 
# The mediation of the United States in the war of the Pacific

The conferences of Arica

ABSTRACT

In the current dissertation, there is a serious analysis of the War of the Pacific and the mediation of the United States which was consolidated in October 1880 at the Conferences of Arica.

This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter is about the military and economical situation prior to the conferences. The second chapter focuses on the analysis of the international political situation of the countries involved in the conflict after the victory of Chile in the marine campaign and Tarapaca and the impact of this event in the north American politics. The final chapter consists of a critical analysis of the north American mediation, since the Department of State offered their good offices and mediation until the process of the Conferences of Arica.

INTRODUCTION

Once Chile conducted a military occupation of the Tarapaca's territory during the War of the Pacific (1879 - 1884), the issue of the nitrate-rich Peruvian region's destiny arose, in which many economic interests had converged. Peru's economic situation was already precarious before the confrontation, but its government had all the intentions of paying its external debt from the mining area's income. A large population of Chilean businessmen had made substantial investments in the mining industry of Peru, making it the second largest production center of nitrate, copper, and guano. The same phenomenon had happened in Tarapaca with Italian, French, English, and German entrepreneurs.

Despite the fact that Peru had been defeated in both land and naval campaigns, and had lost the whole province of Tarapaca after the fall of Arica, Pierola's government wished for its territory and its foreign capital assets to remain intact, as they were key for repaying the country's external loans. Chile, on the other hand, considered that the war had damaged the country significantly, making it possible then to ask the defeated countries for a compensation to be used for restoration. In addition, the Chilean government sought some measures to secure the terms of the Treaty of Ancón. The occupation of Arica practically defined the war's result, having Chile as the victor. Prolonging the conflict would have meant a useless extension of the allies' resistance and a waste for Chile, exhausting the already drained resources of the country.

By the end of 1880, Peru and Bolivia acknowledged their military defeat, but were confident on receiving external aid to help them maintain their territories as they were. It was in this context that the United States, considered a great power, took part in the Pacific war. According to the Monroe Doctrine, the US did not want European intervention in the North American hemisphere, since they had already established their own sphere of influence trying to contest monetary hegemony after the Mexican Cession (1848), Civil War (1861 - 1865) and the Spanish-American war (1898), in spite of efforts from some European powers, especially England.

Though the Americans did not have economic interests in Tarapaca, the result of the war was still an issue to them*. A victory for the allies would have meant an interference of European interests in detriment to the North Americans. Thus, the United States intervened in the conflict, precluding any intentions of European countries for mediation.

Despite the need for the belligerent parties to find peace between them after the fall of Arica in favor of Chile, the North American attempt to manage arbitration through the Arica Conference ended up in failure. Failure that resulted in three more years of war which left Peru and Bolivia with no possible armed resistance.

This study tries to determine the reasons for the failure of the Arica Conference, having the preceding situation of the conflict as a starting point of our hypothesis. This issue generated a series of intricate diplomatic, economic, political, and military relationships, which had such a negative impact on the possible course action on the Arica Conference, wasting and depleting efforts, ideas and arguments. The study also tries to determine how the plenipotentiaries found themselves forced to take an uncompromising position, which led to the mediation's failure. We also tried to find the reason for the belligerent parties to accept the North American good will to summon a peace conference.

Other questions we try to answer here refer to the reasons of the belligerent countries to accept the help of the North Americans, as well as their intentions to summon a peace conference. We also question whether the United States' intermediary role was partial or not, which was the position of European and Latin American countries against the conflict. It has been established that, before the US offered its help, many other countries offered their mediation as well, but none of them materialized. We are also interested in finding out why these countries made these offers.

In an effort to find answers, we will analyze the development of the war until the moment the mediation was offered, as well as the positions and objectives of the Latin American and European countries and the US. It became necessary then to study not only the Conference episode, but also the situation of the Nitrate Resources in Tarapaca before the war. By examining these issues from an economic, military, and political point of view, as well as their evolution, we found it greatly helped to explain the results.

From the point of view of its originality, this investigation is justified, as it shed some light on the issue of why the outcome of the conference was negative. We are not certain why it happened that way or why an opportunity to end the war was lost. After all, these were the elements that led the American intervention to occur. Perhaps, the manner in which the conference was implemented also contributed to its failure, giving us a valuable lesson for the future.

The preliminary steps of the mediation and the Conference of Arica's final process are the topics we tried to present critically and analytically throughout this research. It was mainly based on the study of primary sources and properly selected complementary bibliography. We were able to acquire documents about the dispatch of North American diplomats and their instructions from the US Department of State thanks to the National Archives Microfilm Publication, Department of State, bringing new light to a process studied rather superficially by some treatise writers of the War of the Pacific.

In the case of Chilean archival sources, this information is still categorized as confidential; hence its consultation was not possible. However, this glitch did not stop the investigation from reaching its final objectives, as the information from other sources filled the blanks.

The method of study conditioned the usage of bibliography and sources, since it was compulsory to resort to the pre-war situation in order to establish the causes for the Conference results, and to continue our study from an economic, diplomatic, political and military point of view. The investigation was organized from general to specific information. In the first chapter we addressed more general issues, continuing with more specific topics in the second chapter, ending with a study of the Conference in the third chapter. This way, our bibliography and source work was naturally organized following the same order from the chapters. Reading from different sources such as newspapers from the time was useful to get a global understanding of the process that led to the result of the conference as well as guiding the investigation. It can be appreciated that, in spite of being well informed about the tracks of the war, such as the position and attitude of the involved parties, these newspapers could not be used in its majority since the source of the information was not mentioned, producing doubts about their credibility. Fortunately, this information was present in a more refined manner in the official documents. For this reason, the latter sources were given a more preferential treatment.

This Book is based on the thesis of Mr...____ to apply for a Master's degree on History, at Universidad de Santiago de Chile.

Finally, by presenting this document, the author wants to express his thanks to everyone who collaborated on this task. Among these people, and only to mention some, I want to thank the Instituto de Investigacion del Patrimonio Nacional's Library, from the University of Santiago, Chile, and the National Library Newspaper Section's personnel.

CHAPTER I

THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC IN 1880

Arbitration and mediation before the War of The Pacific in Chile-Bolivia Relationship

In order to understand the process of US mediation and Conference of Arica, a very important chapter of diplomatic history of the War of the Pacific, we must analyze the origins of the conflict and the actions developed between 1879 and 1880 until Arica Assumption which influenced the results of inclusive administration.

The government of President Bulnes (1841-1851) was the first to establish the limits of Chile in the north and the south.

Between 1842-1843, the northern limit was determined at Mejillones parallel. In October 1842, after discovering the guano deposits, the Law determined that the northern limit consisted of the Mejillones Bay, saying that all guanos located in the Southern area were Chilean property.

The Bolivian government complained about this provision saying that the southern limit of Bolivia consisted of latitude 25. After a long negotiation they solved their issues by signing the Treaty of 1866, which established a dividing line at parallel 24° from the Pacific Ocean to Cordillera Range. Thus, there was an agreement to the division of taxes coming from guano and mineral export which were produced between parallels 23º and 25º south latitude.

According to Gonzalo Bulnes, this treaty had a conditional basis (even though this word does not appear in the text) because from all their provisions, the idea that Chile recognized some part of the territory as property of Bolivia, was only because the high-plateau country fulfilled its agreements for guano and minerals.

Some difficulties that rose from the accomplishment of the treaty led to a new negotiation which ended with the treaty of August 6th, 1874, derogating the last one.

The new treaty set the boundaries in the parallel 24 and though Chile quit its rights for the northern territory, it was set that the agreement signed by Bolivia related to this last one, would not set special taxes over Chilean people, capitals and industries at the zone given by Chile to the north at parallel 24, updating the normal and current taxation.

In order to guarantee the national capitals in Caracoles and the coastal salt mines, the article 4 established the following:

"The export duties imposed to exploited minerals at the area, mentioned by the previous articles will not exceed the amount that is normally asked for, and Chilean people, industries and capitals will not be subject to currently existing taxes of any kind, the provision contained in this article will last for the period of 25 years." (1)

In spite of this provision, the Bolivian government sentenced on February 14th , 1878 a resolution that enacted the transaction celebrated by the same government on November 27th , 1873 with the representative of Compañia de Salitres y Ferrocarriles in Antofagasta, provided that they set a tax of 10 cents per quintal of exported nitrate.

Afterwards, on November 8th , 1878 the Chilean government told the Bolivians the taxes of 10 cents could lead to the derogation the Treaty of 1874, and when it was cancelled, the government of Chile was free to recover the ceded territories. E Diaz de Medina has written the following:

"It was said then that when the government established the tax of 10 cents per quintal of exported nitrate, Bolivia violated the article 4th of Treaty of 1874, but it is sufficiently demonstrated that such financial compensation was not a tax, but a fair compensation for the recognition of uncertain rights of the nitrate industry. But the Chilean government insisted by complaining against the assumed gravamen, meanwhile Bolivia withdrawing the Decree which was an excuse to the interference of the Chilean government, cancelled the agreement. Then Chile plunged into war defending the private interests of such company. That war was begun due to a private law controversy". (2)

According to Mario Barros (3). Bolivian authors tend to confirm that in the War of the Pacific period, Chile was a poor country drifted into crises, with a stagnant economy that went to war only to solve its problems, planning carefully all aspects, especially everything related to weapons. The incident of the 10 cents was, according to XIX century historians, an excuse to justify war and not its cause, because the litigation between a foreign corporation (Nitrate and Railway Campaign in Antofagasta) and the government of Bolivia was the jurisdiction of courts because it was a private law company.

On the other hand, some Peruvian authors try to show that the Secret Treaty of 1873 wasn't offensive but defensive, and it had never been written and signed but for Chilean desires and expansionist policies. This treaty had 6 main provisions, one of them said that the alliance will guarantee Bolivia its coastline, the second one said that it would offend Bolivia, any requirement from another powerhouse to legislate with it in its divided territory collaboratively. The third part said that the allies will decide if an offense is a cause of intervention, the fourth one will restrict the conclusion of boundaries agreements without the prior knowledge of the ally. In the fifth, there was a request for the adherence to the treaty to other American nations and last provision gave the secret character of the treaty.

Bolivia had committed a serious negligence when violating the treaty of 1874, knowing the Chilean interest of seizing any opportunity to take the nitrate.

The Peruvian historians say that their nation went to war against their will and that they were not prepared for it. The fact they asked Argentina to be a Peru-Bolivia ally was also defensive. At last, the statement about the Chilean theory that Peru had a plan to monopolize the world's nitrate was totally false, as well as the statement that Chile needed the war to solve its internal problems and that Peru and not Bolivia was the chosen victim to be expelled from the Pacific.

About the issue Diez de Medina says:

"The real and direct cause of the war was, as many Chilean publicists say, the possession of nitrate territories of Antofagasta and Tarapaca. Neither the measures nor the laws dictated by the Peruvian government, keeping their interests, determined the conflict, but the Chilean fiscal poverty and its open aspiration to be the owner of those valuable territories where it already had its money and arms." (4)

Unlike Bolivian and Peruvian authors, the Chilean historians who have worried about the problem say that Chile through the treaties of 1866 and 1874 generously gave Bolivia the territories and in spite of this the country was unfairly provoked with the violation of article 4 of the Treaty of 1874. They also say that Peru tried to mediate artfully in the conflict Chile-Bolivia, when the secret agreement of 1873 was already signed, which is considered offensive. Chile was not prepared for this war and it was forced against its will, as many authors have said it.

Luis Barrios Borgoño highlights the disbelief of President Anibal Pinto Garmendia and says the following:

"it is interesting and always appropriate to check how far the Chilean good faith reached the ignorance its government had about the existence of the Secret Agreement and the confidence in the Peruvian friendship.

The president of Chile, Mr Anibal Pinto, righteous and peace oriented who saw the war as the greatest disaster in these countries, had kept updated on the Peruvian business representative in Chile with the problems of Bolivia, and when these issues reached the highest point, he was notified in order to make him intervene in the name of his country." (5)

Indeed, President Pinto on February 21st, 1879 wrote a note to his representative in Lima Mr Joaquin Godoy, inviting Peru to offer his good offices and mediation, telling them that Chile, satisfied with its American spirit, will always be willing to accept a solution to restore good relationships between Chile and Bolivia.

The version of Barros Borgoño corresponds to Mario Barrios Van Buren who says that Pinto did not believe in war and did not think of the Argentinian hostility.

Barros Van Buren writes:

"the only memory of the armored cars and weapons bought by Blest Gana in Europe made him sick..... he ordered Blest to sell both armored cars, Mr Alberto Blest, offered them in England in 1877 and Russia in 1878. As luck would have it, none of those countries answered. In November 1878, Chile stopped trying to sell the armored cars, after Belisario Prats, Ministry of Internal Affairs managed to convince the President". (6)

Mario Barros, says that Pinto wanted desperately to avoid war so he trained Joaquin Godoy to accept good offices as mediator if President Prado offered them.

According to this author the president's good faith was similar to naivety and he insisted that Pinto was the only Chilean person who did not believe in the Secret Treaty." (7)

For Barros Van Buren, the bases for mediation offered by Peru could only be that Chile kept the city of Antofagasta and ceded Bolivia an amount of money as compensation.

This idea was successful not just because somebody thought it was an efficient mediation but because Peru had the time to finish their war strategies.

According to this, the mission of Jose Antonio Lavalle, which was carried out at the beginning of 1879 tried not to recognize the Secret Treaty, and the Peruvian diplomat managed to avoid the topic in his conversations with some Chilean authorities.

The Peruvian government appointed Jose Antonio Lavalle as plenipotentiary having the task of offering the mediation of Peru. This action would have as a requirement to ask Chile to leave Antofagasta.

Gonzalo Bulnes says:

"The trip Lavalle had in mind was to gain time to repair the ships, buy new ones and obtain the alliance of the Argentinean republic. This is shown by Pardo's hurry in buying in Europe armored cars and torpedoes. The Peruvian government was decided to go to war and tell its diplomatic agents about it, they knew that asking for Antofagasta vacation was not an acceptable question for Chile". (8)

Lavalle belonged to a high-social class from Peru, brother-in-law of Manuel Pardo representative in Berlin and Saint Petersburg.

While they were discussing the possibility of Peru going to war, Minister Fierro interviewed Lavalle about the effectiveness of the Secret Treaty. Lavalle said that it was not true because he had not shown up in the Congress since 1876

when he was the foreign affairs president. Lavalle was not lying about the date because the treaty was signed in 1873.

On March 5, 1879, Peruvian Chancellery sent a secret circular announcing that military arrangements had finished and the war would start next month.

At the same time, the government commanded its agents abroad to try to stop the Chilean weapons purchases and try to disrupt the nitrate sales.

The minister in Buenos Aires tried to make Argentina become an ally offering then a coastline in the Pacific opposite Salta. Peru strengthened its diplomatic missions and the secret service.

The past events lead us to conclude that at the beginning of 1879, there were strong reasons to believe that there will be a war conflict.

However, there still was an action to avoid the beginning of conflagration: the arbitration considering the Treaty of 1874. This treaty stated that in case of disagreement, they will be delivered to the mediation of a third country.

The importance of referring to an arbitration in this part of the study is twofold.

First of all, because it demonstrates the result of the action both countries took to avoid war, and secondly because the arbitration was requested by the alliance during the meetings in Arica.

Chile discarded the arbitration saying that it was an embodied action to avoid a war conflict and not to use it when the conflict has evolved and there are some advantages for one of the warring parties.

Vergara said about the arbitration:

"Chile before holding its weapons and using force proposed several times to find an arbitrator to decide about dispute, but as it was not heard, it was forced to go to war" (9)

On January 3rd, 1879 Chile invoked arbitration. The minister of Chile in La Paz (Videla) requested Bolivia to answer in a 48-hour term if they wanted to arbitrate the conflict.

A second note on February 5th insists on the same topic. At first, Bolivia accepted the Chilean offer, but as a condition, asked Chile to accept the Law against Compañia de Salitres y Ferrocarril of Antofagasta. Chile did not accept that condition and the expectations of peace were disrupted.

Once the conflict finished in 1882, Mr José Manuel Balmaceda, Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a circular addressing all governments which had relations with Chile:

"Our efforts to maintain our enemies in the field of law we offer, as a last chance, arbitrate the extortion but Bolivia rejected the arbitration as long as Chile would not accept the imposition which could submit to an arbitration lawsuit notwithstanding putting it into effect.

The purpose was clear, they wanted to humiliate Chile, confiscate Antofagasta and in the event of opposition take away all Chilean territories that were about to produce nitrate, consolidating that way, the oppressive and absorbent action introduced by the Laws of Peru in 1873". (10)

Barros Borgoño says that Chile could not accept the implementation of the disposition of the Law that was approved by the Bolivian assembly, which affected all Chilean people in Antofagasta, and after being unheard the repeated propositions of arbitration produced the virtual breakdown, and the resulting declaration of war".(11)

On January 6th, 1879 the Prefect of Antofagasta Colonel Severino Zapata, informed the Company the instruction of paying the taxes established by the Law. As it was not fulfilled, on January 11th the government declared the embargo of the company properties and its resulting auction. When the

Manager heard he was going to be arrested, he ran away to the pampas, the jobs were paralyzed and 2000 people were unemployed.

Seeing this, the government of President Pinto decided to take action to avoid the auction.

On February 14th three naval units: warships Blanco, Cochrane and O'Higgins anchored in Antofagasta. A company of marines and another artillery landed and took possession of the city, which was covered by Chilean flags.

Bolivian authorities ran away inland.

The Chilean disembarkation was nothing but a demand as a response to Bolivian aggravations. On February 21st, 1879 President Pinto sent Joaquin Godoy an extensive letter arguing:

"we have not taken possession of the coastline as corsairs we have gone there as a need to defend our violated rights. We have been always willing to accept a solution to restore the relationship between Chile and Bolivia. He also adds: "The only possible solution would be an arrangement where we are the only owner of this territory in compensation of a sum of money." (12)

The game of foreign interests in Tarapaca

There are lots of implications to be made about the extra American interest on Tarapaca territory, from both economical and geopolitical point of view. Peru had the logical interest a country may have on a territory from other countries, because of nitrate and guano deposits. Due to those relationships among these interests and the result of the mediation, it is necessary to refer to them.

In 1841, Peru started a large scale exploitation of guano in the deposits of chinches islands. The product found good reception in the European market and soon became the main source of Peruvian state incomes and its ruling class, as well as contractors and consignees, especially English and French, who became Peruvian creditors. In 1879 the superiority of British people in the guano business went from being disputed by Dreyfus group. Peru had a heavy debt with the consignees. To pay its debts, it was necessary to increase the production of guano and implement a new system of merchandising substituting the consignment for the direct selling in Europe. In that moment, the French financer Augusto Dreyfus came into business and proposed the purchase of 2 M tons. That was accepted. The government started to receive immediate down payment / advance from Dreyfus that dealt with the service of the external debt of Peru.

The appearance of Dreyfus caused the resentment of previous English consignees. Some authors, Osborn Bermudez among others, have believed seeing in this chapter the beginning of a sharp antagonism between the English and the French capitalists that later achieved a higher level. Bermudez supported:

"Disaffected the Peruvian guano company of the Peruvian government and its tendency to the Chilean government is due to that environment of trust in Chile which was predominant in England." (18)

In 1869, the production of sodium nitrate was started in the first office at Salar del Carmen, Pampa located behind the coastal hills in Antofagasta. In the same period, the industry of the Nitrate in Tarapaca was about 40 years of development.

When entering office as President Manuel Pardo, the government of Peru in 1872, found that the situation of the fiscal incomes was scarce. The incomes came mainly from the guano which was a state ownership. Then, they thought about a new source of income which could come from nitrate which was in private hands.

