Prof: I guess what I'll
do today is talk a little bit
about the fall of communism.
 
It's hard to believe,
because all that happened,
and now, next year it will be
the twentieth anniversary of the
fall of the Wall.
 
You guys were not born yet,
a few of you.
Some of you were born in 1990.
 
Is that possible?
 
Were you born in 1990,
some of you?
See, that's after the Wall fell.
 
I can remember seeing on TV the
quick trial of the Ceaucescu
couple, and them being gunned
down in the garden behind their
house.
 
They were really a nasty pair.
 
But now it seems like old
history.
I'm going to talk a little bit
about that and then talk about
kind of global challenges,
and themes that we've talked
about.
 
We talk about immigration;
we talk more about
globalization.
 
But I'm going to talk a little
bit about that,
too.
 
Let's do that.
 
Then we're out of here.
 
Again, it seems like this
is--to some of you it's not
history at all.
 
It's something that we all
lived through,
and in a way anticipated,
and then saw developing.
We were in France when all that
was happening,
and just listening on the
radio, and BBC,
and all this stuff.
 
It was really quite amazing.
 
The big difference, of course,
that made possible the
dramatic,
dramatic changes that happened
in Eastern Europe between 1989
and 1992 must begin with a guy
who,
independent of the fact that
the Soviet system just didn't
work,
but with a guy whose declining
reputation in Russia I find just
incredible.
 
That's Mikhail Gorbachev.
 
It was relegated a few years
ago, he actually did a TV ad for
Burger King, at that point,
because he needed the money.
The fall of his image in the
former Soviet Union and Russia I
find extraordinarily hard to
imagine.
It made all the difference in
the world that when people in
Hungary and in Czechoslovakia,
which then split between the
Czech Republic and Slovakia,
and in Poland--and in other
places,
but mostly those three
places--when they began to push
for reforms,
and they decide that they
wanted to reform communism,
and they didn't want even
communism at all.
The big difference was in 1953
when there were riots in East
Berlin, and I'm old enough to
remember crossing the border,
the Wall in East Berlin.
 
They were squished like grapes.
 
In 1968,
when Dubcek,
who ends up basically with
janitorial duties after that,
tried to put a human face on
communism and reform communism,
there were,
as the expression goes,
tanks before teatime.
 
The Soviet tanks rolled in and
squished them,
too, like grapes.
 
They had their martyrs in
Wenceslaus Square.
One guy burned himself to death
in protest.
It's still a memory embedded in
the collective memory of that
place.
 
But there was a big difference.
 
There was a big,
big difference,
in that Gorbachev made clear
that there wouldn't be tanks
before teatime.
 
When he went to Berlin,
and when he went to Prague and
his name became a sign of
protest,
when they were chanting,
"Gorby,
Gorby,"
they're chanting for the
demands of reform in their own
states.
When the various groups had
been meeting off and on,
particularly in Poland and
Hungary,
where dissidence was most
developed,
and where there was an
alternate kind of civic society
or civic space developed,
Gorby's name had become
symbolic with the possibility of
change.
He made clear that there
weren't going to be tanks sent
in.
 
At that point,
these huge changes were
inevitable.
 
But these changes in Eastern
Europe in the former satellite
states really were facilitated,
were accentuated,
were made inevitable by the
fact that communism didn't work
in the Soviet Union,
that the lines were longer and
longer.
 
There was more attention to
consumer goods.
But also that Gorbachev was a
very different leader.
Gorbachev was educated.
 
Unlike Brezhnev,
who was his extremely elderly
predecessor, he could give a
speech without reading it off
note cards.
 
Well, Ronald Reagan really
couldn't either.
But Gorbachev was compelling.
 
He was smart.
 
He was educated.
 
He understood the system.
 
He had come up through the
system.
And he was committed to change.
 
But until the very end,
even when they kind of kidnap
him--not kind of,
they kidnapped him,
and he was held under house
arrest in Crimea.
He stuck until the end with the
belief that communism could be
reformed,
and that you could put a human
face,
à la Dubcek--he
didn't look at Dubcek as a
model,
but on communism.
 
