What is the Belt and Road?
Very short,
It is a multi-level ambitious project 
promoted by China,
and it is a very interesting example of 
how a modern state employs
historical discourses of old transcontinental roads,
in order to argue the strategic necessity
for establishing new networks 
in Eurasia and beyond.
And special importance
in the implementation of the Belt 
and Road Initiative has been attached
to the Central Asian states in particular.
China regards them as the key element
of the successful 
BRI progress in the future.
When talking about the developments 
of the Belt and Road Initiative
in Central Asia,
I argue, that so far there have been 
four separate stages.
 For historians it is probably better 
to call these periods
of the BRI implementation in the region.
These periods are:
The first is the period of preconditions 
and taking off.
The second, the period of putting out 
feelers to prospective partners.
The third period is the period of 
preparing the groundwork.
And finally the ongoing period of 
adjustments of the Belt Road Initiative.
If we talk about the first one, the preconditions
and taking off of the Belt and Road,
we can cover the events before 2013,
before the Belt and Road was launched.
By that time, China
became one of the main trade partners 
of the Central Asian states,
and it secured a
comprehensive strategic partnership
with each state in the region,
and all major bilateral agreements
between China and these states
were focused on economic issues.
However, not everything
ran smoothly before 2013,
there were both contradictions
between China and Central Asian
states on bilateral level,
and within the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation
Organization) on multilateral level.
For example, if we talk
about the bilateral levels,
there were
contradictions on the railway construction,
on the multilateral levels,
not every Central Asian
state was supporting
the idea of the economic, the
adjustment of economic cooperation
between China and the Central Asian states
and Russia. Also, within the SCO (Shanghai
Cooperation Organization) framework.
So, China needed something else,
some new mechanism
in order to make it more appealing
for the Central Asian states.
And here the narrative
of the Asian Silk Road,
which connected civilizations,
connected China and outer space,
contributing to the mutual development,
became very, worked very well for China.
The second period is the
period of putting of feelers.
It is a very short time between 2014, 2015.
China officially suggested
the Belt and Road Initiative
for the Central Asian states in particular.
But in a very general form,
and there were no white papers or
any other official documents on that.
And so far, there was high
uncertainty about this new project,
and China was waiting for the response
from the Central Asian states.
So, while talking about this particular
period we should speak mostly about
how the Central Asian states
perceived the Belt and Road
and how they started to respond.
In the region,
the Belt and Road Initiative, or at that
time the Silk Road Economic Belt project,
was perceived as corresponding
with local needs to
promote international transit roads
and attract more much-needed
investments in the region,
to dissolve existing
economic and social problems.
The Belt and Road Initiative
implied no specific
political requirements to fulfill.
And this is also
what was very attractive for
the Central Asian regimes,
which wanted to keep in power.
Therefore, official discourses on the
Belt and Road Initiative at that time
were all very positive.
And if we talk about
the academic discourses,
which started to appear
throughout the region,
they were both positive. But some
experts were also covering
possible dangers for
the Central Asian states
and the dependency of each state
in the region on China in the future.
The third period, preparing the groundwork
is the period in between 2015 and 2018.
For the first time, China came up with the
official white paper about the
Belt and Road Initiative in 2015,
and later on Belt and Road
became more actively articulated
in the official discourse
of China, and it even
was put in the
Constitution of the Communist Party of China
later, during the 19th Party Congress.
It all meant that the Belt
and Road became a very
important part of Chinese
policymaking for the future.
Among the external factors, which started
to influence the belt and Road
implementation in the region,
were the start of the US-China
strategic competition at the time.
Also the Russian factor. Russia became
again more active in the region.
And in the end of 2016,
even placed Central Asian states,
those who were the members
of the Eurasian Economic Union, and
the Collective Security
Treaty Organization,
among the most
important states in the foreign security
policy concept in the Post-Soviet space.
And third, there were also internal changes
within the region, such as
the change of power in Uzbekistan
and later the start of the new
rapprochement process
in the region, initiated by Uzbekistan
and supported by Kazakhstan, mostly,
and other states in the region.
