 
### A Singular Charter in Perpetuity

A Singular Charter in Perpetuity

Jean-Marc LeBouquin

Copyright © May 15, 2019 Jean-Marc LeBouquin – illustration under same copyright.

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### A Singular Charter in Perpetuity

### Table of Contents

A Supernumerary Chapter – Eisenhower's Warning

Origins of Obligation in Contract

Chapter 1 – Easily Identified Perpetrators

Chapter 2 – Make up of the Board of Governors and the Procurement Working Group Panel – With a Description of the Working Group Mandate

Chapter 3 – Unsupportable Notion of the Self-Appointed Commission

Chapter 4 – Encouraging the Great to Intimidate the Lesser

Chapter 5 – The Bait and Switch Summer Vacation Plan

Stiffening the Lectures on a Misinformation Campaign

Chapter 6 – Ignoring Safety Catches

Chapter 7 – Self-Induced Political Embarrassment; Desperate Face-Saving Remediation

Chapter 8 – Direction of the Ruling Franchise Announced

Our Permanent Date with the Court

Chapter 9 – Generally Accepted Definition of Totalitarian Ideology

Chapter 10 – Contraband Arms Dealing in Perpetuity

Chapter 11 – Ignoring the Existence of the Court into Oblivion

Chapter 12 – Obama's Three Phony Pillars of Power

Chapter 13 – Mining Sites, Milling Sites; and Other Non-Inspected Areas

Chapter 14 – Brief Afterwards

Appendices

Chapter 15 – Appendix 1 – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause

Chapter 16 – Appendix 2 – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"

Chapter 17 – Appendix 3 – How (why) the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was renamed "S/2015/546

Chapter 18 – Appendix 4 – IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a. and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2.

Chapter 19 – Appendix 5 – Compounding the felony by bundling control over nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets

Chapter 20 – Appendix 6 – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

Chapter 21 – Appendix 7 – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress"

Chapter 22 – Appendix 8 – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

* * * * *
When  
Did you intend  
That these should end?
– A Supernumerary Chapter – Eisenhower's Warning –

Certainly in his second term in office, in the late1950's, President Dwight Eisenhower could see emerging in the United States a powerful internal menace which could distort and corrupt the ideals of a representative form of governance.

President Eisenhower perceived that weapons manufacturing and arms dealing interests could rise to such preeminence as to exert undue influence in the development of national policy. In his farewell speech at the end of his second term, Mr. Eisenhower warned the Citizen of his apprehensions [the following is an excerpt]:

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, and even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, and every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded...

...It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system -- ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

* * * * *

We are witnessing at this time how the greed of self-serving partisan politicians has coincided with possible arms racketeering interests of industrialists to direct the general Government of the United States away from adherence to the United States Constitution; in at the very least so far as the Government's requirement that it honor international treaty made under the Authority of the United States [Article VI].

This intentional subversion of the Government's approach to the Constitution; its dismissal of the Constitution, was inaugurated under the administration of President Barack Obama in the arrangement he made with Iran to assist that nation in its development of domestic nuclear weapons capacity. This arrangement, known officially as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, more commonly known in the United States at this time as the "Iran nuclear deal," egregiously violates international treaty and law – and cannot be understood as legally being made under the Authority of the Charter of the United Nations. This is some of what will be examined in this book.

From the onset I make clear that I am not of the opinion that domestic arms manufacturers are guilty of any crime in wanting to further glorious returns in profits to themselves through their labors of manufacturing and entering into weapons sales contracts; that is the business they are in. In all, as far as I know, they sell legally;(per U.S. Government doctrine) to whomever the Government of the United States tells them they may sell to, regardless as to whether or not this violates international law and treaty.

* * * * *

Succeeding to the Obama administration, President Trump pulled the U.S. out of participation in Obama's aberrant international arms scheme for a time. And so for now, domestic arms dealing interests will not sell to Iran.

But the withdrawal from Obama's "Iran nuclear deal," officially known as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) is tenuous. Democratic Party Candidates running for the presidency in 2020 all support getting the U.S. back into the ongoing international arms sales to Iran – these being carried out in violation of treaty.

A president reentering the ongoing market selling contraband arms to Iran would be a President who chooses to violate treaty, and therefore the Constitution and the Oath to _preserve, protect and defend_ the Constitution.

This would be a President who violates his Oath should he allow or encourage, domestic arms dealers to sell the Weapons of Mass Destruction associated assets to Iran which are in violation of treaty; regardless that Resolution 2231 encourages the activity, and that the other Great Arms Dealing Nations are all currently engaged in profiting from doing so.

We begin our examination:

* * * * *
Origin of Obligation in Contract

– Chapter 1 –  
Easily Identified Perpetrators

Among other things, it is the ongoing sales to Iran of contraband nuclear weapons assets while at the same time prohibiting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting these with a view towards verifying that the Iranian acquisitions are not being diverted towards the development of nuclear weapons capacity – which condemns United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to nullification by the Court.

Security Council Resolution 2231 provides for a Procurement Working Group bureaucracy which oversees, expedites and approves of the nuclear weapons associated sales to Iran provided for, allowed for and encouraged by Resolution 2231 in violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ( _Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty_ , or NPT). As noted, the IAEA is prohibited by the Procurement Working Group from inspecting anything related to this activity.

Naturally it is suspicious that a project which asserts itself as preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons capacity would prohibit the IAEA from verifying that thing claimed to be the case – just as this one does.

That the IAEA is prohibited from reviewing the contents of the weapons associated sales made under the auspices of the U.N.; prohibits the IAEA from knowing where these acquisitions are being stowed; or what use they are being put to; the prohibition of such investigation is in violation of Clause 1; Article III of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty).

[Appendix 1 – Chapter 15: _The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a_ []]

The first clause of Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons orders the IAEA to inspect, with a view to preventing diversion of technologies or means or goods or services; from peaceful uses of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy **from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**...

The Board of Directors simply chases IAEA inspectors off the job of investigating or inspecting the Weapons of Mass Destruction associated assets sold Iran. The Board of Directors are a position to do that easily. The entities controlling the vote on the Board of Directors panel are the exact entities selling these contraband classes of weapons to Iran under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group – just another department run and managed by these entities soon to be named.

The Board of Governors is not satisfied to simply prevent IAEA inspectors from investigating any aspect of the weapons assets sold. The Board of Governors also must prohibit inspectors from at all looking into certain activities essential to Iran's development of its nuclear weapons capacity.

Since "JCPOA Implementation Day," 16 January 2016, Iran has been allowed by Obama's Iran nuclear deal – United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 – to engage in "activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device" – and Iran is allowed to engage in this activity with the guarantee that whatever project it has underway, this will not be molested or interfered with by pesky IAEA inspectors.

[Appendix 2 – Chapter 16: _Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ " []]

The Board of Governors carries off this prohibition on IAEA inspection by order of its alternate identity – the Procurement Working Group.

Let us now examine and name the exact entities in control of these two powerful bureaucracies dedicated to assisting Iran in its acquisitions of goods, technologies and support services essential to development of a well-rounded nuclear weapons capacity.

* * * * *

Origin of Obligation in Contract

– Chapter 2 –  
Make up of the Board of Governors and the Procurement Working Group Panel – With a Description of the Working Group Mandate.

The entities making up the Procurement Working Group Panel are identified in Security Council Resolution 2231; and the entities comprising the IAEA Board of Governors are identified yearly in International Atomic Energy Agency _General Conference_ reports consistently titled: _Election of Members to the Board of Governors_.*

*[To find these lists of the Board of Governors per year, search for:  
https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/Documents/  
This International Atomic Energy Agency internet page which appears is titled as: General Conference Archive

A pull down menu just under the banner photograph on the page lists dates: any year of the IAEA's existence can be found.

Scroll down the list of documents presented on the desired page (the year being looked for) and find one titled: Election of Members to the Board of Governors (this document will show the population of the Board of Governors of the respective year selected).

The available pdf document corresponding informs as to which nations were elected to the Board of Governors in the given year.]

* * * * *

I don't ordinarily like to interrupt the narrative with this sort of listing, and would often rather place a listing in an appendix. In this case, as I list the Board of Governors per year from 2013 through 2018, I see not much harm in it. The reader may simply skim the following and see what I'm talking about:

**2013  
** Australia • Russian Federation • Canada • China • France • United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland • Germany • United States Of America

And

Japan • Brazil • South Africa • Sweden • India

**2014  
** Australia • Russian Federation • Canada • China • France • United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland • Germany • United States Of America

And

Argentina • Japan • South Africa • Spain • India

**2015  
** Australia • Russian Federation • Canada • China • France • United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland • Germany • United States Of America

And

Argentina • Japan • Finland • South Africa • India

**2016  
** Australia • Russian Federation • Canada • China • France • United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland • Germany • United States Of America

And

Argentina • Japan • Switzerland • South Africa • India

**2017  
** Australia • Russian Federation • Canada • China • France • United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland • Germany • United States Of America

And

Brazil • Japan • Italy • South Africa • India

**2017** [After the vote – the United States laer defects from the Procurement Working Group] **  
**Australia • Russian Federation • Canada • China • France • United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland • Germany

And

Brazil • Japan • Netherlands • South Africa • India • United States Of America

The entities comprising the Procurement Working Group are identified in Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex A: JCPOA; JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission;

The membership of the Procurement Working Group is identified under Paragraph **6; Procurement Working Group** ; and the Paragraph **6.3** which follows it – as: France, Germany, the U.K., the United States, Russia, China, and Iran.

Iran naturally is not on the IAEA Board of Directors – but all the other Procurement Working Group States are.

Previously, the Procurement Working Group member Entities had a controlling voting block (with the inclusion of the Commonwealth States of Canada and Australia) on the Board of Directors of eight to five.

With the United States defection under President Trump, the lead is reduced down seven to six; nevertheless still giving the Procurement Working Group States the vote needed to suppress any dissidence.

THE PROCUREMENT WORKING GROUP / Controlling block of the Board of Governors has, as we have read in Appendices 1 and 2, appointed itself with its own commission to violate treaty that it may anoint itself with some phony authority to prohibit IAEA inspectors from investigating both Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets, and investigating Iranian engagement in activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device – all of this in violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_.

Next under investigation is the legal status of a self-appointed commission such as this.

* * * * *
Origin of Obligation in Contract

– Chapter 3 –  
Unsupportable Notion of the Self-Appointed Commission

The misrepresentation is so often played out by schemers and politicians that the public has often become confused into thinking that the origin of an obligation in a given contract arises from the Contract itself. This is an unfortunate and often recurrent misconception intentionally promoted by some; a recurrent misconception leading to the success of the many traps conniving political partisan syndicates lay out to misdirect; to mislead the unwary.

Were it true that obligation in contract arises from the contract itself; then absurd notions, such as the ones proposed by the Procurement Working Group / Controlling block of the Board of Governors, would constantly arise and be honored.

The IAEA Board of Governors has commissioned itself with the authority, among other things, to chase _International Atomic Energy Agency_ inspectors off the job when it comes to investigating the contents or whereabouts of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated goods, services and technologies. [Appendix 2 – Chapter 16 []]

To some, the preventing International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from essential review of extremely sensitive material which the Islamic Republic of Iran doesn't want IAEA inspectors knowing anything about – this might sound like part of a well-rounded program specifically designed to enable the development of Iranian nuclear weapons capacity; and it is indeed what Barack Obama, the ministers of the Government of Iran, and the other Parties agreed to.

And if were generally accepted that enforceable recognized obligation arises out of whatever Parties agree to; for example such Parties as Barack Obama, the ministers of the Government of Iran, and the other Parties involved in the "Iran nuclear deal;" then the IAEA should forever be prohibiting its obligation under the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty to inspect.

So if it is in general true, or even ever true, that Obligation in Contract originates from whatever was agreed to in a private agreement; and it is true that the Resolution 2231 Contract does stipulate that IAEA inspectors are not to know of the nuclear weapons associated contents of Iranian acquisitions of procurement packages made through the Procurement Working Group; and that the IAEA is not to know of the whereabouts of these acquisitions in Iran; and that therefore the IAEA is not permitted to, and cannot possibly investigate what end-use these are being put to;

Then, if it were considered true that obligation in contract arises from the Contract itself, and not from some external source – then the IAEA Board of Directors' would have a self-appointed or automatic commission, to prevent IAEA inspectors from investigating anything having to do with the said acquisitions. And this would be in violation of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty; Article III; Clause 1 presented earlier.

The resulting logical conclusion resulting from the notion that obligation arises from agreement leads to a justification for the Parties to the Iran nuclear agreement to assert that it had been decided by them that the IAEA is to stay out of their affairs regardless of whatever treaty requires.

The Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty had been a previous agreement they had made, not just between themselves; but also with the 1## or so other signatories to the internationally signed multilateral treaty.

The States yet adherent to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty clearly want that agreement to last; they want to continue to enjoy the benefits to the peace and security that treaty would afford them if signatories would adhere to it.

But the rogues States associated with the Iran nuclear deal have decided they will no longer entirely honor that previous agreement because they've made an alternative arrangement. They are immune from harm, nobodies about to shoot a ballistic missile tipped with a nuclear warhead at them. This is in large part thanks to the calm which has resulted since the adoption of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_.

I was alive and remember it vividly the period before the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty was first presented, and before its adoption. At that time it was anyone's guess how things would end. The annihilation of all human life on the planed seemed pretty much inevitable – and anyone aware of the history of the early 1960's knows that it did almost, within a hair's breadth, come to that.

There was some freak hope in the public when it was suggested that a treaty something like the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty might be produced. But that vague proposition seemed so far fetched given the broiling fanaticism of both the United States and the Soviet Union at the time. The one good thing the possibility of such a treaty had going for it was that both leaderships of the Great Adversaries realized after the fact what had almost happened during the course of the Cuban Missile Crisis affair. The leaderships were shitting their pants out of fear over when something like that was going to come up again.

IF IT WERE EVER considered true under international norms that the origins of obligation in contract arise from the Contract itself; then this mischievous notion would lead to the conclusion that the direct participants in this new Resolution 2231 agreement would be right – they could throw out any old agreement for the new; and any treaty could be tossed out or ignored by the next expedient concept that just happened along. The Parties to Resolution 2231 carry out their actives as though the false premise that obligation in contract arises from the agreement made is considered the accepted international norm – when it is most certainly not.

THE ENTIRELY INTOLERABLE **self-appointed commission** of the IAEA Board of Governors is its mirage commission to prohibit the IAEA from inspecting in areas the Agency's inspectors are required to investigate. Specifically, Agency inspectors are precluded from looking into any Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed inventories; or acquisitions from the later (INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2list) regardless that treaty requires these inspections be carried out.

Resolution 2231 allows that Iran, as of JCPOA implementation day, may begin engaging in "... _activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device_ ;" and lists the types of components the Iranians may work with in their researches [see Chapter 16 – Appendix 2 – _Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing_ " _Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device_ " []]

The components which Iran is allowed to work with are all INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2, and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed inventories. The IAEA is naturally, therefore, prohibited from going anywhere near what Iran is working with down there in the lab. Nevertheless, the IAEA is required by treaty to look into these " _Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device,_ " regardless that the direct Participants to the Security Council resolution prohibit it.

The controlling members of the Board of Governors are identified as the five permanent Members of the Security Council: Russia, the U.S., the U.K., France and China; these along with Germany. These are the Parties, along with Iran, which make up the Procurement Working Group.

The five permanent Members of the Security Council and Germany and Iran have come to an agreement that IAEA inspectors are not to look into certain troubling matters. Therefore the Board of Governors of the IAEA granted itself the authority, the commission, to keep IAEA inspectors out of certain areas, this in violation of treaty.

But after all, the agreement made obligates that the Board of Governors lay down some new rules; that the Board might better keep their inspectors up to date on how the world has changed.

* * * * *

AS NOTED Resolution 2231 established a " **Procurement Working Group** " bureaucracy with a mandate to facilitate, expedite and approve sales to Iran of procurement packages bundling nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets in violation to treaty.

In the following advertisement the Procurement Working Group, with its mandate, has been carrying on a promotional sales campaign since somewhere in early 2016, which openly seeks out vendors world-wide to present sales proposals offering such wares:

Information on the Procurement Channel

B. Further questions and answers

18. Can a proposal include items which are set out in _S/2015/546_ as well as in _INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part_ _1_ or _INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2?_

A proposal may include items which fall both under _S/2015/546_ , as well as one of the _INFCIRC_ s. Such a proposal should be submitted for review as an activity falling under Paragraph 2 of Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council will decide on such proposals based on a recommendation of the Joint Commission.

That paragraph is found in the United Nations issued document " _Information on the Procurement Channel_ " which is recovered from the United Nations website page: **http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml**

The page directly accessing the document in question (English Version) is: **https://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/Information%20note_EN.pdf**

It is by now well-known to vendors world-wide; that the alpha-numeric code referred to above; " _S/2015/546_ " refers to the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_. [Appendix 3 – Chapter 17: _How (why) the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was renamed by some "S/2015/546_ ; explains how this code name came into existence; []]. The _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ is a list of ballistic missile and associated technologies not to be distributed if there is a risk that these should fall into the hands of terrorists; or if these are to be used in conjunction with the development of nuclear warheads.

The INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2; lately updated as INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 is the IAEA list of nuclear weapons associated inventories which the IAEA warns should not be transferred: "... _when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons_." [Appendix 4 _–_ Chapter 18: _IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2;_ presents the notification [].]

**Sales of procurement packages** , intended for any State; those which bundle nuclear weapons assets and ballistic missile delivery systems, are in direct violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_. [Appendix 5 – Chapter 19: _Compounding the felony by bundling control over nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets;_ explains the origins and intent of this aspect of the NPT. []].

**As Resolution 2231** provides sales to Iran of Items listed on the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 lists; these sales can include "Technical Data" such as: " _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories_." [Appendix 5 – Chapter 20: _Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2aand INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)_ ; furnishes an excerpt from the list as sample [].] Blueprints etc., are found under the heading "Technical Data."

That Procurement Working Group Information on the Procurement Channel; _B. Further Questions and Answers_ thing – that thing of theirs didn't just appear out of thin air. Regardless that these bundling of nuclear weapons associated assets along with ballistic missile assets along with nuclear weapons assets into procurement packages intended for sale to Iran entirely violates the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty; Resolution 2231 declares that these will be formally available as of "JCPOA Implementation Day" which was 16 January 2016. Security Council Resolution 2231 does that here:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2231); Annex B.

As provided by a resolution so deciding, the following provisions would apply on the date on which the IAEA Director General submits a report verifying that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA [this means "JCPOA Implementation Day; which turned out to be 16 January 2016];

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) ; Annex B.

2. [first clause] All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and **INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2** ( **or the most recent versions** of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;

(b) the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above; and

The Parties to Resolution 2231 had themselves agreed; that as of 16 January 2016 the Principle's to Obama's "Iran nuclear deal," Russia, Germany, China, France, the U.K,, The U.S. under the Obama machine – these States along with Iran; had agreed among themselves that they were and are permitted to violate Articles I and II of the multilateral international treaty, the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ (to which they are all also Party), in order to engage in the enterprising project of the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran.

Engaging in expediting and approving Sales to Iran of Nuclear Weapons associated assets of the nature defined in the Procurement Working Group advertisement is to be construed as assisting, or inducing a non-nuclear-weapons-State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such in violation of treaty.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and **not in any way to assist,** encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to **manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices** , or **control over such weapons or explosive devices**.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to **receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever** of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; **and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**.

If it were ever true that Obligation in Contract is recognized as originating from whatever is agreed to by any ramshackle, un-scrupled group empowered in political office; then violation of treaty would always be recognized as legitimate because the Parties setting out to, and violating treaty or international law had justified their extravagance by simply agreeing to it. That's all it would take to justify breaking the law at any whim or expediency.

NO LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE obligation ever originates in any contract or agreement. An agreement may logically result in certain consequential obligations if it is to be carried out lawfully. These obligations may be implied or stipulated; but whether expressed or left unsaid, no enforceability of any aspect of the agreement is innate, or is understood as residing within the agreement itself.

The enforceability of an obligation in a contract originates outside the contract – in the social compact of the law, or laws which control(s) the particular contract(s). So if an agreement is to be is to be considered as legal, and considered as being lawfully carried out, or to be considered as enforceable – then the "obligations" logically resulting from the parameters of the agreement itself must all be in conformity to obligations originating and stipulated in the relevant law controlling the agreement.

We have examined Procurement Working Group / Board of Governors prevention of _International Atomic Energy Agency_ inspectors from doing their jobs. This is one example of an aspect of a favorite falsehood promoted by self-interested groups – the pervasive false premise that an agreement itself justifies a violation of treaty or anything else.

And this ploy is naturally also a favorite of the cheap, unscrupulous and incorrigible current opportunistic politician of the Congress of the United States.

Speaking from the floor of the 114th Congress on 10 September 2015; unfettered dim bulb Democratic House of Representatives leader; Her Exalted Pomposity – Ms. Nancy Pelosi, proudly once again pursued pushing the famous charlatan politicians' favorite ruse on the U.S. Citizen – she said:

"...having been briefed all along the way, I still was pleasantly pleased to see what the final product was. What the President negotiated was remarkable. It was remarkable in several respects.'

'One was that the P5, the permanent members of the Security Council, plus one—that would be Germany—the P5 nations negotiated this agreement with Iran: China, Russia, France, the U.K., and the United States.'

'This is quite remarkable, that all of those countries could come to agreement. And an important part of that leadership was the leadership of President Obama to have that engagement sustained over a couple-year period."

[Found at: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 114th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION; Vol. 161, No. 130 page H5900, first column (September 10, 2015): This record can be retrieved as a pdf file at web address: https://www.congress.gov/crec/2015/09/10/CREC-2015-09-10.pdf]

Hardly remarkable at all that the greatest arms purveying nations world-wide would, and did, enthusiastically and publicly enter into an agreement to violate treaty so that they might profit from assisting Iran in its ambition to develop nuclear weapons capacity.

