Prof: So last Wednesday
I asked you to suspend disbelief
and bear with me as we worked
our way through the Pareto
system as a way of backing into
the political theory of John
Stuart Mill,
which is going to be our
subject today.
 
And I also promised you that a
side-benefit of Wednesday's
lecture was you would get to
learn everything you ever needed
to know about neoclassical
economics.
That in fact is true.
 
Everything you ever do in
economics is basically derived
from or built from those simple
ideas that Pareto and Edgeworth
put together.
 
So it is, indeed,
I think, a side-benefit of
working through it.
 
But now what I want to do today
is integrate what we saw in the
Pareto system and the remarks I
made about Stevenson's emotivism
and philosophy,
and come into the central
arguments in political theory
that are informed by these
mature Enlightenment ideas.
 
And you're going to see why I
talk about the mature
Enlightenment with respect to
Mill further on in today's
lecture.
 
As you can see here,
I talk about Mill as attempting
to synthesize rights and
utility.
And you might think,
"Well, okay.
How's he going to do that?"
 
Some of you who know a little
bit more about Mill may also
think it's odd that I have chose
his little essay called "On
Liberty"
for you to read,
in explaining his
utilitarianism,
when in fact Mill wrote an
essay on utilitarianism which
I'm not having you read,
although I'm certainly not
prohibiting you from reading it.
 
But I think that what you can
see is that the synthesis of
rights and utility can be
approached from either end,
and I'm going to approach it
from the rights end at least
initially,
and then we'll worry about the
utilitarian end of things later.
 
But I think Mill's basic view
is whether you start to develop
a fully satisfying conception of
individual rights,
or whether you start to develop
a fully satisfying conception of
utilitarianism,
you're going to end up
incorporating the other one of
those two into your account.
Let me tell you a little bit
about who John Stuart Mill was.
He was the son of James Mill,
who had been a contemporary of
Jeremy Bentham's.
 
Indeed, not only a
contemporary,
but actually a disciple of
Jeremy Bentham's,
and a true believer in
Benthamite utilitarianism,
including in the matter of the
education of his son.
He was very concerned to give
his son the most efficient
possible education in order to
get him to achieve at the
highest level.
 
And so he was,
what we would today call,
home-schooled.
 
There were governesses and
schoolteachers brought to his
home.
 
He never went to school,
and indeed he turned out to be
a brilliant child.
 
He was doing differential
calculus at a very young age.
He was speaking Latin and Greek
in his teens.
He was just an astonishingly
smart child,
and so they ramped up his
education at an incredible clip
with the result that,
by the age of 21,
he actually had a nervous
breakdown.
He had no friends.
 
He had no life.
 
He was a miserable brilliant
nerd.
And he never entirely recovered
from that experience,
and nor did he ever quite
absolve Bentham and his father's
single-mindedness from
responsibility for doing that to
him.
 
And he was a somewhat pained
and tortured person later in
life.
 
I think he never quite shed the
scars,
but his wife Harriet,
who was a very interesting
intellectual in her own right,
and wrote much of Mill's famous
essay that appeared over his
name on the subjugation of
women.
 
And indeed, some Mill scholars
think that Harriet also had a
big role in the writing of On
Liberty, but that's more
speculative.
 
So he never quite got over that
early shock-and-awe utilitarian
education,
but he also never entirely shed
the commitment to the idea that
utilitarianism is the best
system for thinking about
politics.
At one point he says,
"I do endorse
utilitarianism,
but only in the largest sense
of man as a progressive being.
 
We'll come back to what that
might mean as we proceed.
So Mill does have one useful
characteristic in common with
Bentham.
 
I think it's the only one.
 
As I said, that Bentham is one
of these monomaniacal people,
and what makes him useful to us
is he takes an idea and runs
with it to the absolute extreme,
and that's useful because you
can see its assumptions in a
very sharp and stark light.
Mill is somebody who is aware
of the infinitely complex nature
of human existence and is not a
Johnny One Note in a sense that
Bentham was,
and you'll see this very
quickly as we get into his
argument.
Nonetheless,
he shares in common with
Bentham the feature that he
reduces his doctrine to a single
paragraph, just as Bentham did.
 
It was the opening paragraph of
his Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and
Legislation.
With Mill it comes about twelve
pages in on the Hackett edition
that you're reading.
 
He says categorically,
The object of this essay is to
assert one very simple
principle;
as entitled to govern
absolutely (this sounds quite
unequivocal) the dealings of
society with the individual in
the way of compulsion and
control,
whether the means used be
physical force in the form of
legal penalties or the moral
coercion of public opinion.
That principle is that the sole
end for which mankind are
warranted,
individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty
of action of any of their number
is self-protection.
 