Until the very end,
he believed that you could have
communism, this good idea gone
terribly wrong,
that could be reformist.
 
He's very, very different than
his predecessors.
Khrushchev has often been
underappreciated.
Khrushchev, after all,
did come out against Stalinism
in the famous Party Congress,
and all of that.
Khrushchev was a very wily guy
who knew a lot about agriculture
and, in some ways,
was a compelling character.
But his disappearance in
1964--isn't that when Khrushchev
leaves power,
in 1964?--he was followed by a
couple of really orthodox
Stalinians.
Gorbachev's rise really must be
seen in that context.
Gorbachev was born in southern
Russia in 1931.
He worked his way up,
as you had to,
in the party organization.
 
He studied law at the
University of Moscow.
He knew the West and respected
many things about the West.
He also knew how just
devastating Stalinism had been
for his own country.
 
Both his grandfathers had been
arrested on false charges when
he was a boy.
 
He was very talented.
 
He knew how to manipulate the
system, and he becomes secretary
to the Communist Central
Committee.
Like Khrushchev before,
in his origins,
he was responsible for Soviet
agriculture.
Unlike his predecessors,
really including Khrushchev,
he was less xenophobic.
 
He had less of this suspicion
of non-Russians,
and the Soviet Union was
dominated by Russia,
let us leave no doubt about
that.
So, he believed that the
communist dream had been
destroyed by Stalinism,
and by the rigidity of the
structure,
and by the inability to enact
serious economic reforms.
 
The Soviet Union,
like the other powers,
had simply miserable economies,
miserable economic situations.
The East European satellite
states were in many ways
victimized by unfavorable
economic arrangements with the
Soviet Union,
who exploited them.
But nonetheless,
they were able to be kept
afloat by the Soviet Union.
 
He embraces the--only two
terms, I didn't send these out,
to be remembered,
I suppose.
One is the policy of
liberalization which is called
glasnost,
openness in government combined
with a greater degree of free
expression.
He takes people who are
liberals, who are real reformers
not just party hacks,
and he gives them positions of
responsibility.
 
He realized that if you live in
northern Russia,
you can see Finnish television.
 
If you live in Estonia,
where the language is somewhat
similar to Finnish,
that most difficult of
languages, you can see what's
going on.
These images of,
as in East Berlin,
West Berlin and of a different
way of life.
You can't simply pretend that
there wasn't a better way of
life for many people.
 
There were lots of people in
the former Soviet Union who may
have had their doubts within the
following ten years about the
kind of runaway,
bandit capitalism,
the high-crime capitalism that
developed in the victimized
Russia,
and Bulgaria, in particular,
and in other places as well.
 
He spoke openly,
publicly about the failings of
the system.
 
That was the hush-hush where
you didn't talk about the
failings of the system.
 
You were always talking about
the "radiant future."
Remember the radiant future.
 
But the future wasn't radiant.
 
There were long lines.
 
It just simply didn't work.
 
He realized that if you're
going to supply the cities with
consumer goods,
you have to return to the free
market.
 
You really have to return to
the old New Economic Policy that
you already know about in the
early 1920s.
Also, the second is
perestroika,
the restructuring of the whole
system with the belief,
that he had,
that communism could be made
responsible to the desires of
ordinary people in the Soviet
Republic.
 
He said--and he could toss off
memorable phrases very easily,
he was an extremely bright guy.
 
He's still very much alive.
 
"We need a revolution of
the mind."
You had to recommence with zero.
 
You had to begin from the
beginning and reconstruct this
reformed communism that would be
responsive to ordinary people.
It didn't work out the way he
thought it was going to work
out.
 
The entire system collapsed.
 