Pelosi's is but another example of the domestic opportunistic politicians' presenting arguments based on the favored ruse that – as the typically infantile U.S. politician would have us all misunderstand – the origins of obligations in an agreement arise from the agreement itself. Therefore, whatever the direct Parties to Security Council Resolution 2231 came up with must be good and legal because they quite remarkably agreed to it – and whatever these of the prestigious globe trotting elite have agreed to has to be honored as it is automatically to be regarded as honorable and legal because they agreed to it.

Like-minded pro-contraband arms proliferation enthusiast, Democratic Party 115th House of Representatives weasel Jim Costa had this contribution to make.

In this following, House of Representatives weasel from California, Jim Costa, shares his utterly confused amorality with the American People. The date of the following speech was 11 October 2017; [and the speech is found on https://www.congress.gov/115/crec/2017/10/11/CREC-2017-10-11.pdf]:

RECERTIFY IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. COSTA) for 5 minutes. Mr. COSTA. Mr. Speaker,

I rise today to speak about the significance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding Iran, more commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear agreement...

_...we should not withhold certification of the Iran nuclear agreement without credible evidence that Iran is not complying_ [with the agreement] _. Let's remember, this agreement has always been about Iran, not obtaining nuclear weapons. Doing so would strip the United States of our credibility in future international agreements not just with Iran, but with our allies as well. In addition to Iran, we negotiated the Iran nuclear agreement with the United Kingdom, Germany, European Union, China, and Russia, and we must keep our word. In other words, to remain credible, the United States cannot change positions on international agreements from one administration to another without serious justification and without the consent in working with our allies._

... we must work with our allies and together, make a safer world through a comprehensive strategy that involves diplomacy, sanctions, and, yes, deterrence, if we must use such force. We have methods for addressing Iran's nonnuclear behavior besides refusing to recertify the agreement, and I will continue to advocate for the use of these tools to take a strong stance against Iran for their support of terrorist state activities and their abuse of human rights.

But refusing to recertify the Iran nuclear agreement, without clear evidence that Iran has breached the agreement, will deeply damage our relationships with our allies, and it will weaken our credibility worldwide.

That lovely little speech was passed off on the U.S. Citizen on 11 October 2017. Within about two weeks, on 26 October 2017; almost the entire House of Representatives (save two abstaining and seven not present) would vote in favor of attempting to directly legalize the sales of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile weapons to Iran under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group.

House Bill HR 1698 made it clear – that if ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services, were shunted to Iran under the official auspices of the Procurement Working Group – then the 115th House of Representatives was satisfied that there would be no need for any reporting or announcement of any of that sort of thing to Congress.

Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698

SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES.

(e) SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILES.

''(B) ADDITIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGY.—

''(iv) PROCUREMENT WORKING GROUP DEFINED.—In clause (iii)(I), the term 'procurement working group' means the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established under Annex IV of the applicable provisions in Annex A of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698

SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES.

''(I) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of subclauses (I), (II), and (III) of clause (i), and except as provided in subclause (II) of this clause, efforts by the Government of Iran with respect to ballistic missile-related goods, services, and technologies described in this subsection are efforts by the Government of Iran to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, test or use ballistic missiles or associated goods, services, or technology by the Government of Iran, including efforts by the Government of Iran to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, purchase—

''(aa) goods, services, or technology listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of October 8, 2015, and subsequent revisions that have been acquired outside of the Procurement Working Group or not otherwise approved by the United Nations Security Council;

However; permission to sell ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services grants corresponding permission to bundle these assets in procurement packages which include nuclear weapons associated goods, support services and technologies listed on the INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 inventory list [Technologies may include: _blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories_."].

[Appendix 6 – Chapter 20: _Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a_ and _INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)_ ; furnishes an excerpt from the list as sample []. Blueprints etc., are found under the heading "Technical Data."]

The Congress of the United States has no control over what material sales are made Iran under the auspices of the Procurement Working Group – so the 115th was attempting to somehow "legalize sales to the non-nuclear-weapons-State of Iran bundled packages of nuclear and ballistic missile inventories in violation of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty – and the 115th imbecile Congress of the United States was attempting to do this without any idea of what exactly it would permit being sold to Iran. These are our super patriotic geniuses of the Congress at work.

Unscrupulous Jimmy Costa, in step with the rest of the current national level Democratic Party, knows that his pet project is not at all about preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. It is exactly about serving corporate arms manufacturing and speculative contraband arms racketeering interests intent on sharing in the business of contraband arms profiteering; this in violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. Jimmy Costa knows that his adopted Iran nuclear project is exactly about getting Iran its nuclear weapons capacity as soon as reasonably possible;

And so, when the vote comes up on the floor of the House of Representatives, Jimmy makes sure he's there to stand with the others in favor of contraband weapons proliferation racketeering efforts.

JIMMY COSTA'S precious little speech of 11 October 2017 deserves a bit of further analysis, beyond the mere passing mention of it, in order to gain a better appreciation of the menacing predispositions and endangering prejudices of the political movement now in control of the national level Democratic Party. Jimmy effectively begins:

...we should not withhold certification of the Iran nuclear agreement without credible evidence that Iran is not complying [with the agreement]. Let's remember, this agreement has always been about Iran, not obtaining nuclear weapons.

In those first two sentences, Jimmy puts the Citizen on notice of two aspects of his general character and orientation. In the second sentence Jimmy informs us in his declaration: "... _agreement has always been about Iran, not obtaining nuclear weapons_...;" he informs us that as a politician, he is to be known as a professional, habitual liar.

In the first sentence: "... _we should not withhold certification of the Iran nuclear agreement without credible evidence that Iran is not complying_...;" Costa exposes himself as being completely ignorant of essential concepts. He tells us that compliance with an illegal deal is what is to be honored. It is not to be considered disgraceful to comply with a deal which violates a fundamental international multilaterally signed Treaty. What is to be considered disgraceful is withholding approval of compliance with this or any other illicit arrangement.

Jimmy Costa of California is the warped little political imbecile. He, like Democratic Party leader Nancy Pelosi and all the others; is easily impressed and inflamed by the prestige of crooked politicians, foreign and domestic, coming to an illicit agreement.

Jimmy the ignorant, exposes himself to be of the mind that obligation in contract arises from the agreement itself. It is apparent that half-wit Jimmy seems simply too dull in capacity to grasp the concept that no legally enforceable obligation ever originates in any contract or agreement.

Legally enforceable obligation originates in the law, or body of laws, which control the agreement, whatever it is. But appreciation for or consideration of the law might prove too difficult for the likes of Democratic Party Leader Nancy Pelosi, and followers like ignorant Jimmy to handle.

Inept Jimmy, in his speech, next resorts to empty threats and fear tactics

...Doing so [refusing to recertify – to re-approve the deal] would strip the United States of our credibility in future international agreements not just with Iran, but with our allies as well. In addition to Iran, we negotiated the Iran nuclear agreement with the United Kingdom, Germany, European Union, China, and Russia, and we must keep our word. In other words, to remain credible, the United States cannot change positions on international agreements from one administration to another without serious justification and without the consent in working with our allies.

It is true that the Obama administration instigated the utterly corrupt Iran nuclear deal in violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_. Jimmy is upset that if the U.S. were to back out of the deal in any small way, then the U.S. Government might lose face with the other corrupt leadership Partners-in-Crime. That might be true to some extent.

But "to remain credible," the U.S. must not change its position on adhering to international treaties. Incidentally – it was after all, the United States and the Soviet Union which brought the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ into existence. The United States must loyally adhere to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty – even at the expense of Jimmy's pet project if need be. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons takes precedence over dim Jim Costa's personal preferences and biases, or those of the rest of the Democratic Party membership – including the biases and motivations of the pro-nuclear weapons proliferation leadership now controlling the national level Democratic Party.

Despite the adventuring corrupt enterprise the Obama administration launched the United States into in egregious violation of treaty; an attempt to correct the error and return to adherence to treaty not only made under the Authority of the United States – as a U.S. ratified treaty is so styled in the Constitution – and treaty especially regarded as jointly conceived of and brought about by the mutual consent of the two greatest nuclear weapons superpowers of the time (still are); the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russian Federation).

Despite Obama and his acolytes, the return to adherence to treaty was critical. The President succeeding Barack Obama, having assumed office, eventually responded to Resolution 2231 in the reasonable manner – he pulled the U.S. out of the illicit deal. Now it remains for President Trump to bring the whole travesty before the only proper venue, the Court. The International Court of Justice will take this matter properly in hand.

* * * * *

Jimmy's next paragraph is more blah, blah, blah; and he finally terminates his tiresome broadcast with;

...refusing to recertify the Iran nuclear agreement, without clear evidence that Iran has breached the agreement, will deeply damage our relationships with our allies, and it will weaken our credibility worldwide.

Here dimmest bulb follower Jimmy puts his deceptions and misconceptions and taunting little cheap threats in a peanut shell. The content of the illicit agreement is not important – it is the outward appearance of conformity to the illicit agreement which impresses the hell out our seemingly impossibly infantile and shallow Jim Costa of California.

...refusing to recertify the Iran nuclear agreement, without clear evidence that Iran has breached the agreement...

And the appeasing "Jimmy chicken little" squawk about town carries on with his petty little grade school empty threat that if the Executive Branch of the United States of America displays even the slightest bit of discomfort with Obama's egregiously illicit "Iran nuclear deal," the sky will come crashing down and this insubordination on the part of the Trump administration:

...will deeply damage our relationships with our allies, and it will weaken our credibility worldwide.

ACTUALLY, if Jim dim bulb Costa could show any capacity for any insight – then he might have noticed a thing or two about the world around him which might cause him to rethink his political alliance with the pro-nuclear weapons proliferation elements controlling the Democratic Party at this point in the game.

What the Squitterbreech Partners-in-Crime, Jimmy's fantasy notion of so-called allies, are necessarily terrified of is that Trump might organize an alliance of Nations all terrorized by the almost inevitable consequences of this irrational and highly illegal weapons deal – and that these gathered will take this whole Dangerous mockery in petition for exposure of it before the International Court of Justice.

This chapter has explored to some extent the pervasive false premise that obligations arising from an agreement itself can possibly justify any violation of treaty whatsoever; regardless of the gossiping up of hysterically ignorant rumors and phony premises spread by politicians exhibiting themselves as the commonplace opportunist thugs, clods, broken down political cogs; each seeking support of, and supported by, either of the two grand dilapidated political machines showcasing themselves as running the country.

Next we examine an even more pernicious, intimidating manifestation of the false premise intended to terrorize.

* * * * *

Origin of Obligation in Contract

– Chapter 4 –  
Encouraging the Great to Intimidate the Lesser

Barack Obama, in laying out the infrastructure of his House of Cards Security Council Resolution 2231; decided to fabricate a complete counterfeit to entirely justify, in his characteristically phony way, the packaging of the multiple violations of treaty contained in the illegitimate arrangement. Obama invented this fraud:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Underscoring that Member States _are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions_...

Obama here pretends that the Charter of the United Nations asserts that the origins of obligation in an agreement arise from the agreement itself – which is neither domestically nor internationally ever true.

United Nations Security Council; Article 25 says nothing like what Obama invents for it to say, nor can it legitimately be suggested that the Article in any way implies anything in Obama's twisted characterization of it.

Charter of the United Nations; Article 24, directly preceding Article 25, declares in its second clause:

The Charter of the United Nations;

*CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 24

2. In discharging these [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations...

Here then, Article 24 is implicitly informing that any Security Council action taken, or decision – such as a Security Council resolution, must ultimately be governed by, and can only be justified by, one of the laws controlling it – the Charter of the United Nations.

The origins of any enforceable obligation suggested by a Security Council resolution is found in the Charter of the United Nations; not as arising from whatever legal or illegal (such as Obama's) Security Council decision is formulated by that body. No Security Council resolution is automatically or innately legal or enforceable; and the Security Council has no authority to decree just whatever it wants and then expect that any of its self-serving whims be immediately recognized, accepted, and followed through on.

What Charter of the United Nations; Article 25 does say is as follows:

Charter of the United Nations;

*CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

No where is the word "obligated" or any hint or indication of duress implied in the above – such as Obama falsely asserts.

The wording of the Article is exactly the opposite of what Obama perversely stipulates it means to say. "Agree to accept..." means, in the written context, exactly the opposite of obligated. "Agree to accept" means _no duress_!

" _In accordance with the present Charter_ ;" explicitly specifies that Security Council resolutions must conform to the Charter of the United Nations, the law which governs them – otherwise they are unenforceable and void. "... _Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter_ ;" ascertains that it is the Member States of the United Nations who are decided as being the _first interpreters_ as to whether or not a given Security Council resolution is deemed as being in conformance with the Charter of the United Nations (the **Final Interpreter** being the International Court of Justice, if a dispute were to arise and it should be deemed necessary to resolve the dispute in that wise.)

In agreeing to accept; the Members affirm that they each feel that the Security Council resolution does conform to the Charter of the United Nations. They are therefore in the role of first interpreters as to whether or not a Security Council decision is made in accordance to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Upholding that interpretation of Article 25 presented here is, among other Charter of the United Nations provisions; Charter of the United Nations Article 2; Clause 7:

Charter of the United Nations

*CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

7. **Nothing contained in the present Charter shall** **authorize** the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall **require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter**...

It is the Members States which decide that it is the policy of their Governments to adhere to treaty – they are the first interpreters as to whether or not Obama's Security Council decree that all States are obligated to violate treaty at Obama's whim conforms to the Charter of the United Nations. If they find they Obama's dictums are not in accordance to the Charter of the United Nations, then they simply shrug shoulders and don't go along with the scam. And they don't even have to defend their stance in Court.

TIN-PLATED LITTLE DESPOT Obama having invented his counterfeit; proceeded to order that all States without exception, in response to his fraud; are expected to and will correctly renounce their national sovereignties and ally themselves with the premise that on some level they are to accept and cooperate with or participate in the contraband weapons exchanges the Obama-era five permanent Member States of the Security Council had clearly in writing decided to endow the Government of Iran; evidently for the benefit of assisting in Iran's ambitious development of its own domestic nuclear weapons capacity. Beginning with the following from Resolution 2231 section _Terminations_ :

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

[section] Terminations:

5. [the Security Council] Requests that, as soon as the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this fact (16 January 2016, as it turned out) to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

In the above, the Security Council resolution is stipulating a time-frame for commencement of certain activities relating to the carrying out of the Resolution 2231 decrees. The above paragraph describes JCPOA Implementation Day, which occurred 16 January 2016. Paragraph 7 of section _Terminations_ next follows from Paragraph 5.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

[section] Terminations:

7. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, upon receipt by the Security Council of the report from the IAEA described in paragraph 5 {upon 16 January 2016 – which is designated as JCPOA Implementation Day:

(b) All States shall comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 and the provisions in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 of Annex B for the duration specified in each paragraph or subparagraph, and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annex B;

[Resolution 2231; Annex B; paragraph 1 defines the term "all States," as meaning "all States without exception," as follows: "The term 'all States' as used in this document, and as incorporated in the resolution, means 'all States without exception." (quoted from Resolution 2231; Annex B; Paragraph 1.)]

THE SECURITY COUNCIL decides here that All States are compelled to comply with what is provided for in the above indicated paragraphs. And paragraph 2 (mentioned above) is all about selling nuclear weapons associated assets to Iran:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

2. [first clause] All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and **INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2** (or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;

(b) the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above; and

Here the Security Council softens the language a bit; no longer compelling States to obey, but instead, permitting States to participate in the Security Council project: "... _All States may participate in and permit the following activities_...;"

So which one is it? Are all States compelled to violate treaty; or are they permitted by the Security Council to violate Treaty at the Security Council's say so?

It doesn't matter either way; the Security Council is not authorized to compel States to violate international treaty or peremptory norm of general international law; nor is the Security Council granted any license to permit, furnish the avenue to the misdeed, or in some way induce, support and promote that States should engage in such manner of activity.

THE OBAMA-ERA five permanent Member States of the Security Council, in their Resolution 2231, clearly declared their re-definition of the status of Member States per the Brave New Provisions laid out in their frontal assault on the Charter of the United Nations.

The Charter of the United Nations is very clear:

Charter of the United Nations

*CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

Resolution 2231 very clearly asserts that States are by no means to be regarded or respected as equal in their sovereignty:

Security Council Resolution 2231;

[section] Other Matters

27. [the Security Council]... Decides that all provisions contained in the JCPOA **are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran** and **should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State** or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices;

The exceptions made for Iran pertain largely to the Resolution 2231 provisions allowing sales of contraband weapons to Iran in violation of treaty.

The Sovereignty of Iran is to be given top priority over all other States. Other States are there to serve by participating in the weapons development project – or at least by accepting it and not protesting it.

As to the sovereignty of those Member States Iran advertises it will, or already does, target with aggression; their sovereignty is really hardly to be considered an issue at this point – as long as Resolution 2231 stays in place.

* * * * *

The reassessment of the status of sovereignty of Member States ordained by the Security Council is broad and sweeping, vague and ill-defined.

At one point Resolution 2231 is ordering that all Member States, whether they like it or not, are to assist Iran in its (for example) acquisition of ballistic missile technologies:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

[section] Terminations:

7(b) All States shall comply with paragraphs...4... for the duration specified in each paragraph or subparagraph...

Then – by the time Security Council Resolution gets to paragraph 4 the tone seems to soften a little:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B. - Statement

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

The authors perpetrating Security Council Resolution 2231 might not have been sure of what exactly they were going to push or how far they're going to push it; but certainly infringement on the sovereignty and jurisdictions of Member States was a featured part of their plan – supported by Obama's specious fiction that some or any part of the Charter of the United Nations gives the Security Council the Authority to take anything it wants from the Member States.

[As an aside, I still haven't heard if the five permanent Member States of the Security Council have yet managed to succeed in convincing or pressuring Saudi Arabia to assist in the arming of Iran with "... _items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems_."]

The supporters of the pro-nuclear weapons proliferation measures so blatantly and openly provided for in the Security Council resolution, perpetuate the false political notion that because the prestigious despotic leaders of the Great Weapons Dealing Nations had formulated an official agreement to directly lie to all the Nations of the World proclaiming that all Member States of the United Nations are automatically "Obligated" to carry out commandments of the Security Council;

Because the Security Council had, through their agreement, stipulated that Member States are automatically necessarily bound to whatever the Security Council "obligation" decides upon in that agreement and every other;

Then Member States are obligated to accept and carry out whatever the Security Council ordains no matter how illegal, preposterous, or destructive.

AS HAS LONG SINCE been understood in the modern world; no legally enforceable obligation ever originates in any contract or agreement; such as the agreement arranged between Obama, the Ministers of Iran, and the other direct Parties to the invention.

The legal enforceability of any obligation in a contract, incidental or intended, originates in the law or laws, or the body of laws controlling the given Contract or agreement. These obligations are the only ones pertaining to an agreement which may be interpreted as legally enforceable.

In this case; the primary body of laws controlling Resolution 2231 are; peremptory norm of general international law, the _Charter of the United Nations_ and the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ – all against which the resolution grotesquely, incontinently conspires and violates.

There is, and does naturally remain in this world, the alternative to legal enforcement – which is to enforce by threats and intimidation. This is the chosen method of the Great Nuclear Weapons Powers' Exchequer, the Central Committee comprised of the New Chinese Imperialist Central Mercantile Unit; Putin's Neo-Czarist Imperialist Russia; the recently revived Empire of France, and the Newly Reconstituted British Empire led posthumously by reappointment to the Throne, His Britannic Majesty in memory; King George III.

All this international nuclear weapons racketeering syndicate has had to do so far to get its way in whatever it has wanted is to invent unbelievable fiction and wave its big hammy, sweaty nuclear fists around just making sure everyone knows their place and is respectfully paying attention.

RESPECTING JUDGES WORLD-WIDE: Justices feel and take deeply seriously their duty to human society, their responsibility in their writings, to educate and illuminate a defenseless and suffering humanity wanting in the need of their experiences and insights. No doubt the Justices of the Court, the International Court of Justice, would have much to say of the supercilious Barack Obama's arrogant and preposterous falsification of Article 25 – and of the many other outrages instigated in the provisions of Security Council Resolution 2231.

Barack Obama's intentional perversion of Article 25 remains an entirely visible, politically motivated attempt to spread the most outlandish scandalous confusion and misinformation among the U.S. domestic and the international public.

The one possible contribution which might be accredited Obama's extravagantly presumptuous attempt at non-commissioned usurpation of authority – is that he managed to demonstrate without a doubt why no legally enforceable obligation may ever be considered as originating from within an agreement in itself. If the potential for legal enforcement of a perceived obligation is to be found – then it must be found within the law, or body of laws, which govern the agreement.

* * * * *

If only it had been that the United States Citizen had had the luck and the opportunity to have elected a President to succeed Obama; a President with backbone enough, and the intelligence to understand the need for this charade to have been taken to Court as soon as yesterday; for oh-so-many reasons, including the clearing up of any bad-feeling left behind by the persistent, won't-go-away stink left behind by Obama's self-serving pro-contraband weapons proliferation partisan propaganda campaign...if only;

Yet Trump might still be the next best thing. Sadly however, given his performance on the issue so far already into his third year in office; there presently doesn't seem much hope for it.

* * * * *

Origin of Obligation in Contract

– Chapter 5 –  
The Bait and Switch Summer Vacation Plan

Ex-President Barack Obama never did transmit United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) to Congress as he had promised to do in the law he himself had happily signed on to 22 May 2015.

The 114th Congress developed the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ ; under which the ex-President had legally pledged that he would transmit to the Congress, any agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, no later than 5 calendar days after having reached that agreement. As is stipulated in the Act:

Public Law No: 114-17

*SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 134 the following new section:

''SEC. 135. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN.

