It is truly my
privilege and pleasure
to welcome back Professor
Moghaddam to Stanford.
We had the pleasure of having
him here three years ago
when his earlier book
about dictatorship
was just published.
He now has a book about the
psychology of democracy.
He handles issues that are
rather simple and complicated.
I think in our times, with
the rise of fundamentalism
throughout the world, with
the rise of despotism,
with the resurgence
of authoritarianism
around the world, the notion
that human beings, whether they
have an innate
tendency for democracy
or that they have an innate
tendency for despotism,
is one of the most relevant
and contemporary issues.
Professor Moghaddam is a
professor of psychology
at Georgetown University.
One of the events--
I was just talking
with him, but one
of the programs we have just
launched on Iranian studies
this year is a joint program
with the medical school,
with the lab and
the medical school,
with Profesor [INAUDIBLE]
and it basically
tries to work on
aspects of a program
that Professor Moghaddam
has launched at Georgetown.
His program at Georgetown is
an interdisciplinary program
of cognitive science.
Our program is an
interdisciplinary approach
to what neuroscience tells
us about good and evil,
about sources of
morality and ethics.
Professor Moghaddam is
an impeccable scholar,
and the depth of his
knowledge, and the depth
of his scholarship,
the depth of his work
is only matched by his humility
and his remarkable sense
of discipline.
Every time I have the
pleasure and privilege
of talking with him I say to
myself, what would it be--
why, wouldn't it be wonderful
if he wasn't at Stanford
and I could enjoy this
conversation around the clock?
The weather is better
than Georgetown,
but I'm not sure we can provide
all the amenities you have.
So, please join me in
welcoming Professor Moghaddam.
[APPLAUSE]
Thank you very much.
It's a pleasure and honor to be
here, and particularly an honor
to be introduced by Dr.
Milani who is really
one of the leading scholars in
the world on Iranian studies,
and has made this
center a world leader.
I wish we could take
you to the east coast.
I always provide an outline
for what I'm going to say.
Please, if you don't have
it, there are lots of copies.
Could we hand out--
thank you.
So the hand that is
available, and it's important
because I lose my way and I
don't know what I'm saying.
So at least when you
have the handout,
you know what I'm
supposed to be saying.
So, I'm going to start off
by talking about a puzzle,
and the puzzle is a
very important puzzle
because it impacts all
of us and it concerns
the puzzle of revolutions.
And I faced this puzzle, as I
think some of you did, in 1979.
I was a student in England
and I rushed back to Iran.
I still remember driving
overland to Iran,
and on the road there
were thousands of us
very excited about the
revolution and the changes
we were going to bring.
I still remember
how excited we were
when we got to the border
of Iran from Turkey,
and we drove to Tehran, and it
was the spring of revolution.
If at that time you
had told me that we
would have a dictatorship so
soon after the revolution,
I would not have
believed it because there
was absolute freedom.
Women were free to
participate in politics,
I started teaching at
universities immediately.
When they reopened, the first
semester I was there women
were very active.
There were many different
groups on campuses.
There were Trotskyites,
there were Maoists,
there were Islamic
fundamentalists,
and it seemed unbelievable that,
within a few years, all of that
would be wiped away.
So that was a puzzle about Iran.
But as I studied revolutions
as a psychologist,
I learned gradually that
it was not just Iran.
If we go back to the
French Revolution,
the Great Revolution,
Napoleon became an emperor
and he established his family as
kings and queens around Europe.
Yes?
All of these previous
revolutions--
Can you ask the questions later?
There is a question
and answer segment.
I'm sorry, I apologize.
OK.
So, the French Revolution
did not end monarchy.
The Russian Revolution of
1917, we got rid of the czar
and we ended up with Stalin.
And now, we have Putin.
The Cuban revolution
didn't end dictatorship,
we've had the Castro
family ruling.
The Russian-- the Arab Spring.
The Arab Spring started
with such great hope,
and unfortunately,
very quickly, we've
ended up with
dictatorships again.
The only country that
seems to be an exception
is Tunisia, where
there is some hope.
So the puzzle is this,
why is it that revolutions
against dictatorship
so often end up
with other dictatorships?
Now there are a few
exceptions you could argue.
For example, the American
Revolution, you could argue,
was an anti-dictatorship
revolution.
The revolution in
South Africa didn't
end with another
dictatorship, we might argue.
However, in those cases the
leaders were exceptional.
Washington and Mandela are one
of the few people in history
who had absolute
power and gave it up,
and I'm going to come
back to those cases.
So the question is, why
do revolutions fail?
Why do anti-dictatorship
movements fail?
And I believe the answer comes
back to not just institutions,
not just constitutions,
but it comes back
to basics psychology.
And particularly, the psychology
of groups and the psychology
of individuals.
And I'm starting
with groups first,
and that is not
traditional because
in traditional Western
psychology, at least,
we focus on the individual.
But for me, the
collective has priority.
So I'm going to come
back to that theme
of collective change.
Why is it so difficult to
achieve collective change?
I'm going to begin with
the assumption that all--
thank you.
Thank you.
All societies began
as dictatorships,
some societies have made
some progress towards what
I call actualised democracy.
Actualised democracy
is an ideal.
It's what we're
shooting towards.
Obviously, when we look at the
present situation in the United
States, and Europe,
and even Scandinavia,
it's pretty obvious we
do not have the ideal.
We don't have the ideal
candidates, anyway.
The key role played
by psychology
becomes more obvious
when we think
about the psychological
traits that I'm
going to talk about later.
Traits like tolerance
for ambiguity.
Tolerance for ambiguity.
The ability to think
with fuzzy categories.
The ability to think outside the
black and white system of I'm
right, you're wrong.
These I'm going to
come back to later.
Now I'm going to start,
though, with a question.
Is it the case that one
person's dictatorship
is another person's democracy?
