of contraband nuclear weapons associated assets could lead to other nations intimidated by Iran deciding to pursue development of the bomb for themselves.

In the above provision under section "Other Matters," the authors of Resolution 2231 ludicrously attempted to decree a prohibition against all nations other than Iran developing their own nuclear explosive devices.

In their myopic conceits, the leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council had failed to grasp that by rejecting the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons solely in favor of Iran's development project – they would eventually lose any credible authority to order restraint on the part of other nations.

* * * * *

Without having given their per treaty mandatory notice, the leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council effectively have walked out of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_. The treaty could legitimately be internationally construed as no longer controlling were the situation to get desperate enough, given the dreadful ongoing unprecedented support favoring Iranian violations.

It is possible that the U.S. Citizen voter, in roundly rejecting the pro-proliferation party's bid to reclaim the White House in 2016 (Obama's chosen crown successor Clinton could not even achieve a third of the popular vote); this combined with Trump's vociferous hostility to the provisions of Resolution 2231, and eventual withdrawal from the whole tawdry mess – might have offered some international reassurance in many quarters that, despite nominal continuing support in the United States for that pro-proliferation hawk faction which had gained control of the national level Democratic Party; the rest of the United States had not suddenly gone completely nuclear weapons Kill Crazy.

Trump has been blackballed and vilified by the 115th Congress for having chosen to ignore the domestic and international powerful in his sympathizing with, and his support for the positions of the weaker States.

Naturally the leaderships of Germany along with the five permanent Member States of the Security Council, those State promoters actively engaging themselves in Iran's preparations for its pledged future waging war of aggression or war in violation of treaty and international assurances;

The leaderships of those State promoters of what most reasonably can be construed as the internationally defined War Crime, _Crimes against Peace_ ; might naturally be resentful of Trump maybe making them look kind of bad publicly by his holier-than-thou refusal to maintain United States participation in what must be construed as _Crimes against Peace_.

Congressional membership promoting United States Government active documented participation in Iran's preparations for its pledged future waging of war of aggression or war in violation of treaty and international assurances; they can vilify Trump all they will for his decision to withdraw from a policy which perpetuates and sustains United States involvement in a War Crime; the War Crime itself defined as such by the United States, along with the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom and what remained of the international community towards the end of World War II.

Whatever anyone might want to say about Trump in other areas – this author (me) has no problem with the stance the President took on this one.

* * * * *

Senator King asks:

**Senator King** :

Do you think it would be in the national security interests of the country to maintain the Iran agreement, at least for the near term?

What's that thing of maintaining " _the Iran agreement, at least for the near term_ " about? The longer anyone holds off on doing anything about the situation – the more nuclear and ballistic missile associated assets are approved for Iranian acquisition.

The latest _Six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [released 21 June 2018] [NOTE] reports on eight new secret content procurement packages approved for Iranian acquisition and consumption during the reporting period between 15 December 2017 and mid June 2018.

Senator King might have asked General Votel if in his opinion the General thought it beneficial to national security interests if the United States military is to be continually kept in the dark about the undisclosed weapons assets the Iranian Government has managed to accumulate under the provisions of Resolution 2231, even just in that short "near term."

Senator King exhibits he is entirely unwilling to display any sense of a social compact. The smug, self-centered King knows about what's going on with Procurement Working Group, and he knows about the permission granted to Iranian scientists to begin engaging in " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ " as of 16 October 2016;

Without sharing information with the General; King asks Votel in 2018 if the General if he thinks the United States should remain in the "deal" for purposes national security interests.

Both King and Reed were trying to make a fool of the General and the U.S. Citizen. Those two smug blubbering clowns of the Senate weren't going to share any good information with the General. They both know about the overwhelming 115 House of Representatives vote in favor of promoting as national policy the Procurement Working Group monopoly on approving Iranian acquisitions of bundled nuclear and ballistic weapons associated assets, etc.

And it's pretty easy to tell that the General is not informed in this area – as this is not Votel's area of expertise.

The smug Senators know about the whole scam the 115th Congress has been carrying on with. They know all about Procurement Working Group activities – they're required to know. But they lack any willingness to respond to the scam by displaying any sense of a social compact which might have urged them to volunteer providing Votel with any good intelligence which could inform and assist the General in formulating a reasonable assessment of the situation.

Senators King and Reed, in March of 2018, wanted a validation from the General that in the "near term" the United States should continue to put up with Iranian engagement in " _Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ " presumably since the "near term" embarkation point of 16 October 2016. The General, clearly uninformed on the issue responded:

**Votel** :

I share the secretary of defense's and chairman's comments on this. Right now, I think it is in our interest.

Senator's Reed and King were engaging in another one of those favorite sports of the U.S. politician. The two Senatorial clowns were kicking the can down the road for someone else to deal with maybe somewhere later on.

However, the ongoing transfers to Iran of nuclear and ballistic missile weapons assets is about accumulating weapons arsenals; it's about what is known as military escalation; it isn't a thing which is going to wait for U.S. politicians' taking their own sweet time about to finally get around to maybe address somewhere down the road in some indefinite future.

The proper manner of addressing the extraordinarily menacing Security Council resolution ongoing and unrestrained weapons transfer program dedicated to violating treaty, and upholding the leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council indulgence in the sport of _Crimes against Peace_ ; is to address the issue in Court so that the International Court of Justice can throw the whole Security Council resolution out in its entirety – and clean the situation up from there.

* * * * *

Publicly demonstrating their real-life-vicious smug-self-satisfaction, the Senators posed their questions based on premises they knew to be false. The smart asshole Senate Committee succeeded temporarily in keeping the General in the dark in the moment of the interview event.

The Senate Committee could have chosen differently: the representatives of Republican Party on the Committee weren't required to sit by silently and complacently as King and Reed gossiped up the General.

Nor was the Democratic partisan membership on the Committee required to sit by idly and watch those two Clowns of the Senate, Reed and King, make public fools of themselves demonstrating the entire Jackass Senate Committee's insular disdain for the public in suggesting or quietly implying on record the 115th's contemptuous absurdist conjecture, which assumes that not even a tiny portion of the population of some Two Hundred Million plus Eligible Registered Voters could possibly have looked into and read what the 115th Congress won't publicly acknowledge – United Nations Security Council Resolution 2213 – which not one of the paltry population of the dull-witted 114th Congress had bothered to even inquire as to the existence of, or mention the existence of by the time the then population of the 114th took their extravagant 2015 September 10th and 11th vote on something the reality of which they had not bothered to conceive of or imagine might possibly exist even at the edge of their wildest incredibly narrow imbecile imaginings.

That thing which they had pretended they might desire to take a vote on those days of 2015 September 10 and 11 – that thing which they had pretended they might desire to take a vote but never even bothered to scramble their graspy hot little hands to get hold of: that thing being the actual Security Council Resolution 2231, documenting in its text the agreement between Barack Obama and the Ministers of the Government of Iran; that which is being acted on by the international community and still ignored in 2019 by the current U.S. Congress;

That thing was exactly the instrument that later would be called upon to justify the 115th House of Representatives almost unanimous vote for a bill intending to promote as national policy the United Nations Security Council Procurement Working Group monopoly on approving Iranian acquisitions of bundled nuclear and ballistic weapons associated assets while prohibiting the International Atomic Energy Agency from having any contact with, and prohibiting the IAEA from verifying these procured assets were not being diverted from peaceful use to the development of nuclear weapons capacity – when the very prohibition of IAEA inspections in violation of treaty is easily understood as a loud and clear suggestion that these weapons associated transfers are exactly intended to enhance Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile weapons development.

Naturally the pack of completely unconcerned idiot pro-weapons profiteering hawks of the 114th and 115th Congress (many of the same people in both assemblies), who so couldn't be bothered at that time to look into even the existence of what might be the actual document they were claiming to consider taking a vote on;

Naturally it followed that this rare population of collective high strung moron politician elitists subsequently, after their idiot and negligent non-votes of September 10 and 11 2015, showed no public capacity to do better than to resentfully disdain the possibility that even a small sampling of a voting population of some 200,000,000+ might have dared to look into what they of the 114th and 115th sessions, in their ineffable contempt for humanity, had refused to bother troubling themselves to take any note of.

It is as though it might have seemed to their minds that the Obama administrations had done such an effective job propagating his own administration's gross fabrication that nobody in the Government needed to answer anything to any single one of that 200,000,000+ of the voting population who might still be paying attention out there;

Nevertheless, given that the United States Government was responsible for intentionally feeding misinformation to the public; and that evidence indicates that Commander in Chief Obama's determined scheming ploy of misinformation had, if nothing else, worked well enough to keep the military in thrall, in ignorance, and unprepared to respond to a threat imposed upon the Citizen by that Citizens' own Government, regardless if whether or not some eccentric peculiars of the 200,000,000+ ignored voting population might know more than what prestigious politicians might condescend to share with the General or the public;

The Senate Armed Services Committee interlocution of the General on the issue of Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" ends up presenting itself a feature showcase of an attempt by officials of the Government to feebly make something or other of a sticking point, probably for their own personal political ends, by exploiting misinformation generated by the United States Government itself.

And the 13 March 2018 interrogatory of the General was conducted long enough since the time of the 115th House of Representatives open on record vote acknowledging that not only was Obama's deal not intended to cut off all pathways to Iran's acquiring access to nuclear weapons capacity – but that the 115th House of Representatives had exposed itself, in its perverse overwhelming vote favoring continuation of the ongoing process of United States Government approvals of Iranian acquisitions of bundled nuclear and ballistic missile associated weapons assets; this while prohibiting IAEA inspections of same.

The population staffing the 115th House of Representatives had voted their said 26 October 2017 Bill overwhelmingly into being: and now, regardless that they couldn't make it stick, they are nevertheless known for their true stance and standard; and for what they would desire have imposed on the rest of us.

That written, I think this writing has paid its proper respects to Senator Reed and Senator King's inane and manipulative line of questioning, and has given it some of, though perhaps not near enough of, its due.

It is time now to move on to the serious question of new green President Donald Trump's enigmatic non-response to the current situation.

* * * * *
Chapter 9

– At Children of Woe's Mercy –

Although they all had to know about it, none of the Senators brought it up to the General at the 13 March 2018 SASC meeting; but in a matter of two and a half years from the interview, on 18 October 2020, the market on conventional weapons sales to and from Iran would open for business. Paragraph 5 of Resolution 2231; _Annex B_ describes the terms:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2231); Annex B.

As provided by a resolution so deciding, the following provisions would apply on the date on which the IAEA Director General submits a report verifying that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA. ["JCPOA Implementation Day."];

5. All States may participate in and permit, provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any **battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems,** as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, and the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in this subparagraph...

This paragraph shall apply until the date five years after the **JCPOA Adoption Day** or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

"JCPOA Adoption Day" took place on 18 October 2015; so per the above, on 18 October 2020 – just a few weeks before the national election for the President of the United States; it's almost got to be a sure bet there's going to be hornets' nest stirring of activity as enthusiastic buyers' purchase orders start rolling in. It doesn't matter who gets too be elected President in November 2020 – the Iran weapons market balance of power game changer, as agreed, goes into effect no matter what.

There's that; and then there is the definite indication of very real contraband weapons assets exchanging hands in the first year of Trump's first term in office. No one's been talking on record in Washington about those particular 2017, first year Trump administration U.S. Government approved procurement packages facilitated under Procurement Working Group auspices – not Democrats or Republicans that I've found yet. The exchanges are however, documented by the United Nations Security Council itself, so they're very hard to refute.

EARLY IN 2019 the Democrats decided on the wording of their 2020 election platform vis-à-vis Obama's Iran nuclear deal. Among the other phony rumors the Democratic partisans habitually promote to justify their livelihood, the Democrats asserted in the writing of their platform agenda:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because, as it is vigorously enforced and implemented, **it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb**...