So, if we talk about the BRI in that time,
China started to put even more investments
in the region, especially two big key states
in the region, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
And if we try to explore
the actual correlation
between the multilateral
and bilateral cooperation,
and between China and
the states of the region,
mainly, again, the cooperation was
promoted at the bilateral level.
And the majority, the
majority of the projects
which have been started,
were already projects
initiated before the Belt
and Road was proposed.
Some of them were successful,
for example the line C of the
Central Asian gas pipeline.
Some of them are not successful
at all, for example line D or the
Kyrgyzstan, 
China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway.
And finally, if we speak about the last
period, the ongoing period
of the BRI adjustments,
this is also very interesting,
because China,
being aware of the critique about
the Belt and Road Initiative,
and especially about the
critique on China's loans
to the Central Asian states
China's geopolitical
ambitions in the region,
China and some corrupt practices
of gaining advantages of the
businesses in the region.
I still had to continue putting efforts
into making the Belt
and Road Initiative more
more appealing for the
Central Asian states.
And during the second Belt and
Road Forum, two months ago,
in Beijing,
China started to bring more,
bring up a deeper, more concrete
discourse on the Belt and Road.
This particular period, there were new
factors of influence within Central Asia.
Such as,
again, the political transition
in the region, in Kazakhstan,
in particular, this time,
further rapprochement of the
states within the region,
and again the Russian factor.
And also if we talk about this stage,
there are also some changes within China.
Because China started to be more
active in the fight against terrorism,
and it should devise a paper
in the spring of 2018 on fighting
against terrorism in Xinjiang,
and also the issue of the
so-called Vocational Centers
in Xinjiang appeared,
and the question of refugees
escaping from Xinjiang to Central
Asian states became one more
important issue of relations
in-between China and the states.
Although the official response
of the Central Asian states,
in particular of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan to this issue was positive,
because all officials regarded this
issue as China's internal question.
But at the same time, it started
to cause further public response
from the Central Asian, from
the Central Asian population,
about what is going on inside Xinjiang
and how it can affect the situation
in Central Asia in particular.
By the time when the Belt and
Road was launched in Central Asia,
China's presence in the region
had already been very impressive.
All of the Central Asian states,
although to different degrees,
had become significantly
dependent on their
commercial and financial ties with China.
For example, up to 2013 Kazakhstan became,
for Kazakhstan, China became
the second largest trade partner
after Russia,
and one 1/4, 25% of its
oil was produced by China
and 1/5 of its oil
exports, 20% was being sold to China.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were also very
highly dependent on China that time.
More than 50% of the imported goods
came to the States from China,
and China's share in the
foreign depth was already 35%
for Kirgiztan and 50% for
Tajikistan respectively.
Turkmenistan also became
highly dependent on
exporting its gas to
China,
more than 60% of its gas
was already being sold
to its eastern partner.
Uzbekistan also
experienced the raise of Chinese
investments into infrastructure products,
which was good for Uzbekistan,
but at the same time they
were continuing to sell
the raw materials to China,
again being dependent on
this kind of collaboration.
During my answer to the first question,
I mentioned four different stages.
So, if we talk about the second stage
of the BRI implementation, 2014 - 2015,
the People's Republic of China
and its economic influence
in Central Asia has become even more
observable, in each state of Central Asia
and China secured its position as the
largest investor
in all of the five states.
The largest creditor,
except from Kazakhstan,
and the largest for Turkmenistan
or second largest trading partner,
which was really very important for
the Central Asian States at that time.
During the third period, 2016 - 2018,
China's economic role became especially
significant for Turkmenistan.
Because Turkmenistan before
sold part of its gas to Russia,
but after the start of the
economic sanctions against Russia
in the early 2010s,
there were tensions between Russia
and Turkmenistan on the prices of gas
and Turkmenistan stopped
selling gas to Russia, and after that, 
it had to
sell more gas to China for lower prices,
which lowered benefits
for Turkmenistan itself,
since the gas exports accounted for
80% of the government's revenues
and 35% of the country's GDP.
So it all exacerbated internal economic
problems in Turkmenistan in particular.
And it was a really huge
dependence on its ties with China.