Do we actually have criteria
to identify progress
toward democracy?
I would argue we do.
Under number four, I've
listed some of the criteria
that I think are important.
One of them is the
town square criteria.
That is, can you go to
your local town square
and speak against the leadership
and not be attacked, not
be killed, not be jailed?
Well, I know that
there are parts
of the world where
I could not do
that, including, unfortunately,
Iran at the moment.
Minority rights.
A democracy must give
importance to minority rights.
We know that it's majority
rule, but the majority rule
must not violate the
rights of minorities.
And again, we know in
many parts of the world
that violation takes place.
The vote them out test.
A democracy must enable citizens
to vote out the leaders.
We can see in some
countries they
have elections, for
example, in Russia.
Increasingly the same is
true in Turkey, for example,
where they have elections but
you cannot vote out the leader
because the leader
becomes the president,
then the prime minister,
then something else.
And, an independent judiciary.
So I could go on with this
list, but the key point
is that we can objectively
identify some criteria that
tell us how much
progress has been made
towards actualised democracy.
Now this particular
moment in time
is important because
the threat to democracy
is increasing in so many ways.
First of all, terrorism.
Of course, the number of
people killed by terrorists
is very small.
Around 20,000 people
commit suicide each year.
We don't have a war on suicide.
Very few people are
killed by terrorism.
The danger from terrorism is
not the number of people killed,
it's that governments
around the world
are using security as
an excuse to take away
basic freedoms from people.
So that is a grave danger
to democracy at the moment.
Another danger to
democracy at the moment
is the rising threat of
major dictatorships, China
and Russia.
We mustn't forget
that they are not just
dictatorships for
themselves, they
are anti-democratic
around the world.
And, minor dictatorships
such as Iran and North Korea.
Again, these are not
just isolated states.
These are states actively
working against openness
in other parts of the world.
Another reason why
democracy is under threat
and a danger at the
moment is because there
are a number of countries that,
20 years ago, were becoming
more democratic,
but now are going
backwards towards dictatorship.
These include Turkey, these
include Venezuela, as well as
a number of South
American countries.
Venezuela is a classic instance.
I taught at Caracas University
when Chavez was alive,
and you could see the
step by step movement
away from the open society.
He was clamping down
and ending freedoms,
and now we are in
a situation where
a country with
such rich resources
is economically stifled
and politically corrupted.
So, democracy is under
attack in this way
as well, where there has
been a slide backwards
in a number of countries that
were becoming democratic.
Another issue that I
think is important,
and some might
disagree with me--
we can debate this.
I believe that increasing
inequalities and concentration
of wealth in fewer
and fewer hands,
as demonstrated by
recent research,
for example, Thomas
Picketty's book.
The concentration of wealth
in fewer and fewer hands
is a danger to democracy,
especially when you have,
in the United States, the
Supreme Court deciding
that spending money in elections
is equal to free speech.
Recently, Oxfam
announced that something
like 80 people in the
world have as much wealth
as half the world's population.
80 people, and 3.5
billion people.
I believe that is a flaw,
and that is something that
impacts, weakens, democracy.
Another factor that very few
people are attending to--
but Gordon has written a
brilliant book recently,
his book is called The Rise
and Fall of American Growth--
and this factor is the leveling
off, and perhaps even decline
of, productivity.
Very few people are
attending to this.
What's happened is
that, since the 1970s,
productivity has stagnated
and even perhaps declined.
Now this may seem very
strange because all of us
are running around saying
we're working harder than ever.
But actually, the statistics
show that productivity has not
risen since the 1970s.
Facebook, Twitter,
all these things,
they have not
increased productivity.
Now you take the trend of
increasing wealth concentration
in fewer and fewer hands,
and stagnating productivity,
and the consequence for the
bottom 40%, 50%, is clear.
The bottom 40%, 50%, is
being squeezed even more.
I believe these
are all trends that
threaten democracy even more.
Why?
Because when you have
people, the majority,
who are getting deprived
economically, under pressure,
they cannot participate
in the democratic process.
It's no good saying, well,
they all have a vote.
They all have a vote, but
participation in democracy
is different.
So that's the
context we're leading
with-- we're dealing with.
Let me now turn
to another issue.
The approach I'm taking
is very different
from traditional psychology.
Traditional psychology,
as I've mentioned,
focuses on individual processes.
I believe the way to look at
democracy and dictatorship
to understand it is to look
at collective processes first,
and then individual processes.
Traditional
psychology has focused
on the personality of leaders,
personality of dictators.
So we have thousands of studies
on people like Hitler, Gaddafi,
et cetera.
I've argued that the way
to understand dictatorship
and the weakness of democracy
is not to focus on individuals,
but the context in which
the dictatorship arises.
I call this the springboard
to dictatorship.
A springboard is created,
it enables the dictator
to rise up and grab power.
My argument is that in
any group, in any family,
in any work setting--
you know this--
there are potentially
individuals
who could become dictators.
You know this from
your own family.
What prevents them from
becoming a dictator
is that the springboard
is not in place.
So my focus is on the context--
the context-- and
the long term process
of moving from
dictatorship to democracy.
Now, again, I'm going
to disagree with most
of the traditional models.
The traditional
discussion has been
that there is an inevitability
to this movement.
Of course, from the left
we have the Marxist view
that there is an
inevitable movement
towards the
proletariat revolution,
et cetera, et cetera.
And one day, we will
get to a better world.
On the right, in the
last few decades,
we've had this
tendency to celebrate
the decline of
communism and to argue
that there is an
inevitable movement
towards liberal
democracy, and there's
some kind of end of history.
I would argue that,
psychologically, there
is actually no inevitability
to human change.
We could become more
democratic, but we could
become much less democratic.
Indeed, if I were to bet whether
dictatorships or democracies
rule by the end of the 21st
century, I'd flip a coin.