That the only purpose for which
power can rightfully be
exercised over any member of a
civilized community,
against his will,
is to prevent harm to others.
His own good,
either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant.
 
He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or to forbear
because it will be better for
him to do so,
because it will make him
happier, because,
in the opinions of others,
to do so would be wise or even
right.
 
These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him,
or reasoning with him,
or persuading him,
or entreating him,
but not for compelling him or
visiting him with any evil in
case he do otherwise.
To justify that (that is,
to justify compelling him),
the conduct from which it's
desired to deter him must be
calculated to produce evil to
someone else.
The only part of the conduct of
anyone for which he's amenable
to society is that which
concerns others.
In the part which merely
concerns himself,
his independence is,
of right, absolute.
Over himself,
over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign.
 
 
 
Anyone think they have any
doubt about what he's saying?
I mean, setting aside whether
you agree with it.
Anyone think you feel pretty
clear about what he's saying?
Never mind whether we agree
with it.
Okay, only one person feels
clear.
Who feels unclear about what
he's saying?
So we have one person who's
clear, nobody who's unclear,
and 136 undecided?
 
Wow!
 
I mean, isn't it clear?
 
As I say, I'm not asking you
whether you agree.
It's just saying,
unless you harm somebody else
you've got to be left alone,
and the statements a)
"Leave you alone,"
and b) "Stop anyone else
who wants to interfere with
you," harkening back to
Bentham's point that the law
should stay the hand of a third
party, right?
 
That's what he's saying here,
yeah?
It's not rocket science.
 
I mean, it's very direct.
 
Okay, so that's what he's
saying.
You might say,
"Well, okay."
I mean, just to give you an
example,
he's saying if one of you comes
to me at the end of this course
and says,
"Professor Shapiro,
will you write me a letter
because I want to go to law
school?"
 
And I say, "Well,
I've come to know you,
and you've got a lot of good
qualities and skills,
but you are not a lawyer.
 
Trust me.
 
I've been around a long time.
 
You should not go to law
school."
The appropriate answer,
Mill would say,
is, "Well,
thank you for your opinion.
I'm not asking you to tell me
what to do."
I can plead with you.
 
I can remonstrate with you.
 
I can try and persuade you,
but at the end of the day if
you say,
"Well, thank you very
much,
but I'm going to law
school,"
I shouldn't try to coerce you.
And not only that,
I shouldn't try and get others
to put pressure on you,
right?
It's not only should you not be
compelled, but we shouldn't try
and coerce you with the moral
force of public opinion.
We shouldn't start telling
lawyer jokes to make you feel
bad, right?
 
So we have to respect the
autonomy of the individual.
Complete opposite,
at least going in,
from where Bentham starts,
right?
And one of the things you
should see from this,
and should be starting to go
through your mind,
is that there is a deep
structural identity between
Mill's harm principle and the
Pareto principle that we
discussed last time.
 
I'll come back to that later,
but there's a basic structural
identity between those two
things.
Now, you could say,
"Okay, so Mill is saying
respect everybody's rights.
 
This is a strong theory of
individual rights.
Unless somebody's harming
somebody else they're to be left
alone and the state has to make
sure that they're going to be
left alone.
 
Fine, that's a theory of
rights, but what does this have
to do with utilitarianism?"
 
Right?
 
How does Mill get from
protecting freedom of the
individual through this robust
doctrine of individual rights to
the notion that we're going to
maximize the utility in society?
 
 
Anyone have any idea?
 
 
 
Anyone?
 
Yeah?
 
Yes, sir?
 
Wait for the microphone.
 
Student:  Does he argue
that freedom leads to the
highest level of pleasure?
 
That an individual given that
type of freedom would gain
utility from that and thus
maximizing that type of freedom
at the individual level?
 
Prof: But why?
 
Student:  Why do we gain
utility from freedom?
Prof: Yes.
 
In Mill's mind,
why does maximizing freedom
also maximize utility?
 
I mean, you're right.
 
You're dead right,
but there's an intermediate
step.
 
Yeah? Okay, over here.
 
Student:  According to
Mill, only individual people can
decide for themselves what makes
them happy.
Prof: According to Mill
only individuals can decide for
themselves what makes them
happy.
That is also correct,
but there's still another step
in this that I want us to focus
on that neither of you has
mentioned yet.
 