Three things made this
possible, the fall of communism
in the Soviet Union and in
Eastern and Central Europe.
First, within all of these
states--but most notably the
Baltic states where people held
hands,
they formed a human chain all
the way across Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia holding
hands,
a human chain across the entire
Baltic region--these places had
strong nationalist movements,
such as the Lithuanian movement
that we discussed earlier.
 
These continued.
 
But also in Eastern Europe,
particularly in Hungary and in
Poland, but also in Ukraine.
 
Remember, Ukrainian is a
different language.
It's a related but different
language.
There's still huge problems
because so many Russians still
live in Ukraine.
 
We don't have time to talk
about the ethnic complexities of
these regions.
 
The Russians who were left in
Latvia, there were more Russians
in Latvia than in Estonia or
Lithuania, faced all sorts of
discrimination.
 
This is a problem.
 
Anyway, these cultural demands,
these nationalistic demands
could not be placated by talk
about a reformed communism.
In the Soviet Union,
the idea that the republics
were equal was a sheer myth.
 
The idea that there would be
tolerance,
toleration of different ways of
looking at the world--basically,
there was some showcase stuff
about the flowering of the
cultures,
but it was basically myth.
Secondly, in 1989 in these
countries,
amid economic crisis,
the great horrors of
deprivation,
the long lines of people
wearing threadbare coats waiting
for trams that were late,
a reform movement,
a politically democratic
movement emerges in all of these
states.
In Russia it was led by the
Nobel-Prize-winning physicist
Andrei Sakharov,
who had helped develop,
of all things,
the hydrogen bomb.
Then, whereas the works of
Solzhenitsyn--Solzhenitsyn,
whose vision--you have to
separate Solzhenitsyn's critique
of the gulag from his vision of
the return of the czar,
or whatever.
 
Solzhenitsyn,
I used to run into him here in
the Sterling Memorial Library.
 
He was here for a year or two
working in the stacks,
in the collection there.
 
Solzhenitsyn,
whereas before his stuff on the
gulag was passed from hand to
hand, typed scripts passed
secretly from hand to hand,
you could read it.
You could read Solzhenitsyn on
what was the increasingly no
longer hidden secret of the
gulag, and what happened to
people sent to the gulag.
 
These dissidents begin to reach
an increasing audience within
all of these countries,
within all of the Soviet
Republics and in the United
States.
Gorbachev comes to Washington,
D.C.
in the Mall,
and he scares the hell--in a
country that had had political
assassinations,
you will remember this one--out
of those people who were
supposed to protect him.
 
He leaves the limousine,
and he plunges into the crowd,
and gives the Russian
equivalent of high fives and
shakes hands with people.
 
They were just scared to death
someone was going to blow them
away.
 
He charms the Reagans,
and of course his intellectual
capacity was many times those
folks.
His interest,
I shouldn't have said capacity,
his interest.
 
He charms people.
 
He was a real live,
functioning intellectual in
politics, obviously committed in
putting his reputation and
putting the whole estate on the
line.
This was the second thing.
 
Third, it was the extenuation,
acceleration of this economic
crisis.
 
Things weren't getting better.
 
Poland is the great example of
that, the reason that Solidarity
starts in 1980 in the shipyards
of Gdansk.
It's bizarre to go back there.
 
They're probably going to close.
 
There's huge pictures of the
pope all over the place.
But it still is a sight of
memory when you go to Gdansk.
The reason that solidarity
starts with Lech Walesa--and not
just alone--and my friends in
Poland,
who are a little bit younger
than Lech Walesa,
and lots of other people--is
because there wasn't enough to
eat.
 
You had a terrible situation.
 
So they unionized.
 
They said, "We're going to
put forth our claims,"
like unions had done in France,
and in Italy,
and in Spain,
and in other places,
as people had wanted to do in
the early days of the Soviet
regime,
and they had been squished like
grapes.
 