It's not clear that democracy
is going to win out.
It's not clear that the
United States and Europe
will remain more powerful
than the dictatorships that
are rising.
China has already
just about overtaken
the United States in terms
of the size of its economy,
and its building up its
military very rapidly.
I was in the Philippines
and Japan recently.
The worry in that
part of the world
is the expansion of China.
And it's not at all clear that,
by the end of this century,
China will not be
the dominant power.
So there is no inevitability
about democracy winning out.
It may well be that
we will go backwards.
So that's my assumption,
that it's an open system
and we have to fight
to maintain democracy.
It's not inevitable.
Now let me come back
to my starting puzzle,
the puzzle of why
it is so difficult
to get from a dictatorship, to
a revolution, to a democracy.
Why is it that we keep having
revolutions and going back
to dictatorships?
I believe the answer
is human plasticity.
Now those of you who know
something about neuroscience
know that plasticity is a
huge topic in neuroscience.
There's actually a
journal called Plasticity,
and the research in
neuroscience is really
focused on neurons,
neurotransmitters,
neural networks, and how
malleable the human brain
is, how we can learn
and relearn, et cetera.
My argument is that we need to
look outside now, not inside,
and to think hard about
malleability of plasticity
in human relationships.
What happens when you
have a revolution?
In Iran, we had a
revolution against the Shah,
the Shah leaves.
What do we need to happen next?
Next, we need to change the
relationship of the people
with the leadership.
So you need to change
collective processes.
You need to change leader
follower relationships.
That's at a broad level.
At a more minute level,
we need to change
interpersonal relations.
Relationships within families,
between husband and wife,
between parents and children.
We need to change relationships
in context, such as voting--
where voting takes place.
After the revolution, I did
some very simple studies
looking at how Iranians interact
when it was time for elections.
In the first year
of the revolution,
there was relative
freedom in the sense
that no particular
group had a monopoly.
There were a number of
interesting elections.
Now, they weren't elections
in the Western sense,
but there was some
freedom to try
to elect people who were less
liberal, more liberal, et
cetera.
It wasn't completely
controlled yet,
and women were coming
to these elections
still relatively
free without having
to wear their hijab, et cetera.
Then what happened
in these places?
One of the first
things that happened
was people looked
at one another,
and just by looking they
could tell, more or less, who
you were going to vote for.
And what happened was most
of the voting was in mosques,
and there would be
groups of people
standing outside the mosque.
And if you didn't look
like the kind of person who
would vote for their
person, you would
be given a rough time going in.
Sometimes, I went
inside and there
were people who were illiterate,
and they would take their paper
and fill it in for them.
There was discussions
and debates
inside the mosque about
who you should vote for.
In other words,
the basics of what
we would understand to be
a free and fair election
were not there.
People had not yet
learned what it takes.
Now, unfortunately,
the government
wasn't interested in
people learning what
it takes to be in a democracy.
Very quickly after that,
the pressure came on.
I remember an election
where, like all the elections
at that time, you had to
have your fingerprint taken,
and there was indelible ink.
The next day, I did not
have that ink on my finger.
Well, there was a
lot of pressure.
People noticing,
oh, you didn't vote.
Well, I didn't like
the candidates.
I went and put ink on my
finger because the pressure was
so great that I had to
go into certain offices
to get things done, and
people notice you didn't vote.
Very quickly, pressure was
on to conform and obey.
So when I talk about
political plasticity,
plasticity in behavior,
the same kinds
of behaviors that were
there during the Shah's time
continued and intensified
through the influence
of the mullahs.
The leadership didn't
change, the relationship
between the leadership and
the followers did not change.
So essentially,
what we failed to do
was to change fast enough
in a democratic direction.
And, of course,
this lack of change
was supported by a leadership
who did not want change
in that direction anyway.
So, we had real problems.
So by plasticity, I'm
referring to change,
I'm referring to change not just
individually, but collectively.
And it's not just
relevant, of course, Iran.
It's certainly relevant to the
United States at the moment.
If we look at
patterns of voting,
patterns of support
for candidates,
and what's going on
with deprived people who
feel they've been shut out, and
their perceptions of how Donald
Trump is going to save them, you
can see this lack of plasticity
there.
Now we have mechanisms
for bringing about change.
This is now the second page.
We have mechanisms.
We know that through
schools, through families,
through community centers,
through the media,
we can bring about change.
But the question is,
toward what goal?
What is our goal?
I've tried to work out some
of these goals, at least
psychologically, and I've
tried to represent them
in this circle.
What do we have to teach the
citizen so that the citizen is
capable of participating,
of engaging,
in a democratic process?
Well, this is the
ideal I set out.
I think in academia, one
of the things we can do
is to be idealistic.
The first thing is having the
ability to say I could be wrong
and to feel that.
I could be wrong.
Obviously, if I am a
fanatical religious person,
that's very difficult. If I am
a fanatical political person,
that's very difficult. But
to get beyond that fanaticism
and to be able to say I could
be wrong as a starting point.
Then the next two.
I must critically question
even the sacred beliefs
of my own society.
Well, that's very
difficult to do.
It's easy to say.
There is a huge literature,
research literature,
on ethnocentrism.
Ethnocentrism is the
tendency to think
that my way of doing
things is the right way.
How do you cook rice?
In the microwave.
Oh, in the microwave?
That's obviously wrong.
God.
That's not even a start.
You know, psychologists
have done a lot of work
on ethnocentrism.
But I think, I still think,
the best work on this
is by Jonathan Swift
in Gulliver's Travels
where he describes the war
going on for generations
between these little people,
groups of little people,
and they ask him, could you come
and help us defeat our enemy.
And he says, well,
OK, I'll help you.
But tell me first, why are
you killing each other?
And of course, he's expecting
this enormously important
reason.