Yeah?
 
Student:  Maybe that
individuals,
knowing their own desires,
will bargain with one another,
using their freedom to gain the
mutual maximum utility.
Prof: Well,
that's a very good point,
and that is where the identity
with the Pareto principle comes
in.
 
If you leave people alone,
right, they will do what they
want with themselves or with
others,
and so what Mill's harm
principle allows in politics is
this sort of analog of what we
were calling Pareto superior in
economics.
 
That's also true,
but it's not what I was looking
for right now,
though there's no reason you
should know that because you
can't read my mind.
But there's another step.
 
Think back to the big picture.
 
The big picture is all these
Enlightenment theories are
committed both to the freedom of
individual and to scientific
truth, right?
 
Mill is an Enlightenment
thinker of the first order.
If you flip through your whole
copy of On Liberty you'll
see--what is the longest chapter
about?
What is the longest chapter
about?
It's probably half the book.
 
 
 
Student:  Freedom of
thought and discussion.
Prof: Freedom of thought
and discussion,
right.
 
Freedom of speech.
 
So why is freedom of speech so
important?
Because Mill thinks that is the
path to the truth.
Freedom of speech is the path
to the truth.
I want to spend a little bit of
time on this because it's really
important.
 
It's really important for two
reasons.
The first is you're going to
see a very different conception
of science informing Mill's
work.
Remember back to our discussion
of the early Enlightenment of
Hobbes, of Locke,
of Bentham, that truth was
equated with certainty.
 
Remember, the
seventeenth-century people had
this weird root to this because
it wasn't what we think of as
a priori truths,
but things that were a product
of wills and all that,
right?
But the early Enlightenment
idea of science is to find
certainty, right?
 
Cartesian doubt,
remember, is looking for
propositions that cannot be
doubted, things that can be
known with certainty.
 
Mill is a fallibilist.
 
Mill has a much more modern
concept of science,
the one that you intuitively
have, which says,
first of all,
that all knowledge is
corrigible,
all propositions have to be
evaluated by reference to
evidence in the scientific
method,
and we could always be wrong in
our attempts to do that.
 
So a very important move in the
history of the philosophy of
science,
in this regard,
was to move away from talking
about what philosophers used--
they used the word
verificationism,
proving that a scientific
theory is correct,
and instead starting to talk
about falsificationism,
proving that it hasn't yet been
falsified.
And so any of you who takes a
statistics course in the social
sciences will know what you have
is a hypothesis,
an empirical hypothesis,
saying high tax rates lead to
inflation.
 
And you go and you'll test it
against the evidence.
And you'll have some other
hypothesis that will be called
the competing hypothesis,
or the null hypothesis,
and all you'll ever be able to
say is that your hypothesis
hasn't been shown to be false.
 
You'll never know for certain
that some other hypothesis
couldn't do better,
okay?
So falsificationism is the idea
that would eventually become
associated with the philosopher
Karl Popper who we don't read in
this course.
 
But it's this idea that
knowledge claims are corrigible.
All of our knowledge claims
might be wrong,
and the scientific attitude
involves recognizing that and
acting accordingly.
 
So the mature Enlightenment
conception of science means you
have to be committed to finding
the truth as an ongoing quest,
and this is really important
for Mill, okay?
So freedom of speech is really
important for Mill as a path to
the truth, as the path to the
truth.
Now, that's one reason it's
important.
The second is that Mill injects
into a desirable political
system, the importance of
argument, arguing.
And this is going to come up
again and again in the course,
particularly in the last
section when we get to
democratic theory.
 
When I say Mill talks about the
importance of argument,
this is very different from
deliberation.
It's not the idea that we
should all get together,
and hold hands,
and sing Kumbaya,
and see what we can agree
about.
That's the sort of deliberative
ideal, right?
Deliberation.
 
Argument is,
how many here have seen Prime
Minister's Questions on TV,
right?
That's argument, okay?
 
Or Crossfire,
the TV program,
that's argument,
where people hurl the best
criticisms they can come up with
against the other side.
It's not surprisingly where
Mill is often held to be
responsible for the metaphor of
the competition of ideas.
These are two very different
models of the role of speech in
politics.
 
Just to give you an example of
what's at stake here,
there's a lot of experimental
work that's been done by social
psychologists on this question.
 
So suppose there's a field and
in the middle of the field there
is a cow, and we're all standing
around the field looking at the
cow.
 
And the question is,
what does the cow weigh?
And think about two ways of
tackling this question.
One would be that we all
discuss--"What do you think
the cow weighs?
 