Everybody's been squished like
grapes.
The economic crisis makes these
three things merge:
nationalism,
democratic reform,
and the desire for economic
change.
You've got this charming man
who takes big-time decisions.
Lots of Jews,
for example,
wanted to leave the Soviet
Union.
They were victimized by
anti-Semitism there.
They were often treated as
second-class citizens.
Gorbachev says,
"Fine."
He says, "Yes,
you can emigrate.
You can go to Israel or the
United States."
So, things change.
 
There's palpable change,
and people have a sense of
what's going to happen,
that new things are going to
occur.
 
The speed with which this
happened took Western leaders by
surprise.
 
They were not Thatcher.
 
That's a good example.
 
They were not ready for the
speed at which these changes
were coming.
 
When people are shouting,
"Gorby, Gorby,
Gorby,"
the subtext is that we want the
reforms in Hungary,
in Poland,
in Czechoslovakia,
and in other countries as well,
but the movements were much
smaller in Bulgaria or in
Romania,
which was under the police
state of Ceausescu.
 
You had the same situation in
Albania, kind of the cult of
Hoxha, who was very tied to
communist China,
etc., etc.
 
He makes clear in Strasbourg,
in a speech to the Council of
Europe in July 1989,
that he rejects the Brezhnev
doctrine,
his predecessor Leonid
Brezhnev,
that the Soviet Union,
as in 1953,
and as in 1968,
or in 1956 in Hungary--I
remember when I was a really
little kid,
I remember Hungarian children
who had been lucky enough to
escape the revolution coming to
Ainsworth School in Portland,
Oregon.
He said, "Any interference
in domestic affairs and any
attempts to restrict the
sovereignty of states,
both friends and allies or any
others,
are inadmissible."
 
Gorbachev says that these
movements in Hungary and Poland
are inspiring.
 
He found them personally
inspiring.
So, the rest,
as they say,
is history.
 
You've all seen images of the
Wall,
first of young students your
age, your age,
putting flowers in the guns of
the Vopos,
who were the East German
guards,
flowers in the guns.
 
Then the whole goddamned thing
just collapses.
Suddenly people are pouring
over the Wall.
People on trains are--and the
East German government,
Honecker was one of the very,
very worst of all of them.
He really was just awful.
 
The Stasi infiltrated almost
every organization.
There's a great movie called
The Lives of Others,
a great, great movie.
 
If this course went this far,
I would recommend you see
The Lives of Others,
about spying,
and integrity,
and just all sorts of things.
Honecker was saying,
"Give these people,
return them to East
Germany."
The Hungarians say,
"No, we won't return them
to East Germany."
 
They start taking down the
barbed wire borders around their
own country.
 
The whole thing just happens
like that.
The Berlin Wall collapses,
and within a month Ceaucescus,
for better or for worse,
have been gunned down in a
garden after a very hasty
televised trial.
They were very bad people.
 
There's no doubt it.
 
But there was no due process.
 
But that was the end of that.
 
And Honecker,
whose slogan was "Always
forward,
never backward"
until the very end--and the
Czech leader was very much the
same,
and the Bulgarian and Romanian
leaders,
and Albanian leaders--Albania
is a case apart--were going to
keep the whole thing alive.
The whole communist system was
going to survive,
no matter what.
 
Of course, it didn't work out
that way.
In Czechoslovakia the group of
writers and intellectuals,
including Václav Havel,
who had signed Charter 77 and
were put in jail as a result of
that,
who demanded reform.
 
You already had in
Czechoslovakia,
and in Poland,
and in Hungary,
you already had intellectuals
who were anti-communist,
or who were reforming
communists,
meeting sometimes very openly.
 
In these countries that
transition to democracy or to
parliamentary rule would be
easier, because the passing of
the torch was easier.
 
In Czechoslovakia you know
there were some parliamentary
antecedents.
 
Poland also did.
 
Hungary less so,
but you had this sort of
flourishing, alternative civil
society that had been
developing.
 
So, the passing to the new
generation,
despite all the economic
problems,
and despite the ethnic tensions
that would remain,
was much easier than it would
be in Bulgaria,
for example.
 