And they say, well, it starts
with the Little-Endians
versus the Big-Endians.
He says, what do you
mean Little-Endians?
Well, some of us break our
eggs at the little end,
and that other group--
they are heretics.
They insist on breaking their
boiled eggs at the big end.
And, of course, we're right.
Ethnocentrism is a
global phenomenon,
it's not unique
to any one group.
Getting beyond ethnocentrism
is very difficult.
But you're still
wrong with your rice.
I must revise my opinion
based on evidence.
When the evidence comes in,
I have to change my mind,
I have to change my opinion.
We can see this in global
warming debates right now.
Global warming is a
hoax put out by China.
You can see this is very
difficult to bring about, even
in open societies.
The next two are about
interacting with others.
Understanding that those
who are different from me
can still teach me things of
value, being open to that.
And again, this is very easy
to say, but difficult to do.
There is a human tendency
towards similarity attraction.
It works at the
interpersonal level,
it works at the
inter-group level.
I did a study up in
Canada, the heart
of multiculturalism,
an open society
where they love each other.
We did a study with six
different ethnic groups,
and we looked at how similar
these groups see themselves
to be to other
groups, and how much
they want to interact
with the other groups.
Are you willing to live next
door to that other group?
Are you willing for
that other group
to marry into your family?
What did we find?
We found that these
ethnic groups--
the more they saw the
other group as dissimilar,
the less they wanted to
have to do with them.
Similarity is a big factor.
Teaching people to interact and
learn from dissimilar others
is a huge challenge.
It's not just in
the third world,
it's in North America
and Europe as well.
The next two are
about experiences
and seeking information
from different sources.
Understanding that we have to
be open to new experiences,
and being willing to
open up and teach others,
giving them new experiences.
Now these are all things
that we can talk about,
and they're very
easy to discuss--
especially in a
university setting--
but in practice, they are
very difficult to implement.
And what I'm suggesting
is that there
are an ideal that, in terms
of personality development,
in terms of cognitive style,
we need to think about
in the long term in order to
have a fully vibrant democracy.
Now there's one big problem
with all of this that I've said.
It could lead us to take a
very relativistic perspective.
If I'm going to be open
to you, and you to me,
and we're going
to be all seeking
information and
willing to change,
then it sounds as if
there are no principles.
So the last two
I put here, there
are principles of
right and wrong.
That's very important.
And the principles
of right and wrong
don't just come out of
law books right now.
I believe there is
an evolutionary basis
for morality.
If you look at
research on animals,
it's pretty clear fairness
is not unique to humans.
There's a wonderful
study, the title
is something like monkeys
reject unequal pay.
It's a very simple study.
You get a monkey in cage
one, monkey in cage two,
you put them next to each other.
You teach them to
carry out a task,
you give them equal rewards.
The pay is the same.
They can see that the other
monkey is getting the same pay.
Then you give one of the
monkeys a lesser pay.
What does that monkey do?
Throws a tantrum.
There's lots of research
showing that animals,
at some basic level,
understand fairness.
I've researched human rights and
duties from this perspective,
that our understanding
of rights and duties
actually emerge from
very primitive behaviors.
Example, turn taking.
Turn taking is
present in animals,
it's basic to human behavior.
Human communications
depends on turn taking.
Turn taking is learned
by infants very early.
If you look at mother
infant interaction,
turn taking takes
place very quickly.
Turn taking is used by us as a
basis for our justice system.
And if you listen to
little children playing
in the playground, one
of the first things you
hear is that's not
fair, he took my turn.
Kids understand turn taking.
There is an evolutionary
basis to it,
and later on we learn to use
the terminology of rights
and duties in relation
to turn taking.
So in the [INAUDIBLE]
courts, we have
the prosecution taking a turn,
then the defense taking a turn.
In politics we have term
limits, which enforce
some kind of turn taking.
So there is an evolutionary
basis to our morality,
and there are principles
of right and wrong.
It's not all random.
Some experiences--
finally, some experiences
are of value more than others.
So it's not that I'm
open to your experiences
and you're open to mine in
some kind of haphazard way.
There are principles that
say some experiences are
better than others.
So I believe what we should
be doing is investing,
at a very basic level,
in training citizens
to participate in
fuller democracies,
including in the United
States, including in Europe,
where the arrival of
millions of refugees
has created new tensions and is
testing the democracies there.
I want to end by focusing
on the role of psychology.
In the end,
democracy is an idea.
It has to be practiced,
it has to be carried out
by human beings.
And it will depend on
the capacity for us
to relate to one another
in a democratic way.
That's what it will depend on.
And unfortunately, what
happens in revolutions
is that we've managed to
overthrow regimes and smash
down statues, but we do not
manage to quickly enough change
ourselves in our relationships.
And that's where we
failed in Iran, that's
where we have failed
in other revolutions--
to move fast enough so that
the next dictator doesn't
have the opportunity
to spring to power.
I'll end there for
discussion, thank you.
[APPLAUSE]
I want to mention that the
springboard that brought
these revolutions about were--
each time, an external
factor came in
and the French Revolution,
the monarchies,
came in to restore the
monarchy in France.
And Russia and the other
nations, the Western nations,
came in to throw out the Lenin.
In Cuba, we came in to try to
get rid of Castro seven times--
six times they tried
to assassinate him.
And as I understand it,
in Iran things were OK.
I've read that until
Rockefeller got
the Shah admitted to
the United States,
which they said so enraged
the Iranians that they felt
that the outside world
was cheating them
and they became enemies
of the outside worlds.
So psychology, as you
say, is the big deal here.
But it so happens that every
time somebody has a revolution,
the other outsiders
don't want it.
Well certainly world
powers are always
intervening in the affairs
of smaller countries,
there's no doubt about that.