What do you think it
weighs?"--and we eventually
reach some agreement upon what
we think the cow weighs and we
go with that number.
 
The second approach would be to
say we don't talk to each other
at all.
 
Each of us looks at the cow and
makes our own best judgment
about what the cow weighs.
 
We add them all up and divide
it by the number of people.
Which method do you think is
more likely to get the weight of
the cow accurate?
 
How many people think the
deliberative method?
Hands up for the deliberative
method.
Okay, it looks like about a
third of you.
How many for the
non-deliberative additive
method?
 
Okay, so you win two-to-one.
 
Well, it turns out you're right.
 
It turns out that the
non-deliberative additive method
gets the answer right almost
exactly, where the deliberative
method goes all over the place.
 
Now, there's lots of
speculation about why.
Now, one reason could be,
well, the trouble with the
deliberative method is it's
going to lead people to listen
to strong personalities,
or people who think they know
more than they do.
 
Leonid over there says,
"Look, I grew up on a
farm.
 
Don't tell me about cows.
 
I know everything there is to
know about cows,
what do you people know?
 
And I say that cow weighs 1500
pounds."
And then a lot of other people
say, "Well,
he did.
 
He grew up on a farm.
 
What do I know?"
 
And so maybe opinion gets
swayed in that way.
That's one possible reason.
 
People may copy what other
people say just because they
don't know, etcetera.
 
But for whatever reason,
and we could speculate,
and when we come to talk about
deliberative democracy later
we'll go into it more.
 
I just wanted to flag this
distinction that argument is not
deliberation,
okay?
And so when Mill talks about
argument it's rather this idea
that everybody makes their own
independent judgment.
He wants our capacity to make
that judgment to be
strengthened,
but that's not the same thing
as deliberation.
 
He wants us to have our own
individual robust judgments and
trust them, okay?
 
That is his ideal,
and we should never ever kowtow
to the opinions of others.
 
This is not a deliberative
model.
And indeed, Mill gives us four
reasons for thinking that
freedom of speech is important.
 
For one thing he says
here--this is the point about
fallibilism--
he says if any opinion is
compelled to silence,
that opinion,
for all we might know,
might be true.
"To deny that is to assume
our own infallibility."
So science is not about
certainty, it's not about faith,
right?
 
It's recognizing that whatever
we say might be wrong.
Secondly, though a silenced
opinion be an error,
it may, and very commonly does,
contain a portion of the truth;
and since the general or
prevailing opinion on any
subject is rarely or never the
whole truth,
it is only by the collision of
adverse opinions (that's Prime
Minister's Questions,
that is Crossfire,
the collision of adverse
opinions) that the remainder of
the truth has any chance of
being supplied.
Thirdly, even if the received
opinion be not only true,
but the whole truth;
unless it is suffered to be and
actually is,
vigorously and earnestly
contested,
it will, by most of those who
receive it,
be held in the manner of a
prejudice,
with little comprehension or
feeling of its rational grounds.
 
That is, you don't want to only
get the right answer.
You want to get the right
answer for the right reason.
If you copy somebody's math
assignment when you can't do the
problem you have the right
answer,
but you haven't got the right
answer for the right reason.
And not only this, but;
fourthly, the meaning of the
doctrine itself will be in
danger of being lost,
or enfeebled,
and deprived of all its vital
effect on the character and
conduct: the dogma of becoming a
mere formal profession,
inefficacious for good,
but cumbering the ground,
and preventing the growth of
any real and heartfelt
conviction from reason or
personal experience.
 
So you can say that Mill is,
in some ways,
what we would think of today as
a libertarian.
He's got this idea of freedom
of speech.
We should all be left alone to
do as we like without
interference from the state
except when the state stops
others from interfering with us,
right, what Nozick will later
call the night-watchman state of
liberal theory,
this negative-freedom,
standard libertarian view.
On the other hand,
he's also a kind of romantic
individualist,
right?
He sees individual human
flourishing.
Somebody said here,
"The path to happiness.
Everybody knows their own
sources of utility.
Nobody can tell you what makes
you happy."
This is the link to Stevenson
we were talking about last time.
I can't tell you what should be
in your utility function.
I don't know.
 
No interpersonal comparisons of
utility, that's the link to
Pareto.
 
