FEDERALIST No. 60.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the
Power of Congress to Regulate the Election
of Members)
From The Independent Journal.
Saturday, February 23, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power
over the elections to the federal government
could not, without hazard, be committed to
the State legislatures.
Let us now see, what would be the danger on
the other side; that is, from confiding the
ultimate right of regulating its own elections
to the Union itself.
It is not pretended, that this right would
ever be used for the exclusion of any State
from its share in the representation.
The interest of all would, in this respect
at least, be the security of all.
But it is alleged, that it might be employed
in such a manner as to promote the election
of some favorite class of men in exclusion
of others, by confining the places of election
to particular districts, and rendering it
impracticable to the citizens at large to
partake in the choice.
Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems
to be the most chimerical.
On the one hand, no rational calculation of
probabilities would lead us to imagine that
the disposition which a conduct so violent
and extraordinary would imply, could ever
find its way into the national councils; and
on the other, it may be concluded with certainty,
that if so improper a spirit should ever gain
admittance into them, it would display itself
in a form altogether different and far more
decisive.
The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily
inferred from this single reflection, that
it could never be made without causing an
immediate revolt of the great body of the
people, headed and directed by the State governments.
It is not difficult to conceive that this
characteristic right of freedom may, in certain
turbulent and factious seasons, be violated,
in respect to a particular class of citizens,
by a victorious and overbearing majority;
but that so fundamental a privilege, in a
country so situated and enlightened, should
be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass
of the people, by the deliberate policy of
the government, without occasioning a popular
revolution, is altogether inconceivable and
incredible.
In addition to this general reflection, there
are considerations of a more precise nature,
which forbid all apprehension on the subject.
The dissimilarity in the ingredients which
will compose the national government, and
still more in the manner in which they will
be brought into action in its various branches,
must form a powerful obstacle to a concert
of views in any partial scheme of elections.
There is sufficient diversity in the state
of property, in the genius, manners, and habits
of the people of the different parts of the
Union, to occasion a material diversity of
disposition in their representatives towards
the different ranks and conditions in society.
And though an intimate intercourse under the
same government will promote a gradual assimilation
in some of these respects, yet there are causes,
as well physical as moral, which may, in a
greater or less degree, permanently nourish
different propensities and inclinations in
this respect.
But the circumstance which will be likely
to have the greatest influence in the matter,
will be the dissimilar modes of constituting
the several component parts of the government.
The House of Representatives being to be elected
immediately by the people, the Senate by the
State legislatures, the President by electors
chosen for that purpose by the people, there
would be little probability of a common interest
to cement these different branches in a predilection
for any particular class of electors.
As to the Senate, it is impossible that any
regulation of "time and manner," which is
all that is proposed to be submitted to the
national government in respect to that body,
can affect the spirit which will direct the
choice of its members.
The collective sense of the State legislatures
can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances
of that sort; a consideration which alone
ought to satisfy us that the discrimination
apprehended would never be attempted.
For what inducement could the Senate have
to concur in a preference in which itself
would not be included?
Or to what purpose would it be established,
in reference to one branch of the legislature,
if it could not be extended to the other?
The composition of the one would in this case
counteract that of the other.
And we can never suppose that it would embrace
the appointments to the Senate, unless we
can at the same time suppose the voluntary
co-operation of the State legislatures.
If we make the latter supposition, it then
becomes immaterial where the power in question
is placed—whether in their hands or in those
of the Union.
But what is to be the object of this capricious
partiality in the national councils?
Is it to be exercised in a discrimination
between the different departments of industry,
or between the different kinds of property,
or between the different degrees of property?
Will it lean in favor of the landed interest,
or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile
interest, or the manufacturing interest?
Or, to speak in the fashionable language of
the adversaries to the Constitution, will
it court the elevation of "the wealthy and
the well-born," to the exclusion and debasement
of all the rest of the society?
If this partiality is to be exerted in favor
of those who are concerned in any particular
description of industry or property, I presume
it will readily be admitted, that the competition
for it will lie between landed men and merchants.
And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infinitely
less likely that either of them should gain
an ascendant in the national councils, than
that the one or the other of them should predominate
in all the local councils.
The inference will be, that a conduct tending
to give an undue preference to either is much
less to be dreaded from the former than from
the latter.
The several States are in various degrees
addicted to agriculture and commerce.
In most, if not all of them, agriculture is
predominant.
In a few of them, however, commerce nearly
divides its empire, and in most of them has
a considerable share of influence.
In proportion as either prevails, it will
be conveyed into the national representation;
and for the very reason, that this will be
an emanation from a greater variety of interests,
and in much more various proportions, than
are to be found in any single State, it will
be much less apt to espouse either of them
with a decided partiality, than the representation
of any single State.