To do this, the Peruvian government received the approval from the parliament from different laws which allowed the establishment of guano monopoly in the hands of the State and the expropriation of all nitrate companies in Tarapaca where there were strong foreign assets among them, some of which were Chilean property. On the other side, Valparaiso was the site for numerous and important foreign and Chilean companies, commercializing nitrate. Gonzalo Bulnes says that:

"Pardo decided to gather in one hand the nitrate and the guano: the fiscal monopoly presented an inconvenience; the business of nitrate was residing in Chile and this country was the first in Tarapaca." (14)

The expropriation of the nitrate companies in Tarapaca and the allocation of properties in Toco were cancelled by the Peruvian government through a salt peter certificate of 21.308.203 soles.

The offices in Tarapaca were transferred in 15.000.000 soles and the properties of Toco in 583.000 soles. The Law of April 14th, 1875 provided the payment of all certificates financing a loan payable within 2 years. Nevertheless, the contract wasn't finalized and the nitrate certificate remained as external debts documents which depreciated and covered the real value.

The condition of these documents holders were criticized after the declaration of war.

Oscar Bermudez shows in the following chart the moment of the nitrate producers in Tarapaca in 1879.

Peruvian assets 9.583.000 quintals of producer power 58,5%

Chilean assets 3.120.000 quintals of producer power 19%

English assets 2.202.000 quintals of producer power 13.5%

German assets 1.250.000 quintals of producer power 8%

Italian assets 210.000 quintals of producer power 1%(15)

As these amounts show the economic interest in Chilean citizens in Tarapaca was not indifferent to the government. In addition, the construction of nitrate railways caused the settlement of a huge amount of Chilean workers, the census in 1866 showed that the Chilean population in Tarapaca was a 50% of Peruvians.

Chilean domination and foreign interests in Tarapaca

After occupying Antofagasta and having failed all the arrangements for arbitration and military events which happened really fast.

On November 1879, the Chilean army had decided about the department of Tarapaca, and in June 1880 the army had dominated Arica. The Chilean government chose the campaign of Tarapaca due to its vicinity to headquarters, to prevent revenues from the enemy, to fight with all resources coming from that area and have in hand the pledge to assure expenses indemnity and future guarantees.

When the Chilean army finished the military occupation in Tarapaca, they raised a question of which could be the destiny of that territory. There were divided opinions about it. Some people thought the territory should be used as a guarantee to obtain indemnity of war, others thought it was necessary to include it to national domains. The fall of Tarapaca under Chilean hands, raised the question of the current situation of nitrate and guano. The House French-Israeli Augusto Dreyfus Hnos., the French society Le Credit Industrielle and the english The Peruvian Guano Company Limited needed to recover from the Peruvian debts with new agreements for the sales of guano and nitrate. Those companies and the English groups that had to pay the Peruvian debt, asked the support to their governments called from their diplomatic representatives in the United States, whose sympathies had been skillfully exploited by Nicolas Pierola who was supplied with weapons and ammunitions and all types of military elements for those signatures. Pierola admitted having a previous debt of 4.000.000 pounds with House Dreyfus, giving them the guano.

The uncertainty of Tarapaca's final destination, and consequently the riches of the sector, also disturbed several countries and people who thought of an intervention allowing them to reap dividends. In December 1881, the minister of France in Lima informed to his Chancellery:

"The war of the Pacific is the war of nitrate, nothing else. The question is to know if this precious substance, whose reservoirs are concentrated in Atacama and Tarapaca deserts, will remain in Chile or return to Peru, or will be grabbed by the northamericans, after a certain financial agreement with Peru. (16)

The countries that offer to the belligerents their good offices, mediation or arbitration, had a certain relationship or interest in the region of Tarapaca, in such a way that they could not be indifferent to their destination in the future, both for the riches of saltpeter and the guano and the geopolitical situation which may alter the balance of the power in South America, as seen previously, in the table quoted by Bermudez: Italy, England, France and Germany had economic interests in Tarapaca, and all of them offered their good offices with the objective of putting an end to the conflict, playing a different role in each situation.

Once the Chilean military success was known in Europe, and considering that Peru and Bolivia would not have the possibility to recover by armed force the lost territory, the trading houses which may be interested in saltpeter and guano, pressured their governments in order to take sides for the rank of their convenience. This pressure turned into an offering of good offices and mediation whose purpose was to support Peru by keeping its territory untouched. Anselmo Blanlot explains:

"It is true that, afterwards, when Peru was divested from any connection of responsibility with Bolivia, there was more than one foreign union that enabled them to replace with monetary compensation the territory assignment, the fact remains that enablers expected compensation with the riches of Tarapaca and the exploitation of an entire country and they flattered themselves saying that the military intervention will force Chile to submit to arbitration the monetary compensation, knowing or believing that this would not exceed from 50 million pesos (17).

Some authors like Vladimir Smolenski have believed that they have seen the origin of the war in the clash of economical and political interests of government fields of Chile, Peru and Bolivia and in the connections of the bourgeoisie linked to the political power with the foreign capital.

According to this author, these social groups had the idea of widening the territorial borders of their states and take hold of mineral ores. Not content with that explanation, Smolenski adds that the foreign powers took one side or the other saying that:

"... the intervention of foreign powers, specially the United States, delayed the peace arrangement and the war extended for several years, causing great sacrifices and additional devastations". (18)

Smolenski says also that due to the economical interest of United States in the area, the White House and Department of State offered their good offices, not to end the conflict but to exert pressure on the sides in struggle, with the aim of making profits for their country. About this issue, Smolenski says:

"Moreover, the documents certify that northamerican diplomats stimulated the hostility of southamerican republics." (19)

The article of Smolenski, which intended to attack the United States for their intervention in the war, was refuted by Professor William F. Slater who used the same documentation as the soviet historian. Sater showed the tampering of texts and the interpretation not very logical and preconceived of Smolenski without denying of course that the economical interests play an important role – not the only one – in causes of consequences of the War of the Pacific, and obviously in the attempts of mediation carried out by the powers interested in the saltpeter industry.

The economic interests, specifically the interest of individuals disturbing their governments with the aim of provoking an intervention in the war, was important and succeeded in promoting some diplomatic actions, which while having a certain importance, were not vital in the result of the struggle.

In fact, the foreign indifferences did not shake the course of events of the war, as for example through an armed action or an imposed arbitration, as several Bolivians and the Dreyfus group.

While this group recognized that Chile had the right for a compensation, they rejected the territory assignment, openly tending to a monetary compensation. As Peru and Bolivia did not have funds to pay this compensation, they will be contributed by foreign capitals, on the understanding that, on the other side a mortgage deed was established on the riches of the north.

According to this position, it was intended to offer Chile such compensation, in the event that Chile would not accept the offer, it was thought to force it through a diplomatic intervention, which was never implemented.

These approaches underestimated Chile believing or trusting that the country would easily be impressionable and suddenly comply what foreign powers would determine. On the other side, the same approaches oversized the possibilities that particular private interests could lead the governments of their respective countries to an open intervention even of a military character.

While the economic interests of various sectors were combined to decide the final destination of Tarapaca due to the result of military operations, around 1880. There was an economic crisis in the region which had its origin in the stoppage of a large percentage of the extractive industry, a situation which particularly affected local commerce which forced to lower prices and return their goods.

Military Situation around 1880

Once the Chilean forces occupied Antofagasta, they continued with Mejillones and Caracoles. Later they became present in Cobija, Tocopilla and Calama. The Combat of Topater took place in this last site among Chilean and Bolivians in the region of Antofagasta. Since Peru entered the war and began naval operations, the superiority of the Peruvian fleet was demonstrated.

On May 17th, the Chilean squad set sail from Iquique with the purpose of bombing El Callao, which were La Esmeralda and Covagonda. The rest of the Chilean squad crossed without finding each other offshore with the Peruvian ships the Huascar and the Independencia. These ships surprised the Chilean vessels, sinking the Esmeralda and the Independencia in the combat.

After a second skirmish in Iquique as well between the Huascar and the gunboat Magallanes in July 1879, the Peruvian army began an attack to cut off all communications to the north. These operations allowed Peru to capture the Chilean vessel Rimac.

On October 8th, 1879, Chile ended the naval power of Peru, and by consequence with their communications. From then on, the terrestrial phase of the war began. The Chilean army landed in Pisagua, beating opposing forces an in November 1879, Chile took over the province of Tarapaca. At the beginning of 1880, the Chilean army defeated the allied troops in Tacna and Arica. After the battle in Tacna, the Bolivian army did not continue the military campaign and the rest of the army returned to the Altiplano (highlands).

Undoubtedly, after these battles, the appropriate time to negotiate peace arose, because the outcome of the war was sufficiently defined. Most of the authors who have studied the problem, agree on this statement, Luis Barros Borgoño says:

"In fact, Chilean had the absolute domination of the sea and the victorious campaigns delivered by the provinces of Tarapaca and Tacna, the fate of weapons was resolved in July 1880, Bolivia had lost its coastline and Peru had not been able to defend its nitrate province and the interests in this industry that had incited them to war. The monopoly had fallen collapsed by its defenders of trade freedom and is opened to national and foreign people in Tarapaca and Antofagasta, and a new regime of guarantees for capital and protection for the right of individuals that would mark the beginning of an era of prosperity for the industry of saltpeter. (21)

Manuel Jordan Lopez, who investigated the diplomatic history in the war of the pacific referring to a previous period to mediation, says:

"the situation of the allies to the time of conference, was a chaos. Peru did not have a squad and the entire Bolivian coastline, together with Tarapaca and Arica was under the power of Chile". (22).

On the other hand, Garcia Calderon, actor and witness of the war, President of Peru established by the Chilean authorities during the occupation for a short period of time, says in his memories:

"Due to a lack of efficient mediation, the war lasted a long time and resulted in an almost complete destruction of the military power of Peru, the occupation of the Chilean troops all along the coastline of this Republic and despair of Bolivian army. Peru was in the most really difficult situation where a country might be. The foreign war had not left but just a small force in Arequipa which was the last bastion of its independence and Bolivia could not help them, because they declared their army had fallen down in Tacna, and while they did not recognize the army they would not do anything."(23)

Even though the facts showed it was necessary to negotiate peace with the objective of not transforming the military defeat of Peru in a crushing with the extension of the war, Pierola proclaimed to the Peruvian people an offer of maintaining the territorial integrity by all means. The diplomatic documents generally refer about a conditioned peace but the government of Lima strongly denied what the military defeats spoke for themselves. Peru would not accept the territorial dismemberment without a total defeat. The attitude of Bolivia was different, the highland country was more realistic, they recognized their defeat, and that explains why the war was a more favorable tendency towards the end of the struggle, assuming they did not have a military power.

Meanwhile, the public opinion in Chile, according to Gonzalo Bulnes:

"...there were 2 new tendencies, one of them was popular, they agreed the option of the campaign with the objective of taking over Lima, the other one, represented by the president and official circles, believed that Chile was still in the position of all they needed as self-assurance, the moment had come to tell Peru a word of peace, through friendly governments". (24)

The option of occupying Lima was also shared by some parliamentarians among them it is important to highlight Carlos Walker Martinez and Jose Manuel Balmaceda. General Manuel Baquedano and his staff were supporters of the campaign to Lima, and in that way they clarified President Pinto trying to persuade him by pointing out the magnitude of the enterprise which was not exempted of the danger of losing everything earned in previous campaigns. According to Gonzalo Bulnes, President Pinto opposed to the campaign of Lima because he did not trust on the leadership of the army handed by Baquedano and among civilians did not find who was going to replace Rafael Sotomayor Baeza, the minister of war in campaign deceased in the Camp of Varas before the battle of Campo de la Alianza. Sotomayor had been one of the authors of the victory of Chile. Also, the President thought the campaign over Lima would be unfruitful, because Pierola could escape to the mountains and from these continue resistance, as did with Jose Avelino Caceres after Chorrillos and Miraflores. On the other hand, he thought about the investment it was necessary to finance the campaign and bear the costs, in the context that the country was unable to go into more debts.

The Cabinet supported Pinto with the aim of avoiding the campaign of Lima, but once the results of the battle of Tacna were known in Santiago, there was a ministerial crisis, and a new Cabinet integrated by Manuel Recabarren, in the ministry of Interior; in foreign relations Melquiades Valderrama; Jose Alonso in Treasury; Manuel Garcia de la Huerta in Justice and Instruction, and Eusebio Lillo in War and Marine; as this person did not accept, he was replaced by Jose Francisco Vergara who returned to proactive policy and the war after a voluntary withdrawal in Viña del Mar due to unfair accusations he was made because of the defeat of Tarapaca. Domingo Santa Maria and Jose Manuel Balmaceda, efficient collaborators of Pinto, were representatives of opposite positions about the campaign of Lima. Santa Maria insisted on what it is called "Bolivian politics" thinking that a separately approach to Bolivia, considering the results of the military campaigns and the attitude of the government in La Paz. Santa Maria was confident that this approach would be successful. On the contrary, Balmaceda asserted that Bolivia could not resume the military actions, but through loyalty to Peru, they did not negotiate peace separately; everything else, according to Balmaceda, it would harbor unfunded illusions. Santa Maria's position must have been weighed in the Cabinet, because three of its members Alfonso Garcia de la Huerta, and Lillo had been appointed thanks to his influence. Ever though, the discussion focused on the opportunity and the convenience of prosecuting the campaign of Lima, which would be interpreted as a lack of unity in the government and the public opinion according to the annexation of Tarapaca (25). Thus, it is convenient to analyze which was the position of Chile regarding this territory before the conference of Arica.

When Chile militarily occupied the region of Antofagasta, it was interpreted as a territorial repossession and assertion given that legally Bolivia did not have rights to the Pacific (despite Cobija o Puerto La Mar) and the fact that the country had infringed the Treaty of 1874. Circa February 1879, there were no plans of annexation of Tarapaca or occupation of Lima.

As Chile moved to the north and the costs of war were increasing, they started thinking about the idea of a war compensation which should have at least two requirements: first, a fair compensation for expenses incurred to Chile, because the country has been provoked and led to an unwanted war. Secondly, the idea of coming to a solid and lasting peace, preventing future conflicts. Nevertheless, there was a third consideration: the interests of Chile in the territory of Tarapaca expressed in the economic investments and the presence of thousands of local people who had settled down in the area. If the government would not have stayed strong in its position, the entire country would have probably made it rectify its position. This way, the government knew quite well the national feeling; they would not take down the flag that was raised in Quebrada Camarones. Consequently, the inability of the government to accept a monetary compensation as indemnity of war, resulted in reinstating Tarapaca to Peru. Thus, subsequently, Jose Francisco Vergara said the following words in the conference of Arica.

"I'll repeat once more: Chile cannot take down its flag from those territories _ the Chilean plenipotentiaries cannot sign as agreement offering that, if they do that, the government and the country would deny the approval." (26)

Vergara knew that Tarapaca was not negotiable, because the country felt that the territory development was completely due to labors and capitals in Chile. Therefore, it was not acceptable to compromise a monetary indemnity. It is not effective what Manuel Jordan Lopez asserted in his thesis (27) concerning that Chile knowing that Peru and Bolivia could not pay a monetary indemnity, Chile may need to annex Antofagasta and Tarapaca to its territory. Regarding, this topic, the author claims:

"Peru and Bolivia were at the end of the war, in the absolute impossibility of paying a monetary indemnity. Bolivia could not afford an adequate indemnity and its credit was null before the war, the only country where they could ask for a loan was Chile. This loan was suspended as soon as they received the money. On the other hand, Peru was prevented from its credit, since it has abused going into debt in about 300 million pesos whose payment had been totally suspended, without the money and solvency necessary to face the payment of an indemnity however small it is. (27)

It is effective that both countries lack of internal resources to pay the monetary indemnity, but Mr. Jordan was wrong when he did not consider the foreign resources Peru could resort to pay the indemnity.

Thus we consider the statement that Peru "cannot pay an indemnity however how small it is" is not effective. In this regard, it is important to remember that Dreyfus House was especially interested in avoiding the dismemberment of the Peruvian territory and it offered the resources to pay the compensation Chile was demanding, obviously after bargaining a little. Professor Sater is referring to these points as follows:

"Unquestionably, these companies (La Credit Industriel and Compañia Peruana) were not inspired by any feeling of warm sympathy towards Peru. Both companies represented to European shareholders who were afraid that the annexation of Tarapaca to Chile endangered their investments. To protect these companies and avoid the seizure of Tarapaca, they proposed any indemnity that Chile could demand". (28)

Professor Sater insists that Chile could demand a monetary indemnity, for the amount they consider appropriate as despite Peru did not have a credit, there were third parties really interested in the nation of Rimac, avoiding a territorial loss.

There were also other elements that made monetary indemnity possible. How much would be that compensation? That implied to put a price to the experienced damages during the war. Jose Manuel Balmaceda clarifies:

"All damages caused to our local people in 1873, and during the struggle all effective expenses of war, the disturbances caused by the industry of 40.000 soldiers during 3 years of national defense, oscillations and economical disruptions that intensified the crisis at the beginning of the war, the assistance due to the invalids, the huge amounts that claimed blood and lives of 17.000 victims, and finally, the penalty Chile has the right to impose to its unjust aggressor, they add up an amount that its enemy is not able to pay.(29)

From the foregoing, nobody could dare to evaluate economically the losses of the country, either, in other words, how much could be the spilled blood of all Chileans? And another question was to know if the amount of money would satisfy the country. However, the government did not want to draw back the veil of doubt.

According to this, it becomes clear that the country would resist any transaction involving the return of Tarapaca to Peru. In this sense, it was established that in the period previous to the conference of Arica, Chile had a defined position about the destination of Tarapaca, and if the government did not accept this condition through the diplomatic channel, they would be forced to accept it, what implied go marching over Lima. The conferences of Arica made the government think if Peru and Bolivia recognized their defeat, they would accept to surrender Tarapaca and Antofagasta to avoid the possibility of peace, in case of having positive results, it would avoid the extension of a war, which by this time the conference it was defined enough.

Quotes to Chapter I

Gonzalo Bulnes, Resumen de la Guerra del Pacífico. (Santiago, 1976), p 18

E Diez de Medina, La Cuestión del Pacifico. (La Paz, 1923) p 107

Mario Barros Van Buren. Historia Diplomática de Chile. (Barcelona, 1970) p 341

E Diez de Medina. p. 62

Luis Barros Borgoño, La Cuestión del Pacifico. p. 102

Ibid, p 312

Ibid, p 334

Bulnes, p. 311

Protocols of the Conferences held by the Plenipotentiaries of Chile, Peru and Bolivia, in the Recollection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1880, p. 90

Jose Manuel Balmaceda, United States of America, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Department of State, "Notes from the Chilean Legation in the US to the Department of State, 1811-1906, Microcopy Nº13 roll 4, this publication will later be quoted with the abbreviation N.A.M.P. indicating the corresponding numbers to the microcopy and roll.

Barros Borgoño, p.37

Bulnes, p.36

Osborn Bermudez Miral, Historia del Salitre, Santiago, 1984, p. 88

Bulnes, p.36

Bermudez, p.55

Dispatches from Baron D'Avril French Minister resident in Chile, unpublished reports from foreign diplomats during the War of the Pacific, Santiago, p.325

Anselmo Blandot Halley, Conferencia Internacional, Chile, Peru and Bolivia. Santiago, 1919 p. 20

Wladimir Smolensky, "Los Estados Unidos y La Guerra del Pacífico", in the newsletter from the Chilean Academy of History Nº78, Santiago 1968 p. 98

Ibid, p. 99

Sater p.p185 a 206

Barros Borgoño, p. 109

Jordan Lopez, Historia Diplomática de la Guerra del Pacifico, dissertation to obtain the degree of Bachelor in Legal Sciences, U de Chile, Santiago, p. 101

Francisco García Calderon, Memoria de Cautiverio, Lima

Bulnes, p. 168

When quoting the annexation of Tarapaca, I refer to the transfer to Chile of the area, comprising the South of Quebrada Camarones, to the west of the border of Los Andes Range Peru and Bolivia until Quebrada Chorrillos and to the west until the Argentinian border, passing through the center of Lago Ascotan.