Naturally the Iran nuclear agreement does no such thing as cut off all pathways to a bomb; and as documented, its vigorous implementation and enforcement is verifiably directed at facilitating and approving Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies and support services;

But the Democrats want that the United States should rejoin with abandon the ongoing international pact with its blatant and indispensable contributions to the development of Iranian nuclear weapons capacity.

In order this should happen; the pro-weapons sales cabal now profoundly in control of the Democratic Party (since Iran nuclear deal implementation), will need to get its own President into the 2020 White House if U.S. arms dealing interests are going to be certain about making any headway gaining access to the Iranian conventional weapons market opening up the month before votes are cast in the 2020 national election.

The Democrats hope to carry the 2020 White House in part by virtue of the gimmicky lies they propagate favoring promotion of their contraband weapons profiteering fiasco project;

For their sham claims to work the proper magic, the pro-weapons development project political partisans in entrenched control of the Party forum must hope, among other things; there are enough members of the voting population out there who haven't yet heard the regularly circulated Democratic Party deceptions openly contradicted by the documented facts .

UNFORTUNATELY, even the simplest common sense question doesn't get asked of any 2020 presidential candidates all agitating in favor of the nuclear deal or a return to it:

"Care to explain to the Citizen consumer how provisions of Resolution 2231 – inducing sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2; while precluding International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of this – how that whole bit of presumed bankable business plan is going to successfully cut off all Iran's pathways to the bomb?"

It's disappointing that it never occurs to the people who matter to inquire, to pose the obvious query when there is the public opportunity to do so.

The silence coming out the Republican camp on the issue does give rise to the very reasonable suspicion that among the Republicans as well, there is no desire to openly discuss with the public any potential profits to be gained by speculation on the soon to be open Iranian conventional weapons market; which domestic arms profiteering interests would most likely be overjoyed to gain access to were Trump's sanctions on Iranian weapons procurement and development to be lifted by a succeeding President in 2020.

* * * * *

What would be in it for Iran and the other Resolution 2231 partners, Russia and China; were a Democratic Party candidate to be elected in 2020 – and were that new President Elect to approach, hat in hand, requesting that the U.S. Government be allowed to rejoin, as a direct voting participant; the current Parties to the deal who themselves have all the while the United States was absent, maintained direct involvement in the Security Council Resolution 2231 decision making process?

2020 Democratic Party candidates for the presidency have declared that they will renegotiate the deal with Iran. Candidates do say a lot of things that they imagine might further the advancement of their campaigns; regardless of whether Iran cares to renegotiate with the U.S. or not...

For its part, Iran has stated repeatedly that it will not renegotiate the terms of the deal. As well, the other Parties participating in the Resolution 2231 project, especially Russia and China, seem quite happy with the way things are going without United States Government added opinion to the decision making give and take. There already seems to be among the other original Parties directly participating; a great deal of satisfaction with the organization and the procedural process established through Obama's and the Ministers' lasting handiwork.

The Iranians aren't themselves complaining that the U.S. is not in the deal. If the Iranians couldn't care less, or actually prefer the U.S. not be directly involved in proceedings – if there isn't much desire to have the U.S. Government return to the deal; then holding out, playing at hard-to-get-the-Americans-back is one piece of leverage a pro-weapons project, pro-reentry presidential candidate won't have in any imagined future discussions with the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

On the other hand; the Iranians are bitterly concerned about the sanctions President Trump has imposed on that nation's economy.

After U.S. withdrawal from the deal, and after a few months grace period, Trump began leveling new, or re-imposing previous sanctions on various targeted individuals or entities doing business in Iran.

On May 3rd, 2019, the State Department announced this following, in its Fact Sheet titled _Advancing the Maximum Pressure Campaign by Restricting Iran's Nuclear Activities_ :

Advancing the Maximum Pressure Campaign by Restricting Iran's Nuclear Activities

FACT SHEET

Maximum Pressure Campaign

– The Administration has imposed the toughest sanctions ever on the Iranian regime. We will continue to apply maximum pressure until Iran's leaders change their destructive behavior, respect the rights of their people, and return to the negotiating table.

– The United States is committed to denying Iran any pathway to nuclear weapons. Today, Secretary Pompeo further increased U.S. pressure on Iran's nuclear program, following earlier steps taken in November 2018 and March 2019...

Increasing Nuclear Pressure

– Secretary Pompeo continues to believe that Iran must declare to the IAEA a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program, and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity. Additionally, he reiterates his call that Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing.

ACTUALLY, the business of Iran undertaking the "reprocessing" of plutonium is a very real concern. Trump, or the State Department, might not have the terminology down exactly correctly – but specifically; Iran is permitted by the Security Council resolution to engage very liberally and without International Atomic Energy Agency supervision; in work which could involve casting weapons grade uranium or plutonium into shapes suitable for initiating a fissile chain reaction.

It's an aspect in the fine print of Resolution 2231 which hasn't been much on the top of anyone in government's list to talk about; so I'm glad the President, or the Secretary of State, finally got around to mentioning it after some two years in Office.

Proceeding to an examination of this noteworthy feature found in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; _Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action_ :

* * * * *

Beginning review of the question by identifying when Iran is allowed, under the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, to commence work with weapons grade uranium or plutonium:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex – Annex V

E. UNSCR Termination Day

23. UNSCR (UN Security Council resolution) Termination Day will occur in accordance with the terms of the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA, which is 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated.

24. On UNSCR Termination Day, the provisions and measures imposed in that resolution would terminate and the UN Security Council would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue.

F. Other

26. The terminations described in this Annex V are without prejudice to other JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates.

"Without prejudice to other JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates" certainly refers to, among other things, the allowance that Iran may begin to produce or trade in weapons grade plutonium, and weapons grade uranium, in 2030, as in declared in the provisions below ( _E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES_ ; paragraphs 24 and 25).

Iran is allowed to fashion this material into any form it wants; with the IAEA naturally kept out of reviewing the end product of any forming, casting or machining of plutonium or uranium. This is how and where this is announced in resolution 2201:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.

25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years...

The above restraint continues for fifteen years only; after that, anything is acceptable. There is no provision that, once Iran is allowed to produce or acquire, and work with the special fissional materials required to produce fissile nuclear weapons; there is no provision stipulating that Iran is restricted from forming or casting these materials into configurations favorable to creating a high yield fissile chain reaction explosion.

There is no provision at all restraining Iran's working in this area.

The special fissional materials under discussion here; highly enriched, weapons grade uranium, or plutonium (isotope forms of plutonium are not clarified in Resolution 2231; therefore there is nothing in Resolution 2231 prohibiting use of weapons grade plutonium); these materials do fall in the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 category of inventories (as opposed to the Rev. 9 & 10.Part 2 category of weapons associated inventories). Recalling that INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 inventories are designated for use the production of nuclear energy, one may assume that the IAEA – which is allowed knowledge of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear assets destined for use in nuclear power plants) does have reasonable knowledge of end-use, location and quantities of these materials allowed to float around Iran under the above provisions of:

Article 57 of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and Iran ( _Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards In Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ) places safeguards on nationwide quantities of plutonium over a total of 1kgm. Aside from that, there is this:

Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards In Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Article 13

Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used in non-nuclear activities

Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the Government of Iran shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such material may be terminated.

And then there is this:

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES

Article 14

If the Government of Iran intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) The Government of Iran shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:

(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the Government of Iran may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and

(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded material in Iran and of any export of such material; and

(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as, inter alia, temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval [of] or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.

[The text of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and Iran is identified as IAEA Information Circular document number listing: INFCIRC/214. It is dated 13 December 1974 and its status of accessibility is listed as GENERAL Distr. – which means: for general distribution. Its original language is English. Web address access is: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1974/infcirc214.pdf [Last accessed June 24, 2016].]

UNDER ARTICLE 13 (above), we see that when safeguarded material is used in the production of [metallurgical] alloys, safeguards are terminated. Article 13 does not indicate any prejudice or controls concerning the precise composition of the alloys to be formed or cast; nor does it make any distinction as to the configuration in which these alloys are to be formed – once radioactive metals are cast or formed, they are hardly, any longer, subject to outside scrutiny.

Furthermore, under Article 14(c), International Atomic Energy Agency approval of the activity regarding whatever it is that the alloys are to be used for is not required; and the IAEA is not allowed any classified knowledge of nuclear related military activity that the alloys may be applied to.

However, as a concession from Iran, under 14(a)(ii), Iran concedes that "... _That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices_..."

Iran promises not to weaponize its uranium or plutonium metallurgical alloys while these are in the discrete and watchful custody of the Iranian military – _that_ is the reassurance which the Government of Iran offers the world;

And that is what the pro-proliferation movement partisans, most notably the cabal of pro-proliferation politicians which currently have gained control of the national level Democratic Party; those cited above provisions concerning Iranian handling of weapons grade plutonium or uranium, are part of the agreement which the Democratic Party with its candidates for the 2020 presidency argue in their 2020 election campaign platform: "... _verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb_...".

* * * * *

President Trump insisted in his State Department's May 3, 2019 Fact Sheet that Iran should not be allowed any handling of weapons grade fissile materials.

Trump also demanded that Iran must stop domestic uranium enrichment entirely.

THE PROVISIONS of Security Council Resolution 2231 covering Iranian domestic enrichment activities are exactly what proponents of the project pretend gives the Security Council resolution its thin veneer of phony respectability.

These collective provisions, which allow the International Atomic Energy Agency unfettered inspection of aspects of the fuel enrichment process, are the window dressing showpiece which proponents of the international weapons development scheme point to when promoting the project as one which develops peaceful deployment of atomic energy in Iran.

The publicity hungry leaderships of France, Germany, the U.K. and I daresay; publicity hungry politicians in the United States have been using legitimate IAEA activity in one area as justification for the whole project. Legitimate activity is the foil used to direct attention away from international nuclear weapons associated exchanges which by far erase any effort to deter or prevent Iran's progress towards nuclear weapons manufacture.

The misdirection ploy is infantile; but so far it has worked in that politicians in favor of the weapons profiteering scheme have avoided having to contend publicly with this simple observation:

"It doesn't matter that Iran is only enriching uranium up to 3.67 percent for the time being; because the provisions of Security Council Resolution 2231 furnish the inducement that Iran will be assisted in acquiring all the best, most expert international weapons development support on goods, technology and services which it is willing to pay for in the here and now."

Trump's demand that Iran's domestic enrichment program be halted is characterized by those factions in support Resolution 2231 as being a sign of the President's inflexibility.

Trump is vilified as being intractable, wholly unreasonable and unsound – perhaps unhinged, but impossible to negotiate with anyway. The very idea that Trump refuses to trust the Iranian Government to enrich its own uranium without cheating is proof of Trump's belligerent intransigence.

Those who oppose Trump on the issue; the proponents of Obama's Iran nuclear deal; make President Trump's attitude seem like that's a bad thing.

Actually, the two positions really are mutually exclusive and therefore non-negotiable. Trump, as of yet insufficiently jaded by Washington lobbying efforts, insists Iran should not achieve nuclear weapons capacity;

Trump's position on the international transfer of nuclear weapons associated goods, technology and services to Iran coincides with the position of most United States Citizens – especially those not on the recipients' list of perks expected and garnered by those in public office.

The politicians supporting Obama's nuclear deal know that the electorate is vastly opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in regards to Iran;

And so, the pro-Obama Congressperson obviously must ignore, refuse to acknowledge the existence of the facts of the matter.

Trump for his part – wants as President to prevent Iranian development of nuclear weapons capabilities;

Others want to profit in piecemeal sales of this capacity to Iran.

The devices provided for in the Obama Iran nuclear deal pretend to justify the latter position; while imposing upon the rights of innocent Parties to the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , which are infringed upon by the violations implemented under the Obama deal.