In Bulgaria,
what the leadership does,
they feel cornered,
so they try to accentuate
anti-Turkish feelings,
because there were many Turks
who lived in Bulgaria.
 
Lots of Turks flee and then
they go to Turkey.
In fact, they find that things
are worse in Turkey and many of
them go back to Bulgaria.
 
The tensions between the
Romanians and the Hungarians in
Romania helps generate change
for reform,
because outside of Bucharest
the big calls for reform and the
organization is the work of
Hungarians who are living in the
Hungarian parts of Romania.
 
But the transition to
parliamentary regime would be
much harder in those places.
 
The case of Bulgaria is
particularly interesting.
It's also the one I know the
least about.
They have just had the change
is so slow in many ways they're
happening.
 
The kind of banditization,
or the kind of infiltration of
major crime networks in Bulgaria
really continue to run the show.
You find that to an extent,
as everybody knows,
in Russia.
 
But that's another case.
 
So, the Velvet Revolution
occurs in Czechoslovakia,
where the entire Politburo,
that is the ruling group,
resigned on November 19,1989.
 
This is just a matter of a
short period of time after the
Berlin Wall essentially goes
down.
One of the interesting things
about all this is that despite
the huge ethnic tensions in many
of these places,
you didn't have the kind of
awful blood bath that you would
have in ex-Yugoslavia,
which was primarily the work of
the Serbs in those horrible,
horrible wars that began
bloodletting,
ethnic cleansing.
Mass murder is a less fancy way
of putting it than ethnic
cleansing.
 
For example,
you had all these tensions
between Poles and Ukrainians,
because of the parts of Eastern
Poland had passed back and
forth,
and lots of Ukrainians live in
that part of Poland,
and lots of Poles live near
Lviv in Ukraine.
Actually, for all of the
persecution of ethnic Russians
living in Latvia,
above all,
but also in Estonia and
Lithuania,
you really didn't have the
kinds of massacres that happened
in ex-Yugoslavia.
 
Two reasons for that.
 
One is because of the ethnic
religious complexity,
in that the massacres were
primarily perpetuated against
Muslims by Orthodox Serbs who
were inspired by one of the real
villains of the last century,
or any century,
Slobodan Milosevic,
who died during his trial in
the Hague,
who kept talking about a
"Greater Serbia"
to include Kosovo,
to include everywhere else.
 
Also on a more minor scale,
those carried out by some
Croatians against Muslims and
all that.
That was one major reason why
you didn't have that same thing,
that is, the religious
difference.
Secondly is that in Ukraine
nobody was really talking about
"Greater Ukraine."
 
People in Poland weren't
talking about "Greater
Poland,"
imagining annexing anybody they
could possibly do,
the way Hitler had done,
or the way that Milosevic
perpetuated his sleazy career as
leader of the Yugoslav and then
Serb Communist Party by giving
inflammatory speeches in Kosovo,
etc., etc.
So, the whole thing collapses.
 
Of course, this doesn't
eliminate problems.
If you don't have a real
tradition of parliamentary rule,
how do you suddenly create
parties that are viable?
How do you create this sort of
civic culture?
That's not very easy.
 
Also, the Americans,
particularly from the
University of Chicago economic
school,
were giving advice in Poland
saying,
"You just need an
automatic infusion of
capitalism.
 
That will solve
everything."
That's not what happens at all.
 
If anything,
it increases the gap between
the very,
very wealthy people,
who formerly would have been
party cadres in the Communist
Party and very ordinary people.
 
Anyone who follows contemporary
Russia now knows all that,
or in the Côte d'Azur in
Nice, in the Negresco Hotel in
Nice.
 
I shouldn't knock the Negresco,
I've stayed there while guiding
a Yale alumni tour.
 
But anyway,
you find these extraordinarily
wealthy Russian billionaires
buying up everything,
including soccer teams in
England,
while there's still people with
not enough to eat.
There are other problems.
 