Recollection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chile, 1880, pp. 81-82

Jordan, p. 114

Sater, p. 194

Jose Manuel Balmaceda, Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chile to the legations of the Chilean Republic overseas, Santiago, 24 of December 1981, in Recollection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1881, annex 2, p. 5

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND MEDIATION BACKGROUNDS IN 1880

The international situation of Chile in 1880

In 1879, the Chilean diplomatic representation abroad was rather meager and fit the role that Chile played in the international community. The staff was composed by authorized Minister Plenipotentiaries in France, Great Britain, United States of America, Ecuador, Brazil and Uruguay; as a Chargé d´affaires with headquarters in Colombia; and a Secretary who temporarily had the same position in Argentina. During the war of the Pacific, the diplomatic corps was enlarged so Resident Ministers were appointed in Uruguay and Germanic Empire; and Charge d'affaires in Italy, Brazil, Great Britain and Argentina.

During the war, the government of President Anibal Pinto had the task of preparing the diplomatic front, especially at the time of American mediation, the chancellor had to face the emergency with a shortage of economic resources and personnel.

According to Mario Barros Van Buren, the diplomatic organization of the country was formed as follows:

"In order to coordinate diplomatic and military affairs, he appointed Mr. Jovino Novoa in charge of the Baquedano General Headquarters, and the secretary Mr.Domingo Gana as an counselor of Mr. José Francisco Vergara; during the conference in Arica; and a dozen of other appointments of Legation secretaries as Mr. Pedro Nolasco in Quito; Mr. José Tocornal in Bogota; Mr. Jorge Astaburuaga in Mexico and Mr. José Bernales in Washington. Professor José Abelardo Nuñez was appointed in charge of the Intelligence Service."(1)

Barros adds that during the war, diplomatic missions were established in London, Germany, Mexico and Rio de Janeiro. The first minister in Germany was Guillermo Matta; Adolfo Carrasco Albano was the representative in Mexico. In 1880, Anibal Zañartu was appointed as Minister in Quito, replacing Joaquin Godoy.

The Chilean representatives abroad had to carry out an arduous but successful task, taking into account the magnitude of the problems they faced with the scarce resources they had at those times.

Missions abroad had to earn sympathies and support from the foreign governments to the cause of Chile as well as distort the campaign that allies made against Chile among the diplomatic circles and the public opinion. They also had to be aware of the machinations of Peruvian and Bolivian diplomats who bought war supplies through third parties and tried to block provisions to Chile. In these cases, they had to unmask such actions uncovering the real destination of weapons and ammunitions. Referring to the tasks of the Chilean representatives, Manuel Jordán López points out:

"In fact, the few representatives of Chile abroad, especially those accredited in France, England and the United States, had to work hard to make the management of certain financial and banking circles inoperable, which were closely linked to Peruvian guano and saltpeter that allies put into motion skillfully with the aim of provoking an intervention from European powers assigned to impose the peace; in this way they could safeguard the numerous monopolistic interests threatened by the war." (2)

Jordan is right because before the Conference of Arica, the foreign powers with interests in the saltpeter did make several efforts to intervene in the conflict individually and collectively. The Chilean diplomats had to be alert to the origin and purpose of these actions; something not always easy to distinguish.

It was possible to compose a table showing the certified Chilean diplomatic corps and foreign resident diplomats accredited in Santiago by using, as a source, the Memoirs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented to the National Congress in 1880 and 1881.

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION OF CHILE (1880 – 1881)

CHILEAN DIPLOMATIC CORPS 1880 – 1881

FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC CORPS CERTIFIED IN CHILE 1879 – 1880

Bolivian Politics

Once Chile faced the war conflict, the government made different moves with other foreign governments in order to support the Chilean cause. The result of these proceedings was negative and the best arrangement the government got was a declaration of impartiality.

Chile, without international support, had to confront war out of its own resources. Discovering that its military actions, such as the bombing of the Peruvian coasts or the fire in the Hacienda Palo Seco, attracted negative attention toward the country. In other cases, the Chilean Diplomacy could not take actions because of the atmosphere that was created by its foreign allies.

In addition, there was an underlying bordering situation with the Argentinian Republic at that time, and of course, its allies tried to attract their approvals. The President of Argentina, Domingo Sarmiento, supported the idea that the Argentinian Republic had to join the secret agreement between Peru and Bolivia in 1873, but the Congress refused to agree with their President's idea.

This way, in 1881 Chile was facing problems with all its neighbors.

At the beginning of the war, a part of the Chilean government commanded by Domingo Santamaria, thought that reducing the hostilities and conflicts with the Bolivian Government through the transfer of Tacna and Arica for Antofagasta would separate them from Peru. This way they could maintain peace. All these efforts were useless. We have to clarify two issues about them.

The first one is to determine why supporters of the Bolivian Politics thought that this was the best idea and had a positive outcome. And the second one, is to know why, despite the efforts made on it, they didn't reach their goal. The study effectively shows the pretensions of Bolivia to seize Tacna and Arica. In that way knowing about this interest, Santamaria was not wrong to think about the proposal of a negotiation to the Government of Bolivia so they were able to dominate all of that territory. However, the negotiation efforts failed, all because of the Bolivian's iron will to support their ally, which was finally endorsed in the Secret Agreement of 1873. It was impossible to get a Peace Treaty or get to negotiate with Bolivia separately; Bolivia had to wait till the defeat of their ally, even though it was harmful to their interests.

Regarding the efforts of approaching Bolivia, Manuel Jordan states that:

"The letters sent to Daza about that situation did not get a response and were handed to the Peruvian Government. This way, the effect of this policy was the discredit of Chile in Peru and Argentina through the advertising of the correspondence _"_ (3)

About the interest of Bolivia in the position of Tacna and Arica, Jose Maria Valdivia states that:

"Thanks to this historical review, we can see that the Bolivian aspiration of acquiring Tacna and Arica, even with the Republic of Peru informed about it and initiated by the Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho in 1826, was maintained by the Governments of Mariscal Santa Cruz in 1830, Dr. Baptista in 1842, General Baptista in 1845, General Campero in 1880, Dr. Villazon in 1910 and in 1913 by General Montes; ambition that has been transmitted and perpetuated through declarations and civil wars" (4)

As it is evidenced in the quotation above, the Bolivian interest on Tacna and Arica was real. Jordan Lopez was correct after establishing that this action did not get a positive result but entailed the discredit of Chile. A work about the Bolivian coastline says that:

"T _he propositions of the Chilean Government were, on the other hand, the transfer of the territory of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Here we can see the double felony of offering foreign territory in compensation of the snatched coastline of our nation_ ". (5)

The failure of Bolivian politics proved that it was impossible, despite the efforts of Chile, to separate the allies. Bolivia established that it was going with Peru till the last consequences, a situation that some Bolivian authors regret:

"Bolivia could have dealt by their own, in those moments where the peace was in a negotiation, and when the war ended, with huge advantages, but they chose to follow Peru instead, until the end; such a behavior has never been recognized at the other side of the Titicaca". (6)

Bustamante, after saying that Peru recognized Bolivia's loyalty during the war, considered the opinions of many authors, who point out that after the Battle of Tacna, Bolivia abandoned Peru, not because they did not want to continue, but because Bolivia was militarily restricted to do it. As seen in Chapter I, after the Battle of Tacna, the Bolivian government recognized its defeat.

Despite the result of the initial arrangements of "Bolivian politics", the attempts of Chile for the implementation were kept till the realization of the Conference of Arica, without getting, of course, positive results.

The impact of the War of the Pacific on the American Continent

The situation that Chile faced before the Latin-American countries in the period prior to the Conferences was not favorable to its claims. The Peruvian diplomats communicated to the rest of the countries the Chilean interest for the region of Antofagasta, introducing Chile as an expansionist country, so it was seen as a real danger for the Latin-American balance.

Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, sympathized with the allies to a certain degree. The Central American countries said they agreed with Peru since the beginning of the conflict. This empathy brought collaboration with the allies, and it meant facilities for transporting guns from the United States. This was claimed by the Chilean Chancellery to the governments of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Colombia and Guatemala.

Once the attempts of Diego Barros Arana to come into an agreement in terms of boundaries had finished, the Argentinian consul in Valparaiso, Mr. Mariano E de Sarratea and Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna got an agreement in principle which was the basis for the treaty signed on December 6th 1878 known as the Treaty Ferro-Sarratea. In this treaty, the arbitration was established to solve the problems regarding the territories in dispute and incorporate the status quo of the Argentinian jurisdiction in the Atlantic, and over the Strait of Magellan from the Chilean side.

This treaty was ratified by Chile, but the parliament in Argentina rejected it, causing new tensions in Chile, especially since the War of the Pacific started. The solution was reached by signing the Treaty on July 23rd 1881.

According to Jaime Eyzaguirre (7) despite the treaty Fierro-Sarratea was received happily by public opinion in Argentina. The rejection of the Parliament was due to the situation created by the War of the Pacific, because at the same time the Chilean army was heading to the North in 1880, the Argentinian colonel Julio A Roca began the penetration of Patagonia to incorporate it to its country heritage. This colonizing action was legally confirmed in 1881. The situation with Argentina, on the eve of the Conference of Arica was not resolved.

Before the pact Ferro-Sarratea there were some conflicts that inflamed people and led to a harsh atmosphere. Mario Van Buren writes:

"After the capture of the North American corvette Devonshire, which was loaded with guano of an Argentinian license, captured by the gunboat Magallanes, Avellaneda tried to calm down the toiling masses who were surrounding the Palace, shouting and demanding the war against Chile, ordering the squad to set sail to the south. Belisario Prats understood that if he gave positions, Chile was lost. Passing over the president, the ministers of War and Foreign Relations, he said that if there was not a total mobilization, he was going home leaving Chile and would not come back to a country of cowards, on November 4th he stood the squad up and Chile took offensive". (8)

In this opportunity, the Chilean squad parked their ships in the Strait of Magellan waiting for orders. Avellaneda understood that Chile would not give positions and did not prosecute the conflict.

Mario Barros said that Argentina had different reasons to avoid getting into the War of the Pacific, which were:

1. In 1879, the situation in Patagonia was resolved.

2. The armored ship in construction was going to be blocked.

3. At the moment of war, Argentina was disarmed.

4. The war was seen as a disaster.

5. There were divisions inside the armed forces.

6. The danger of Brazil's intervention.

7. How fast Chile was in the Navy Naval campaign.

8. Why the Peruvian diplomacy was oriented after 1880 to mediation. ?? From that event, the war was stopped after every campaign and there were hopes for peace. Argentina could not go into war but during the campaigns there were long and short conversations.

9. The Treaty of 1881 ended with the warlike spirit.

Knowing the disadvantaged position of Chile against Argentina, the allies thought they could benefit from this situation, making them to join the Secret Treaty of 1873, and thus wage war with Chile. According to Diego Barros Arana, during the Conferences of Arica:

"T _he Plenipotentiaries of Chile did not know then, that on those days, while two representatives of Peru flaunted the horror of the conquest in Arica and their respect for the territorial integrity of the American states, there were other Plenipotentiaries from Peru in Buenos Aires unsuccessfully asking for the Argentinian alliance against Chile, and offering as payment for this alliance the dismemberment and mutilation of the Chilean territory, the government of dictatorship had had very good reasons to keep under secrecy everything related to unsuccessful tasks of Legation in Buenos Aires"._ (10)

Under these circumstances, Pinto's government oriented his diplomatic action to prevent Argentina from entering the war. With the objective of knowing the real intentions of the Trans-Andean government, at the end of 1979, Chile sent the deputy José Manuel Balmaceda on a special mission to Buenos Aires.

In his book about diplomatic history, Mario Barrios says that another way of finding the purposes of the Argentinian government was through the Chilean representation of Rio de Janeiro. Barrios Arana had access to the secret archives of Rio, which allowed them to have an adequate vision about the Argentinian-Chilean issue, understanding at the same time that this country would not change its attitude unless it was forced to.

Chile had neglected the relationships with Brazil in the years prior to the war, even removing the Chilean legislation in Rio. However, the close proximity to the conflict caused a change of attitude and the Government accredited José V. Lastarria before the Emperor, in a special mission to negotiate an alliance with Brazil in case Argentina entered the conflict as a belligerent.

José Tomás de Amaral, Baron of Cabo Frío and the one in charge of Brazil's international politics, after learning the Chilean purposes, said that his government did not have intentions of entering a continental war, since Brazil's interests were best served by keeping a strict impartiality. The Government justified this procedure as a rejection from Chile to a similar proposal by Brazil many years ago.

Apart from the sympathies shown by Brazil to the Chilean cause, the diplomatic efforts did not result.

When the Conferences of Arica finished, Argentina noted with concern that the military success was leaning towards the Chilean side, and as the boundary issue was still pending, the Chancellor Bernardo Yrigoyen requested the Argentinian minister in Rio, Luis L. Domínguez make known the current Bolivian attitude, especially the approaches and ideas of Chancellor Souza, who replaced the Baron of Cabo Frío when conveying the foreign policies. In response to the Argentinian offer of a joint mediation, the Brazilian Government postponed the response until January 24th, 1881, when the news about the victories in Chorrillos and Miraflores were known. Only then, the Brazilian Chancellor said to the Argentinian representative:

"There are no longer belligerents in the position to hear propositions of peace and discuss the means to bring it in a convenient way for both sides, but victors who fully consider the result of their efforts, and the defeated who are carried to the end not being able to extend the resistance. Furthermore, in Peru there is no Government to deal with the powerhouses eager to help them from their misfortune." (11)

The note from the Brazilian Government showed that mediations after the failure of the Conferences of Arica were unfeasible because one of the sides prevailed over the other, proving that the Conferences were done at the right time to negotiate peace and finish the conflict. Chile needed to show what was already known: At the time of the Conferences, there was an indisputable winner; everything else could have been avoided.

Before the Conference of Arica, there were some offers of good offices on the part of some Latin-American countries.

The government of Colombia was the first in offering their good offices. The respective note arrived in the Chilean chancellery on April 15th 1879, when the hostilities had begun.

In June of the same year, the government of Ecuador, moved by the same conciliatory purpose of Colombia, arranged the delivery of an extraordinary mission to Santiago, led by General Urbina, who asked the belligerents to empower their representatives in Quito to agree to the foundations of a settlement, stopping the hostilities from that moment.

Chile made Urbina see that neither Bolivia nor Peru would hear the proposals of peace, before Chile abandoned the territory of Antofagasta and as that was impossible, General Urbina saved his purposes for a better occasion and returned to his country.

It is important to mention that the offer of good offices, between these two countries, was inspired in a sound conciliatory purpose and an American spirit. Colombia and Ecuador did not have interest in the conflict area and they wished to avoid the bloodshed. Thus, these offers were reliable and lacked a second intention.

Nevertheless, the government of Pinto sent Manuel Valdes Vergara to Bogota with a special mission to influence the Colombian government to stop the weapon trafficking done by the allies in the Isthmus of Panama.

Valdes Vergara could not accomplish his mission successfully because the central government, before his arrival, had issued a decree signed on July 2nd, whereby it authorized the free trafficking of all kinds of goods and items through the isthmus, among them weapons and ammunitions. The decree banned the shipment of weapons in belligerent vessels through Panamanian waters. Despite this provision the shipments continued in Balboa to El Callao and other Peruvian coasts, especially in the transport vessels Chalaco, Oroya and Limeña.

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC ON EUROPEAN

FOREIGN POLICY

As seen previously, the Chilean military invasion in Tarapaca left the question open about the final outcome of those rich territories. The private companies associated with their respective governments, viewed with concern the risk of losing their investments in Tarapaca, which led them to negotiate some actions to protect their interests.

After knowing the Chilean victories in Europe, there was an adverse atmosphere against Chile, especially because England and France had considerable large interests involved in the war, especially linked to the foreign debt of the belligerent countries, the saltpeter company, the guano and commerce.

On the other hand, Germany was victorious in 1870, broadening its political and economic horizons, beyond Europe. The United States, afraid of a European intervention in America, looked for a solution to the conflict and during the period when James Blaine was the Secretary of State, lobbied in favor of the Peruvian government which only settled down with the withdrawal of Blaine from the government. (12)

The European position in the conflict had two sectors: one integrated by the United Kingdom, France and Italy, which acted along with the offers, and another one represented by Germany which refused to intervene in the conflict despite the interests in Tarapaca.

The Monroe Doctrine was another important element which stopped the European diplomatic action, avoiding the offer of good offices was imposed by force. That was because of the balance of European-American interests in Latin-America. A dispatch to a French diplomat reported this situation in the following terms:

"What is happening nowadays in the coast of the Pacific, it is an indirect but very natural consequence, of the Monroe Doctrine. From the moment the "Estados de America Meridional" considered that Union del Norte will protect them against the European ambition and pressure, they must understand that protection implies protectorate, that is to say a real sovereignty, but nominal. Anyone protected by his shield, sooner or later will feel the strength." (13)

Some authors like Vladimir Smolenski and Fernando Lecaros might have seen a rivalry between England and the United States due to the Latin-American domination. This is important because they pointed out that in accordance with this rivalry, the United States would have supported Peru, and England would have supported Chile. This support had connections with the country that would ultimately be victorious in the conflict, and would favor their own interests. What is true is that this theory is not effective as a specific situation. These authors generalize, though, effectively, some actions of the United States and England might suggest they would support, to some extent, one of the opponents. But it is not less true that these actions would favor one of the sides for one chance and the other side in some other time. So it is superficial to say that the United States had an open and sustained policy to support Peru and that England would do the same to Chile.

After suggesting the rivalry between the two powers, Fernando Lecaros says:

" _In this way, as the second third of XIV Century, the position of the English dominion against Argentina, Bolivia and Peru may be considered as a critical order, instead the submission of Chile, to the English dominion and its guidelines were so enormous that there was not only a full awareness in England where authorities claimed publicly in 1865 that "almost all companies in Chile depend on the British capital" but also, in other countries such as the United States of America, where some people saw how the European development grew, especially the British inside the new continent. Such a development was understood to be intensified in a special way during the American civil war to be developed according to its own dynamics so as 1882 they did not hesitate to say that within the Congress of Washington, Chile was, from the economical point of view "substantially a European province but British such a statement was raised along with other similar judgments to be evaluated on those congresses, the character of the war that was taking place in those moments for the Bolivian-Peruvian saltpeter, there were some people saying that was an idea from the British empire_ ".(14)

James Blaine occupied the Secretary of State under the government of President Garfield between March 7th 1881 and December 19th 1881. Blaine led a foreign policy different from England, which affected the peace conversations among the belligerents. In the Senate, Blaine said that talking about the saltpeter conflict as a war between Chile and Peru was a mistake. He said that "it is a war of England against Peru", using Chile as an instrument, adding that "I assume the responsibility of this statement". Blaine not only said these words to the Congress but he also transmitted them to the press, especially the Washington Post, in the issue of January 30th, 1882, which transcribed the following statement from the Secretary of State:

" _(Chile) obtained from England ships and war material. The Chilean soldiers marched to Peru with English cloth uniforms and rifles on their shoulders. The English empathy has supported Chile in its conquest and the commercial interest of England would receive a great push for the enlargement of Chile_ ".(15)

Despite Blaine's declarations, this was not an indication that England was in favor of Chile during the war. It is not true that the United States supported Peru during the whole period. It was only during the period of Secretary Blaine. So you cannot generalize with the attitudes of Great Britain and the United States.