Adherence to the NPT; or defiant noncompliance – the two positions cannot be reconciled through negotiation. A petition before the International Court of Justice for remedy and redress is the proper solution at this point.

The only way to legally bring international participation in the whole debacle to a grinding halt is to bring the affair, with all evidence, before the International Court of Justice;

And it would not take years in Court to seriously impede or entirely deter as too risky any lawful entity's projected near-future involvement in the travesty.

WERE THE United States Government to bring various other nations on board, all Party to the NPT in an alliance submitting petition to the Court that the various egregious infringements and violation of treaty and international law – repugnant to international law and to the Charter of the United Nations – these which are provided for and are actively carried out under the provisions of Resolution 2231 and the auspices of the Security Council;

Were the Trump administration, in alliance with other nations Party to the NPT to successfully petition the Court that Resolution 2231 be found by the Court to be repugnant to the Constituent Treaty of the _Charter of the United Nations_ , the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , and to peremptory norm of general international law; and to constitute an intolerable menace to world peace;

Then the Court might agree with that view and confirm the invalidity of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015); a determination from which follows:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 2. INVALIDITY OF TREATIES

Article 53. Treaties Conflicting With a Peremptory Norm of General International Law ("Jus Cogens")

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

Such ruling would confirm the Security Council resolution as void from conclusion at which point this next would follow:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVALIDITY, TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF A TREATY

Article 71. Consequences of the Invalidity of a Treaty which Conflicts with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law

1. In the case of a treaty which is void under article 53 [above] the parties shall:

(a) Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law; and.

(b) Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

The Court could then proceed to define and Order how the infringing Parties are to _bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law_.

It is not best practice to assume to know what approach a Court would take in stipulating how the errant parties were to bring relations into conformity with peremptory norm. There are many things a panel of nine to fifteen Judges on the bench could take into consideration in an attempt to remedy.

However, it's probably fair to surmise that having sent Resolution 2231 into the oblivion of an instrument which is recognized as never having existed; then it's fair to guess that at least previous United Nations Security Council Resolutions which had been put aside by Resolution 2231 would be immediately back in play and could be treated by the Court as never having been out of play – as Resolution 22331 would never have been there to take them out of action. Which could mean that any Contract under Resolution 2231 made before the ruling would have to be reversed or canceled probably without compensation regardless of any guarantees of protection made in the JCPOA section of the resolution.

Simply bringing Resolution 2231 before would radically change the Risk Analysis profile of conducting any business with Iran which might even be inferred to have the slightest connection with Procurement Working Group activity.

It might be found necessary, for example; that Procurement Working Group books would need be opened for inspection – and this might prove very embarrassing for vendors, at least in the west, who had previously sought to profit from the new weapons associated business opportunity;

And no secrecy agreement in regards to this or any other aspect of the Security Council resolution could be honored; as it would be as if Resolution 2231 never had existed and this whole activity would be considered a rogue operation put into effect without any Authorization from the Charter of the United Nations. The Court could order the books on Procurement Working Group sales to Iran be opened.

In any event, whatever the Court were to come up with – noting again, just the fact Resolution 2231 having been brought to Court would cast the future of doing business with Iran in such a light of uncertainty that progress of Procurement Working Group expedited sales to Iran would be somewhat or greatly impacted, even if it were allowed to continue while a trail was in motion.

In this case, with a petition bringing the Security Council resolution before the Court, United States unilateral sanctions could suddenly become much more seriously effective.

Why would any business person choose to risk losing access to huge and secure markets in the United States just to take a big risk in making a sale, or doing piecemeal business with Iran? – And what happens to insurance if the issue brought to Court?

ANOTHER aspect of a court proceeding being brought against the Security Council resolution is that the NATO allies France, Germany and the U.K., working against the self-interests of their own nations and the interests of the NATO alliance in assisting Iran in develop its weapons capacities so that potentially Iran could one day, for whatever reason, point its missiles at Berlin, Paris and London – these NATO allies could find themselves more convincingly called on the carpet by the other members of the NATO alliance.

A petition before the Court in play, the United States President could more effectively present the NATO alliance with a clearer perspective in bringing up serious questions as to the conduct of the three rogue NATO allies; begging the question of future NATO policies if or when such issues should again arise.

Such open discussion before all of the NATO allies could have domestic repercussions in France, Germany and the U.K. putting serious domestic political pressure on the Party Leaderships of those nations who have elected to assist in the pointing missiles at Berlin, Paris and London; Party Leaderships who no more want to be exposed for who they really are and what they are doing than does any pro-Obama weapons proliferation policy proponent hawk in the U.S. Congress.

AS TO THE Congress of the United States, along with that political regressive hawk faction which has taken control of the national level Democratic Party in recent years; there may be some hollering in protest; but what can anyone in the Congress really say about it?

Resolution 2231 isn't any kind of United States law that Trump might be thought of as going against – the Congress never acknowledged ever bothering to look at the resolution, not to mention vote on it. And United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 was always up there on the Security Council website free to download. So any Congressperson might read it for themselves – Obama having failed to transmit it to Congress regardless.

Nobody in the cavalier 114th or 115th National Assemblies took enough of an interest to make a public point of doing so, or even suggest on the Congressional Record that such a thing existed and that being the case, perhaps the Congress should read, publicly review, and discuss specific provisions of concern within the Security Council resolution.

And how about that 26 October 2017 House of Representatives vote overwhelmingly in favor of pushing for a law endorsing the Procurement Working Group mandate which could be most readily construed as seriously violating the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_?!

What a sorry saga – kind of like a real true-to-life modern-day Sodom and Gomorrah story – where not one in the entire 115th House of Representatives, none of the requisite ten people of virtue were to be found to save the world from death by nuclear conflagration. Only nine would not vote in support of an attempt to elect into law a policy promoting violation of international treaty made under the Authority of the United States Constitution; and thereby electing to vote into statutory law a policy repugnant to the United States Constitution.

The pro-Obama partisans defending the policy of nuclear weapons proliferation haven't got a domestic law to support any notion that President Trump's must challenge Resolution 2231 in Court in defense of this most important foundational treaty,; the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , made under the Authority of the United States Constitution; and therefore in defense of the United States Constitution; and in defense of essential national security interests;

There is no domestic statute that could compel any notion of any conflict were the President to instigate or join in alliance with other Nations in a petition to the International Court of Justice concerning the voiding of Resolution 2231.

On the other hand, there is the United States Constitution which upholds such action taken in defense of the Constitution:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article II - The Executive Branch

*Section 1 - The President

[Oath of Office clause] Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Indeed, this President Trump might be construed to be remiss in not bringing the issue to Court. The United States Constitution is suffering international assault. The leaderships of the Republic of France, Germany, the U.K., Russia and China are all currently working to effectively dismantle the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; which is understood in the United States as an essential Law of the Land:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article VI - Debts, Supremacy, Oaths

[Clause 2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; **and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land** ; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

"... _and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof_..." is generally taken to mean the laws issuing directly from the Constitution; the various amendments to the Constitution as opposed to transitory statutes made which can be easily overturned by either the Supreme Court, or votes in Congress.

Amendments and Treaties made under the Authority of the United States are not easily backed away from; these are denoted as parts of the " _supreme Law of the Land_."

The 115th House of Representatives' desperate bi-partisan assault on a supreme Law of the Land – attempted in its _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698_ , which sputtered and failed once outside the comforting climate controlled environment of the House of Representatives; is an example of an internal official mutiny presuming to challenge the Authority of the United States Constitution and a recognized supreme Law of the Land protected by the Constitution.

As we observe from the Oath of Office President Trump took before entering into the execution of his duties; Trump is required to "preserve" the Constitution – or more fully, to "... _preserve, protect and defend_..." the Constitution.

Trump could never have signed into law the contemplated mutiny against the Constitution developed in the 115th House of Representatives – the President would have been violating his Oath of Office to "preserve" the Constitution.

The international assault, currently working to effectively denigrate into insignificance the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , this assault being actively conducted directly by the leaderships of the Republic of France, Germany, the U.K., Russia, China and Iran working together under the auspices of the United Nations sponsored Resolution 2231; may be considered a clear menace to world peace; and, of course, a menace repugnant to international treaty and peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted. The defined War Crime; _Crimes against Peace_ is an example of a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted.

A President is under his Oath to the Constitution, and therefore must determine an effective and appropriate response to domestic and foreign contraband weapons dealing interests which are simultaneously threatening to both the preservation of the Constitution and to the security of the United States – and also, in this case, to humanity world-wide.

The President's Constitutional duties demand he respond to the assault – and I myself can think of no more moral, effective and legitimate response than to side with the weaker, intimidated nations of the world in lawful alliance to petition the Court for redress, and for relief from this Security Council resolution's egregious assault on the _Charter of the United Nations_ (which is itself another international constituent treaty); for the grievous menacing assault on peremptory norm of general international law, and world peace; this assault which surely must be found as repugnant to the International Court of Justice.

The hawk politician pro-Obama mutineers of the 115th Congress might loudly campaign against a commendable action finally taken by the President;

But as observed previously, nothing in the Constitution says he can't bring this affair before the Court; and as he is authorized by the Constitution to do so – he should; in defense of treaty and for the benefit of the country, and on behalf of world peace.

Adherence to treaty is one of the strongest weapons in the nation's self defense toolbox. The Parties participating in and profiting from Obama's Iran nuclear deal have disassociated themselves from it.

However much I've look for it, I haven't found any reference in the Congressional Record of any Congress person ever suggesting rule of law as the obvious recourse to discovering a constructive resolution to this unhappy circumstance brought about by the Security Council resolution.

With those populating the Congress; a solution resides in either the generally currently fashionable myopic view of "diplomacy" with Iran (this amounts to appeasement by siding with Iran and the mighty, the other States which are direct Parties to the Iran nuclear agreement; siding with them against treaty and the relatively defenseless weaker nations – or the other solution is to go to War with Iran.

What a shame it seems, that our very own lawmaking branch in Washington – making laws to rule over us with – can only conceive of those two solutions offered in their paradigm construct.

Not one Congressperson of our national assembly has ever suggested on record petitioning for recourse to the rule of law as remedy to the situation instigated by the Obama administration.

The extremist pro-deal membership of the 115th House of Representatives, in their October 2017 vote favoring the _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698_ ; made a quite a spectacle of themselves exposing the true bi-partisan sympathies of both Republicans and Democrats.

The studied mendacity surrounding the contraband arms profiteering deal is carried on with through 2018, through 2019, and even to the extent that the Democratic candidates for the 2020 presidency seek election at least in part on the basis of their ongoing egregious misrepresentation of the nature of the Resolution 2231 Iran nuclear weapons development project.

* * * * *

It is worth remembering and noting some words of the earlier President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which he shared with us in his January 1960 farewell as President; to the people of the United States. The following is an excerpt:

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, and even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, and every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded...

...It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system -- ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

WE ARE THERE NOW. We are now in this present period forced to experience manifestation of the predicable. Our weapons makers must be kept busily funded; as do those who speculate in favor of that need.

Decision-making by those in power, or seeking power; or seeking to remain in power must give credence and way to that tension in our society. Sales opportunities in foreign lands are to be taken into priority account.

The Democratic Party Machine candidates pursuing election to the 2020 presidency – each of these presidential hopefuls behave with the confidence of one who is sure that they act with almost certain impunity.

The candidates must bet that enough of the U.S. voting population still doesn't know that the text of Obama's Iran deal, is actually United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 and not simply _Annex A: JCPOA_ of the Security Council resolution; and it is tailored to appease certain interests by providing the method and approach to be undertaken in expediting Iranian paid for acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets.