However, the argument I'm
making is that in order
to move from one type
of regime to another--
for example, in order to
move from a dictatorship
that could be a monarchy or
some other kind of dictatorship,
to a more open
democratic society.
Even if there were no external
factors, what you need to have
is a citizenship
that has changed
and that can sustain
the new system.
Imagine us in this room.
We could decide in an hour
what the constitution will
be to govern ourselves
in this room.
We could write
that constitution.
Now, do we have the
psychological makeup
to actually make that
constitution work?
That's the question.
Are we capable of governing
according to that constitution?
Well, depends what
the constitution is.
If it's very different
from what we've ever known,
then it's going to be very
difficult to implement.
And that's what you
have in revolutions.
Typically, people sit around
and write a constitution,
and then to implement the
constitution becomes difficult.
Of course, in the case
of Iran, the constitution
that we have is
fatally flawed anyway.
So that's another problem.
What is the role of
polarization like it
happened in Egypt
after the Arab Spring?
They heard one group of
people that are Islamists,
another group called
democracy seekers,
and the two couldn't
come together.
As a result, only
the numbers spoken
and the regime
that came to power
ultimately caused
its own demise.
Yes.
Very good point
about polarization.
You've actually jumped
ahead to my next book.
[INAUDIBLE] the question.
Oh, yes.
He's asking what is the
role of polarization.
I'm actually writing on mutual
radicalization, radicalization
of one another.
It is a huge problem
in revolutions.
When a dictatorship is
toppled, typically what
you've had to do in order
to topple that dictatorship
is to coordinate a vast
range of interests,
which is what happened
in Iran, which is what
happened in Russia in 1917.
So you have these different
political interests
coordinating to
topple the regime.
Then after that collapse,
they start fighting,
they start competing.
And, of course, the most
ruthless typically survive.
I mean, what was it that allowed
the fundamentalists in Iran
to survive?
Well, go back to Darwin.
It's reproduction and
extermination of the other,
if you like.
They reproduced faster
than anybody else.
And certainly, polarization
does take place.
But in order for change
towards democracy
to take place, what
you need to happen
is that those
groups need to have
the cognitive ability
and the social skills
to start negotiating and
including one another,
whereas what happens
typically after
an anti-dictatorship revolution
is quite the opposite of that.
The most ruthless
group comes out on top
because they're the ones willing
to kill fastest and the most.
The reason societies don't
move from a dictatorship
to democracy is because the
plasticity doesn't happen.
As we know in
psychology class, this
is not something that
happens overnight.
Plasticity requires learning
something, accepting it,
and then doing it repeatedly.
Yes.
And for that to
happen, you need time.
In a society that has never
had a chance to practice--
and plasticity
comes from outside.
It comes from you experiencing
something from outside
that starts having
an effect for you.
It's not an indigenous
system, it's
not something that you sort
of plasticize in your mind.
So for that to
happen [INAUDIBLE]
takes a good long
time to practice.
And under a dictatorship, you
have never had that opportunity
to practice.
So inevitably, when you
go from dictatorship,
you know what you don't want but
you don't know what you want.
That's the biggest
problem of a revolution
because you have never had--
because you have experienced
every day what you don't want,
but you have never
had the opportunity
to know what it
is that you want.
Yes.
So really to
understand these causes
and see how we move
from one to the other,
it's not going to
solve the problem.
It's good, it's interesting, but
it doesn't solve any problems.
And maybe the reason that South
Africa and the United States
that revolution
took a different way
is not because these
people were more skillful
in their human
relationship, maybe
it was because it was a
war against occupation
more than an internal
strife that had been there
for hundreds of years.
And these people came from a
lot of different backgrounds.
In South Africa, you can have
a completely different set
of circumstances.
So to me, it's important to
know, really, what changes--
what do we need to do
in [INAUDIBLE] regimes
to bring about that plasticity
before the eruption starts.
Well, I certainly agree with
you about the long term.
I start the book The Psychology
of Dictatorship with Athens,
and I stress that movement
towards actualized democracy
is thousands of years.
It's certainly not decades.
And I start the quote--
with a quote from John
Adams, the second president,
saying all democracies
commit suicide.
If you go back to Athens
2,500 years ago or so,
they had a sort of
democracy, very limited.
Free men could
participate and vote.
But of course, it was
much fuller participation
than we know today.
Free man in Athens had
to participate by taking
responsibility directly.
They would come to you and
say, OK, this year you're
in the committee for
taxes of the port,
you're in the committee for--
you couldn't say no, no, I
don't have time.
You had to participate.
Now Athens, of course, failed.
Then we had to wait
for quite a long time
before we had the next set
of changes towards democracy.
But we have to remember
that it's taken a long time.
American democracy started
with the vote for free men
who were very rich.
In England, when they started
having the vote for men,
it was for rich men.
And in 1832, the Reform Act
that came in still basically
gave the vote to men
who were propertied.
It wasn't until the 20th century
that men without property
actually got the vote.
And then, gradually,
women got the vote.
And it wasn't until the
1960s that minorities could
vote in the United States.
So what we call democracy
today, even this limited form
of democracy, is very recent.
And we have to look back
at least 2,500 years
to understand the process.
But what I'm saying is that the
next phase is not inevitable.
It's not inevitable
that we move forward.
We may move backward.
But in order to make
sure we go forward,
there are certain things
that we need to bring about
and that one of them
is the socialization
of democratic citizens.
And these are some of
the characteristics
I believe democratic
citizens need to have.
Of course, it's easy to discuss
this in a university setting.
It's much more
difficult to discuss it
in a setting in rural Iowa.
Do you think that
democracy's always and at all
times the best system?
I'm thinking [INAUDIBLE]
Singapore under, I would say,
a smart dictator, somewhat
benevolent dictator--
[INAUDIBLE]
You could see that in
just one generation,
Singapore went from being
dirt poor to become very rich.