Since the war began, the European diplomats who lived in the belligerent countries were concerned about the course of events, because they worried about the business aspect, the property and the goods of foreign residents. The ministry dispatches show their concerns and the position they assumed according to instructions received from their chancellors as the battles occurred. One of the first dispatches dated on April 11th 1879 is the best example of what was happening.

The following is the text:

" _Residencia Ministerial Imperial Alemana para Chile._

11th of April 1879

To His Excellency Minister of State

Mr. Von Bulow in Berlin

Will you have the courtesy of reading upon Chile, which has declared the war to Peru, has set a block to the Peruvian port in Iquique.

Iquique is the Port of Peru, where there are mainly saltpeter exports. The number of British, Italian and French residents in Iquique is higher than the Germans. The number of Germans could reach 60 people. _Gulich."_ (16)

The diplomats also expressed on their reports their concern about the actions of American agents, concern that was interpreted in trying to understand how the balance of forces would be after the war. A German dispatch exemplifies this concern:

" _Residencia Ministerial Imperial Alemana para Chile. Santiago, December 5th 1881_

CONFIDENCIAL

To His Excellency the Imperial Chancellor

Prince Von Bismarck

" _The commercial policy of the United States is addressed in general to absorb the business in the western coast of South America to the United States and move to the European commerce_ " (17)

Even though there was a real struggle to gain a major business influence in South America between England and the United States, this competition was not rendered into public supplies for the belligerents. Even though, at first, the European interest in Tarapaca Province motivated some action even of a military character, this was not caused by the presence of diplomats, agents and observants from the United States. If this country did not join the Europeans in an intervention, the more likely was an opposition to a European intervention as a support of the Monroe Doctrine, as effectively happened. The attitude of the German government frustrated the desires of interventionists who recognized their interest in Tarapaca did not join the attempt of the english-french-italian alliance, which refers to a possible European intervention. An instruction of Chancellery of Berlin dated on May 20th 1880, specifies:

" _Even though, at first, the interests of some European potencies, due to their commerce were talking in favor of an intervention, there is a very detailed analysis and much more important than the interests of big potencies which are against all kinds of intervention... a European intervention by the force of weapons had certainly bad consequences to Europe in the sense that the flames of aversion of Latin America would burst against Europe which had numbed lately._

_Especially due to the European intervention, the nationals who belonged to the controller potencies and those who lived in Latin America would be suffering._ "(18)

Even though the governments of England, France and Italy were conscious of the limitations of a possible intervention, the fact remains that they were continually pressured by the trading houses of their co-nationals to push them to intervention, and in this atmosphere several offers of good offices from the European potencies were carried out preceding the Conference of Arica.

Time after the Declaration of War to Peru, the government of Her Royal Majesty was the first to offer its good offices and although at the time of receiving this offer there were military operations, the Chilean government accepted the offer. On the other hand, the Peruvian Chancellery had a negative response to the British offer, arguing that it was not possible to accept it, due to:

" _Unfortunately as it is of public matter the hostilities have begun on the part of Chilean government and in the shape of a barbarity character_ ".(19)

Any attempt of mediation, in circumstances that the hostilities had begun, would have implied that before the negotiations, the allies would claim the immediate evacuation of territories in possession of Chilean weapons, such a petition could not be accepted by Chile.

Moreover, both belligerent parties trusted their own capacities to lead their opponent's defeat, and seeing this atmosphere all attempts of mediation would be useless.

To exemplify this situation, Manuel Jordan Lopez says that the Chilean attack to Pisagua had been the excuse for the English government, which was moved in secrecy by the Peruvian creditors, to obtain a joint action with other potencies. For such purposes, Chile asked the German government which was the only one that had expressed its sympathies for Chile. The German chancellery trying to frustrate the British initiative, accepted with the condition of extending the invitation to the United States. The German chancellery knew that the United States would not accept a joint mediation. Mario Barros Van Buren says:

" _Eager to give the operation an international and wide mood, Salisbury invited the Ambassadors of Germany, Italy and France to Saint James. The last two countries agreed on a joint action. Count Münster, Ambassador of Bismarck said that Germany would not intervene if the United States would not do it either. The four representatives knew that the American Sub-secretary_ _Mr. Evarts did not support the intervention of American affairs along with European powers. Hence, the German proposition was seen as an elegant way to put themselves aside._ (20)

The North American answer to this proposition was negative and confirmed the German position. The Chilean attack over Mollendo and the resulting consequences, caused a strong reaction against Chile. In this opportunity, the Italian government led the way, supported by the governments of England and France, protesting for the damages caused to the non-partisan's properties and goods, hence the idea of imposing a joint mediation to belligerents. This idea failed because of the position of the German government that refused to join the mediation. Bismarck had sympathy for the Chilean people, having it in mind as the Prussia of South America.

After all these attempts, England and its allies saw the necessity to change its policies and guide a one-sided intervention offering only its good offices. Once the English proved the failure of the Conference of Arica, they decided on arbitration. On December 3rd 1880, the English ambassador certified in Berlin, proposed to the German government a new project, which included, among their main bases, the submission of all issues that caused the war and the adjustment of all peace terms to a mediator's resolution. Again, Germany frustrated these attempts, saying that an intervention would always tend to decide on the defeated, when in a specific case, one of the belligerents was the unquestionable victor. To Germany, it would be difficult to fail to impartiality.

As it can be seen, there were several attempts by England and its allies to intervene in the war in the shape of mediation and arbitration. These attempts caused a great job to the European and American ministries certified in Lima, La Paz and Santiago.

On the eve of the American mediation, on September 10th, 1880, Baron D'avil referred to the topic as follows:

"President Pinto has thanked us for our good offices. If it is necessary, I will always provide assistance to the work of peace.

I could do it without compromising our dignity, because we, Count Sanmiatelli, Mr. Pakenham and I, have to be careful of expressing any bias in favor of treacheries that are not respectable from the American side, even from the Chileans, these people have shown more dissimulation than frankness. Ceasing the war is all that matters now, even if it is only to prevent the eventualities of Lima. You must remember that the good offices from British, Italian and French legations have led to the first conversations, and justifying the American mediation, we must wish them every success." (21)

It is difficult to say and prove which were the motives of the pressure from the English and allies to carry out a mediation or arbitration, but the fact remains that there was a clear relationship between the governments, the trading houses and the interests in Tarapaca saltpeter. If the Peruvian Government lost the saltpeter reservoir, the debts contracted with France could not be repaid, especially the ones from the Dreyfus House, which had a strong relationship with the French Government. Thus, it was vital for this French house to avoid Tarapaca from being ceded to Chile. The joint mediation attempts show that it is not true that the English Government was interesting in promoting Chile, and in the light of above, the only government interested in favoring Chile was Germany, which in our opinion, has not been properly studied. All of this, in spite of the work of Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal and the general review don by Professor Ricardo Krebs Wilchens. (22

The failure of the European diplomatic intervention, in which the Old Country chancellors put all their efforts in many occasions, opened the way for the United States.

THE NORTH AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC

Between 1877 and 1881, President Rutherford B. Hayes ruled the U.S., with William M. Evarts as Secretary of State. James A. Garfield took office from 1881 with James B. Blaine as Secretary of State.

President Garfield ruled only for a few months, and died in office after being assassinated. He was succeeded by Vice President Chester Arthur, who appointed F.T Frelinghuysen as Secretary of State.

The American foreign policies suffered an unparalleled overturn due to Blaine's actions, who adopted a highly anti-European mindset, specifically anti-British, in relation to Latin-American affairs, facing an interventionist action in order to stop the British commercial expansion.

As Blaine was convinced that the English definitely supported Chile and that a Chilean victory would favor the English interests, he opted to support Peru to avoid the cession of Tarapaca to Chile as much as possible.

Garcia Calderon assumed the Presidency of Peru temporarily with consent of Chile after the occupation of Lima. In his Memoires he says:

" _Mister Garfield, President, and Mister Blaine, Secretary of State, wanted to infuse their country's international policies with an essential American spirit. That Government not only recognized the one I represented and constituted a Legation to support my policy of dealing with Chile without giving up territory, but also by a diplomatic agreement held in Santiago, obtained the promise from the Chilean Government to let the Legation to be constituted without interference."_ (23)

Blaine's period constituted a well-defined break for the foreign policies of the United States, whereby at its end, they took a less interventionist position in the affairs of the War of the Pacific. This period obscured the foreign policies of the United States, but according to our judgment, it is a mistake to confuse the Period of Blaine with the whole American foreign policy during the War of the Pacific. In fact, before Blaine took office as Secretary of State in 1881, the world of foreign policy was perfectly coherent. Although Blaine's administration started immediately after the Conferences of Arica, it is necessary to refer to the changes done during his term.

According to Mario Barros, the War of the Pacific was not interesting at the beginning. He adds:

" _What the government did not see, was seen however by the American diplomats in Buenos Aires, Santiago, Lima and La Paz. If the United States did not interfere, the Europeans would have, especially England, France and the international bankers, whose interests were being destroyed by the war, and above all, their investments in Peru."_ (24)

The US did not have great economic interests in Tarapaca. According to several authors, like Barros Van Buren, The United States did not have great economic interests involved in Tarapaca. According to several authors, like Barros Van Buren, the United States' motivation to intervene in the conflict was a hegemonic struggle with the European countries. In accordance with this assumption the United States should move from the South American business to the English, a real fact during the period of Blaine. The diplomatic material from the previous stage, as it was studied, allows us to conclude that there is no evidence that proves such a motivation and less could be claimed that the United States offer of good offices were hiding the motivation of moving the English business. By contrast, you must remember that England agreed on participating in joint mediation with the United States on a second attempt, the idea that England was supporting Chile and the United States to Peru did not have documentary support and it is a theory that has been used with preconceived purposes.

On the other hand, José Victorino Lastarria did not stay too long in Rio de Janeiro, and following instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he headed to Montevideo where he met with President Latorre, who empathized with the Chilean cause. However the President watched out to express this feeling having in mind their neighborhood with Argentina. After leaving Lima, Joaquin Godoy was certified in Ecuador with the mission of getting an alliance, having in mind the border difficulties between two countries. This objective was not achieved because General Veintinella had come to the government of Ecuador with Peruvian support. Godoy, noticing this situation just requested the performance of duties according to his neutral position in the conflict, succeeding in this mission.

Having reviewed the international situation of Chile in the diplomatic Latin-American context, it can be assumed that, in the period prior to the Conference of Arica, the country would fall short of allies that could provide effective support for the war. On the contrary, the allies had the support of most countries from South America, that without a military intervention, would allow the traffic of weapons through their countries. On the continent level, Chile had to face the fate of war completely isolated.

Before analyzing the background of mediation in the North American case, it is convenient to refer to the situation of Legation in Chile, in Washington. Once the war started, President Pinto decided to certify Francisco Solano Astaburuaga y Cienfuegos at the White House, as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. Astaburuaga had carried out the same role during the American Civil War.

Pinto sent the American president, on April 3rd, 1879, the following message:

"Anibal Pinto, President of Chile to His Excellency the President of the United States of America, great and good friend, I passionately express to you my interest of maintaining the close and cordial relations between Chile and the United States and as a token of my desire to have close connections with you, I have decided to certify the Chilean citizen Francisco Solano Astaburuaga as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, who has carried out the same role at your government. The honorable backgrounds of Mr Astaburuaga, his friendly and conciliatory spirit, makes me feel that you will give him a warm welcome and give credit to what he says in my name, especially when the votes means, I have for the enlargement of the United States and your happiness, I beg the Lord has you in his Glory". (26)

Francisco Solano Astaburuaga performed his duty up to January 24th, 1881. His mission was hard, as of all Chilean representatives in Europe, since he had to undermine the anti Chilean campaign of the allies, block the weapons shipment and war supplies and strive the United States in neutral. In one of his notes, he describes how to avoid the purchase of a torpedo boat from Peru, saying:

" _For this reason, and by virtue of provisions of Treaty 1832 between the United States and Chile, permanently and perpetual concerning peace and sincere friendship and respective neutrality, I'd promise you the adoption of appropriate measures to sort the departure from ports of the United States of the torpedo boat, that clearly it is allocated to trigger hostilities against Chile._ " (55)

The mission also made him defend his country from several complaints made by American residents in Tarapaca, due to alleged damages to their properties and goods on account of military operations.

The last days of the ministry of Varas, the first official management of the American government was carried out to stop the war which was done through the American representative in La Paz, Mr. Newton Pettis who contacted Doria Medina and the representative of Daza in La Paz, Mr. Guerra. Pettis agreed along with President Daza y Prado arbitration in charge of the president of the United States or by a court ad-hoc formed by plenipotentiaries. In Santiago, Pettis met with Minister Hunneus, who surrogated Santa Maria in the Relations Portfolio. In this opportunity, Hunneus said that Chile considered a basic requirement to obtain peace, the derogation of Secret Treaty of 1873.

Pettis and Osborn presented a formal proposition of arbitration, where the government of Chile accepted only in relation to Bolivia, not Peru. Bolivia did not accept this condition and frustrated the first American attempt.

In this negotiation, at least three important aspects were observed: the American interests of stopping the conflict _with the only intention of preventing major damages_ and the Chilean demand of derogating the Treaty of 1873. Chile still was not recovered from the impression that while Peru was introduced as a mediator, they had a Secret Treaty with Bolivia. And finally it was also proved that Bolivia would not break the alliance with Peru and would not pact peace separately. Until August 1880, Bolivia did not raise any new idea of mediation.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

As it was demonstrated in the first chapter, at the moment of carrying out the Conference of Arica, the allies were militarily defeated. The campaign of Tarapaca practically had decided the result of the war and its extension would be a sterile resistance. After the battle of Tacna, Bolivia decided not to continue military operations and the government authorities announced to their people they had been defeated. But, despite Bolivia understanding that their efforts had had a negative outcome, they were not willing to negotiate peace separately and remained loyal to their ally. As this country was determined to resist until sacrifice, Bolivia assorted the Peruvian government in their audacity.

In Chile, an important sector of the government did not agree the expeditionary idea over Lima because of the human and economic sacrifices and the great effort implying the new campaign. Furthermore, the insecurity in the leading of the army due to the disappearance of Rafael Sotomayor was another source of concern. Instead, the Parliament and the vast majority of public opinion were determined supporters to go to Lima. The offer of mediation done by the United States was a stopover that could have decided the war and it agreed with the approach of the government to retain Tarapaca, avoiding the Campaign of Lima.

QUOTES TO CHAPTER II

(01) Mario Barros Van Buren, Historia Diplomática de Chile; Barcelona, 1970. pp. 309-310

(02) Manuel Jordán López, Historia diplomática de la Guerra del Pacífico, Santiago.

(03) Ibid, p. 92

(04) José María Valdivia, Tacna, Arica y Cobija, La Paz, 1919, p. 135

(05) Instituto Investigaciones Históricas y Culturales de La Paz, El problema del litoral boliviano. La Paz, 1966, p. 141

(06) Daniel S. Bustamante, Bolivia su estructura y sus derechos en el Pacífico, La Paz, 1919, p. 164

(07) Jaime Eyzaguirre, Breve historia de las fronteras de Chile. Santiago, 1967, p.

(08) Barros, p. 314

(09) Ibis, p. 356

(10) Diego Barros Arana, Guerra del Pacifico, Complete Works, Volume XVI, p. 381

(11) Francisco Antonio Encina, Historia de Chile

(12) Unpublished reports from foreign diplomats during the War of the Pacific, Santiago, 1980, pp. 9 and 10

(13) Ibid, p. 310

(14) Fernando Lecaros, La Guerra con Chile.

(15) Lecaros, p. 79

(16) Dispatch from the German Minister resident in Chile to the Minister of of the German State, Santiago, 11 of April 1879, in unpublished Reports, p. 68

(17) Dispatch of the German Minister resident in Chile, the German chancellor. Santiago 5 of December 1881, in unpublished Reports, p. 876.

(18) Unpublished reports, p. 49.

(19) Jordan, p. 95

(20) Barros, p. 49

(21) Dispatch of the French Minister resident in Santiago, to the Secretary of the French State, Santiago, 10 of September 1880, in unpublished Reports, p. 289

(22) See Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal, "Actitud de Alemania durante la Guerra del Pacifico" in Boletín de la Economía Chilena de la Historia Nº40, Santiago, 1949, p.p 29-44

(23) Francisco García Calderon, Memorias del Cautiverio, Lima, 1949.

(24) Barros, p. 364

(25) Barros, p. 364

(26) Letter of the President of Chileno to the President of the United States of America, Santiago 3 of April 1879, en N.A.M.P. Microcopy Nº 73, roll Nº3

(27) Note from the Chilean Minister resident in the United States of America to the Secretary of State of the United States, in N.A.M.P. Microcopy Nº73, roll Nº3

CHAPTER III

THE CONFERENCE OF ARICA. ORIGINS AND ACCEPTANCE OF MEDIATION

The conferences of Arica constitute an important episode in the History of the Pacific War because it was the first time the belligerents accepted the good offices and the mediation of third power and sat at the negotiation table. Up to that moment, all attempts for mediation had aborted before the representatives were brought together. Also, it was the first occasion on which the terms of peace were discussed, even though the war had not finished. The belligerents had a certain level of faith in the result of the conferences. For Chile, there was a possibility that the allies would recognize their defeat and accept the terms demanded, avoiding thus, the campaign of Lima. To Bolivia and Peru, it meant the possibility of either avoiding the territorial transfer or paving the way to arbitration, if mediation failed.

In previous chapters, it was demonstrated that at the time of mediation, the military resistance of the allies had become an agony. Mr. Andres Avelino Caceres said that:

"with the taking of Arica, the territories of the South, which were the object of the invaders' ambition, passed into their hands. It was then when the diplomatic leverage was used to stop the war" (1)

Maks Portugal highlighted that the mediation offer was made by the United States government: "In view of the fact that the war was taking about two long years; that Peru had come to an internal political disruption at the same time; and that in Bolivia the political situation had changed after the separation of General Daza from his high rank as President of the Republic and Supreme Chief of the campaign, the government- at the time in charge of General Narciso Campero- accepted to go to the conferences" (2)

Another point that is clear in Chapter II is that Chile lacked effective international support, as Jose Manuel Balmaceda stated:

"we have come into war on our own, and in the exercise of sovereignty and our legitimate international freedom, we will finish it alone" (3)

The North American government reckoned that the fall of Arica was the best moment to offer its good offices and mediation. According to Vicuña Mackenna, any person who ignored the military events but that had studied the documents in which the mediation was offered and accepted, would have concluded that Chile was the defeated country and the allies were the victors. In those documents, Chile appears as the first country accepting the mediation, which meant that mediation came from the victor and not vice versa. It can also be concluded that the allies accepted the mediation with some reluctance. That is why Mackenna says:

"an adverse destiny to Chile wanted things to happen in that way, and the innuendos of peace never came from the defeated enemy but from La Moneda Palace."(4)

On August 26th, 1880, the North American minister in La Paz, General Charles Adams, received instructions from the Department of State to offer mediation to the government of Bolivia. The same happened simultaneously with the ministers JP Christiancy in Peru and Thomas Osborn in Chile. The resident minister in Peru did not have the occasion to receive instructions, because the same day, August 26th , he arrived in Valparaiso from Lima with the purpose of meeting with the minister of the United States in Chile.