For any of the Democratic Party candidates to eke out a victory in 2020; just enough of the voting population must remain unaware of the malevolent nature of the plan worked out between Obama and the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

Each one in the bunch pledges as president to unabashedly to drag us back into another four years of a government administration whose domestic foundation of political power is based at least in large part, on appeasing interests speculating on profiting from a restoration of the contraband weapons racketeering opportunity originally contrived, organized and implemented by President Barack Obama and team.

FOR THE U.S. Government to rejoin the syndicate (direct Parties to the deal) on some level, it would have to drop sanctions on Iran imposed by a former President, Trump.

Iran's position has been that those sanctions have to go; and those in control of a theoretical 2020 Democratic Party Government would necessarily drop the sanctions. Otherwise; as is obvious, U.S. arms dealing interests couldn't at least earn a profit from selling on the Iranian conventional weapons market.

Lifting Trump's sanctions clearly is prerequisite for any kind of U.S. association with the arms dealing Parties still directly involved in the Iran nuclear deal (France, the U.K., Russia, Germany and China).

Iran has an incentive to buy goods, technologies and support services from U.S. companies as doing so gives the Iranians insight into what the Americans have produced; and it provides further opportunities for Iranian specialists to get their hands on and backwards engineer U.S. products.

The Iran nuclear deal places no limit on which nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 may be bought. So as has been observed, Iran would have the opportunity to acquire from U.S. whatever _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices_ might be made available – this provided that Trump administration sanctions were dropped by a succeeding administration favoring return to participation in Resolution 2231 activities.

Procurement Working Group membership most likely would not be allowed the Americans by the other Procurement Working Group participants. U.S. presence in the Procurement Working Group decision making process would, aside from day to day mucking things up for those already involved; give the Americans added insight into the capabilities and possible future deployment of Iranian arsenals. It might clue the U.S. Military in as to what might have to be contended with in a future conflict scenario. This is something which obviously Iran wouldn't want to concede to any U.S. Government come begging.

So rejoining the deal would probably mean the possibility of U.S. arms dealing interests making a profit while having their stuff backwards engineered in the backroom – and that would be as far as it would go. As for the U.S. gaining any military or strategic intelligence to advantage, that seems not likely feasible.

In terms of domestic political advantage: returning to the deal might impress some voters provided that the pro-weapons proliferation Party in charge at the White House (in this scenario) could maintain the charade that Resolution 2231 _cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb_.

* * * * *

Trump has managed to impose sanctions on Iran which evidently have had some effect slowing down progress.

However effective sanctions could be – time is nevertheless moving relentlessly forward towards the scheduled date, fifteen years after JCPOA Adoption Day – 18 October 2030. That's the day Iran is permitted to begin to work with weapons grade Uranium or Plutonium with the approval of Russia, China, France, the U.K., and Germany, and without IAEA supervision.

Interested Parties remain interested, sustaining the momentum of the project – and if weapons sales have occasionally wavered for a few months at a time in the course of the affair, each milestone reached ups the ante and adds further motivation for some to remain in support of the deal.

The opening of the Iranian conventional weapons market on 18 October 2020, just a few months before the U.S. national election, is the first, and currently most notable of the upcoming weapons proliferation milestones.

That impending marker may serve to invigorate the inspired political faction vying for election to the 2020 White House on a platform preoccupied with the prospect that some should profit by swift and timely U.S. return to the deal.

Leaderships of State Parties directly involved in the deal; and the domestic political movement which evades acknowledging publicly the weapons transfers provided for and advanced under Procurement Working Group auspices – these factions can't be counted on to care to reconsider that this fiasco which has gathered and absorbed their attentions, ultimately works against the joint and individual self-interest of all.

THOSE PARTIES which originally formulated and advanced the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had a far better understanding of what disaster would eventually befall should the proliferation of nuclear weapons continue unrestrained.

These latest generations of myopic buffoons leading the way in dismissing the treaty show they still don't get it; even though many of them, like me, were alive and should remember what the height of nuclear tensions between the Soviets and the Americans was like.

The only way to put a halt to the whole Iran nuclear deal contraband weapons profiteering business is by petition to the International Court of Justice.

Approaching the Bench with petition from an alliance of States opposed to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 would make the case establishing once again that rule of law and adherence to treaty are to be taken seriously;

And reasserting the case that the fate of humanity should not rest on the arbitrary impositions of absolutist princes, potentates and politicians pressuring their arguments and conditions upon the peoples of the earth.

This Country; the international community targeted by Iran or North Korea; the legacy of world peace and the protections enjoyed by peoples world over through collective adherence to treaty; all these have everything to gain by taking Security Council Resolution 2231 to Court;

* * * * *

This ends the narrative of the writing. Appendices follow this brief advertisement:

* * * * *

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Part II – Appendices  
Chapter 10: Appendix 1 – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

[]

Following is an excerpt of the inventories listed on the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ :

Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex

CATEGORY I -ITEM 1

COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

1.A.1. Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.A.2. Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.B.1. "Production facilities"

1.D.1. "Software"

1.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY I -ITEM 2

COMPLETE SUBSYSTEMS USABLE FOR COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

2.A.1. "Complete subsystems"

2.B.1. "Production facilities"

2.B.2. "Production equipment"

2.D.1. "Software"

2.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 3

PROPULSION COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT

3.A.1. Turbojet and turbofan engines

3.A.2. Ramjet/scramjet/pulse jet/combined cycle engines

3.A.3. Rocket motor cases, 'insulation' components and nozzles

3.A.4. Staging mechanisms, separation mechanisms and interstages

3.A.5. Liquid and slurry propellant (including oxidisers) control systems

3.A.6. Hybrid rocket motors

3.A.7. Radial ball bearings

3.A.8. Liquid propellant tanks

3.A.9. Turboprop engine systems

3.A.10. Combustion chambers

3.B.1. "Production facilities"

3.B.2. "Production equipment"

3.B.3. Flow-forming machines

3.C.1. 'Interior lining' usable for rocket motor cases

3.C.2. 'Insulation' material in bulk form usable for rocket motor cases

3.D.1. "Software"

3.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 4

PROPELLANTS, CHEMICALS AND PROPELLANT PRODUCTION

4.A. None

4.B.1. "Production equipment"

4.B.2. "Production equipment"

4.B.3. a. Batch mixers

4.B.3. b. Continuous mixers

4.B.3. c. Fluid energy mills

4.B.3. d. Metal powder "production equipment"

4.C.1. Composite and composite modified double base propellants

4.C.2. Fuel substances

4.C.2. a. Hydrazine

4.C.2. b. Hydrazine derivatives

4.C.2. c. Spherical aluminium powder

4.C.2. d. Zirconium, beryllium, magnesium and alloys

4.C.2. e. Boron and boron alloys

4.C.2. f. High energy density materials

4.C.3. Perchlorates, chlorates or chromates

4.C.4. a. Oxidiser substances –liquid propellant rocket engines

4.C.4. b. Oxidiser substances –solid propellant rocket motors

4.C.5. Polymeric substances

4.C.6. Other propellant additives and agents

4.C.6. a. Bonding agents

4.C.6. b. Curing reaction catalysts

4.C.6. c. Burning rate modifiers

4.C.6. d. Esters and plasticisers

4.C.6. e. Stabilisers

4.D.1. "Software"

4.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 6

PRODUCTION OF STRUCTURAL COMPOSITES, PYROLYTIC DEPOSITION AND DENSIFICATION, AND STRUCTURAL MATERIALS

6.A.1. Composite structures, laminates and manufactures thereof

6.A.2. Resaturated pyrolised materials

6.B.1. a. Filament winding machines or fibre placement machines

6.B.1. b. Tape-laying machines

6.B.1. c. Multi-directional, multi-dimensional weaving machines or interlacing machines

6.B.1. d. Equipment designed or modified for the production of fibrous or filamentary materials

6.B.1. e. Equipment designed or modified for special fibre surface treatment

6.B.2. Nozzles

6.B.3. Isostatic presses

6.B.4. Chemical vapour deposition furnaces

6.B.5. Equipment and controls for the densification and pyrolysis process

6.C.1. Resin impregnated fibre prepregs and metal coated fibre preforms

6.C.2. Resaturated pyrolised materials

6.C.3. Fine grain graphites

6.C.4. Pyrolytic or fibrous reinforced graphites

6.C.5. Ceramic composite materials for missile radomes

6.C.6. Silicon-carbide materials

6.C.7. Tungsten molybdenum and alloys

6.C.8. Maraging steel

6.C.9. Titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel

6.D.1. "Software"

6.E.1. "Technology"

6.E.2. "Technical data"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 9

INSTRUMENTATION, NAVIGATION AND DIRECTION FINDING

9.A.1. Integrated flight instrument systems

9.A.2. Gyro-astro compasses

9.A.3. Linear accelerometers

9.A.4. All types of gyros

9.A.5. Accelerometers or gyros

9.A.6. Inertial or other equipment

9.A.7. 'Integrated navigation systems'

9.A.8. Three axis magnetic heading sensors

9.B.1. "Production equipment", and other test, calibration and alignment equipment

9.B.2. a. Balancing machines

9.B.2. b. Indicator heads

9.B.2. c. Motion simulators/rate tables

9.B.2. d. Positioning tables

9.B.2. e. Centrifuges

9.D.1. "Software"

9.D.2. Integration "Software"

9.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 10

FLIGHT CONTROL

10.A.1. Hydraulic, mechanical, electro-optical or electromechanical flight control systems

10.A.2. Attitude control equipment

10.A.3. Flight control servo-valves

10.B.1. Test calibration and alignment equipment

10.C. None

10.D.1. "Software"

10.E.1. Design "technology" for integration of air vehicle fuselage, propulsion system and lifting control surfaces

10.E.2. Design "technology" for integration of the flight control, guidance, and propulsion data into a flight management system

10.E.3. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 11

AVIONICS

11.A.1. Radar and laser radar systems including altimeters

11.A.2. Passive sensors

11.A.3. Receiving equipment GNSS e.g. GPS,

GLONASS or Galileo

11.A.4. Electronic assemblies and components

11.A.5. Umbilical and interstage electrical connectors

11.D.1. "Software"

11.E.1. Design "technology"

11.E.2. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 12

LAUNCH SUPPORT

12.A.1. Apparatus and devices

12.A.2. Vehicles

12.A.3. Gravity meters (gravimeters), gravity gradiometers

12.A.4. Telemetry and telecontrol equipment, including ground equipment

12.A.5. Precision tracking systems

12.A.5. a. Tracking Systems

12.A.5. b. Range instrumentation radars

12.A.6. Thermal Batteries

12.D.1. "Software"

12.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 15

TEST FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

15.B.1. Vibration test equipment

15.B.1. a. Vibration test systems

15.B.1. b. Digital controllers [continued]

15.B.1. c. Vibration thrusters (shaker units)

15.B.1. d. Test piece support structures and electronic units

15.B.2. Wind-tunnels

15.B.3. Test benches/stands

15.B.4. Environmental chambers

15.B.5. Accelerators

15.D.1. "Software"

15.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 16

MODELLING-SIMULATION AND DESIGN INTEGRATION

16.A.1. Hybrid (combined analogue/digital) computers

16.D.1. "Software"

16.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 17

STEALTH

17.A.1. Devices for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A. or 20.A.

17.B.1. Systems specially designed for radar cross section measurement

17.C.1. Materials for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A.

CATEGORY II -ITEM 18

NUCLEAR EFFECTS PROTECTION

18.A.1. "Radiation Hardened" "microcircuits"

18.A.2. 'Detectors'

18.A.3. Radomes

18.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 19

OTHER COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

19.A.1. Complete rocket systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.2. Complete UAV systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.3. Complete UAV systems

19.B.1. "Production facilities"

19.D.1. "Software"

19.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 20

OTHER COMPLETE SUBSYSTEMS

20.A.1. a. Individual rocket stages

20.A.1. b. Solid propellant rocket motors, hybrid rocket motors or liquid propellant rocket engines

20.B.1. "Production facilities"

20.B.2. "Production equipment"

There's more to that list – but that should give the reader a pretty good idea that a substantial part of the E3/EU+3 Iran, Resolution 2231 is about promising technological support to a weapons development program; all the while claiming that this whole arrangement is deeply concerned only with promoting the "exclusively" peaceful development of nuclear energy – and could never possibly have anything to do with any impure motives like arms trade profiteering.

THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME – Equipment, Software and Technology Annex is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry, primarily dealing with ballistic missiles and delivery systems; and with other weapons technologies associated with ballistic missiles. This list was developed by the international Missile Technology Control Regime association. The Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was assembled as a list of weapons inventory the M.T.C.R. association considers should be controlled.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (M.T.C.R.) itself is a voluntary association of (currently) 34 member States joining together to establish and promote guidelines coordinating national export licensing efforts aimed at containing and restraining the proliferation of specific weapons war. The M.T.C.R. is not affiliated with the United Nations, but its members may also be United Nations members. All five of the Nuclear Weapons Nations (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China) as well as Germany are all members of this association; the Islamic Republic of Iran is not.

For a more detailed description of the association's purpose and activities the interested reader may refer to the Missile Technology Control Regime website: http://www.mtcr.info/english/The Missile Technology Control Regime; or, possibly better, http://www.mtcr.info/.

The _Missile Technology Control Regime – Equipment, Software And Technology Annex_ does not correspond to the weapons inventory of any particular nation – rather, as mentioned, is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry that the M.T.C.R. association considers should be controlled; and that great care and restraint should be exhibited when considering the import, export, sale or transfer of the listed inventory. The M.T.C.R. has established suggested common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines). These are non-binding legally, but may serve to be taken into account when developing export / import regulations regarding the list of voluntarily controlled items presented in the M.T.C.R. Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

The E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel agreement, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, utilizes the M.T.C.R. Equipment, Software and Technology Annex for a use other than for which it was initially intended. It is used in the arrangement between Iran and the E3/EU+3 as a convenient shopping list which the Islamic Republic of Iran is to be given access to, on a case-by-case, basis as of 16 January 2016, and full access to some eight years after. The use of the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex by the E3/EU+3 Iran Project resembles the Cartel's employment of the International Atomic Energy Agency INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list.

* * * * *
Chapter 11: Appendix 2 – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

[]

This following is an excerpt – the complete list is found at: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents

Or as an alternate source: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

ANNEX CONTENTS

5. Test and Measurement Equipment for the Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices

5.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

5.B.1. Flash X-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators 5 – 1

5.B.2. High-velocity gun systems

5.B.3. High speed cameras and imaging devices

5.B.5. Specialized instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments

5.B.6. High-speed pulse generators

5.B.7. High explosive containment vessels

5.D. SOFTWARE

5.D.1. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment not controlled in Item 5.B.3. so that it meets or exceeds the characteristics specified in Item 5.B.3.

5.D.2. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment controlled in Item 5.B.3.

5.E. TECHNOLOGY

5.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 5.A. through 5.D.

6. Components for Nuclear Explosive Devices

6.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

6.A.1. Detonators and multipoint initiation systems

6.A.2. Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulse generators

6.A.3. Switching devices

6.A.4. Pulse discharge capacitors

6.A.5. Neutron generator systems

6.A.6. Striplines

6.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

6.C. MATERIALS

6.C.1. High explosive substances or mixtures,

6.E. TECHNOLOGY 6 – 4

6.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development","production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software"

These are examples of some of the inventory found in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; but to understand a little of what is meant by the above we must look at some definitions:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013) ;

DEFINITIONS

"Development" --

is related to all phases before "production" such as:

• design

• design research

• design analysis

• design concepts

• assembly and testing of prototypes

• pilot production schemes

• design data

• process of transforming design data into a product

• configuration design

• integration design

• layouts

"Production" --

means all production phases such as:

• construction

• production engineering

• manufacture

• integration

• assembly (mounting)

• inspection

• testing

• quality assurance

"Technical assistance" --

"Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

"Technical data" --

"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

"Technology" --

means specific information required for the "development", "production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance".

*[ INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents \- or as an alternate https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]]

The above is a partial list, giving a sense of the kinds of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies, training and support services the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel.

The list of nuclear weapons associated inventories from which the United Nations pledges to expedite procurement of to the benefit of the discretion of use ultimately to be decided upon by the Sovereign Government of Iran – has been identified; and a sense of some of the classes of inventories has been presented.

* * * * *
Chapter 12: Appendix 3 – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council Resolution's Annex A: JCPOA – from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"

[2E]; []

AS HAS BEEN presented in the various appendices, the International Atomic Energy Agency is to be kept from the knowledge of any contents of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies, or support services – and subsequently, any knowledge of end-use location, whereabouts, or end-use of such acquisitions.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 also asserts this in its _JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures_ :

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

A. General

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.

Nothing in Annex V mentioned in the paragraph _A – General; 1_ , mentioned above; indicates that the timeline for putting in to effect the very important Section T following below "... _has otherwise been specified_...;" therefore the following activities described under JCPOA Annex I; Section T have been permitted since JCPOA Implementation Day; 16 January 2016.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

The JCPOA has already indicated, in _JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission_ ; paragraph _6. Procurement Working Group_ ; sub-paragraph _6.8_ , that Iran has not given the IAEA permission to:... _verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2_...;"

The materials referred to above, in 825.2 through 82.4 e.g.: "...multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device...explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras)...;" neutron generating systems in application as: "... explosively driven neutron sources..." etc.; these are all INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories (see Appendix II [footnote]).

Again – the IAEA is not entitled to look into these per the JCPOA. The above paragraph 8, with subparagraphs, stipulates that these things will be monitored. The answer to the question of "by whom" is not within the scope of that paragraph. Paragraph 6.7 of Resolution 2231; Annex A: JCPOA; (sub-Annex of JCPOA) JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission; paragraph 6.8 gives us an idea:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6. Procurement Working Group

6.8 **Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2** (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, **the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification**.

The Security Council JCPOA Joint Commission asserts that it will provide expertise required for end-use verification. That's open ended it would seem. End-use verification can suggest that the monitoring and verification of the end-use of any Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories in the capacity detailed in paragraphs 82.2 through 82.4 listed above is to be conducted by the ad hoc committee set up by the Joint Commission – as much as the ad hoc committee set up by the Joint Commission feel like doing. It's pretty vague. Nevertheless:

This set-up bears witness of the intent by the Security Council to supersede treaty with vague promises. The Security Council asserts it will supersede treaty by preventing the IAEA from fulfilling its mandate to verify that INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories are not being diverted.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive **purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**...

Every signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT) has agreed that it will be the International Atomic Energy Agency which verifies there is no diversion of resources to a nuclear weapons development project. It is not for an ad-hoc committee of lackey functionaries, playing the role of foxes guarding the hen house, to say that everything is going just fine.

Any committee the Procurement Working Group sets up for "verification" is simply not recognized by treaty.

That having been mentioned, the Security Council proceeds to supplant the IAEA with its own ad hoc unrecognizable verifiers – those who are not recognized by the NPT treaty signed on to by a multitude of Nations.

* * * * *
Chapter 13: Appendix 4 – Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25

[05]

The Security Council asserts its claim that Security Council has the authority to declare any of its decisions, at any time, to be an exception to any accepted rule made under the authority of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council presented a fabricated misrepresentation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25; which the resolution idiotically submits in its clause 14 of the introduction to Resolution 2231:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions,

THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH VERSION of the Article ascertains that the Members of the United Nations agree to carry out Security Council decisions that are in accordance with the Charter, that conform to the present Charter.

Charter of the United Nations

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH VERSION ASCERTAINS that the Members of the United Nations agree to carry out Security Council decisions that are in accordance with the Charter, that conform to the present Charter.

This writing translated and compared the writing of Article 25 in various languages. The comparison was intended as an example; but no comparative analysis of the translation is really necessary at all – in aggregate and together, Articles 24, and 25 give the context to Article 25, no matter which translation, as we shall review soon enough.

* * * * *

"In accordance," in English means, of course, that Security Council Resolutions must conform to the Charter of the United Nations. If the Security Council comes up with some obvious scheme to violate international treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, nobody has to agree to go along with it. Such a Security Council resolution would have no authority under the Charter of the United Nations.

As an example of the meaning of "in accordance" in English I present a parable of a sort:

Should a person perceive a fashion of the day, and that same person would desire to subscribe to that perceived fashion as an admirable and desirable norm; then that person might enthusiastically attempt to mimic it in as convincing and satisfying a manner available;

And should a body, in Office of Trust - be given a law; then that body, comprised of individuals holding Offices of trust, should choose to act in accordance with that law. This is what "in accordance" means, this is how the concept of "in accordance" is translated to English. To act contrary to law is the opposite of acting in "accordance" to the norms of law.

It seems simple enough.

If the Security Council decrees that it is now necessary for all States without exception to violate international law and international treaty in order to support various weapons development projects and schemes in an exceptional and uniquely favored State; a State which the Security Council has determined is deserving of every extraordinary deference; then the Security Council must apply, with its reasoning, to the International Court of Justice and attempt to convince the Court of the legitimacy of their construction.

The Security Council can't just order all States without exception to just anything the politicians populating the Security Council want done for whatever reason of chance and eccentricity of personality holds sway over that body at a given time.

The Charter of the United Nations places another restraint against aggressive, lunatic recommendations made and promoted by the Security Council:

Charter of the United Nations

*CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter...

That above stipulates that it is the Member States that are presumed to be in the right – these States do are not required to justify rulings within their jurisdictions to the Security Council. Nobody is required to go jump off a cliff just because the five permanent Member States of the Security Council Oligarchy tries wants everyone to go along with their plans to violate international treaty for the sake of arming a Security Council uniquely favored non-nuclear-weapon State with nuclear weapons capacity.

The Security Council does not have the authority to intimidate or force States choosing to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to follow the example of the Oligarchy syndicate.

Member States don't have to constantly appeal to the Court to justify the integrity of their own jurisdictions;

It is for the Security Council to justify its infringement on the integrity of Member States: "... _Nothing contained in the present Charter shall... require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter_...;" the burden of proof of that a Security Council decision is justifiable is the responsibility of the Security Council.

* * * * *

Repeating what is actually written in Article 25, in the English: " _The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter_."

The statement is reciprocal. The Members would agree to a decision if the Security Council decision can be found to be in accordance with the Charter. In accordance with the present Charter means, in English, that a decision must conform to the Charter if it is likely to be considered a valid decision. The Security Council cannot enforce a decision that, under the Charter, the Council was never authorized to ever have made.

The Security Council's only authority is derived from the Charter. Otherwise, discarding that need for restraint, the Security Council is only a collection of powerful nations that would use the United Nations to seek to position themselves into the dominant status previously sought by the tripartite militant powers of NAZI Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Empire of Japan of the World War II era.

Article 25 requires at least two proofs in order to compel States to accept a decision by the Security Council as something that shouldn't be entirely ignored, here is Article 25 again:

"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

The first proof required is that a Security Council's recommendation does conform to the standards set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. If the recommendation is perceived as not even close to being in accord with the Charter (as might be in the case of Resolution 2231); then States have the option to ignore the recommendation. The Security Council has failed the first proof.

The second proof required is that States attempting to follow through on a Security Council's decree can legitimately carry out such without violating international treaty, or the Charter of the United Nations – in other words, can legally carry out the decree.

The only body authorized to decide on proof of whether or not a Security Council's demand can be met without infringing on the Charter of the United Nations, or upon any other international law or treaty, is the International Court of Justice. As of yet, the politicians sitting on the Security Council haven't screwed up the nerve to engage the Court with their presumptions.