In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators
of land, where the rules of an equal representation
obtain, the landed interest must, upon the
whole, preponderate in the government.
As long as this interest prevails in most
of the State legislatures, so long it must
maintain a correspondent superiority in the
national Senate, which will generally be a
faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies.
It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice
of the landed to the mercantile class will
ever be a favorite object of this branch of
the federal legislature.
In applying thus particularly to the Senate
a general observation suggested by the situation
of the country, I am governed by the consideration,
that the credulous votaries of State power
cannot, upon their own principles, suspect,
that the State legislatures would be warped
from their duty by any external influence.
But in reality the same situation must have
the same effect, in the primitive composition
at least of the federal House of Representatives:
an improper bias towards the mercantile class
is as little to be expected from this quarter
as from the other.
In order, perhaps, to give countenance to
the objection at any rate, it may be asked,
is there not danger of an opposite bias in
the national government, which may dispose
it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the
federal administration to the landed class?
As there is little likelihood that the supposition
of such a bias will have any terrors for those
who would be immediately injured by it, a
labored answer to this question will be dispensed
with.
It will be sufficient to remark, first, that
for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is
less likely that any decided partiality should
prevail in the councils of the Union than
in those of any of its members.
Secondly, that there would be no temptation
to violate the Constitution in favor of the
landed class, because that class would, in
the natural course of things, enjoy as great
a preponderancy as itself could desire.
And thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate
the sources of public prosperity upon a large
scale, must be too well convinced of the utility
of commerce, to be inclined to inflict upon
it so deep a wound as would result from the
entire exclusion of those who would best understand
its interest from a share in the management
of them.
The importance of commerce, in the view of
revenue alone, must effectually guard it against
the enmity of a body which would be continually
importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls
of public necessity.
I the rather consult brevity in discussing
the probability of a preference founded upon
a discrimination between the different kinds
of industry and property, because, as far
as I understand the meaning of the objectors,
they contemplate a discrimination of another
kind.
They appear to have in view, as the objects
of the preference with which they endeavor
to alarm us, those whom they designate by
the description of "the wealthy and the well-born."
These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious
pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens.
At one time, however, their elevation is to
be a necessary consequence of the smallness
of the representative body; at another time
it is to be effected by depriving the people
at large of the opportunity of exercising
their right of suffrage in the choice of that
body.
But upon what principle is the discrimination
of the places of election to be made, in order
to answer the purpose of the meditated preference?
Are "the wealthy and the well-born," as they
are called, confined to particular spots in
the several States?
Have they, by some miraculous instinct or
foresight, set apart in each of them a common
place of residence?
Are they only to be met with in the towns
or cities?
Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over
the face of the country as avarice or chance
may have happened to cast their own lot or
that of their predecessors?
If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent
man knows it to be,(1)) is it not evident
that the policy of confining the places of
election to particular districts would be
as subversive of its own aim as it would be
exceptionable on every other account?
The truth is, that there is no method of securing
to the rich the preference apprehended, but
by prescribing qualifications of property
either for those who may elect or be elected.
But this forms no part of the power to be
conferred upon the national government.
Its authority would be expressly restricted
to the regulation of the TIMES, the PLACES,
the MANNER of elections.
The qualifications of the persons who may
choose or be chosen, as has been remarked
upon other occasions, are defined and fixed
in the Constitution, and are unalterable by
the legislature.
Let it, however, be admitted, for argument
sake, that the expedient suggested might be
successful; and let it at the same time be
equally taken for granted that all the scruples
which a sense of duty or an apprehension of
the danger of the experiment might inspire,
were overcome in the breasts of the national
rulers, still I imagine it will hardly be
pretended that they could ever hope to carry
such an enterprise into execution without
the aid of a military force sufficient to
subdue the resistance of the great body of
the people.
The improbability of the existence of a force
equal to that object has been discussed and
demonstrated in different parts of these papers;
but that the futility of the objection under
consideration may appear in the strongest
light, it shall be conceded for a moment that
such a force might exist, and the national
government shall be supposed to be in the
actual possession of it.
What will be the conclusion?
With a disposition to invade the essential
rights of the community, and with the means
of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable
that the persons who were actuated by it would
amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of
fabricating election laws for securing a preference
to a favorite class of men?
Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct
better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement?
Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate
themselves in office by one decisive act of
usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients
which, in spite of all the precautions that
might accompany them, might terminate in the
dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors?
Would they not fear that citizens, not less
tenacious than conscious of their rights,
would flock from the remote extremes of their
respective States to the places of election,
to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute
men who would be disposed to avenge the violated
majesty of the people?
PUBLIUS