These ethnic challenges,
of course, are nowhere more
graphically and horribly
revealed than in the Balkans.
The problem of all of these
communist systems--;they said
above all, you must have
large-scale industry.
So, they start building these
awfully soon out-of-date
factories that crank out
pollution at unimaginable
levels.
 
One of the effects is,
for example,
the obstruction of the Black
Forest in Germany by these
clouds of pollution coming from
the Czech Republic,
to say nothing of the fact that
a lot of the Soviet nuclear
installations were in
Kazakhstan,
and other places,
and trying to get these
diffused and immobilized,
particularly when the United
States has been,
under this last regime,
has been trying to restart the
arms race.
This is a personal comment,
but too bad.
I'm talking about how Europeans
view America.
The Americans now have this
idea to put bases in Poland.
This is a terrible idea,
because these bases could be
transformed into offensive
weapons, as well.
This can very well, as Putin,
who sometimes can't be trusted,
and who was a vigorous,
aggressive Russian nationalist,
for better or for worse,
that this could start again,
unleash,
whatever you call it,
this arms race,
and that would be awful.
So, there's still lots of
problems.
What can I say?
 
Yet every time I go to Poland,
which, as I said,
is very frequently now,
and to other countries,
there is just great hope.
 
There wasn't a lot of hope in
1987 or in 1986.
Suddenly, there was this new,
incredibly transformed world.
In many places it was easier to
tear down,
to say what you are against,
that you didn't want this
unreformed communist state,
or you didn't want communism at
all,
than it was to sort of
miraculously create this new
affair or world.
In Warsaw I'm constantly amazed.
 
Warsaw was completely rebuilt.
 
When I was a kid I was there.
 
All you saw was rubble,
basically.
Now when I walk on the Hotel
Bristol,
a very fancy,
famous hotel,
and I turn left,
it looks like the
Champs-Elysées,
or the Rue Saint-Honoré
in Paris,
all these fancy shops.
As we go out to the university,
then you see all these people
still wearing the same
threadbare coats,
waiting in line for the trams
as before the communist
revolution.
 
Yet, things are better.
 
One of the reasons,
by the way, things are better
in Poland is that they never did
completely collectivize
agriculture at all.
 
Petites
propriétaires,
small units still existed,
and so the transition there was
easier than other places.
 
Well, what can I say?
 
This is what I'm going to say
now is how Europeans view
Europe.
 
Also, as kind of a European,
how they view the United
States.
 
I might certainly be tempted at
the end to talk a little bit
about that, and about human
rights.
We talk about globalization and
all of that.
José Bové
lived in Los Angeles for two
years.
 
He's actually a city guy,
but he made his reputation in
the south of France marching,
and with tractors blocking
French Air Force installations,
trying to keep part of lower
Massif Central called Larzac
from being turned into a place
for bomb testing,
and all that business.
Then he took his campaign
against McDonalds.
McDonalds, MacDo,
became identified with
globalization and with
Americanization.
So, the old anti-American
sentiment among intellectuals,
and José
Bové is that.
When he came to Yale a couple
years ago, Jim Scott brought him
here to Yale.
 
My daughter took him to Rudy's.
 
That's what she did.
 
When he came here,
he came here as sort of a
symbol of anti-globalization.
 
All of you have seen images of
people in Seattle throwing
themselves against the police,
or in Nice against police
barricades, or in Italy as well.
 
Globalization is sort of a
catchall.
But if you don't believe that
we live in a more global
society,
look at the impact of the
economic crisis and how quickly
that spread within the last two
months.
 
It's an obvious thing that we
live in a world where Adidas,
and all these shoes,
and shirts, and T-shirts,
are often outsourced to the
poorest people they can find in
Indonesia and other places.
 
When you have some problem with
your cell phone--I still don't
have a cell phone,
or whatever--but you'll end up
talking to somebody in India or
Pakistan as easily as you are
talking to somebody in New
Jersey.
One aspect of globalization
that is so much more visible now
than even fifteen years ago,
and which fits exactly into one
of the themes of this course,
is obviously immigration.
There are no borders anymore.
 