''(a) TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS OF NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN AND VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT WITH RESPECT TO SUCH AGREEMENTS.—

''(1) TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership—

''(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes;

Despite that; ex-President Obama, being the autocratic elitist politician that he regularly proved himself to be; he somewhere between 22 May 2015 and 27 July 2015 (when the actual official text Security Council 2231 was due in to Congress) changed his mind about the whole thing, and decided he would simply violate his own freshly ratified law with impunity. Obama refused to transmit United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), the actual "Iran nuclear agreement," to the population over billed as "Representatives of the People" relaxing themselves in the 114th Congress.

That United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) (itself being the authorized full text of the Obama "Iran nuclear deal" – the version of the deal that the rest of the world, with the exception of the proud and insular backwater Congress of the United States, is working off of); Resolution 2231 is exactly the class of instrument which the " _Review Act_ " is referring to under the definitions supplied in "subsection (h)(i)" listed above:

''(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

''(1) AGREEMENT.—The term 'agreement' means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.

Since I'm not quite ready at this point to entirely interrupt the necessary narrative explanation of the House of Representatives' August 2015 summer vacation plans – which I have in store for us to review; I have included in appendix, a separate narrative providing the documentary proof that Obama did indeed intentionally refuse to transmit the official version of his "Iran nuclear deal" in Appendix 7 – Chapter 21 of this writing: _Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress_. []

In that examination we review that the Obama administration claimed on Sunday, 19 July 2015 – this is the day before the United Nations Security Council took its vote (Monday,. 20 July 2015) on Obama's United States draft resolution which the U.S. administration had deposited with the Security Council on Friday, 17 July 2015 – on that Sunday before United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) was voted on or issued for circulation; Barack Obama – through his monkey-boy official spokesperson John Kirby – Obama sponsored a big performance phony story "put-on" before the U.S. news-media, wherein he had his boy Kirby claim that the White House had transmitted to the Congress everything pertaining to the "JCPOA,"

It was part of Obama's Administration's Misinformation Campaign strategy to constantly assert at every opportunity ex-President Obama's standard fabrication: that the "JCPOA;" only a part of Resolution 2231; is the full text of his "Iran nuclear deal." Obama did transmit "Annex A: JCPOA" of Resolution 2231 to Congress and left it at that. He clearly wasn't going to tolerate Congress getting a hold of or reading any other part of the Security Council resolution. So naturally the Obama Regime hadn't transmitted to Congress the official, voted on, text of his "Iran nuclear deal" as accepted by the Security Council and which everyone else in the world, aside from the backwater U.S. Congress, is working from – and he would prove that he had no intention of doing so, and would refuse to do so.

Appendix 7 documents the whole charade and proves the negative, that Obama never transmitted the thing. Appendix 7 also documents some rather lethargic complaining from Congresspersons about how some people thought there might be something missing in the Official package Obama had sent; some languorous and somewhat theatrical complaining had escaped the lips of some in Congress. But any remaining residual of the requisite ceremonial moaning sputtered out in about two short weeks.

IT IS WORTHY OF TAKING NOTE in its defense; that Obama towards the end of July, had the 114th Congress seriously sweating and up against the wall at that hell of a worst possible time. From about 5 August through 6 September 2015 (the exact days of the House of Representatives exodus and absence from their own Great Hall is recorded in the Congressional Record) the entire House of Representatives was dead-set to get out of Washington and go on Summer Vacation.

The need for a House of Representatives universal Summer Vacation clearly was understood to outweigh the fact that Obama had already launched the United States Government and the corrupt leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council on a program to assist Iran in its ambition to develop nuclear weapons capacity, this in violation of international treaty and law.

In sympathy for the mood of the 114th Congress at the time – it can be said that it must have seemed to those House of Representatives Public Officers of Trust entirely out of the question that anything could be gained by giving up Summer Vacation just to put on a façade of concern over what Obama was up to, and what he was thinking he was getting the United States into.

We the Citizen should probably have a heart and understand that these Party Loyalist partisans will possibly, from time to time, need a break from their repulsive hypocrisy, and so should be given a holiday to look forward to so they may have a chance to cleanse themselves somewhat of their own self-loathing and revulsion over the self-knowledge of their own innate inadequacy.

* * * * *

Upon returning from a summer's fragrant beauty treatments, House of Representatives political operatives indulged themselves, along with the Senate, in a second extravagance.

It is a fact that the Security Council had voted to act on Obama's "Iran nuclear deal" as stipulated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). And this fact was well-known by the entire Congress, both Houses, on the critical voting dates of 10 and 11 September 2015 – the proof of this assertion is recorded on the Congressional Record.

On the Congressional Record; 114th Congress; Vol. 161; No. 130; Washington, Thursday, September 10th, 2015; page H5926 – Congressperson Maxine Waters of California, having been given 30 minutes of floor time on the House of Representatives – sets out to give us a piece of her mind. The topic of the day is a vote to be taken on the JCPOA:

Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to start by thanking Democratic Leader PELOSI for her tireless and unyielding advocacy for the Iran nuclear deal agreed to between Iran and six major world powers, with the unanimous support of the U.N. Security Council.

Ms. Maxine Waters knows that the Security Council voted in support of the "Iran nuclear deal" on 20 July 2015; Democratic Leader PELOSI knows that the Security Council voted in support of the "Iran nuclear deal" on 20 July 2015; the whole Congress knows that the Security Council voted in support of the "Iran nuclear deal" on 20 July 2015; the whole world knows.

And on the Congressional Record; 114th Congress; Vol. 161; No. 131; Washington, Friday, September 11th, 2015; page E1261 – the topic again being votes taken on the JCPOA in the Lower House and Senate – Congressperson Peter DeFazio of Oregon affirmed:

...this agreement has the unanimous support of the U.N. Security Council, over 90 nations, our Gulf state allies, and the world's largest powers.

I can't say I think much of DeFazio's overconfident speculation on how all of "our Gulf state allies" feel, or his speculation that even any of "our" Sunni Gulf State allies are in any way charmed by being targeted with Iranian nuclear weapons per the Obama Administration's United States instigated assistance to the weapons development program this deal assists Iran developing.

But the point is; DeFazio knows that the Security Council voted on the deal too. And so do the Saudi's, the Jordanians, and every other leadership of every other State Iran despises and openly threatens.

They all know about the Security Council vote and it is only the members of the 114th Backwater Congress of the United States which would seem to pretend to the Citizens of the United States and themselves that Congressional refusal to acknowledge United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 would cause the fact that the Security Council had voted on something other than what the Congress had reviewed to wink out of existence on its owns.

They did not vote approval or disapproval of the Security Council resolution that the whole world knew about – they pretended it didn't exist. Instead they decided to falsely mischaracterize the JCPOA as being Obama's entire "Iran nuclear agreement;" just as Obama had his monkey-boy Kirby pretend on 19 July 2015, the day before United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) came into existence.

The assembled 114th, in the affair, behaved more negligently than a collection of 4th Grade Elementary School truants refusing to get around to doing their homework assignments. And with the same truant's infantile excuse: it was implied that as these freeloading idlers wouldn't look to do their homework assignment; they shouldn't be required to know about, or discuss anything in the assignment either.

These same are the dim-witted, the ignorant lackluster uninformed, the thoroughly remiss huckster charlatans posing themselves as our instructors and positioned to determine and to regulate the course of our future lives.

* * * * *

But why didn't the 114th National Assembly vote on Security Council Resolution 2231? Why did that Cabal decide to pretend that the "JCPOA" was the entire Obama "Iran nuclear deal?"

Why did every occupant of the 114th assembly refuse to download a copy of Resolution 2231 – and with only a glance at it – immediately recognize that this United Nations Security Council resolution is not by any means identical to the much smaller instrument the White House transmitted to Congress in July?

Not one member of Congress spoke up true at the time to alert the Assembly and the Public that the text of Resolution 2231 contains much, much more than what Barack Obama was ever willing to let on at that time (or at any time during or after his term in office). The 115th Congress has refused, and the 116th Congress (made up of the same people previously populating the 114th) still refuses to do that. There was not one person, in 2015, left in Congress who would choose to act in Good Faith. And it is evident in 2019 that there still isn't.

Whatever the aberrant preoccupation(s) shared by members of the 114th Congress which prevented that assembly from taking a vote – I leave that for those people to explain in their memoirs; but the important thing is the vote was not taken – and this leads to consequences.

* * * * *
Stiffening the Lectures on a Misinformation Campaign

– Chapter 6 –  
Ignoring Safety Catches

The authors of the " _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ " had their work signed into law by previous ex-President Obama in early May 2015, as recounted. This was naturally before anyone outside of the Administration had any inkling of what Obama might be negotiating with the Ministers of the Government of Iran. There was at the time and to say the least, much mistrust concerning what Obama might be up to negotiating over there; and so, in the writing of their Statute they inserted a sort of stop gap measure which they imagined might help as a deterrent preventing any mischief agreed upon from going too far. The authors set up a "Certification" requirement for whatever it was that Obama might invent with the Ministers of the Government of Iran; a requirement which theoretically would bind the then President by legal Oath (theoretically):

Public Law No: 114-17

*SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 134 the following new section:

''SEC. 135. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN.

''(a) TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS OF NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN AND VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT WITH RESPECT TO SUCH AGREEMENTS.—

''(1) TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership—

''(C) a certification that—;

''(ii) the President determines the agreement meets United States non-proliferation objectives...

Modern day United States "non-proliferation objectives" regarding nuclear weapons have long since been defined at basis by the fundamental _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. If ex-President Obama were to "Certify" that his agreement with the Ministers of Iran met with United States non-proliferation objectives – he would effectively be declaring that his arrangement with the Ministers conformed to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. Choosing to make that egregiously false claim under legally binding Oath didn't seem it would likely suit our ex-President Obama that time around.

Obama's ingenious solution allowing him to avoid making an official, legally binding determination that the " _agreement meets United States non-proliferation objectives_ " was, as the record shows, to simply not transmit the agreement to Congress at all; no agreement, no need to certify. It was a problem easily solved given the pliability of the brain-dead 114th Congress of the United States which couldn't, when it came down to it, care less about bothering with anything anyhow.

That above safety catch in the Bill worked after a fashion in that it may have helped demonstrate pretty conclusively that Obama understood his "Iran nuclear agreement" as too dangerous and too dirty to attest to under Oath.

THERE IS ANOTHER, similar safety-catch found a little later on in the Bill.

Public Law No: 114-17

Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 [Section 2]

''(6) COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION.— After the review period provided in subsection (b), the President shall, not less than every 90 calendar days—

''(A) determine whether the President is able to certify that—

(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program;

The United States, throughout Trump's first year in Office – 2017 – was officially colluding with Iran, the U.K. France, Russia, Germany and China to expedite and approve sales of to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets; and the United States was officially colluding with these other Procurement Working Group States to prohibit the IAEA from reviewing any aspect of these sales, in order to verify that the sales contents were not being diverted to the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran.

The prohibition on IAEA inspections is documented and explained in APPENDIX 1. The Resolution 2231 decree ordaining these prohibitions on IAEA inspections violates the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – as is explained. And these prohibitions on inspections preclude any argument that the un-inspected items shipped Iran can be in any way reasonably construed or characterized as possibly innocent "dual use" assets. That they are "dual use" means that these can be used either for peaceful purposes or for belligerent purposes. The concern is that these might be diverted to use in a nuclear weapons development project. The purpose of International Atomic Energy Agency investigation is to ascertain that they that they are not being so diverted.

The refusal to allow inspection leads to the most reasonable and just conclusion that these are being for belligerent purposes and illicit ends.

Obama wouldn't certify his own deal in the first place. And Trump on entering office; himself conflicted and evidently confused as to facts pertaining to "re-certification," and to the "Iran nuclear deal" itself; was unsure if he thought it best to "recertify" this thing known as the "Iran nuclear deal" which referred vaguely, for some, to the JCPOA – and for others referred to Resolution 2231, the designated official text of the Iran nuclear Deal.

The political movement in control of the Democratic Party in the 114th through 116th Congress; that political movement favoring Security Council Resolution 2231 and its provisions for assisting the development of nuclear weapons capacity in Iran; favoring U.S. participation in the ongoing international assistance being carried out in this area; and consequentially favoring U.S. domestic arms manufacturing and speculative interests preoccupied with potential gains which might be accrued in engaging in this new contraband arms profiteering scheme established by the Obama administration;

This political movement should not feel cheated that the scheme has run into a few snags and as yet has not turned out as swimmingly as might have been anticipated.

The in control political faction favoring proliferation demanded of the new green President-elect; that he re-certify the "JCPOA" every ninety days. Trump, in the first few months of his tenure, strongly indicated that he wasn't sure if he was inclined to continue doing that.

From November 2016, throughout 2017 and into the beginning of 4th quarter 2018 – the United States Government continued to participate in the illicit Procurement Working Group activity of expediting and approving sales of nuclear weapons associated assets to Iran under Security Council auspices and in violation of treaty.

In 2017 then – the pro-proliferation political partisans had what they wanted materially; but what was lacking was a sense of permanence in the affair. Trump was too unpredictable; and he would not affirm that he would continue to cooperate with weapons racketeering interests – a cooperation which would have been assured had the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton; a great supporter of the Security Council Resolution arms racketeering enterprise – been elected in Trump's stead.

The national level Democrats, at the time of Trumps assumption of Duties, had what they wanted – a United States Government which allied itself with and promoted the arms sales opportunities so enticingly included in Obama's "deal."

Uncertainty over Trump's overall response to the course laid in by the Obama Administration did stir up a maelstrom in a teapot, a tempest of political theatre centered on Trump's hesitancy to "re-certify."

Trump could not legally "re-certify" the "Iran nuclear deal" per the definitions and parameters of the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_. Trump could not declare under Oath that the provisions of Security Council 2231 do not violate both treaties; the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty; and the multilateral constituent treaty of the _Charter of the United Nations_ ; because the Security Council resolution clearly does.

Trump's refusal to re-certify in itself did not affect Security Council Resolution 2231; or even U.S. participation in the Procurement Working Group. The other participating States in Procurement Working Group activities correctly perceived that this squabble carried on in the United States was simply a domestic political spat having no immediate bearing on the activates of the Procurement Working Group – or the Security Council resolution.

Those political elements in the 115th Congress in favor of rendering U.S. Government assistance to Iran in its ambitious efforts to develop nuclear weapons capacity – as is documented as provided for in the text of Resolution 2231;

Those political elements did enjoy, for slightly over a year from late 2016 through early 2018, U.S. Government participation in their cherished campaign serving arms racketeering interests both domestic and international;

That those supporters of contraband arms profiteering interests were enraged on account of new green President-elect Trump's being conflicted and hesitant about having been constrained to automatically re-certify the "Iran nuclear deal," a deal about which no one in the Congress would ever come out and demand if this nebulous reference to a "deal" was really meant to refer to the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; and no one in Congress demanded clarification as to whether or not the definition of what the phrase "the Iran Nuclear Deal" was referring to would be forever kept free-floating.

What was this mysterious deal which no one would exactly identify? Was Trump to recertify only the JCPOA which had never received a favorable vote in Congress; or would Trump be recertifying the entire Resolution 2231 which Congress had never glanced at and President Obama would neither transmit to Congress, nor dare certify himself? The 115th Congress was demanding Trump recertify a mirage.

In any event, both Annex A: JCPOA, and the other parts of Resolution 2231 violate the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty all over the place – to continue to adhere to an instrument which egregiously violates treaty made under the Authority of the United States is a violation of Article VI of the Constitution and a violation of Trump's Oath of Office.

As the guy on the street, I can't see how the concerns of the controlling political clique; the concerns of this pro-contraband weapons racketeering gang who might collectively lose anticipated profits from absence of weapons sales; I can't see how any of that forms any justifiable basis of complaint for them to level against Trump or any other Citizen of the United States (you and me and most of us) for being hesitant to agree with, collude with, or endorse their priorities. They've got no grounds to resent us and remonstrate against us, or to chastise us for out hesitancy to agree because we think their plans and pursuits stink odiously to high-heaven.

* * * * *
Stiffening the Lectures on a Misinformation Campaign

– Chapter 7 –  
Self-Induced Political Embarrassment; Desperate Face-Saving Remediation

I THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT the extraordinary denunciations launched against President-elect Trump in the couple of weeks before his even assuming office were due to any extremist partisan resentment over a Republican taking the Office away from a favored Democrat. That kind of political Party turnover is generally considered as a national sport pastime.

The fact that many consumers to some degree object to Trump's personal style of expression doesn't really explain the extent of the vitriol and hostility poured from some quarters either.

No question Trump was making serious enemies early by going on about how he thought Obama's Iran nuclear deal is a travesty not to be tolerated. That kind of talk does not make good friends at arms dealing interests headquarters or conventions.

The extra-vicious hostility launched against the guy has got to be in part due to that – and in part due to something else related, but maybe not apparent at first glance.

* * * * *

TRUMP came into office effusively wagging the finger of denunciation announcing to the citizens that he was absolutely getting rid of this concoction of the Obama administration. And here is one of his first mistakes – he doesn't tell the American People why he so badly wants the Iran deal thing done away with. That automatically put his argument in an essentially awkward, weak, pretty much indefensible position. Politicians made political hay over that.

By not discussing the matter, new green President Trump implied, in the way that many typical run-of-the-mill politicians most often do, that the prestige of office should carry the weight of the argument; and that supporting facts need not be presented, referenced, or resorted to. As the President has spoken; so it must be so, that's the sense of it and members of Congress were eager to ridicule that premise coming from Trump – where they were eager to portray him as being a completely unreasonable person.

He was not treating with the Citizen respectfully speaking as one Citizen to another either. He was treating with the Citizen as the denizens of the U.S. Congress do – they treat as they are to be vaunted as the elite sons and daughters of the elite; those who are chosen to justly rule over and regulate you.

So now here comes the really dangerous part for Trump – the part where Trump sets himself walking on a volatile smoldering powder keg:

Trump boisterously comes swaggering in exuding the confidence of a man who exactly knows what he's talking about. The new President seems so sure of himself that maybe he does really know something about this Iran deal affair, and that's frightening to people. If he does know something, he poses a serous political threat in that he might expose the cheap house of cards publicity façade the 114th Congress built and the 115th had carried on with...

* * * * *

Previous President Obama had shown up everyone in Congress, Republican and Democrat, to be the unreliable, uninterested fools he guessed them to be, and which they proved themselves to be. Despite that everyone in Congress knew about the existence of it – and can't deny that this knowledge as it was confessed to many times on the Congressional Record; those Congress people demonstrated to the public that they couldn't be trusted to look into what it was the Security Council had voted on. The 114th Congress ended up only voting on an incomplete part of what is being implemented by the Security Council and Germany and Iran; and they didn't even approve of that fraction of the resolution.

When Trump came into office the 115th Congress insisted that Trump continue to recertify something which was construed by some to mean one thing, and by others, a different thing.

The JCPOA had been determined generally in some vague way by the Congress as a proper substitute for Resolution 2231; conveniently due perhaps to the fact that both the 114th and 115th Congress had refused to officially acknowledge the existence of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 – which is the "Iran nuclear deal" as understood by every other nation except for that insular Department known as the Congress of the United States. The Congress, by 2017 most certainly knew its public assessment of identity of the instrument in question to be incorrect, but they decided to sneak around leaving the thing hanging indefinitely anyway; and to keep calling Resolution 2231 the "JCPOA."

As the Congress doesn't, even now in 2019, officially recognize the existence of Security Council Resolution 2231, the Congress currently has no vocabulary to discuss whatever it is the rest of the world might be talking about. For the moment this seems to suit the constricted, simple-minded genteel quirks populating the General Assembly just fine. Nevertheless, the imbecility of it can lead to confusion.

AS IT WOULD BE REVEALED over the course of 2017, Trump was actually effectively clueless about what Resolution 2231 consists of. Trump, as it would turn out, seemed to suffer from the same peculiar malady as the politicians of the 114th and 115th Congress – this refusal to read up on the material. And the President would prove himself worse in that wise being as he, by the time he assumed tenure in office; this President had had since the summer of 2015 to familiarize himself with the details of Resolution 2231. Moreover, Trump had had since May of 2015 to acquaint himself with the obligations imposed upon his office by _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_.

Had Trump read the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ while reflecting on his obligation to uphold treaty – he would have immediately understood that he would be in violation of the _Nuclear_ _Agreement Review Act_ if he were to "re-certify" Resolution 2231.

Trump shows no indication of having read the material, insisting instead on compulsively playing out the role of "World's #1 Biggest unconcerned aloof Jack-ass." The advisors the new green President surrounded himself with didn't show much of an interest in reading either – this tendency seems to have become part of Washington Fashion Plate Culture at this time. It doesn't help though – because without any knowledge of the details it becomes even more of a guessing game divining what's going on with the international nuclear weapons sales project.

The Weasels of Congress sensed ignorance and weakness. They jumped ahead a bit safer in the knowledge that Trump was too far off planet to have realized that a vote had never been taken on Security Council Resolution 2231, and that there was really nothing to recertify.

Protecting themselves from further humiliation which might result from revisiting the drubbing Obama had given them in 2015 – they harangued green President Trump throughout 2017 on the "re-certification" issue; threatening that if Trump couldn't show that Iran wasn't complying with the deal, then the United State had to stay in.

This letter to that effect, signed by the entire 115th House of Representatives Democratic contingent and sent 5 October 2017, gives an idea of the mischief:

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing to urge that you do not withhold certification on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) absent credible evidence of a material breach by Iran. Some of us voted for, and some against, the nuclear agreement with Iran. Nonetheless, we are united in our belief that enforcing this agreement to the fullest extent will provide the United States with more leverage to stop a potential Iranian nuclear weapons program and push back on Iran's destabilizing activities.