So you can see in all of these
fields this move to--it's not
mere subjectivism,
it's the romantic celebration
of subjectivism,
right?
The full flourishing of your
potential can only happen if you
are allowed total freedom of
speech,
of anything you want to do so
long as you don't harm others.
And this is important not just
for your own individual utility
function,
but also because that's how
society learns the truth,
and truth is going to be
important for the pursuit of
utility.
You need these tough-minded
critics.
Whereas for Locke we were all
miniature gods who have maker's
knowledge about creation,
for Mill we're all miniature
scientists.
 
We've got to have the critical
attitude, and you can't get a
critical attitude if you're
copying other people's math.
You have to be able to defend
your reasoning to all comers.
You have to stand there like
Gordon Brown at question time
and have people hurl counter
examples at you,
not people who are trying to
get your agreement,
okay?
 
It's the combat of ideas,
the clash of ideas.
The truth comes out as a
by-product of that just as in
the invisible hand theory of
markets the truth is a
by-product,
efficiency is a by-product of
lots of individual transactions,
right?
So that is the connection,
if you like,
between Mill's idea of the
importance of each individual
getting the truth for themselves
and the Pareto principle.
In both cases it's an invisible
hand explanation,
which says as a byproduct of
this utilitarian efficiency is
maximized.
 
That's why the chapter on
freedom of speech is central to
this doctrine.
 
Okay, so all well and good,
you might say,
but how many read to the end,
the chapter on applications?
It all starts to unravel,
it seems, once we get to the
chapter on applications.
 
Here Mill says,
In many cases,
an individual,
in pursuing a legitimate
object,
necessarily and therefore
legitimately causes pain or loss
to others,
or intercepts a good which they
had a reasonable hope of
attaining.
 
Such opposition of interest
between individuals often arise
from bad social institutions,
but are unavoidable while those
institutions last;
and some would be unavoidable
under any institutions.
 
Whoever succeeds in an
overcrowded profession,
or in a competitive
examination;
whoever is preferred to another
in any contest for an object
which both desire,
reaps benefit from the loss of
others,
from their wasted exertion and
disappointment.
 
But it is, by common admission,
better for the general interest
of mankind,
that persons should pursue
their objects undeterred by this
sort of consequences,
in other words,
society admits no right,
either legal or moral,
in the disappointed
competitors,
to immunity from this kind of
suffering;
and feels called on to
interfere, only when means of
success have been employed which
it is contrary to the general
interest to permit;
namely, fraud or treachery,
and force.
What's the problem with all of
that?
It's not exactly eloquent,
but what's the problem there?
Isn't there a problem?
 
Maybe there's no problem.
 
 
 
That's called a clue.
 
What's the problem?
 
Yeah?
 
Student: According to this
couldn't you reason that
something like the Holocaust was
okay if it's in the general
interest of mankind,
or any kind of...
Professor Ian Shapiro: Yeah.
 
It's a big problem, right?
 
I mean, didn't he say earlier
on that people can't be coerced
into accepting results just
because the majority believes
it?
 
And he went out of his way,
he went out of way to say
whether it's the actions of the
majority or the moral coercion
of public opinion,
but here he's saying,
"But it is by common
admission better that we have
competitive exams.
 
Of course the people who don't
get the job are harmed,
but it's too bad."
 
Seems like a contradiction.
 
No?
 
Give another example:
Again, trade is a social act.
Whoever undertakes to sell any
description of goods to the
public, does what affects the
interest of other persons,
and society in general;
and thus his conduct,
in principle,
comes within the jurisdiction
of society: accordingly,
it was once held to be the duty
of governments,
in all cases which were
considered of importance,
to fix prices,
and regulate the process of
manufacture.
But (I love this passive voice)
it is now recognized,
though not till after a long
struggle,
that both the cheapness and the
good quality of commodities are
more effectually provided for by
leaving the producers and
sellers perfectly free,
under the sole check of equal
freedom to the buyers for
supplying themselves elsewhere.
This is the so-called doctrine
of Free Trade,
which rests on grounds
different from,
though equally solid with,
the principle of individual
liberty asserted in this Essay.
 
 
 
Same problem, right?
 
It is now recognized, by whom?
 
Why should we believe that?
 
And more importantly,
aren't we supposed to be
protected from the dominant
view, right?
So, free trade.
 
We think about the arguments we
have today.
This is a century later.
 
The arguments we have about
outsourcing.
Yes, they harm the interests of
American workers when they move
factories to Mexico,
but Mill said, "Yeah,
it's true, but free trade's
better."
It's better from the standpoint
of utilitarianism.
Big problem, it seems.
 
You think Mill was just
actually not that smart,
he didn't see this huge
contradiction?
Sort of, right,
the minute you start to apply
this doctrine it all just turns
to sand?
 