According to Vicuña Mackenna, on August 28th, when the American ministers were having a meeting, Jorge Hunneus paid them a visit in order to urge them to come to an agreement. (5). He says that on the 29th, Osborn and Christiancy visited President Pinto in a private meeting. It is important to say that Christiancy acted on a personal basis, since he learnt about the instructions to offer a mediation to Peru only when he returned to Lima, It is through Christiancy himself that the aim of the meeting with Pinto on the 29th was known Vicuña Mackenna transcribes a paragraph of a dispatch from Christiancy to the Department of State:that says:

I've just arrived from Santiago where, together with the American minister Mr. Osborn, we had long conversations with the Chilean government, who accepted the mediation of the United States to negotiate peace with Peru and Bolivia. Now I have the permission to say that Peru accepted the mediation, and the negotiations of peace began immediately. When I talked with the Chilean government, I was not authorized, but now I am able to say that Peru accepts the mediation, and the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents will have a meeting on the first days of October" (6).

According to what Vicuña Mackenna says, the government of Chile had accepted the mediation in August, that is to say, before the allies had. The official documents say that Peru accepted the mediation on September 14th, and Bolivia on September 3rd. Vicuña Mackenna insisted on that Chile accepted the mediation on August 27th, but there is evidence that they accepted it on August 6th. This acceptance had a conditional character; the following documents proved the statement:

"Legation of the United States in Bolivia, La Paz, August 27th 1880.

Sir: I have the honor of announcing that I have received a dispatch from the minister of the United States about the Chilean government, informing that my government has expressed the feelings of collaboration for the restoration of peace in honorable terms, as it must be between nations which maintain friendly and sincere relationships. The mediation of the United States has been accepted by President Pinto, and I will be really pleases to communicate this to His Excellency, if the efforts of this nature are considered by the government of Bolivia, and if you accept my invitation to a conference. I also want to express to His Excellency my feelings of highest consideration to be your very obedient servant. Carlos Adams" (7)

According to Vicuña Mackenna, the Government of Chile, afraid of the public opinion that wished the army to march very soon over Lima had offered, out of diplomatic courtesy, the mediation on October 6th in a message of Osborn to Melquiades Valderrama. He says:

Legation of the United States

Santiago, October 6th 1880

Sir: you know that on August 6th I approached the honorable President of the Chilean Republic, with the purpose of knowing if the government of Chile was willing to go to the Conference with the ministers of the belligerent republics in the present war, in order to come to an honorable peace under the mediation, in the shape of good offices, of the United States. Your Excellency informed us in the interview of August 10th that the government would accept the good offices of the United States as suggested, if Peru and Bolivia accepted this idea". (8)

Bolivia conditioned the acceptance of the offer to the Peruvian answer, according to the secret treaty of 1873, The Peruvian chancellery, through his minister in La Paz, Mr. Barinaga, recognized- as stated in the letter of September 14th\- which they only did it "in deference to the government of the United States". The attitude of the allies, according to these declarations, did not correspond exactly to that of the defeated who want to achieve peace quickly so as to avoid further damage.

The following document proves that Bolivia, besides conditioning its agreement, was acting in accordance with Peru, even on personal detriment:

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bolivia.

La Paz, September 3rd, 1880

Mr. Minister: According to what I informed you in our interview of September 1st, and reiterating the tribute to the proposal of the government of the United States to contribute to an honorable solution in the present War of the Pacific, it is satisfying for me to express that my government, in compliance with the pact of the alliance that binds this republic with Peru, is addressing the Peruvian office, making them know that he considers worthy of the American interests and modern civilization the mediation suggested by the government of the United States, and to definitely accept it, he will await the official announcement of the allied government with regard to the equal invitation that was made, as this agreement is essential for the faith with which Bolivia keeps its commitment" (9)

On the letter of September 14th sent by the Peruvian minister to Christiancy, who accepted the mediation, he refers to Chile in offensive terms:

"The mobiles of the war declared surprisingly by Chile to Peru, and the manner how it was made since the very first day, persuaded us how distant Chile is from the path of moderation and justice".

On the same note he adds:

"Not withstanding the evident justice of their cause, their total certainty in the successful end of the war, and the damage and offenses received on entering into negotiations of peace, destroys entirely such mobiles, so the present and painful evidence shows that we are in war with someone who violates the laws of civilization and respect that cultured nations owe to each other" (10)

This letter shows how far Peru was from recognizing their defeat. The terms used by the minister may have well motivated the rejection to mediation on the part of Chile..

This situation did not pass unnoticed by the British, who were attentive to the events, waiting for a moment to intervene in the conflict, such as the English minister acredited in Chile. It says:

"Valparaiso, October 16th, 1880.

Mr. Conde Granville

Regarding my office Nº70 of October 4th, in which I sent you a copy of the United States government's response, please have the honor to include a copy of the letter from Mr. Osborn, Minister of the United States in Chile, formally offering this mediation in the shape of good offices and also the answer of this government accepting the mediation.

This last event has been a surprise in Chile. When the contents of the Peruvian letter were known publicly, it was presumed that its offensive nature would be enough to make any friendly agreement possible. Nevertheless, it has been done differently, and Chile will be represented in the Conference on board the warship of the United States. Vicuña Mackenna, referring to the Chilean acceptance and the Peruvian response, says:

"We do not have the purpose of deepening this shame but to sketch it so as to impose on the perpetrators the punishment of their own deception and for the country and posterity to learn a useful lesson from history. And for the same reason, it will suffice to say that the Peruvian dictator, giving himself airs of requested and making it appear in public documents, named peace negotiators on September 29th , when Chile had already named them three weeks before".(12)

Unlike what happened with the response of the allies to the offer of the American mediation, Chile, in a sober note of October 7th made official its acceptance, .

"Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile.

Santiago October 7th, 1880. Sir: I received the note dated yesterday that you have sent me. After reminding us of the steps taken with the purpose of enquiring if my government would be willing to enter peace conference with other belligerents under mediation, in the shape of good offices from the United States and after reminding us also of the favorable disposition of my government as long as Peruvians and Bolivians would have accepted their management,, you have informed me that the time has come to formally offer the government of Chile the mediation of the United States

His Excellency, the President of the Republic, has commissioned me to convey to you the expression of your gratitude the noble interest with which the government of the United States seeks the restoration of peace between Chile and the allied republics.

My government accepts the mediation, in the shape of good offices that you are offering in the name of the United States and also accepts the procedure that you suggest to carry it out.

I must, yet, repeat here to avoid doubt and ambiguities; this acceptance does not include the suspension of our hostilities.

I take the opportunity to offer you the feelings of high consideration.

Yours truly, Melquiades Valderrama". (13)

As seen in this letter, the Chancellery established that the acceptance of the mediation did not involve the cease-fire. Very probably President Pinto, as a connoisseur of the Chilean people's desire and its army decided to continue with military operations until he could see the result of the conferences. The Chilean attacks in the North of Peru were severely criticized abroad, due to, precisely, having accepted the mediation. The allies were favored with the opportunity created by the Chilean government and started to discredit the country overseas. Vicuña Mackenna expresses his opinion about these activities, this way:

"That crusade of urgency and destruction to bombard and destroy was historically known as "expedition Lynch", which was embarked in the transports Itata and Copiapo to then go, as war pressure, to ruin the valleys and factories of the North, and in this way, push the country into peace.

No brain, as sick as it might be, could have devised an endeavor so much beyond reason and purpose and opportunity, without taking into account the implicit barbarism that witll affect the properties on sea or land." (14)

Truly, the expedition of Patricio Lynch was not fortunate, considering the political moment they were living. One of their many misdeeds was the fire at Hacienda de Palo Seco, which belonged to Mr. Dionisio Derteano. This caused a shocking impression inside the diplomatic circles. The Bolivian chancellery tried to sensitize the north Americans, and a letter sent on October 1st ,1880 from La Paz, let the North American know:

"the ultimate events of devastation perpetrated in the north of Peru by the Chilean forces against private property and unfortunately confirmed in the most despicable tones have called my government attention, not only because they represent an outrage to civilization and rights of the nations, which restrict the war damages to what is absolutely necessary to ensure the success of the military operations, but also because those actions tend to compromise the official word of one of the belligerent powers pledged before the respects of a friendly nation which, as a gift of peace and American interests, had taken upon itself the purpose of making the mediation more effective".(15)

Once the belligerent countries accepted the mediation, a difficulty arose: to agree about the place where the conferences would take place..

The government of Peru made it clear that if the condition was not accepted, they would not go to the conferences. In attention to the military situation of Peru, everything indicated that they were not in a position to attach conditions, but the facts were different. On the other hand, Chile agreed about the conferences for the plenipotentiaries being held on board the North American vessel and in front of the ministries of the United States in Chile, Bolivia and Peru, discarding other mediators. The chancellery also demanded that the ship should be hidden in Arica Port and that the plenipotentiaries from Peru and Bolivia should arrive on a disarmed ship, holding a free pass given by the Chilean Counter Admiral that was blocking El Callao. Chile was hoping that the conferences would be carried out in Arica, which was occupied by the Chilean troops and which, besides, was connected to Santiago by telegraph, which would also facilitate information between the Chilean plenipotentiaries and the government; the latter, obviously, wanted to be informed regarding the progress of the negotiations.

Regarding the places where the conferences had to take place, the North American minister received a letter from the Peruvian chancellery dated September 29th.:

"My government understands that the conferences must be held somewhere on the coast between El Callao and Pacocha, The place will be designated by the plenipotentiaries in the United States, and the belligerents must attend on unarmed ships.."(16)

Once the Chilean demand of negotiating in Arica was known, Chancellor Barinaga wrote a letter to the American minister on September 30th talking about his feelings:

"I am answering the letter I've just received from you, in the case (improbable in the case of His Excellency) Chile would refuse to hold the conference in another place but Arica, which was the place spontaneously chosen by His Excellency, Peru would consider it as a sine quanon condition for negotiations.

You know the reasons that my government has had to propose, instead of Arica, anywhere between Pacocha (where the Chilean troops came) and El Callao, hoping that the plenipotentiaries can communicate by telegraph to their respective governments, reliable conditions for the ease of the negotiations in the region.

We are not questioning this or another place, to which it is impossible to give such decisive importance.

But what we would not have accepted is our plenipotentiaries having a conference in Arica or any other places on the coast that belong to the allies and that are occupied by the enemy.

I let you appreciate yourself the fairness of our decision. As soon as my government knew about the possibility of holding the meeting in Arica, they said it to His Excellency, and we give so much importance to this point, that in the hypothesis that Chile requires it that way, Peru would be deprived of attending the conferences.

With sentiments of high and distinguished consideration, your very attentive server greets you.

Very sincerely yours" (17)

In spite of the very conclusive terms of the letter, the Peruvian demands were not heard due to the Chilean strong opposition. Once the place of the conferences was set, the process went on with the nomination of plenipotentiary representatives of the 3 countries. According to Vicuña Mackenna, the Chilean plenipotentiaries were nominated before the official acceptance of mediation, and the naming was for Eusebio Lillo, who was the civil governor of Tacna and Arica; Eulogio Altamirano, Intendant (Mayor) of Valparaiso; and Jose Francisco Vergara, minister of War.

The Peruvian chancellery emitted 3 decrees dated September 29th, 1880 to appoint the plenipotentiaries from that country and their diplomatic entourage. The first decree says:

"Having designated the plenipotentiaries representing Peru at the conferences, together with Bolivian and Chilean plenipotentiaries, in accordance to the mediation of the United States of America to put an end to the present war with the Republic of Chile, accepted by the belligerents, the following citizens are nominated: Doctor Antonio Arenas, member of the Supreme Court of Justice and President of the American Congress of Justice and the Sea Captain Mr. Aurelio Garcia, both of which will be assisted by Dr Mariano N. Balcarcel as secretary, by Mr Alejandro Garland as secretary interpreter and by Mr. Julian Arenas as pro-secretary. We designate as an assistant of the afore nominated plenipotentiaries Colonel Assistant of the Congress of Jurists Mr. Dario Navarro. We issue the respective powers and instructions".

The other 2 decrees say:

"Appoint as an assistant of the plenipotentiaries of Peru for the conferences that must take place with the Bolivian and Chilean plenipotentiaries- according to the mediation offered by the government of the United States of America- the Temporary Captain of the Reserve Army, Chief of State Mr. Octavio Garcia.

"Appoint as a military assistant of the plenipotentiary Sea Captain Mr. Aurelio García y Garcia, commissioned for the conferences with the Bolivian and Chilean plenipotentiaries, the Temporary Captain of Reserve Army Mr. Carlos Alvarez Calderon, who served as a private secretary without any salary or allowances. (18)

Bolivia nominated as plenipotentiaries, before the mediation, Mariano Baptista and Juan Crisostomo Carrillo. On the other hand, the United States was represented by Thomas A Osborn, resident minister in Chile since 1876, Isaac P. Christiancy, resident minister in Peru, as old man of 70 years old, born in Montgomery, Michigan, in 1812. Christiancy had been a judge in the Supreme Court of Michigan. The last of the plenipotentiaries was General Charles Adams, accredited before the government of Bolivia.

Completing the North American delegation was Charles S. Rand, who served as a secretary and interpreter of the mediators and worked for a long time in Santiago.

INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSITION OF THE BELLIGERENTS DURING THE CONFERENCE

The study of the situation previous to the conferences of Arica showed that they were going to fail. The Peruvian and Bolivian plenipotentiaries had unacceptable instructions, so that the approaches proposed did not leave room for negotiations. The Chilean position contended that the allies must become aware of their military defeat and therefore accept the conditions demanded by the Chilean government. The allies trusted that these conditions would be submitted to arbitration, something that never happened.

With reference to the participation of the United States as a mediation power, it is helpful to clarify some previous concepts to the conferences. First, the revision of the diplomatic correspondence tells that the Department of State wished to act impartially in the negotiations, without clearly favoring any particular contending countries. Manuel Jordan asserts that the President Rutherford Hayes and the secretary of State Evarts, before a possible European interference in the conflict between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, they decided to "notify their representatives in Santiago, Lima and La Paz recommending that, given the occasion, they should offer the mediation of their country in the event that the interests of each country were contemplated with impartiality, even more so as they shared mutual friendship." (19)

Secondly, It must be considered that despite the clear instructions from the Department of State, the resident ministers in Santiago, Lima and La Paz tend to act with personal criterium. This happened in the case of the minister Adams in Bolivia and later with Hurbult in Lima. In this last case, it was necessary to ask Washington to specify if the actions of this diplomat responded to the instructions received. The American answer left it clear that Hurbult acted in many cases in a personal capacity. It also resembles Christiancy's way of acting who went to Santiago without any instructions from the Government to pave the way for mediation.

It is important to quote the role of General Adams, who lead Bolivia to a serious error: to believe in the mediation of the United States.

The negotiations carried out between the government and the Peruvian diplomats on occasion of Christiancy's visit, worried the Chamber of Deputies in Chile, who made an interpellation to the Foreign Affairs and War Ministers.

Now, you will read part of this interpellation:

Mr Urzua (Don Luis) is perplexed by the answers of the ministers.

The minister of War says that they agree on this. This is not true, Mr. Vergara wants to go to Lima, but the president of the republic and the other ministers disagree.

Mr. Recabarren (the minister of Interior) may I Mr. Deputy?

Mr. Amunategui (President) begged the minister not to interrupt.

Mr. Urzua (don Luis) this interruptions are necessary.

Mr. Amunategui (President) the dialogues are prohibited, but you can go on Your

Highness.

Mr. Urzua (Don Luis) continues making some observations:

Why have you come just today to say that you have spoken to some people? Then the Ministry hasn't spoken with sincerity before, and then they have excused themselves from telling the truth. The cabinet is acting with audacity and courage before the chamber.

It is important that the ministers know what men have occupied their position before

It is necessary they measure their size before taking the Chamber for granted.

Beware! We have the right to doubt. We have the right to believe that there have been peace negotiations that hide in La Moneda.

Ask the Minister if he has the strength to stop the country at the edge of the abyss .the executive wants to throw it.

Mr. President of the Republic is contrary to the Lima Expedition and El Callao. He does not hesitate to say it to the country. (20)

This interpellation is the best evidence of the differences between the Parliament and the Executive regarding the Lima campaign. It was in this atmosphere that President Pinto, through the conferences of Arica, took a crucial part to stop the war.

Despite the fact that the sympathy of the North American Ministers was for the country in which they were accredited, this was not an obstacle for them to intervene in a partial way. The interests of the allies clashed against this position. They wanted the United States to leave their neutrality and force Chile to respect the interests of Peru and Bolivia.

In spite that instructions from the Foreign Relations Ministry to the Chilean plenipotentiaries for the conferences are unknown, they can be deducted from the minute presented by the Chilean delegates in Arica. These instructions must have been determined by the internal situation of the country, in which public opinion was not willing to allow them to retreat to the north and wanted this campaign to be done.

In this context, the Chilean government was interested in mediation so as to see the possibility of avoiding the Lima campaign. This position had two objectives: to obtain a war compensation through the transfer to the Chilean sovereignty of the whole territory in Tarapaca and the certainty of preventing other conflicts in the future. That's why the government would demand the derogation of the Secret Treaty of 1873 and the security that Arica would be considered as an exclusive commercial port.

This way Chile was determined to obtain Tarapaca through the negotiations, otherwise they should do it by marching over Lima forcefully.

According to Mario Barrios van Buren, Eusebio Lillo went to the conferences with classified instructions.

"as an international episode the conferences of Arica were a comedy. Peru attended deceived by Adams, and Bolivia attended pressed by Peru. The two Chilean delegates only attended in deference to President Pinto, without trust on the meeting and not willing to compromise anything. Eusebio Lillo, as the secretary of the delegation, received classified instructions from Santa Maria which were to get in touch with Mariano Baptista to re-edit the "Bolivian Politics". But Mr. Lillo kept his mission for himself after knowing that the opinion of Vergara and the conversations of the Bolivian Politics were naïve" (21)

Regarding the essential requirements proposed by the Chilean government to achieve peace with Peru, Luis Barros Borgoño says:

"Peace with Peru should not only consider a fair compensation for the victor, but also safety conditions for the future that will protect them against new criminal offenses and international confrontations; and the absolute and ultimate transfer of Tarapaca with the essential condition of an agreement formulated in the Conference of Arica (12)

The point made by Barros Borgoño, that Peru went to the conferences deceived by Minister Arias is incorrect. If anyone was deceived, that was the government of Bolivar, which was evidenced by the memorandum of the conference held between Adams and Carrillo the 1st of September 1880 (note 28).The point made that Bolivia was pushed to the conferences of Peru is incorrect and questionable. due to the fact that Bolivia, based on Adam's words, made Peru believe in the possibility of an arbitration. This is evidenced in the letter sent by Carrillo on September 10th to the Bolivian minister resident in Peru (see note 29). What is completely clear is that the Chilean ministers were determined in advance not to compromise the transfer of Tarapaca. This way the arbitration could not be made.

In the case of Peru, the instructions given to the plenipotentiaries for the conferences, showed that Pierola would not accept the military defeat and thereby peace. Walker Martinez says the following:

The conference of Arica gives testimony of the first of various Peruvian attempts to put

The American Chancellery on their side, and to convince them to leave their neutrality and help them fulfill their dream of invalidating, without effort and sacrifice the consequences of their mistakes, the damage they caused, the battles they lost and the treaties they signed.

