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The buzz around wayne rooney started well
before his premier leaue debut against Spurs
at the start of the 02/03 season. After scoring
eight goals in eight games on the way to the
2001-02 FA Youth Cup final, Rooney was finally
named as an unused sub against Southampton
and crucially handed the No 18 shirt previously
worn by one of his idols, Paul Gascoigne.
By 16, Rooney already had the physical attributes
to compete in the men’s game and the technique
to go with it.
His breakthrough came at the start of the
next campaign when he partnered Kevin Campbell
in David Moyes’ 4-4-2 system. Unlike Campbell,
who played on the shoulder of the final defender
and was known for his penalty-box prowess,
Rooney was afforded the luxury to drift in
a freer role, making use of his ability to
receive possession between the lines and drive
at defenders. From his deep position, rarely
did he score tap-ins; instead, he had a penchant
for the spectacular, as evidenced by his famous
long-range winner in the 2-1 victory over
Arsenal.
Rooney was never an out-and-out No 9 at Everton
— his tally of 17 goals in 77 games demonstrates
that — but he was always good enough to
perform such a role if required. It was felt
that his skills, honed on the streets of north
Liverpool, were better suited to that of a
second striker — part-creator, part-goalscorer.
In his second campaign, he often played off
Duncan Ferguson, one of his teenage idols,
and later behind the speedy Tomasz Radzinski.
Everton fans didn’t see the best of Rooney,
who left in acrimonious circumstances to join
Manchester United in 2004, but it was as an
Everton player that Rooney produced his best
performances at an international tournament.
The Euro 2004 build-up was dominated by discussion
about England’s optimum system. But Eriksson
reverted to the 442.This meant Rooney and
Owen formed a curious strike partnership.
Owen had become accustomed to playing off
a ‘big’ No 9 like Emile Heskey but Rooney
offered a very different option. He took the
No 9 shirt but played off Owen as a second
striker, starting in a slightly deeper position
before running in behind Owen and through
on goal. Owen was leading the line but Rooney
was certainly leading the goalscoring charge.
He finished Euro 2004 with four goals in four
matches, whereas Owen netted just one of England’s
10 goals in Portugal.
Rooney’s final goal at that tournament,
in the 4-2 win over Croatia, summed up their
relationship. Rooney collected the ball between
the lines and drove at the Croatian defence.
Owen, as he did throughout his career, lingered
on verge of the offside line, awaiting a through
ball. Rooney had other ideas, though, playing
the ball just behind Owen, forcing him to
retreat and then hooking a return pass in
behind the defence for Rooney, who was running
through to finish calmly. Rooney was starting
moves and finishing them while Owen had been
relegated to playing the wall passes.
His performances convinced Manchester United
to make him the most expensive teenager in
British football.
His first couple of seasons at Old Trafford
were relatively low-key, and Rooney again
occupied the position of second striker, wearing
the No 8 shirt.
Rooney’s issue here, however, was that he
wasn’t playing behind a particularly cooperative
centre-forward. Ruud van Nistelrooy was the
Premier League’s most clinical finisher,
and had been accustomed to Manchester United’s
attacking play being based solely around him.
The arrival of Cristiano Ronaldo and Rooney
changed things — these weren’t primarily
providers like David Beckham, Paul Scholes
and Ryan Giggs. They were players who wanted
to score goals.
During his first campaign at United, Rooney
was a scorer of great goals rather than a
great goalscorer. Eleven goals and two assists,
was his only returns. He improved in his second
campaign — but, crucially, often looked
better when Van Nistelrooy was omitted from
the side.
But soon, Van Nistelrooy was being eased out
and Rooney’s role was about to change.
The era of Ronaldo and Rooney dominating Manchester
United’s attack started, after the 06 world
cup. Sir Alex Ferguson hadn’t signed an
obvious replacement for Van Nistelrooy — United
were to play with multiple rotating attackers,
surprising the opposition with speed, movement
and interplay as discussed in our dedicated
video on Rooney, Tevez & Ronaldo in the top
right now.
There was little doubt, however, that Ronaldo
was the main man. United’s attackers didn’t
have defined positions during this period
but it was obvious that Ronaldo decided where
he would play, and the others reacted. But
this meant Rooney having to wait in the wings
— often quite literally. In big matches,
particularly in Europe, Rooney was handed
a wide role in United’s 4-5-1 formation,
replicating the job Park Ji-sung was playing
on the opposite wing by manfully tracking
opposition full-backs up and down the pitch.
There were exceptions. Rooney played alone
up front in the 2007 FA Cup final, when United
struggled to get him into the game in a 1-0
loss to Chelsea, and as part of a strike partnership
alongside Carlos Tevez in the following year’s
Champions League final against the same opposition.
But Again, it was Ronaldo who decided he wanted
to go up against Essien, and Rooney reacted.
In the 2-0 loss to Barcelona in the 2009 Champions
League final, it was the other way around.
Ronaldo was up front, Rooney on the left,
because Ferguson wanted Ronaldo sprinting
into the channels. Rooney remained a threat
but the lack of a permanent position, five
years into his United career, was leaving
him frustrated.