The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) requires the President to provide to Congress credible evidence of Iranian noncompliance should violations of the JCPOA occur. We have received no such information to date. On the contrary, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and career U.S. military and intelligence officials continue to verify that Iran has honored its obligations under the agreement, and we remain unaware of any material change in Iranian activity since you last certified compliance to Congress on July 17.

Absent credible and accurate information confirming a material breach, we are concerned that withholding certification of Iran's compliance or walking away from the JCPOA would harm our alliances, embolden Iran, and threaten U.S. national security. We are further concerned that noncertification based on justifications beyond the scope of the nuclear agreement would threaten global non-proliferation efforts and send exactly the wrong message to North Korea at the moment we are trying to diplomatically defuse that crisis. Countries should know that unless Iran commits a material breach of the JCPOA, the United States will keep its word.

We share concerns about Iran's activities in the region, including its ballistic missile development, support for proxies and terror groups, violations of the human rights of its people, and backing of the Assad regime. That is why the Congress took the step of passing the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which provides new tools to counter Iran's malign activities.

We remain hopeful that with strong U.S. leadership, we can ensure vigorous enforcement of the JCPOA, as well as implementation of non-nuclear and multilateral sanctions, including CAATSA, to keep the American people secure and safeguard American interests.

Sincerely,

David E. Price __ Ted Deutch Members of Congress

[The letter may be downloaded from: https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/10.4.17_td_dp_iran_recert_letter.pdf [last accessed Oct., 17, 2017] A facsimile of the letter follows:

None of those Democrats would concede that for the Iran nuclear deal to be recertified the President would have to determine that what was being carried on in Iran would not go against the following:

Public Law No: 114-17

Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 [Section 2]

''(6) COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION.— After the review period provided in subsection (b), the President shall, not less than every 90 calendar days—

''(A) determine whether the President is able to certify that—

(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program;

Naturally no one in Congress would mention a word about the agreement not meeting U.S. non-proliferation objectives as set forth under the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty.

Public Law No: 114-17

*SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015''.

''(C) a certification that—;

''(ii) the President determines the agreement meets United States non-proliferation objectives...

Not the letter, not Democratic Party ideology; neither concede that for Security Council Resolution 2231 to be certified, or "re-certified," it would have to conform to the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ; which is of a piece with the supreme Law of the Land:

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article VI - Debts, Supremacy, Oaths

[Clause 2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The deal that Obama came up with does not conform to treaty – which is only one of the many reasons the deal in its entirety will be thrown out in Court, with participating States being forced to put things back into place as if the Security Council resolution had never existed and gives reason enough explaining why the author of it, Barack Obama, played tricks to evade certifying his arrangement with Iran in the first place.

* * * * *

The 4 October 2017 implicitly promotes the absurd notion that because Iran is complying with Security Council Resolution 2231 by violating the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ on an ongoing basis; Trump is somehow compelled to re-certify Obama's Iran nuclear deal; and to keep the U.S. in the deal regardless.*

*["Absent credible and accurate information confirming a material breach, we are concerned that withholding certification of Iran's compliance or walking away from the JCPOA would harm our alliances, embolden Iran, and threaten U.S. national security."]

I must admit, my view of national security interests are directly opposite those of the Democratic Party Hawk leadership. My view of national security is that first the United States Government should establish itself as reliable in loyally adhering to and upholding and defending international treaties – the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty for example – even in Court when the time comes.

Their view of national security, as convincingly expressed by both what the Hawk leadership does assert, and what it omits in its 4 October 2017 letter; is that the United States Government should make a point of announcing to the world that we are a land led by fools who will invent any excuse to violate the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty in favor of perhaps profiting from promoting the development of nuclear weapons capacity in the most feared State of its neighborhood.

I can't say I think much of the insular, jingoist Hawk Democratic Party's Washington-centric myopic world view or its sense of what might promote or threaten U.S. national security.

That said; the opportunist Democrats promote the notion that because an agreement was made, then whatever obligations perceived as arising from the agreement; those are automatically considered legally binding. It is the infantile politicians' method of explaining that if Parties agree to something, be it a course of action or and exchange, or both; then that agreement is legally binding whether lawful or not.

Trump was never legally bound to recertify the vague notion of the Iran nuclear deal – an instrument repugnant to treaty and therefore disqualified from being considered a legal instrument.

Legally enforceable obligation pertaining to an agreement originates in the law, or body of laws, which control the agreement, whatever that agreement should be. That simple precept precludes the preposterous notion being carried on with by the Democrats (at that time and beyond) that Iran and the United States Government and the other Parties are all free to violate treaty by assisting Iran in its ongoing project to develop nuclear weapons capacity simply because the corrupt international elite leaderships all agreed they wanted to do so.

* * * * *
Stiffening the Lectures on a Misinformation Campaign

– Chapter 8 –  
Direction of the Ruling Franchise Announced

By late January, early February 2019: the Democratic Party had officially published its official Party 2020 Election Campaign Platform on Iran; [https://democrats.org/about/party-platform/#iran]:

IRAN

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because, as it is vigorously enforced and implemented, it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without resorting to war. We reject Donald Trump's view that we should have walked away from a deal that peacefully dismantles Iran's nuclear program. We will continue the work of this administration to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon and will not hesitate to take military action if Iran races towards one

Democrats will also address the detrimental role Iran plays in the region and will robustly enforce and, if necessary, strengthen non-nuclear sanctions. Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism. It violates the human rights of its population, denies the Holocaust, vows to eliminate Israel, and has its fingerprints on almost every conflict in the Middle East. Democrats will push back against Iran's destabilizing activities including its support for terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, counter Iran's ballistic missile program, bolster the capabilities of our Gulf partners, and ensure that Israel always has the ability to defend itself. Finally, Democrats recognize that the Iranian people seek a brighter future for their country and greater engagement with the international community. We will embrace opportunities for cultural, academic and other exchanges with the Iranian people.

The pro-contraband weapons profiteering political franchise which has taken control of the Democratic Party, still after some four years refuses to acknowledge or discuss weapons concessions made Iran, or the extraordinarily dangerous leeway the Obama has given Iran it engaging in " activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device" while the IAEA Board of Directors/ Procurement Working Group block shunts IAEA inspectors away from anything which might prove damaging to the reputation of the Resolution 2231 weapons proliferation and arms profiteering measure to the Security Council 20 July 2015.

The Party platform they have erected is merely a reiteration of the same fabrications the ruling franchise of the Democratic Party has espoused over these last four years.

I'll briefly break the platform down here, piece by piece; and then we'll proceed to the body of the examination:

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because, as it is vigorously enforced and implemented, it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without resorting to war.

This " _Cutting of all of Iran's pathways_..." jibe is just the usual nonsense restated _ad naseum_ by the Party. Provisions of Resolution vigorously promote international assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons development program – enough has been said about that.

AS TO THIS BUSINESS of not resorting to war: it vaguely means "without the United States directly resorting to war:"

We support the nuclear agreement with Iran because... it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb **without resorting to war**.

The Iranian pledge to wage future war of aggression against its neighbors is well known, and cannot be denied – not even by the Democratic Party membership. And in this future war of aggression they will most probably be well equipped with nuclear weapons capacity courtesy of Germany, France, Russia, the U.K., and China; and yes, courtesy of the previous United States Government – and a future United States Government if the Hawk Democrats get their way.

The assistance to Iran in this capacity is defined and codified under international law as the War Crime, _Crimes against Peace_. Examining the definition with a look at which entities may be held as liable for participating:

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) **Crimes against Peace**. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, **preparation** , initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, **or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing**.

[UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON (Public Domain): Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals; Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume III: page XIX]

The list of persons or entities which may be found liable in association with such crime is more extensive then what I present next; but this item 4(a)(b) following will suffice to give an idea of what this is about:

4. (a) The official position of any person, whether as Head of State or as a responsible official in a Government Department, **does not free him from responsibility for a crime or entitle him to mitigation of punishment**.

(b) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior **does not free him from responsibility for a crime** , but may be considered in mitigation.

[UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON (Public Domain): Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuernberg Military Tribunals ; Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 Volume III: page XX]

It is highly unlikely that any of these 2020 Presidential candidates will ever actually be charged with the War Crime, _Crimes against Peace_. Nevertheless – the Crime remains independent of prosecution under it. Politicians and Party can be reasonable and justifiably be perceived as sharing in the same level of amorality as any war criminal. Regardless of how they would like to promote themselves publicly; regardless that the Democrats refuse to discuss it publicly; that hawk political movement favors arming Iran in its preparations for waging war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances; they favor arming that State with nuclear weapons capacity in its pledged waging of war of aggression. Their involving nuclear weapons as one of the elements on the menu of this spectacularly ambitious enterprise is to be construed as Democratic Party assistance in support of a genocidal war of extermination conducted by Iran against some of its neighbors; courtesy of the United States Government, and the others;

And all this for the sake of a form of warped political face saving, and maybe the few crumbs of profit to be gained for interested parties in the United States, proceeding on:

* * * * *

We reject Donald Trump's view that we should have walked away from a deal that peacefully dismantles Iran's nuclear program.

Same old story-line from the Democrats – documentation shows that in fact, Trump walked away from an ongoing international operation still dedicated, in 2019, to assisting in developing and advancing Iran's nuclear weapons program.

We will continue the work of this administration to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon and will not hesitate to take military action if Iran races towards one.

The same in a series of nonsense claims; the Party clearly wants back in on the international contraband arms racketeering swindle.

Democrats will push back against Iran's destabilizing activities including its support for terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, counter Iran's ballistic missile program, bolster the capabilities of our Gulf partners, and ensure that Israel always has the ability to defend itself.

This first part of the assertion; that the " _Democrats will... counter Iran's ballistic missile program_...;" cannot be construed as credible given the Democratic Party's enthusiastic support for continuing U.S. participation in the advancement of Iranian ballistic missile capabilities; this support particularly put on display in the 115th House of Representatives October 2017 vote overwhelmingly in favor of the House Bill: _Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act – HR 1698_.

The meaningless Party-Line declaration that the Democratic Party will "... _ensure that Israel always has the ability to defend itself_." fails to explain the difficulty of how the Party plans to ensure this as it continues in its efforts to re-enter the Weapons of Mass Destruction arms-racketeering venture which assists Iran in its project to develop the weapons capacity to, in a few short minutes, immolate whole population centers in Israel – a nation Iran pledges the destruction of.

To best way to ensure the safety of Israel and every other nation on earth is to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. But this would prohibit the Democratic Party rejoining on any level in Obama's Iran nuclear weapons deal. The Ruling Franchise Elite of the Democratic Party, showing themselves in its eager support for rejoining the efforts of the international Cabal in this adventure of developing nuclear weapons capacity in Iran – is compelled by its Party policy to refuse to go along with this notion of sticking to treaty. Treaty gets in the way of weapons sales and profits in this case.

The Democratic Party is _the_ primary United States political Party which solicits the voters' cooperation in repositioning the U.S. Government to actively again participate, by assisting in Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction development program, in the larger common international plan or conspiracy to aid Iran in its declared pledge to carry out war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances;

Consequentially the Ruling franchise of the Democratic Party _is_ the current political clique in office which favors U.S. Government involvement in the internationally defined and codified War Crime – _Crimes against Peace_.

* * * * *

The promotional propaganda of the elite ruling franchise of the Democratic Party endorse as a virtue that to go along with the leaderships of the Partners in Crime syndicate of nations; to walk out on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and turn in favor of the provisions of Resolution 2231, as they have; to engage the War Crime _Crimes against Peace_ ; to engage in what can only be construed as participation in Iranian preparations for its pledged war of aggression in violation of treaty or international – this is considered a virtue by this perverted nightmare version of the Democratic Party.

It is the myth of a "virtue" which can only be sustained by suppression of fact; by ignoring fact; and by the Democratic Party's maintaining its protracted policy of lying to the public for the sport of seeing how long the Party can keep the charade up, and how many people the Party can manage to convince at any one time for however long they need convincing.

What the National Level Democratic Party in support of would be arms-profiteering adventures holds as the mythological vice; the evil among us – is adherence to treaty, adherence to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. Under the Obama administration, the United States Government walked out on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The President succeeding Barack Obama has brought the United States back into compliance with that fundamental treaty – which is what should be expected from any half decent human being; be that person the President of the United States; or the guy or gal on the street (although none of us would have had the authority to bring the United States back into compliance).

* * * * *

For their part, the amoral, unprincipled membership of the Democratic Party Ruling Franchise wants to drag the People of the United States into a quagmire of their own making. They will drag us back into it whether we want it or not.

They want a return to the arms sales adventure which can only inflame belligerence in the Middle East. Of course these thoroughly mendacious and voracious politicians all know very well that their claim about Obama's Iran nuclear deal's preventing Iran from ever acquiring nuclear weapons capacity is simply an infantile lie put out to justify re-entry into the international contraband arms racketeering game.

Having no other strategy than to fabricate, deceive – to lie wholesale; for the Ruling Franchise Cabal the 2020 national election becomes a head count game, the success of their winning of which depends on how many in the nation will follow along and blindly accept the Democratic Party Brand Name as what is to be believed in and voted in favor of as the most important thing over all else.

That portrayal can reasonably be construed as an accurate characterization of the predatory approach of the cheap mendacious self serving politicians obsessed with their collective preoccupation on finding profit for U.S. corporations through contraband arms sales enterprises they support – whether or not those corporations seek such cooperation and support from Congress.

NEITHER the collective memberships of the Republic or the Democratic Party show any capacity to understand the seriousness of the issue.

The 2020 national election centers on the existential threat posed to the United States and to world peace by this ongoing program assisting the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction capacity in any Government; and yet, neither party discusses the issue honestly. The Democrats offensively mischaracterize Obama's agreement, the Republican Party (and who's to say this bunch is immune to the temptations of arms profiteering) is silent on the issue – acting though it doesn't exist.

Both Parties know the vast majority of citizens are troubled by the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation – and certainly would be deeply concerned with U.S. involvement in scheme to advance the nuclear weapons capacity of the Government which openly pledges genocidal warfare and the extinction of neighboring populations.

Not one member of either House in Congress has ever suggested recourse to international rule of law as a method of resolving questions and concerns about the international arms dealing swindle. Recourse to rule of law would rob these opportunistic Drama King and Queen politicians of their ritual live stage performances consistently made up of dramatically bickering and backbiting over immaterial non-sequitors, evasions, and direct fabrications.

What else would there be for those people to talk about if they were to lose their stage productions to the Court; to have sweat out the time it would take for the Court to decide on the matter; before they could convincingly resume the pleasure of putting on display their frivolous and absorbing affected outbursts so diligently practiced and prepared for the public.

And when the Court rules against Iconic Obama's grand gesture – former supporters would be dumbstruck and crestfallen; their back and forth routine would have reached its inevitable conclusion. The Court, the Rule of Law, should be kept out of politics, and kept out of the affair. When in Court, the glamorous dramatics of politicians may seem to lose some stature of theatrical presence.

THE 2020 NATIONAL ELECTION centers on the need to take this United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to Court so that the instrument and the activities surrounding it may be properly shut down entirely.

Who will bring this in petition to the Bench? Certainly not arms profiteering intent corporate Democrats; who invent every fabrication in order to currently coerce the voter to return the United States Government into actively committing to further engagement and participation in _Crimes against Peace_.

Trump has to be pressured by the People to stop fooling around. Trump came into office grousing about how much he didn't like the Obama Iran nuclear deal. He never bothered to share with the public what he had against the deal. Over time I've come to the impression that Trump never did produce any facts speaking against the "deal" because Trump didn't know anything about the deal in the first place.

He's had time now – since August of 2015 when United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 hit the internet – to improve and educate himself. But if he's going to spend his tenure in office sitting around like the moss covered idiot ignorant log on this issue, then he doesn't really acquit himself as a very energetic executive enthusiastically carrying out the duties of his office. Lack of energy in the Executive means (per this writing) apathetic conduct in the carrying out duties of the Executive Department; a half-hearted approach to executive implementation means poor execution of Government. Poor execution of governance means bad, feeble Government.

That the vast majority of Americans are vehemently opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons didn't originate with Trump. That many, and more over time of the electorate know of what's being carried on with illegally, and without any authority of the Charter of the United Nations, by the remaining four members of the original Obama-era leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council Cabal isn't something that the President has had anything to do with.

This President however, showing himself prone to eerie timidity and indecisiveness, despite having almost the entire weight of the American People behind him on this one and only issue – refuses to speak publicly with the People, to broadcast in a nice fire-side chat manner, his solidarity with the People on this issue. He doesn't come out and speak frankly of the documented facts exposing Obama's arrangement with Iran as the menace to world peace it was always intended to be.

Without such a message of solidarity, Trump leaves it to the Ruling Franchise to traverse the political stage solemnly repeating over their perversely distorted fabrications desperately trying to hang on to those who will vote Democratic Party Brand Name no matter what.

Screw the interests of the Ruling Franchise and screw the Democratic Party Brand Name. This election must be in large about taking Obama's existential threat to world peace and national security to the International Court of Justice so that it will inevitably be declared null and be voided.

The President must be reminded that despite whatever feelings of hesitancy or cowardice he might experience, he has a Constitutional Duty... _to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States_ ; and defending the Constitution includes all aspects of it; including the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , which is of a piece with the Constitution and is recognized as of a piece of the supreme Law of the Land.

President Trump must see to it that the United States Government defends the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ in Court against those primary Parties antagonistic towards it aggressively engaged in assaulting it; France, Iran, the U.K. Russia, Germany and China.

* * * * *
Our Permanent Date with the Court

– Chapter 9 –  
Generally Accepted Definition of Totalitarian Ideology

As we know, for centuries in Europe and around the world, the absolute Monarch, or despot, or what have you; was allowed to change rules immediately and arbitrarily.

Eventually other forms of pursuing the business of governance by a little better than simply following rules that suddenly come about and might be gone tomorrow began to evolve; and so we see the emergence of later forms of thought and the development of such simple premises as to the origins of obligation in Contract cited earlier; where the origins of obligation do not arise from an agreement itself – but from the law, or body of laws, controlling the agreement.

Totalitarian Ideology dictates that whatever is agreed upon by the dictator; the oligarchy; or as in the case of Resolution 2231, the compact of the leaderships of the Obama-era five permanent Member States of the Security Council; whatever that is, that is now to be considered the rule of law.

The totalitarian ideology does not recognize the obligations imposed by any rule of law understood as superseding a usurpation of a self-appointed commission acting under the authority of a non-existent charter never voted on or duly granted.

Under totalitarian principles and ideology; it is the singular magistrate, the "Strong-Man" if you will; or the Oligarchy/Privy Council &c., which ordains at will what is to be.

The "Strong-Man" is the Rule of Law, the source of all Authority and Interpretation – the "Strong-Man" is to be considered the fountainhead of all correct doing, acting, thinking or speaking.

Barack Obama did not discover himself clever enough to find a way of egregiously breaking with peremptory norm of general international law without egregiously violating peremptory norm of general international law in order to violate treaty with the objective of assisting a non-nuclear-weapons-State in its ambition to develop nuclear weapons capacity – and without showing himself to be fundamentally inclined towards totalitarian ideology and the exercise of expedient despotic methodology.

Obama, eager to get the job done as fast as possible, simply pursued the course of following through on his inspired despot's inclination and fabricated his counterfeit version of Article 25; that he may seemingly justify his approvals of sales of nuclear weapons assets to a non-nuclear-weapons-State:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Underscoring that Member States _are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions_...

President Obama banked on that he could trick people with that cheap claptrap; and it was remarkable how many of our prestigious United Nations functionaries and world leaders turned out to be the half-wits which no one would have previously suspected them of being. We may now review the world around us with a new sudden awareness of the primitive characters and world views of the leaderships setting the standards of our current society of nations; were it were not so.

Obama's counterfeit of Article 25 does proclaim falsely that legal obligation arises from Security Council decisions – and not from the controlling law of the _Charter of the United Nations_ and (in this case) the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty – when the Security Council determines there is no need for these to be adhered to.

The words "... _in accordance with the present Charter_ " are not found in Obama's counterfeit of Article 25.

Obama's counterfeit leads to his provisions arising out of it. One of those provisions declares that Iran may be excluded from the obligations of treaty when the Security Council says it may, as follows:

Security Council Resolution 2231;

[section] Other Matters

27. [the Security Council]... Decides that all provisions contained in the JCPOA **are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran** and **should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State** or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices;

Iran may now, at Obama's whim, enjoy all the benefits of international assistance in developing its nuclear weapons capacity regardless of what treaty attempts to restrain.

Obama's insistence on the primacy of United Nations Security Council decisions effectively, under international law, puts United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 out of business on the spot:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 2. INVALIDITY OF TREATIES

Article 53. Treaties Conflicting With a Peremptory Norm of General International Law ("Jus Cogens")

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

And if one likes, one can review the definition of a treaty:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

* PART I. INTRODUCTION

_Article 2._ Use of Terms

1. For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and **governed by international law** , whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation;

Obama insists that the Security Council is allowed to suspend or do away with treaty at will. The perversity and menace to world peace imposed by the provisions of Resolution 2231 which are designed to assist in the advancement of nuclear weapons development in one uniquely favored non-nuclear-weapons-State. Those along with Obama's implicit declaration that his product supersedes international law and treaty will, if this goes to Court, shut the whole project down with the Cure ensuing:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVALIDITY, TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF A TREATY

Article 71. Consequences of the Invalidity of a Treaty which Conflicts with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law

1. In the case of a treaty which is void under article 53 [above] the parties shall:

(a) Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law; and.

(b) Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

The Court would then interpret how, and determine and Order what actions would be required to be carried out, both by the Security Council and the Parties most directly responsible.

TRUMP INSISTS he doesn't like Previous President Obama's deal with Iran. Good; he should thereby stop being so timid and begin readying the troops to defend the Constitution and international law – hopefully by also mustering an international alliance of States all eager to defend their rights, alongside the United States, in petition before the International Court of Justice.