Therefore there is not any State that is compelled to, permitted to, required to, or entitled to, violate international treaty on the say-so of the United Nations Security Council as of yet; and no State should be required or permitted to comply with any decree of United Nations Security Council recommendation 2231 that goes against international law until the Court rules on the subject – or perhaps any decree of the resolution at all; this is a resolution that has not been shown to have been given a qualifying, competent vote (competent by any legitimately granted authority vested by the Charter of the United Nations). In other words, as it is not clear that the resolution has ever received a competent vote – then it could most reasonably be construed that Resolution 2231 remains only a draft proposal; waiting for a vote which might never come.

The writing of Article 25 is a reciprocal agreement: " _The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter_."

Both Parties to the agreement have to conduct themselves in a manner conforming to the Charter of the United Nations. In order to be considered valid, the Security Council request must not conflict or violate the Charter; and parties following through on the request must not violate the Charter in their actions attempting to comply with the given Security Council recommendation.

AS FAR AS THE WORD "OBLIGATED;" English speaking Barack Obama, and the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel along with him, chose to insert into their version of the writing of Article 25 – that word, or any derivation of it, exists no where in the true text of the Article – Article 25. It doesn't exist in the authorized English language translation of the Charter of the United Nations; it doesn't exist in the other authorized translations I read.

By inserting the word "obligated" into their peculiar fashioning of the wording of Article 25, the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel cabal tried to make it appear as though all States without exception must be expected, to at any time, unconditionally surrender their rights to any arbitrary pleasure of, or for any arbitrary decision made by the whichever politicians staffing the Security Council at a given time; politicians who might insist that any or every nation on earth must violate international treaty and, or the Charter of the United Nations and, or their own laws in order to appease the whims of the politicians and high-minded diplomats representing the Security Council.

Let us examine, among other things, if the word "obligated," or any of its translations or adaptations, ever appears in either the Spanish or French language translations of Article 25. The Spanish text follows:

CARTA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

*CAPITULO V

EL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD

Funciones y Poderes

Artículo 25

Los Miembros de las Naciones Unidas convienen en aceptar y cumplir las decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad de acuerdo con esta Carta.

Translating the Spanish into English (with connotations noted):

"The Members of the United Nations shall find it fitting to agree to accept and comply with the decisions of the Security Council which are in accordance with this Charter."

Again we find the reciprocal agreement. The decision must conform to and meet the standards of the Charter, and the conduct of carrying out the decision must conform to the Charter. There is no mention of any obligation.

Somehow however, the word "obligated" [obligación, obligar, obligatorio, obligado] or any of its translations or derivatives has nowhere made an appearance. Let's see what happens in French:

CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES

*CHAPITRE V

CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

FONCTIONS ET POUVOIRS

Article 25

Les Membres de l'Organisation conviennent d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.

Translating into English (with connotations noted):

"The Members of the United Nations find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and apply the decisions of the Security Council conforming to this present Charter."

The French version is almost the same as the English and Spanish – but it's very precise in its own context.

The Spanish version had left out exactly saying " _the present Charter_ ," and instead exchanged that for "this Charter;" or, "... de acuerdo con esta Carta."

The French leaves in "the present Charter," allowing for the understanding of the potential mutability of the Charter: <<...à la présente Charte.>> The French there is consistent with the English. This is not really that important; I'm just making a note of it here to give a feeling of how translations may differ slightly.

Whatever the small differences in linguistic usages – the concept is the same: Article 25 defines a reciprocal agreement which the Security Council, in its warped misrepresentation of the Article, seeks to deny.

The French translation chooses the adverb construction <<...les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.>> The French usage << conformément à>> is stronger than merely stating something like – are in accordance with. The French usage seems a bit firmer in the opinion of this writing; it seems to put much more weight on the responsibility of the Security Council. Let us look at this sentence in French and translated into English again, with perhaps a better English translation:

Les Membres de l'Organisation conviennent d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité conformément à la présente Charte.

"The Members of the Organization find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and to apply the decisions of the Security Council conforming to the present Charter."

This writing is still unhappy with its own English translation in the above. There this writing's English translation fails to indicate the emphasis placed on "conforming to." Perhaps it is better to translate into English using an English language phrase that most resembles << conformément à>> in this context:

"The Members of the Organization find it fitting to convene in agreement to accept and to apply the decisions of the Security Council which follow and conform to the present Charter."

The usage << conformément à>> seems closer to something like "follow in conformance to..." in English. When translating the phrase into English as:...which follow and conform to the present Charter... this writing believes that a translation like that helps to better understand in English the emphasis and precision of the writing in French. Other's might disagree and translate it better, but this writing reads it that way.

In any event – the word "obligated," or any derivation of it, fails to make an appearance in any of the translations.

It is entirely unambiguous from all versions that the Security Council has a clear responsibility and duty to present a recommendation which adheres to the Charter. The Security Council can't just make up anything it likes and then simply order States to do what it says.

No where in the three versions does the word, or any derivative of the word, "obligation" make an appearance. Nowhere in the actual text of the Charter can it be construed that nations are under any obligation to follow illegal orders that might be handed down by the Security Council at any moment.

The above comparative analysis of the translation might be interesting to some – and it was intended only to emphasize the point. As mentioned, there really no need for a comparative analysis of translation at all – a reader can rely entirely on any one of the authentic translations of the Charter, sticking to just one of the languages without having to peek into the others.

The Charter makes its meaning clear through an aggregate of provisions and Articles.

Article 24, 2nd clause, gives the necessary context to Article 25, no matter which translation; between the two Articles there can be no misconstruing the meaning. Let us examine:

The Charter of the United Nations;

*CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 24

2. In discharging these [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations...

Article 24 declares that the Security Council must fulfill its mandate to perform its duties in conformance to, and in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. Article 2 clause 7, along with Article 24 clause 2, clarify some limits (there are more) on the authority of a Security Council decision.

Article 24 declares that a Security Council decision must conform to the Charter; Article 2 declares that if the Security Council that if a member State feels such decision to infringe on Domestic Jurisdiction; then the burden of proving the justice of the Security Council; which must bring its petition before the International Court of Justice.

In the aggregate context of the three articles, the meaning of Articles 25 cannot be reasonably mistaken – no translation is needed. A Security Council decision has no absolute authority. The terms are fixed by agreement, not by arbitrary despotic whim.

The authorship of Resolution 2231 demonstrated – in their rewriting of the Article – their true stance as despotic and absolutist, and contrary to the position of the Charter. The Charter speaks but in terms of agreement and consensus – and chooses justice over the arbitrary unjust, unworkable, and irrational absolutism presented throughout Security Council Resolution 2231.

* * * * *
Chapter 14: Appendix 5 – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress

[2B]; [2C]; [06]

Barack Obama did not share with the Congress, any part of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 other than Annex A – as is documented in this following timeline of ev7ents – this despite that he had signed into Law and agreement that should have guaranteed his doing so.

The following presents a step-by step timeline of how this evasion of responsibility by the Obama administration was carried out:

**ON 22 MAY 2015** , as President, Barack Obama, signed the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ into law. This law stipulates that within not later than five calendar days "... _after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit_ [such agreement] _to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership_...;"

And that " _an agreement_ ," for the purposes of that Act is defined as:

"... _an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future_."

This appendix is an examination of the simple ruse used by the White House to evade transmitting United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to Congress.

**ON TUESDAY 14 July 2015** , the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed in Vienna. President Barack Obama made a speech from the East Room of the White House corroborating the event stating, among other things:

"After two years of negotiations, the United States, together with our international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has not: a comprehensive long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon." *

*[BARACK OBAMA; Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal; American University, Washington D.C.; August 5, 2015; This file has been archived, find it on google at: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.]

**On the same day** ; in another part of the world, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano asserted that the following had been agreed to and mutually signed on to by the IAEA and Iran:

"I have just signed the Road-map between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. The text has been signed on behalf of Iran by the country's Vice-President, and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi. This is a significant step forward towards clarifying outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme....

'... Implementation of this Road-map will provide an important opportunity to resolve the outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme...." *

*[INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: IAEA Director General's Statement and Road-map for the Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program; (Tuesday 14 July 2015 8:30 CEST); Web address: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-road-map-for-the-clarification-of-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-programme]

Director General Amano then proceeded to an explanation – which was reprinted in IAEA Board of Governors report GOV/INF/2015/14: In his explanation, Director General Amano stipulates that Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on 14 July 2015, had entered into two side agreements, which can be associated with the new JCPOA. Here are some excerpts of his explanation:

Road-map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program:

Joint Statement

By the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi.

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi agreed on 14 July 2015 the following...

1. The IAEA and Iran agreed on a separate arrangement that would allow them to address the remaining outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director's General report (GOV/2011/65). Activities undertaken and the outcomes achieved to date by Iran and the IAEA regarding some of the issues will be reflected in the process....

5. Iran and the IAEA agreed on another separate arrangement regarding the issue of Parchin.*

*[INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: GOV/INF/2015/14: (Date: 14 July 2015) https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2015-14.pdf - The contents of the document have been published in many places by the IAEA, in its press releases and secondary sources reporting on it – on or around July 14, 2015.]

This declaration by the IAEA Director General is brought up here as it is used indirectly by at least one specific Democratic Party member of the House of Representatives to distract attention away from the fact that the Congress had never been transmitted the official United Nations recognized version of the agreement.

**ON THURSDAY, 16 July 2015** , Texas Senator Ted Cruz addressed a letter to Barack Obama describing some of his concerns relating to the JCPOA. Senator Cruz wrote:

"Language in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) assumes Congressional consent of this agreement and fails to even mention the statutory review process that you signed into law on February 27, 2015...."

[This writing isn't sure why Senator Cruz mentioned February 27, he may have been thinking of the date of the inception of the original Bill – the bill which would be later known as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.'' This writing adheres to the date listed on Public Law 114–17, which is 22 May 2015]

_"Specifically, Annex V of the JCPOA states that the United States and Iran "will endorse this JCPOA," and further elucidates that the UN Security Council will undertake a prompt review of the agreement after the conclusion of negotiations..."_

In the above, the Senator is paraphrasing material from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:

i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.

Presented following is a facsimile of the letter Senator Cruz sent the White House on 16 July 2015 – viewing the whole of what was sent might give a better understanding of the impressions the Senator was under during the course of the week's events.

[The letter which follows can be found at:

https://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/20150716_LettertoPOTUSonIranDeal.pdf.]

For the purposes of this writing, referencing this 16 July 2015 letter clarifies that the Executive Branch had transmitted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to the Congress by at least 16 July 2015. We note from the above facsimile that on Thursday the 16th, Senator Cruz was under the impression: "... _That_ [Ambassador] _Samantha Power has already introduced a draft resolution to the Security Council_..." Actually, Ambassador Ms. Power was up to something quite different on that day.

* * * * *

On Thursday July 16, 2015, two days after the July 14th Vienna signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ms. Samantha Power, sent a Letter of Transmittal to the acting President of the United Nations Security Council, Mr. McCully of New Zealand. Ms. Power wrote: " _The United States Mission to the United Nations requests that the attached Missile Technology Control Regime list (see annex) be circulated as a document of the Security Council_." *

*[U.S. AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER: Letter dated 16 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. (United Nations document number S/2015/546): Available on the internet at: https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/6d9eec6cdd36149b85257ddc006cd868/e7551f39803265f285257e92005b6a0c/$FILE/S%202015%20546.pdf [last accessed: August 22, 2016.]]

The letter was necessary as part of a sub-gambit. Nobody needed the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ to be recirculated through the Security Council. Such an action would represent a redundancy. The above list is a well known international document.

It would be like asking the Security Council to re-circulate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is perfectly alright to do so – but it would be sort of a waste of departmental secretaries' time.