The creation of the European
Union,
for better or for worse,
means that you can go
essentially from Calais all the
way to Lithuania and never have
your ID checked not once.
 
I travel on my French ID there.
 
It's only in England and in
coming back to the United States
that you need a passport at all.
 
But the result is you've got
all of these immigrants.
You've all seen pictures of
bodies bobbing in the sea of
Moroccans, and people from Mali,
or Tunisia, or Senegal,
trying to get into Spain.
 
Once you got into Spain you've
essentially got it made.
The same passages that Spanish
refugees fled Franco's terror
during and after the Spanish
Civil War bring people from Mali
into France.
 
Of course, female and male sex
trafficking from Moldavia in
particular,
from Bulgaria and from Albania,
those are the three major
points,
is something that is just
everywhere.
Immigrants are not new.
 
In the 1960s these governments
said, "Please."
They put up signs.
 
"Please come to work in
France."
"Come to work in Germany,
in Istanbul."
So many Turks went to Germany.
 
Then, all of a sudden,
when the bottom of the economy
falls out with the Arab oil
embargo in 1973 and 1974,
then some of these people who
helped make the economy run,
and who still help make the
economy run--there's a whole
underground economy and do jobs
of lots of other people--they
suddenly they say,
"We don't want them."
One of the risks that's an
obvious risk to anyone who has
studied Germany in the 1920s and
1930s,
which you have,
is that economic crisis causes
people to scapegoat and to
stereotype into scapegoat.
In countries like France where
the Gaullists made their pact
with the devil and joined with
the National Front in an
over-the-top,
aggressively racist political
party whose leader was a
torturer,
Jean-Marie Le Pen in Algeria,
and who described the Holocaust
as "a minor detail"
of World War II and whose
supporters are
négationnistes,
negationists who believe that
there wasn't a Holocaust.
When they start,
when their discourse becomes
extremely, extremely--not only
prevalent but acceptable,
then you have a problem.
 
Even in Switzerland,
where it is very hard to become
a resident of Switzerland,
which does have a large
immigrant population,
you had a party of the extreme
right.
 
In Denmark, one of the most
tolerant places one could ever
imagine, you had one of the most
over-the-top--and still have
right wing organizations.
 
Jörg Haider,
who just got himself killed
running his car off the road a
couple weeks ago in Austria,
he was,
unapologetic is probably a bit
too strong,
but he said things were much
better when the Nazis were in
control of the economy.
We didn't have all these other
people around.
Economic crisis,
and national stereotyping,
and racism is a recipe for
disaster.
Even in countries where
democracy really,
really works,
again returning to the case of
Poland,
when you have black players
being taunted in soccer games.
 
Poland, as in other countries,
as in Spain,
one of the worst of a kind of
racist baiting that goes on when
these clubs play.
 
In France, with Paris
Saint-Germain,
that's another classic example,
or Lazio,
which is the Mussolini
granddaughter's favorite team in
Italy,
then you've got a real problem.
When it becomes acceptable,
and maybe some of you may
consider unfair,
but when Sarkozy,
president of France,
he's the son of Hungarian
immigrants,
and when he borrows the
language,
the language of racism,
the language of Le Pen,
to help put him over the
top--and when someone
interviewed Le Pen and said,
"Why do you do so badly in
the elections?"
he said, and he was right for
once, he said,
"Because they said the
same things we're saying."
Then you've got a problem.
 
"Fortress Europe"
may be trying--all these human
rights documents give people the
right to emigrate,
but not to immigrate.
 
How these countries,
including ours,
treat people who are legal
immigrants and those who are
illegal immigrants is a true
test of the kinds of values that
they have.
 
This is an obvious thing to
say, but this is the future.
This is an ongoing problem,
an ongoing challenge,
in every single European
country.
Toleration, civic harmony,
generosity, caring in hard
times is under assault.
 