* * * * *
Our Permanent Date with the Court

– Chapter 10 –

Contraband Arms Dealing in Perpetuity

As brought up on occasion in this writing, both populations of the Democratic and Republican membership of the 114th, 115th and 116th Congresses over the past four years since July 2015; have refused to utter a whisper pertaining to the contraband arms dealing measures promised and provided for in Obama's United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

It doesn't come then as an unexpected shock; that over the last four years; nobody managed to find a bit of a break anywhere in the quiet conversation to bring up that point about how there's no scheduled cut-off date for selling Iran nuclear weapons associated assets (in violation of treaty) including the latest improvements and upgrades on nuclear weapons technologies as soon as these are developed and polished to a shine.

That's Correct! There's no one there with a stop watch ready to say: "Okay, that's enough, time's up – you've got plenty of goodies now Mr. and Mrs. Iran; you can make it on your own from here on in; just go back home and study the stuff thoroughly; and backwards engineer everything yet another time, and send us a nice card every now and then to let us know how you're doing."

Under a limitless sky, when does the Government of Iran decide it has enough stuff to go ahead and make its move? Nobody knows.

It was originally settled between Obama and the Ministers of the Government of Iran and the other Parties to the agreement that those contraband weapons sales carried on in violation of treaty were to be carried on in perpetuity;

And that Iran, and every other Party working with Iran in this area, is effectively immune from any obligation under the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ in perpetuity because the arrangement made between them has arranged it;

And the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ is in perpetuity to be put down in regarding the agreement. The Resolution 2231 arrangement is now to supersede the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, this because the direct Parties to the arrangement say so. The justification for all this mischief is simple – as Barack Obama was happy to counterfeit it:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Underscoring that Member States _are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions_...

We proceed to examine how the ingenious Security Council Resolution 2231 plan is laid out:

* * * * *

UNSCR (United Nations Security Council Resolution) _Termination Day_ is scheduled to take place ten years after JCPOA _Adoption Day_ – which was 18 October 2015. On Termination Day, as Resolution 2231 puts it: "... _the UN Security Council would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue_." The upshot of this is that all projects described in Resolution 2231 Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which have been scheduled as ongoing will be carried on with in perpetuity. The following text of the resolution explains the matter:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex – Annex V

E. UNSCR Termination Day

23. UNSCR (UN Security Council resolution) Termination Day will occur in accordance with the terms of the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA, which is 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated.

24. On UNSCR Termination Day, the provisions and measures imposed in that resolution would terminate and the UN Security Council would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue.

F. Other

26. The terminations described in this Annex V are **without prejudice** to other JCPOA commitments **that would continue beyond such termination dates**.

" _Without prejudice to other JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates_ ," stipulates the perpetual nature of the "commitments." This means that if some commitments are not ended on Termination Day, those are scheduled to go on forever.

* * * * *

Maintaining sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets in perpetuity, and maintaining support services regarding these assets in perpetuity is described in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council Resolution _2231 Annex B: Statement_ (One of the areas of Resolution 2231 His Royal Chief of Censorship Obama prevented Congress from reviewing:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex B: Statement

2. [first clause] All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and **INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2** (or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;

(b) the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above...

As explained, INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 highlighted above (and the later version, INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2) is the list of nuclear weapons assets the IAEA cautions against distributing when there is a risk "... _for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or... when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons_..."

Fuller control (without any need for advance approval from the Procurement Working Group) of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed components necessary for the manufacture of detonation systems for fissile nuclear warheads – and the other things – is handed off to Iran on JCPOA Termination Day, October 18, 2025 – as stipulated in the final clause of paragraph 2, Annex B.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex B: Statement

[final clause of paragraph 2]

This paragraph [Paragraph 2 entire] shall apply until the date ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, except if the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion before that date, then the requirement to obtain approval in advance by the Security Council shall be suspended immediately and, beginning on the date of this suspension, the exceptions provided for in this paragraph shall continue to apply and all States may participate in and permit the activities set forth in this paragraph if they notify the Security Council and the Joint Commission at least ten working days in advance of each such activity on a case-by-case basis.

After ten years, no Joint Commission or Security Council approval is necessary – only notification. In any event, the Security Council is "no longer seized of the matter." and this becomes an issue only for the Joint Commission (France Germany, Russia, The U.K., China, and Iran),

The prohibition regarding IAEA inspections remains unaltered – the Procurement Working Group remains in place to see to that. And there is no stipulation that the International Atomic Energy Agency may now be informed of what is being sold Iran, where it is stowed, and what it is being used for. There is no provision de-restricting IAEA inspections. The situation is fixed and perpetual.

* * * * *

The current Leadership; the Ruling Franchise of the Democratic Party; has got to be one of the most bizarrely conceived of, desperately crazed opportunist political movements this country has ever produced.

Knowing full well that the vast majority of Americans would never knowingly tolerate a program designed to furnish, in perpetuity no less, the Theocracy of Iran or any other nation with the latest U.S. developments in nuclear weapons technologies, goods, and support services; they challenge all reason and pervert any morality that any of these people might once have shared with humanity by choosing to serve the short term domestic weapons profiteering interests held by a few powerful domestic entities.

The Ruling Franchise of the Democratic Party knows that the credibility of the false claims they've been spreading over the last four years are quickly running out of steam as more and more citizens become aware of the extent of the scam – but they persist in squawking endlessly on about how Obama's cherished agreement " _verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb_ ;" whereas it allows Iran to acquire at a price the latest in Weapons of Mass Destruction contraband technology, goods and services in perpetuity.

The Ruling Franchise Candidates set to run for President in 2020 want to make it their contribution that the White House be converted, at least for the duration of the next tenure, into a refuge affording sanctuary to their ambition that the United States jump back into this ongoing international arms dealing scam; and to turn the White House into a formidable propaganda platform promoting this "deal" which provides for limitless, forever ongoing assistance to Iranian weapons development goals in permanent violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_.

IN QUICK SUMMARY: On the international level, the world is being remade to accommodate this international agreement which extends, to Iran only, the swindlers' pledge that Iran is forever to be given access to what has been discussed.

The Democrats' Ruling Franchise wants back into the White House so that at least U.S. weapons sanctions can be dropped and U.S. arms dealing interests may be further served.

Whether the U.S. is participating or not – the sales to Iran of nuclear weapons assets in violation of treaty has been approved by the Security Council is to be carried on in perpetuity;

The Ruling Franchise will never initiate a case to be brought before the International Court of Justice petitioning for justice and correction. Instead they will waste more time serving the malfeasant, amoral aspirations of the racketeers, if they can.

On the international level, and despite any expected obstructionism from the Democrats' entrenched Ruling Franchise leadership, this challenge to international law – that the Security Council has any authority at all to establish a perpetual system of contraband weapons distribution in perpetual violation of international treaty and international law; this has got to go to the Court and get cleaned up.

* * * * *

Our Permanent Date with the Court

– Chapter 11 –

Ignoring the Existence of the Court into Oblivion

One might, from time to time, bring oneself to contemplate the marveling question: "What would become of the world – what would the world be like if there were no International Court of Justice?" But why ask? – We may look around and witness, we are in the process of living the transition to that right now.

The Court does not come to us – we petition the Court – or are brought before it.

In this case, in the case of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 – no discussion of recourse to international law has ever been entered into by any in either the 114th; 115th; or 116th Congress; no thought of recourse to judicial interpretation in the resolution of questions is known to have darkened the brow of any in the United States Legislature. The situation, of course, is the logical result of the imbecile policy of idiot self-serving politicians universally pretending there is nothing wrong when they know that they are in large part responsible for what is in the escalating process of going very wrong.

For current the culture of United States Government; and especially that of the Congress; the International Court of Justice virtually does not exist. It is hardly mentioned – and not in the context of the Obama dream deal insofar as I have found. And further, mention of recourse to international law (which no one over there in Congress demonstrates any knowledge of anyway) never occurs. It would perhaps be, in this culture, a political embarrassment to even bring up that there may be a need to petition the Court for recourse in a dispute. .

I refer to some writings of early United States Supreme Court Justice Mr. Joseph Story on the importance of the Judiciary. These are lent from his 1833 volume "Commentaries on the Constitution:"

* * * * *

This following excerpt is from Chapter XVIII, _Judiciary – Organization and Power_ :

§ 818 Where there is no judicial department to interpret, pronounce, and execute the law, to decide controversies, and to enforce rights, the government must either perish by its own imbecility, or the other departments of government must usurp powers, for the purpose of commanding obedience, to the destruction of liberty. The will of those, who govern, will, under such circumstances, become absolute and despotic ; and it is wholly immaterial, whether power is vested in a single tyrant, or in an assembly of tyrants. No remark is better founded in human experience, than that of Montesquieu, that " _there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive powers_." And it is no less true, that personal security and private property rest entirely upon the wisdom, the stability, and the integrity of the courts of justice.

If that government can be truly said to be despotic and intolerable, in which the law is vague and uncertain, it cannot but be rendered still more oppressive and more mischievous, when the actual administration of justice is dependent upon caprice, or favour, upon the will of rulers, or the influence of popularity.

When power [in itself] becomes right, it is of little consequence, whether decisions rest upon corruption, or weakness, upon the accidents of chance, or upon deliberate wrong.

In every well organized government, therefore, with reference to the security both of public rights and private rights, it is indispensable, that there should be a judicial department to ascertain, and decide rights, to punish crimes, to administer justice, and to protect the innocent from injury and usurpation.

IN OUR Paleolithic World where the very existence of the Court is ignored into oblivion;

In Our World, advantaged with all the accoutrements and advancements of the Modern Age, and yet where the purpose of having Court or Law seems too obscure to manage entry into our thoughts;

It is in this Our World of the Forgotten Court that the anointed fetishist symbol, messianic Barack Obama, arose to stride upon the world stage pronouncing his message that anything the Security Council decides, the rest of the world need accept and carry out. And naturally what follows from that is the contraband arms racketeering being carried out internationally.

Under Barack Obama's totalitarian re-writing of United Nations Security Council Article 25 – the U.N. Member States are at the mercy of whatever whim the Security Council decides to broadcast to the nations of the world; such as the edict designating Iran as the sole, unique State which will forevermore be entitled to the exclusive privilege of violating the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty; and shall be forever entitled, in perpetuity, to be sold the latest upgrades in nuclear weapons technology the Government of that State will decide to buy from whomever from time to time – (all of this as defined, documented and determined in the text of Resolution 2231).

Barack Obama's central edict in Resolution 2231; that edict being Obama's counterfeit rewriting of United Nations Security Council Article 25;

Barack Obama's central edict – from which phony justification for all commands following ensue; this edict, when viewed with a sense of an International Court of Justice enthusiastically supported by nations world wide, would seem preposterously megalomaniacal given that Obama's little intimidation would be thrown out immediately upon the almost automatic petition, by multiple deeply insulted nations, to Court.

But in Our Paleolithic World – a world where the existence of the Court is often not even considered, or where the International Court of Justice may be often thought of as some sort of inexplicable bureaucratic appendage to the United Nations – Barack Obama did make the most preposterous totalitarian claim to an authority never be granted. He took that claimed authority and used it to grant Iran its singular perpetual Charter that Iran, and only may buy at price forevermore the latest upgrades in nuclear weapons technologies, goods, support services etc.; all while preventing IAEA inspection of any aspect of this for purposes of verifying that none of the acquisitions are being diverted towards development of nuclear weapons; and all of this in violation of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Court does not solicit petition; it will not send out an Agent to President Donald Trump and confront the President while he might be relaxing on his easy recliner lawn chair; and talk the situation over with him.

So the Agent from the Court isn't going to show up; and that arms deal isn't going away of its own accord. The arms deal is a charter that's thought to have been made to last into forever; and it's expected to keep that big weapons money rollin' in for some, for some time to come. The only way to get rid of that predatory ghoul is by taking it to Court where it will be determined void and null.

* * * * *

Our Permanent Date with the Court

– Chapter 12 –

Obama's Three Phony Pillars of Power

Obama's Central Phony Pillar of Power, that the Security Council may decree anything and have its edict necessarily be accepted and carried out – as though the Charter of the United Nations were a medieval junket nation ruled by the Oligarchy of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council;

That singular outright fraud is central in upholding Obama's decrees, and central to all else; the assistance to Iran in acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction associated goods, support services and technologies in violation of the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ ; the prohibition on International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of any of these acquisitions, inspections to be made with a view that these acquisitions will not be diverted to the development of nuclear weapons capacity; and the various other things already discoursed – all of these malevolent programs arise from the fraud of Obama's Central Phony Pillar of Power.

The Court will find intolerable this egregious totalitarian usurpation of authority undertaken by tin plated despot Barack Obama and the other corrupted Leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council; this power grab so clearly designed to put the Charter of the United Nations under the Control of those five permanent Members of the Security Council.

REVIEWING now, succinctly in a peanut shell; the effective meanings of all three of the Phony Pillars of Power invented by Mr. Barack Obama in the flesh:

**First** : That all States must accept and do whatever the Security Council decides upon.

**Second** : That the Security Council has the authority to declare a treaty null either in its entirety or in a few peculiar aspects;

Arising from that; the Security Council has the power to and can decree that States may be allowed, or compelled, to violate treaty in the case of arming the non-nuclear-weapons-State of Iran with Weapons of Mass Destruction associated support services, technologies and goods while securing these from IAEA inspection.

**Third** : The Security Council authorizes itself with the power to carry out actions in violation of treaty; and as these are to be carried out by the Security Council, they are automatically considered valid; and even as they are authorized to be carried on with into perpetuity; any previous treaty or international understanding or international law notwithstanding.

* * * * *

The Ruling Franchise, having made clear the Democratic Party position in their 2020 Elections Campaign Platform; have embarked their throng of 2020 Candidates on the Quest to pursue the path of Obama's Three Pillars of Phony Power. The Ruling Franchise of the Democratic Party, and the various Candidates for the Presidency, all want to drag the United States Citizen back into this poisoned weapons profiteering campaign suiting their inclination to serve the interests of those who would gain from sales to Iran of the prohibited technologies, support services and goods;

The Hawk Democratic Party would never bring Resolution 2231 to Court in petition to have it declared void. The Democratic Party is the Party most aggressively in favor of the international swindle which is intended to go on forever.

* * * * *

**Summarizing the approach of the Ruling Franchise for 2020** :

The Democratic Party carries on with a fundamentally warped approach from the beginning. The Democratic Party recognizes the expediency of an agreement having been made as superseding the supremacy of the law. Recalling the words of Jim Costa of California:

".... In addition to Iran, we negotiated the Iran nuclear agreement with the United Kingdom, Germany, European Union, China, and Russia, and we must keep our word. In other words, to remain credible, the United States cannot change positions on international agreements from one administration to another without serious justification and without the consent in working with our allies."

Primitive Jimmy and the others are intentionally ignoring that the United States is already invested in the superseding international treaty, the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, signed on to by many more nations than just the few Jimmy mentions above – and Jimmy would of course never mention that his favored agreement aggressively violates the superseding treaty, the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, over and over again. And Jimmy and the others fail to mention that the good-buddies entered into Obama's Iran nuclear Deal (including Iran); all the good-buddies bent on violating the treaty, are all signatories to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty as well.

Jimmy and the Democrats adhere to the totalitarian ideology that obligation arises from whatever expedient agreement is arrived at; not from the legal obligations originating in the rule of law that controls and supersedes the agreement. Jimmy doesn't give the law controlling his agreement, the _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , a thought. He just lets his mouth run making it easier for others to follow suit.

The approach of the Ruling Franchise is the same as that of any bunch of cheap swindlers: "We made a deal, we know it's illegal, and screw the law because the law won't let us have what we want; which is to profit from selling Iran contraband weapons and associated assets in our own special way and in perpetuity." The Democratic Party swindlers; like cheap crooks everywhere, stick to the rules of their own agreement – not to the rule of law.

The Ruling Franchise of the Democratic Party proves this clique of politicians to be a completely out-of-ideas political movement. They've got nothing to promote themselves with come election time but the fiction that the Iran nuclear deal will permanently prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capacity.

So that the public charade should successfully continue, no one in the Party must ever mention the ongoing sales to Iran of nuclear weapon associated assets undertaken under their favored agreement; and certainly no on in the Party must ever mention that it has been arranged that these weapons sales to Iran are designed to be carried on with in perpetuity.

The Party Line charade can certainly be construed as earning the Democratic Party the support of powerful domestic weapons profiteering interests which had been frustrated by President Trump's disruption of Barack Obama's arrangement with Iran – and that is a strong incentive for the Ruling Franchise to field Candidates pledged to jump the United States back into the arms race already underway in the middle east.

The Ruling Franchise of the Democratic Party asserts that it has the interests of "our Gulf Partners' at heart; and that it will "... _ensure that Israel always has the ability to defend itself_...;" assertions such as these must be explained in the face of the Democratic Party commitment to assisting Iran in developing and furthering its nuclear weapons capacity in perpetuity.

Claims by the Democrats, such that the Party will "... _ensure that Israel always has the ability to defend itself_...;" are really only made to gain hoodwinked votes from targeted segments of the U.S. population.

As is known world-wide, the Government of Iran repeatedly pledges the waging of war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances, particularly against Israel. The Democratic Party seeks to participate in this known plan by assisting Iran in its acquisitions of nuclear weapons capacity. This would re-involve the U.S. Government in the internationally codified War Crime – _Crimes against Peace_ ; reviewing:

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) **Crimes against Peace**. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, **preparation** , initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, **or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing**.

The mendacious Democratic Party platform proves the incumbent membership populating the Party shares in the amorality of the War Criminal in its approval of the perpetual pact Obama agreed to with Iran.

They know they aren't ensuring Israel's (or any other nations' safety) by approving and seeking to re-enter into this perpetual pact with Iran. They are clearly opting to gain someone profit by participating by assisting Iranian pledged waging of war of aggression in violation of treaty or international assurances.

These people show themselves to be professional, habitual liars compelled by Party loyalty to deceive the public unendingly along the lines of their policies; they're not very smart; they ignore international norms and have no respect for international law and treaty;

And yet these insular myopic and jingoistic Candidates presume that they should be considered capable of parleying on the international level with any of the sophisticated leaderships of China, Russia, or Iran – all of which out-class these oblivious half-wits by dimensions.

* * * * *

It really is for the American People, if we can; if Trump will be budged towards reason; it is for us to strenuously implore the President to take this travesty to Court as now is the best time to prevail in the effort.

It is deeply unjust that the posturings of opportunistic party politicians should force the People of the United States to live in a nation where the American Citizen is reduced to being the indirect tax serf of the Government of Iran

Thomas Paine writes in _Common Sense_ ; First Chapter; _Of the Origin and Design of Government in General, with Concise Remarks on the English Constitution_ :

"...when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by a government, which we might expect in a country without government, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer."

With a pro-nuclear weapons proliferation Party Candidate elected President in 2020 – we become the tax-paying cogs who are to be forced to support Democratic Party policies promoting Iran's weapons development ambitions.

We shouldn't be forced to have to live out our short spans on this good earth as the miserable playthings of the powerful Weapons Profiteering interests.

We should be allowed to have a life of our own to enjoy, free from the menace, duress and the pressure of the threats to national security and world peace instigated by, and now attempting to be perpetuated by the Democratic Party initiative; Resolution 2231.

The Peoples of the world deserve to have a life of their own to enjoy, to seek what happiness may be found, to live free from the menace, duress and the pressure of the threats to world peace instigated by Obama's Resolution 2231.

The Democratic Party would place the Peoples of the Gulf States; Saudi Arabia and the others targeted by Iran; in perpetual danger and under perpetual duress knowing that it is the United States Government which is perpetually committed to assisting nearby hostile Iran in its ongoing development of nuclear weapons capacity – and it would be the U.S. Government that would also be committed to the upgrading of that capability in perpetuity.

The Democratic Party, which publicity-wise assumes a proprietary, patronizing role as being some sort of protector of Israel; this Democratic Party would place the Peoples of Israel in perpetual danger and under perpetual duress knowing that it is the back-stabbing United States Government which is perpetually committed to assisting nearby hostile Iran in its ongoing development of nuclear weapons capacity – and the upgrading of that capability in perpetuity.

* * * * *

Donald Trump must be reminded of the existence of the Court; which is the only venue and Authority which can peaceably put a stop to this spawning escalation.

And President Trump must be reminded of his Oath to: "... _preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States_." In this case not on the battlefield with force of Arms;

...But by force of Reason responding to the American Peoples' yearning for justice. Donald Trump must assemble his team to petition the International Court of Justice for remedy and correction; for the voiding and nullification of Resolution 2231 and all of which this consequentially entails.

If Donald Trump chooses to sit around moping about it throughout the rest of his tenure, as he has been doing thus far – then he will be known as a timid President who couldn't do better than to let the People down. He will have been the indecisive President who let the Nation down, who let the World down, who let Humanity down.

Trump has every good opportunity and every advantage of law, justice and natural reason on his side. His neglect of the issue would be inexcusable and unforgivable.

* * * * *
Our Permanent Date with the Court

– Chapter 13 –

Mining Sites, Milling Sites; and Other Non-Inspected Areas

This chapter examines how it was worked out in the agreement that Iran gets its bomb, necessarily in violation of treaty, but nevertheless with the permission of those Parties to the original arrangement.

* * * * *

Not everything carried out, or not carried out, or prohibited from being carried out under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 is in violation of treaty.

There has been no International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of any Iranian mining or milling site in Iran since May of 2014 – before the Security Council resolution was voted on – but, much to many peoples' possible surprise, that does not violate the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not control inspections of mining or milling sites.

There is nothing illegal about the terms Iran and Obama agreed upon regarding inspection or non-inspection of mines, milling – or even conversion operations; nothing illegal that anyone is going to find – I don't doubt;

And it should come as no surprise that the IAEA isn't spending any time directly inspecting mining or milling facilities. From 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency had been faced, from the Iranian Government, with increasing hostility to, and lack of cooperation with IAEA inspection and verifications measures.