The purpose of this seemingly trivial exercise was not necessarily to have the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ circulated. It was to get that Security Council document number appearing on that upper left hand corner of the page of the copied letter of transmittal. This document number was immediately used as a code word, avoiding the need to refer directly to the Annex by name within the text of Resolution 2231 – as we shall soon examine.

When it came time for Congress to debate United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; the use of the code word, which nobody in Congress would think to wonder as to the meaning of or look into, would initially obscure from the body of the Security Council: and, or from the Congress, or from the electorate, positive knowledge that certain classes of weapons were to be made available to Iran through the agreement – as is shown by the provision of Resolution 2231 presented below.

The Code Word was used once in Resolution 2231. It was needed for use in Annex B of the resolution, paragraph 4(a) below. Annex B would never be transmitted to the Congress – nevertheless the code word was used in the following Annex B; paragraph 4(a), which has since become well-known:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B. - Statement

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in _S/2015/546_ and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology **that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems** ; and

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

The code word gambit would make it easier for the administration to hide its assistance to, and promotion of the Iranian expansions of its ballistic missile program and arsenals; and to assert that the agreement authored by the Obama administration, had every intention of retaining sanctions limiting Iranian weapons procurements – as opposed to allowing and promoting unheard of Iranian paying procurement of the latest in western weapons design style in advanced achievement.

The Appendix (Chapter 9) – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex presents a substantial excerpt from the list and gives a pretty good idea of what the administration was attempting to cover up with its code word.

**ON FRIDAY 17 July 2015** : Barack Obama, completely ignoring the Texas Senator's letter as a matter of course; went ahead and had his draft resolution deposited with the Security Council.

Here is a facsimile of the header to the first page of _United States of America: draft resolution S/2015/547_ is presented immediately below presented as verification of the chronology as stated:

The entire document of the original draft resolution (in pfd format) submitted on the 17 July 2015 was to be found at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/547 [last accessed May, 3 2016.]. However, the United Nations has since modified the document it allows the public to review. The new web address finding United States of America: draft resolution is: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2F2015%2F547&Lang=E

What's missing in this newer version here is any mention of the submittal of the draft resolution by the United States – or the date on which the draft resolution was deposited, by the United States, with the Security Council (17 July 2015). That's perhaps an example of part of your Obama-era, post Obama-Era United Nations Security Council emerging style of paperwork deciding upon the new ideal of what to show the public, and when, in this day and age:

The header of this later version does note that the draft resolution was put out for General Distribution on 20 July 2015, the date of adoption of the resolution by the Security Council. Here then, the Security Council establishes its claim that the entire body of the Security Council, which does include the non-permanent Member States of the Council (none of which were privy to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA negotiation itself); here the Security Council establishes its chronology, which verifies the claim (voiced the morning of the 20th by U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power, and which will be documented anon) that there had been no real review of the draft resolution by the entire body of the Security Council before the 9 AM vote for adoption on Monday morning, 20 July 2015, before anyone was really sure if everyone had even already had their cup of coffee yet.

The original version of the draft resolution can still be found in two places that this writing knows of:

_Human Rights Voices_ has it listed at:

http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/7.17.2015.security.council.resolution.iran.pdf

And _document cloud.org_ retains this at:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2168507/security-council-draft-resolution.pdf

The identical adopted Security Council Resolution 2231 version, as adopted on 20 July 2015 is found at is found (in English) at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015)

To find United Nations Security Council resolutions by year refer to: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions

**ON SUNDAY, 19 July 2015** , Obama Spokesperson John Kirby announced in a press release that the State Department had transmitted to Congress everything relevant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – this was the day before Resolution 2231 was even adopted by the Security Council. The resolution didn't exist yet, transmittal of an authorized version was impossible – and since, as the Security Council claims, the draft proposal would only be circulated of the following day; for the State Department to transmit to Congress an official copy of an un-circulated U.N. document would have been a bureaucratic impossibility. Here is what Kirby released to the news media:

"Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include the Unclassified Verification Assessment Report on the JCPOA and the Intelligence Community's Classified Annex to the Verification Assessment Report, as required under the law. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20 ."*

*[DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Press Statement, John Kirby, Washington DC (July 19, 2015). This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# - Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245051.htm]

What Kirby does here is to declare that the administration has transmitted these documents as " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ ;" the act which stipulates that:

Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership— ''(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes;

...and continues on by defining what an "Agreement" as far as it concerns the Bill:

''(1) AGREEMENT.—The term 'agreement' means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.

The JCPOA is of interest; but no more so than the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. According to the law, the 60-day countdown period for review couldn't and can't begin just because the Obama administration had only transmitted a part of Resolution 2231. The President had not transmitted to Congress the main attraction, the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

Sunday 19 July 2015, was the day before Monday 20 July 2017 – the day when the Security Council voted unanimously to recognize the Draft Resolution deposited by the United States administration of President Barack Obama.

It's too easy to know: Barack Obama's intentionally mendacious Puppet Gnome Agent John Kirby claimed to have transmitted everything required by the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ to Congress on the day before the awaited United Nations Security Council authorization qualifying the agreement existed. The United Nations' recognized perception the agreement didn't exist yet.

John Kirby declared that: " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include...,_ _as required under the law_ _. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20_."

The Obama administration, in asserting that it had sent everything, asserted the irrelevancy of the United Nations Security Council resolution to be declared the following day.

This was the excuse the maliciously mendacious overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress that there were any significant additions to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA that the administration felt might merit any discussion by the Congress of the United States.

This was the excuse the maliciously mendacious overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress the various weapons transactions agreed to within the entirety of Barack Obama's United States Proposed Draft Resolution, which was accepted as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) on 20 July 2019 – the day after Obama Gnome Agent offered the Obama administration's official statement claiming that it had sent everything relevant which needed be submitted to Congress.

**ON MONDAY, 20 July 2015** , the vote adopting Barack Obama's _United States draft proposal S/2015/547_ as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 takes place in the 7488th meeting of the Security Council. Now Barack Obama finally had something to send Congress; but there is no movement at that time of any time following, in that regard, emanating from the Obama White House. The 60 day countdown for Congressional review of the "Iran Deal" officially begins – not because Obama had transmitted Resolution 2231 to the Congress; but because Obama had decided explicitly on his own that the race will get started at that time; perhaps, because it should be thought of as the race to see if Congress would ever figure out within the 60-day countdown period that Obama had not acted on any pretence of an intention to effect transmission of Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress...

The day before the resolution existed; on Sunday 19 July 2015; the Obama administration effectively told the Congress that whatever was in that resolution; to be voted on the next day, wasn't of interest to the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015,_ law. The Obama administration here had implicitly, or maybe more or less explicitly, asserted that many of the agreed upon weapons transfers to Iran which are reflected in parts of Resolution 2231 other than Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, were not of interest to Congress or the law Obama had signed on to. Whatever the case contemplated and put into effect by the Obama administration; there was never a transmittal of Resolution 2231 to the Congress from the; but further confirmation on that point is required:

**ON WEDNESDAY, 22 July 2015** , White House Spokesperson John Kirby held a press conference in the White House.

The following is a recounting of some further details of the questions posed, and answers given during that July 22 press Conference.

QUESTION: _Yes, please. Just to clarify, you mentioned that the Congress has what we have. And in the same time you mentioned yesterday and today in a TV appearance that you transferred to the Congress all the documents that you have regarding this issue. Can you describe it? I mean, what is it? I mean, it's like it is detailed or it's just – I assume it's not --_

MR KIRBY: _It's the entire set of documents that go along with the deal to include the annexes and a verification assessment._

QUESTION: _...It's all the technical, the financial part and everything?_

MR KIRBY: _...It's – everything that we have about this deal has been provided to Congress. And I would point out that much of it is already available to all of you online._

QUESTION: _...It's not the 158 pages, right? It's more than that, right?_

MR KIRBY:...There is some additional information provided there, yeah, but a lot of it's already been made publicly available. But yes, everything is up there. It got there on Sunday.*

*[U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT: Daily Press Briefing \- Washington DC (July 22, 2015); John Kirby, spokesperson. This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# \- Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/07/245186.htm]

It was all a nonsensical lie, of course. On Sunday, 19 July 2015; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 didn't exist yet. Kirby simply made up an inane story to cover for the Obama administration's refusal to transmit the resolution to Congress. And naturally., the imbecile members of the 114th Congress , incapable of exhibiting any common sense whatsoever, unanimously swallowed the story whole; And naturally, no member of the 114th Congress would take an interest in going up to the Security Council website and pulling down a free copy of the resolution to read it and consider what it might contain. This was, and remains even today, the going standard of disinterest in this whole issue of Barack Obama's "Iran Nuclear Deal."

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 was not going to get transmitted to the Congress. Going through the Congressional Record, and State Department records, there is no trace of anything having to do with Obama's "Iran Deal" being transmitted or received after that Sunday, the 19th. The Statements made on the 22nd by John Kirby would be the White House final word on the matter.

That no one in Congress would complain about how the information being relayed by the White House simply didn't match up with the facts is another example of the lack attention, the dinterest; and the primitive nature of discussion surrounding this issue of Security Council Resolution 2231, "JCPOA."

* * * * *

But not quite; the White House later, in December 2015, made a very interesting declaration in writing concerning this "Obama Deal" which was never reviewed by the Congress.

Although everyone in Congress knew about the 20 July 2015 vote in the Security Council, it was blithely ignored until members of the Senate – Republicans Tom Cotton and Mike Pompeo made an earth-shattering discovery/observation on or around 18 September 2015 that nobody in Congress had any signed copies of the JCPOA.

This discovery dawned on these two after both Houses of Congress had voted on something purported to be the "Iran Nuclear Deal" on 10 and 11 September 2017, a little over a week before.

Being the wondering audience they were, Senator Pompeo wrote the State Department, Secretary of State John Kerry, on 18 September 2015, asking questions:

Dear Secretary Kerry:

I have reviewed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Islamic Republic of Iran – or at least the parts of the agreement that were provided to Congress by the administration. As you know, pursuant to H. Res. 411, the House of Representatives considers the documents transmitted on July 19, 2015 incomplete in light of the fact that the secret side deals between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran were not provided to Congress. I look forward to seeing the entire agreement – including the two secret side deals that are part of the JCPOA – so that Congress may continue to evaluate the JCPOA and, depending on the outcome of the vote under the relevant provisions of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, potentially end the current and continuing prohibition of the lifting of sanctions on Iran.

During that review, I found that the copies provided to Congress of the JCPOA are not signed by any of the P5+1 members nor by Iran. Having never seen an international agreement of this magnitude not signed by the parties or an agent of the parties, I assume this is simply an oversight or an administrative error. That is, Congress must not have the final version of the agreement that would necessarily be signed. I request that you provide us with copies of a final, executed copy of the JCPOA. In the event that the JCPOA has not yet been signed by the parties, please inform us (a) when signatures will be placed on the agreement, (b) what parties will be signing, and (c) which person you anticipate will sign on behalf of each of those parties, including on behalf of the United States.

I am confident that you intended for the JCPOA to be signed by each of the P5+1 participants. I can find no international agreement of this "historic" nature that was not signed by the parties. Each of the past five major nuclear agreements to which the U.S. is a party – SALT I, SALT II, START I, START II and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea – were signed by representatives of each nation that was party to the agreement. This is not a mere formality. Those signatures represent the commitment of the signatory and the country on whose behalf he or she is signing.

A signature also serves to make clear precisely who the parties to the agreement are and the authority under which that nation entered into the agreement. In short, just as with any legal instrument, signing matters.

This is particularly important with respect to JCPOA. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has made clear that he does not believe that JCPOA is legally binding on his nation, saying, "If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is sent to (and passed by) parliament, it will create an obligation for the government. It will mean the president, who has not signed it so far, will have to sign it. Why should we place an unnecessary legal restriction on the Iranian people?"