Another example could be Taiwan.
Yes.
And maybe these countries
are more ready now
for a real democracy,
but you could
argue that 50 years ago if you
hadn't studied on the democracy
path like India, for instance,
they would never have achieved
what they have achieved today.
A very good question.
If we go back to the
Romans, the Romans actually
believed, even during their
more democratic times,
they had in their
constitution a clause that
said in times of trouble we
will hand power to a dictator.
The term dictator actually
is origined with the Romans.
They used a dictator, and
it would be for something
like six months.
Of course, the
problem was that they
found once you hand power
over to the dictator you
can't get it back.
That, you know--
but this argument
that during certain periods
of national development
it is better to have a dictator,
that's an interesting argument.
I would argue that it
is not the best system
if the administration of
society is fairly efficient,
and that's a big if.
But I accept that
some dictators--
Peter the Great, I think
he did some good in Russia.
There are some
dictators who bring
about changes that
are for reform,
there's no doubt about that.
You mentioned that the most--
in Iran's revolution, the most
ruthless won the revolution.
Do you think it's
because of that only,
or it was because it was
they were more familiar--
or, masses were more familiar
with what they were saying,
or they had deeper
roots in the masses.
And I have another question
from what you said just now
that you think [INAUDIBLE] was
an example of a dictatorship
that helped the society.
Well, the first question about
the regime of the mullahs
being closer to
the people, we have
to remember there were
factions within the mullahs.
The question is, why did this
particular faction win out?
Because there were factions who
were much more liberal, much
more tolerant, and they
were wiped out basically,
and it continues.
Look at the Green Revolution
and what happened.
With respect to
[INAUDIBLE], you know,
I'm sure that he did some good.
The problem is that the Shah's
regime created the conditions
for the mullahs to take over.
So I-- it's rather
like saying, you know,
what happened in
feudalism, you know,
created the conditions
for capitalism.
So we wouldn't have had
one without the other,
it seems to me.
Thank you so much for a
very interesting subject
that you raise.
For many years I have talked
about Iranian mentalities,
and I want to ask your
opinion or your advice.
If you could give
advice to Iranian study
all over in the
universities, how we
can fight against
Iranian ethic--
too much pride because I have
realized that, for instance,
you can criticize
Israelis, or even
generals, the American
general, and you
will be treated well
after criticizing them.
But with Iranian, you
cannot criticize anything
because still they are
very proud of 2,500 years
of civilization
and this and that.
And I, personally, take
approach by insulting them,
but I don't know
insulting Iranian
because I feel that maybe they
need a shock a little bit,
that someone shocks
them, even if I am not so
agree myself so extreme,
but I go to the extreme
to exercise that.
I don't know if I'm
doing the right thing
or not, and what
is your suggestion,
generally, for breaking this
too much narrow mindedness?
OK.
Well are you telling me
I'm wrong to tell him
that his rice is lousy?
I mean, that's an
excellent question.
I think there are
people here who
are more qualified to
answer it than I am.
Of course, I never get
insulted or shocked.
But I would be happy to
discuss it afterwards.
I think there are people who
are better qualified than me.
You were talking
about revolution,
and I think oppression
starts leading to revolution.
Like in Iran, we were so
fed up with the monarchy
the Shah x, y, and
z, that we were
consumed psychologically
for a change,
and we invested zero amount--
change to what?
We never thought
about democracy.
We shouted democracy, but
we wanted the Shah out.
We never thought about,
what is the infrastructure?
What is the education?
And it takes time.
I don't think we were
ready for democracy.
Now when you talk about India,
you talk about South Africa,
you talk about here
in the US, the fact
that those leaders
were astute enough
to know that they
have to educate
the public, the
Americans at the time I'm
sure they weren't educated
to understand even voting.
But the leaders were
willing to give the time
and infrastructure
to the society
to learn what
democracy's all about.
I think those are
some of the elements
that we never had in Iraq.
Yes.
Well, I think you're
right about the elements.
I think timing and
luck are also factors.
For example, I think
the United States
was extremely lucky to have had
George Washington because he
was offered the
opportunity to be king.
He refused.
He set the tradition
of term limits.
Mandela was the same, the
idea that he could easily
have continued to rule.
There is actually research in
psychology on the old adage
that power corrupts-- absolute
power corrupts absolutely.
There's good experimental
evidence that most people,
if they have absolute power,
they become corrupted.
Now, not everybody.
Not us, not us.
Those other people.
But certainly Mandela
and Washington--
I think that they
are exceptional.
They are exceptional.
Gandhi was almost the same.
Well, OK, but he
didn't have the power.
He didn't have the power.
But however, I agree with
you about the time factor.
We need time, and that's a big,
big, big part of this process.
[INAUDIBLE] in terms
of history a suggestion
that certain good behavior,
democratic behavior,
is evolutionary selected.
Are there bad behaviors that
are also evolutionary elected?
Should we be worried
about evolution
in terms of the
rise of despotism,
or is evolution in our favor?
Oh.
Well, is evolution in our favor?
I think there is
some characteristics
that we have that are
certainly in our favor,
and I would point
to basic things
like empathy, and fairness,
and those things that are
[INAUDIBLE].
However, aggressivity
is a big factor.
You know, I have to mention
Freud because I once
set myself the task of reading
everything he'd ever written,
and it took me about six months
of spending hours every day.
And at the end of it I thought,
gosh, what a lot of garbage.
You know?
I mean, 99% of it was so bad.
But the 1% he gets
right is brilliant.
I think he's the only genius
we've had in psychology.
I hope there aren't any
psychologists around.
But it's true, he gets that
one thing right and it's
about his discussions on war.
The fact that we humans
continually go to war,
we are aggressive, and our
aggressivity is a big danger.