The express lack of cooperation was reiterated many times over in ongoing IAEA Board of Governors Reports. These reports of the Board of Governors eventually resulted in actions taken by the Board of Governors.

The Board of Governors passed a series of resolutions over the years that were sent up to the Security Council to try and elicit some sort of response from the Security Council. Here is the list of Board of Governors Resolutions resulting from general Iranian ongoing obstruction of IAEA inspection and verification efforts:

GOV/2004/49 Date: 18 June 2004: • GOV/2004/79 Date: 18 Sept. 2004; • GOV/2004/90 Date: 29 Nov. 2004; • GOV/2005/64 Date: 11 Aug. 2005; • GOV/2005/77 Date: 24 Sept. 2005; • GOV/2006/14 Date: 4 Feb. 2006; • GOV/2009/82 Date: 27 Nov. 2009; • GOV/2011/69 Date: 18 Nov. 2011; • GOV/2012/50 Date: 13 Sept. 2012

And those reports resulted in the Security Council resolutions which brought the sanctions against Iran which finally led up to the Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010):

1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010)

It appears, that at the time of Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), Iran's two most powerful friends, Russia and China, had also become fed-up with Iranian unruly intransigence. These two nations both decided, for whatever their own reasons, to join in on .weapons embargoes against Iran – thus putting Iran under greater pressure. Iran, faced with losing its last two powerful friends, although remaining defiant, did ultimately soften and send out feelers that there might be something to discuss and straighten out in this misunderstanding after all.

The thing that might have proven most alarming to Iran is that United Nations Security Council 1929 (2010) decreed, with Russia and China terrifyingly joining in; the following:

United Nations Security Council resolution 1929 (2010)

8. Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) ("the Committee"), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities; [39]

This might be in large part what finally brought Iran to the negotiating table.

Although the Security Council supported the IAEA at that time, the policies of the Council have noticeably changed since commencement of the Obama era.

The Security Council has shown, in Resolution 2231; that it is willing to violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in various ways, already noted – and specifically by prohibiting IAEA inspections of Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed items.

* * * * *

It is essential to note; that the IAEA / Iran Safeguards Agreement precludes, under its Article 33, IAEA investigations of Iranian mining or mill (Uranium Ore Concentrate) operations and sites:

Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards In Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Starting Point of Safeguards

Article 33

Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing activities.

With that declaration in mind; it becomes clear as to why there is no mention, in any part of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, of any mining or milling site in Iran.

It is completely implausible for a document which is purported to refer to guaranteed independent party inspections of mining and milling sites in Iran – it is entirely implausible that such a guarantee of inspection would never even identify, or indicate, the sites to be inspected. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 never even mentions a word about any mining or milling sites in Iran – not a word.

Best evidence, from the text of the Resolution 2223 and the Safeguards Agreement, is that it had been agreed that investigation of mining and milling sites was not included in the arrangement between the Ministers of Iran and Barack Obama, along with the remainder of the E3/EU+3 syndicate.

* * * * *

Before examining further; it is essential to understand the difference between application of the "Provisional" IAEA Additional Protocol; and acceptance, or ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol itself.

The IAEA Additional Protocol is a legally binding document, by which Iran contracts with the other Parties to the multilaterally signed _Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons_ , to guarantee that Iran will promise to perform on certain aspects of IAEA inspection routines.

The "Provisional" application of the Additional Protocol asserts that Iranian compliance to the Additional Protocol is strictly voluntary, entirely at the discretion of Iran.

Reviewing the _Vienna Convention on the law of treaties_ to get a better sense of the difference between being bound by agreement – and not being bound by agreement:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART III. OBSERVANCE, APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 1. OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES

_Article 26_. "PACTA SUNT SERVANDA"

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART I. INTRODUCTION

_Article 2_. USE OF TERMS

1. For the purposes of the present Convention:

(b) "Ratification", "acceptance", "approval" and "accession" mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty;

Bearing in mind the concept of being bound by agreement, by consent – the following from the standard IAEA Additional Protocol describes how the protocol can be enforce-ably, or nominally, be brought into play:

MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article 17

a. This Protocol shall enter into force

on the date on which the Agency receives from .......... [Iran] written notification that ..........'s [Iran's] statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met.

OR

upon signature by the representatives of .......... [Iran] and the Agency.

The conditions upon which the Additional Protocol can justifiably be internationally considered as having the signatory's consent to be bound by the agreement of the Additional Protocol are enumerated in the above bullet point "a."

This following bullet point "b." describes how the non-signatory, although not internationally recognized as consenting to being bound by the Additional Protocol; nevertheless agrees to acknowledge it, and comply with it nominally on a completely voluntary basis when it chooses to do so:

b. .......... [Iran, the signatory] may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that it will apply this Protocol provisionally.

In "b." the signatory does not refuse to accept the Additional Protocol outright. The signatory reserves the right to agree to comply with the protocol's directives voluntarily as the signatory sees fit. The signatory does not give consent to ultimately be bound by the Additional Protocol.

Examining the Diplomatic Language of the IAEA Board of Governors' Reports on inspections of the Iranian Nuclear Project; one finds the phrase "Iran _continues to_ _provisionally apply_ _the Additional Protocol_..." constantly reappearing. For example:

**IAEA Board of Governors: (** Report **) GOV/2017/35 –** Derestricted 13 September 2017

E. Other Relevant Information

24. **Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol** to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, [listed above] pending its entry into force. The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran's declarations under the Additional Protocol and to conduct **complementary accesses** under the Additional Protocol to sites and other locations in Iran.

An appreciation of the established legal definition of binding and non-binding is necessary to understanding what is meant by the above diplomatic phrase in the IAEA Report, paragraph 24; section _E. Other Relevant Information_ ; the phrase declaring that: " _Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol_..." That phrase establishes that Iran has continued to voluntarily, as a courtesy, allow the IAEA some inspections of the Iran nuclear program.

Consensual, binding acceptance of the IAEA Additional Protocol would, for Iran, would mean this for example:

MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS

Article 5

.......... [Iran, the Signatory] shall provide the Agency with access to:

a. (i) Any place on a site; [a nuclear project associated site]

Currently the Safeguards Agreement, by Article 33, excludes the IAEA from inspecting mining or milling operations without Iranian consent. Obviously, Iranian consent to be bound to the Additional Protocol would necessarily mean that mining and milling sites would be opened up for IAEA inspection.

* * * * *

The Terms of the Arrangement between Barack Obama, the Ministers of Iran, and the remainder of the E3/EU+3 Cartel syndicate (Russia, the U.K., China, Germany and France) were announced to the world on 20 July 2015 via United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

The terms of the agreement stipulated that Iran would not even consider being consensually bound by the Additional Protocol until eight years after the resolution had been adopted (JCPOA Adoption Day). Resolution 2231 establishes that Iran will only submit the resolution to the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) for consideration of ratification eight years after JCPOA Adoption Day. Until that time – Iran allowed that it could refuse to even review the Additional Protocol as a first step in consenting to be internationally bound by the decrees of the Additional Protocol. This is clearly stipulated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

[paragraph 34] iv. Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day.... On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, **ratification of the Additional Protocol**.

At that time, _8 years after Adoption Day_ , which turns out to be 18 October 2023; per the agreement between the Barack Obama, Ministers of Iran, et al coalition; at that time the Ruling Class of Iran, condescends to formally allow this independent Iranian Parliament, the Majlis, to take its time to review the issue of whether Iran wants to be consensually bound to the constraints imposed by the Additional Protocol.

Nowhere in the agreement is Iran forced to make a commitment that it must ever be consensually bound to the constraints imposed by the Additional Protocol. Iran gets its nuclear weapons associated assets whether it ratifies the Additional protocol or not. That is the arrangement.

A REVIEW of what an IAEA Report, which speaks about what even a cursory IAEA inspection of a mine site or milling operation looks like:

**IAEA Board of Governors: (** Report **) GOV/INF/2014/6 – 20 March 2014 – Derestricted** 10 September 2015

2. The Agency confirms that since 20 January 2014, Iran has:

xi. provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine;

**IAEA Board of Governors: (** Report **) GOV/INF/2014/29 – 19 December 2014 –** Derestricted 10 September 2015

2. The Agency confirms that since 20 January 2014, Iran has:

xi. provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine,(7) to the Saghand Uranium Mine (8) and the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant;(9);

The footnotes above, noted in the original IAEA documents as numbers in parentheses, stipulate in the original document the dates on which "managed access" was allowed the IAEA by Iran.

Visits to the uranium mine and mill site at Gchine (7) was allowed on 29 January 2014; to the Saghand Uranium Mine (8); on 6 May 2014; and to the Uranium Production Plant(9), on 7 May 2014.

As an interesting aside, it's worth noticing that these two reports; one being internally published on 20 March 2014, the other being internally published on 19 December 2014; were both derestricted on 10 September 2015 – which happened, by coincidence to be the exact date of the vote in the Senate on whether or not to give the JCPOA a vote of confidence.

That is rather odd, it usually only takes a few weeks to de-restrict a Board of Governors Report – what was the extraordinary hold-up this time around? Following is the proof of the dates of publication:

As observed, of the 13 nations voting on the Board of Governors, six are Parties to the formulation of Resolution 2231, and five of those six are the five permanent members of the Security Council. Two of the nations, Australia and Canada, although ostensibly independent – are members of the United Kingdom Commonwealth – which gives nations voting in favor the Security Council resolution an automatic majority on the IAEA Board of Governors.

That there could have been some nutty undue influence in holding out on very routine reporting is quite conceivable; but to what end? Of course those two reports, so long held back, were finally published only on exactly the day the U.S. Senate was to take its vote on the JCPOA – but why withhold?

It simply doesn't make sense; Congressional proponents of Barack Obama's Iran Nuclear Deal;" which everyone in Congress thought at the time consisted only of the JCPOA, would want to argue that there were IAEA mining and milling site inspections being carried out in Iran – so why not let everyone know how well Iran was behaving? It doesn't matter trying to reason it out – it may be some sort of a symptom of Barack Obama's innate megalomaniacal paranoia that he just couldn't allow what should have been the perfectly innocent information to be released – or it may have already been decided that the IAEA wouldn't be coming in for any more inspections after those, which can be affirmed as being the case from the later Board of Governors Reports.

* * * * *

No need to get too sidetracked on the tempest in the teapot issue as to whether or not the IAEA has reported on having visited any mine or milling site since the United Nations Security Council acceptance of Resolution 2231. This writing suggests that the IAEA has presented no evidence that such visits had been carried out.

But since the issue would probably be considered immaterial to the Court, I won't dwell on it further here, This small section intends to give some technical information to the reader that is useful in understanding what is to come down the road:.

IT IS IMPORTANT to understand what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines as a facility; and what the IAEA defines "nuclear material" as. For example, neither a mining nor a milling operation is referred to as a facility. The word "Facility" is not an all-purpose word and cannot be associated with uranium ore mining or milling operations. The IAEA technical definition of "facilities" follows:

Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards In Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

DEFINITIONS

Article 98

For the purposes of this Agreement:

I. Facility means:

(a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or

(b) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.

"One effective kilogram" is also a technically defined term. For the purposes of clarity, let us begin to unravel the meaning of this by examining the term "effective kilogram" as written in sub-paragraph (b). The definition of the technical term "effective kilogram" is, for the purposes of the IAEA and Resolution 2231:

Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards In Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

DEFINITIONS

Article 98

For the purposes of this Agreement:

G. Effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material. The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking:

(a) For plutonium, its weight in kilograms;

(b) For uranium with an enrichment of 0. 01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;

(c) For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5% its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0. 0001; and.

(d) For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005

A mining or a milling operation is not defined as a "Facility" under the Safeguards Agreement because these operations only involve uranium that has not been enriched at all. The measurement Effective Kilogram is a measurement derived from uranium enriched to some level, or radioactive thorium, or plutonium – as is described in the above. Because these operations should not contain any enriched uranium, without the Additional Protocol, they are outside of IAEA inspection protocols. (If a mining or milling operation was declared as also being used to warehouse enriched uranium or the other radioactive elements; or if a mining or milling operation were to be found surreptitiously concealing storage of the like, then its status would automatically change and it would be subject to inspection.)

That is the logic behind Article 33 of the Safeguards Agreement which states: "Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing activities;" and as Paragraph 78 of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 states: "Principle nuclear facility" means a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of a nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating a nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant) or a facility or plant of such other type as may be designated by the Board from time to time, including associated storage facilities" (See [Endnote] for a fuller explanation.)

* * * * *

Under the JCPOA, Iran is allowed to stockpile 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67%. Any excess of the enriched Uranium may be "sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran." Or, Iran may have the choice to down blend excess UF6 enriched to 3.67% to natural uranium level. The following describes what may be done with the excess:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I - Nuclear-related measures

J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS

57. All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. Iran will enter into a commercial contract with an entity outside Iran for the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kg UF6 in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, where applicable, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. Iran may choose to seek to sell excess enriched uranium to the IAEA fuel bank in Kazakhstan when the fuel bank becomes operational.

The JCPOA also indicates that depleted UF6 streams coming off of Iran's work on its more advanced IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge cascades will be gathered and recombined " _through the use of welded pipe work on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of enriched and depleted uranium materials_ ," this would be verified by the IAEA. Presumably the uranium gathered in the welded pipe work would be under IAEA seal.

There are various other provisions around the use, or export, and commercial exchanges regarding enriched uranium and products that are very well-described in the JCPOA.

The JCPOA makes only the one reference, under the above mentioned paragraph 39, as to the disposition of depleted uranium. However, the IAEA / Iran Safeguards Agreement discusses depleted uranium further, and the Safeguards Agreement is binding on Iran. Under Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement the following nuclear material may be exempted from safeguards:

Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards In Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Exemptions From Safeguards

Article 37

At the request of the Government of Iran the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards, provided that the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempted in Iran in accordance with this Article may not at any time exceed:

(b) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium [UF6] and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0. 50/6);

(c) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium [UF6] with an enrichment of 0. 005 (0. 50/6) or below; and

(d) Twenty metric tons of thorium; or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application. [31]

Under the JCPOA it might be very problematic for the IAEA to accurately verify the amounts of natural (UF6) uranium. IAEA surveillance of the Iranian Esfahan uranium conversion plant is sketchy. There is only one reference, in the JCPOA, to the Esfahan uranium conversion plant, as follows:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I - Nuclear-related measures

O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)

68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period.

69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.

Regarding paragraph 68 above: it is difficult to determine what agreed measures the IAEA would like to take in order to monitor that all Iranian domestic yellow cake is being delivered to the Esfahan site since the IAEA has no on-site access to mining or milling operations and can never be sure of how much yellowcake is being produced from those sources. The IAEA only has Iran's records to review and is very much reliant on Iran's word for how much material is being extracted from the mines and how much Yellow Cake is obtained as the result of mining and milling operations.

And nowhere is there any mention of Iran agreeing to allow the IAEA continuous monitoring through electronic surveillance means, of the conversion process of the yellow cake into the final UF6 product. This lack of a monitored chain of custody could lead to a great deal of uncertainty as to the actual amount of un-enriched UF6 that is actually floating around in Iran.

* * * * *

I apologize to the reader if the previous material made the eyelids heavy – but I felt it necessary to give the reader some background for where we now are.

We are now in 2030, and this is when Iran is given implicit permission to make its own nuclear warheads.

IRAN may begin to trade in weapons grade plutonium, and weapons grade uranium in 2030.

Iran is allowed to fashion this material into any form it wants; with the IAEA naturally kept out of reviewing the end product of any forming, casting or machining of plutonium or uranium. This is how and where this JCPOA procedure is announced:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.

25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years...

The above restraint continues for fifteen years only; after that, anything is acceptable. There is no provision that, once Iran is allowed to acquire and work with the special fissional materials required to produce fissile nuclear weapons; there is no provision stipulating that Iran is restricted from forming or casting these materials into configurations favorable to creating a high yield fissile chain reaction explosion.

The special fissional materials under discussion here; highly enriched uranium, and plutonium (isotope forms of plutonium are not clarified in Resolution 2231; there is nothing in Resolution 2231 prohibiting use of weapons grade plutonium); these materials do fall in the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 category of inventories (as opposed to the Rev. 9 category of inventories), and we recall that INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 inventories are designated for use the production of nuclear energy. Therefore, one may assume that the IAEA does have reasonable knowledge of end-use, location and quantities of these materials allowed to float around Iran.

Article 57 of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and Iran places safeguards on nationwide quantities of plutonium over a total of 1kgm. Aside from that, there is this:

**Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards In Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [14]**

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Article 13

Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used in non-nuclear activities

Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the Government of Iran shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such material may be terminated.

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES

Article 14

If the Government of Iran intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) The Government of Iran shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:

(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the Government of Iran may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and

(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded material in Iran and of any export of such material; and

(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as, inter alia, temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval [of] or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.

UNDER ARTICLE 13 (above), we see that when safeguarded material is used in the production of [metallurgical] alloys, safeguards are terminated. Article 13 does not indicate any prejudice or controls concerning the precise composition of the alloys to be formed or cast; nor does it make any distinction as to the configuration in which these alloys are to be formed – once radioactive metals are cast or formed, they are hardly, any longer, subject to outside scrutiny.

Furthermore, under Article 14(c), IAEA approval of the activity regarding whatever it is that the alloys are to be used for is not required; and, the IAEA is not allowed any classified knowledge of nuclear related military activity that the alloys may be applied to.

However, as a concession from Iran, under 14(a)(ii), Iran concedes that "... _That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices_..."

Iran promises not to weaponize its uranium or plutonium metallurgical alloys while these are in the discrete and watchful custody of the Iranian military – _that_ is the reassurance that the Government of Iran offers the world.

* * * * *
Our Permanent Date with the Court

– Chapter 14 –

Brief Afterwards

It seems without a doubt that Obama's deal with the Ministers of Iran was intended from the beginning to assist in conferring to the Government of Iran nuclear weapons capacity, in exchange for securing the interests of domestic and international arms profiteering interests.

And now is is the time to take this to Court to have the Security Council resolution thrown out with things being put back in place so far as possible.

As things stand now, the Resolution 2231 provisions granting permission to assist Iran in its contraband weapons assets procurement continues indefinitely, as scheduled;

And if this thing is simply left hanging out there until 2030; then we will be living in a strange world where it is not really clear whether or not Iran believes it has implicit permission to begin testing or manufacturing nuclear warheads.

In the 2030 era – the international compact to assist Iran acquiring the latest in nuclear weapons technology should still be ongoing in its chartered perpetuity.

Since 16 January 2016 Iran has been given permission to engage in activities which could contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device:

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, **unless approved by the Joint Commission** for non-nuclear purposes and **subject to monitoring**.

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless **approved by the Joint Commission** for non-nuclear purposes and **subject to monitoring**.

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

The phrase "subject to monitoring" is decidedly vague. The Security Council resolution could easily have designated an outside Agency to monitor this activity. The resolution is intentionally silent on the matter – and naturally the Iranian nuclear agency in whatever capacity would monitor progress in the effort internally; that would seem to be without dispute.

So while Iran is left to monitor its own engagement in the activity; the extent of how far experimentation in this area may be engaged is also left unanswered.

In 2030, Iran, with the freedom to cast and form its weapons grade plutonium or uranium as it sees fit, and working with the systems allowed all that's left in the study then is to test the resulting product for efficacy.

The Iranian Government should have no trouble formulating a somewhat seemingly persuasive argument that Iran believed it had implicit permission to begin testing nuclear warheads (if permission even matters to Iran) given all of what's in Resolution 2231.

Nobody knows exactly how all this spins out. But why sit around waiting for this self-made catastrophe to fully form?

This whole thing has been in violation of treaty from the start, and this whole thing is bound to lead to growing fear and to escalation in the region – there are indications that it already is doing so somewhat.

It's the keg of nitroglycerin waiting to be jostled and blow; it is the potential for violence which can only be handled and suppressed by the Rule of Law.

Let's make the President take it to Court and get it shut down.

* * * * *

This ends the narrative of the writing. Appendices now follow:

* * * * *

Books by the Same Author: Jean-Marc LeBouquin

– Congress Jerks the General; The Citizen Too –

– Throw All the Bums Out Legal;  
Explanation of the National "Vote of No Confidence" Amendment –

– A Singular Charter in Perpetuity –

– Hoping or Better Swindler's Seats –

– U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking –

– A Vice President's Adventures in Letter –

– Smiling Vultue Ignites Escalation –

– What Do I Ask Myself on This Yom Hashoa?–
– Chapter 15 –  
Appendix 1 – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause

[]

What is allowed and what is not allowed as far as concerns IAEA Participation in review of nuclear related assets acquired by Iran is detailed in the JCPOA as follows:

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

6.4. Except as otherwise provided by the Joint Commission or the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:

6.4.1 Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA..:

As a concession to the IAEA, the Agency is informed as to the contents of a proposal when such proposal "... relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA...;" which, as it turns out, means when a proposal has nothing to do with nuclear weapons associated INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories.

6.1.6....When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.

A clearer sense of which meetings the IAEA is authorized to attend, as opposed to not authorized, begins to take on more defined shape upon a bit further examination of later provisions of paragraph six with its subs and sub-subs:

6.7. Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.

6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.

The IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1; unlike INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; refers to components and technologies associated specifically with nuclear energy production.

Sub paragraph 6.7 says the IAEA can hang around and check out the lay of the land – the end uses and end use locations of any goods and technology, any inventory, procured from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1.

When it comes to Iranian acquisitions from the prominent, nuclear weapons related inventories listed of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a, the IAEA is dropped from the picture; the Oligarchy authors of the arrangement leave out mention of anything about the IAEA being invited to drop in for inspection time.

It being the case therefore, that IAEA is explicitly not allowed in either to meetings, and is not explicitly granted authority to confirm end-use location of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories – one might ask if the IAEA is allowed to inspect this anyway.