For other states in the region,
during this particular period,
dependence on the Chinese
markets remained a challenge,
because mineral resources
continued to one of the major
export items for each of the states.
Also, during the third stage we
can speak about a new dimension
of China's involvement in the region,
because for the first time
China launched the so-called
quadrilateral cooperation
and coordination mechanism,
in between itself, Tajikistan,
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
So, for the first time Tajikistan,
who was a member of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization led by Russia,
was involved in another
cooperation mechanism with
some military and political-military
agenda with China.
And it was not in the framework of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
It was something new.
China became a potential security provider
for the Central Asian states
and for Tajikistan in particular
during this particular stage.
And if we talk about the
last stage of the ongoing
cooperation between China and Central Asian
states, and the implementation
of the Belt and Road,
we can just see the
continuation of this processes.
So, the economic dependency
and the start of the security provision
for the Central Asian states
and it will be very interesting to see
how the situation is going
to evolve in the future.
And first, if we speak about the
challenges of the Belt and Road
implementation for China itself in Eurasia,
first of all, it is very interesting
to see how China will try to combine
its will to follow the market principles
and rely only on, mostly
on commercial funds
for financing the BRI
projects in the future.
With the
need to institutionalize the Belt
and Road and its implementation,
and again to follow the
China Communist Party
constitution set goals
to promote the Belt and Road as
one of the biggest objectives
for China's foreign policy in the future.
Also for China another challenge is,
they need to combine the
narratives of a big family,
good neighborliness
and the success story of turning
into rich, while being poor, previously.
With the necessity to create a positive,
image of China in many countries,
especially in those neighboring states,
where the image
of China has been hostile for centuries.
So, this is also very interesting to see
how China is going to adjust to this.
If we talk about the challenges
for other states in Eurasia,
first of all, there is this 
dilemma of sovereignty,
and we all know that the Belt and Roads
is being sold under the flag of
being apolitical
and the emphasis is put on the
principles of non-interference
and territorial integrity.
The question is, how far the engagement
within the Belt and Road may
go for the states of Eurasia,
and whether this red line
for accepting the proposed projects
under the Belt and Road auspices.
For example, again, if we speak
about the Central Asian states,
there is possibility of militarization
of the Belt and Road inspired projects.
China, in case of the deterioration of
the situation in Afghanistan will need to
secure its pipelines in Central Asia. 
And the question is,
whether China is going to
use its military force within the future or
how else is its going to be implemented.
Also, there is information now about
the Chinese military base in Tajikistan,
so this is one more proof of China
going out,
with not only its economic policies, but
also with its political and military agenda.
Also, another challenge for the
every Eurasian States is the question
of the indigenous populations
in many Eurasian states,
and the Chinese state-supported
need to implement the Belt and Road,
and popularize the idea of mutual
equality and mutual respect.
And at the same time there is this
potential clash of the
new space cooperation
with ethnic and religious nationalism,
a lot has been said about the
case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur question
and the relationship
between the states and the population
within the context of the BRI
can also become more challenging in case of
public non-acceptance of
the Belt and Road projects.
We can see the situation in
the Central Asian states again.
We also can see the negative
perception of Chinese coming
with the projects to
other states, in
in many other states in Eurasia.
For example, in Eastern Europe
and the Caucasus, in
Southeast Asia and so on.
And finally, one more challenge is the problem
of the definition of the Belt and Road.
It is still blurred and not clear,
but at the same time it is flexible,
while being blurred and unclear.
And it allows new things to
be put inside the projects.
So, this is both challenge and potential.
The potential is that anything can be added
for the BRI in the future,
and if something goes not very good,
China can add other things on the agenda.
For example, it was done before with
the Shanghai Cooperation, Organization
starting from 2001 and later,
but this will not show the
success of this project,
this is just the adjustment, the adjustment
of China's foreign policy towards
the acceptance, again, or
non-acceptance of the Belt and Road.
And the challenge about
the blurriness, again,
is about the implementation
of the Belt and Road
how is it going to be done
on the field in each state,
which is being interested in
becoming a partner of china
in this particular field.