Now, there are those
who have argued
that aggression, and
warfare, and killing has
declined in recent years,
and they've given statistics.
I think that's persuasive.
However, when we
look at violence
there are actually
different types of violence.
One is direct violence,
one is structural violence,
another is cultural violence.
And I believe that structural
and cultural violence
have actually increased.
Now, why has direct
violence declined?
In large part
because of medicine.
If it hadn't been
for modern medicine,
the number of Americans
killed in Iraq and Afghanistan
would be huge.
But now we can patch people
together and keep them alive
and say, well, now
look at the statistics.
Only so many people
have died in this war,
whereas in Vietnam we didn't
have that capability up
to that point.
It seems obvious to me
that if there is ever
a single government on
earth, a single sovereignty
with the control
of violence, you
know, a one world
government, it's
going to be a dictatorship.
But maybe I'm wrong.
Do you think there's
any possibility
that a one world government
could be an actual functioning
democracy?
One of my disappointments--
his question was, can
a one world government
be a democracy?
He believes it's more
likely to be a dictatorship.
That's a complicated question.
As we globalize, there is
this integration going on,
and there is language death.
As every month
several languages die,
the prominence of English and
some other languages increases.
Over the last 500 years,
something like 9,000 languages
have died.
Only about 6,000 are left.
So you could argue
we're becoming
one world with fewer
languages, fewer differences,
and we're going to end
up with one government.
But there's a counter-argument
that just as we globalize,
there is more efforts
to break away.
There's Brexit, there's attempts
to create Quebec independence,
all these separatist movements.
I'm not sure that
we're going to end up
with one global government.
It would be interesting
to think about it.
How would it work?
Our governments so
far have resisted
using modern
technologies to allow
ordinary people to participate
in decision making.
We could have much
greater participation
in decision making
through modern technology.
We have the technology, but the
governments are not interested.
So how would it work
at the global level
with seven billion people?
Well, I don't think that
the authorities, if they're
in the shape of the
authorities we have now,
are interested in the
people participating.
If they were, we would
have much greater decision
making by people.
Really, what a loaded topic.
I've been thinking
about quite a few things
as you've been
speaking, but one thing
that you've left out
of the chart here,
which seems just absolutely
undeniably apparent,
is the circumstance
and the situation.
For example, you
brought up the idea
that if we were in
this room, we decided
to adopt some sort
of manifesto, how are
we going to conduct ourselves.
In this setting, able to leave
the classroom, et cetera,
and go out into the
world from here.
But if for some
reason this classroom
happened to break
away from the world
and we were traveling
through outer space,
I think we could come to
some sort of arrangement
where we would have an interest.
So obviously the importance
of situationalism.
So I think the
American experiment,
in terms of this democracy which
I've never really thought of,
but was so incredible in
so much as it was somewhat
of a fresh start.
And the monarch wasn't here in
North America, it was overseas.
And I wonder how this would
have played out differently
if the monarchy happened to
be here in North America.
And one other thing.
So in Iran, when you
don't have trust--
I imagine with the
Shah and whatnot,
I imagine the secret
police and all this,
and the citizens just naturally
distrusted one another.
So even if the Shah
gets removed and you
don't trust your neighbor,
this plasticity, all this sort
of stuff, if you don't
actually have trust
in your fellow
citizen how are you
supposed to bring all
this stuff together?
And the other point
was a question
with social media
and modern day.
If you were to
recreate society, seems
like the children,
the youth, really
rule social media more or less.
And so what consequences--
I'll try to pose a question.
What consequences do you
think social media would
play in the modern era, in
terms of the establishment
of a democracy, and the dangers
of, as you labeled them,
personalities?
Like, Trump and
Hillary are both--
and individuals
within that setting
only voting for their
own self-interests
rather than the interest
of the entire group.
OK.
Well I'll try to extract a
question from what you've said.
We have to remember that
young people are always
different in the sense that
their voting participation
is always lower.
They may be very
active on social media,
and they may go out
and demonstrate,
but actually if you
look at voting patterns,
if you're younger,
blacker, poorer,
you are less likely to vote.
That's what the
statistics tell us.
Now, will younger people
make a bigger difference
through social media?
I don't think politically, no.
Occupy Wall Street
was interesting,
but actually,
politically, they didn't
manage to push Sanders as
far as the Tea Party has
managed to push Trump.
So I'm skeptical
that younger people
will make the difference,
as things stand.
So this is partly a counterpoint
to the first question
that came up.
You've created a model of
these 10 characteristics, which
look very interesting
and are, you
know, skills that
need to be developed
in order to enable democracy.
But you also use the term that
we need to teach these skills.
And as one of the
previous questions
asked, who is going
to teach those skills?
When you say we, who
does we refer to?
And are you saying that
there is an obligation
on the part of democracies
to teach other countries
about democracy?
And if so, then how do
you avoid this feeling
of us forcing a system on
others that don't want it?
Great question.
Well first of all, in
order to export democracy
we have to have
something to export.
So I would argue we don't have
full democracy here to export.
What we need to
first of all do is
to have a full democracy
in the United States.
I think that we are about as
far as anybody's going to get,
so to require that idealism
is an unachievable goal.
Well, that's where we disagree.
I think that if you look
at the education system,
we are doing a fantastic
job at the elite level.
So at Stanford,
everything is fine.
But, I mean, I've taught--
in Canada, I used
to be at McGill.
I've taught in Europe.
One of the things I notice about
the American system is that--
in Canada, while
I was at McGill,
McGill is sort of top
of the heap in Canada,
if you went from McGill to
other universities there
was very little difference.
It wasn't that big a difference.
If you go from the top
British universities
to the next layers,
they're all pretty similar.
Why?
Because we use external
examiners there.
While I was a student in
England, none of my professors
examined me.
I was always examined
by professors
from other universities.