Paragraph 26 of Resolution 2231 – Annex A: JCPOA – section SANCTIONS informs us of the following:

26. ...There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration... will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. **Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part**.

Any attempt to insist – after the fait accompli – that the IAEA suddenly should be given access to meetings relating to; or given applicable knowledge of end-use or end-use location whereabouts of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons related inventories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; anything like that could justifiably be understood as an attempt to sabotage the E3/EU+3 Iran arrangement effort by imposing a new nuclear related restriction, or restrictive measure.

Note: All participating Parties to the negotiation and concluded arrangement were united in their approval over what had been agreed upon.

It must also be noted that All Parties signatory to the NPT agree that it is the International Atomic Energy Agency that has the duty, the obligation, the responsibility and the mandate to verify that there is no "... diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," as follows under the first clause of Article III of the NPT – or to report otherwise:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...

* * * * *
– Chapter 16 –  
Appendix 2 – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"

[]; []; []

AS HAS BEEN presented in the various appendices, the International Atomic Energy Agency is to be kept from the knowledge of any contents of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies, or support services – and subsequently, any knowledge of end-use location, whereabouts, or end-use of such acquisitions.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 also asserts this in its _JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures_ :

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

A. General

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.

Nothing in Annex V mentioned in the paragraph _A – General; 1_ , mentioned above; indicates that the timeline for putting in to effect the very important Section T following below "... _has otherwise been specified_...;" therefore the following activities described under JCPOA Annex I; Section T have been permitted since JCPOA Implementation Day; 16 January 2016.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

The JCPOA has already indicated, in _JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission_ ; paragraph _6. Procurement Working Group_ ; sub-paragraph _6.8_ , that Iran has not given the IAEA permission to:... _verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2_...;"

The materials referred to above, in 825.2 through 82.4 e.g.: "...multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device...explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras)...;" neutron generating systems in application as: "... explosively driven neutron sources..." etc.; these are all INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories (see Appendix II [footnote]).

Again – the IAEA is not entitled to look into these per the JCPOA. The above paragraph 8, with subparagraphs, stipulates that these things will be monitored. The answer to the question of "by whom" is not within the scope of that paragraph. Paragraph 6.7 of Resolution 2231; Annex A: JCPOA; (sub-Annex of JCPOA) JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission; paragraph 6.8 gives us an idea:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6. Procurement Working Group

6.8 **Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2** (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, **the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification**.

The Security Council JCPOA Joint Commission asserts that it will provide expertise required for end-use verification. That's open ended it would seem. End-use verification can suggest that the monitoring and verification of the end-use of any Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories in the capacity detailed in paragraphs 82.2 through 82.4 listed above is to be conducted by the ad hoc committee set up by the Joint Commission – as much as the ad hoc committee set up by the Joint Commission feel like doing. It's pretty vague. Nevertheless:

This set-up bears witness of the intent by the Security Council to supersede treaty with vague promises. The Security Council asserts it will supersede treaty by preventing the IAEA from fulfilling its mandate to verify that INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories are not being diverted.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive **purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**...

Every signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT) has agreed that it will be the International Atomic Energy Agency which verifies there is no diversion of resources to a nuclear weapons development project. It is not for an ad-hoc committee of lackey functionaries, playing the role of foxes guarding the hen house, to say that everything is going just fine.

Any committee the Procurement Working Group sets up for "verification" is simply not recognized by treaty.

That having been mentioned, the Security Council proceeds to supplant the IAEA with its own ad hoc unrecognizable verifiers – those who are not recognized by the NPT treaty signed on to by a multitude of Nations.

* * * * *
– Chapter 17 –  
Appendix 3 – How (why) the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was renamed "S/2015/546

[];

Two days after the July 14th Vienna signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ms. Samantha Power, sent a Letter of Transmittal to the acting President of the United Nations Security Council, Mr. McCully of New Zealand. Ms. Power wrote: "The United States Mission to the United Nations requests that the attached Missile Technology Control Regime list (see Appendix 9 – Chapter 13, for an excerpt of that list [] be circulated as a document of the Security Council."

The letter was necessary as part of a gambit. Nobody needed the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex to be re-circulated through the Security Council. Such an action would represent a redundancy. The above list is a well known international document.

It would be like asking the Security Council to re-circulate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is perfectly alright to do so – but it would be sort of a waste of departmental secretaries' time.

The purpose of this seemingly trivial exercise was not necessarily to have the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex circulated. It was to get that Security Council document number appearing on that upper left hand corner of the page of the copied letter of transmittal. This document number was immediately used as a code word, avoiding the need to refer directly to the Annex by name within the text of Resolution 2231.

When it came time for Congress to debate United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; the use of the code word, which nobody in Congress did show any signs of thinking to wonder as to the meaning of or look into it; would initially obscure from the body of the Security Council: and, or from the Congress, or from the electorate, positive knowledge that certain classes of weapons were to be made available to Iran through the agreement – as is shown by the provision of Resolution 2231 presented below.

The Code Word was used once in Resolution 2231. It was needed for use in Annex B of the resolution, paragraph 4(a) below.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B. - Statement

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; and

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

The code word gambit would make it easier for the administration to hide its assistance to, and promotion of the Iranian expansions of its ballistic missile program and arsenals; while at the same time maintaining the pretence that the agreement authored by the Obama administration, was designed with every intention of retaining sanctions limiting Iranian weapons procurements – as opposed to allowing and promoting unheard of Iranian paying procurement of the latest in western weapons design style advanced achievement.

Annex B would never be transmitted to the Congress – nevertheless the code word was used in the Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B; paragraph 4(a).

The meaning of the code word has since become well-known in many quarters; although, even almost three years later, apparently not by our self-indulgent, indifferent 115th, or 116th Congress of the United States.

* * * * *
– Chapter 18 –  
Appendix 4 – IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a. and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2.

[]

Below is the Statement of purpose the International Atomic Energy Agency has declared concerning this INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list of inventories the Agency itself had put together:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013);

GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR-RELATED DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, SOFTWARE, AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY*

OBJECTIVE

1. With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, suppliers have had under consideration procedures in relation to the transfer of certain equipment, materials, software, and related technology that could make a major contribution to a "nuclear explosive activity," an "unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity" or acts of nuclear terrorism. In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common definitions, and an export control list of equipment, materials, software, and related technology. Suppliers intend to implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation and relevant international commitments.

And some of the Basic Principles are:

BASIC PRINCIPLE

2. Suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, materials, software, or related technology identified in the Annex:

– for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or

– in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or

– when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism.

*[ INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents \- or as an alternate https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]]

* * * * *

– Chapter 19 –  
Appendix 5 – Compounding the felony by bundling control over nuclear and ballistic missile weapons associated assets

[]

The activities undertaken under the Procurement Working Group mandate are in direct egregious violation of the very first, basic Article of the NPT.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and **not in any way to assist,** encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to **manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices** , or **control over such weapons or explosive devices**.

Article I declares: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer **to any recipient** whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or **control** over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to **assist**...etc."

To better understand how the dedicated bundling of nuclear and basslistic associated assets further compounds the felony; clarification of the intent of the meaning, the definition, of control over such weapons is necessary. This is found in the correspondence of the two nations authoring the NPT – the then Soviet Union, and the United States touched upon earlier in this writing.

On January 1, 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union presented a joint draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation to the United Nations Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee; thus confirming that earlier efforts at consolidating differing points of view were not simply intended as political grandstanding marked by competitive one-upmanship – as has been so often the case – rather, the sincere efforts at cooperation were evidently the product of seriously frightened parties motivated by a deeply felt desire to avoid a perceived inevitable disastrous and irreversible harm to humanity and to the planet that could result from a single act of negligence, error in judgment, or madness.

It is through the documentation of the discussions relating to the development of a mutually agreed upon terms between the Soviet Union and the United States that one learns of part of the intention and meaning of Articles I and II of the NPT, and the meaning of control of nuclear weapons. This writing mentions two documents that it feels may be helpful to clarify the aspects of the intentions of the NPT, and the interpretation of those first two articles.

Four question between the U.S. and NATO allies were reproduced in a then classified document titled: Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together with Answers Given by the United States. This document is comprised of a set of four questions with corresponding responses. The questions and answers outlined the United States' position on the first two proposed articles of the NPT. The document was considered classified at the time; these have since been declassified. The questions and answers contained therein were intended to be presented to the Soviet Union for correction or approval. These were presented on April 28, 1967 and met with no objection from the Soviet Union. The Questions and Answers follow:

Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty asked by U.S. Allies together with answers given by the United States.

1.Q. What may and what may not be transferred under the Draft Treaty?

A. The Treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted.

It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of "nuclear weapons" or control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosives devices because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use.

It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipients, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads.

2.Q. Does the Draft Treaty prohibit consultations and planning on Nuclear Defense among NATO Members?

A. It does not deal with allied consultation and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of Nuclear Weapons or control over them results.

3.Q. Does the Draft Treaty prohibit arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons owned or controlled by the United States within the territory of Non-Nuclear NATO members?

A. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer on nuclear weapons or control over them, unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the Treaty would no longer be controlling.

4.Q. Would the Draft prohibit the unification of Europe if a nuclear-weapon State was one of the Constituent States?

A. It does not deal with the problem of European Unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European State to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to been so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federate state, the Treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.

IN A LETTER, DATED APRIL 10, 1968 from Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, Mr. Katzenbach indicated that:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Before you go to The Hague for the Nuclear Planning Group meeting on April 18-19, I believe you should be familiar with the US interpretations of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regarding alliance arrangements for nuclear defense...

...The language of Articles I and II of the NPT was chosen in order to protect alliance consultations on nuclear defense as well as on nuclear defense deployment arrangements. These are not explicitly sanctioned by Articles I and II, since the USSR was not prepared to provide such an endorsement of NATO arrangements.

In Secretary Rusk's October 10, 1966 talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko, it was clearly understood that Articles I and II of the NPT deal only with what is prohibited and not what is permitted. Article I of the NPT prohibits the transfer of ownership or control of nuclear weapons (understood to mean warheads and bombs and not delivery vehicles). It does not mention alliance consultations or deployment arrangements not involving a transfer of nuclear weapons. We worked out interpretations on these and other aspects of Articles• I and II with our allies (and in particular the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany, the nation of then divided West Germany]) which were presented to the Soviets on April 28, 1967 in the form of answers to questions posed by our allies (Tab A). *****

***[** This letter and related correspondence can be found under: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964–1968 Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 232. Document 232 refers to the particular letter; Volume XI provides related items of interest. **]**

This excerpt from the April 10 letter confirms that Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko, and hence the Soviet government, understood the U.S. position as early as the end of April, 1967. As previously mentioned, on January 1, 1968 the United States and the Soviet Union presented a joint draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation to the United Nations Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. This Joint Draft between the US and the USSR (presented long after the April 28, 1967) supports that the Questions and Answers document presented to the Soviet Union was considered an appropriated interpretation of Articles I and II by both parties.

A facsimile of the full April 10, 1968 letter is reproduced on following pages for the readers' interest (the Addressee's name, Clark Clifford, is listed on the bottom of page 1). The reproduction of the Questions and Answers document follows. Both documents were considered sensitive at the time, but they have long since been declassified. And so, as unclassified government documents, they are in the public domain. These documents are presented following:

* * * * *
– Chapter 20 –  
Appendix 6 – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

[]; [];

This following is an excerpt – the complete list is found at: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents

Or as an alternate source: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

ANNEX CONTENTS

5. Test and Measurement Equipment for the Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices

5.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

5.B.1. Flash X-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators 5 – 1

5.B.2. High-velocity gun systems

5.B.3. High speed cameras and imaging devices

5.B.5. Specialized instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments

5.B.6. High-speed pulse generators

5.B.7. High explosive containment vessels

5.D. SOFTWARE

5.D.1. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment not controlled in Item 5.B.3. so that it meets or exceeds the characteristics specified in Item 5.B.3.

5.D.2. "Software" or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the performance characteristics of equipment controlled in Item 5.B.3.

5.E. TECHNOLOGY

5.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 5.A. through 5.D.

6. Components for Nuclear Explosive Devices

6.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

6.A.1. Detonators and multipoint initiation systems

6.A.2. Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulse generators

6.A.3. Switching devices

6.A.4. Pulse discharge capacitors

6.A.5. Neutron generator systems

6.A.6. Striplines

6.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

6.C. MATERIALS

6.C.1. High explosive substances or mixtures,

6.E. TECHNOLOGY 6 – 4

6.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development","production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software"

These are examples of some of the inventory found in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; but to understand a little of what is meant by the above we must look at some definitions:

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013) ;

DEFINITIONS

"Development" --

is related to all phases before "production" such as:

• design

• design research

• design analysis

• design concepts

• assembly and testing of prototypes

• pilot production schemes

• design data

• process of transforming design data into a product

• configuration design

• integration design

• layouts

"Production" --

means all production phases such as:

• construction

• production engineering

• manufacture

• integration

• assembly (mounting)

• inspection

• testing

• quality assurance

"Technical assistance" --

"Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

"Technical data" --

"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

"Technology" --

means specific information required for the "development", "production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance".

*[ INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a; part 2 (12 November 2013), https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/purpose-series-documents \- or as an alternate https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf [last accessed: May 9, 2016]]

The above is a partial list, giving a sense of the kinds of nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies, training and support services the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel.

The list of nuclear weapons associated inventories from which the United Nations pledges to expedite procurement of to the benefit of the discretion of use ultimately to be decided upon by the Sovereign Government of Iran – has been identified; and a sense of some of the classes of inventories has been presented.

* * * * *

– Chapter 21 –  
Appendix 7 – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress

[]; [14 – return]; [20]

Barack Obama did not share with the Congress, any part of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 other than Annex A – as is documented in this following timeline of ev7ents – this despite that he had signed into Law and agreement that should have guaranteed his doing so.

The following presents a step-by step timeline of how this evasion of responsibility by the Obama administration was carried out:

**ON 22 MAY 2015** , as President, Barack Obama, signed the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ into law. This law stipulates that within not later than five calendar days "... _after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit_ [such agreement] _to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership_...;"

And that " _an agreement_ ," for the purposes of that Act is defined as:

"... _an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future_."

This appendix is an examination of the simple ruse used by the White House to evade transmitting United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to Congress.

**ON TUESDAY 14 July 2015** , the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed in Vienna. President Barack Obama made a speech from the East Room of the White House corroborating the event stating, among other things:

"After two years of negotiations, the United States, together with our international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has not: a comprehensive long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon." *

*[BARACK OBAMA; Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal; American University, Washington D.C.; August 5, 2015; This file has been archived, find it on google at: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.]

**On the same day** ; in another part of the world, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano asserted that the following had been agreed to and mutually signed on to by the IAEA and Iran:

"I have just signed the Road-map between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. The text has been signed on behalf of Iran by the country's Vice-President, and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi. This is a significant step forward towards clarifying outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme....

'... Implementation of this Road-map will provide an important opportunity to resolve the outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme...." *

*[INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: IAEA Director General's Statement and Road-map for the Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program; (Tuesday 14 July 2015 8:30 CEST); Web address: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-road-map-for-the-clarification-of-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-programme]

Director General Amano then proceeded to an explanation – which was reprinted in IAEA Board of Governors report GOV/INF/2015/14: In his explanation, Director General Amano stipulates that Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on 14 July 2015, had entered into two side agreements, which can be associated with the new JCPOA. Here are some excerpts of his explanation:

Road-map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program:

Joint Statement

By the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi.

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi agreed on 14 July 2015 the following...

1. The IAEA and Iran agreed on a separate arrangement that would allow them to address the remaining outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director's General report (GOV/2011/65). Activities undertaken and the outcomes achieved to date by Iran and the IAEA regarding some of the issues will be reflected in the process....

5. Iran and the IAEA agreed on another separate arrangement regarding the issue of Parchin.*

*[INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: GOV/INF/2015/14: (Date: 14 July 2015) https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2015-14.pdf - The contents of the document have been published in many places by the IAEA, in its press releases and secondary sources reporting on it – on or around July 14, 2015.]

This declaration by the IAEA Director General is brought up here as it is used indirectly by at least one specific Democratic Party member of the House of Representatives to distract attention away from the fact that the Congress had never been transmitted the official United Nations recognized version of the agreement.

**ON THURSDAY, 16 July 2015** , Texas Senator Ted Cruz addressed a letter to Barack Obama describing some of his concerns relating to the JCPOA. Senator Cruz wrote:

"Language in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) assumes Congressional consent of this agreement and fails to even mention the statutory review process that you signed into law on February 27, 2015...."

[This writing isn't sure why Senator Cruz mentioned February 27, he may have been thinking of the date of the inception of the original Bill – the bill which would be later known as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.'' This writing adheres to the date listed on Public Law 114–17, which is 22 May 2015]

_"Specifically, Annex V of the JCPOA states that the United States and Iran "will endorse this JCPOA," and further elucidates that the UN Security Council will undertake a prompt review of the agreement after the conclusion of negotiations..."_

In the above, the Senator is paraphrasing material from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:

i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.

Presented following is a facsimile of the letter Senator Cruz sent the White House on 16 July 2015 – viewing the whole of what was sent might give a better understanding of the impressions the Senator was under during the course of the week's events.

[The letter which follows can be found at:

https://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/20150716_LettertoPOTUSonIranDeal.pdf.]

For the purposes of this writing, referencing this 16 July 2015 letter clarifies that the Executive Branch had transmitted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to the Congress by at least 16 July 2015. We note from the above facsimile that on Thursday the 16th, Senator Cruz was under the impression: "... _That_ [Ambassador] _Samantha Power has already introduced a draft resolution to the Security Council_..." Actually, Ambassador Ms. Power was up to something quite different on that day.

* * * * *

On Thursday July 16, 2015, two days after the July 14th Vienna signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ms. Samantha Power, sent a Letter of Transmittal to the acting President of the United Nations Security Council, Mr. McCully of New Zealand. Ms. Power wrote: " _The United States Mission to the United Nations requests that the attached Missile Technology Control Regime list (see annex) be circulated as a document of the Security Council_." *

*[U.S. AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER: Letter dated 16 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. (United Nations document number S/2015/546): Available on the internet at: https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/6d9eec6cdd36149b85257ddc006cd868/e7551f39803265f285257e92005b6a0c/$FILE/S%202015%20546.pdf [last accessed: August 22, 2016.]]

The letter was necessary as part of a sub-gambit. Nobody needed the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ to be recirculated through the Security Council. Such an action would represent a redundancy. The above list is a well known international document.

It would be like asking the Security Council to re-circulate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is perfectly alright to do so – but it would be sort of a waste of departmental secretaries' time.

The purpose of this seemingly trivial exercise was not necessarily to have the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ circulated. It was to get that Security Council document number appearing on that upper left hand corner of the page of the copied letter of transmittal. This document number was immediately used as a code word, avoiding the need to refer directly to the Annex by name within the text of Resolution 2231 – as we shall soon examine.

When it came time for Congress to debate United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; the use of the code word, which nobody in Congress would think to wonder as to the meaning of or look into, would initially obscure from the body of the Security Council: and, or from the Congress, or from the electorate, positive knowledge that certain classes of weapons were to be made available to Iran through the agreement – as is shown by the provision of Resolution 2231 presented below.

The Code Word was used once in Resolution 2231. It was needed for use in Annex B of the resolution, paragraph 4(a) below. Annex B would never be transmitted to the Congress – nevertheless the code word was used in the following Annex B; paragraph 4(a), which has since become well-known:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B. - Statement

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in _S/2015/546_ and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology **that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems** ; and

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

The code word gambit would make it easier for the administration to hide its assistance to, and promotion of the Iranian expansions of its ballistic missile program and arsenals; and to assert that the agreement authored by the Obama administration, had every intention of retaining sanctions limiting Iranian weapons procurements – as opposed to allowing and promoting unheard of Iranian paying procurement of the latest in western weapons design style in advanced achievement.

The Appendix (Chapter 9) – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex presents a substantial excerpt from the list and gives a pretty good idea of what the administration was attempting to cover up with its code word.

**ON FRIDAY 17 July 2015** : Barack Obama, completely ignoring the Texas Senator's letter as a matter of course; went ahead and had his draft resolution deposited with the Security Council.

Here is a facsimile of the header to the first page of _United States of America: draft resolution S/2015/547_ is presented immediately below presented as verification of the chronology as stated:

The entire document of the original draft resolution (in pfd format) submitted on the 17 July 2015 was to be found at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/547 [last accessed May, 3 2016.]. However, the United Nations has since modified the document it allows the public to review. The new web address finding United States of America: draft resolution is: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2F2015%2F547&Lang=E

What's missing in this newer version here is any mention of the submittal of the draft resolution by the United States – or the date on which the draft resolution was deposited, by the United States, with the Security Council (17 July 2015). That's perhaps an example of part of your Obama-era, post Obama-Era United Nations Security Council emerging style of paperwork deciding upon the new ideal of what to show the public, and when, in this day and age:

The header of this later version does note that the draft resolution was put out for General Distribution on 20 July 2015, the date of adoption of the resolution by the Security Council. Here then, the Security Council establishes its claim that the entire body of the Security Council, which does include the non-permanent Member States of the Council (none of which were privy to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA negotiation itself); here the Security Council establishes its chronology, which verifies the claim (voiced the morning of the 20th by U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power, and which will be documented anon) that there had been no real review of the draft resolution by the entire body of the Security Council before the 9 AM vote for adoption on Monday morning, 20 July 2015, before anyone was really sure if everyone had even already had their cup of coffee yet.