"Prudence, ability and patriotism advised the Peruvian plenipotentiaries to take into account the force of the accomplished facts. They didn't do that, and the failure of the conferences of Arica is attributable to the insincerity with which our opponents attended them" (23)

The Peruvian position might have lacked sincerity, but they had a great deal of confidence. All of their position was based on the belief that arbitration was possible and would favor them. They also believed that Lima would not fall, despite the defeats showed unavoidable weakness. Bustamante said:

"Peru extended the war after Alto de la Alianza without any certainty of winning but confident in effective mediations of a chancellery that would not allow territory appendices, nor any abuse of the victory in America. The confidence was dissipated because small setbacks obstructed the continuity of the United States' policy and changed the nature of mediations: what at first was considered a condemnation of conquest, at the end it was seen as contemplation of accomplished facts. (24)

On revising the American diplomatic mail, we have found a document sent by Pierola to Carrillo. In it the thoughts of the Peruvian President regarding the conferences can be appreciated. This document expresses:

"the conferences will be held on board the American ship between Callao and Pacocha. They will help to restore the state previous to the war. If there is no agreement, there will be mediation from the United States over all the issues. In the meantime, on the basis of the last Chilean hostilities, Peru will maintain retaliations. It is convenient to inform about this attitude to the Bolivian government. (25)

For considering the instructions given by Pierola to the plenipotentiaries of Peru a key element of the results of the conferences, we will fully transcribe them. These instructions are dated in Lima on September 30th 1880.

"For a better implementation of this important and delicate commission given to the illustrated patriotism of VV.SS., I will include in the present instructions, and with the strong agreement of the Supreme Chief of State, the best way to appreciate from the part of the government the attitude of Peru in the present war with Chile, which must be maintained by VV.SS in the diplomatic conferences, where after Chile, we have had to consent in favor of the friendly mediation of the United States of America.

Unexpectedly pushed to war, and more than that, placed suddenly for a year and a half in the need to defend itself against Chilean attacks, all the interest of Peru in the present war has been in keeping, together with Bolivia, its rights and decorum safe, violated by the Chilean government. Today, like in the first day, we have withdrawn from any other purposes.

During the long struggle we have sustained, the path of arms has not favored us. Chile has won material advantages over us during the war, but we haven't decreased our unwavering resolution of fighting until the last moment and at all costs, until we get redress. Never have we doubted the final success of the war.

Such situation unequivocally determines the line of conduct that we must follow: not putting an obstacle to hinder the restoration of peace and the respect to the rights and dignity of the republic, but not accepting by any means a pact of peace that holds the oblivion of our unique supreme and national interest.

Persuaded by the United States of America, after the acceptance of Chile to confer with their representatives about the end of the war, we could not and should not refuse the idea, so we went to those conferences with the clear understanding of our rights and our unwavering resolution of sustaining them with no apparent interest other than justice.

The content of these instructions shows that Peru did not feel defeated and trusted that the final result of the war would favor them. Pierola did not believe that Chile had the chance to take over Lima, and they did not hurry to achieve peace. The fact that Chile had not suspended hostilities was seen as an absence of consideration to the mediator, thus a favorable situation for Peru.

For the Chilean government the potential success of the conference lay in that Peru, admitting their defeat, would accept the transfer of Tarapaca. As it can be seen in the instructions, Peru was far from accepting such a situation.

Barros Arana, referring to the Peruvian attitude said:

"The plenipotentiaries of Peru left Lima without knowing the plans of Pierola, They hadn't even heard of the arrangements the American diplomats had made to set the place where the conferences should be held.

The Peruvian government had handled out a list of instructions with some supplementary notes, but they were written vaguely and in a spirit that seemed like they were the victors." (27)

What draws attention in these instructions is the Peruvian determination, that if arbitration was reached, it should fall on the United States, which shows the Peruvian confidence that the United States would favor them. This Peruvian belief came from the information given by the Bolivian diplomats, who interpreted the words of General Adams as a true arbitration. The conference between the Bolivian Minister of Foreign affairs and the North American representative, on September 1st, 1880, was fundamental for the position held by the allies, as described in the following document transcription:

"Memorandum of the conference held between Mr. Juan C Carrillo Bolivian minister of Foreign affairs and General Carlos Adams, minister resident of the United States of America in La Paz, on September 1st 1880.

Mr. Adams, on referring to office of the last 27, states that Mr. Osborn, Minister of the United States in Santiago, has informed him that the Chilean government has accepted the mediation of the United states in the following terms: each belligerent country will appoint their plenipotentiary to hold a conference in some place on the coast, and with this purpose the government of the United States will put at the disposal of the plenipotentiaries a North American war ship in order for them to deliberate on board the peace conditions, and in the presence and advice and assistance of one or more representatives that the North American government may well wish to assign.

Mr. Carrillo inquires if some bases have been provided under which Chile accepts the procedure. Mr. Adams replies that there has not been an agreement yet but the purpose of the meeting would be a compromise (as soon as possible) of the three nations to embrace an honorable peace.

Mr. Carrillo asks again about the result of the meeting if the plenipotentiaries did not come to a definitive agreement; if in this case he had to understand that there might be a solution; or if, on the contrary, it was intended to leave the solution of all the issues and the peace conditions to the arbitration and ruling of Chile.

Mr. Adams says that he fears that Mr. Osborn's office might not be explicit enough to give a definitive answer to this question, but as the afore mentioned office says that full powers must be given to the respective plenipotentiaries, and as Mr Adams believes that if the role of the American representatives was limited to making them feel like mere spectators or advisors, the conference would probably not have good results. It would seem to him and he would feel authorized to say that the idea is or should be, that in case that the plenipotentiaries of the three republics would not understand one another, they should have instructions and full power of their governments to carry the resolution of all the issues and peace conditions to arbitrage, so to speak, by the United States, in order to be decided either in the United States or by commissioners appointed in Washington. These deliberations should take place in front of the plenipotentiaries, over all because they understand that the government of the United States has not offered their good offices for mediation, it has done it only with the idea of ending the war, that is why in any case, the decision had to be final and absolute.

Mr. Carrillo thanks the government using eloquent words to the Great Republic to its influence and initiative in American affairs, to its laws or institutions, to its government and the nature of its people, and states that he understands the aim of the mediation, but that he thinks Mr. Adams would consider it fair that the Bolivian government should keep its official acceptance until receiving a note from their allies, the Peruvian government, even more so when they expected to receive good news from the Bolivian minister in Lima regarding this affair because he presumed that the government of Peru must have been informed about the mediation and been invited to the conference.

Mr. Adams claims that his government would not assist or lend its good offices under any arrangement in which the belligerents were not represented and it would not sanction a partial peace. Nevertheless, with the objective of saving time and ending the war costs that overwhelmed the three countries, He suggests that the Bolivian government name its plenipotentiary immediately so that he would move to Mollendo and get in touch with Lima and be ready to start the negotiations without delay. And the government of Peru, without hesitation, agreed on that procedure.

At the same time, Mr. Carrillo recognizes the convenience of this step, He believes it is opportune to inform Mr. Adams. If the government of Bolivia took these steps forward, only with the acceptance of Chile and without the Peruvian government's knowledge, this could generate misgivings because the press in Chile had done manifestations to divide the interests of the Alliance. He believes it is prudent to wait for the official letter of Lima to start mediation; nevertheless, this serious problem would be notified to the President and the cabinet would inform Mr. Adams about his government's plans.

In order to express the feelings of his government, Mr. Adams also adds that they would be grateful if the three plenipotentiaries on board of the American ship could agree on any other power _neutral in every aspect_ that could offer their service as mediator, either alone or with the United States, to find, prompt, just and complete solution to make peace.

Mr. Adams concludes by offering, through the Chilean authorities in Arica and El Callao, to transmit any communication regarding the affairs that the Bolivian government would like to exchange with his minister in Lima, and thus saving time. This offer is accepted by Mr. Carrillo.

This way the conference was closed. JUAN C CARRILLO – CHARLES ADAMS. F AVELINO ARAMAYO, Secretary Interpreter.

NOTE: The current memorandum has been written in the United States legation, signed prior agreement of its accuracy. (28)

According to what Mr. Adams said to Mr. Carrillo, this is an evidence that what was said had no relation with the instructions received, and due to this, the American minister points out: " I believe and I am authorized" to carry out all issues of arbitration. This hypothetical statement was regarded by a final answer by Bolivia and Peru, who saw as a real fact the possibility of arbitration. Bolivia and Peru believed that the plenipotentiaries of the Alliance arrived to the conferences of Arica with incorrect information.

Two days later, September 3rd 1880, the minister of Foreign Affairs in Bolivia Juan C. Carrillo accepted the Bolivian participation in the mediation and ratified its position around the arbitration, which was qualified as "the essential basis for the mediation". This is the text which states such an affirmation:

"According to what I said to His Highness in the interview of September 1st and reiterating the homage to the initiative of the government of the United States aiming at contributing to an honorable solution to the present War of the Pacific, it is a pleasure for me to say to His Highness that my government, in compliance with the Pact of the Alliance, which binds this republic with Peru has addressed on this date to the government of Lima, to make them know that they consider worthy of the American interests and modern civilization the mediation proposed by the government of the Unites States, and to accept it definitely, they wait for the official notice from the allied government because this agreement is essential to the faith with which Bolivia keeps its commitment.

As soon as they receive the final acceptance from the Government of Peru, Bolivia will send their plenipotentiary to the conference so that, along with the ally country and Chile it will attend the conferences and will set the arrangements to be held on board an American ship so as to finish the current war complications.

As the government of the United States was fully encouraged to give this significant step, the one of getting an honorable and worthwhile solution for the belligerent countries, the Bolivian government understands that the arbitration has become the essential basis for the mediation, as it is improbable that the serious differences with the United States might be solved by the appointed plenipotentiaries .

In this context, and with the firm intention of the American government to seriously contribute to restoring peace, as your Excellency saw fit to declare in the conference; my government accepts the mediation with confidence, on the one hand, because it compromises the word of a powerful and just nation, on the other, because it takes this arbitration as an essential condition, keeps the parties in war in an equally worthy position, keeps their national feelings, and offers the only solution in accordance with principles of justice.

My government, faithfully interpreting the national feeling, can assure you that as well as Bolivia is willing to make any kind of sacrifice to keep their sovereign rights and the independence against the impositions of war which are adverse to the South American politics, it is also willing to accept without reservations any means to help solve the restoration of peace.

And peace being the end proposed by the implied mediation, my government will gladly accept the government of the United States to be the judge who will solve the issues debated in the struggle over the War of the Pacific that cannot be solved by the plenipotentiaries of the belligerent powers.

Expressing the feelings of my government in a correct and precise way, and as a friendly answer to mediation from the government of the United States, it is a pleasure for me to renew the feelings of consideration and respect from yours truly." (29)

Mr. Adams's speech confused the Bolivian government first, and through it to Peru. Despite the evident mistake, the American diplomat did nothing to avoid this error, and in his answer letter to the Chancellor Mr. Carrillo on September 4th 1880, he didn't mention the problem he had created and about which he was fully aware. The text is revealing:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note dated yesterday and where you declare eloquently that the government of Bolivia is prepared to accept the mediation, and if necessary, the arbitration from the government of the United States as you propose, if the ally government does agree.

I will not stop communicating to my government, your estimable and honorable feelings and I can only express my hope that Peru, animated by the same elevated spirit will agree on stopping this cruel, inhumane and fratricide war. If, unfortunately, these attempts will not prove effective, I can at least testify that Bolivia was ready to stop more bloodshed and that the blame would be for whoever has it.

So let me renew the feelings of my highest consideration and appreciation, yours truly" (30)

The analysis of these documents regarding the Bolivian seen position from another point of view evidenced that Bolivia was acting in combination with Peru for the upcoming negotiations in the peace Conferences. This couldn't be done another way since the Secret Treaty of 1873 was in force. Another letter sent by Mr. Carrillo to the Bolivian minister says:

"The arbitration and intervention of the United States, prior agreement with the government of Peru, make up the main thought of Bolivia and on it the United States should be inspired especially when there is no permission to receive immediate instructions". (31)

On this note, Mr. Carrillo not only talks about arbitration but also intervention. Convinced of this possibility, it was assumed as accepted. The diplomats of the alliance confidently attended the conferences of Arica.

THE CONFERENCES OF ARICA

The conferences were held during the 22nd, 25th, 27th of October, 1880, on board the war ship of the United States Lackawana on the Arica Bay.

On October 19th Mr. Altamirano arrived to Arica. The same day, he wrote a letter to Mr. Osborn saying that Chilean plenipotentiaries had gone to the port and they were ready to carry out their mission.

The same day, October 19th he was the only one of the allied plenipotentiaries who had arrived to Arica. Mr. Baptista had come from Mollendo to help save the ongoing difficulties presented by the Peruvians.

Their mission didn't have any practical result due to the strong determination of the Chilean government to carry out the conferences in Arica. Being the Peruvians informed of this, they attended the conference on October 20th on board the ship Chalaco. The 20th

all the American ministers were in Arica.

On October 21st Minister Osborn informed the representatives of the three countries that there would be no difficulties to start the conferences the following day at 12.00.

After the Chilean plenipotentiaries were informed about the beginning of the mediation they decided to write a minute (document) where they would state their main demands. This document says:

"Taking into account the announced conference and assigning not little importance to the speed and urgency of the proceedings, we thought that we could take advantage by writing a minute with our most important demands and present it in the first meeting.

This way the plenipotentiaries of the allied republics would be from the first moment in a position to appreciate each of our most important requirements and we would find it easier to guess, the possibility of coming or not to real peace agreements after the second conference." (32)

The Chilean delegates boarded the ship of the United States some minutes before 12.00, at about the same time the Peruvian plenipotentiaries Mr. Arenas and Mr. Garcia y Garcia, and Mr. Baptista from Bolivia did. The other Bolivian delegate Mr. Carrillo was forced to stay at port due to a serious illness during his trip.

On the first conference done on October 22nd, Mr. Thomas Osborn, Dean of the American ministers, took the floor to say that the three American representatives had to appoint Mr. Carlos S. Rand as a secretary and interpreter, and he asked them to inform about any doubts during the translation of the documents, since each delegation had their own interpreter.

After that, Mr. Osborn said that it was a pleasure to verify that the conference was a fait accompli (an accomplished fact) and his government had closely monitored the conflict, its development and progress, and they regretted the current state of war observed between brother countries. For this reason, the United States looked forward to the end of the war and before closing the ceremonies, lasting and honorable peace would be achieved.

Mr. Osborn warned that the mediators were determined not to participate in any discussion of the issues submitted to the conferences and the bases under which peace could be celebrated, were exclusively the plenipotentiaries' domain, nevertheless, Mr. Osborn said that American representatives were willing to help the negotiators with their friendly collaboration and good offices, if necessary.

The clarifications done by Mr. Osborn at the beginning of the conferences thwarted the allied plans to achieve arbitration. Bolivian and Peruvian wanted the United States to take a more biased role that would lead the differences to a mediated solution. Osborn's speech, instead, created a satisfactory impression on the Chilean delegates and they thought this diplomat act would lead a neutral trend.

Mr. Osborn's words proved two things: first, that neutrality was the official position of the United States government and any other interpretation was incorrect. Therefore, what Mr. Adams said to the chancellor Mr. Carrillo was on a personal basis in the sense that the United States would favor the allies interests through an arbitration. (28) It is important to remember that Mr. Adams' statement was the one that led Bolivia first and then Peru, to believe the arbitration was mandatory.

Later, on the same session there was an exchange of powers. After Mr. Baptista excused the absence of his colleague, the minister Osborn declared the conference open. On behalf of his government and fellows, Mr. Altamirano took the floor and thanked the noble and selfless effort done by the representative of the United States to end the war. He added that all steps taken by the American ministers proved what Mr. Osborn asserted.

Thereupon, and regarding the serious problem coming in due time, Mr. Altamirano pointed out that the circumstances imposed as an unavoidable duty: ensure an immediate outcome and look for the most appropriate procedure to come to this point. For that reason, the Chilean delegation had believed it was necessary to write in a minute all the proposals that, according to their instructions, should be the basis of the peace treaty. Mr. Altamirano pointed out that the minute should be the basis of the discussion, because if they proceeded otherwise there was a risk of an unfortunate waste of time.

He also said that in the note were only the main demands from his government and that in due time they would bring to the debate other propositions, which, important as they might be, they were not insurmountable difficulties and could be of easy solution. He said that if this procedure was approved, a copy of the minute would be given to the plenipotentiary ministers of Bolivia, Peru and the mediators.

Considering the procedure proposed by the Chilean delegates, Mr. Mackenna has written:

"Having met in the dark cabin at the Lackawana ship in Honduras, the seven peace emissaries held the conferences during the 22nd, the 23rd, and 25th of October, the curious and bombastic conferences that by neat and sterile we are not going to discuss here. It is enough to say, for the flush of history and its teaching, that the first day of the meeting was used for the exchange of power and the presentation of the conditions of Chile (we felt really humiliated when we only expected to hear the requirements of the defeated".) (33)

After Mr. Altamirano's intervention, Mr. Arenas took the floor. He said that he was grateful to the Great American Republic's friendly attitude assumed in the war of the Pacific. He declared that the objective of the conferences was to achieve peace, as long as it was honorable for Peru, Bolivia and Chile. He said that he agreed with Mr. Altamirano on that it was convenient to precise the questionable points in order not to waste time in the scrutiny of undetermined issues. He finally accepted the procedure presented by Mr. Altamirano even though he didn't know the points written in the document. Accordingly, he asked the minute to be read as soon as possible. Once the revision was done, he would ask Mr. Osborn to call for a new meeting.

Next, Mr. Baptista from Bolivia spoke on behalf of the government of Bolivia. He said they recognized the effort of the United States to model and create the South American democratic institutions, He added that Bolivia was attending the conferences to negotiate peace in a sincere way; he also believed that the rest of the belligerent governments also aimed at achieving peace with seriousness and with undeniable great vision. The American ministers were the guarantee of these efficient conferences. Mr. Altamirano finished his speech saying that he understood the Chilean proposal was more than a simple note of issues, but also a group of propositions and he accepted the procedure.

Minister Christiancy said that the government had a great interest in achieving peace, the prosperity of all South American republics and a successful outcome of all their institutions; for this reason, they desired to promote by means of good offices, as soon as possible, the end of the war and the harmony between the states,.

Thereupon, the plenipotentiaries and mediators agreed that the protocol of the conference would be written by the secretaries of the respective legations. Mr. Arenas said that the Peruvian secretary was Dr. Mariano Nicolás Valcárcel. Mr. Altamirano introduced Domingo Gana and Mr. Baptista introduced Mr. Felix Avelino Aramayo. Before concluding, it was agreed upon that Mr. Arenas would communicate through Mr. Osborn the exact date of the second conference, including the protocol of the minute proposed by the Chilean delegation:

"Regarding the essential conditions that Chile demands to achieve peace, introduced by the Chilean plenipotentiaries to the Peruvian and Bolivian plenipotentiaries in the conference held on board of the American ship Lackanawa on October 22nd, 1880.

First: Concession to Chile of the Peruvian and Bolivian territories that extend from the South of Quebrada Camarones, and west of the line that on the Andes Range separates Peru and Bolivia until the canyon of Cordillera, and west until the boundary with Argentina, passing through the Lake Ascotan.

Second: Pay out to Chile for Peru and Bolivia, severally, the amount of 20 million pesos, whereof 4 million will be paid in cash.

Third: Refund of the properties that have been taken from the companies and Chilean citizens in Peru and Bolivia.

Fourth: Restitution of the transport RIMAC.

Fifth: Abrogation of the Secret Treaty held between Bolivia and Peru in 1873, leaving at the same time without effect or value the steps taken to ensure a confederation between both nations.

Sixth: Confiscation by Chile of the territories of Maquegua, Tacna and Arica occupied by the Chilean army, until all obligations regarding prior conditions are fulfilled.