Our country has never been
immune from that as well.
This is an obvious case,
but it's something that's going
to concern people that work on
Europe.
Look at the role of xenophobia
in the rise of the right in the
1920s and, above all,
in the 1930s.
It's the same thing over and
over again.
Just to end with this.
 
There's the question of human
rights.
Europeans have a hard time
understanding the United States.
They don't understand capital
punishment.
They don't understand why you
can just pick up a gun.
You can't vote,
but you can buy a machine gun
at some gun show almost anywhere
you are, north or south.
They can't understand that.
 
One of the other things they
can't understand is why in this
country we have a deep,
abiding,
institutionalized believe in
the right to bear arms,
etc., etc.,
but in civic rights or civil
rights,
your rights as defined by being
a member of the state--but we
have often not accepted human
rights as a category.
 
Europeans are often just
mystified by this.
Let me give you an example
there.
Again, this is not politics,
but I can't help saying this.
It's very difficult to explain
to people how it is that the
United States in the last few
years finds itself on a list of
countries that torture.
 
Not big-time,
not Nazi Germany,
not Stalin, not even the level
of Pinochet, who they tried to
extradite and they tried to do
everything.
Not on the level of Milosevic,
who finally was carted off to
tribunal.
 
But the United States,
in the smirks of President
George Bush, and Cheney,
and these people,
these people put us on the list
of torturers.
Guantanamo hurt the United
States, the view that people
have of the United States,
in ways that are simply
unimaginable.
 
The idea that these
people--some of them are some
really bad people,
other people just got sort of
caught up in the wrong
thing--but even if they're bad
people,
they never had charges pressed
against them.
 
You see them chained to the
ground with their little orange
uniforms.
 
You see the images that came
out of the prisons,
or you have Blackwater or these
private contractors gunning down
civilians with impunity.
 
This stuff didn't used to
happen in this country.
Even during Vietnam,
when Lieutenant Calley,
who murdered all those people
in Vietnam--you don't remember
Vietnam.
 
Bob sitting amng you and a few
others remember Vietnam--;Calley
went on trial.
 
But when states become involved
with this, with kidnapping
people off the streets,
what do they call it?
And secret plane flights to
England, or to wherever,
this is what made the United
States lose so much of its
image, of its respect.
 
It's incredible.
 
Even in a place that I live
with 330 people--and people are
not terribly politicized,
politics is still families that
have hated each other for
generations--but there is this
image of,
"How could this happen in
the United States?"
 
It was always the place that
you wanted to go to,
because things were fair.
 
Things were right.
 
I believe, nobody asked me,
but since we're talking about
the view of Europeans,
I believe that people like Bush
and Cheney ought to go before
the tribunal at The Hague,
if human rights is going to
mean anything.
Because they are from the most
powerful country in the world
doesn't mean that they shouldn't
face the same kind of standards
that you all believe.
 
It should be that way.
 
Bernard Kouchner is a sort of
moderate politician in France.
He's somewhat socialist,
but he's in the government of
Sarko, Sarkozy.
 
He was the one who helped one
of the original creators of
Médecins sans
frontières,
Doctors Without Borders.
 
French, but not just French,
Americans and other people,
many of you may do this,
go off and try to help.
I have a friend who's a
physician's assistant who goes
off to Guatemala all the time to
help people in Nicaragua.
Kouchner is a really good guy.
 
He's very pro-American.
 
He said--this is just chilling,
it ought to be chilling for
you--he said that the magic is
done.
"The magic is over."
 
That's exactly what he said.
 
He said it in English, too.
 
He said, "The magic is
over."
What was the magic?
 
It was what this country
represents to Europeans.
The magic is over.
 
Then he paused and he said,
"Things will never be the
same again."
 
So, I guess just in conclusion,
it's up to you to believe in
human rights and believe in the
value of people,
whether they're clandestine,
or legal immigrants or not,
and that human rights should be
written on the face of this
country as well,
and that you can return and
restore that magic.
 