The original version of the draft resolution can still be found in two places that this writing knows of:

_Human Rights Voices_ has it listed at:

http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/7.17.2015.security.council.resolution.iran.pdf

And _document cloud.org_ retains this at:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2168507/security-council-draft-resolution.pdf

The identical adopted Security Council Resolution 2231 version, as adopted on 20 July 2015 is found at is found (in English) at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015)

To find United Nations Security Council resolutions by year refer to: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions

**ON SUNDAY, 19 July 2015** , Obama Spokesperson John Kirby announced in a press release that the State Department had transmitted to Congress everything relevant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – this was the day before Resolution 2231 was even adopted by the Security Council. The resolution didn't exist yet, transmittal of an authorized version was impossible – and since, as the Security Council claims, the draft proposal would only be circulated of the following day; for the State Department to transmit to Congress an official copy of an un-circulated U.N. document would have been a bureaucratic impossibility. Here is what Kirby released to the news media:

"Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include the Unclassified Verification Assessment Report on the JCPOA and the Intelligence Community's Classified Annex to the Verification Assessment Report, as required under the law. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20 ."*

*[DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Press Statement, John Kirby, Washington DC (July 19, 2015). This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# - Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245051.htm]

What Kirby does here is to declare that the administration has transmitted these documents as " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ ;" the act which stipulates that:

Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership— ''(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes;

...and continues on by defining what an "Agreement" as far as it concerns the Bill:

''(1) AGREEMENT.—The term 'agreement' means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.

The JCPOA is of interest; but no more so than the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. According to the law, the 60-day countdown period for review couldn't and can't begin just because the Obama administration had only transmitted a part of Resolution 2231. The President had not transmitted to Congress the main attraction, the entire United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

Sunday 19 July 2015, was the day before Monday 20 July 2017 – the day when the Security Council voted unanimously to recognize the Draft Resolution deposited by the United States administration of President Barack Obama.

It's too easy to know: Barack Obama's intentionally mendacious Puppet Gnome Agent John Kirby claimed to have transmitted everything required by the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015_ to Congress on the day before the awaited United Nations Security Council authorization qualifying the agreement existed. The United Nations' recognized perception the agreement didn't exist yet.

John Kirby declared that: " _Pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, today the State Department transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its annexes, and related materials. These documents include...,_ _as required under the law_ _. Therefore, Day One of the 60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20_."

The Obama administration, in asserting that it had sent everything, asserted the irrelevancy of the United Nations Security Council resolution to be declared the following day.

This was the excuse the maliciously mendacious overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress that there were any significant additions to the E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel JCPOA that the administration felt might merit any discussion by the Congress of the United States.

This was the excuse the maliciously mendacious overt liars of the Obama administration used to try to hide from the Congress the various weapons transactions agreed to within the entirety of Barack Obama's United States Proposed Draft Resolution, which was accepted as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) on 20 July 2019 – the day after Obama Gnome Agent offered the Obama administration's official statement claiming that it had sent everything relevant which needed be submitted to Congress.

**ON MONDAY, 20 July 2015** , the vote adopting Barack Obama's _United States draft proposal S/2015/547_ as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 takes place in the 7488th meeting of the Security Council. Now Barack Obama finally had something to send Congress; but there is no movement at that time of any time following, in that regard, emanating from the Obama White House. The 60 day countdown for Congressional review of the "Iran Deal" officially begins – not because Obama had transmitted Resolution 2231 to the Congress; but because Obama had decided explicitly on his own that the race will get started at that time; perhaps, because it should be thought of as the race to see if Congress would ever figure out within the 60-day countdown period that Obama had not acted on any pretence of an intention to effect transmission of Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress...

The day before the resolution existed; on Sunday 19 July 2015; the Obama administration effectively told the Congress that whatever was in that resolution; to be voted on the next day, wasn't of interest to the _Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015,_ law. The Obama administration here had implicitly, or maybe more or less explicitly, asserted that many of the agreed upon weapons transfers to Iran which are reflected in parts of Resolution 2231 other than Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, were not of interest to Congress or the law Obama had signed on to. Whatever the case contemplated and put into effect by the Obama administration; there was never a transmittal of Resolution 2231 to the Congress from the; but further confirmation on that point is required:

**ON WEDNESDAY, 22 July 2015** , White House Spokesperson John Kirby held a press conference in the White House.

The following is a recounting of some further details of the questions posed, and answers given during that July 22 press Conference.

QUESTION: _Yes, please. Just to clarify, you mentioned that the Congress has what we have. And in the same time you mentioned yesterday and today in a TV appearance that you transferred to the Congress all the documents that you have regarding this issue. Can you describe it? I mean, what is it? I mean, it's like it is detailed or it's just – I assume it's not --_

MR KIRBY: _It's the entire set of documents that go along with the deal to include the annexes and a verification assessment._

QUESTION: _...It's all the technical, the financial part and everything?_

MR KIRBY: _...It's – everything that we have about this deal has been provided to Congress. And I would point out that much of it is already available to all of you online._

QUESTION: _...It's not the 158 pages, right? It's more than that, right?_

MR KIRBY:...There is some additional information provided there, yeah, but a lot of it's already been made publicly available. But yes, everything is up there. It got there on Sunday.*

*[U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT: Daily Press Briefing \- Washington DC (July 22, 2015); John Kirby, spokesperson. This document has been archived in the State Department files. In order to find it, first go to this webpage: https://2009-2017.state.gov/# \- Once on that page, notice the Search box just below the headline. In the Search box type: 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/07/245186.htm]

It was all a nonsensical lie, of course. On Sunday, 19 July 2015; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 didn't exist yet. Kirby simply made up an inane story to cover for the Obama administration's refusal to transmit the resolution to Congress. And naturally., the imbecile members of the 114th Congress , incapable of exhibiting any common sense whatsoever, unanimously swallowed the story whole; And naturally, no member of the 114th Congress would take an interest in going up to the Security Council website and pulling down a free copy of the resolution to read it and consider what it might contain. This was, and remains even today, the going standard of disinterest in this whole issue of Barack Obama's "Iran Nuclear Deal."

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 was not going to get transmitted to the Congress. Going through the Congressional Record, and State Department records, there is no trace of anything having to do with Obama's "Iran Deal" being transmitted or received after that Sunday, the 19th. The Statements made on the 22nd by John Kirby would be the White House final word on the matter.

That no one in Congress would complain about how the information being relayed by the White House simply didn't match up with the facts is another example of the lack attention, the dinterest; and the primitive nature of discussion surrounding this issue of Security Council Resolution 2231, "JCPOA."

* * * * *

But not quite; the White House later, in December 2015, made a very interesting declaration in writing concerning this "Obama Deal" which was never reviewed by the Congress.

Although everyone in Congress knew about the 20 July 2015 vote in the Security Council, it was blithely ignored until members of the Senate – Republicans Tom Cotton and Mike Pompeo made an earth-shattering discovery/observation on or around 18 September 2015 that nobody in Congress had any signed copies of the JCPOA.

This discovery dawned on these two after both Houses of Congress had voted on something purported to be the "Iran Nuclear Deal" on 10 and 11 September 2017, a little over a week before.

Being the wondering audience they were, Senator Pompeo wrote the State Department, Secretary of State John Kerry, on 18 September 2015, asking questions:

Dear Secretary Kerry:

I have reviewed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Islamic Republic of Iran – or at least the parts of the agreement that were provided to Congress by the administration. As you know, pursuant to H. Res. 411, the House of Representatives considers the documents transmitted on July 19, 2015 incomplete in light of the fact that the secret side deals between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran were not provided to Congress. I look forward to seeing the entire agreement – including the two secret side deals that are part of the JCPOA – so that Congress may continue to evaluate the JCPOA and, depending on the outcome of the vote under the relevant provisions of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, potentially end the current and continuing prohibition of the lifting of sanctions on Iran.

During that review, I found that the copies provided to Congress of the JCPOA are not signed by any of the P5+1 members nor by Iran. Having never seen an international agreement of this magnitude not signed by the parties or an agent of the parties, I assume this is simply an oversight or an administrative error. That is, Congress must not have the final version of the agreement that would necessarily be signed. I request that you provide us with copies of a final, executed copy of the JCPOA. In the event that the JCPOA has not yet been signed by the parties, please inform us (a) when signatures will be placed on the agreement, (b) what parties will be signing, and (c) which person you anticipate will sign on behalf of each of those parties, including on behalf of the United States.

I am confident that you intended for the JCPOA to be signed by each of the P5+1 participants. I can find no international agreement of this "historic" nature that was not signed by the parties. Each of the past five major nuclear agreements to which the U.S. is a party – SALT I, SALT II, START I, START II and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea – were signed by representatives of each nation that was party to the agreement. This is not a mere formality. Those signatures represent the commitment of the signatory and the country on whose behalf he or she is signing.

A signature also serves to make clear precisely who the parties to the agreement are and the authority under which that nation entered into the agreement. In short, just as with any legal instrument, signing matters.

This is particularly important with respect to JCPOA. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has made clear that he does not believe that JCPOA is legally binding on his nation, saying, "If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is sent to (and passed by) parliament, it will create an obligation for the government. It will mean the president, who has not signed it so far, will have to sign it. Why should we place an unnecessary legal restriction on the Iranian people?"

Given the many benefits that will accrue to the ayatollahs, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and other unsavory elements of the Iranian regime, I believe that Iran should, at the very least, bind itself to the few requirements placed on it under the JCPOA by signing the agreement. I also believe that the United States and its P5+1 partners on the JCPOA should execute the agreement on behalf of their countries. I look forward to your response.

We all do. *

*[The text of the letter was found in two places

https://cjhsla.org/2015/11/01/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/

And:

http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/the-iran-deal-was-not-signed-by-iran-or-anyone-else/2015/09/19/

I was unable to locate an original facsimile; however, the response to the letter from the State Department verifies that the letter was sent.]

The text of the response follows – and a facsimile of the response is presented after:

Dear Mr. Pompeo.:

Thank you for your September 18 letter regarding the nuclear deal with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the European Union. As you know, the United States has a long-standing practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in political commitments.

The success of the JCPOA will depend not whether it is legally binding or signed, but rather on the extensive verification measures we have put in place, as well as Iran's understanding that we have the capacity to re-impose and ramp up – our sanction if Iran does not meet its commitments.

Everything the JCPOA and its annexes are commitments Iran made, and must keep, to remain in compliance. Iran breaks these commitments, we can snap back both unilateral and UN sanction.

We provided Congress with everything agreed to between the P5+1 and Iran in the JCPOA, in full compliance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INAEA). There are no "secret deals" between the P5+1 and Iran, and no JCPOA document that Congress does not already have. The Administration is fully committed to providing information to Congress to ensure full transparency as we implement the JCPOA.

We hope this information is useful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Julia Frifield; Assistant Secretary; Legislative Affairs.

The facsimile presented next can be found at: _http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/11.24.2015.state.dept.letter.jcpoa.pdf_

The letter claims that the JCPOA was unsigned. The letter doesn't mention that the JCPOA had been incorporated into the larger, Resolution 2231 program and that the resolution's policy of arms transactions is not presented in the resolution's Annex A: JCPOA.

To an extent – this letter gives evidence; again, that Resolution 2231 was never transmitted to the Congress, and never looked at or voted on by the Congress.

* * * * *
– Chapter 22 –  
Appendix 8 – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

[Return to Appendix 3]

Following is an excerpt of the inventories listed on the _Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex_ :

Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex

CATEGORY I -ITEM 1

COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

1.A.1. Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.A.2. Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.B.1. "Production facilities"

1.D.1. "Software"

1.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY I -ITEM 2

COMPLETE SUBSYSTEMS USABLE FOR COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

2.A.1. "Complete subsystems"

2.B.1. "Production facilities"

2.B.2. "Production equipment"

2.D.1. "Software"

2.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 3

PROPULSION COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT

3.A.1. Turbojet and turbofan engines

3.A.2. Ramjet/scramjet/pulse jet/combined cycle engines

3.A.3. Rocket motor cases, 'insulation' components and nozzles

3.A.4. Staging mechanisms, separation mechanisms and interstages

3.A.5. Liquid and slurry propellant (including oxidisers) control systems

3.A.6. Hybrid rocket motors

3.A.7. Radial ball bearings

3.A.8. Liquid propellant tanks

3.A.9. Turboprop engine systems

3.A.10. Combustion chambers

3.B.1. "Production facilities"

3.B.2. "Production equipment"

3.B.3. Flow-forming machines

3.C.1. 'Interior lining' usable for rocket motor cases

3.C.2. 'Insulation' material in bulk form usable for rocket motor cases

3.D.1. "Software"

3.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 4

PROPELLANTS, CHEMICALS AND PROPELLANT PRODUCTION

4.A. None

4.B.1. "Production equipment"

4.B.2. "Production equipment"

4.B.3. a. Batch mixers

4.B.3. b. Continuous mixers

4.B.3. c. Fluid energy mills

4.B.3. d. Metal powder "production equipment"

4.C.1. Composite and composite modified double base propellants

4.C.2. Fuel substances

4.C.2. a. Hydrazine

4.C.2. b. Hydrazine derivatives

4.C.2. c. Spherical aluminium powder

4.C.2. d. Zirconium, beryllium, magnesium and alloys

4.C.2. e. Boron and boron alloys

4.C.2. f. High energy density materials

4.C.3. Perchlorates, chlorates or chromates

4.C.4. a. Oxidiser substances –liquid propellant rocket engines

4.C.4. b. Oxidiser substances –solid propellant rocket motors

4.C.5. Polymeric substances

4.C.6. Other propellant additives and agents

4.C.6. a. Bonding agents

4.C.6. b. Curing reaction catalysts

4.C.6. c. Burning rate modifiers

4.C.6. d. Esters and plasticisers

4.C.6. e. Stabilisers

4.D.1. "Software"

4.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 6

PRODUCTION OF STRUCTURAL COMPOSITES, PYROLYTIC DEPOSITION AND DENSIFICATION, AND STRUCTURAL MATERIALS

6.A.1. Composite structures, laminates and manufactures thereof

6.A.2. Resaturated pyrolised materials

6.B.1. a. Filament winding machines or fibre placement machines

6.B.1. b. Tape-laying machines

6.B.1. c. Multi-directional, multi-dimensional weaving machines or interlacing machines

6.B.1. d. Equipment designed or modified for the production of fibrous or filamentary materials

6.B.1. e. Equipment designed or modified for special fibre surface treatment

6.B.2. Nozzles

6.B.3. Isostatic presses

6.B.4. Chemical vapour deposition furnaces

6.B.5. Equipment and controls for the densification and pyrolysis process

6.C.1. Resin impregnated fibre prepregs and metal coated fibre preforms

6.C.2. Resaturated pyrolised materials

6.C.3. Fine grain graphites

6.C.4. Pyrolytic or fibrous reinforced graphites

6.C.5. Ceramic composite materials for missile radomes

6.C.6. Silicon-carbide materials

6.C.7. Tungsten molybdenum and alloys

6.C.8. Maraging steel

6.C.9. Titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel

6.D.1. "Software"

6.E.1. "Technology"

6.E.2. "Technical data"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 9

INSTRUMENTATION, NAVIGATION AND DIRECTION FINDING

9.A.1. Integrated flight instrument systems

9.A.2. Gyro-astro compasses

9.A.3. Linear accelerometers

9.A.4. All types of gyros

9.A.5. Accelerometers or gyros

9.A.6. Inertial or other equipment

9.A.7. 'Integrated navigation systems'

9.A.8. Three axis magnetic heading sensors

9.B.1. "Production equipment", and other test, calibration and alignment equipment

9.B.2. a. Balancing machines

9.B.2. b. Indicator heads

9.B.2. c. Motion simulators/rate tables

9.B.2. d. Positioning tables

9.B.2. e. Centrifuges

9.D.1. "Software"

9.D.2. Integration "Software"

9.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 10

FLIGHT CONTROL

10.A.1. Hydraulic, mechanical, electro-optical or electromechanical flight control systems

10.A.2. Attitude control equipment

10.A.3. Flight control servo-valves

10.B.1. Test calibration and alignment equipment

10.C. None

10.D.1. "Software"

10.E.1. Design "technology" for integration of air vehicle fuselage, propulsion system and lifting control surfaces

10.E.2. Design "technology" for integration of the flight control, guidance, and propulsion data into a flight management system

10.E.3. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 11

AVIONICS

11.A.1. Radar and laser radar systems including altimeters

11.A.2. Passive sensors

11.A.3. Receiving equipment GNSS e.g. GPS,

GLONASS or Galileo

11.A.4. Electronic assemblies and components

11.A.5. Umbilical and interstage electrical connectors

11.D.1. "Software"

11.E.1. Design "technology"

11.E.2. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 12

LAUNCH SUPPORT

12.A.1. Apparatus and devices

12.A.2. Vehicles

12.A.3. Gravity meters (gravimeters), gravity gradiometers

12.A.4. Telemetry and telecontrol equipment, including ground equipment

12.A.5. Precision tracking systems

12.A.5. a. Tracking Systems

12.A.5. b. Range instrumentation radars

12.A.6. Thermal Batteries

12.D.1. "Software"

12.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 15

TEST FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

15.B.1. Vibration test equipment

15.B.1. a. Vibration test systems

15.B.1. b. Digital controllers [continued]

15.B.1. c. Vibration thrusters (shaker units)

15.B.1. d. Test piece support structures and electronic units

15.B.2. Wind-tunnels

15.B.3. Test benches/stands

15.B.4. Environmental chambers

15.B.5. Accelerators

15.D.1. "Software"

15.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 16

MODELLING-SIMULATION AND DESIGN INTEGRATION

16.A.1. Hybrid (combined analogue/digital) computers

16.D.1. "Software"

16.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 17

STEALTH

17.A.1. Devices for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A. or 20.A.

17.B.1. Systems specially designed for radar cross section measurement

17.C.1. Materials for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A.

CATEGORY II -ITEM 18

NUCLEAR EFFECTS PROTECTION

18.A.1. "Radiation Hardened" "microcircuits"

18.A.2. 'Detectors'

18.A.3. Radomes

18.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 19

OTHER COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

19.A.1. Complete rocket systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.2. Complete UAV systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.3. Complete UAV systems

19.B.1. "Production facilities"

19.D.1. "Software"

19.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 20

OTHER COMPLETE SUBSYSTEMS

20.A.1. a. Individual rocket stages

20.A.1. b. Solid propellant rocket motors, hybrid rocket motors or liquid propellant rocket engines

20.B.1. "Production facilities"

20.B.2. "Production equipment"

There's more to that list – but that should give the reader a pretty good idea that a substantial part of the E3/EU+3 Iran, Resolution 2231 is about promising technological support to a weapons development program; all the while claiming that this whole arrangement is deeply concerned only with promoting the "exclusively" peaceful development of nuclear energy – and could never possibly have anything to do with any impure motives like arms trade profiteering.

THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME – Equipment, Software and Technology Annex is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry, primarily dealing with ballistic missiles and delivery systems; and with other weapons technologies associated with ballistic missiles. This list was developed by the international Missile Technology Control Regime association. The Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was assembled as a list of weapons inventory the M.T.C.R. association considers should be controlled.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (M.T.C.R.) itself is a voluntary association of (currently) 34 member States joining together to establish and promote guidelines coordinating national export licensing efforts aimed at containing and restraining the proliferation of specific weapons war. The M.T.C.R. is not affiliated with the United Nations, but its members may also be United Nations members. All five of the Nuclear Weapons Nations (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China) as well as Germany are all members of this association; the Islamic Republic of Iran is not.

For a more detailed description of the association's purpose and activities the interested reader may refer to the Missile Technology Control Regime website: http://www.mtcr.info/english/The Missile Technology Control Regime; or, possibly better, http://www.mtcr.info/.

The _Missile Technology Control Regime – Equipment, Software And Technology Annex_ does not correspond to the weapons inventory of any particular nation – rather, as mentioned, is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry that the M.T.C.R. association considers should be controlled; and that great care and restraint should be exhibited when considering the import, export, sale or transfer of the listed inventory. The M.T.C.R. has established suggested common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines). These are non-binding legally, but may serve to be taken into account when developing export / import regulations regarding the list of voluntarily controlled items presented in the M.T.C.R. Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

The E3/EU+3 Iran Cartel agreement, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, utilizes the M.T.C.R. Equipment, Software and Technology Annex for a use other than for which it was initially intended. It is used in the arrangement between Iran and the E3/EU+3 as a convenient shopping list which the Islamic Republic of Iran is to be given access to, on a case-by-case, basis as of 16 January 2016, and full access to some eight years after. The use of the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex by the E3/EU+3 Iran Project resembles the Cartel's employment of the International Atomic Energy Agency INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list.

* * * * *
– Endnote –

[Endnote return]

The technical term, "Facility" is understood to be defined with respect to the definition of Effective Kilogram as described under item G, Article 98 (already presented in the body of the text). In order for a site to be established as a facility it must be a location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used. The IAEA SAFEGUARDS GLOSSARY 2001 Edition clarifies this. [https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf];

This glossary definition is found under section 5.24. Facility; there we find this definition: "a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used." References: [153, para. 106], [540, Article 18.j]. Under [66], two kinds of facility are defined (in paras 78 and 81, respectively).

The numbers referred to in brackets above signify IAEA Information Circular document numbers. Hence, "[153, para. 106]" represents doc. number INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972 [http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/44/089/44089080.pdf]; "[540, para. 18.j]" represents INFCIRC/540, Sept. 1997 [https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc540.pdf]; and "[66]" represents doc. number INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, Sept. 16, 1968.

Paragraph 78 of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 states: "Principle nuclear facility" means a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of a nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating a nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant) or a facility or plant of such other type as may be designated by the Board from time to time, including associated storage facilities."

Paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 states: "Research and development facility" means a facility, other than a principle nuclear facility, used for research and development in the field of nuclear energy."

Article 18 – [item] J of INFCIRC/540 states: "Location outside facilities means any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less."

Paragraph 106 of INFCIRC/153 gives the same definition as in the Safeguard Agreement: Article 98; Definitions [item] I (above).

Safeguard Agreement: Article 98; Definitions [item] G; gives the definition of Effective Kilogram identical to item I in the body of the narrative

* * * * *