 
Anyone think there's a way out
of this for Mill?
 
 
Well, people have been
struggling with this ever since
he wrote it because it does seem
to be a big problem,
but on the other hand the
allure of this rights-utility
synthesis is so great that
people want to find a way to
solve it.
 
And I think this is how Mill
thought about this:
there's no contradiction at
all.
I think that Mill thinks in
terms of a two-step test.
Step one, as you say,
of any proposed action,
is there going to be harm to
somebody else?
So, smoking marijuana,
or in more, I guess,
contextually appropriate at the
time, prohibition.
This is a case that Mill
considered in what you read.
If you go to your room and you
get paralytically drunk or you
get stoned, and you sleep it
off, you're not harming anybody.
So it's protected.
 
So Mill was a libertarian in
that sense, and he opposed
prohibition which was a very
live issue when he was writing.
But there are a lot of
activities where it's inevitable
that there's going to be harm.
 
Yes, it's true that
protectionism harms some people,
but any trade regime is going
to harm some people,
right?
 
So, I'm sorry;
free trade harms American
workers, but protectionism harms
African workers or Indonesian
workers, right?
 
Whatever you do for a trade
policy somebody's going to be
harmed,
or whatever system you have for
giving away jobs in the civil
service,
whoever doesn't get the job's
going to be harmed.
If you have pure competition
the people who don't get the
highest scores are going to be
harmed.
If you have job reservation for
whites, as they had in South
Africa, then blacks are not
going to get the jobs.
If you have affirmative action
to remedy past injustices in the
Connecticut Fire Department,
then the people who would
otherwise have gotten the jobs
are going to be harmed as the
Supreme Court said last year.
 
So Mill's point is you first
make an inquiry.
Is there a harm?
 
If the answer's no,
the action's self-regarding and
it's protected.
 
Free speech doesn't hurt
anybody.
That's why it's so important to
protect it.
Indeed, he wants to say the
externalities of free speech are
positive.
 
Free speech doesn't hurt
anybody.
Drinking doesn't hurt anybody.
 
Now, some of you might question
that.
You might say,
well, if you go to a bar and
you get paralytically drunk,
and you then get behind the
wheel of a car,
and you go home and you kill
somebody,
drinking does harm.
What do you think Mill would
say to that?
 
 
I think Mill would say,
"Well, that's a reason to
penalize drunk driving,
but not drinking,"
right?
 
So I think that's what he'd say
to that.
But, so the first step is you
ask, is there a harm to others?
If the answer's no,
it's protected by the harm
principle.
 
If the answer's yes,
there's a harm to others,
then you make a utilitarian
calculation as to what's best
for society.
 
So if there's a harm to others
then you make the utilitarian
calculation, and that's why it's
important to have good science.
Because when you make the
utilitarian calculation you want
to bring the best scientific
knowledge to bear on making that
calculation.
 
He doesn't trust majority
opinion, right?
He wants to say,
"Free trade is better than
protectionism.
 
We now know that as a matter of
economic science,"
when he was writing.
 
"If somebody could come
along and show that there's
something other than free trade
that would be even better then
we would pick that,"
okay?
So it's not the case that he
wants to say this is infallible
knowledge or known for all time,
"But, for the moment,
the best scientific judgment,
when I am writing this book on
liberty,"
Mill says,
"is that free trade
maximizes utility."
So step one, is there a harm?
 
If no, it's protected.
 
If yes, then you make the
utilitarian calculation,
and then it's important to have
good science behind you,
not majority opinion,
right?
And that's why freedom of
speech is the pathway from
liberty to utilitarian
efficiency.
And that's why all good things
go together in Mill's account,
and we can have this hunky-dory
synthesis of rights and utility.
Great, right?
 
Now, we're going to go more
deeply into this question on
Wednesday,
whether it is all hunky-dory,
because I've said now,
well, there's a two-step test
for determining harm,
and that makes sense,
and it makes the apparent
contradiction go away,
and I think it is the best
reconstruction of what Mill
wanted to say even though he
could have said it more clearly
if he had come out and done
that.
Nonetheless,
there's still the question of
who gets to decide what counts
as a relevant harm.
I said you do the first stage,
is there harm?
But just from the little
example I gave of drunken
driving and drinking you can see
that this might be problematic.
One of the things I want you to
think about between now and
Wednesday, some other examples
such as prostitution.
Does that involve harm to
others or not?
Okay, I don't want to answer
that now.
Just think about it.
 
I want to ask you that.
 
 
 