Given the many benefits that will accrue to the ayatollahs, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and other unsavory elements of the Iranian regime, I believe that Iran should, at the very least, bind itself to the few requirements placed on it under the JCPOA by signing the agreement. I also believe that the United States and its P5+1 partners on the JCPOA should execute the agreement on behalf of their countries. I look forward to your response.

We all do. *

*[The text of the letter was found in two places

https://cjhsla.org/2015/11/01/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/

And:

http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/2015/09/19/

I was unable to locate an original facsimile; however, the response to the letter from the State Department verifies that the letter was sent.]

The text of the response follows – and a facsimile of the response is presented after:

Dear Mr. Pompeo.:

Thank you for your September 18 letter regarding the nuclear deal with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the European Union. As you know, the United States has a long-standing practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in political commitments.

The success of the JCPOA will depend not whether it is legally binding or signed, but rather on the extensive verification measures we have put in place, as well as Iran's understanding that we have the capacity to re-impose and ramp up – our sanction if Iran does not meet its commitments.

Everything the JCPOA and its annexes are commitments Iran made, and must keep, to remain in compliance. Iran breaks these commitments, we can snap back both unilateral and UN sanction.

We provided Congress with everything agreed to between the P5+1 and Iran in the JCPOA, in full compliance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INAEA). There are no "secret deals" between the P5+1 and Iran, and no JCPOA document that Congress does not already have. The Administration is fully committed to providing information to Congress to ensure full transparency as we implement the JCPOA.

We hope this information is useful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Julia Frifield; Assistant Secretary; Legislative Affairs.

The facsimile presented next can be found at: _http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/11.24.2015.state.dept.letter.jcpoa.pdf_

The letter claims that the JCPOA was unsigned. The letter doesn't mention that the JCPOA had been incorporated into the larger, Resolution 2231 program and that the resolution's policy of arms transactions is not presented in the resolution's Annex A: JCPOA.

To an extent – this letter gives evidence; again, that Resolution 2231 was never transmitted to the Congress, and never looked at or voted on by the Congress.

* * * * *
**Chapter 15 –** Appendix 6 – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran

[02D]

As of JCPOA Implementation Day, 16 January 2016 was allowed, upon approval of the Procurement Working Group – Joint Commission, and acceptance by the Security Council, the acquire INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories.

Procurement activities began only as of October 2016. From November 2016 – towards the end of Barack Obama's term in office – through December 2017, fifteen such procurement proposals for items listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a have been approved. The following are the relevant excerpts from the United Nations Security Council Six-month reports of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) which verify the Security Council approvals of such Iranian acquisitions:

_Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [18 January 2017].

The English Language version is found on the United Nations website at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/49&Lang=E

_Third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [27 June 2017]

_Fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)_ [15 December 2017]

All of these can be found on the same page: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/briefings-by-the-facilitator.shtml>

Following is the relevant excerpt from the Second sixth month report:

Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [18 January 2017]

V. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

18. The procurement channel processed five proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) that had been submitted by two Member States to the Security Council for approval. In accordance with paragraph 8 (b) of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), the proposals were immediately forwarded to the Joint Commission for its review.

19. Two proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council on 6 October 2016. The Joint Commission provided recommendations of approval. The two proposals were subsequently approved by the Council on 17 November 2016. One proposal for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 was submitted to the Council on 15 November. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval. The proposal was approved by the Council on 28 December. Two proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Council on 6 December. These proposals are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

20. On 23 December 2016, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) the second six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2016/1113), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reflecting the activities performed during the said six-month reporting period..

Paragraph 20 informs us that the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) the second six-month Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues. This document (S/2016/1113) gives some further insight into what the Procurement Working Group had been up to in the last six months of 2016. The report advises that it "... _provides an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 7 July to 22 December 2016_."

Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (Doc. S/2016/1113) – [23 December 2016]

V. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

2. During the reporting period, the Procurement Working Group — comprising the States that are participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with a designated representative of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy serving as Coordinator — held six meetings. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated as observers in one of the meetings. The Procurement Working Group reviewed five proposals from two States. Three of the proposals were recommended for approval. The rest are currently under review.

The above paragraph 2 of the Joint Commission report speaks of six meetings held, with the IAEA being allowed to attend only one of them. Of five proposals submitted by two separate States, two are under review, three were approved.

Paragraph 19 of the Facilitator's report tells us that of the five proposals submitted only one was related to items listed on the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 document which deals primarily with components for nuclear reactors. Paragraph 2 above tells us that, coincidentally, the IAEA had attended only one of the meetings of the Procurement Working Group.

THE THIRD REPORT informs that five more INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a related proposals were also approved – bringing the total of nuclear weapons related proposals up to nine:

Third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [27 June 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

25. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval for the two proposals that had been submitted to the Security Council in December 2016 and were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report. The two proposals were subsequently approved by the Council.

26 During the reporting period, 10 new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council, including 2 for temporary export for the purposes of demonstration and display in an exhibition. Five of those proposals have been approved, one has been withdrawn and four are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

THE FOURTH REPORT informs that four more INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a related proposals were also approved – bringing the total of nuclear weapons related proposals up to thirteen through 2017:

Fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [15 December 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

29. During the reporting period, eight new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Four of these proposals have been approved, two have been rejected and two have been withdrawn.

30. In addition, the Security Council approved two and rejected one of the four proposals that were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report (S/2017/537). The fourth proposal has been withdrawn.

31. Since Implementation Day, a total of 24 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been, submitted to the Security Council by four Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

In all, through end of year 2017 – thirteen proposals having to do with Iranian INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories have been approved. 24 proposals had been submitted altogether.

IAEA Board of Governor reports (listed further below) throughout the same period indicate that the IAEA has been allowed to attend only 4 of those meetings. Clearly the IAEA is being kept away from the major portion of what goes on in terms of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear related goods:

THE FIFTH REPORT informs that the Procurement Working Group has approved eight more procurement proposals; However, the new Facilitator, _Karel J.G. van Oosterom_ , has insinuated for himself a new reporting policy – Mr. van Oosterom had now decided that the Security Council no longer found it suitable, at this juncture, to differentiate between and report a comparison of the number of nuclear energy related approvals of nuclear energy related procurement applications; and the number of weapons related approvals of procurement applications.

It would appear almost as if there is some sense of embarrassment, and perhaps a touch of the guilty conscience beginning to sink in around the Security Council snack bar lounging areas (one might at least hope).

Fifth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [15 December 2017]

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

23. During the reporting period, 13 new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Eight of those proposals have been approved, two have been withdrawn and three are currently under review.

24. Since Implementation Day, a total of 37 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 34 proposals that have been processed, 24 have been approved, 3 have been disapproved, and 7 have been withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in less than 51 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including the Procurement Working Group, the procurement channel has continued to function and the Joint Commission has continued to review proposals..

It is worth noting that in this fifth report, as indicated; the new Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), _Karel J.G. van Oosterom_ ; unlike his predecessor _Sebastiano Cardi_ ; does not differentiate between Procurement Working Group approvals of Iranian acquisition from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 (nuclear energy related) list of inventories; and approvals of INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 (nuclear weapons related) acquisitions.

However; the Joint Commission / Procurement Working Group also transmits a very brief six month report which gives a tiny bit more information on the subject of approvals. The Joint Commission Report also does not differentiate between the two lists. But it does reveal how many Procurement Working Group meetings were held, how may proposal were submitted, approved, or are under review;

And it does tell how many meetings the IAEA was allowed to attend. We know from the JCPOA that the International Atomic Energy Agency is not allowed to sit in on meetings pertaining to INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2; now become INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 as these refer to nuclear weapons associated assets which the International Atomic Energy Agency is prohibited any knowledge of under the JCPOA arrangement invented mostly between the Obama administration and the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

(Incidentally, the IAEA Board of Governors Reports also mentions how many meeting the IAEA has been allowed to attend. However, the IAEA doesn't seem to know how many meetings total had been held, and so doesn't know what it might have been missing.)

Following is what the Joint Commission has to say for itself in the reporting period referred to:

Report of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (Doc. S/2018/601) – [14 June 2018]

3. The Procurement Working Group held seven meetings. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated as observers in one of the meetings. The Procurement Working Group reviewed 13 proposals from three States: 8 were recommended for approval, 2 were withdrawn by the proposing States and 3 are currently under review.

* * * * *

These following are relevant excerpts of IAEA Board of Governor reports from September 2016 through May 2018. These cover the time period around when the Procurement Working Group got started reviewing and approving applications for Iranian procurement of nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed; later become nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed inventories;

The International Atomic Energy Agency is invited only to attend Procurement Working Group meetings which discuss issues relating to nuclear power production. The IAEA is precluded from attending meetings which discuss proposals relating to sales to Iran of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed, or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed nuclear weapons associated assets.

Note that the International Atomic Energy Agency is prevented from attending most Procurement Working Group meetings. This gives some sense that nuclear weapons associated assets form the vast majority of Iranian material acquisitions through the Procurement Working Group.

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2016/46 – Date: 8 September 2016

E. Other Relevant Information

22. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2016/55 – Date: 9 November 2016

E. Other Relevant Information

22. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/10 – Date: 24 February 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

26. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/24 – Date: 2 June 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

27. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/33 – Date: 31 August 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

28. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2017/48 – Date: 13 November 2017

27. During this reporting period, the Agency attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2018/7 – Date: 22 February 2018

26. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

IAEA – BOARD OF GOVERNORS

GOV/2018/24 – Date: 24 May 2018

26. During this reporting period, the Agency attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

* * * * *
**Chapter 16 – Appendix 7–** The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause

[2G]

What is allowed and what is not allowed as far as concerns IAEA Participation in review of nuclear related assets acquired by Iran is detailed in the JCPOA as follows:

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

6.4. Except as otherwise provided by the Joint Commission or the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:

6.4.1 Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA..:

As a concession to the IAEA, the Agency is informed as to the contents of a proposal when such proposal "... relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA...;" which, as it turns out, means when a proposal has nothing to do with nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories.

6.1.6....When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.

A clearer sense of which meetings the IAEA is authorized to attend, as opposed to not authorized, begins to take on more defined shape upon a bit further examination of later provisions of paragraph six with its subs and sub-subs:

6.7. Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.

6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.

The IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1; unlike INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; refers to components and technologies associated specifically with nuclear energy production.

Sub paragraph 6.7 says the IAEA can hang around and check out the lay of the land – the end uses and end use locations of any goods and technology, any inventory, procured from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1.

When it comes to Iranian acquisitions from the prominent, nuclear weapons related inventories listed of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a, the IAEA is dropped from the picture; the Oligarchy authors of the arrangement leave out mention of anything about the IAEA being invited to drop in for inspection time.

It being the case therefore, that IAEA is explicitly not allowed in either to meetings, and is not explicitly granted authority to confirm end-use location of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories – one might ask if the IAEA is allowed to inspect this anyway.

Paragraph 26 of Resolution 2231 – Annex A: JCPOA – section SANCTIONS informs us of the following:

26. ...There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration... will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. **Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part**.

Any attempt to insist – after the fait accompli – that the IAEA suddenly should be given access to meetings relating to; or given applicable knowledge of end-use or end-use location whereabouts of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons related inventories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; anything like that could justifiably be understood as an attempt to sabotage the E3/EU+3 Iran arrangement effort by imposing a new nuclear related restriction, or restrictive measure.

Note: All participating Parties to the negotiation and concluded arrangement were united in their approval over what had been agreed upon.

It must also be noted that All Parties signatory to the NPT agree that it is the International Atomic Energy Agency that has the duty, the obligation, the responsibility and the mandate to verify that there is no "... diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," as follows under the first clause of Article III of the NPT – or to report otherwise:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...

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