Seventh: Obligation on the part of Peru not to arm the port of Arica when it is released or on any occasion, and commitment that it will be exclusively a commercial port." (34)

Upon delivery of the minute, the session ended at 1.00 pm. In this note, you can see clearly the Chilean interest: the first and second conditions are found essential. Chile was seeking compensation for the damage caused by the war. The fifth and seventh conditions unveiled that Chile wanted to foresee acts of war by protecting its own security. Tomas Cavaino has written:

"There is no point here to make some comments. The demands so clearly and harshly stated by Chilean plenipotentiaries about not accepting any discussion that will not speak about the concession of the deserts of Atacama and Tarapaca to Chile, are clear evidence of what we have said when speaking about the causes of the war against Chile, whose only purpose was the war of conquest, taking advantage of the fact that the fate of the events were decided upon its favor.. They persisted in their essential and early goals. (35)

The opponents to the Conferences or Arica, including Jose Manuel Balmaceda, sustained that there was a difference in introducing the annexation of Tarapaca like an accomplished fact and not like an unsuccessful diplomatic approach. In this sense, Balmaceda, among others, were supporters of moving towards Lima. Concerning this matter, Mr. Barros Arana says:

"Finally, on October 29th the news that the negotiations were broken off arrived in Lima, h, but Chile had officially declared their purpose regarding the territories under dispute.

That was a happy day for the Peruvian government and journalists who would see alliances everywhere against the Chilean plans. "The South American republics (on the headlines of "La Patria de Lima") are informed about the war of Conquest, a real heresy of the American public law. It is a fact and a threat for everybody. The South American balance has been broken off by Chile with a perfidious hand, and the evil historical precedent that their usurper policy proclaims, will eventually turn against them. (36)

The second meeting on October 25th was attended by all the plenipotentiaries. Mr. Juan Crisostomo, from the Bolivian delegation, joined the meeting.

After signing the 4 copies of the of the previous session minute, Mr. Arenas took the floor and said that after reading the document submitted by Mr. Altamirano, he could only say that it offered a sad picture and it shut the doors to a calm and reasonable discussion. In his opinion, the document was an insurmountable obstacle on the track of pacific negotiations and it looked like intimidation to move ahead. He added that the Peruvian Republic, for the principles it profess and for the feelings that encourage all their social classes, cannot consent to the dispossession of part of their territory: even less the one that contains the strength of its wealth.

In the following sentence Mr. Arenas ignored Chile as victor of the conflict:

The states that lack a supreme judge decide their contests regularly in the battle fields, and the one that has obtained the final victory, which in the current war does not exist, demands that the losing party and without means to keep resisting, should give up the pretensions which motivated the hostilities" (37)

This declaration from the Bolivian plenipotentiary confirms what was previously said by the Peruvian government, that they didn't recognize their military defeat, despite the setbacks.

This fact, together with Minister Osborn's position about the neutrality of the United States, is a second point that explains the failure of the peace process. The acknowledgment of the Peruvian military defeat was an essential part in the possible success of the conferences, since peace would have been achieved sooner, avoided that way the Lima campaign.

At this point, it is necessary to ask if the Peruvians were or were not aware of the Chilean demands before the conferences began. This point is crucial too, because if the ministers from Peru knew about the Chilean conditions to treat peace, they should have gone to the conferences willing to give up their position, since it was impossible for them to continue defending their territory.

Peru lacked all war elements needed to continue the war. They didn't have maritime power and their territory was vulnerable, such as it was shown by the Lynch expedition. Bolivia was in a similar situation and in fact, after the Battle of Tacna, they had withdrawn from the war. The following document shows what the Peruvian knew, before the conferences that Chile was demanding Tarapaca and that they went to the mediation believing that Peru would not oppose the Chilean demands.

The document here is the note of February 24th, 1880 by Minister Osborn to the Secretary of State and says:

"As you know, since the Chilean took possession of the province of Tarapaca, this government did not want to listen to the suggestions of peace which did not involve the transfer of this province. The Department of State has several reports about this issue. I think the allies were well informed about this matter. It is impossible to believe they ignored the fact that the public opinion was so adverse that it prevented the possibility of reaching peace. When Mr. Christiancy was here before the Conference of Arica, President Pinto said to him that our mediation would fail, unless Peru was prepared to make such a compromise. I guess Mr. Christiancy informed the government of Pierola about this issue when he returned from Lima, before Peru accepted our mediation. But whatever it may be, I am utterly sure that the European representatives in Lima informed President Pierola about the facts related to this point.

The fact that Mr. Christiancy felt authorized to inform President Pinto that he trusted the Chilean demands would be granted, proves that Peru was not ignorant about this matter. Our mediation was accepted, then, under this condition, and the conferences of Arica were summoned in October. The ministers coming from Chile had instructions to require Tarapaca, among other things. The sentiment of the country about this point was unanimous, and the government couldn't do less than encourage it.

In light of these facts, you may understand how surprised and shocked I was after hearing the allies' answers in the second conference, when they announced that the only irrevocable condition an obstacle to achieve peace was. After the conclusion reached by the Peruvian ministers was announced, Mr. Baptista, from Bolivia, and with the certainty that he and his colleague agreed substantially with the Peruvian representatives, there arose the possibility that the difficulty could be solved by submitting the "rest of the other issues" to the arbitration of the United States. (1) The allies knew that "the other issues" meant nothing for the resolution of the difficulties. They understood, then, such as the Peruvian government had done it before accepting the mediation, which the unshakeable demand of Chile would always be the transfer of Tarapaca, and it would be impossible to achieve peace, unless this point was accepted. Under these circumstances, how empty the propositions related to the arbitration looked! How insincere! (38)

The documents prove that the Peruvian were aware of the conditions that Chile would demand at the conferences, and for this reason they were not willing to accept them, so they took the plunge for the arbitration, having the United States as the mediator. This attitude of the Peruvian government led quickly to the conference failure. In his speech, referring to the Chilean demand, Mr. Arenas said:

"a peace that is based on the territorial dismemberment and the revival of the outdated right of conquest, would be an impossible peace, and although the Peruvian plenipotentiaries would accept it and their government would ratify it, which we cannot assume, the national feeling would reject it and the war would be unavoidable. And if they insist on the first basis, which was an unwavering condition to get an agreement, the hope for peace would be lost". (39)

Mr. Baptista contends that after Mr. Arenas' speech, he was waiting for an answer from the Chilean delegation. Before taking the floor. Mr. Eulogio Altamirano said that Mr. Arenas ' speech had been a painful shock due to the fact that in his speech, the hope for peace seemed lost. Mr. Altamirano says:

"Accepting the war as a painful need, Chile launched itself into it, without thinking about the sacrifice it meant, and for defending its country's rights and honor it has sacrificed its best people and spent its budget without control.

Under these circumstances, your government has honestly accepted the idea of ending the war, as long as it is possible to achieve a sustainable peace, restorative of all the sacrifice made and that will allow Chile to go back to work and their lives.

Their government believes that to ensure peace, it is necessary to go beyond the borderline. In this way, it tries to compensate in part for all the sacrifice the country has made to ensure the future peace.

This demand is for the Chilean government, the country and the plenipotentiaries, who speak on their name because it is fair". (40)

Mr. Altamirano's speech summarizes the aim that Chile pursued with Tarapaca's annexation: "to compensate in part for the great sacrifice the country has made to ensure future peace".

After listening to Mr. Altamirano's speech, Mr. Arenas took the floor and said that he was truly convinced that Chile would not give up its aspirations, but he still believed that there had to be a means that should lead to an honorable and permanent peace, without compromising the future. Minister Christiancy said that just as the Chilean plenipotentiaries had submitted certain claims, the Peruvian and Bolivian could present theirs, in pursue of a solution to this problem.

Next, Mr. Baptista spoke to said that Mr. Eulogio Altamirano's statements seemed to close the way to any discussion. He also added that the Bolivian plenipotentiaries were in total agreement with Mr. Arenas's essential point- compensation or conquest- a subject that was extensively discussed and that concluded that his delegation did not accept the transfer of the territory as a consequence of the war. He added that he still hoped there would be a discussion where the conciliatory issues could be dealt with.

It is important to note that the speeches of Mr. Arenas, Christiancy and Baptista admitted that there might be other ways that might lead to peace. Among them, in first place, arbitration.

After refusing Baptista's ideas about the treaty of 1873, Mr. Eulogio Altamirano said that if the shift of frontiers was an obstacle for peace, Chile must not lift that obstacle.

Commander Garcia y Garcia, after a long introduction, proposed that all the differences between the belligerents should be submitted to the irrevocable arbitration decision of the United States. This country could play a relevant role due to their strong morality and spirit of concord shown to all the representatives.

Next, Mr. Arenas took the floor to say that arbitration was the most practical and decorous solution and he called the Chilean plenipotentiaries to think and meditate about the horrible consequences of a different decision.

Mr. Jose Francisco Vergara, who until that moment had not participated in the discussion, took the floor to say that he would refer only to the the arbitration proposition, declaring categorically, on the name of his government, that it would not accept it at all. In his speech, the minister specified the following ideas, in accordance with the minutes of the session:

"Chile has always shown a firm preference for this rational and equitable procedure to solve international issues, on the one hand, for considering it the one that most suits modern civilized forms, and on the other, because it suits best its own interests. All its disagreements with other nations give testimony of this, but very especially the disagreement which has caused the present war. Before holding their guns and appeal to force, Chile proposed reiteratively that the decision of this conflict should be handed over to arbitration. The voice of this government was not heard, and very reluctantly, he was dragged to war. Thrown onto this war path, which has meant to it so much effort and sacrifice, Chile has managed, thanks to the successful power of its arms, to reach an advantageous position that allows it to claim for a peace which will guarantee for its future and will a compensate it for all the damages and sacrifices which were imposed on it. In the same way as It has also run all the risks of war, exposing itself to the consequences of the negative turns of fortune, it must also use its unquestionable right to take advantage of the prosperity of events.

Chile is looking for a stable peace, which takes into account its present and future interests, which is tailored to the elements and the power it has obtained, the tasks done and the well-founded national hope.

That peace will be immediately negotiated with its opponents when they accept the conditions they seem necessary for their security, and they will not be compelled to deliver to other hands, however honorable they may be, the decision of their destiny.. For these reasons, he declares the proposed arbitration." (41)

After Minister Vergara's speech answering Mr. Garcia y Garcia about his proposition, Mr. Eusebio Lillo took place. He said he was not going to take part in the conference, but the proposition of arbitration from Mr Garcia y Garcia made him change his mind, for which he sais it was his duty to reject the arbitration. He continued to explain his arguments, which were registered in the session minutes:

"He hadn't planned to take part in this solemn conference, but the proposal of arbitration made by Mr. Garcia y Garcia compels him to miss his word. He thinks it is his duty to strongly reject that proposal such as his honorable colleague, Mr. Vergara has done it.

He accepts and understands the arbitration when having to avoid a war, and that is the most honorable way, the most elevated, and in harmony with the principles of civilization and fraternity that cultured peoples must take, mainly those that for their antecedents and close relation form one single family, but the arbitration past its prime, and that moment has unfortunately past for the peace negotiation that concerns us now.

The arbitration after the war and after the victory is not an acceptable solution for Chile. What is the mediator going to ask for? What about the sacrifice made by Chile in a war that was provoked? How to estimate the price of children's blood? How to estimate the action for damages? How to foresee the future so as not to face the painful decision of taking the arms in defense of one's tranquility and rights? Similar solutions after bloody and expensive victories must be only given by the country which has spent its whole fortune in it." (42)

Mr. Lillo kept on explaining that accepting the mediation would be a sign of weakness or hesitancy that could not be accepted. Neither could Mr Baptista's proposition be accepted in the sense that. Chile would fix their war compensation and conditions, maintaining territories that were under Chilean army as a pledge; meanwhile they received full satisfaction from their demands. He also added that he understood this solution and he had to accept his government's instructions. Plenipotentiary Mr. Carrillo insisted on the proposition of arbitration and renewed Mr. Baptista's as follows:

"Status quo for the territory occupied by the Chilean forces while the decision of the arbitral tribunal proposed will be solved over all agreements" (43)

After Mr. Carrillo's speech, Minister Osborn took the floor and fulfilling the Department of State's instructions, undermined the allies expectations: "It is appropriate to state that the government of the United States is not looking forward to being the mediator. The strict compliance of their duties would imply a great deal of work and inconvenience and there's no doubt his government would accept the office if the asked them to, but it is important to clarify that the representatives are not asking for that". (44)

After that, Mr. Eulogio Altamirano took the floor and said that it was painful for him and his government to refuse the arbitration of the United States because if they accepted they would be: "unfairly accused and fairly condemned in their country as offenders for dereliction of duties and treason to the rights and interests of their nation".(45)

After Mr. Osborn asked if any plenipotentiary would take the floor and nobody replied, he said that the conference would continue on the 27th at 12.00. After that, the meeting was adjourned.

The third meeting was held that day with the presence of all plenipotentiaries and the mediators. Minister Osborn thanked the attendance of the delegates and expressed that he hoped after the last meeting there had been sufficient time to meditate about a solution to their difficulties. After that, the meeting was opened and they read the last record which was approved.

In this session, the Chilean plenipotentiaries were the first to speak and expressed that according to his government instructions, it was not possible to modify the basis done in the last meeting.

The Peruvian plenipotentiaries declared that they wouldn't consider other basis, taking in mind that as Chile had insisted on the first condition and they hadn't accepted the arbitration, the doors had been closed, obviating the need for a mediation and thus a return to war.

On the other hand, the Bolivian plenipotentiaries said that Chile having declared their first demand as unwavering, they wouldn't accept it and having rejected the proposition of arbitration, the negotiations had come to an end.

Minister Osborn declared that he and his partners regretted that the conference hadn't delivered the peaceful and conciliator results they had had in mind when the United States offered their good offices and mediation; he also said that the same impression had caused the American nation and government. After his speech, he declared the discussions closed.

One of the main bases of the allies position was the arbitration, where the United States would play a very important role. Nevertheless, the plenipotentiaries' allies noticed that the United States were impartial during the conference. The allies felt disappointed and were persuaded of a possible American arbitration would favor their interests, especially when referring to the transfer of Tarapaca which was the Chilean demand. Mr. Garcia Calderon expressed about the United States participation as follows:

"The American mediators saw, heard and looked up to Heaven praying for inspiration and without saying a word, they finished their task, and as being judges in this diplomatic event they didn't make any decision at all." (46)

The position adopted by the American ministers during the conferences was considered poor by some diplomatic circles because as the allies did, the foreign observers thought that the American would play a more active role.

The French minister resident in Chile informed to his government that:

"The American envoys eliminated in 1880 the European action, but at the cost of their own dignity. Their attitude in Arica was, to make things clear, foolish. Indeed, in this conference, the Chilean plenipotentiaries issued an ultimatum that the belligerents had to accept or reject wholesale, and Mr. Osborn, Mr. Christiancy and Mr. Adams did not say a word about it. Despite their intervention, the mediation was qualified in the form of offices." (47)

The same diplomat esteemed that if they needed a mediation it was necessary to know the basis and demands of Chile, and the possible acceptance of the allies, otherwise, the experience showed that the negotiations rarely succeeded if there isn't a minimum agreement.

What the French minister did not know was that this agreement really existed. When the minister Christiancy talked to President Pinto, he said that the conferences would fail unless the Peruvian government would accept the transfer of Tarapaca. Mr. Christiancy informed about this demand to the government of Peru, and he also accepted the Chilean demand. President Pinto knew about this and accepted going to the conferences. This explains why the allies took the plunge to achieve the arbitration, believing that the United States would favor the Peruvian-Bolivian interests and accept the military defeat.

All these factors made the conferences fail. The failure had as a direct consequence to motivate the Lima campaign where Chile had to confirm what was sufficiently proven that in the War of the Pacific, they were victors.

If the conferences had succeeded the loss of many lives, the huge costs of the Campaigns of Lima and La Sierra would have been avoided. Maybe Mr. Jose Manuel Balmaceda summarized the consequences of the failure of Arica Conferences:

"When the Arica mediation was frustrated, we undertook the Fourth campaign. In Chorrillos and Miraflores we consolidated our motivated our and land supremacy. The opposing squadron completely disappeared, the organized establishments bled to death, the fortresses of Lima and El Callao were crowned by the success of our flags and the enemy was minimized to a radical and absolute impotence." (48)

QUOTES TO CHAPTER III

Andrés A. Cáceres. La Guerra del 79, sus campañas. Lima 1873, p.53

Maks Portugal y Z., El problema del litoral boliviano, La Paz 1966, p. 147

Circular of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, regarding the background information that provoke the war and the Chilean position in the conflict, Santiago, 24 of December 1851, comprised in Recollections of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, Santiago, 1881

Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, Historia de la Campaña de Lima, Santiago, 1881 p. 534

Vicuña Mackenna, p. 533

Vicuña Mackenna, p. 550

Charles Adams, American Minister resident in Bolivia, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bolivia, La Paz, 27 of August 1880, Pascual Ahumada Moreno Ed., Guerra del Pacifico, Valparaiso, 1886. Volume Nº5, p. 483

Thomas A. Osborn, American Minister resident in Chile, to Melquiades Valderrama, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, Santiago, 6 of October 1880, in Recollections of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, 1880, p. 69

Juan C. Carrillo, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bolivia, to Charles Adams, Minister of the United States in Bolivia, La Paz, 3 of December 1880, in Ahumada Moreno, Guerra del Pacifico, Volume Nº3 p. 490

Manuel A. Barinaga, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Peru to I.P. Christiancy, Minister of the United States in Peru, Lima, 14 of September 1880, in Ahumada Moreno, Guerra del Pacifico, Volume Nº3 p. 490

F.J. Pakenham, British Minister in Chile, to the Count Granville, Valparaiso, 16 of October 1880, in unpublished Reports of foreign diplomats during the War of the Pacific, Santiago, 1880, p. 393

Vicuña Mackenna, p. 535

Melquiades Valderrama, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, to Thomas A. Osborn, Minister of the United States in Chile, Santiago, 7 of October 1880, in Memoirs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, 1880. p. 67

Vicuña Mackenna, p. 556

Juan C. Carrillo, to Charles Adams, Minister of The United States in Bolivia, in N.A.M.P.T. roll Nº8

Manuel A. Barinaga, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Peru to the American Minister resident in Peru, Isaac P. Christiancy, Lima, 29 of September 1880, in Ahumada Moreno, Guerra del Pacifico, Volume Nº3

Pascual Ahumada, Volume Nº3

Ibid, Volume Nº3, p. 491

Manuel Jordan Lopez, Historia diplomatica de la Guerra del Pacifico, Santiago, p. 103

Minute of ordinary session of the Deputy Chamber, in El Ferrocarril, Santiago, 17 of September 1880.