Now, in the United States,
if you go from Stanford
to the ranking at
1,230, you know,
there's 4,000 institutions.
There's a huge leap.
And if you go to
high schools here,
you have enormous variation.
So where I say we have a
duty, I mean the people
who are influential in the
education system particularly.
And in government, we have
to invest in education.
We have to invest
in civic education,
and it's not being
done at the moment.
It's not being done at
the schools that matter.
And I don't mean
Stanford, I mean
the schools that are for
the majority, for the poor.
I mean schools where, when
you go to the PTA meeting,
there's two people and a cat.
So we have to think about
the majority, not the elite.
Thank you for your time.
I've been thinking
about my question,
I would say, around six
months, and I've also
been studying about it a lot.
It might be a really interesting
question for you as well.
I don't really want
to name any society,
but in certain societies
governments give rights
to citizen to carry guns.
Do you think that
subject would be
kind of avoiding dictatorship,
or maintaining the democracy?
Because the next government
knows people got something,
they can--
Well, I mean, that's the
argument for a right,
that you're going to be
able to resist government
dictatorship, et cetera.
It's a very
complicated question.
Right.
No, no, I understand
the argument
and, you know, I listen to
enough of Charlton Heston's
speeches when he was
leader and, you know,
I can understand people
making that argument.
But then we have to
think about the costs,
and the costs are enormous in
terms of the tens of thousands
of people killed, particularly
in poor neighborhoods.
So it's a double edged sword.
I believe that the best defense
against government tyranny
is an educated citizenship
rather than the guns.
Do you think that that
would be considered
as a psychological method
to maintain the democracy
in a certain society?
I mean, let me rephrase myself.
Do you think if an Iranian
human or Iranian citizen had,
I don't know, like, gun
rights 35 years ago--
Right.
You mean, if people--
if ordinary people in Iran were
armed, they could resist more.
Is that what you mean?
Yeah.
Well, I mean, I--
right.
I mean, I guess if you had
that kind of counter army,
you could certainly fight.
But there's also [INAUDIBLE].
Right.
I mean, that's another problem.
But certainly, I've heard
that argument before.
I have heard that
argument that--
yes, yes.
Sorry.
She's got the-- she's
ruling right now.
She's the dictator.
I was wondering what your
opinion is about countries
like England that are very--
have a very robust
government, prime minister,
parliament, but the
monarchy, and the queen,
and everything is still
in tact and, you know,
they appear not to interfere
so much with the government
but they're still there.
What is the logic behind it?
Well, I don't worry about
the royal family in England.
I worry more about Rupert
Murdoch and people like that.
You know, it's a
fascinating trend
that if you look back
over the last four or five
prime ministers, one
of the first people
they've met when they've
come to power, often secretly
and we've found out decades
later, is Rupert Murdoch,
and Theresa May has just
had a meeting with him.
And, you know, why am
I concerned about that?
Because this is another
example of individuals
who happen to be
incredibly rich,
have all that wealth,
who are anti-union,
anti-increasing wage, and,
you know, all the things
that the working
class need, and there
is somebody who is much
more powerful than the queen
able to access the prime
minister very quickly after she
comes to power.
So I do think that
places like in England
are extremely unequal still.
If you look at
social mobility, you
know, the probability of a
poor person, a child born
in a poor family, rising to even
middle or upper middle class,
that has actually
stagnated and declined.
We're not doing well in
terms of social mobility,
but we keep this myth about the
American dream and, you know,
how things are open, and
as long as you work hard,
you can get there.
Well, it's not true.
The statistics tell
us it's not true.
It's true for a
minority of people.
And, at the same time, we
have this enormous wealth
concentration, and
it's not income.
Remember, it's people
like me, the middle class,
who rely on income.
The rich rely on wealth,
and wealth concentration
has accumulated dramatically
over the last 30 years.
Piketty's book, Atkinson's
written a wonderful book
on this.
The documentation is very
strong that wealth concentration
is exaggerated now,
it's increasing,
so that fewer and fewer
hands hold the real wealth
of the world, and it's global.
So this is a big challenge
with globalization.
And when Trump says I'm going to
bring the jobs back to America,
all this stuff, well capital
will flow to the cheapest
labor, and his
capital has certainly
flowed to the cheapest labor.
You know, his life is
representing exactly that.
So I'm not worried
about the queen,
I'm worried about the others.
Thank you for an
amazing evening.
I would like to
ask you, would you
comment about
democracy in Ukraine?
Ukraine went through
rough times right now.
It's been independent
for 25 years.
I've been in Ukraine during
the Orange Revolution.
Recently, we've experienced
another revolutionary.
And yes, now we have a lot of
sources, a lot of information,
of how you should
build the democracy,
how you should maintain it.
But unfortunately,
after its revolution
my country is still
facing a lot of problems.
Yes, yes.
Well, as somebody
over there mentioned,
this is an example
of external forces.
And I mentioned
earlier in my talk
that one of the
dangers we have is
that we have major
dictatorships not just
trying to preserve
their own power,
but actively trying to prevent
democracy in other places.
Unlike Mr. Trump, I
don't admire Putin.
I think he is a
force for bad things
in the world at the
moment, and I think that--
I wish the west had
been more forceful
in that part of the world and
helped democracy grow stronger.
This is something that's
going to be very difficult,
and it's part of the story
of how what we thought
was going to be democratic
movement forward
and endless expansion
of democracy.
We thought that was
going to happen,
but now it's retrenchment.
Now we're going backwards.
And even China--
10 years ago I was in China
and it looked promising,
things were going forward.
But now it seems to me, if
you look at last five years,
we've gone backwards in China.
So this is a problem
globally, and I hope--
I very much hope Ukraine comes
through with bigger hope.
That [INAUDIBLE].
OK.
Thank you very, very much.
[APPLAUSE]
It was my pleasure.
My pleasure.