In 2009, Ronaldo departed for Real Madrid
and again Ferguson didn’t sign a direct
replacement. Dimitar Berbatov had arrived
the previous summer and was expected to become
United’s main striker. Antonio Valencia,
a more conventional winger than Ronaldo, arrived
to supply the crosses.
Again, Rooney didn’t have a defined position
— sometimes he was fielded as a second striker
just behind Berbatov and on other occasions,
Ferguson switched to 4-3-3, with Rooney fielded
up front alone. The difference, though, was
that the attack was unashamedly based around
Rooney — he was the focal point, rather
than having to play around others.
In big matches, Ferguson almost exclusively
turned to 4-3-3, with Rooney up front — and
this was where he started to look like one
of Europe’s best. There were two very distinct
elements to his performances when playing
up front alone. On one hand, he looked like
a proper No 9 and scored an impressive number
of headers, generally from right-wing Valencia
crosses. On the other hand, at a time when
Lionel Messi was popularising the false No
9 role, Rooney proved capable of that too.
And when Rooney brought the two roles together,
he seemed unstoppable. One goal, in a 3-1
win away at Arsenal in 2010 showed this perfectly.
Rooney ended the campaign with 26 Premier
League goals. It was more than his previous
two campaigns put together, and 10 more than
his previous best. Although he was not always
deployed up front, it now seemed his best
role.
He had a difficult start to 10/11 including
ankle injuries and his very public declaration
that he wanted to leave United. On the pitch,
he was often paired with Berbatov, sometimes
playing the more advanced striking position
while the Bulgarian linked play together deeper,
although they often rotate positions.
Soon, Ferguson had instead turned to a new
system, effectively a 4-4-1-1 with Rooney
behind Javier Hernandez, a one-dimensional
striker who could only really sprint in behind
the defence. Rooney was now playing as a more
defined No 10, charged with playing through-balls
for the little Mexican.
But his defensive contribution was on the
wane. The pros and cons of this were shown
in the UCL final. Rooney offered an attacking
threat from that position, scoring the equaliser,
but he also cost Manchester United when they
didn’t have possession so His failure to
track Sergio Busquets meant that United were
constantly overrun in midfield.
These problems, continued into the next season.
He was great offensively, enjoying his best
goal scoring season but he was less effective
in the build up and hid defensive contribution
dwindled. Ferguson started to make decisions
for big games based upon Rooney’s inability
to contribute defensively. For what turned
out to be a title-decider away at Manchester
City, a 1-0 loss, Rooney was moved to a lone
centre-forward role, where he’d barely played
all season, because Park’s energy was required
in the No 10 role. Park, however, couldn’t
link play and United were dreadful.
Those shortcomings were precisely why Ferguson
decided to sign a new No 10. Having been wowed
by Shinji Kagawa’s performances for Dortmund
as an energetic, counter-attacking, disciplined
No 10, Ferguson brought him to Manchester
United in the summer of 2012. It was widely
expected that Kagawa would play in that No
10 role, with Rooney returning to his position
up front.
But the plan soon changed, as Ferguson-going
into his final season couldn’t resist splurging
on Robin van Persie. Ferguson tried to cram
Kagawa, Rooney and Van Persie into the same
side, briefly experimenting with an uncharacteristic
midfield diamond. But he eventually turned
to 4-4-2 with Rooney just behind Van Persie.
And this would be the Rooney of the next couple
of years — his goalscoring ability, rather
than his overall contribution, justifying
his place as the No 10.
United often looked shambolic in midfield,
however, completely failing to control matches.
When they encountered top-level European opposition,
Ferguson couldn’t risk playing Rooney as
the No 10 and even dropped him against madrid,
as Welbeck could track Alonso.
In the Louis van Gaal era, it was difficult
to know what Rooney was. Sometimes, he was
deployed up front. Sometimes, he was fielded
in midfield — at times, with midfielder
Angel Di Maria deployed as a striker. Rooney
spread play effectively from his deeper role
but lacked the mobility to get around the
pitch.
In Rooney’s final season at Manchester United,
under Jose Mourinho, the focus was on goals
— specifically, when he would break Bobby
Charlton’s all-time goalscoring record for
Manchester United. He eventually did so in
January 2017, and finished four ahead of Charlton
eventually, on 253.
Rooney wasn’t a first-team regular at United,
however, and elected to leave the club at
the end of the season.
In a bizarre summer of spending, Rooney was
joined by club-record signing Gylfi Sigurdsson
and Davy Klaassen, both of whom were also
considered options for the No 10 role, as
manager Ronald Koeman looked to spread goals
across the side. Instead, this simply led
to confusion tactically and a one-paced forward
line
Rooney was initially the favoured option in
the No 10 role, but it meant club record signing
Sigurdsson was shunted out of position. He
was therefore moved backwards into central
midfield, the idea being to provide Everton
with another ball-playing option from deep,
utilising Rooney’s expansive passing range.
But soon, Rooney’s lack of defensive contribution
from here was exposed against top sides and
Allardyce was vocal about this. He was soon
as a luxury player on high wages and it wasn’t
long before Rooney had to leave his boyhood
club once again.
Hope you enjoyed this look back at an iconic
player. If you want a more detailed look,
including his England evolution, visit the
athletic for the original story which goes
in depth. But that’s all for today and remember,
keep it simple.