Mario Barros, Historia diplomatica de Chile, Barcelona, 1970, p. 366

Luis Barros Borgoño, La Cuestión del Pacifico, Santiago, 1922, p. 116

Joaquin Walker Martinez, La Cuestión del Pacifico, Santiago, 1919, p.p. 36 and 39

Daniel S. Bustamante, Bolivia, their structure and rights in the Pacific, La Paz 1919, p. 165

Nicolas de Pierola, President of Peru, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bolivia, in N.A.M.P.,T. 51, roll Nº8

Instructions given by the Government of Peru to their plenipotentiaries in Arica to the negotiations of peace promoted by the United States of America in 1880, in Ahumada Moreno, Guerra del Pacifico, Volume Nº3 p. 492 and 493

Diego Barros Arana, Guerra del Pacifico, Complete Works, Volume XVI, Santiago, p. 378

Ahumada Moreno, p. 488

In N.A.M.P., T. 51, roll Nº8

Ibid, T. 51 Roll Nº8

Ibid, T. 51, roll Nº8

Note of the first conference of Arica, sent by the Chilean plenipotentiaries to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arica 22 of October 1880, in Ahumada moreno, Guerra del Pacifico, Volume Nº3, p 494

Vicuña Mackenna, Historia de la Campaña de Lima, p. 536

Protocol of the Conference of Arica, Nº1 en Memoirs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, 1880, p. 75 and 76

Tomas Caivano, Historia de la Guerra de America between Chile , Peru and Bolivia, Florencia, 1883, p. 374

Diego Barros Arana, p. 386

Protocol Nº2 of the Conferences of Arica, in Memoirs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1880, p. 79

Thomas Osborn to William Evart, in N.A.M.P., T. 1031, roll Nº10

In Memoirs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, 1880, p. 79

Ibid, p. 81

Ibid, p. 90 and 91

Ibid, p. 91

Ibid, p. 95

Ibid, p. 96

Ibid, p. 97

Garcia Calderon, Memoirs of Cautiverio, Lima, 1949, p. 118

Dispatch from the French minister resident in Chile, in unpublished reports, p. 313

Circular of the minister of Foreign Affairs to the legations of the Republic overseas. Memoirs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1881

CONCLUSIONS

The clash of economic interests between Chile, Bolivia and Peru for the exploitation of saltpeter and guano deposits located in Antofagasta and Tarapacá was one of the main causes of the War of the Pacific. In addition, there was great difficulty establishing geographical limits between Chile and Peru, as well as fiscal poverty suffered by the latter nation. This situation led to the exploitation of guano and saltpeter deposits by foreign commercial houses in exchange of payment of rights. Thus, besides the Chilean capitals and work force that had worked in the area since ancient times, other capitals from Italy, France, Germany and Great Britain appeared in Tarapacá; position Chile as the second power producer after Peru.

Even though the United States did not have any investments in Tarapacá, the rapid increase of European economic activities was concerning for them, whereby they were willing to take any measures to put their competitors at distance. To achieve this, they relied on the excellent image they projected in most of Latin American countries, which conceived North American democracy as a worthy model to be imitated.

Peru and Bolivia were allied by the Secret Treaty of 1873, an alliance which Argentina was about to join. This made the allies believe in the possibility of defeating Chile since the beginning of the war.

Chile had not even thought about going to war and did not want to either, but the successive treaties signed with Bolivia had harmed its interests. The public opinion, aware of the territorial concessions made by Chile, did not allow the government to ignore the violation of the 1874 treaty. Given this, the Chilean government invoked arbitration, following what the Treaty of 1874 stipulated. Bolivia rejected the Chilean proposal, arguing that the legal provisions that levied a tax of 10 cents per ton of nitrate exports through the port of Antofagasta should be put into practice, knowing that this violated what was agreed in 1874. Thus, the possibilities of arbitration were annulled and Chile, according to what it had indicated, occupied Antofagasta in February of 1879. This, in order to avoid the auction in the nitrate mines decreed by the government of La Paz, given the non-cancellation of the tax.

Immediately, Peru offered mediation despite of the 1873 treaty. In Chile, this was taken as a trick to buy some time to prepare for the war. After asking for Peruvian neutrality without success, Chile proceeded to declare war after Bolivia had done the same for occupying Antofagasta.

The Chilean victory in maritime campaign successfully led to the campaign of Tarapacá and, in a short time, the Chilean expeditionary forces occupied Arica thanks to military actions in Pisagua, Germania, Dolores, Tarapacá and fields of the alliance.

Once Chile occupied the Tarapacá region, the future destiny of the territory was still a problem. This concern had a strong impact on foreign Commercial Houses which had made large investments in the conflict zone. In addition, Peru had a considerable external debt, which was proposed to pay with the exploitation of the Tarapacá deposits.

Since that moment the governments of France, England and Italy offered to mediate and end the conflict. Germany and the United States refrained from entering into negotiations with these three countries, which means that there was a connection between the interests of the European powers in Tarapacá and the European mediation in the Pacific War.

Although these were numerous, none was achieved. It is evident that the attempts of European mediation were destined to avoid that Peru lost Tarapacá, since otherwise the situation for the investors of the Old World was complex and full of uncertainty.

For the allies, the diplomatic activity expressed through the numerous offers of mediation and even arbitration represented support to achieve their objectives since they believed they favored their interests, especially regarding the dispute about the territories taken by Chile.

In the international arena, most countries had sympathy for the cause of the allies; except from Brazil and Germany. This resulted in a collaboration when supplying ammunition to Peru and Bolivia. Chile, despite the diplomatic efforts deployed, only succeeded in getting some countries to declare their neutrality in the face of the conflict. This is why they had to face the war completely alone, while enduring the threat of a possible confrontation with Argentina, which lasted until 1881.

Chile made a great economic and military effort in the maritime and Tarapaca campaigns and, having occupied the Peruvian territory as far as Arica, they believed they were entitled to a fair compensation for the sacrifices made. In addition, Chile considered it fair to establish the terms on which future peace would be based, contemplating its security and avoiding another war with Peru and Bolivia.

When the War of the Pacific started, Chile had no intention of taking over the province of Tarapaca, nor did it think that circumstances would force an expedition over Lima.

This idea was only conceived when the Conferences of Arica failed and the prolongation of the war could no longer be avoided. On the other hand, Chilean resources were diminished, so it became necessary to demand compensation for the sacrifices of the country. The allies and countries which had investments in Tarapacá recognized that Chile was entitled to war compensation, but they argued that it should be monetary and not through a territorial cession. Since Peru was deprived of monetary resources, foreign capitalists were willing to provide Peru with payment capacity.

Once Arica fell, different opinions were put forward in Chile about the need to carry out the campaign to occupy Lima. Sectors represented by the Army, the majority of parliament and public opinion, were in favor of carrying it out to force Peru to cede Tarapacá. Another sector represented by the Army argued that the Lima campaign could be avoided through diplomatic negotiations. This group thought that the allies should recognize their military defeat and give up Tarapacá. President Pinto considered that the Lima campaign was very expensive and full of risks, and also the lack of leadership in the Army since the death of Rafael Sotomayor Baeza, and the impossibility of arranging peace because of the in-existence of a government in Lima. The penultimate doubt soon dissipated with the presence of José Francisco Vergara in the Ministry of War and the command of General Manuel Baquedano.

In this context, the American Minister residing in Lima consulted President Pinto if his Government would accept the good offices and mediation of the United States in the conflict. President Pinto responded affirmatively, but under the condition that Peru accepted giving up Tarapacá

Minister Christiancy reported on this requirement to the State Department and the allies, so accepting this would imply accepting the demands of Chile.

At the same time, the allies obtained a pronouncement from the American Minister residing in La Paz, stating that if the mediation failed, the United States would immediately offer its arbitration to put a definite end to the conflict. [...] the American arbitration then sided with the allies, and feeling confident, they concurred to the Conferences of Arica.

Chile attended the mediation believing that the allies would accept the cession of Tarapacá and that this would put an end to the war, thus avoiding the Lima campaign. The allies also attended the conferences believing that the United States would avoid the territorial dismemberment of Peru. In short, misinformation, confusions and misunderstandings characterized the pretensions of diplomatic action.

The Conferences of Arica, held in October 1880 in the Lackawanna war-corvette, largely failed due to the assumptions of the participating governments. The arbitration did not succeed and neither the acceptance of the assignment of Tarapacá to Chile.

The government of Peru did not accept its military defeat and it trusted that it would succeed in the new campaign, so it rejected the conditions demanded by Chile. The conferences of Arica failed and the war extended until 1884.

The failure of the conferences meant the loss of the valuable opportunity to achieve peace. According to what we have shown in this study, it can also be concluded that the United States adopted an impartial position during the conflict and until the Conferences of Arica, which they maintained during the course of the conferences.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA

A. BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDELINES:

Aránguiz Donoso Horacio, Bibliografía Histórica, (1959-1967), Santiago, 1970

Briseño Ramón, Estadísticas bibliográficas de la literatura chilena, 2 volumes, Santiago, 1862 and 1879.

Biblioteca Nacional, Exposición bibliográfica sobre la Guerra del Pacífico, 1879-1884, Santiago, 1961

Biblioteca Nacional, Bibliografía de la Guerra del Pacífico, Santiago, 1979.

Feliú Cruz René, Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía 1911 1941. Index of the first 100 numbers. Santiago, 1943.

Griffin, Charles (Editor) y J. Benedick Warren (assistant editor), Latin America, A Guide to the Historical Literature. Austin, 1971.

Pereira Salas Eugenio, América del Sur, Perú Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile. Período Nacional, México, 1956.

Santana, Francisco. Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía, 1943-1957. Index of the first 100 numbers 101 al 105, Santiago, 1963.

Silva Castro, Raúl. Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia. Index of the first 20 years, 1933-1953. Santiago, 1955.

Velázquez Ch. María del Carmen. Guía bibliográfica para la enseñanza de la historia del Hispano América, México, 1964.

B. GENERAL AND SPECIAL WORKS ABOUT THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC:

Amunátegui Aldunate, Miguel Luis. La cuestión de límites entre Chile y Bolivia. Santiago, 1863.

Baldivia, José María. La tradición portuence de Bolivia. I. parte, Estados Unidos en el conflicto 1825-1827. La Paz, 1951. p 355

Barros, Mario. Historia diplomática de Chile (1541-1938). Barcelona, 1970.

Barros, Arana, Diego. Historia de la Guerra del Pacífico (1879-1881). 2 volumes in 1, Santiago, 1881.

Bello C. Emilio. Anotaciones para la historia de las negociaciones diplomáticas con el Perú y Bolivia 1900-1904. Santiago, 1919.

Bermúdez Miral, Oscar. Historia del salitre desde sus orígenes hasta la Guerra del Pacífico. Santiago, 1963.

Bulnes, Gonzalo. Las causas de la guerra entre Chile y Perú. Santiago, 1919, p. 135

Bulnes, Gonzalo. Guerra del Pacífico, 3 volumes, Valparaíso 1911-1919.

Burgos Ortega, Eduardo. Bolivia y su derecho del mar. Potosí 1966.

Bustamante, Daniel. Bolivia, su estructura y sus derechos en el Pacífico. La Paz, 1919.

Blanlot Holley, Anselmo. Conferencia internacional. I: Chile. Perú y Bolivia, 1820-1879. II: Tratado de Ancón. Santiago, Chile, 1919.

Blanlot Holley, Anselmo. Historia de la paz entre Chile y el Perú 1879-1884. Tacna, 1909.

Caivano, Tomás. Historia de la guerra de América entre Chile, Perú y Bolivia. Spanish Version of Mr. Arturo de Ballestero y Contín. Florencia. 1883.

Calderón Cousiño Adolfo; brief diplomatic history of Chilean-Peruvian relationships. 1800 19879 Santiago 1919

Civati Bernasconi, Edmundo H. War of the Pacific, 1879-1883, Buenos Aires, 1943.

Díaz Villamil, Antonio. Historia de Bolivia, 4th Volume, La Paz, 1965-1969

Diez de Medina, Eduardo. La cuestión del Pacífico y la política internacional de Bolivia, La Paz, 1923

Dimitrijevic. Chile, Perú y Bolivia ante el juicio de cien escritores extranjeros, 2 volumes. Santiago, 1919

Echeñique Gandarillas, José Miguel, El tratado secreto de 1873. Su documentación. Santiago, 1921. p 144

Encina, Francisco Antonio. Resumen de la Historia de Chile. Wording by Leopoldo Castedo 4 volumes, Santiago, 1974

Epílogo de la Guerra del Pacífico. La Paz, 1919.

García Calderón, Francisco. Memoria del Cautiverio. Lima, 1949

García Vidal, Hernán. Historia ilustrada de la Guerra del Pacífico 1879-1884, Santiago, 1979

Querejazu Calvo, Roberto. Guano, salitre, sangre. Historia de la Guerra del Pacífico. La Paz, 1979

Gutiérrez Alberto. La guerra de 1879. Nuevos esclarecimientos. La Paz, 1976.

Historia gráfica de la Guerra del Pacífico. La Paz, 1978.

Jordán López, Manuel. Historia diplomática de la Guerra del Pacífico. Santiago, 1977.

El problema del litoral boliviano, La Paz, 1976

Luna José, Ricardo. El conflicto del Pacífico. Breves reflexiones sobre la guerra de 1879 a 1884 entre el Perú y Chile, Lima, 1919.

De la Lastra Bernales, Jaime. Historia diplomática de la cuestión de Tacna y Arica, Santiago, 1951.

La misión Lavalle en Chile y el Tratado Secreto de 1873. Santiago, 1924.

Viscarra, Eufronio. Bolivia y Chile problemas internacionales. La cuestión del Pacífico. Cochabamba, 1901.

Burr, Robert. The Stillborn Panamá Congress. Power Polities Chilean-Colombian relation during the war of the Pacific, Barkeley, 1962.

Popelaire, Luis. Las negociaciones confidenciales con Bolivia en 1879

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia. El problema del Pacífico y la forma de solución del Secretario de Estado de Estados Unidos. La Paz, 1927

Pérez Canto, Julio. El conflicto después de la victoria. Recuerdos e impresiones de un ex -Diplomático chileno en el Perú, Santiago. 1918.

Varas Antonio "Reminiscencias diplomáticas" en Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía N° 84 Santiago, January-April, 1935.

"Reminiscencias Históricas y Diplomáticas" en Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía N° 86. Santiago. September-December, 1935

Circular del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, señor José M. Balmaceda, a las legaciones de la República de Chile en el extranjero, respecto a antecedentes que provocaron la guerra y posición chilena en el conflicto. Santiago, 24th of December 1881.

Comunicaciones relativas a las últimas gestiones del representante de los Estados Unidos, señor C. A. Logan con el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores en Chile, señor Luis Aldunate, tendientes a procurar el ajuste de la paz. September 9th 1882.

Fierro, Alejandro, Declaration of the Government of Chile to the friendly powers regarding the States of War with the Government of Peru, Santiago, Chile, Imp. Nacional, 1879.

(in American booklets, Guerra del Pacífico 1879-1883).

Exchange of notes among the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. Alejandro Fierro, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Mr. Eulogio Medina and Mr. P.N. Videla of the Chilean Legation in that country, among August 1878 and February 1879. (Topic imp. Salitre)

Declaration of the Government of Chile to the friendly powers regarding the State of War with the Government of Peru, Santiago, Chile. 1879.

Declaration of the Government of Chile to the friendly powers regarding the State of War with the Government of Peru, 12-04. 1879.

Memorandum of the negotiations that the Government of Chile has held with the Minister Plenipotentiary and Special Envoy of the United States Mr. William Henry Trescot, signed by J. M, Balmaceda 1st of September 1882.

Memorial of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Colonization of Chile Mr. Domingo Santa María, introduced at National Congress on 20th of August 1871

Memoirs of Special Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of the republic in G.B. Mr. Marcial Martínez, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 1st of July 1883, including english complaints against Chile and foreign policy of England regarding that country.

Memoirs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and colonization Mr. Luis Aldunate, introduced at the National Congress on 20th November 1883, including all documents regarding the negotiations that originated the peace and friendship treaty between Chile and Peru.

Memoirs of the Special Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of the republic of the United States, Mr. Marcial Martínez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, on 8th of April 1882.

Memoirs sent by Mr. Alberto Blest Gana, Special Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of the republic in France and Great Britain, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 19th of May 1882.

Exchange of notes among the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. Alejandro Fierro, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Mr. Eulogio Medina and Mr. P.N. Videla of the Chilean Delegation in that country, between August 1878 and February 1879. (Topic imp. Saltpeter).

Exchange of notes between the Special Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of Ecuador Mr. José María Urbina and the Minister Interim of Foreign Affairs of Chile Mr. Jorge Huneeus, offering mediation of his government to solve the conflict among Chile, Peru y Bolivia.

Exchange of notes between the Special Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of Foreign Affairs Mr. Melquíades Valderrama, about the mediation offered by that government to solve the conflict among Chile, Peru y Bolivia.-

Including protocol N° 1, 2, 3 of the Conferences held by the plenipotentiaries regarding that mediation.

b) MANUSCRIPTS

Dispatches of the Ministers of the United States in Chile to the Department of State: 3rd of January 1879 - 30th of December 1880.

M.10, roll 30

2. Dispatches of the Ministers of the United States in Chile to the Department of State: 3rd of January 1881 – 30th of June 1882.

M. 10, roll 31

3. Dispatches of the Ministers of the United States in Peru to the Department of State: 20th of November 1878 – 16th of April 1879

T. 52, roll 31

4. Dispatches of the Ministers of the United States in Peru to the Department of State: 16th of April – 26th of November 1879

T. 52, roll 32

5. Dispatches of the Ministers of the United States in Peru to the Department of State: 1st of December 1879 – 28th of April 1880.

T. 52, roll 33

6. Dispatches of the Minister of the United States in Peru: 3rd of May – 16th of December 1880.

Thomas 5234

7. Dispatch of the Ministers of the United States in Bolivia to the Department of State: 25th of March 1875 – 15th of October 1879

T. 51, roll 7

8. Dispatches of the Ministers of the United States in Bolivia to the Department of State: 18th of October 1879 - 27th of February 1882

T. 51 roll 8

8.a) Instructions of the Department of State to the Ministers of the United States in Chile 19th of February 1867 - 24th of February 1882

M. 77, rull 36

Markham, Clements D. The War between Perú and Chile 1879 – 1882. London 1882 XI 306. p. 32

Mason, Theodorous. Guerra en el Pacífico Sur. Buenos Aires 1971.

Mayo John, "La Compañía de Salitre de Antofagasta y la Guerra del Pacífico" History number 14, Institute of History, Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago 1979 p 71 - 102

Santa María, Ignacio Guerra del Pacífico Santiago 1919 2b

Vial, Solar, Javier, Páginas Diplomáticas, Santiago, 1900

Vicuña Mackenna, Benjamín Guerra del Pacífico. Santiago, 1880 1881 4 volume

C. PRINTED DOCUMENTS AND MANUSCRIPTS

Documentos esenciales del debate Peruano-Chileno, publicado por el comité Patriótico Peruano. Buenos Aires. 1919

Fierro Alejandro, Cuestión Chileno-Boliviana Exposición del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile sobre los motivos que justifican la reivindicación del territorio comprendido entre los paralelos 23 y 24 latitud S

Lavalle, José Antonio de. Mi misión en Chile 1879, Lima

b) Instructions from the Department of State to the Ministers of the United States in Bolivia, 25th of April 1848 - 5th of June 1906

M. 77, roll 22

c) Instructions from the Department of State to the Ministers of the United States in Peru: 7th of July 1863 - 23rd of July 1883

M. 77, roll 131

C. I. Notes of the Chilean Legation in Washington to the Department of State: 26th of January 1867 - 20th of May 1881

M. 73, roll 3

II. Notes of the Chilean Legation in Washington to the Department of State: 1st of June - 31st of December 1886.

M. 73, roll 4

III. Note of the Bolivian Legation in Washington to the Department of State

T. 795 roll 1

D. NEWSPAPERS OF THAT TIME

Los Debates (Santiago) 1884-87

La Época (Santiago) 1881-91

El Estandarte Católico (Santiago) 1879-91

El Ferrocarril (Santiago) 1880-1911

El Ferrocarrilito (Santiago, Morning Newspaper, 1880 81

El Independiente (Santiago) 1866, 1879-1890

El Mercurio (Valparaíso 1939 and 1848 1879 1881 1902 1976

El Mercurio del Vapor (Valparaíso) 1878-1882

El Nuevo Ferrocarril (Santiago 1879 1880 1881

La Patria (Valparaíso) 1873-4, 1880 91 1893 6

Los Tiempos(Santiago) 1879-1881
